ordinary afghans that are paying the price. ♪ nick: will vladimir putin go nuclear in ukraine? the russian president said he will deploy nuclear weapons in neighboring belarus. so could the war take a new turn? and how might nato respond? this is "inside story." ♪ hello there. welcome to the program. i'm nick clark. so, president vladimir putin says russia will deploy nuclear weapons in belarus, and that's drawn sharp criticism from the west.

the european union called putin's comments irresponsible and warned that russia's ally belarus could face more sanctions. ukraine has called for an urgent meeting of the un security council, accusing muska of making minsk a nuclear hostage. putin says the move does not violate any treaties and is no different to america basing its arsenal of nuclear weapons in nato-member states. the russian president also warned that he would be forced to react if the u.k. supplied ukraine with armor piercing ammunition containing depleted uranium. >> as for our negotiations with resident lukashenko of belarus, the pretext was the statement of the british defense secretary that they were going to deliver depleted uranium rounds to ukraine. it is still connected with nuclear technologies. it is obvious. however, even out of context with those events, this statement that lukashenko has been bringing up the question of

deploying russian tactical nuclear weapons in belarus for a long time. lukashenko makes a point. why did the americans deploy nuclear weapons with their allies on their territory? train crews, pilots have to use this type of weapon if needed? we agree that we will do the same without violating our obligations. nick: so what about the relationship between russia and belarus? well, they're both part of the collective security treaty and a military alliance of seven former soviet states led by moscow. russia offered financial support and security to the president, alexander lukashenko, during a crackdown on major protests against his rule in 2020. russian forces also used territory in belarus to invade ukraine and launch an offensive against kyiv. russia continues to hold military drills in belarus near the border with ukraine that's forced kyiv to deploy forces there. ♪ nick: all right. joining me in moscow is pavel felgenhauer, he is a defense military analyst. in utrecht, susi snyder is

joining us, program coordinator at the international campaign to abolish nuclear weapons. in london, samuel ramani, who is an associate fellow at the royal united services institute. a warm welcome to all of you. pavel, if i could start with you in moscow. so vladimir putin says all this is in response to a long -standing request from the belarusian leader, alexander lukashenko. safe to say, there is more to it than that. guest: lukashenko has been, for some time, lamenting that he made a grave mistake in the 1990's when he repatriated former soviet nuclear weapons from the territory of belarus and onto russia, and turned the roots into a nonnuclear state. that if he would have retained, he said, these weapons, belarus would have been better off.

and he was asking moscow to return some weapons back. russia sort of agreed. but this is more of a political bargaining thing. the military significance is -- there is, of course military , significance, but this is primarily a political move to reinstate some nuclear weapons in belarus. and of course that will happen somewhere in the second half of 2023. nick: all it is about is raising the threat level? guest: yes, it raises to some extent the threat level. although apparently this weapons will be mimicking are, meaning it needs an ok from washington and the respective

european capitals for usage. here it will be belarus aircraft and belarus missiles supplied by russia. they are nuclear capable, and then there will be some russian nuclear weapons may be attached to them. but of course, this may give additional capabilities, but not that much. this is not the cuban missile crisis of 1962, because where russia has nuclear capable weapons and apparently confirmed incoming grand, it is more to the west of belarus. nick: susi snyder, does this francesca: the danger of escalation? do you think?

guest: it absolutely does increase the danger level. anytime you start moving nuclear weapons around, there are nuclear risks. and now they are starting to add new actors into the decision , making a process that opens the door to miscommunication. there are safety issues. it introduces the possibility of further use of nuclear weapons, further use of the weapons, which would be catastrophic, or where they are targeted. nick: samuel, just that mention of the word nuclear makes everybody sit up and take notice. and the president is ramping up that threat level, using uncertainty toward he would presume to be his advantage. guest: that has been a long-standing russian policy that dates back long before this conflict. we saw that the russians used the threat of nuclear weapons to deter what western arms

shipments to ukraine, especially the movement of tanks and fighter jets. that field as a deterrent. so now he is basically ratcheting up the threat as ukraine continues one year into the war. nick: moving weapons to the belarus moves them closer to poland and lithuania, doesn't it? guest: it does. belarusians held a referendum last year. 65% of the people voted to keep these nuclear warheads on their soil. supposedly under those nonfree and fair conditions. given the fact that russia has had so many tensions with poland and lithuania over issues ranging from the trade from c, to -- trade from kaliningrad to poland's very hawkish support for the ukrainian cause, early movement of tanks, rapid increases in defense spending, 3% of gdp, and lithuania has affectively annihilated asymptomatic presence inside

