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Understanding 9/11tv Debate on U.S. Policy Toward Iran Middle East CSPAN April 4, 2024 1:00pm-1:45pm EDT
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>> to former senior directors of the national security council debate u.s. policy toward iran and the middle east. they also discuss the funding of militant groups by iran and their role in the attack on israel by hamas. this event was cohosted by the alexander hamilton society and john quincy adams society at george washington university. >> hello, everyone. welcome. my name is alexander wilson, on the president of the john quincy adams society here at gw when i am so honored to be starting off our event, facing the next step for u.s. foreign policy in iran. it is a great honor to host this event which has been nine months in the making. thank you all for coming. [indiscernible]
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>> thank you all for coming out. it is a pleasure to see you all excited about this event being offered today. a special thanks to sam who did a lot of the great work in presenting and creating this event.
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>> thank you for the kind invitation. it is great to be here. i will start with introducing our speakers. [indiscernible] as we move on the questions will be more difficult. especially the last one. michael singh is a managing director at the washington institute and a former senior director of the national security council. [indiscernible]
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with a focus on iran and the middle east. michael is on the board of the u.s. institute of peace where i interned. [indiscernible] when i was writing my dissertation he patiently and graciously answered all the questions i sent to him. so thank you. steven simon is a visiting professor at the school of international studies with a distinguished career spanning roles in the clinton administration. he is a recognized author on counterterrorism [indiscernible] with a notable publication such
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as his latest work. steven is senior fellow at the quincy institute for responsible statecraft. thank you both of you for coming. i will start with an easy question. proxy forces are one of the pillars of iran's so-called forward defense strategy along with missile and nuclear programs they rely on a variety of proxy groups which they call our own nato alliance. michael, if you could briefly discuss them and then i will move on. michael: it is a pleasure to be here and appear with you both. i have known -- up here for you
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both. i have known both of you for a long time. this is an important topic. we have been clashing with iran and the middle east for a long time and iran presents a particularly troublesome case in the u.s. in part because of the strategy they deployed in the region, a strategy not based upon in many ways the traditional tools of statecraft. they are not signing treaties and making friends with neighbors. they lack a conventional military capability in many ways, they do not have a navy or air force. they face not only sanctions but also on historical factors, the nature of the regime and the origins in 1979 revolution.
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instead they employ this strategy of asymmetric power, training and arming groups around the middle east which then attend to wage war on and create problems for states which might otherwise be adversary to them. saudi arabia, a traditional rival of them, has to worry a lot about what is happening in the southern flank in yemen and maybe that means from iran's perspective they have less resources to focus on iran itself so we see ron working with youth groups across the region. hezbollah in lebanon. islamic jihad and hamas in the palestine territory. ruthie relished -- houthi rebels in yemen. syria, iraq, afghanistan.
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not all the relationships of the same. hezbollah is the largest most capable of the groups and probably has the closest relationship with iran. it is not accident that after the strike yesterday that quickly we saw a statement from hezbollah condemning it. why would hezbollah condemning a strike that israel conducted in syria against iran? because they are close with iran. hamas has had an up-and-down relationship with iran. hamas and iran at first were not on the same side. not to say hamas was on the side of democracy in any way but it was on the side of jihadist groups waging war against u.s. ally groups and the regime that
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is a client of iran. houthis in yemen, that relationship until recently was a looser relationship they had with partners on proxies around the region but has become closer in recent years as the houthis engage in wars with the u.s. and allies. other proxies are creations of iran. militias in syria or iraq would not exist if iran had not funded and created and staffed them. so there are a variety of relationships but they are all essentially for the same purpose, to project influence, to project power, to keep adversaries busy away from iran's borders.
