c-span has been delivering unfiltered congressional coverage for 45 years. here are highlights from key moments. >> although this city was the nation's capital for only a short time, from those early days, the eyes of the world have continued to be on new york. one year ago, this great center of history, enterprise, and creativity suffered the greatest of cruelties and showed itself to be a place of valor and generosity and grace. here, where so many innocent lives were suddenly taken, the world saw acts of kindness and heroism that will be remembered forever. >> c-span. powered by cable. >> next, an event marking nato's 75th anniversary. the u.s. ambassador to nato, julianne smith, spoke about the importance of the military

alliance to the u.s. and internationally, and nato's recent expansion to include sweden and finland as new members. while the russia-ukraine war continues. other speakers also discussed nato's future and its deterrent strategy. >> good morning, and thanks for coming out early on a monday morning, and thank you for that lovely introduction. it has been a real pleasure and honor to open this conference, nato at 75: charting a new course, and i look forward to your questions in a few minutes. for 3/4 of a century, nato has been a cornerstone of international peace and security , united nations in a collective commitment to mutual defense and

to our shared values. nato's success story really is remarkable, and it is one that was by no means preordained. the fact that in 2024, 75 years after it was founded, the alliance is bigger, stronger, and more united speaks to the alliance's adaptability, to nato's resilience. but it also speaks to the commitment and courage of millions of soldiers, sailors, aviators that operate together under the nato umbrella. but i think it also speaks to the attractiveness of nato's core values, democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law. i do not have enough time this morning here to go through all of nato's many achievements over the last seven decades, and will

be several panels throughout the day where folks will be allowed to look at the alliance from different angles. it looks like a superb conference and series of discussions, and i congratulate the organizers. but what i do want to do this morning as i want to walk us through all that has happened inside the nato alliance over just the last two years. since russia launched its unprovoked war of aggression in ukraine. these last two years have in many ways been transformative, and i do not use that word lightly. i do not think there is a better word to describe what has happened across the nato alliance since the war started. i think they have showcased time and time again nato's agility and its innovation. let me walk you through five big changes that we have seen in the last two years. first, after many years of

focusing on expeditionary operations, or you will remember in the 1990's they were often referred to as out of area operations, the alliance has come home and returned to its core mandate of collective defense. it has taken a series of dramatic steps to enhance its deterrence. before the war even started, nato allies were moving force posture into eastern europe. you will remember that nato, just a few months after the war started, announced four new multinational battalions on the eastern flank that were paired with the four that were created in the three baltic states in poland right after russia went into crimea in 2014. at a summit last year, the alliance also rolled out new regional plans that provided clarity to all allies in terms of what is required to protect

every inch of nato territory. we are also working on an entirely new command-and-control structure, which i suspect the general will talk about in his remarks later today. and we just finished conducting our largest military exercise since the cold war, steadfast defender, with 90,000 nato troops. that exercise, for the first time in a long time, enabled us to exercise north american troops moving across the atlantic and into europe to defend nato territory. that is point number one, dramatic shift or a coming home of sorts to collective defense and enhanced determinants. secondly, burden sharing has increased significantly in recent years. you may remember that in 2014 all allies judged to spend -- pledged to spend 2% of their own gdp on national defense.

that pledge was to last 10 years. in 2024, when we started the pledged 10 years ago, we had three countries in the alliance spending 2% of gdp on defense, and by last count, we don't know where we are going to end up i the end of this calendar year, but right now we have 20 allies meeting the 2% pledge, 20 allies. that is a significant increase over a decade. we want it to be all 32, and we are going to keep pushing until we get there, but the movement we saw over the last two years, particularly by countries like germany that put an extra 100 billion euros on the table for their own defense after the war started, speaks volumes about where they are -- where we are on the subject of burden sharing. but when we talk about burden sharing, it is not just about 2% of gdp spending on national defense. burden sharing also takes us to the question of ukraine.

here, we are also seeing a remarkable level of burden sharing across the alliance. the united states over the last two years has provided roughly $74 billion worth of support to our friends and you train, how are you -- our friends in ukraine. our european allies have provided somewhere on the order of 110 billion dollars of support to ukraine. every single member of the alliance is providing assistance to ukraine, economic, humanitarian, and security assistance. burden sharing is something that we have seen -- an area where we have seen tremendous positive shift just over the last two years. third, nato has added two new members. you will remember after the war started in spring of 2022, there was a knock at the door, and two countries that had hundreds of years of nonalignment decided to shift their national policy and request former nato -- formal

