equality, consur watch saturday 7:00 p.m. eastern two. >> next, testimony on worldwide security threats with the director of the cia, the director of national intelligence and the fbi director. they joined other leaders from the intelligence community to about ukraine the israel hamas war,, titian with china, border security, andmation. held by the senate intelligence committee, this is about two hours and 15 minutes. pressing issues. the house select intelligence committee hearing is nearly three hours.

[inaudible conversations] >> the committee will come to order. without objectilick a any time. today, we come together to discuss the intelligence communities to 124 we begin with an open session and is been broadcast live and stream on the committee's you tube channel. the open session is entirelyunclassified all participants are reminded to refrain from discussing classified information or other information protected from public disclosure. on the conclusion of the open session we were recess and resume in the closed session in the committee hearing room at two p.m. or immediately following the first vote currently scheduled from 1:30 that you can come pick it his intention to proceed with us and without any disruptions. any disruption of the committee will result in the united states capitol police restoring order and the protesters will be renewed and arrested. it is my pleasure to welcome a renowned group of intelligence

community leaders during today's proceedings with with her from the honorable avril haines director of national intelligence, the honorable william burns director of central intelligence agency, the article christopher wray director of the federal. investigation. general timothy hauck director of the national security agent and command of u.s. cyber command, and lieutenant general geoffrey kruse director of the defense intelligence agency. i want to pause for a minute to get my personal thanks to director burns into director haines. a man and what you work with this commit over the past over a year now in both a bipartisan way, working with jim himes myself and all of our members making certain we have the information we need and being available for discussion on import agreed appreciate your contributions to the success of this committee and he wanted to recognize that. the annual threat assessment hearing provides intelligence community an opportunity to opt e-commerce and the american people and she is threats to.ince committee exist to protect the american people by informing policy and decision-makers of the threats

posed to national security which includes critical infrastructure economic security cybersecurity food security of several of the components of national security. each year the world evolves growing more interdependent. our . our adversaries are aligning and emerging technologies are changing the operational and vibrant. we are in the midst of a shifting geopolitical landscape with strategic competition at the forefront. now more than at any other time at least not since the cold war the united states national security concerns. regime moscow and tehran are anti-american and working together drastically regionally and internationally. these common adversaries overlapping interest and approaches example code russia's invasion ukraine hamas' attack an issue and continued iranian proxy assault in the region of the people's republic of china regular military show of force threatening taiwan. also concern is killing gangs recent test of the north green intercommunal ballistic missile

based on the missiles flight data south korea and japanese assets are at risk and it has the potential range of striking the united states. this is a flagrant violation of united nations security council resolution. over the last year the committee has conducted numerous engagements both in and beyond the scif. one area that seems fragmented de. there are heightened threats at the border in the home and is under constant assault whether it be from cyber attacks counterintelligence threats for foreign malign influence. what is not clear is how the intelligence community communicates those threats to other federal state local tribal or private sector partners. the lack of clarity on this issue raises a question of whether the federal government is organized appropriate and prepared to defend the united states against the kind of threat seemed to be faced from our foreign adversaries here. on more than one occasion some of your publicly warned a threat still might security from the people's republic of china the prc's compromise and maintain persistent access to u.s.

critical infrastructure. as stated in unclassified cybersecurity advisory published to the public last month drc's targeting and as compromise telecommunications energy, transportation and water sectors. to quote this advisor in some cases the cyber actors had have been living inside information technology networks for years to pre-position for disruptive or destructive cyber attacks in event of a major crisis or conflict. remember t advisory states that this activity has been going on for years and that really if i think the threat we need to rise to is an understanding that this is not a new phenomenon of the prc targeting assets and infrastructure of the united states. in addition to pre-position in critical infrastructure, china seeks to be a world power in science and technology by any means possible. this posse counterintelligence threat. china is attempting to advance as a technology superpower by

