peace i am dan baron the international president for policy research here for a wonderful program this afternoon in partnership with ecf are -- ecfr with whom we share value, interest, and increasingly, geography because they are in our building now. i am excited to hear from yvonne and mark about their new report and from sophia my wonderful colleague here in the europe program and from my cousin sylvie because the last time i saw you, i am descended from the call plans of strasburg. one of the things about today's program as we think about the world we are in is as clear as

those strategic stakes of the war in ukraine remain, and last week, jake sullivan said there is no plan b. the strategic stakes are clear. but increasingly, we are living through a time of ambiguity about what is going on on the ground and what outcomes will be. the ambiguity and heartbreak, i think that is challenging to us morally. it is also challenging strategically. there is nobody that loves ambiguity more than vladimir putin. he is increasingly using that against us. against ukraine and the west. one of the ways we see that manifest is in the increasing divergence between politics, both in europe and the u.s., and, what we know to be good policy. that part of the collis -- conversation today i think will be an important contribution to try to get back to a convergence of politics and policy under the months to come, which is essential for ukraine's success

and survival. with that i will hand it over to jeremy. applause -- [applause] jeremy: i am jeremy schapiro the head of the new ecfr washington office located in this building and we are very excited to be working with carnegie and excited to be opening up a washington office. this event, our inaugural event, is an example of the kind of thing we want to do with carnegie and all of our research programs that come to town. we have a lot of research on the transatlantic relationship, on europe. we want to bring it to washington. we want to show you how europeans think about these issues. which is distinct, though, not opposed to how americans think about it. we want to share the experiences and the research we are doing. the research that mark and

yvonne will present and that sophie will comment on is a good example of the kind of public opinion polling we are trying to do to get at the question, that i think is so essential these days, and it what was alluded to, what do our publics really think about these foreign policy issues that have traditionally been so much a province of the foreign policy establishment in both the u.s. and europe? we all have the sense that this is becoming a more populist stage, that we have to pay attention more to these things you that we have to understand what people want even if we are not slaves to the public passions. this is part of what we are trying to do here. and i think that we are very lucky to have sylvie calvin, currently an editor that has long been editor-in-chief for a long time.

a really astute observer of both european and american foreign policy and also the political and public interactions with that to lead the panel. so i will have her come up with the panel to introduce them. thank you. [applause] sylvie: thank you very much. good afternoon. thank you for being here. welcome to this inaugural event. it's great to have a little bit more presents of europe in washington, d.c.. such an audience. i will spare you the old joke about henry kissinger's phone number. but if you want to talk about your, talk to europe, no more about europe, please, call the

cfr office in washington here. you can also call jeremy schapiro. he will be happy to share his phone number with all you. so,. on june, 400 million citizens of the european union will be called upon to vote in 27 member states to elect the european parliament. it will be a very important election because of the context in which it is happening. with such issues as war in ukraine, migration, the rise of the far right, the fragmentation of the political landscape in many european countries, climate change, all these issues.

so important. this election will have major consequences on the future, for the future of europe. the feeling might not be shared so widely here. correct me if i am wrong later. but, for many citizens of europe, particularly, those that live closer to the eastern border, this is an election in a time of war. then of course, there is the other election. the one we don't get to vote in. but, which will also affect us in a major way. this is the election that we will be watching very intently on november 5 on the other site of the atlantic. this will all come into our discussion this afternoon. but, what we are going to start with is to focus on the very

important, useful, and fascinating work mark has been doing on the state of the public opinion in europe. so, we will do this with mark leonard, the founder, the co-founder i should say a director of the european council. he is the author of the age of peace. and he has a weekly podcast "world in 30 minutes" that i highly recommend. it's very lively and very good. we also have ivan, a founding member of ecfr and the chairman of the center for liberal strategies in sophia and a fellow at the institute for

human sciences. he has written many excellent books in cord -- including the important "after europe" and we have sophia, a fellow of the europe program at carnegie. thank you for joining us. the way we will proceed is mark will present the main conclusions of this. of the research that he has been directing and then ivan will give us his take. then sophia besch will react and discuss and contest whatever you want to say. and then we will engage in a discussion including with you and i will open the floor to questions. then i think we can continue the discussion in a more informal way in a short reception

afterwards. so, mark, why don't you start? mark: it is a huge pleasure to be here at carnegie. to be sharing space with you here. and for the warm welcome you have given my colleagues from carnegie. as jeremy said, our goal is to try to not only help share some of the work that ecfr's network of researchers are doing about the world, but also, for us to try to understand more how the u.s. is changing the nature of american foreign policy, that is so critical for europeans. that is one of the things we will be looking at. i will show you five slides that capture some of the most interesting findings we have. this is a report that ivan and i

