he has to measure everything he says and he'll continue to be in that mode for probably six months to a year after the october party in congress. and then the big question will be what kind of leader will he be. and beyond the five year plans that everybody understands today, what will be his personality priorities from a

policy stand point. >> charlie: we continue with henry kissinger former secretary of state and former national computer advisor whose latest book is called on china. >> in the conversations that i've had with the vice president and with his entourage, they seem to understand that this is a period of tremendous upheaval around the world which is better dealt with by a cooperative relationship. now that does not mean that they can necessarily bring themselves to see eye to eye with us on such issues as syria or for that matter on domestic governance. so it will be a del delicate prs for both countries to adjust to this emerging world. >> charlie: we conclude with

robert kagan the world the america made which focts focusen america decline or lack of and its relationship with china and its rise. >> the united states go through these crises almost every 40 easiest. she had a great depression in the 1890's, we had the energy crises of 197 07s and we are here 40 years later. what's interesting if you go back and look at that period, the next decade in every one of those situations, the united states came roaring back and actually was stronger relative to the rest of the word than it was before. >> charlie: huntsman, kissinger, kagan when we continue. captioning sponsored by rose communications

from our studios in new york city, this is charlie rose. >> charlie: we begin tonight looking at china, chinese vice

president arrived in the united states on monday. he is anticipated to become head of the ruling communist party this year before assuming the presidency in march 2013. his unofficial and highly observed visit takes him from washington to iowa to laws an less. meant to introduce him to the leadership and the american public. the trip comes at a time of growing grow economic and military tension between the two countries. early today mr. xi jinping met with officials. they realize the importance between the two global powers. joining me from washington jon huntsman. he was previously the outs ambassador to china and governor of utah. i am pleased to have him this evening to talk about something he knows a lot about which is china. he in fact speaks the language. welcome. where do you think china and the united states is at this moment

and what will be the most important conversation to take place in washington? >> the back drop as we sit here today is one of pau politics whr you're in washington or whether you're in beijing. it's an interesting time in the history of the bilateral relationship in the sense that we have politics playing out this year right at the same time that politics are playing out in beijing, so not promisingly you're hearing from time to time a little bit of political rhetoric coming out of our system, and not surprisingly, even in china a little bit of rhetoric may be a little sharp-edged coming out of their system. we'll have of course all of this wrapped up here in november and the 18th party congress will be wrapped up in october. what is interesting about all of this, charlie, is the fact it's really, in an historic sense, i can't remember another time when we've seen such sweeping change all occur at one party setting. so if you stop to imagine that

probably 7 0% of the top 200 including seven members of all the important ruling standing committee of the politburo, seven of nine will turn over. you're looking at the years ahead i think being some potentially good years in determines of the development of the u.s.-china relationship. that will assume xi jinping will successfully solidify his power base after october which will take him six months to a year. that also assumes some of the new members, and we don't know who all of them will be. members of the standing committee of the politburo are a little more open to reform and change as compared and contrarlsecontrasted to the las. they will be simply because they don't have a lot of choice right now. >> charlie: what do you mean by that, no choice? >> well you've got the power of the internet generation, 500 million internet users in china, you know.

you've got 90 million bloggers, many of whom are having conversations today with respect to political reform, human rights, religious tolerance, the role of the internet in society, the kinds of conversations that would have landed anyone in prison a few short years ago. and at some level, the new leadership team will have to find some kind of accommodation in the years ahead. everything is seen today through the prism of the events that played out in june of 1989, the tiananmen square massacre. there will have to be some accommodation struck by the new party leadership and the new minded movers and shakers. whether that happens two three four five years from now. i think xi jinping is savvy politically. i suspect the 23450 team within the standing committee of the politburo will recollect nays -- recognize the need to want to

