>> c-span is liberates 45 years of covering congress why no other. we have been your primary source for capitol hill, providing balanced, unfiltered coverage of government. taking you to where policies are debated and decided all with the support of cable companies. c-span, 45 years and counting, powered by cable. continues. host: david miller is with us. he is a senior fellow and thank you for your time. guest: a pleasure to be here. host: a longtime watcher of israeli-palestinian issues. how have the last few months complicated the issue? guest: three october seven, the israeli-palestinian issue had reached what i call a strategic cul-de-sac.

the prospects of significant breakthroughs in pursuit of a conflict ending solution were basically undermined by the absence of leadership by either side and the sheer impossibility of reaching agreement on border security. that this conflict would bring to a settlement of existing claims situation with difficult and fraught well before october 7. now, we've taken the israeli-palestinian conflict to a place it's never been before. the traumatic impact of october 7 and and the israeli response is created extraordinary trauma primarily to civilian populations especially in gaza. it has created a sense that when

this phase dies down, as it will, israelis and palestinians will not sit with one another. the problem is not that we don't understand one another, the problem is you know each other only too well and if that transpires, i think the future is going to be truly bleak because there will not be any space, any space in order to create what is required first to stop conflict and then somehow to end it to a better pathway of negotiations leading to what i believe is the least worst solution to this conflict and that is separation through negotiation into a palestinian state living in peace and security alongside israel. the processes are slim to say the least.

it's clear what happens in gaza also does not stay in gaza because you now have a situation where even though the regional conflict has been somewhat contained over the last six months between israel and hezbollah, we see iranian strikes against u.s. military and the recent escalation between iran and israel has taken us into new, dangerous and very uncharted waters. host: in the short term, what are possible aftereffects of what we saw a couple of weeks ago concerning iran? guest: there are two or three questions we need to ask that are clear to me. answering them will be difficult. has the attacks on one another's territory which is unprecedented , certainly attacks that were overtly claimed by both sides, unprecedented. will these attacks lead to a greater risk readiness on the

part of iran and israel? could this somehow become the new normal all or turn it to, will this lead both of them to scale back and understand how close they came to the possibility -- which i think neither of them once frankly -- and that is taking another step or two of the escalatory letter, something the middle east is never experian's before which is a regional war. number two is the issue of how will each side compensate for the loss of deterrence which i think has been clearly demonstrated by the fact that there was very little compunction in striking the territory. for the iranians, this may well lead to a decision to ramp up their nuclear program. with the israelis have struck iran if tehran had a deliverable

nuclear weapon? iran strike israel full well knowing, even though it is not acknowledged by u.s. officials or the israelis, that israel possesses not one deliverable nuclear weapon but quite a few. i think those are the two questions. if in fact there was some mechanism, some de-escalation process that would somehow work with both parties and diminish the prospects of conflict, i would feel more sanguine about what the future holds but the reality is the competition is a strategic rivalry. it is a zero-sum game in which both parties believe that the stakes are existential in nature. when it comes to those sorts of conflicts, i look at the last 27 years of my experience from the late 70's to the early oughts,

2003 is when i left the state department. when parties in conflict believe their vital interests are at stake, these outside parties are very limited. the middle east is literally littered with remains of great powers who wrongly believed they could impose their dreams and schemes and ambitions on smaller ones. i'm afraid. i don't have a whole lot of positive prescriptions either for the israeli-i must warrant gaza or the regional competition between tehran and jerusalem. host: our guesswork to the state department as a middle east analyst and negotiator and republican and democratic administrations and currently at the carnegie endowment for international peace here to take your questions, (202) 748-8001 for republicans, (202) 748-8000

for democrats and independents (202) 748-8002. to the role the u.s. plays now, what is the best role? guest: the question is what does the united states want to achieve? i think it's ending in containing the conflict in six months income i think the biden administration finds itself in what i call a strategic cul-de-sac. it's politically weekend, dealing with two parties, the government is israel in the islamic resistance of hamas with no urgency now in either side frankly to ending this conflict and is now faced with the prospect of a serious escalation that could without much of my nation -- without much imagination could go into a war. there may be a lot of leverage on paper.

six months in, the administration for any number of reasons, we can talk about has basically been reluctant to impose what i would describe and what normal humans, let's assume u.n. me would describe as significant or serious pressure. that's as far as the israelis are concerned. with respect to hamas, i don't know where the levers start. u.s. doesn't have any and countries have limited access and they post the hamas external leadership. the architect of the october 7, what his true calculations are, is this and end of days strategy for him in this cosmic world or does he believe that he can survive this using time, tunnels and the tragic situation of hostages.