cowrote together. ivan lays out simple steps about what it actually means. but i will talk you through some of the headline findings are in the background for this, the reason we called it "war and election" is because wars are sometimes fought and lost on the battlefield, but often, they end at the ballot box as well. it is certainly the case that vladimir putin is hoping to win this war in the ballot box. that is something which alluded him on the battlefield so far. i think there is a strong hope in moscow that more fatigue in the west will lead ukraine adrift. what we are trying to do is pull 12 european countries to test this proposition. our findings show both why the russians might feel good about

this approach and to be attracted by it, but also, why it might ultimately not work. there are very interesting ways public opinion is changing in our better think that the leaders need to understand that to maintain public assistance -- consensus for support for ukraine, something we strongly believe in at ecfr. what we find in the poll is european voters are living in the shadow both of vladimir putin, but also, the u.s. elections, as a sylvie was talking about. and on three key issues with ukraine, both ukraine itself, the question of european security, and also, the political unity of europe. we are seeing that both vladimir putin and donald trump are forcing europeans to visit tia assumptions. that are quite different from

where we were at the beginning of the war two years ago. so, i will look at these three. the first thing that is very clear is this moment is bringing much more strategic clarity about what a ukrainian victory or defeat might entail. on one hand, we asked the poll about how the world -- war would end. one in 10 europeans think ukraine will win back all its territory, very different from the findings we found last summer during the ukrainian counteroffensive. twice as many people think russia will win the war. most people, a plurality of people think there will be some sort of compromise settlement that ends the war. but, what is interesting as well as even though that is how

people think the war will end, it does not reflect their preferences. in most countries, people, not just feel very strongly that it is russia's fault and they are appalled at the illegal invasion of ukraine, but, in many countries, they want us, the europeans, to carry on back in ukraine rather than seeing a ukrainian defeat. one of the things that we looked at is how people feel about donald trump's victory and how that will affect the world. this slide shows that in some areas europeans don't really know what to expect. so, war between china and the u.s.. 25% think that is more likely after trump and 24% think it is less likely. you have equally balancing on a lot of other issues. what is very clear here is a very large number of europeans

think that donald trump's election will make it much less likely for ukraine to succeed against russia. in other words a donald trump victory, in the minds of many europeans is equivalent to a defeat from ukraine. we ask people what they would do were trump to come to power and withdraw u.s. support to try to force ukraine to settle. we find a very interesting picture where in some countries, like sweden and poland, and portugal, interestingly, you have a majority of people that either want to carry on support at the same level or to increase it to try to replace american support. you have other countries like greece and hungary which are at the other extreme. but, what you see is if you add that together command also, added the majority of countries that we polled, a plurality of

people either want to carry on support at the current level or increase it. you have a sense on the one hand of pessimism. the same time you have a feeling europeans are not in the mood for peace. for what they see being offered, talks of a trump peace plan. they see that boris defeat. for ukraine. i think what that is leading to come as ivan has written brilliantly about, it is a reassessment of what ukrainian victory or defeat looks like, focused less on the idea of territory and more on the geopolitical orientation that ukraine can have. the idea of ukraine that can be part of the west, can be part of europe, can be part of nato rather than simply focusing on territory. the second interesting finding

is to deal with the european debate about security and defense. we have seen a huge turnaround in the figures for spending on military support. which is, i think, echoed in a lot of the polling we have done. we heard from nato that of the 23 united -- european union members of nato they will be on track to present by the time of the nato summit and collectively the europeans are to 2%. putin deserves a lot of credit for that shift and trump should also take a share of credit for that. not the least because of recent rhetoric. then the final thing that is most interesting is what this slide shows. witches, donald trump's contribution to the political

unity of europe. in 2016 when he was first elected, many people feared he would be the leader of a global liberal international that would have a lot of echo in different european capitals. at the time of the last european election five years ago the big fear, as the steve bannon went round europe working with far right parties in different countries was, the european elections would be act iii of a play that started with brexit in the u.k. and carried on with your 2016 elections and was going to transform european politics into a trumpian populist body that would reform the european union. this shows a far right to search under the european elections that we can talk more about in the discussions. but what we are seeing is a european shift towards trumpian