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>> sort of taking the fight away from iran's borders, if you do not fight the adversaries abroad we will have to fight them on our own streets sort of. stephen, the proxy forces michael pointed out. what is the nature of the relationship? puppetmaster? alliance? a partnership? can iranians pick up the phone and tell houthis or hamas or hezbollah to attack such and such place or do they have their own agency? >> i think it is important to know that they would use whatsapp. nobody uses phone calls anymore. [laughter]
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it's a very good question. it is important to bear in mind a connection with your question that the relationship between these groups and iran for the most part are those of convenience. the iranians are opportunists. the u.s. and allies create many opportunities for iran to grab. these other groups are opportunistic in seeking or accepting iranian assistance because it serves their purposes. i think it is a system that works very well for iran as well as these other groups. it is mutually beneficial. you can see how well it is working or has been working for the who these -- houthis. houthis have been using fairly
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sophisticated missiles and drones in the red sea. they have been using these weapons and largely halting commercial shipping through the red sea into the suez canal, gravely damaging egypt and egypt's economy and adding substantial cost international shipping, largely inflated because of covid and adjustments the global shipping industry made in response to that crisis. thus far, international commerce has not been all that heavily affected by what the houthis have done but houthis would not have been able to do it if it were not for the very large number of weapons that iran has supplied over the years so that works quite nicely for them.
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these relationships work to the advantage of iraqi initial -- iraqi initial's aligned with iran, they receive services from iran that help them press their agenda within iraq. these are examples of symbiotic relationships between iran and these other groups and the united states does this. it is a classic strategy. the united states uses the kurds as proxy, i am not equating it but in functional terms the kurds serve as proxy warfare for the united states and the united states has not perfected the proxy warfare, using yugoslav
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communists in world war ii, others in vietnam, cubans, it is an age-old strategy that works for any state when they can get it but as michael pointed out, the iranians are uniquely reliant on these proxy relationships because it cannot establish relationships with state actors so it has to settle for associate actors. michael: i want to emphasize one thing steve mentioned, the ambiguity of plausible deniability is part of the iran strategy. we often find ourselves in the wake of something that happened in the middle east having a debate come up what role did they know about it. the fact that there is uncertainty around this is part of their strategy. so even something where we do
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not have a lot of uncertainty, we are pretty sure what they are doing, they will deny it. sending arms to the houthis. where did the arms come from we ask iran. we don't know. it is clear what partners u.s. supports. iran is not like that. we did not give hamas the weapons, we did not give the houthis weapons, we don't know where they came from. plausible deniability. that's part of their strategy. it is important to recognize that regardless of the nature of the relationship between iran and hamas, what we can say clearly is hamas cannot do something like october 7 without the help of ron. houthis could not shut down
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shipping in the red sea without help from iran. steven: just a couple steven: steven: of observations on that point that i think is the important one. i disagree that iran support for hamas being essential for the attack they carried out october 7. i did not see a relationship at all. the ambiguity and plausible died -- deniability is crucially important for iran's adversaries, seeing it in their interest as attacking ron at home. nobody wants to do that. united states has never attacked iran mainland even after they have drawn considerable quantities of american blood. a full-scale war with iran seems
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income as a writ with whatever benefit the u.s. could extract from the conflict so they are happy about the plausible deniability because it relieves them the need to justify not attacking iran at home, on the mainland, something that countries simply do not wish to do. certainly the united states. >> a follow-up question on the houthis. some scholars [indiscernible] iran said this is the perfect opportunity and let's make yemen saudi arabia's vietnam, and make
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them spend a lot of money. yes or no? do you agree or not? steven: poor yemen has been everyone's vietnam since the 1950's. the iran houthis and houthis -- the iranian and who the interests aligned in this case. -- houthi interests align in this case. houthis are riding high on the international recognition they have gotten from striking shipping in the gulf.
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houthis must be deriving some satisfaction from imposing sanctions on the u.s. and their allies. for decades the u.s. has used economic sanctions to bring their enemies to their knees, or at least try to. the u.s. has a unique asset for doing that, the federal reserve and the fact that the dollar is the reserve currency. so the u.s. can impose very heavy economic penalties on adversaries. the houthis have something that is equivalent that they can use to keep ships from transiting the red sea safely.