offering investment and inquiring or stealing intellectual property in feels like power and energy, artificial intelligence, biotechnology, agriculture quantum computing and semiconductors. russia continues an unjust war against ukraine's sovereignty bolstering its defense production by leveraging relationships with chinand we should not forget north korea munitions factories are supplying russia with weapons and artillery shells to use against ukraine. we look forward to further insights on russia's nuclear posture directed energy weapons come at a selected those in space and ground based at the satellite missiles designed to satellites. iran does also benefiting from closer ties with china and russia has built and funded and network of proxies to promote iran's regional objectives. iran's support of hamas' attack in israel continues to back hamas. i ran provides weapons and intelligence for terrorist attacks on u.s. personnel installations in the region and terrorist attacks on the global supply chain transiting the red sea. last year during annual threat assessment hearing i set forth the committee's plan for the reauthorization of fisa

section seven at you. and the next amount of committee wo has our bill reforming fisa. we produced a strong bill that puts in place the appropriate compliance guardrails and provides the tools necessary protect our country. we know the importance of this authority and we know the danger to america and our allies if the intelligence committee does not have the capability to produce intelligence from fisa 702 collection. there is a perceived lack of accountability that is the most troubling aspect for congress and the american public to trustrv th and that the intelligence community is doing the right thing reporting wrongdoing, taking responsibility correcting actions and monitoring actions. that is what our fisa bill aggressively reforms the fisa process to address past abuses. in the face of all these challenges the core mission stands which is give 54 threats and provide warning to protect americans. our committee oversight worknd we continually examine areas for improvement and provide bipartisan legislation solutions as needed.

today with her questions from our members on various interest areas and the respect the time ask all of you be direct at the scene. with that of affording the answers from our esteemed panel at a vacant eyes by ranking member for his opening remarks. >> thank you mr. chairman and welcome to our distinguished panel and in particular general hawk and general accrue sort joining for the first time. this annual hearing is a vital part of our oversight. it's a unique chance for the public to her directly from each of you about the icy assessment of a range of threats andissues. the stuff we hear every single day behind closed doors. the world can sometimes feel as though it's straining under the weight of conflict. putin's ongoing assault and you can come the peoples republic of china saber rattling a democratic taiwan, the ongoing crisis in gaza come to dream situation in haiti i could go on.d the public to see a dedicated and objective intelligence community that can soberly present these challenges based on fact and rigorous analysis. we are fortunate to see this

daily on on a classified basis and in no your parents today will help reinforce that. i will return to this dreamlike questions but we we're amid another presidential election. in previous federal campaign cycles we know foreign powers have attempted to interfere and the latest, the assessment by the ic says it's a possibility that they may do so again. we need to ensure and in no way do i discussed any of catalog of foreign threats that the chairman lee.com i agree with them in their entirety but we need to ensure in particular that foreigners period. and we need the community to credibly collect against and what the public whenhey determine such malign activity targeting our political process are occurring. we will be focused on this threat in the months ahead. please this committee was the opportunity to receive a classified update next week at the working level. as the eye sees assessment layette we've seen pass interference efforts by russia,

china different sorts and with every reason to believe that some or all of them will try again. i'm particularly concern that putin is exploring opportunities because he has already done so in part and because he has a lot to gain. you'll give us a sense of what the russian leaders calculus may look like as will a set of other potential actors. i'll also note that thisill be air of generative ai, which can create realistic video photos audio and text at a scale and sophistication that was unimaginable just a year ago. we need to be ready. the ic's job is to focus its collective powers outward to protect our nation but i feel strongly some of the greatest threats to our security and the world security our home grown. i fear we are slouching towards an election in which decisions will be made based on what excites us, what enrages us, what in raptures as, that we

will substitute for the critical faculties that are essential for a citizen and d self-satisfied scratching of our prior beliefs and political opinions. i, constituents regularly that you will all work very hard. we will work hard you try to take down the temperature and restore civility and intelligence of our politics, at the end of the day americans and their decisions about how people act as citizens of a democracy will get the democracy that they deserve. we are faltering with a continued failure to support ukraine. the russian leaders has been emboldened to believe he can snatch victory from the jaws of defeat. our ukrainian partners have fought with incredible courage against the russian war machine and then when victories that were beyond anyone's expectation. it appears however that we have lost our nerve at the critical juncture.