politics. in fact in many countries in the far right parties have been actively distancing themselves but -- both from vladimir putin and donald trump. even in hungry, -- hungary a country that stands out in having a bubbly embrace to donald trump, or at least from its prime minister has. only 28% of hungarians would be pleased or very pleased were donald trump to win the elections. the truth in both countries is a large majority of people would be disappointed. so, in those ways, you can see actually the u.s. election is both scaring europeans and actually, in some ways, driving them to take more response ability for what is happening in ukraine. in a side i have not showed yet you can see europeans for the first time are starting to

realize ukraine might be less of a global war and other parts of the world might be shifting away. that makes them feel more responsible. there is a sense that this is existential for european security and is something they cannot run away from and therefore have to take responsibility for. sylvie: thank you very much. this is indeed extremely revealing and fascinating research. ivan, were you surprised by the findings? ivan: before 1989 there was a poster in our classroom that religion is the opiate of the people. from this point of view, i will try kind of to come with a simple story. we have been pulling for the last two years. this is the thing that ecfr has devoted itself very much too.

we don't believe people have a very clear idea on many of these things. it's not about that. we ourselves don't have a very clear idea. but we are interested in trends. what i will do now is not just focus on this last paper, but tell you about the two years where we have been poland around ukraine, the things that surprised me -- polling around ukraine to things that surprised me most. the most interesting things from opinion polling are things that surprise you and we have been polling inside and outside of europe. we have been polling in nine western countries. here is the interesting surprise. we have been polling for the last year. a simple question. do you believe the west is in a war with russia? the majority of russians said yes. 53%. the majority of the chinese said yes. 62%. in every single country we

pulled outside of the west, only south korea, that is part of the west, won't agree with this. only europe and the united states, we believe that we are not in a war. for different reasons. probably in america because what you know of what it means to be in a war, because you have soldiers here and there, in europe because we are not sure what is a war because we are not very exposed to it. at the end of the day i find it is very important because when we go to people outside the west russia is winning in the pervading view. there was a certain correlation that made a strong compression -- impression on mark and me. the majority of people that believe russia will prevail at ukraine believe the european union won't be around in the next 20 years. that comes to my first question. we talk a lot about victory and defeat. i believe people should be more

inventive and creative when the talk about victory. it is important to know what exactly is defeat. particularly, defeat not only for ukraine, but europe. because from the public opinion perception if russia will prevail in ukraine basically people outside the west will perceive this of the west in -- as a whole and europe in particular. i find this important. this is why for us it was critically important to define the meaning of defeat. for me the meaning of defeat is, basically, ukraine won't simply lose territory, but, the political fate of the ukrainian state will be lost if ukraine can't integrate into western strategy. it will be kind of a no man's land. it won't have economic

sustainability. this is why this understanding is important when we are talking about what we learn from these bowls. -- polls. the second thing that made a strong impression on me from the polls was at the question, out of the five major crises europe has been dealing with in the last 15 years, you have international prices, climate, covid, immigration, the war. which of these crises to people in europe believe it's the most import when it comes to the future? in a certain way we try to see the crisis typesetting europe. how people see the most important one. geography matters.

in places like estonia more than 60% see war as the major crisis. go to france. only 6% believe it is the major crisis. these are five tribes are so similar to each other at a size. -- in size. this is so important. the tribes have incredibly important internal dynamics. it is important that you can't win elections just focusing on ukraine if you aren't going to be. europe whenever keep its unity if it is about security. this is very interesting when you see the divisions about the war, when the war started the major division was east and

west. the western europe, germany, france, share nuclear war. then, with the next studies we have been doing you see how the picture starts to change. it was not east, west, it was east, east. the countries most important to ukraine are not part of the former soviet umpire but the former russian empire. but you have poles and so does finland then bulgarians, greeks. i think this is important because as a result of the war we want to know how it is found and where wouldn't in the

studies and seen how the ukrainian war is going and this is where mark started from. what is happening from the elections will affect the war. president putin is not going to lose the war on the russian election. so the major story is europeans cannot tayshawn political support for a long time. for europe, the biggest problem is particularly in a moment in which the american support is there it is as a result of the war. some major assumptions has been questioned by this war. we were taking piece for advantage. war was up thinkable. the reason europeans were less ready to believe the american intelligence information on the eve of the war you double this

will happen. second, we vetted that military power is not as important as it was and it is not particularly if you don't have. third is american security guarantees are more questioned. you can make any type of speech in washington, people looking around to the american congress cannot vote the money when the ukrainians need ammunition. from this point of view an important story is also mentioned by mark, the war in ukraine, the turning point from which the west can rally western parties in defense and liberal order. in a certain way many of the

people and say it is your war, secondly they said ok. there are opportunities and how others are sitting on the fence many of the countries are not sitting. do you believe he was sitting? they seek opportunities. so this is why for us this type of policy talk and they give the public opinion go together because what we most learned from the united states in 2016 it is not enough to have a consensus on the foreign policy. be sure that people are part of the consensus or you can be surprised in a way you don't want to be. >> thank you very much. sofia, you come from europe but you live here and work here.