sit down and make a few accommodations at the right time. >> charlie: where might those accommodations be? >> well i'm guessing that we're going to have to deal with three major concerns that are fall into their lapse very very soon after they take power. one of which the question of whether or not china's becoming more repressive toward its people. i believe the answer and that will require some sort of domestic fix, whether it is greater openness and tolerance toward dissent. whether it's opening up the political party to accommodate some sort of approach toward choosing officials based on a vote. in other words, demonstrat demog the party within its own elections. whether it's articulating a role for the internet in society, providing less in the way of

rode blocks toward openness and expression. and how they deal with tibet. this will be part of the discussion they'll have to have in the years ahead. the second big issue, charlie, really has to do with their movement in recent years toward greater economic nationalism, a preference toward rewarding state-owned enterprises, the preference toward picking chinese companies. there are members of the wto, they have international obligations so they need to increasingly meet. and they're going to have to deal with that big issue. and finally, the view that they're becoming a whole lot more assertive on the international stage. countries, not only in the asia pacific region but indeed very beyond and concern board of director what this means and where it takes china into the future and xi jinping and new leadership team will have to deal with that issue as well. >> charlie: how well do you know him?

>> i've been in several meetings with him, starting at the beginning of my tenure as ambassador running right through to my fasci fare well visit witm when i left. i've seen him with many senior leaders of the united states and i've found him to be well briefed, charming, even charismatic. personal level, which is would it a departure from what we kind with some of today's leaders. but more than that, i think that he's a very politically savvy player. and i think there's some evidence backing up that statement. the first would be the very fact that he's been able to stitch together a collation that has allowed him to remain on this projectory toward power which is to say that he's had to make certain accommodations toward the people's liberation army. he's had to make certain accommodations toward the

political party elite. and certainly he's had to maintain some important relationships within the princeling population. he hasn't prepared hum and stumbled yet so that suggests he's a fairly deft party. he does everything he says and he will continue to be in that mode for probably six months to a year until the october party congress. them the next question will be what kind of leader will xi jinping be and under the five year plans that everybody understands today what will be his personal priorities from a priority standpoint. >> charlie: do we know that? >> i don't think we do, but rest assured that much of his priorities will play right back into the overall goal of maintaining regime stability. and to maintain regime

stability, that means you've got to have a viable economy. i believe today when you look at china's leadership there's a real sense of insecurity. i mean i haven't seen this level of insecurity in a good number of years. and i think that largely stems from uncertainty about where their economy is going. uncertainty about this transition they're making from an export model to more of a consumption model. uncertainty about a restive population. we see china, we see $3 trillion in surplus. we see the second largest economy, the largest emitter now in the world. when they see china they she 700 million people living at the poverty line. they seat 99th country in the world in terms of per capita income. they see this tremendous income disparity. we both conjure up different images when we look and try to assess china. they see it from a potential risk standpoint, and that is what could a poor economy mean

in terms of general societal and political instability longer term. and the number one goal will be to always ensure that that never happens. >> whehappens. >> charlie: when you look at their attitude about the united states, what surprised you most b you know, what they might have said about the united states, the obama administration, how they perceived american ambition. >> well, first of all, they love us and hate us in the asia pacific region. they like the idea that we keep the sea lanes open for the free haflow of trade and commerce whh we have for decades in which they benefit enormously from an economic standpoint. while at the same time they get very concerned about our relationship building in the region. they think we're trying to hem them in. they think we're trying to contain their influence in the region. they look at our relationship with evaluate numb, wit vietnamh

korea and japan and beyond, and feel very strongly that we're trying to somehow hem them in. so in some sense, it's a love-hate relationship. the fact of the matter is, we're both on the world stage. they know that. we've got to forag forge a relationship that not only allows us to get serious about our areas of disagreement which are sometimes quite profound. but we've also got to have the kind of relationship that allows us to identify areas of common cause and areas of common interests and i think those are the very real issues that will sustain the u.s.-china relationship longer term. and allow it to either sank or k or swim. >> charlie: those issues that track scend national borders. when you come to something like