nato membership. immediately they wanted to start the process. as you know, finland became an official member last spring, and sweden just joined officially, and now it has taken its seat at the table just a couple of weeks ago. those two allies are already making many meaningful contributions to the alliance each and every day. number four, nato ruled out -- rolled out a new strategic concept in 2022. this is nothing new. nato rewrites the concept about once a decade. what was new about this particular strategic concept was that in addition to mentioning the two core threats the alliance is facing -- russia and terrorism -- for the first time in nato history, the strategic concept mentions the prc, challenges associated with the prc for nato member states, and

the importance of deepening our partnerships with our friends in the indo pacific. why is nato doing this? does it have aspirations to become a global alliance? absolutely not. our indo pacific partners do not have an interest in joining the alliance, and the alliance is not looking to go public, but what we see -- go global, but what we see is increased utility in working with our friends in the indo pacific on a number of shared security challenges that really have no geographic boundaries. disinformation, malicious cyber attacks, or emerging and disrupting technology. we view these security challenges in one theater, not limited to just the atlantic or the pacific. nato is moving out to deep in

these important partnerships with our friends in the indo-pacific to share best practices on those challenges. finally, nato, while it has been addressing the challenges in ukraine and coping with the russia threat, has taken a series of unprecedented steps to address a wide range of emerging and future challenges. i will give you a couple examples. we have new initiatives across the alliance in two new domains, cyber and space. when nato was created, we focused on land, sea, and air, and now increasingly the alliance is moving out to focus on security threats that exist in cyberspace and space proper. nato also recently announced a one billion euro innovation fund to protect our collective technological edge. nato is in the process of building something called the defense innovation accelerator for the north atlantic, which has the handy name of diana, to

solve critical defense challenges, both feet private sector and with academic institutions. we have extended our work across the nato alliance on climate security, but also resilience. we have identified eight key areas, such as our telecommunication network, our health systems, our continuity of government that must mean resilient in the face of any attacks. last summer, we announced something called the defense production action plan to ensure nato has the industrial capacity and capabilities it needs to support its defense plan. taken together, what does all of this mean for this alliance? the enhanced deterrence? the new resourcing? the new members still trying to join this alliance? the deeper partnerships with our friends in the indo-pacific, and all the new initiatives we are rolling out to cope with future

challenges? it tells us that at 75, this alliance remains relevant, it remains resilient, and it remains ready for the future. that is why we look forward to hosting this year's anniversary summit right here in washington, d.c., july 9 through 11th, where we will no doubt celebrate 75 years of historic achievements, our strong transit manic bond, and nato's alliance in defending against threats. we will be spending a lot of time at the summit focus on you rain. i can't predict -- none of us can with any certainty -- what the war will look like come july. we do know all 32 heads of state will be traveling to washington, d.c., in july to showcase their unwavering unity, their unwavering resolve in helping

ukraine win. we will send a strong signal to president putin that he cannot wait us out, that we are not distracted, that we are not looking away, and we may remain focused on ukraine's immediate and future security needs. we will take concrete steps at the summit to move ukraine closer to the alliance and build a bridge to nato membership. of course, in addition to ukraine, the alliance will be making a series of new announcements on many of the subjects i just mentioned. we are rolling out new initiatives as it relates to cyber, to resilience, to climate security, and defense production as well. let me close with this. sometimes i encounter folks that wonder whether nato's 75 years is some sort of liability. i have a very short answer on those types of questions. nato's 75 years of experience is

not a liability. that is an asset. 75 years of working towards consensus with our closest allies day after day, nato's core mandate and our future mandate has made unity our greatest strength. yes, working with 31 other allies day in and day out does have its challenges. it is not always easy to get 32 nations to agree around the table, but when allies put their full weight behind an issue or a position or a new initiative, there is no question that it has both regional and global applications. i think madeleine albright, our first female secretary of state, said it best when she said, we know that when the democracies of europe and america are divided, crevices are created through which forces of evil and

aggression may emerge, but when we stand together, there is no greater force than our solidarity on behalf of freedom. that's it, it is our solidarity, the solidarity that makes nato's stronger and has made nato one of the most successful alliances in history, and one that has made the alliance ready for tomorrow's challenges. thank you. i look forward to your questions. [applause] thank you. >> well, thank you, ambassador smith. thank you to everyone for being here. i'm david sanger from the new york times. just so you understand the order of the next few minutes, the ambassador and i are going to talk for about half an hour, and then we are going to go out to questions for everybody. there are a couple of microphones lined up where you

can stand for your questions. thank you for this. thanks for coming all the way from brussels. great to see you again. we had offices next to each other. but it was hard to imagine then that you would be the ambassador to nato. i am still doing the same thing i was doing. so, let me start with your comments about what we've learned in the past two years. it has been an extraordinary moment for nato, and i think you summarized it well, that there were decades where they were doing expeditionary, out of area operations. a lot of debate was in nato, is this really what we were created for? there was some debate, do we need nato anymore?