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so they are imposing economic sanctions on their enemies. it is a clever move for them. the question is, do they stop when they achieve their expressed goal, which is to end hostilities and the withdrawal of israeli forces from gaza. i do not see them happening and if there were to happen, are the houthis now deriving so much satisfaction and intangible goods from these attacks that they will just continue them or resume them when they decide another [indiscernible] have been denied by the united states in some way? >> michael, next question.
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after the october 7 attacks, some israel officials and members of congress suggest this is iran's fault and said we have to hit the head of the snake, which is iran. in that context, how has the u.s. response then and how would you grade the bidens -- the biden administration's strategy? michael: it is true to some extent that iran needs to be held accountable for the actions of the proxy, which is not to say they are the same. hamas has the goals that do not necessarily align completely with those of iran, although
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they are often complementary. my own view is that hamas cannot do what it has done without iran's help and therefore there needs to be a cost imposed on iran for these actions, for supporting proxies like hamas. if you look at the situation with the movies, it was reported that -- if you look at the situation with the houthis, iran has sometimes played a direct role in their activities. in my view there has to be a cost to that. at the same time you have to bear in mind the bigger strategic picture. why did october 7 happen? in part because hamas exists not
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to help ordinary palestinians, but to inflict violence upon israel. it is their reason for being. you also have to look at some other things happening in the region. the move towards israeli normalization with arab states, especially with saudi arabia. for iran and the proxies, this is a very negative development. they are adversaries of iran banding in ways that strengthen the united states and the u.s. team in the region getting stronger. whether it was the proxy objective or not, i think october 7, one of the things you would hope would happen would be derailed that project so one of the things we have to do in washington is trying to get that
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back on the rails. whatever comes out of this conflict, we have to get back to the more positive agenda for the region. very difficult to do but jake sullivan is in saudi arabia this week it seems with the expressed desire to do that. has the biden administration done everything i would want, no. i think we need to be more willing to impose costs on iran for sure. my pleased to see jake is in riyadh, trying to get movement on this agenda in the wake of the gaza conflict that won't happen until the fighting is mostly over, yes. but i will resist your request to grade them and leave it at that. i will especially resist that question. >> let me ask you a follow-up.
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[inaudible] excuse me. if the proxy objective was to make sure the alliance is not being formed, the normalization between saudi arabia and iran, how successful was iran do you think and making sure this does not happen? some argue that because of the sheer death toll in gaza it would be extremely difficult politically for anyone to move towards normalization with israel. so if you may grade iran in their fallen -- foreign policy, what would you say? michael: my guess is the iranian regime is pleased with how
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things are gone. i am sardis say. look around the region. -- i am sorry to say. look around the region. u.s. and israel in some way isolated in the world. look at what has been happening with the u.n.. hamas back at the top of the agenda in a way it was not before and in the region the palestinian issue has hamas in a way they didn't before. you look at the access houthis have had in shutting down shipping in the red sea despite u.s. efforts to resist. you achieve all of this with, until yesterday, a relatively minimal toll of iranian casualties or any real cost for iran. until yesterday i think they would've said we achieved a lot without a good deal of cost.
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that is just the beginning of the story. that is just the first phase. you have tremendous suffering in gaza. i do not think iranian leaders and regime lose any sleep over that. the only thing they fit -- they don't worry when it happens to their own population, it is hard to imagine they worry about anybody else. but we can turn it around. if we can get the strategic agenda back on track, which i do think it is possible, if we can ensure iran pays the cost for its actions in the region and reopen shipping in the red sea despite houthis efforts to stop it, i think iran will turn around and say there has been a setback strategically but we have not yet gotten to that point.