syria, it is said obviously they supported the same position that russia did and prepared to veto the security council. why did they do that and was it simply to be on the same side as russia or their political judgment. >> well, fundamentally, we have two very different approaches to foreign policy. our foreign policy approach tends to be one based on values. based upon extending liberty, democracy, human rights and free markets. in the case of china, their northern policy tend to be an extension of their more immediate national interests. and in the case of the middle east, whether you look at syria or whether you look at iran, it is either the procurement of raw materials that will allow china's economy to continue to grow or in the case of syria, wanting to make sure that the regime long standing dictatorship under the assad

family isn't toppled because what are the natural implications that people are going to draw. they're going to continue to draw the same implications they have throughout the jasmyne spring period and that is long standing dictatorships and pockets of economic despair. that's when people rise up and cause trouble and that leads to instability. you better believe just like when the soviet union resolved from 15 republics. the chinese watched the gorbachev period very very carefully and embarked upon policies that did just the opposite, which is to say, to hold on to politics, to loosen up the economy. they were informed by that chapter plaipg out righ playingn their border and rest assured they'll be informed what plays out with respect to the jasmyne spring in the middle piece. >> charlie: there is this near ofear of tension and fear f instability seems to go deep

into their being whether it's religious organizions i organize seems to be this notion that somehow there is a threat there and therefore they have to exercise a very tight control. are they realistic? >> well, their sense of stability really draws from who innethey are and their culture d tradition and their sense of hierarchy. what stable he means and listen they reflect on history probably a whole lot more than we tend to do here in the united states and all you have to do is look at the last century starting with the box ire boxer rebellion ally to tiananmen square. there were episodes of

instability, revolt and revolution which caused tremendous setbacks in china, opened the way for the larger powers of the world to be able to step in and play a role in china. and they never want to see those days again. so important to them really fr , that coupled with recovering all of their lost territories. in other words sovereignty which has always been a central personapillear policy making. they want to keep the mothership together and they know what instability means in terms of breaking up countries. >> charlie: jon huntsman, thank you so much. former governor, former republican presidential candidate, former ambassador to china with a long record of service to his country. thank you. >> thank you, charlie. great being with you. >> charlie: we continue now with former secretary of state henry kissinger's latest book is called "on china."

welcome to the program. you're in washington. >> yes, i am. >> charlie: tell me what you think the message of xi jinping is as he talks with american officials. >> the message seems to be that he or that chinese leadership interested in a period of cooperation with the united states. that they believe that the problems of the region have to be dealt with from an asia-pacific basis and not as a conflict between china and the united states. across the pacific. >> charlie: does it understand what the responsibilities are as it tries to do that? >> well, it is, of course, very

hard toudge at a moment when about 70% of the top chinese leadership will be changing over the period of the next year. but in the conversations that i've had with the vice president and with his u entourage, they seem to understand that this is a poured of tremendous upheaval around the world, which is better dealt with by a cooperative relationship. now that does not mean that they can necessarily bring themselves to see eye to eye with us on such issues as syria or for that matter on domestic governance. so it will be a delicate process

for both countries to adjust to this emerging world. >> charlie: what do you think, beyond the method they have, what are the sensitivities that they want to you dress? >> well, i don't think they came here to address detail of specific issues. the pressure for specific issues is more on outside because of the urgency of our election campaign. the chinese vice president is not yet in office. the standing committee which it's the connective leadership that will be governing china starting in october, has not yet been announced. and is unknown to the chinese

public and probably has not yet even been determined. so from the chinese point of view, the vice president is here to make an assessment of the major of american leaders and the kind of debate that is going on in this country to see to what extent they can be synchronized with the issues that they face. >> charlie: why do you think he emerged as the presumptive new president? >> this is fifth generation of chinese leaders. this is the first generation of chinese leaders that have lived all of their adult life in a chechina at peace. it's the first generation of chinese leaders that wealth

through the culture revolution in their formative years in contrast to their parents who were the direct victims, this generation saw it from the point of view of the next group. so they have had a different experience than their predecessors. also the first group that will have to falls the political and total implications of the enormous change in economic conditions in china that has observed their predecessors. so it is an important visit in the sense that they are really starting, it's comparable in that respect to the visit of when president nixon, in which