they were my favorite conversations that i dug up when i was working on new cold war's. there were internal discussions in the bush administration about whether you could bring russia into nato, and the russia nato council gave them an office inside the nato headquarters. i think that is gone. amb. smith: it is gone. david: so that takes me to the question of what we have -- what we were surprised by and what we have learned. you gave us some of the great strengths and they have come together. there are three things that strike me, that took nato by surprise, and i wanted to run through them, because it would give us a sense of how they reacted. in the opening days of the war, or in the run-up to the war, i should say, a lot of european

leaders, even the weekend before the war at the munich security conference, were telling me, were telling you, were telling secretary blinken that the russians are just bluffing. they are not really going to do this. their economic interests are so great in providing gas and oil, they would never take these risks. he is just trying to get a negotiated solution. what lessons have emerged from the fact that while the united states provided the intelligence and the europeans believed the intelligence, they did not believe our assessment of the intelligence? amb. smith: you are right. this was an interesting time for me, because i was confirmed in november of 2021, right in the thick of -- i think it was early fall 2021 when we had -- the biden administration had taken this decision to share an

unprecedented amount of intelligence with our closest allies to read them into what we thought was a clear ended -- a clear indication that they were not just bluffing. they were preparing to go to war. and so i landed in brussels late that november, late 2021, and i frankly did not quite know what to expect. my assumption going in was that with the united states putting this information on the table, the debates would shift and that we would all sing from the same song sheet. but what happened is what you are describing. there were many allies around the table saying come on, we hear what you are saying, we appreciate the fact that you have shared this level of intelligence with us many times, not just in one instance, but we were keeping the allies -- we

were making it public. it was not just with our closest allies. but one of my most vivid memories is when the phone rang on february 22 at 3:00 a.m. we always talk about the 3:00 a.m. phone call in the united states. it literally rang around that time. we went in for the north atlantic agency council meeting. before the meeting got started, one of my colleagues from eastern europe raised his hand. before we were going to launch a series of affects, we were activating the nato response force, a flurry of activity, he said, i just need to say -- put his head out, looked down the table at me and said i don't believe you. david: secretary blinken has said similar. amb. smith: but what that did, so, the fact that tragically russia decided to go forward

with this war, there were several diplomatic efforts you will remember, the trips to geneva, the nato russia council at nato had hers on january 12 -- nato headquarters on january 12. we had made efforts to encourage them to take another path. they did not. the war starts. there was a shift inside the alliance in that there was suddenly a different approach and attitude towards u.s. intelligence after that moment. it had created a situation where the u.s. had built up a considerable amount of credibility because we had shared the intelligence and called it out and tragically it had come to pass that at that moment forward, as the u.s. continued to share intelligence about russian plans, their strategy, what was happening on the ground, and what we envisioned would be next steps,

then you could see the allies' attention and focus on what is being presented by u.s. prefers. there was a significant shift from one day to the next across the alliance. david: do you think now the intel between the u.s. and the other nato members, the agreement on assessment has fundamentally changed? amb. smith: i think it has fundamentally changed, and the changes we saw two years ago -- in terms of the seriousness with which allies look at and consider u.s. intelligence. david: there were two other areas that jumped out at me from my reporting on this period, one from the oldest of tech and one from the newest. you had pretty much stopped making conventional ammunition and artillery shells at the time you cease fired.

the ukrainians, while microsoft, amazon and others did a fabulous job moving the ukrainian government to the cloud, there had been no planning for how they were going to communicate. elon musk stepped in and solved this one, but that was not part of a plan. i am wondering if you can bring us up-to-date on both the ammunition side and the communication cyber side. so -- sorry, desperately need some caffeine here. two things. first and foremost on what was happening in europe, one of the hardest lessons for the war in ukraine for the nato allies was a deeper appreciation and understanding of the brittleness of the transatlantic defense industrial base. some of the shortages that we

were seeing because of an aging, shrinking workforce across that defense industrial base. what we thought were nato's standards that enabled us to have the stocks necessary to cope with any particular contingency, ukraine opened our eyes to the reality that first and foremost, we needed to have a lot more on hand, but also that we needed to open up those production lines that we had shuttered many years ago. and re-think how we would -- we are still in the process of doing this -- backfill the shortages that now exist across the alliance but of the assistance that has been provided to our friends in ukraine. that defense production piece is front and center for us as a transatlantic project. we have seen remarkable steps