there is the expert initial rise in deaths of palestinians with who had nothing to do with this conflict. 30 or 40% of women and children to which hamas expose them to retaliation to destroy hamas as a political and military organization. neither israel nor hamas right now are on the cusp of realizing their objectives and that poses a huge problem. i think the administration thought and maybe it still believes that it could create the environment for an israeli-hamas hostage exchange that would buy six weeks of quiet, returning 134 hostages, 34 of whom the israelis believe were killed on october 7 and the bodies taken to gaza. that leaves 100 hostages. even if that deal was

consummated, hamas would still retain 50 hostages, almost certainly israeli soldiers and male soldiers and male civilians. what they want is a comprehensive cease-fire and withdrawal of the israeli forces from gaza but that's clearly not going to happen. i don't see how it will happen. israel is bent on continuing its campaign to destroy hamas. to be quite honest, i cannot provide you with an rx had to get out of this. i don't think the u.s. is in a position to use the leverage it has. i think we have very little leverage when it comes to hamas and that's where things stand. it's not encouraging. host: this is our first call from richard in michigan on our independent line.

good morning, go ahead. caller: i'd like you to confirm and pedro i'd like you to make a pledge and have the host of c-span, whenever someone says that israel is committing genocide, is a blood libel canard because let's just say 35,000 people were killed, at least half of them were soldiers and fighters and if israel wanted to, they could kill hundreds of thousands of people. they've destroyed 50 or 60% of the buildings and only killed that few people, they are either pretty poor aims or they are really not trying to kill everybody. host: that's richard in michigan. guest: the international court of justice and it will take them

another two years if that to rule on the question of whether the israelis are committing genocide in gaza. if genocide -- there is a definition of it and i'm not an international lawyer but i look at the situation. what the israelis done in an effort to destroy hamas as a military organization has involved the deaths of scores of thousands of innocents and yes, the 34,000 of the hamas-controlled ministry of health has calculated includes 12-14,000 hamas fighters and combatants. i think this is a just war but i think it's been waged with an expansion of israel's rules of engagement. i think there is no question about that. is it genocide? i don't think is genocide. i don't think the israelis

willfully determine as the khmer rouge in cambodia where the nazis were in germany fundamentally extinguish socially, culturally politically an entire people? i don't think that's a what's going on. we wouldn't even be having this conversation if october 7 had not occurred. host: sorry. guest: i think these discussions and debates, i understand the emotional impact but frankly in the end, i think they don't deal with the practical reality that in effect we face. those practicalities are so galactic right now. this conflict shows no prospects between israelis and palestinians of coming to an end and i don't see the mechanism by which that will happen. it certainly will not happen by adjudication in the international criminal court or court of justice were in the

corridors of power. it has to be somehow ameliorated by the influence of parties working with the israelis and key states that have influence over hamas and somehow create another path forward but right now, i refuse to engage in hypothetical discussions of this or that solution. we are six-month into the work and we have yet to see a compelling pathway for how both sides get out of it. frankly, right now, i don't see it nor do i see the international community which in response to so many examples of mask killing, where do you want to start? the holocaust, cambodia marie wanda -- rwanda, the international commute including the united states needs to focus the power and intent and motivation to deal with these issues and right now, as we talk

about gaza, we are talking about catastrophic levels of violence and starvation in places like sudan. again, i don't think united states is a potted plant. we can use our influence but right now i don't see how given the circumstances. that includes the political circumstances that will be -- that won't be terribly effective to end this conflict. host: alan in indiana, democrats line. caller: thank you for having me on. i appreciate "washington journal " and i'm a big fan of yours. much kudos to you and good luck. i have to add some odds with just observations. i think this is a simple situation with a very simple solution in the occupation. 76 years and this did not start

on october 7. 76 years ago, palestine was invaded and occupied by 200,000 displaced european jews. because of our american and british imperialism, it was a protector britain and britain did a lousy job protecting them. we decided to dump the people there because we had no thoughts about palestinians even though we had a ban on european jews coming to the united states. we didn't want them but we would dump them in palestine. they had a good run for about 76 years just like south africa but it's time to end the occupation. the second question i want to ask you, does israel have nuclear weapons? i guess we should all know the answer to that because in my mind it's yes but if you look at the signing 10