director burns you recent return from another visit to kyiv. i hope you will share some reflections on what's at stake and urgency with which we need to act. finally, as the chairman said and in the category of self-imposed crazies i am deeply concerned section 702 of fisa expired in just over a month and thus congress ask because he icy winds can attest, 702 is her most important intelligence authority and wendy to reauthorize it right away. i appreciate all the work the witnesses at the table and done help make that the case but we're not done yet. before getting back to the chair but i like to touch briefly on technology adoption and i've long championed this work and also to report on the topic some years ago. for all of china's strengths they cannot compete with the entrepreneurial culture and innovation that we regularly achieve here in the united states. getting that innovation intoic's mission and judith dod's mission is going to defy our success over the next decade. we spent a lot of time in this

place abating with a capital should flow, how ip should be protected, whether we should shut down a chinese own social media platform. the merits of those efforts are open to debate, but if we continue to integrate the way we always have, we will win. so i thank you all here. i look forward to what will hopefully be a very alley procession for the american public and i yield back. >> i will now turn to april 8 come director of national intelligence will be presenting the opening statement. >> thank you so much, chairman turner ranking member himes members of the committee. thank you for the opportunity to be here alongside a wonderful colleagues to present the ic's annual threat assessment. before i start i want to public thank the people of the intelligence community from the collector to the analyst and everyone in between. we are presenting the results of their labor at this hearing. they worked tirelessly everyday to keep our country safe and

prosperous and we're all very proud to represent them. and also want to take the opportunity to thank all of you for the extraordinary support that you shown to the intelligence community. the ic's relationship with its oversight committees quite obviously is critically important edge all work with us on a bipartisan basis that is especially inspiring in today's environment, and we're grateful for your encouragement and for your wisdom. today, the united states faces an increasingly complex and interconnected threat environment characterized i really three categories of challenges. the first is an accelerating strategic competition with major authoritarian powers that are actively working to undermine the rules-based rules-based order and open international system that the united states and our partners rely on for trade commerce, the free flow of informaon and ruth. the second category is a set of more intense and unpredictable transnational challenges suchclimate change, corruption, narcotics trafficking health

security terrorism and cybercrime that often interact with traditional state-basedpolitical, economical and security challenges. the third category is regional and localized conflicts that have far-reaching and at times cascading locations not only for neighboring countries but also for the world. and all three challenges are affected by trends in new and emhqerging technologies, environmental changes and economic strain that are stoking instability and make it that much more challenging for us to forecast the development and their implications. these dynamics are putting unprecedented that the united states relies on to manage such challenges, and perhaps more than ever highlight the need for sustained u.s. leadership to uphold the rules-based order. and i will just touch on these three categories of challenges starting with strategic competition in china. in an effort tt and highlight some of the intersections. president xi continue to envision china as a leading power on the world stage and

chinese leaders believe it is essential to project power globally in order to be able to resist u.s. pressure for their convinced that the u states will not tolerate a powerful china. nevertheless the prc seeks to ensure china can maintain positive ties to the united states and will likely continue to do so this year. as this seeks to build a relationship is to the capacity to attract our direct inst domestic economy is a fundamental priority for president xi yet he appears be doubling down for long-term growthwill deepen public and investor pessimism over the near-term with youth unemployment around major stimulus aimed at consumption forthcoming massive local dance and a property market difficult year for china's economy, all against the backdrop of an aging and shrinking population and slowing economicpresident xi is counting on china's investment in technologies such as advanced manufacturing and robotics, official intelligence,