forward in just two short years. we have a lot of work to do ahead of us. the checks used to produce about 10,000 155 -- 10,155 per year. now they are producing 100,000 155's. what has been done in germany has also been impressive. we've done a lot to increase production in the united states, especially on ammunition, but frankly across many systems. but the ukraine piece of it, there is an interesting set of different lessons that we have learned from them and we are learning in real-time, and that is this war with russia, that the ukrainians are in the middle of defending their territory, has brought emerging tech into

what sometimes feels -- and i know general milley has this great quote in your book -- it is trench warfare. it feels not like world war ii, with tanks rolling back and forth, but the trench warfare really brings us back to world war i, and the ukrainians are peering new technology and drones, using apps, swipe right for more ammunition. it is unbelievable, what the ukraine's have done in terms of attaching new technology to basically soviet legacy equipment. on that side of things, yes, they are feeling the pinch and the shortfalls that exist in europe and the united states, but they have also continued to innovate throughout the war and use of technology to their advantage. that is why nato just recently created something that will allow us to work with ukraine

and extract lessons learned on how they are fighting the russians, what modern-day combat with the russians actually looks like. and how it has pieces of a sci-fi movie, and yet it also has pieces of world war i conventional welfare -- conventional warfare. david: it is interesting, i was going to ask you and you had it right, about the milley quote. he is colorful, and i will cut out the colorful words. he speaks army as his first language. he said french warfare, for a while we thought this would be a cyber war, then i thought -- we thought it was looking like an old-fashioned world war ii tank war, and then there were other days where i thought they were fighting world war i. the fact of the matter is, it is part 1914, part 1941, and part

2024. amb. smith: that is exactly it. david: does nato now habits had around that alteration, in that you are doing something that mixes these three arrows? amb. smith: absolutely. first and foremost, we are obviously working to extract those lessons learned and what it means for the alliance. we are increasing production. we have thought increasingly about have nato's standards need to continue to drive and send signals to defense industry. if nato says let me pick a random number, nato mandates all members must have, let's say, 30 days of ammunition, and then suddenly says not 30 days, six months, a year, three months, whatever it is, and dramatically increases what the nato's standard is that all allies have to meet, it obviously then sends

the right signal to industry that hey, this as a future and it merits reopening these old mines. the answer you get from defense industry so often now, when we pound on their doors and say please produce more and faster, both for around stocks and for our friends in ukraine, they often say, well, you need it right now, will you need it next year? we have seen this movie before where nato allies think they need a certain capability and then they back off it or pitted to something else or planning dictates a different set of requirements. we are trying to take a long look at what those nato's standards are. particularly as we refill our stocks based on the assistance we have provided, but then to send the right signal that this will be a lasting project for the alliance, the way we see it, the defense production piece of

it will be, over the next decade, we are going to be working on not only ensuring that we have the stock necessary to counter any potential threat, but to backfill and continue to get the ukrainians what they need. david: this is expensive, what you are describing. i know you were celebrating the 2% marker for 20 of the 32 countries, but that 2% marker was set 10 years ago. amb. smith: correct. david: i just spent a couple of months in berlin and spent some time with the german defense officials about their plans to do exactly what you have just described. while the plans are impressive, you can't do it for the 72 billion euros a year that they spent on defense. hard for me to say this with any accuracy, but i have my doubts whether you could do it for twice what they are spending.

and yet the political conversation in europe, including in germany, has not caught up with the cost of doing what you have just described. amb. smith: yes, there is good news and bad news. david: good news is we are getting 2%, bad news is 2% will not do it anymore. amb. smith: if you go back and look at the language at the summit last summer, what did we say about 2%? we said it is a floor and not a ceiling. we said that because increasingly, when we look at what is going to be read wired for the future, we increasingly believe that additional resources above and beyond every country hitting 2% are going to be needed. secretary austen has been clear about that. no doubt the general will mention it again later today. in europe, we are seeing countries now stretch the percent.

we have countries already at 2.5. not just the baltic states, by the way. a whole array of countries now are looking at 3%, and the polls are talking about 4%. with the polls, because they are right there on the edge of what is happening in ukraine, they feel this war in ways others maybe do not feel it. but it is a conversation that is occurring across the alliance day in and day out about whether or not, even when we all hit 2%, whether or not that will be sufficient. you are right to point out that not only to do the backfill work that we have to do, but to prepare for all contingencies, including in new areas we mentioned, it is going to require resourcing. david: so the bill in congress right now, the 64 billion, if you get it, much of the ammunition is just going to

backfill into things we have already given them. it would not result in more ammo going to the ukrainians. amb. smith: it is both. that is why we have to get the supplemental done. it is critical that we get this through congress. the ukrainians need this support desperately. they need u.s. continued leadership, they need these resources. we want to make sure they do not come into the summer rationing ammunition or facing any unnecessary shortfall. we want to put them in the best position possible. they are rationing. if there are some shortages currently that they are grappling with. we all hope that that supplemental will get through no later than the end of this month. david: let's talk for a moment about something you raised at the end of your discussion, the delicate dance of how you talk