russia, this is clearly a warning threat to both those countries. belarus has said its sovereignty is being threatened by nato, by poland, by lithuania and now, ukraine. this plays into lukashenko's propaganda as well. nick: susi, outside of the general nuclear threat, how do you perceive the game on the ground within the auspices of the ukrainian conflict? how does it change that, do you think? guest: it brings more actors into this. and it also raises the likelihood of the use of nuclear weapons, something that we have seen repeatedly makes people in ukraine, in eastern europe, europe, makes people here in my neighborhood in utrecht hours , drive away from the u.s.'s nuclear weapons, nervous. it increases our concern to the

point that last year we had a run on iodine tablets. not just in ukraine, where we have seen images of school teachers trying to explain to children where they need to go in the case of the use of the nuclear weapon. for generations, this has not been at the topmost of people's mind. now, it is. and we know, we know without a fact that any use of nuclear weapons on any popular should be catastrophic. and there is no humanitarian response. we can imagine the horrifying results, to introduce nuclear weapons into the current conflict in which there is already almost no humanitarian capacity left. to bring this possibility, to bring the long-term effects of a nuclear weapon into this, it would just be terrifying and catastrophic. . alright, we can see that threat. pavel, what about attending here? the experts say that doesn't yet appear to be satellite imagery that suggests there is a knock there weapon storage facility

being built in belarus at this point in time. what do you think of the timeline, is vladimir putin exaggerating how soon this will happen? guest: yes, of course, you need nuclear special facility of the 12th main directorate of the russian defense ministry to keep and maintain the nuclear devices when they are not attached to delivery systems. lukashenko has boasted a couple of years ago that -- when he was asking for russian nuclear weapons -- that he maintained in good order the nuclear facilities, the so-called s bunkers that were in belarus during the cold war in soviet times. belarusian military district was one of the main and most militarized parts of the red army. so right now, you don't have to

build it. you just have to renovate it and see that it is in working order. that is basically what putin was saying, that we are going to renovate them. so it will not really take that much time to prepare, most likely. the other thing is, does the russian military really want to have nuclear weapons of large numbers of the russian territory? because even if it is under russian control, there is the belarusian military there, and wt to have some nuclear weapons of his own to maintain his rule using nuclear blackmail. so, there could be some dragging of feet by the russian military, because deployment in belarus does not bring that much military dividend, but it brings some risks. putin said it would be after the first of july. but how many? will there be real

nuclear weapons or just dummies to make lukashenko happy? that is an open question. nick: interesting insight, isn't it, that russia-deployed nuclear weapons and the roots could end up being a threat to russia itself. guest: absolutely. that is often underestimated. the use of any of these weapons, including so-called tactical weapons which are often described as smaller, they are still nuclear weapons. . they have a massive impact, much bigger than conventional forces. the use of these weapons would have a detrimental effect on soldiers, whether they be russian, belarusian, or ukraine, as well as on civilian populations. pavel's reference to the idea of hanging onto the weapons in the future in order to continue nuclear blackmail, it is quite a powerful statement.

because that is what we see constantly. we see the threat of new there weapons use as a way to -- nuclear weapons use as a way to coerce activity that otherwise the international community would not stand for, and it is very unfortunate and why the successful actions we have seen every time we have seen steps back from this, there has been tremendous condemnation for -- from the international community for these activities. nick: what about the arguments, what did putin say in europe, you host u.s. for social nuclear weapons, why should we not? first, tell us which countries host u.s. nuclear weapons, how does it work? how many weapons are there? guest: they are located in several different countries -- germany, turkiye, belgium and germany. there are areas where weapons are being stored.