does this conversation surprise you about the way the war is seen differently on both sides of the atlantic? >> first let me say welcome from me. we feed more europeans -- we need more europeans and we are happy to have adopted him. the two papers we are discussing the polls at the heart of them and you ask very hard questions that some you're phraoerpbdz would struggle to answer. but i find very interesting particularly the sections in your research where you get to

the, so what? what does this mean for the european elections and how we feed it make the case for europe and ukraine. and i think it is really good in your research you point out this tension between the one hand having to mobilize those pro european voters that might not care enough to vote in the european elections and to depress the skeptic vote which is a protest vote at the national level. so i would have to comment on the european election challenge with the view from washington. you think we all find ourselves about the election that sometimes draws strenuous

parallels between the elections that are quite different scenarios. but reading your research, it strikes me there are a couple of parallels an lessons we can take from each other when making the case for ukraine and making the case for europe. i want to make three points of whatnot to do not to counterthose and how to make the case for europe and the u.s. then the one warning of tensions between pro europeans in europe and pro europeans in the u.s. i think argument you make of how not to counter wraoeupbgt

populism by not making the same case that the right wing populists make. i agree. we see that you cannot ou-trump trump. the reason it doesn't work is it is not policies. he stands for antieliteism and antiestablishment. what is crucial is warning for europeans we can't sign the european project as elite project and establishment. we know it benefits disadvantaged members of society and the paper by mark makes the point. it is hard to focus the debate on e.u. successes with the

notion of their weaknesses. mark and i were both in the u.k. when brexit happened. it is hard to lecture people about how they benefit about the e.u. a would president biden is experiencing a similar perception trap where the economy is going well and they associate president trump with economic success and not biden. so he faces the same challenge of how to make the case for his policies without lecturing people and if we see how he framed the challenge in the state of the union there's something about how he did that. he talked about come back america, right. he talked about acknowledging the weaknesses that are still there but focusing on the successes of his administration.

he talked about ideas and international order and freedom and democracy countering forces but we mobilize those that are already with us. but for those we have not you have to tell a story about interest. so how do you make the case for europe and come back europe story work ahead of the european elections and in the context of continued support to ukraine. i think it your research you say it is important to not make it about solidarity for ukraine but sovereignty for europe and i we will heartedly agree. i think we need to make the case for europe that can shape owns destiny. we have examples is european defense policy. we need to shift from solidarity short-term aid for ukraine

emptying our warehouses to a solve representity long-term european defense capacity increase. you did that with -- you do that with large scale orders and you can fund them through joint debt. the point is we need to start talking defense policy whether there is a trump term or not. we can't allow the future of europe to depend on majorities in capitol. you need the congress for european defense to matter who the next president s. there is a tension here not that the anti-europeans and u.s. administration, i think sometimes when i come to europe people have an idea of tell being anti-european.

i don't want to overstate the u.s. interests in the european elections. it is an uphill battle to get people in europe to go. people do care about the future. they care about the future of the peace facility and ukraine and e.u. so, i don't think the problem is anti-europeans. the tension is how can europeans make the argument for europe at homeed a make pro europeans make the argument for europe in the u.s. pro europeans here are combat ing ideas of free riding europe and outdated transatlantic and behind closed doors they will admit europe has stepped up to ukraine stuff but it is not good

politics to say that. what is seen as more promising by pro europeans here is to say europe is a good deal. nato is a good deal for the u.s. the supplemental for ukraine is a good deal for u.s. the money we spend on europe will come back to u.s. businesses and firms and workers. we will see this at the nato summit which is the next time europeans -- and last time before the elections that europeans get to make the case for europe here in the u.s. it will be brimming with c.e.o.'s and defense firms and how do they put europe is a good deal at home and we need to invest but also a good year for the u.s. that is what we need to do to maintain support for ukraine in

the u.s. and europe. that is some of the challenges i see this paper and polling that you have done highlights. >> thank you very much for the comments. they are very interesting and constructive ideas. there's one question which has arisen recently -- and you alluded to it, mark -- can europe fight a war on its own depending what is happening here? but it is not only because of trump, it is because of what we have been observing over the past few months here. i would like to ask the three of you, ask this question to the three of you. how have you seen the political