the basic theme was, what do we think of the world and where do we think we can be going. and in a way this is an exploratory visit in the same direction. >> charlie: you had dinner with him last night as did others. what questions does he ask? what does he want to know from you? >> he began the dinner by making a statement which pai paralleled which he had said in maybe more specificity. but he saispecificity. then he asked lead questions about continuity, about the evolution that people foresaw and i forget actually what the third question was. and since this was a group of

people that are reasonably continuateopinionated, 24569 thd tonight statements which neighborhood him to listen. and he did not talk again substantially until he commented, made an overall comment on having heard our opinions. that was about the main purpose of the meeting. but i had an opportunity also to talk to him later during the day today and i believe that he understands that the american relationship is to the next decade in china, and that he is

trying to form an opinion on how close it can be and how safe it is for them. and i'm sure that our leaders, our president and secretary of state are trying to make the same judgment. >> charlie: so i hear you saying that your impression based on questions based on your private conversation is that what he looks for is a stable relationship and a positive relationship with the united states so that they can focus on their own economic prosperity and also making sure that the social tension that exist in china do not get out of hand. >> well, it's certainly not put in terms of things inside china getting out of hand. but i think it is safe to say that they are very conscious of the fact that major domestic

decisions will await them over the next ten years. and that when 60% of the chinese population is now urban. this means that hundreds of millions of people have moved from the country side into the cities. that means that the traditional value of the country side have to be adjusted to and superseded by the necessary fees of usual bun -- of urban life and of a different mode of production. and also that china has been more or less an observer of international politics for the greatest part of the last 40 years. but now it is an integral part

of the global economic system and also an increasing element in the global political system. all of these require significant decisions as time goes on. and have to be dealt with by what is essentially a new leadership. the general view is that the entire standing committee which is nine members of a collective leadership will be replaced before the year is over. >> charlie: what is your judgment of the thing that they worry the most about with respect to the united states. is it, for example, whether we can get our economic house in order. is it, for example, whether the united states can emerge out of this presidential campaign with strong leadership that they can

ascertain how willing they are to work with the chinese government? what is it? >> the fundamental difference between the chinese and american approach to issues. americans look at a problem in terms of a solution and believe the solution can be found in finite time. the chinese look at the solution as the beginning of a new set of problems. so the americans want to deal with the immediate challenge. the chinese are trying to integrate it into a process. this is an underlying problem, a difficulty that both sides have to recognize. so they are trying to judge and we're trying to judge the

underlying stability of the american decision-making process. and the degree to which the american decisions that are being discussed within today will still be the governing concerns down the road. of course they have immediate issue of whether the existing administration will be in office a year from now. but they have seen changes of administration before. and the remarkable thing over these 40 years is that eight different american administrations have more or less conducted a parallel policy over an extended period of time. >> charlie: henry kissinger, knowing so much for joining us from washington where you have been meeting and have met with the vice president of china. >> always a pleasure to talk to

you. >> charlie: it has become one of the central debates of our time, is america in decline with the imminent rise of new world powers and growing list of problems at home, many believe the united states has lost its way. but robert kagan believes that america is as strong as ever and some people seem to be listening. this is what the president said in his state of the union address on january 24th. >> from the coalition we've built to secure nuclear materials to the missions we've led against hunger and disease and the blows we've dealt one enemies. to the enduring power to our moral example, america is back. anyone who tells you otherwise, anyone who tells you that american is in decline or that our influence has wit waned doet know what they're talking about. >> plowabout. >> charlie: here is the

president's national security add supervisor tom donaldson sitting with me on january 26th. >> when you look back at historyn't those times when the united states was said to have maximum power, the united states couldn't snap their fingers and have countries do exactly what they wanted to do in every situation. in every period there are going to be disappointments in your foreign policy and he catalogs that. but secondly he makes the point that you have to look at comprehensive nature of power, right. not just a unidimensional discussion of power. if you look at the united states, i would think it actually stacks up quite favorably. >> charlie: and here he is, robert kagan, a senior fellow at the brooklyn institution and the columnist for "the washington post" he talks about the myth of american decline in this new small book called the world that america made. i'm pleased to have him here. you haven't seen that. >> i haven't read the clip. i read some of the dialogue but i hadn't seen the clip. >> charlie: here is the argument you make in your are ye