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steven: quick note on what michael said. there is an iranian spy ship set to be sailing in that area providing intelligence to the houthis and some say the u.s. should start attacking iranian interest by targeting the ship. so what michael said i will repeat the same question for you, how would you grade this administration and would -- and is attacking the head of the snake a wise policy? steven: i think i largely savor the administration's approach to the crisis thus far. i teach for a living so the idea of grading is just -- [laughter] let's give it a pass/fail kind
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of thing. this is kind of a special study kind of thing. when the crisis erupted i think the administration did all the right things. i think it was important to lay out strong support for israel. on the outset, israel had just endured a horrible attack, we all know the details about it, it was heinous. and it is also an unwritten rule in u.s. diplomacy that if one is trying to manage israel and a crisis that could get out of hand, you want to embrace it very closely at the outset and assure them of your support because that will afford you capital you can draw down on further down the road in the
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conflict to manage israel's response. so, good right out of the gate. i think the response was strategic in that u.s. quickly deployed two carrier battle groups to the eastern mediterranean. that is not a joke. there are 90 combat aircraft on each aircraft carrier, that is 180 combat aircraft. that is a tremendous amount of offensive power on those airplanes and the administration did so very deliberately, in biden's words, to ensure that if iran or other parties were thinking of exploiting the
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crisis in israel, they shouldn't think about that. the statement was just don't. backing that up with the carrier battle groups was pretty deft. so i think that was the right response. the united states continued to support israel in a very robust way, and i think it is important to recognize the very complex domestic politics that the biden administration faces in dealing with this crisis. there are demonstrations on campuses, disruptive activity events at which biden has appeared that criticize the administration very heavily for its support of israel and you
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get the impression that the biden administration is doing something politically suicidal in supporting israel in this way and some interpreted the primary results in michigan as confirming of serious risk for the administration. sort of presumably wiser experts in political opinion and pulling experts think that actually although the protests have been quite vociferous, that most americans, and even a majority of democrats, favor american support for israel's response to the crisis thus far. that is not reported on very
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heavily so we tend to lose sight of it but the administration is not losing sight of it. nevertheless, they have to balance their game and you can see the way in which they have in part by abstaining from a particular u.n. security resolution. return of hostages to a cease-fire and the sanctioning of four settler activists on the west bank for their egregious acts. so the administration is finding new things and in the president's remarks the other day i think were primarily intended to affect a domestic audience. when leaders talk they are addressing different audiences, usually simultaneously. this one was largely addressed -- i would say until now he has
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done pretty well, including dealing with the houthi threat because while it is true there is no deterring them at this point because they are doing well with their current strategy, the fact is the houthis have succeeded in attacking very few ships, despite the presumed help of this iranian ship that is being channeled by electrical warfare assets that the u.s. has deployed to the red sea so i think the u.s. has done pretty well, because the aim is to decree -- degrade over time houthis capabilities to carry out attacks of this kind in the future. michael: it is remarkable how
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supportive president biden has been of israel, in the face of some oppositions and i think he deserves credit for that but i would not want that to get lost in all of this. he has made some tough choices, in some cases unpopular choices, to support an ally and i think you have to do that. he deserves credit for that. >> if you were the president, what would you do differently? michael: then what he is doing now? i think now we need to continue supporting our allies, and that is very difficult to do as these things drag on. but i think if you look at the position the houthis have in yemen, i think it is owed in some part to the fact that we shied away from supporting the saudi's in their conflict there.