grounds shifting in europe and here as this question was coming up? mark, do you want to start? >> sure. it is like the war in yugoslav in 1992 and i remember the errors of war and -- the horrors of war and almost a feeling of powerlessness which led it lots of debate about european defense and security and rapid reaction forces and lots of policy papers. and other things which left very little trace in terms of european capability. we have double decades of europeans talking about the need

to be geopolitical and less dependent on the u.s. i think the people are rightly skeptical about the extent to which things have changed. because after that we had kosovo, we had the situation in georgia in 2008, we have the annexation of crimea and crises have come and gone and european defense spending has continued to go down over the years as have the sort of strategic culture. it has degraded with each crisis. there's a lot of reason to be skeptical where we are at the moment but i'm quite optimistic about what has happened. i think the security crisis is

something which is terrifying what is happening in ukraine but more important is the identity crisis for a lot of european countries. i think the way europeans in many partsf the accountant incident think of themselves and institutions have changed fundamentally. i have written and -- an essay and the last certain decades the european union has been driven by the quest for peace and the last couple of years the enemy has come from preparing for war and you have seen where countries have changed their sense of themselves. it is the cot annual industry to complain about germany and where they are going and the glass is

almost laugh full. but it is pretty remarkable when you look at the debates in germany until three years ago about very few people were saying we feed to understand russia, we can't look at history this way. it is a very different debate and all sorts of debate about that but it is a different kind of debate. i think it has been a hard shift in military spending and there is a real interest in eastern europe and that goes against the french d.n.a. in italy and poland you have the belief we are elected on the basis brussels is a enemy of

sovereignty. there is a sense if you were in favor of a strong transatlantic relationship you would have to gauge your strategic autonomy and people realize the only way is the europeans to get their act together and stop being so against and it is impossible the extent to which we have depended on the good will of american taxpayers for the last few decades. i think there's been a fundamental change of how people see themselves and it will take a long time to work its way through the system. the terrifying thing is the next six months and whether we can get enough shells to ukraine and stop the ukrainian front from collapsing. but i think you take a longer-term perspective something fundamental has

changed. it is essential because the only way the relationship can survivor is for europeans to take a different attitude toward their own security. it is hard it explain to my 12-year-old daughter or son the extent europeans expect americans to pay for that security decades after the end of the cold war. i think we are in a different place. we could very well see this as a real changing moment, which would be quite different from what happened in the balkans and 2008 and annexation of crimea.

>> it is been the most deep change has had to happen and it is probably not over. but you describe the race against china and we don't know if we are going to win it race. -- win this race. not all european countries were wrong or had a mistaken idea of russia and this situation. so, how would you describe this change? you were talking about the east-west divide at the beginning of the war. how would you qualify this evolution? >> the reason i'm on the panel is not to be excessively

optimistic. this is not just change of politics. europe was living in a post world war through 2022 because 2014 was not clear. they will say the annexation of crimea happened and it becomes a world and it is a totally different world. europeans were were more particularly ready but poland and hungary are not in the same place. a country like romania is different. public opinion is closer to italy than poland. even in countries like poland there was a moment in the

beginning of the war where 8% of the households were hosting ukrainian refugees and taking care of them but did you polish society is becoming concerned with their relations to what the refugees is changing and even certain things that what is good news can be bad news. ukrainians are treated as refugees differently from europeans than those from africa or middle east. but the fact that your people is week is not necessarily good because many of them will not go back to ukraine and the biggest problem ukraine is facing is a democratic crisis. it is losing people and you have a situation in which for two years the women and men have

been separated. so what people don't realize is the scale of the war. when people see war on television you are going to see one kind of town being destroyed here or there. in ukraine you have two very big countries that are fighting each other. one of them is a superpower. it is more than between north and south korea. the number of artillery shares on a daily basis fired in world war ii. i think we are missing the scale. this is a big european war and it is a cultural change. after 1989, this was not part of

the social contract. you don't have the feeling that governments had the right to ask people to die. we are talking about germany but you should stand in a certain way for germany it did with russia what they did with everybody. trading, believing that economic interdependence will be enough to secure peace. they did with worked for tell and suddenly it didn't. and the country is spending money and changing but this is a cultural change. a country that was praised for not getting soldiers will now be judged for their soldiers.

we could end up in french troops in ukraine, we create that strategic clarity which is european countries say we are not going, president biden saying in the union we are not going with the american troops. so russia has the advantage on the ground, they have created a war economy they are producing twice more ammunitions than we are doing together. thirdly, ukraine has a manpower problem because they have the mobilization problem and it a major democrat being graphic -- democrat -- demographic situation and at the in this is going to change but the problem is to survive the six or seven months.