the analogy that russians are using, germany has said that is not the case because this is an act of reflection. also russia has really escalated nuclear brinkmanship. moreover. , russia's withdrawal suspension from new start treaty. it followed allegations that they had been noncompliant with the agreement which trump withdrew from unilaterally. it points to a broader tendency of russia using nuclear threat mongering as well as the threat of sabotage international arms treaties. inspection seems to be a rejection of diplomacy and dialogue as well. so it's less that russia is even proliferating these nuclear weapons, but because the us and nato have done that too. nick: you can see his point. why shouldn't russia and belarus , notwithstanding the nuclear threat which is enormous, but as far as his strategy is

concerned. guest: well, that is interesting. nato's statement about the russia -- the russian nuclear doctrine has been reinstated many times, sometimes as a veiled threat, is that russia will only strike with nuclear weapons if it feels its territorial integrity or insecurity is under some kind of immediate threat. but the problem is it defines territorial integrity differently, to include illegally occupied regions of ukraine, crimea, donetsk, luhansk, kherson, zaporizhzhya. you get the picture. russia is effectively not only broadening the proliferation regime, but also threatening to use nuclear weapons to effectively justify illegal occupations and illegal seizures of territory. to justify violations of international law. whereas nato's nuclear weapons use are through sovereign agreements with respective member states that have been used to defend the sovereignty

of countries under international legal frameworks. what russia has done is clearly illegal. nick: pavel, what do you make of that? guest: russia is using its nuclear arsenal for nuclear deterrence, basically. that is how it nuclear weapons have been used since 1945, by all sides. that is basically legitimate, because that is what nuclear weapons were made for, for deterrence, which is the same word for brinkmanship. actually it is more or less blackmail, but it works. when russia says there is a possibility of usage of nuclear weapons because it is involved in a rather high-intensity military conflict and it is in

superpower, yes, that is true. and that is the normal use of nukes. but going from there over the nuclear threshold to actually use them, that is a totally different story. that does not seem right now -- you can't say that it is impossible. it is not that it is zero possibility. it is not zero. but it is not very high right now, because going over the threshold to -- nuclear deterrence works both ways. russia does not want to go into a nuclear confrontation at all. using it in the limited way against ukraine also would not drink russia -- would not bring to russia much dividends politically or actually militarily. so right now i believe it's going to remain in the domain of deterrence and blackmail. that is where it is going to stay for the foreseeable future. nick: susi, do you want to come

back at that, that the use of nuclear weapons is not very high right now? guest: i am sorry, with all due respect, we have seen overt threats to use nuclear weapons, which we have not seen for generations. the risk of use is higher and it has been across-the-board. everyone acknowledges this, the risk is higher than it has been perhaps since the initiation of the cold war. why we would all like to believe that the use is unlikely, let's be really honest here, there are nine manning the world who decide whether or not to use their weapons, and we cannot imagine what is going through their brain at any given moment. nine individuals who make that decision to push the button or not. nine guys. so the threat perception of any one of those nine could change rapidly. and it could lead to the initiation of these nuclear weapons. and we know that once the order is given, it is minutes until it is executed.

and it is less than one hour until missiles arrive where they are destined to go. so the fact that we have come -- that we are not taking these threats as seriously as we should, that is extremely concerning and i think that what we are seeing over the last year is because the threats have escalated. because there has been an erosion of the taboo of even threatening the use of the philippines. threats are responding, particularly those that have signed onto the treaty of the prohibition of nuclear weapons, have made the strongest multilateral condemnation of these threats ever. and as a result, they have been walked back. and it is absolutely necessary for any state that does not want to see this threat to continue. to continue, to sign onto that tree and put their money where their mouth is. nick: i just want to throw that to pavel in moscow. do you want to respond to susi's

comments? guest: yes, is possible. that possibility is not zero but also not very high. usage in several minutes, that is only about strategic nuclear weapons. they are on readiness. the technical ones are not really so. you have to attach the weapons to the delivery systems, the same delivery systems that are being used in ukraine. and other cruise missiles which are also nuclear-capable. now they are used conventionally. you have to attach the warheads and that would be noticed by, say, the american spy satellites. they would notice the russians are preparing for usage. they don't see that preparation happening. or the russians would note is it. the americans actually attaching

the nukes to delivery systems. we are not yet in the minutes zone. we are talking about a longer time period where you can actually try and negotiate something on hotlines, not just simply press the button and go. nick: right. susi, i can see that you want to jump in, i will come back to you in just a second. samuel, does this move undermine moscow's obligations? guest: it does to a degree, obviously. the russians would come back with some kind of most likely disinformation or exaggerated information about britain bringing uranium shells to ukraine, which i think seems to be an extension of the dirty bomb conspiracies we saw the russians come up with about the americans and the british and the french in october. nick: the u.k. supply ammunition with uranium is not the same as nuclear weapons. guest: the timing of this