rubbic. is american in decliner the americans in danger of committing preemptive suicide out of misplaced near out of their own declining power. so that is the question. >> i think as you said at the outset the united states is really as strong as it's ever been. ofobviously we face challenges from arising china and others but not greater challenges we faced in the past with the soviet union and we were worried about japan at one time. we can in a way talk ourselves into decline if as a result of a misperception that we're declining, we start to pull back from the rest of the world. we start ar are startup hold ouy uphold what we created. right now we have the capacity

to continue to shake the world as we have in the past. >> charlie: take a look at this. this is from another national computer advisor and president cartedder who also speaks to this question a new book called strategy. here it is. >> i wan charlie: i want to come to. what caused you to write this. are there other books about this subject. >> what caused me to write this is the feeling that one we missed an enormous opportunity after 1990, when for brief period of time the united states was the un-- >> charlie: i remind you wrote a book about that. >> i did and i thought we had a chance to play it and we didn't play it. well instead from ited aw from y opportunities. we really wasted it. and secondly i did it because i do think that by and large we as a country don't recognize the extent to which the nature of

global power is now changing. i've been working on thinking about this phenomena of global political awakening for a number of years and that is traps forming the nature of -- transforming the nature of politics in our age. >> charlie: there you go. he says we don't understand how the nature of the global power is changing. do you? >> i think i do. by the way i want to point out we have the same basic view that the united states does decline the world order as we know is going to change fundmentally unless we manage ourselves. power is shifting around. you have the rise of asia as an economic force, you have the rise of brazil and india and turkey but you still need to do kind of a rigorous analysis what does that mean for the american position in the world. there were fluxes before, during the cold war there was the rise of japan, there was the rise of germany. >> charlie: i'll give you one small example. the total gdp of the emerging nations we're talking about the so-called brick countries and others, certainly brazil and china expinld yea and india, tae

big one is going to be so much larger over the next 15 years and occupy so much more of the together gdp of the world. >> well, that's probably true, although some of these projections don't quite turn out the way, a lot of that assumes known hanobody has a hiccup andl these countries had hiccups in their past. setting that aside if you look over the last 40 years it's rather striking how the united states has maintained a pretty steady share of global gdp throughout that period of 25-30 percent depending how you measure it and most of the rise of china has come with the expense of you're and come at the expense of japan. but let's look at all of these different countries. let's say that india is rising. if the united states is going to falls the greatest competition from china let's say over the next ten or 20 years, doesn't the rise of indian strength, the rise of indian power help the united states rather than cut into american power. that's why i make this analogy in the book with the rise of

germany and japan. yes, they came at the expense of america's share how far global gdp. we had 50%, they come to 25%. in our struggle with the soviet union it was tremendously to our advantage that germany and japan became wealthy, became strong and could stand on their own two feet. even though we panicked about japan's rise. they were buying rockefeller center and turned out not to be a great investment for them. i hope white know buy rockefeller center too. i don't want to minimize the challenge, it's going to be serious but the question is how are we relative to them. and let's not forget and there's a lot of writing about this right now with xi's visits. that china faces a lot of problems themselves domestically, certainly, they face huge social problems, huge problems keeping all their economic growth. but also strategically they are surrounded by major mowers. japan, india, korea, all of who

is nervous about china's rise all who look to united states for support. >> charlie: do you think we have the right strategy to take advantage of that, that those countries would surround china want to have a very smart and constructive relationship with the united states and a strategy for the future. >> i think actually, on this issue the obama administration has struck a very nice balance. i think they have, you know, clearly attempted to maintain a reasonable engagement with china, but when they talk about this pivot to asia, i think the chinese and everybody else understands when you're putting opening a new base in australia that it's zeal about strengthening those types with the united states. it's a means of steering china in the most positive direction. we want to steer china toward developing its economy not expanding is its sway and power in the message. >> charlie: therthe -- in the . >> charlie: there are those