you cannot expect that european public in two years will change dramatically. you can change budgets but i'm no great specialist on military history but i learn things from the generals, budgets do not fight wars. people fight wars and by the way ukraine is a great example. so, how europeans are culturally changing is the biggest problem. how the government is changing. from this point of view and this is my last point the ukraine war is a european moment and nationalist moment at the same time. there were the power of the nationalist mobilization in ukraine that showed the story that he was pity for nations that need heroes. doesn't work in the time of war.

in the time of war you need people that are ready to extent. but what extent europe is ready for this but the europe you know from before is not the same. i hope it works out. i'm not going to bet that this is the only outcome the way i don't believe america will be with israel in five years. polling is not telling you what to do but telling you what you cannot do any more. >> your book you have describing the european war and president macron said is this our war or not our war and how is it soon from here. do you see an efficient solution? >> you ask can europe fight a

war by itself? sure if you put together all our military budgets and look at our economy compared to the russian economy. i agree that there's been a mind set shift when it comes to how russia is seen in europe. but you can't fight a war without money and you can't hire the people it fight a war without money. so i think -- i can't help myself with the recommendation. i think we have a very clear path toward getting europe to be able to fight this kind of war but we are not there. what we need is defense industrial overhaul to increase production and i will bring up europe bonds because we tpaoefpltd u. level funding for that. we need in the short-term to get ukraine through the next six months, then the next year.

this war doesn't follow the election cycle of the u.s. what we have it consider is if we have another trump presidency we face a very different situation. we face a situation where it is not just investing in industries and getting equipment to ukraine. president trump would not need to withdraw from nato to fundamentally weaken architecture. he can centered of inserts his -- he can insert his own people in brussels. can withdraw troops and question the u.s. nuclear umbrella. where does that leave europeans with a russia that would be emboldened if it forces ukraine into a deal with russia.

what do we do? there's a very clear gap the europeans need to invest in. there are capability gaps that have existed, the nuclear umbrella gap that we have to have this conversation about how to replace a u.s. nuclear plan and command and control gap of capable officers in the nato and e.u. headquarters that can replace the very capable u.s. officers. can europe fight this war right now? no. could it in the future? if we make the raoeupbt investigatements, yes. these are very tough questions and i don't think we are going to answer all of them today. but before i give you the floor there is one question you raised

which is very important. you said the rest of the world doesn't believe us basically. how important is that? >> you remember we the war started the same statement that the ambassador in u.n. we in africa better understand what is going on because it is like the colonial war. but it is difficult to identify with the ukrainian anti-imperialism when they see the former colonial power being their major supporters. and russian benefits incredibly that they get the legacy of the soviet union and support from the colonial movement and not being the union which means at the do not threaten were there kind of current and then we have

the situation which is eye opening if you compare the social media in the first three weeks in the war in ukraine and first three weeks in the war in gaza in a country lake brazil you will see that four times more social media activity was on the gaza war. so suddenly the gaza war was a global event while the war in ukraine was a european event. there is very much our war it the extent that unlike it the united states for europe there is going against a page kind of a security concern of member states. they are not less critical than we are, let's put it mildly. but in a certain way they have a right to be cynical because in a certain way they see themselves

as weaker. and one of the things we are trying to understand is that what for us was an order they are trying to benefit. they see opportunities, they are repositioning. they are not going with russia. if the chinese are not trying to -- they are trying to go after their interest and how to deal with this country and it is particularly true for europe and it became clear the failure of france to deal with post colonial legacies in africa have resulted in what we have seen so we are in a different worlds not just europe and eastern europe and the cold war narrative is replaced by the dicoll anization. when it started biden said it is

a fight between democracy and. you remember the definition of pornography but we can't define it is we recognize it. depending on the day some countries are democracy and some are autocracy. when you see how we are posing tease you see the nature of the political regime of how india or south korea or brazil will position themselves and we should be ready to face this reality and say we are in a different world and we should try toen gauge with others and have an agenda that is important with them and show we can solve our problems and in a certain way this is very different than it was. and my fear as you was defending

the status quo that doesn't exist any more because this is sever defeating position and if you are winners of the previous round you are kinds of tempted to do exactly this. europe has been doing this with respect to russia after 2014 so the world is not the way it was and will probably not go back the way it was. >> ok. we collected some questions. do we need a mic -- here in the front. >> thank you. great conversation. i was wondering if there is any specific priming factors or narratives or contextual cues that get people more supportive