about admitting ukraine eventually. no secret there are big divisions within the nato alliance on this. the eastern europeans are pretty clear that they want them in basically now. the president and chancellor schultz were basically the two leaders who were most vocal on the question that you cannot admit a country while it is in the midst of war. it sounds, from what i am hearing, like they want to take a word that they used in vilnius about when ukraine would get admitted and move similar wording forward for the 75th anniversary. president zelenskyy came in pretty hot because of the vilnius meeting after this, if you read his tweets. tell us how you are managing

this. amb. smith: look, in vilnius, we did a lot. we came together. it was not easy. it had challenges. allies have different perspectives on this, as you've noted. but we did come together into a couple of things. first, we said to the ukrainians, there is no question about membership, you will become a member of this alliance. your future place is in nato. we will continue to work to get there. we also made clear that there are a number of reforms they need to undertake to be granted full-fledged membership, and that is a challenge that all aspirants have faced. they are making good progress. we just had secretary blinken in brussels last week, and we were able to get a report from the ukrainians on they were doing. it is an impressive list for a country in the middle of a war to continue to make progress on

anticorruption is extremely admirable. we applaud those efforts and want them to keep going, but we also, in addition to basically saying to them, look, nato will agree to full-fledged membership for ukraine when conditions are met and when allies agree -- david: when the war ends or is at least at a stopping point. amb. smith: exactly. but what we did do was create a new nato ukraine counsel, where ukraine sits as an equal around the table and is able to share first-hand insights and impressions from the war. we can hear what their requirements are, but we can also talk about a variety of other subjects. we have had meetings on the tax on critical infrastructure -- on on critical infrastructure. there was the plan that many new

members have gone through, which can be a bit of a lengthy process. we have removed that entirely and said you will not have a membership action plan. you will proceed towards a session when the timing is right. your question is, well, but are you going to do this summer on top of what you did last summer if membership is not on the table. from there, we will have a concrete deliverable for ukraine. i cannot get into the full details at this juncture, but we are working on a way to get them what we are calling a bridge to membership by deepening nato's work with the ukrainians on questions of interoperability, on modernization, providing additional resources to our friends in ukraine, and institutionalizing some of the bilateral support that was provided today. david: you mentioned cyber. several years the war broke out, nato agreed that a major

cyberattack on a member would constitute something as a trigger to article five. tell us a little bit about what you have seen the russians doing, both how they are using cyber inside ukraine, where it moments the cyber attacks and connecticut connects -- connecticut tax see time together, and what you are seeing outside of -- the kinetic attacks see time together, and what you are seeing out of ukraine. we have seen an attack surface in the nato area, but not higher. amb. smith: i would describe that as in essence, it has been a steady state. the russians, this is one of their favorite tools, the variety of hybrid tactics on which they regularly rely. malicious cyber attacks is a play we have seen them rely on time and time again.

to have an impact inside ukraine on the battlefield with the ukrainian public to create political, strategic dilemmas for president zelenskyy, to drive disinformation -- they also use disinformation on a regular basis as well. but cyber security and cyber attacks is a regular part of what we cope with across the alliance. it is ever present, not just up and down the eastern flank. i would be hard-pressed to find an ally that has not dealt with some sort of cyberattack in the last couple of years. by the way, the amount of learning that is happening between the prc and russia in this space is staggering. those two actors increasingly learn from each other and rely on that cyber instrument to divide the nato alliance from within, to divide europe from the united states.

info wars, but also cyber attacks on our government structures, on secure systems, on what the ukrainians are doing on the battlefield. what is nato doing about it? nato started first and foremost with protecting its own networks , project number one, and declaring cyber a new domain, which happened in 2016, as you noted. from there, last year, we built a virtual cyber response capability under which an ally under attack and can nato's door and say, what is available here in terms of i need forensic help, i need help patching a system, i've got part of my government offline? -- offline? what can nato provide me? we had this response, almost like a chinese menu, a whole array of options you can hand to an ally and say this is what is available to you today. david: have you enacted this and made use of it? amb. smith: yes.