who look at the united states and say problems problems problems. >> we are facing fiscal, solar problems. >> charlie: we have the capacity to deal with problems it's not just economics. >> i agree. i was going to list the problems we have trouble dealing with but okay. the question is can we get out of this. it's interesting if you look back at american history. the system is clunk pee. the founders design it to be clunky, slow, sometimes paralyzed. you look back in history where we have been locked and unable to fix a problem. then at certain points almost when you think the spheanl kettle's about -- steam kettle's about to blow whether it's the reselection of a president or election of a new president can open the log jam. the united states has gone through these crises almost once every 40 years. we had a great depression in the 1890's. we had a great depression in the 190's. we had the economic crises in the 19 70's and here we are 40

years later. the next decade in every one of those situations the united states came roaring back and actually was stronger relative to the rest of the world than it was before. now as they say most performance is no guarantee. i don't want to be complacent but it but we approved as a nation to be remarkably resilient and flexible even at times when it doesn't look like it we find up fighting our way through those problems. >> charlie: do you have in your judgment a more optimistic future if we could deal with these paralysis that affect our own capacity to do things that we know are in our interest. >> of course. i mean, as i say, these are problems that we must address. i'm not saying if we don't address them, we will not succeed. i do agree with that. >> charlie: the big f is -- >> quite honestly, you and i do not know what the fawch is going to be. >> charlie: the very reason the debt was down graded by standard & poor's because we

didn't vf have the political wil to do something. >> we didn't at that time. >> charlie: but today. >> you're massachusetts iting a lack of -- positing as a result of facing the crises and the election which will make a differences regardless whether the president is re-elected or we have a new person in the whitehouse that person will have more of a mandate to deal with these problems. we've been in a state of paralysis and we have a new election and add a divided government in some respect. we do need to see what this new election brings. i'm not saying it's the answer but i'm not ready to just bury it. >> charlie: in you in fact accept your thesis what do you were he to about that might make it untrue that america will somehow topple into decline. because it's the history for the most part of great empires in the world. hello london, hello rome. >> well rome lasted 600 years. if you're going to tell me we

are going to decline in 400 years, we can talk about that, that's fine. i think the united states does enjoy unique advantages as one of the world's procedures which makes it different. i'll give you the most basic. it's jog featur fee. but -- it's geography. we have no great power threat in our own hemisphere. that is untrue of every other power including britain who ultimately faced the threat right across the channel from germany. that means that we have the capacity to project power without fear of what's going to happen to us at home. secondly, every other major power in the world is surrounded but other main powers. so if china raises all the powders around it get nervous turn to the united states. if russia raises we saw what happened. if iran rises, the government states and the middle -- the gulf state and middle perience countries turn to us. we're not as threatening as most

emmyers because we're so far away even in this modern digital age we're still the distant power. who by the way i think everyone knows is desirous of concurring the teeter. this is not the whole story. we're not a classic empire in the sense that we're holding on to distant teeter and i territof we lose it that's the end of the empire. we're driven out of vietnam, maybe we'll be driven out of afghanistan. it will be a set back but unlike the britain driven out of india, that's a big blow to their empire. the united states has proved very adaptable over the years. >> charlie: can survive iraq and afghanistan and move forward. >> we will pay a price for it as we paid a price for vietnam and other failures in our foreign policy. and by the way our foreign policy history is lightered with failures. -- littered with failures. these will not be the only failures but yes they don't necessarily undermine the overall position the united states is in. >> charlie: what's the future of europe? >> i think europe's very