of ukrainians in their war effort and how it can be translated in this transatlantic context with the united states. >> maybe we should start with the things that aren't working well. and that slide we showed only 10% of people think ukraine can win is a good starting point. if you basically go to the public with something which was implausible then you are likely to meet a wall of skepticism. therefore, what you need to do, i think, is have a story that is credible. if most people think this is ultimately going to end in some kind of settlement, i think it

is more plausible to say we want to put ukraine in as strong a position as possible so it doesn't have to accept an end to the war on russia's terms and that is a more as you believe way of making the case tan saying every inch of ukrainian, which is what everybody wants and everybody will recognize an inch of russian territory or acquisition but a good starting point to understand what people think is going to happen and the other important point, something that ivan was seeing and sofia, to make the case in terms of people's national interest in their own security. it is very different for estonians and poles. they feel that they could be

next the way the italians or spanish people or even british people and french people don't feel. but at the same time if we make a case which is more centered around european securityness around our ability to control our future that is more credible than an altruistic set of actions with the ukraines. that is not something you can sustain over a long period of time. one of the striking things about the polling is how ukraine latinos big problems with natal toe because many of the countries that showed solidarity in the beginning and the ones with the post mixed feelings. if you look at the polish farmers and their attitudes toward migration. we ask with we taught migrants were an opportunity or a threat and if you look, they are quite

positive, more positive than i was expecting. if you look at the talk about the migration crisis. where that is not true are the immediate neighbors where 40% of the people see ukrainian migrants as a threat rather than an opportunity. a really important thing is to be quite contextual and for the u.s. the big problem is the perception that europeans are not doing as much as the u.s. and you can make a case for american support. what you need to do is get their act together to take more

responsibility for what is happening for their own sake not because of trump or anyone else here. and if americans realize that they are not carrying any possible burden for them it would be a lot easier to make the case for that. as a foreigner coming here, if you look at how much is being spending on ukraine and compare it to afghanistan and gaza is not materially but the we are i iness is difficult because it is a compound experience after threat of wars and sense of frustration about where american foreign policy is and domestic consensus. but it is interesting how you

can shift out of once you get into the narrative structure how you get out of it and assess it is complicated and differ. >> sofia, you wanted to comment, then back to mark with something you mentioned. i think altruism is one of main traps. it is about helping ukraine, saving europe and that is really important because the threat is not going to be over with the deal. there's a huge challenge of integrating ukraine in european security architecture that will remain as long as putin is president if not longer so we have to keep up support for that and that is where we get in trouble in europe over -- the

mic always drops out -- here we go. distributional challenges. when we talk about ukraine we have to talk about economic policy and finds a deal that works for the polls to continue supporting ukraine and the french, of course. and farms all over europe, really, when it comes about continued support for ukraine and integrating them. one other thing i believe this is also, you said we have to make ukraine strong enough so that they can have negotiations with russia at some point from a position of strength and that is also the argue to president trump if he wants to make a deal, it makes sense to put ukraine in a strong position now through the supplemental, give them the money now so when he comes in he can swoop in from a

position of strength and negotiate a deal. >> if the supplement could be passed that would be great. mark, you mentioned the u.k. it is not included in your research for obvious reasons, but when you talk about countries that rack differently because they were closer or farther away from ukraine, actually the united kingdom is a bit of exception because it is far away but it had a policy on ukraine for a long time. >> i was not a supporter of brexit. i think it was an act of extraordinary sever harm. but -- self-harm and i think it is a psycho drama england has gone

through is not an edifying spectacle. but one that is starting to change attitudes beyond time passing and lack of major benefits from brexit which accrued to british citizen was the war in ukraine, which reminded people that britain might have left the european union but it can't leave the european continent and insecurity and its interests are indefined with its -- undefined with its neighbors and it is harmeder -- we johnson was

elected you saw a change and new ethic of collaboration and working together and brits have had a lot of prime ministers since then. >> we have lost count. >> with each one has been to look of ways of working more closely with the e.u. and we are going to have fore prime minister before the end of the year and i suspect we will see a much bigger step up in the direction of cooperation. and it is going to start with security and the labor party in the u.k. who have now been likely to win the next election will be to sign a security pact with the european union. >> taste another change. -- that's another change. >> they have changed their

identity. it goes through quite a big shift and i think there's an appetite for that because there's not always been a huge appetite with reengaging with u.k. because of frustration in brussels and other capitals. but i think ukraine makes people, you know, take these things a bit more seriously and realize that there's a lot to be gained from both sides to go back to a different situation. i expect u.k. relationships with the e.u. britain won't be a member of the e.u. in five or 10 years. i think it will look different and there will be a higher level of cooperation and integration. >> and we can observe quite a lot of rapprochement. is there any other question?