i don't want to get into details about that, but we have put it to good use. now at this summit, but we are going to be focused on, we are going to have four or five sivert deliverables at the washington summit. we are working on building greater capacity at the national level across the alliance. as you know, we have nato members that are best in class when it comes to preventing, deterring, detecting cyber attacks, and we have allies that are catching up. we want to bring the capacity of all allies up to the same level when it comes to capture defense. david: of your nato members, the u.s. and britain have pretty extensive cyber capabilities. i have written about it over many years. could you envision nato having an offensive cyber capability as well? amb. smith: we are not talking about that. david: you raised the chinese cooperation with the russians in

cyber, but it is much broader than that. i would say one of the surprises of this era is that the is that the partnership, without limits, it turned out to have some limits, was announced by president xi and president putin , is one of the major dynamics of superpower conflict now. it is also what nixon and kissinger spent decades, for years, anyway, finding the motivation. two years into this, for the olympics, prior to the invasion in 2022, how do you assess the level of russia and chinese cooperation? obviously they have been

providing a lot of battlefield help, drone help to the russians. amb. smith: yes, and let's not forget the dprk as well. the amount of assistance their friend in russia has also had a major impact. david: you are talking about the artillery. amb. smith: yeah. david: it has had a major impact. amb. smith: i think it has had an impact. why don't we leave it there? and certainly something that the allies talk about. why is nato investing so much right now in these partnerships from japan, korea, and new zealand? because we have so much to learn about what the prk is doing to support russia right now in this moment. you can talk about the p.r.c. that they are providing material

support through use component, and we can talk a lot about that across the alliance and with our indo pacific partners and ban, as you noted, the iranians provided a whole array of lethal drones to their friends. david: the u.s. has been using satellites to try to interrupt supply chains through the drones, sanctions of many kinds and so forth. how effective is that being? does it have an impact on being able to produce? i know the iranians in fact and russia. amb. smith: yeah. we do believe it has been an impact. it is an ongoing project for the transatlantic partners. i'm sure our investor to the european union could get up here and tell you why the last few years have been incredibly

transported for the u.s.-eu relationship because of what is happening in ukraine. the amount of work we have done with the european union on sanctions, on support for our friends in ukraine has also been absolutely remarkable. but back to your question about the p.r.c. in russia, we do find across the alliance increasingly grappling with this question, how do we draw attention bilaterally and with our relationship with the p.r.c., to call them out on this material support, to apply pressure, not to continue to provide support, and make sure they understand the consequences if they continue down this path. we are seeing them becoming much more forthcoming and calling out

the chinese for this no limit partnership but also their political support for what russia is doing in ukraine and that material support that i just mentioned. david:david: the core of the nato security guarantees, since nato's creation 75 years ago, has faced issues at every turn, yet we've seen in the past few years, nuclear threats, i described in the book, the scare of october 2024, when we were quite concerned, that some of your colleagues at that a 50/50 chance that russia would get a battlefield weapon in ukraine. first, talk a little bit about how that experience may have been transforming to the nato members. were they is fully aware as the

u.s. was of the nature of the threat? let's talk about how it is changing the way nato is thinking of that nuclear strategy. amb. smith: a couple of things on that. when we rewrote the strategic concept of 2022, you can see nuclear deterrence remain the backbone of nato deterrence policy, no question. our wording on that is very clear. as long as nato exists, nato will remain a nuclear alliance. that is not going anywhere, and the language on that i think is crystal clear. you're right to point out that with the war in ukraine and all the saber rattling we've seen on the part of president putin, we have gotten into almost a review of what is a review, dusting off

the nuclear iq. just the whole theory of deterrence, i would say, came back to the forefront, when the war started, and we were back where nato started 75 years ago. so, obviously we take what putin says seriously, and we are able to see what nato allies are seeing, but it is what putin is saying that is getting attention. he has been very public about this, very outspoken about the potential use of tactical weapons in ukraine, not as much recently, but you are right, but in the early stages of the war, we heard a lot about the potential use of tactical nuclear weapons. so you can imagine what the reaction was around the alliance, we were deeply concerned.

publicly but also privately with our closest allies, we did not see any clear indication that the russians were actually preparing to use nuclear weapons, not then, not now. we are in close contact with all of our allies up and down the eastern flank, that obviously are gravely concerned about this process, but we have also, one, reassured our allies about what we were seeing, whether or not we were seeing any signs of weapons being moved closer to the border, but also the need to continually warn the russians that they would be serious, i think jake sullivan has that "catastrophic consequences," should russ opted to do so. david: back to the 2022 period, which president biden likened to

the russian missile crisis, his most candid at the fundraiser, was a pretty searing moment. they did not move any nuclear weapons, as you say. the last question for you, as we seek out the summit that is coming forward, there are assurances that you can put on paper. there are capabilities that you can build, and you described to us how you are doing that, but there is a difference for the allies conviction that the u.s. will be there should they invoke article five. you heard what one said publicly about what he would do if, you