high-performance computing to drive productivity gains and spur growth in the future. yet he's increasingly concerned about the united interfere with china's technological goals. consequently an effort to protect and promote china's capacity to compete technologically, which president strategy, prc leaders modified their approach to economic retaliation against the united states last year imposingly some tangible cost on u.s. firms even as they continue to moderate such actions to avoiddership is for the more pursuing a strategy to boost china's indigenous innovation and technological self-reliance, expand their efforts to acquire steel or compel the production of a lecture property and capabilities from others, and continue to engage in coercive behavior to control critical global supply chains of relevance. in the meantime president xi is emphasis on control and central oversight is unlikely to solve e challenges px7osed by china's

endemic corruption, demographic decline, and over the coming challenges and china's aspirations for greater geopolitical power will probably become all the more apparent. give it its ambitions beijing will continue to use its military forces to intimidate its neighbors and to shape the regions adance with the prc's priorities. we expect the pla will feel more advanced platforms the ploy new technologies and grow more confident in joint operations with a particular focus on taiwan and the western pacific. the role and tender for china's growing dr. ford's and cyber capabilities in this effort and ultimate intent behind unprecedented growth in these areas remain priorities for us in the ic and are not unrelated to the actions in russia. president putin's war of aggression against ukraine continues unabated. ukraine's retreat and a struggle to stave off further territorial losses in the past few weeks

have expose the erosion of ukraine's military capabilities anning availability of external military aid. the assistance that is contemplated in the supplement is absolutely critical to ukraine's defense right now and without that assistance it is hard to imagine how ukraine will be able to maintain the extremely hard-fought advances it is made against the russians, especially given the sustained surge in russian ammunition production and purchase from north korea and iran. meanwhile, president putin is increasingly increasing defense spending in russia, reversing his long-standing reluctance devote a high percentage of gdp to the military as a looks to rebuild. and in many ways this is profit by the fact russia has paid an enormous price of the war in ukraine. not only has russia summit or military losses than at any time since world war ii, roughly 300,000 casualties and thousands of tanks and armored combat vehicles setting them back years, it is also precipitated finland and sweden's membership

in data which putin this requires an expansion of russia's ground forces. putin continues to judge that time is on a site and almost certainly a better equip military will also serve the purpose of driving that point home to western audiences. such messaging is important because putin's strategic goals remain unchanged. he continued to see nato enlargement and western support his long-held belief that the united states and europe seek to restrict russian power and undermine him. and, of course, in the meantime russia continues to modernize and fortify its nuclear weapons capability even though it maintains the largest and most diverse nuclear weapons stockpile, and we remain concerned moscow will put at greater risk long-standing global norms against the use of asymmetrical strategically destabilized weapons in space and in the cyber domain. another critical intersection where monitoring is the relationship among the governments of russia, north korea, china and iran which is

evolving as these four countries expand collaboration through a web of bilateral and to soms bilateral arrangements. this growing cooperation willingness to exchange eight in military economic, political and intelligence matters enhances their individual capacities enables them to cooperate uncompetitive actions assistant to further undermine the rules-based order and gives them from external international pressure. nevertheless we assess these relationships will remain far short of formal alliances or multilateral access, parochial interest desire to avoid entanglements, and wariness apart and stability for each other's actions will likely mit their cooperation and ensure it advances incrementally, absent directing coffee between what of these countries and the united states. nevertheless the power dynamics are shifting among them and this is creating new challenges. in particular russia's need for support in forced it to grant some long-standing concessions

to china north korea and iran with the potential dynamite among other things long-held nonproliferation norms. and as a noted in the beginning intensifying transnational challenges or interacting with his more traditional threats for example with the advent of generative ai, state and nonstate actors were interested in conducting for one polite influence operations no longer need to maste create potentially come to create potentially believable false content. and the threat of maligned actors exploiting these tools and technology to undercut u.s. interests and democracy is particularly phone as voters go to the polls in more ttions around the globe this year. we have also a massive increase in the number of ransomware attacks globally which went up roughly 74% in 2023 from 2023 from what it was in 2022. use entities with the most heavily targeted. many of these are conducted by nonstate actors with group, like bed remain the most popular ransomware services as a provider.