yes, please, go ahead here. >> one important question is missing. and perhaps maybe you can have it in future polls. this was involving nato and my impression is that what is the cause of this war? did putin invade ukraine to restore the empire and continue with and some people in the united states and congress saying that he will come here as well. or it is to protect his country from nato encircling. and when nato started expanding many in the united states objected.

and not only george cannon but moynihan said nato expansion with lead to nuclear war. and we know that until february of 2014 the ukrainians were against nato expansion. after the coup, this changed. my question is maybe sings you made it -- since you made this point would all of this horror be prevented if ukraine would keep neutral status and benefit from that. >> i'm sure you want to answer. >> you don't need one reason it start the war.

the russians were unhappy about the expansion of nato. but there's something quite important and this is what makes the ukrainian situation specific. president putin is quite openly think what he is doing. he learned over the years is take him literally. in the summer of 2022 -- by the way, there was an essay which is not the form presidents normally do. he wrote it personally. so it was not a speech writer and he made a statement that was not focused on nato --2014 is important and 2008 the bucharest summit was not the wisest decision made but there is a understanding that president putin will and that is

ukrainians and russians are the same people. we can decide if it could be dealt with but in 2014 russia decided not to recognize the territories and it was not about certain territories and minorities it is his in my opinion more than demographics is that the russian population is shrinking so on several occasions he made a statement saying the scientists said there will be 500 million russians in the world and now there only 120 or 130. so the problem is not a security problem, it is identity. he is very clear. so i do believe we can have a legitimate criticism of the

night toe enlargement. to believe that putin came with the idea that russians and ukrainians are the same people in the summer of 2022 is overdone. he thought the integration of this base is unnatural. he is a person of a specific generation and he did what he did. i think certain western policies could be different but it is clear from conversations president biden made two things we at the met. first that america is not about the regime change and not only that nato membership of ukraine is a priority from anybody. so i believe his timing was based on other things. otherwise, if something the west

had done different after end of the cold war i have questions of what was done. but don't forget. ukrainian perspective. this was society and nations that was promised in 1994 by the united states, united kingdom, russia that you are not going to give them nuclear weapons and they are the third biggest nuclear power. their security is guaranteed. so it is very difficult to believe this level of neutrality will work. and there is a big shraofplt >> we have another question over there. >> i thank you for the interesting conversation. i wonder whether you could dwell a little more on your conceptization of victory because i was struck how you suggested or put out there to think about moving from

storiality to political belonging because if you look to nato membership people say territorial integrity is the prerequisite for political belonging. thank you. >> i will be very quick because i'm sure the othersment to speak. i know one country that became a member of nato before the territory being unified is where the security conference is based and that is west germany. >> i don't think anybody as i said before is talking about recognizing the affectionation -- annexation of ukraine but the question a ukraine that is forced into neutrality and forced to disarm if that happens to ukraine would that be a good or bad outcome for europe and i

think it is pretty clear if you think about european security and reasons that europeans are supporting ukraine beyond a belief in the viability of borders, et cetera, the idea of a ukraine that is basically forced into being a buffer zone and which could protect -- would be a real defeat. but also if you think of how this war can end i think one of the only ways is giving ukraine a real sense of security in the future is going to be having credible guarantees for its security. that is why the west german model, i think, is something people are talking about and thinking about. it is not something that is relevant for tomorrow but it definitely will be part of

discussions where we get to a situation where we are moving toward a settlement. i think it is very hard for any ukrainian leader to talk about moving to a different phase if they are not getting into the european union or ukraine. you look what their citizens are saying anything that doesn't include throws of belong -- those will look more like a defeat tan a victory. >> -- than a victory. >> it is true there definition of victory or defeat has been evolving a lot the past two years. and that now we're also moving to another debate which is it is not only about whether ukraine wins or is defeated, it is also about the security of the rest of europe. and would you agree with this? >> i think that the mental model

for european security feels a cooperative model where we made security with russia and hoping to have a single set of institutions. i think as long as putin is in the kremlin that is not going to be the mental model. it is the borders between us are important and the clear reference to the ukrainian people is not to be on the russian side of the borders and that is why the questions have a different significance in that world tan the world we were in a couple of years ago. >> are there any other questions? so, i think we will leave it here and thank our panel for describing this very shifting ground and environment. thank you very much for your attention and your questions.

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