know, they paid up, but it is hard to know the 2%. separate come apart from canada , apart from canada trump's, you know, comments. questioning about whether or not the political body of the united states is as committed to nato as it was before. the republican party has several prominent members who have expressed doubts, both about ukraine and nato. they may just be voicing noise out here, and i suspect the majority has its all views, but this must be a problem that both drives you crazy and you can't do anything about, because all you can do is work on the

capabilities side, not only political will side. amb. smith: well, that is not entirely true. i think it is on all of us. those nato issues to continue to make the case. i traveled throughout my home state, the state of michigan, to have conversations with the governor on a variety of student groups. i went to the university of michigan, michigan state. i was able to do talk radio, do a lot of outreach to try and answer those questions about, why do you still have the nato alliance, and why should we still keep supporting ukraine? and i'm heading off to ohio tomorrow to do the same thing. so some of it is out of my control, and i was sure you were going to ask this question, but here is what i say when i get this question frequently. there are two questions i hear, one, are you going to get the supplemental done, or is u.s. support for ukraine over?

is it now on us? will europeans have to take over and provide the remaining assistance to ukraine? two, can we count on seven more decades of u.s. presidents of all political stripes standing up and committing and supporting the nato alliance? i think my answer on both fronts is pretty optimistic. one, i think we have visitors coming through from congress almost every week, delegations that are made up of republicans and democrats traveling together, and all i hear from them time and time again is we are going to get the supplemental done, we need to continue funneling support, there's a broad base of support in the house, in the senate, it is bipartisan to continue supporting ukraine. there are members in the house, we all know, that are skeptical, don't want to see the submittal go through, but by and large, when that vote was to the floor, we are confident -- david: but you have to get to

before. amb. smith: that is the challenge. two, on broad u.s. support of the alliance, i would say public opinion data, actually the most recent poll that came out shows that u.s. support for the nato alliance is up. folks increasingly understand why this alliance serves u.s. interest and why it serves our allies' interests. and that bumper sticker we say a lot, "robert together," is not just a bumper sticker, it is the truth. coping with ukraine is something we need to do with 50 other countries around the world in terms of providing security assistance. coping with instability elsewhere in the world requires us to work with our closest allies and partners, it is not just ukraine. i think mentally, americans understand the values of alliance's and the importance of the nato alliance in particular, but i will say, when i travel around the united states and counter americans in places far

away from washington, d.c.,, i think, again, there is this kind of bipartisan support. nato is not a bipartisan issue. it always, i suppose, has a chance of going in that direction, but from where i sit right now, whether i'm traveling around the united states, doing press interviews, engaging with congress, i think nato enjoys a privileged place with american foreign policy, the majority of americans understand why it was created and why it is so relevant 70 years later, and that is what we are going to be trying to do at the summit this summer. david: great. well, if people would like to line up, i think what we will probably do is take two questions at a time. our time is short.

the investor revealed in the course of the depth of her diplomatic field, that she went to both michigan and michigan state. amb. smith: outreach, yep. i did not study at both. david: even just attending the two for a day tells you of your skills here. [laughter] why don't we take the first two questions here? jason: thank you. jason davidson from the university and the atlantic council. last week, the secretary-general confirmed that the washington summit the allies will put forth its first southern flank strategy. some people would look at that and say well, the alliance center had a problem on it eastern flake, but why is it messing around on the southern flight? can you say anything about the alliance and why the united states should care about the

alliance and what you would like to see at the strategy at the washington summit? david: great, and we will take one behind you. >> thank you for an interesting discussion and the recent deployment of sanctions. i was wondering, when you came to the point of sanctions' effectiveness, actually when you talked about sanctions' effectiveness, it came to my mind, and we do research also come on how effective sanctions are, because russia is evading sanctions with the use of many, many countries, like central asia, china, you know, and what are the philosophies, you know, that you have? at the nato level and maybe at the u.s. government level. i am a political and global professor. amb. smith: great. let me start with the south. it was a good question.

we have kind of a phrase that we use around the nato alliance, that we have a 360 degree approach, which means that the alliance is not exclusively focused on the north atlantic or its southern flank or eastern flank, that we simultaneously try to take on all of those areas, and the new regional plans that i mentioned in my remarks actually divide the all-nato territories into three different regions, and there is a region that has very detailed plans for nato's south on how to defend against any potential forms of instability or any southern flank. there is a question on the table, why the u.s. is focused on the war in ukraine, what more can be aligned to be doing to address some of the potential challenges or threats that

emanate from the south? there, there's a whole array of things to talk about, and it will surprise you to hear that our southern member states, from portugal to spain, greece to turkey, italy, a whole array of countries want to see the alliance fortify its initiatives and policies in this particular area. so late last year, we appointed a group of experts, a small group of policymakers and academics with deep experience in handling some of those southern challenges, and they just recently came to the nato alliance and presented us with over 100 different ideas of what the alliance could do to move out and strengthen its deterrence and defense and the way in which it protects its southern flank. nato is in the middle of debating those over 100 recommendations, and there are a lot of good ideas there. there are small things, and