sorkin ransomware is a service provider. locket was responsible for nearly a quarter of all claimed attacks worldwide leading to a joint effort by 11 countries to seize its resources and take them its online domain. transnational criminal organizations in human smuggling operations increasingly exploit migrants through extortion kidnapping and human trafficking. and in particular the threat from illicit drugs remains at historic levels with mexican transnational criminal organizations supplying and moving large amounts of synthetical goods such as that no into the united more than 100,000 americans have died from drug related overdoses during the past year and most of those deaths have been attributed to elicit fentanyl. as such the threat from fentanyl and other synthetic drugs to the health and welfare of everyday americans remain a top priority for the intelligence community. in the third category with multiple regional conflicts with far-reaching implications press no more obvious even in the middle east. the crisis in gaza is a regional development have the potential

for broader and even global implications. now, having lasted for more than five months, the middle is with renewed instability present new security paradigms and humanitarian challenges while polling in the range of actors. the conflict has prompted new dynamics even as it is entrenched old one. we continue to assess that hezbollah and iran did not want to cause an conflict that pulls us or even a dent into a format war. yet, the houthis entered the war and were willing to do so becoming one of the most aggressive actors in the conflict. the iranian aligned militia groups and if i can see that of an attacking our forces have more focus on the united states and israel using the conflict as an opportunity to pursue their own agenda. moreover the crisis has galvanizediolent and range of actors around the world and what it is too early to tell it is likely the gaza crisis will have a generational impact on terrorism. both al-qaeda and isis inspired by hamas who directed supporters to conduct attacks against israel and u.s. interests, and we seem how it is

inspiring individuals to conduct acts of anti-semitism and islamophobic terror worldwide. in this third category of regional and local as catholics we have many more we might discuss include haiti sedan what is happening in eastern democratic republic of congo and the list goes on. this brings me to section 702 of surveillance act as was mentioned, which will expel on april 19 with that congressional action. the intelligence gathered pursuant to section 702 was essential in preparing this annual assessment and is absolutely fundamental to every aspect of our work. section 702 provides unique insights into foreign intelligence target such as for emphasis terrorist organizations including hamas weapons proliferators proliferators, spies malicious cyber actors and fentanyl traffickers. it does so at a speed and reliability that we simply cannot replace any other authority. as congress pursues reauthorization, we understand there would be reformed and we support those to bolster the

complaint and oversight regimes in place today while preserving the operational agility that is vital to keeping the nation safe and we know how much this committee has worked on that forward to your question. >> thank you director haines. i also want to thank director burns, director haines, directorate and, of course, former director of nsa nakasone or your assistance and the process that this committee in drafting our 702 reforms will and reauthorization. the reforms that are in that bill this can you worked very diligently responding to each of the areas and will be found abuses and this the intelligence community to collect intelligence on foreigners abroad, not american citizens foreigners abroad, it also addresses the concerns that we had and the concerns that been part of the public discussion in congress of the abuses. i appreciate the fact that you have not only cooperate with this but you've assisted us in

the overall process of drafting it. .. >> people who want to do america harm have enterede.he count now, you have continues to cite that warning and i'd hike -- you have continued to cite that warning. and you believe that we significant risk right now here, from the possibility of a terrorist attack. >> i believe that the terrorist thending with right now is at a whole other level from an already heightened terrorist threat level that we were seeing even before october 7. and i say that before a variety of

reasons. first, you've seen a veritable rogue gallery of foreign terrorist organizations calling forrist attacks against us in a way that we haven't seen in a long, long time. and these are terrori this committee knows very well, which can often don't see eye to eye on much, but they seem to see eye to eye on this. i would add to that, that we are very concerned about the risk of inspire spd attacks lone actors here inspired be by some of those same calls for violence from over in t east. and so this is the a time not for panic but for heightened vigilance given the rice -- the racing. director,. >> director, i'm going to scu you a couple questions about the fbi's role in designating individuals as known terrorists, suspected terrorists and on the no-fly list. when there are concerns that an individual might be affiliated with a terrorist organization or have the intent to undertake a terrorist attack, there are designated categories, known terrorists suspected