important to us and i think that, you know, as important as the rise of asia economically i think europe is still the heart of the world order and that we created and depend on and i want that so that may color my views. i actually am as they stay at the state dent cautiously optimistic. europe will struggle its way through. people have been betting against euro in terms of the european union now for quite sometime. although their economic crises is serious. who knows what will happen in greece per se but i believe europe will pull through. >> charlie: when you look at the united states and its relationships around the world, it used to be said, and this certainly at the time of iraq, we told people what we wanted to do and we never listened to them. now, it is said that we really need to exercise a kind of leadership and we recognize the multiplity of the world and we

say to people what do you think. >> i think that always should be true. sometimes we overstate the degree to which it never really has been true. i mean in you take the period after world war ii when we establish nato, i mean to sam extent we were listening to the europeans. after all they were the ones who wanted nato. we didn't want to go into nato. i'm sure they complained plenty that we weren't listening to them and weren't paying attention to them. but obviously we do need to be an empathetic and sympathetic power and not just be driven by our own perception of right and wrong. but look, the world has gotten used to the way we are, including all our imperfections. >> charlie: okay speak to that because that's what you write about as well that somehow the world accepts our dominance. >> not all the world. it is remarkable and it is another unique quality of the united states when you think about every other major power in the world. all the international relation theorists would say when one power becomes more powerful,

everybody else will gang all and try to keep it down. but that's not been the story of the united states. after the end of the cold ware when the soviet union failed the united states emerges as a super power europe was cutting defense budgets, russia, the chinese ware not increasing their dear fence budget. when the united states goes to war, even in unpopular wars it never goes alone. it always has, you might want more, we might wants greater solidarity but it always has a number of countries that join huupwith it. when russia goes to war it goes alone. when china goes to war it goes alone. that sets us apart because the world has an accurate impression of what america's sensibilities are in this regard. >> charlie: do you believe in america exceptionalism. >> w countries are exceptional in their own ways but america is exceptional in the way it is important. this is the kind of thing going

to get me into all kinds of trouble. everyone feels exceptional but the united states from my moment view and dealing with the thesis of the book what kind of world order do you want to. do you want to have a fundamentally democrat world order or fundmentally liberal economic international system. the united states is exceptionally well suited to support that order. it's exceptional in a sense that and again this is where i think that he and i agree is we don't have the world order anymore. >> charlie: the whole world has something to fear if america is in decline because it will not play the role it has played. >> well i think that's true. i'm sure the russians don't think they have to fear that. there are many chinese who think they don't have to fear that. but i think for instance china who depends on a certain international economic system which it has thrived in, well it really is the united states that's been playing the major role, not ft the exclusive rolen making that regem, that

international order possible. >> charlie: we will mark it for the exports. >> the funny thing about america it's like the god father we always made money for our partners. that's a successful strategy all countries that have been in the united states by and large have gotten richer, including china. >> charlie: when are the numb informant new ideas that are shaping beyond the rise of the east? >> you know obviously wear seeing -- weare seeing the move- we've been seeing this for a while by the way but we've seep it move away from the europey centric transatlantic sent trake world. you see a country like brazil making it in a way latin countries haven't been able to do for more than a country if even then. being a player on the international economic scene and increasingly on the diplomatic scene you see a country like turkey showing the kind of growth and activism in the

region that turkey has shown. these are new developments. this is in a way the development post colonial phase that we're looking in. agaibegin some people say it's d for the united states but i don't think it's bad for the united states. i don't see any reason why the rising influence of brazil or turkey or india is in any way temporary to american interests. >> charlie: is the rise of the arab spring in the arab world good for the united states? >> i think on the balance -- >> charlie: and for the world and the people of the arab world. >> this is a classic it's too soon to answer this question. i don't know what the arab spring will lead to. what's interesting is in the best of all words let's say egypt really is a democracy we're going to have this very mixed picture. there are ways in which it's going to be set backs for the united states strategically. popularly governed egypt is not going to be as close an ally and is war on terror, on other issues as, you know, as the