announcement was directly related to britain's announcement about the uranium shells. , i agree there is zero chance of russia using the nuclear war phase. in september, 1400 difficult choice, either surrender, mobileeye's, or use nuclear weapons. china in particular pushed putin not to using up their weapons. xi jinping's meeting in moscow last week -- no use of nuclear weapons as well as no bombing or destruction of nuclear power plants are two of the 12 points in that peace plan. even if the west and russia are not having dialogue about nuclear weapons right now, china at least is putting pressure on russia to back off. that is why i think the chances are very low. nick: susi, please come back to that, if you will.

guest: putin had three things at his disposal -- energy, and massive conventional force, and the possibility of nuclear weapons. the energy risks and the conventional forces have been decimated. i worry about how close he is authorizing that nuclear strike, which as was noted, we are minutes away from a strategic strike. i don't want to worry populations. i don't think it is extremely likely. but it is of desperate concern and we need to make sure that governments take this seriously and condemn it at the least. nick: ok, let's shift away slightly from the threat issue and to that of belarus itself. pavel, what is their role in this, is it just acting willingly, or does it just have to accept russia's plans? guest: actually, this is most likely look at shanker's idea to deploy their weapons in belarus -- lukashenko's idea to deploy

their weapons to belarus and to use belarusian delivery systems as to deliver these russian weapons. he would want to have nuclear capability, after the rather disastrous august of 2020 presidential elections. his regime was a bit wobbly. there was massive antigovernment demonstrations. and of course, lots of western sanctions imposed. so right now, lukashenko would want to be seen as a nuclear capable leader like leaders of north korea. nick: sorry to jump in, how does that go down with the people of belarus? they support this? guest: it is hard to say. right now the belarussians are a tightly controlled society. what the people really think about that -- you should notice that lukashenko, despite being

threatening that possibly he would go into conflict with ukraine, has not mobilized his military. the size of the military is tiny. the fact that he is afraid of putting in large numbers of reservists, because you never know belarus with eight will turn their weapons against. he still has a rather wobbly regime. economically, he is in a very tight spot because he was always surviving and kind of mediating between russia and the west. now he has lost that capability. so maybe he sees nuclear weapons as a kind of source of last resort, ok to survive. nick: i will try and squeeze in a couple more questions. the first one to samuel. ukraine has called for an emergency meeting of the u.n. security council. it's not going to happen, is it? guest: it's extremely unlikely to happen. if it did happen, it's unlikely

to produce an guaranteed results in part because china has traditionally backed russia on the issue of arms control. they may not be wanting russia to use nuclear weapons, but they certainly have not refused to join new start negotiations, because they feel that the western there and supplies, particularly the ones held in europe, are not sufficiently regulated by international treaties. so i think that china and russia will definitely block this kind of investigation and that it will not go anywhere in the security council. nick: susi, in general, but would you say the ukraine war has done for nuclear proliferation? and once the war is over, how do we rebuild trust that has clearly been lost? guest: what we have seen is that it has brought the issue of nokia weapons to the front of people's attention. it's an issue that we thought was maybe gone and possibly forgotten, and it is not. we have seen that states are overwhelmingly -- more states

are joining the treaty on the prohibition of nokia weapons to reject any suggestions of nuclear weapons use, any threat or possession of nuclear weapons than they are leaning towards nuclear weapons as some sort of security strategy. it is 2:1 really are states rejecting the use of weapons. we need to deny after this war is over, deny anyone the option of holding the world to blackmail of nuclear weapons again. it calls for urgent action for complete negotiations to illuminate all arsenals. fortunately there is a two day that makes the weapons illegal and provides a pathway towards their complete elimination, and that is the next step all around. nick: susi, thanks very much indeed for that. and thank you indeed to all our guests, pavel felgenhauer, susi snyder, samuel ramani, thanks very much indeed for this important discussion. and thank you, too, for watching.

you can see the program again anytime by visiting our website, aljazeera.com. and for further discussion, go to our facebook page. that is facebook.com/ajinsidestory. you can also join the conversation on twitter. our handle is @ajinsidestory. from me, nick clark, and the whole team here, it is goodbye, for now. ♪

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