terrorists no-fly list and selectee. could you describe the fbi's role in those designations? >> so the fbi maintains the so-called terrorist watch the known or suspected terrorist list based on information that comes from a variety of sources. that could come from fbi investigative work, but very it comes from information from our from our intelligence partners. or from other sources other agencies. and so that's when the so-called drog the derogatory information about the individual, puts them on the list. and then armed with that list, that's what allows us to engage with dhs as a running -- as they're running names when they come in. >> who with designates someone on the no-fly list? >> well, the difference between no-fly list and the selectee list i guess i would say is they are both individuals who based on the list don't fly or

shouldn't fly and then there are those who are identified for heightened screening. and it, an interagency process determines who's in which category. >> what's the fbi's role in that? >> well, the fbi contributes its own threat intelligence, and obviously,atch list itself. >> and the no-fly list is maintained by the fbi? >> that's my understanding. >> have anyrorists, suspected terrorists or who are on the no-fly list presented themselves at the southern border or been apprehended crossing illegally into the united states? >> we have seen over the last, i think, five years an increase in the number of ksts or known or suspected terrorists attempting to cross the southern border. >> have individuals on the knownist list, suspected terrorist list on no-fly if list presented themselves at a u.s. airports once entering the united states, attempting to fly? >> i believe the answer to that

is yes as well, although i don't have that right in front of me at the moment. >> have they known? -- flown? if. >> well, there may have been instances where as part of an investigation if in close to potentially ap apprehend somebody somebody's allowed to fly in order to see where they're going and then take action. but intentionally. >> have individuals on the no-fly list been permitted to fly? >> i believe again depends on what time period you're talking about, but i believe there have been individuals where in coordination with investigators and other agencies, an individual that we want to see where they're going is and be able to potentially arrest them, that there may have been situations where somebody's allowed to fly in that situation. >> does the fbi have a role if someone presents themselves at an a u.s. airport with the intent to fly that is on the no-fly list, the fbi involved in

permitting them to fly or down graigd their status the for them to not. no. well we provide information to the agency, the dhs agency that's involved at the decision to allow them to fly is not ours. >> are you notified if someone prosecute no-fly list shows up fly? >> certainly most of the time, that's my understanding yes. >> thank you. director burns director haines, ukraine is a significant issue for the united states as we are unfortunately, in a position where we are caught up in the legislative process that has not yet resolved the issue of continued u.s. support for ukraine as they struggle on the battlefield against russia and ukraine, aggression. director burns, there are still individuals who claim that this war, this aggressio by russia

where they've invaded ukraine is about russia wanting to prevent ukraine from being nato or perhaps if even that russia instigated this incursion by russia russia itself is trying to counter nato in ukraine. this conflict's much more than that isn't it, director burns? if help us understand this conflict -- you've served as the u.s. ambassador to russia, you know putin well. you've seen the intelligence. you have been active in working with ukraine and this administration on this issue. what is this conflict about and what is putin seeking in ukraine? >> i think what vladimir putin seeks, what caused him to launch his brutal and unp years ago was his fixation on subjugating ukraine and controlling its choices, much broader than the issue of nato. i think putin and i've heard him say this many times in the

past believes that ukraine isn't a real country that it's weak and divided and what ukrainians have done is demonstrate that a real countries fight back. and so i think there's a great deal at stake today in the supplemental assistance that the congress is considering. there's a great deal at stake not only for ukrainians and european security, for our long-term interests around the globe including in the indo-pacific. >> do ukrainians want to be part of russia? >> i'm sorry? >> do ukrainians want to be part of russia. >> the vast majority of ukrainians especially putin's brutal invasion want to be a part of a sovereign and independent ukraine. that's why they've fought with such bravery and valor with our orsupp incredibly important and remains incred write important to their success. >> in other words if there was support in ukraine for russia, woul this conflict seen is an insurgency, some uprising of individuals who were carrying the cause of