stalwart are lubaric was. my view nevertheless because our transcending interest is in a certain kind of world order we benefit nevertheless even if we pay a price in some short term interest. one example like that i think of is the philippines in 1986. we helped undermine marcos in the same way we hoped undermine mubarak. six years later they kick the united states out what we consider to be crucial bases, big strategic setbacks. today when we look back on a hole aren't we just as happy the philippines are democratic even if we tonight have though bases. >> charlie: let me ask you this. your wife is a spokesman for secretary clinton at the state department in the obama administration. you are some kind of advisor to candidate romney in the republican primary process. mitt romney is successful and becomes the republic nominee and then somehow defeats the president. what would you like to see him do that president obama is not doing? >> i would like to see him take

on the very difficult but important task of reversing this general trend toward seeking fiscal solutions by cutting the defense budget. i think that is a problem. if you talk about what can lead us to decline. so much of what, not all of it but a lot of what the united states provides to the world is security. the world order is upheld to a large extent by a dominant navy and the ability to provide security in different regions. when we start to cut into that ability, i'm not saying we're necessarily this yet but when we start to cut into that ability, you do begin to lose a grip on this world order. so i think that is something by the way governor romney has talked about wanting to do that. >> charlie: the president talked about that at west point when he said history suggests when you lose your economic supremacy than your geo political supremacy will also decline. >> he has said all those things. but the problems he also says other things and i've actually brought this up with him 123450eu6789 what othe.>> charlr things. >> like we should be

nation-building at home not overseas which plays to a sensibility that does in the exist in the united states that everything we do overseas detracts from what we could be doing here at home. there are times especially in this recollectio election seasoa country that's tired -- >> charlie: overextends, too. >> right but not just that. i think, he's playing for this a little too much. i think a president has to resist the temptation of the united states which always exists. i mean one of the points that i make in my book is we are a conflicted almost schizophrenic nation. we want to shape the world but then we tonight want the responsibility and then we wish we hadn't gotten into it. every time we enter an interventure we have one fount out the door before we completed it. presidents in my opinion who see the whole picture need to push back against those tendencies. >> charlie: with this president, it was frequently said zero experience. he's been a state senator and

then some. although an interesting academic pedigree. yet it is a foreign policy where he had no experience he's getting the highest marks. what does that say about experience versus other values you hope a president has. >> i think that sensibility is what the country is about is probably more important than vast experience, i would say. and i think you know -- >> charlie: sensibility about what? >> i guess a sense that understands the point that i'm trying to make in the book that the united states does have a crucial role to play. and president obama i think has come to see this in a way that he didn't necessarily see it. >> charlie: as a candidate? >> as a president. when he -- >> charlie: he's changed since he became president. >> i think the obama administration has gone through a couple different phases. phase one was anti-bush. whatever bush was doing we're going to try not to do. phase two is, that's not quite as simple as we thought, but more importantly i believe that

the major figures 23469 obama team including the pled himself discovered this point. that the world still relies on the information more thaunited y thought. that goes around the expurld and everybody amazingly enough looking at the united states and saying what are you going to do. i think that experience has had the impact of the president and his officers. unfortunately it's election season so now you're playing a different game but i think that that core understanding is there. >> charlie: and there's this too. when are governor romney goes around suggesting that the president of the united states goes around the world apologizing, what do you think of that? >> well, he did do some of that actually in the early days and i think has done a little bit less of it now. but he effectively apologized for the c.i.a. over throw of iraq and iran. he's not the first president to apologize. jimmy carter apologized for one thing or another and there were things the united states did wrong.

it doesn't actually do you any good with anybody. i don't think the iranians cared that he apologized for that past behavior. i think it's better not to do it but maybe that was one the lessons to be learned. >> charlie: should the information have apologized for that. >> when you do something to somebody how much do they care whether you apologize. i guess maybe your wife appreciates a good apology but i'm not sure that the iranians care that we apologize noovment it's great to have you here. >> it's great to be here, thanks a lot. >> charlie: robert kagan. this book is called "the world america made." thank you for joining us. see you next time. captioning sponsored by rose communications captioned by media access group at wgbh access.wgbh.org