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it left the houthis in place. we are all paying attention to the shutting down of shipping in the red sea because it is an international news story. but the houthis care about yemen. what have they achieved? shutting down international shipping does not help yemen or houthis. it may be in it increases biggest their prestige -- increases their prestige but does not help them suffer under sanctions. when these things become more difficult and drag on that is when you have to be really steadfast in your support. it does not mean you have to agree with every decision or not try to use your influence or criticize it or save the question of humanitarian aid act and so forth but to start stepping away and saying now that it is more costly we do not
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want to support our allies i think is not the right way to conduct policy. i do not think the biden administration is there, but i was not a fan on abstaining on this resolution for them. i do not like abstaining. you are either for something or against it but we need to hold our nerves as this goes forward and still be there to influence what happens next. >> stephen, if you were the president, what would you have done differently? steven: i am going to be kind of boring here. what else is new, i know. i don't mean to sort of hiatus from the question but i am not sure that doing anything very different, i think the administration is in a very difficult position right now but
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i do not see a lot of room for maneuvering. i think the administration is thinking in terms of serious departures from existing policy because of the emerging goals -- gulf between netanyahu and biden. netanyahu is essentially running against joe biden now in an israeli electoral contest and that is contributing to serious tensions. netanyahu is really sort of provocative of the president's
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requests and suggestions and so forth and that is pushing the two leaders into a very difficult situation. i know that some people are considering, i once supported this position myself, but the notion that the united states president, who has demonstrated his profound support for israel in a crisis against opposition within his own country and his own party would be in a position to reach over the head of the israeli prime minister to the israeli people and say, listen,
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netanyahu, whatever he is about is not leading israel in a good direction. we have some better ideas, and here they are. and say listen, netanyahu, whatever he is about, it is not leading israel in a good direction. here they are. in the hope of spurring move toward elections. theoretically, netanyahu has another three years to run before their need to be elections. my own view was that he could probably write about, at least in the near term, but the u.s. i think at this point is coming to
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see it as in its interest, our interest that netanyahu's reign come to an end. we are doing this in part because it is an election year in the united states. we are getting too close to the campaign season. the president would not want to avoid any open ruptures with netanyahu. that has been an example of something that could be done differently that i do not think it would be advisable necessarily. michael: i will say if you wanted to strengthen netanyahu, this is probably the way to do it. it seems to me he would make a virtue out of president biden opposing him, criticizing him and so forth because he would say look, i am standing up for israel's interest and i am doing it even in the face of opposition from our closest ally, the united states. you need someone strong enough to do that.
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i would say the risk of meddling from afar in another country's politics, including another democracy's politics is not just that it may be wrong period if it is an ally to democracy, but it may backfire and produce the opposite of the result you want. stephen: i agree with you. >> more difficult question -- last night, the israelis attacked the iranian embassy in damascus, which resulted in the death of a number of iranian commanders. imagine that you are into ron -- in tehran and they call you in the middle of the night and say mr. singh, we summon you to the iranian security council, and please tell us, what should iranians do in response to the attack?
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i have seen some iranian commentators suggesting enough is enough, we have been attacked too many times, and there has to be a response. if you were to advise the iranians, what would you advise them? michael: we started off talking about iran's strategy in the region, based on strategic power, not confrontation. iran is not very strong. when faced with this kind of direct, sharp pushback, my guess is you will not see iran eager for a direct confrontation. perhaps they will feel they have to make some show of response. but my guess is it will be a show of response and that the real retaliation will come, as it often does from iran, in an attempt do so through proxy, asymmetric means, and so forth. this is generally the pattern with iran. when iran has been faced within this kind of sharp pushback, and
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you could point out the same thing in its clash recently with pakistan, which did not get as much attention in washington because it seemed a little out of the ordinary him about it was something very similar when iran -- ordinary, but it was something very similar when iran struck and pakistan struck back and iran's response was to say let's calm down. it is not going to sue for peace with israel. it is not going to send an envoy to israel to negotiate. i would be surprised if iran was negotiating with israel. it is based on the proxies being the ones to take the casualties, not themselves. i am not of the view that is going to change simply because of what happened yesterday. i am not going to suggest that what i would say to the supreme leader in iran, and thankfully i have never found myself in that position, but my guess is that is how they will operate. >> same question to you. stephen: i largely agree with --
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steven: i largely agree with michael. the striking thing thus far has been iranian restraint. and hezbollah restraint. these actors are rational actors, fundamentally. they may, as michael said, pursue a strategy owing to the respective strengths of iran and of its enemies, but they are rational and are deterred by the threat of punishment. this is one of the reasons that they were so upset with hamas for having done this thing on october 7, because it exposed iran to tremendous
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