there are bigger, more ambitious initiatives, but between now and july, the allies are going to have to along just a handful of initiatives that will enable us to deliver on something for the south. and as i noted also earlier, there's two chief threats that we are facing inside the nato alliance, russia and terrorism, so we want to ensure that nato continues to do good work in both of those spaces, fortifying its deterrence and defense to counter both of those threats. i don't want to get into where the u.s. position is on those 100 plus recommendations. i really can't get into the details of that, because we are literally right in the middle of debating all of those good recommendations, but you are right to know that the alliance will have something more to say about its southern flank. and the reason i think that is important, i think why the secretary-general thinks it is important, is to showcase many would-be adversaries were after

that we are prepared for all contingencies. this is an alliance that can, as the old adage goes, walk and chew gum at the same time. so as i said, nato is addressing what is happening in ukraine but simultaneously moving out on an array of new initiatives. on the sanctions question, i mean, again, nato does not take on sanctions, per se. this is not part of our chief work inside the alliance, so i'm hesitant to get into it. i will say that we believe that the unprecedented sanctions that both europe and the united states have imposed since the start of the war has had an impact. there are instances where we see evasion, and we continue to work with our closest partners in europe, through the g7, through the u.s.-eu relationship and other bilateral relationships, to get at the heart of that, to prevent it from happening, that

it remains a key feature of what we work on with our transatlantic partners, but we believe the sanctions that have been put on the table since the war started have left the russians with $400 billion less than they would have normally to put toward this military operation. and the fact that the russians are now turning to countries like the dprk or iran or the p.r.c. for capabilities and technologies say a lot about what the west has been able to do to shut off the flow of potential components that could help them pursue this war. david: although the dprk artillery, about half of it is duds? amb. smith: there are significant instances of where we see what they are providing not working. david: two more here, and i think that will maybe bring us

to the end. if you can make your questions short and quick, we are running short on time. >> my question has to do with the difference procurements. your statement last month, to increase its role, one of the issues that european member states have, well they meet the standards, they each apply their national requirements onto those procurements, different national variants of tanks, which restrict supply chains, mobilizing site together. i was wondering how nato is approaching not just expanding the defense industrial base in procurements but also seeking to better align capabilities to which you serve. david: ok. and one more question there.

brad: hi my name,, i am in a story and with the department of state. the u.s. withdrew from afghanistan in 2022. what relationship did they have in the monthly dobson the start of the war in ukraine regarding u.s. intelligence sharing with allies? thank you. amb. smith: so on that question, you will remember that i mentioned i was confirmed in late november of 2021, so i actually was here at the state department serving as a senior advisor to secretary blinken throughout most of 2021. i was not inside the nato alliance at the time during the withdrawal of afghanistan, and i feel like i'm probably not the

best person position to talk about that. on the question of fragmentation across u.s. industrial base and the associated challenges that we are seeing as a result of underinvestment over many decades, i mean, this is a challenge that nato is going to have to work on very closely with european union. we were pleased to see the european union recently rollout a european defense industrial strategy. it is a very interesting piece of work that very clearly articulates the challenges that europe faces for the foreseeable future when it comes to building up his defense industrial base and getting some of the fragmentation that were mentioned by the individual who asked the question.

we do, however, want to ensure that as the european union thinks about taking on a variety of new initiatives to build out defense production and build capacity, that it relies on nato standards. the last thing we want to see is for the european union to establish its own set of standards. we would then have situations where countries are looking at their own national standards and requirements, they are looking at what nato is delivering in terms of what is mandated in terms of nato membership, and then there would be a new aspect to it with the european union potentially putting a different set of standards on the table. so, european union is reassuring us that they will rely on nato standard speed we want to keep it that way. we also want to encourage our friends in the european union, at least in the short term, as they look to build out capacity and address some of those shortfalls that we addressed at the top, that it continues to

look at non-eu member states for ways to backfill. now, i understand why the european union wants to focus on eu members and building up their defense industrial base in europe, but we have to work together, we have to find ways to aggregate demand, we have to look at multinational solutions that will help us produce faster and get more for ourselves and into the hands of our friends in ukraine. david: well, thank you. i've got a list of more questions, but we are running out of time, so we will have to save them for the run-up to the nato summit or something like that. but i thank you for spending all of this time, both in your prepared remarks and your candid answers here, and i hope that we've given a good start of for what looks like a really promising an interesting day. amb. smith: thank you very much, davind