russia is? and we've not seen that in ukraine, have we? >> no. what you've seen is incredible bravery and valor as i said before, on the part of ukrainians which have demonstrated their commitment to a sovereign independent democratic ukraine. >> in the areas where russia has taken ukraine territory has are the people there safe? how is russia treating ukrainians once they incorporate a territory? >> they are treating them as with a fair amount of are -- of repression as well. just like, i would add they treat many of their own citizens. >> director burns tell us of some of the war crimes that have occurred against the ukrainian people. >> i think, you know, one of the most vicious of those crimes has been the illegal transportation and abduction n effect, of ukrainian children. i think that's the one that, you know i think strikes at all of our hearts as well. >> if this is about nato, director burns would putin be kidnapping children in ukraine? >> no. as i said, i don't think this is

just about nato, it's about that a wider fixation that putin as about subjugating ukraine. >> dir haines, tell us what in your review of the intelligence, what is this conflict about? >> oh, i think director burns stated it well. certainly about the subjugation of ukraine, but also, i mean, one of the things that's very consistent with in that putin believes t greatest tragedy of the 20th sent arely is the breakdown of the soviet yoon on. he perceives that they lost a tremendous amount in that context think does not want to be the leader that loses even further influence over those states that were a part of in fact, wants to bring it back to its former glory. and i think the other aspect of this that is the importance of our conning to support ukraine in their extraordinarily courageous acts in countering russia is china is

also watching what's aping here. and i think's one of those scenarios where it's -- china sees that we're able and we already overexceeded, i think their expectations in terms of coming together with europe and actually countering russia in this scenario. but they see that resolve weak within and and our inability the maintain assistance, that is going to be a that they're going to learn for the future for their own assertive efforts in their region. >> director haines, tomorrow i ukraine or nato or the united states said no nato for ukraine would this be over? >> no. burns we have, unfortunately, taken a significant amount of time for congress to act for ukraine aid to be approved. we have stood by ukraine we have provided the weapons that they have needed, that they have fought we have nott, they have fought to counter russian aggression with great delay costing

now? if what is happening on the battlefield, and is ukraine at a discuss advantage because we have not approved aid in. >> yes is the short answer. you know, i came back a couple of weeks ago from if my tenth visit to ukraine during the course of the war and in conversations just with president zelenskyy and with our intelligence counterparts and ukrainian military officers, i was struck by several things. first, ukraine is not running out of courage and tenacity, they're running out of ammunition and we're running out of time to help them. i was brief which caused a rushed withdrawal of the ukrainian forces about two days before i arrived in kyiv. and one of t senior ukrainian partners within the battle told me that our men fought as long and hard as they could but we ran out of ammunition, and the russians just kept coming. and what i worry about in '24 without supplemental assistance

is that of these cities. ukraine is going to lose more ground. notwithstanding their courage and tenacity. and and maybe ground over time. and as director haines said, i think that that has consequences for american interests that go well beyond ukraine and european security they go directly to our interests in the indo-pacific. i think they're likely -- that kind of an the chinese leadership and their going to undermine the faith that our partners and allies in the indo-pacific if have in our reil well. with supplemental assistance, however, i think it is possible to cement a strategic success for ukraine, for and a strategic loss for vladimir putin. to defeat him in his goal of subjugating ukraine and controlling its choices. to put ukraine in a position whereby the end of 2024 it can regain the initiative on the ground but even more importantly negotiate from from a position of relative strength.

with putin's russia. i don't think putin is serious negotiating. he may be interested in the theater of negotiations, but he's not interested in compromise he's interested in negotiations whe terms. without supplemental assistance, i think that's the future that a ukrainians could face a year from now. with supplemental assistance, i think it's possible to puncture his arrogance his confidence that time is on his side and put ukrainians in the position where could negotiate an outcome from a position of relative strength an outcome in the which, as i said, putin's goal is defeated, ukraine remains a sovereign, independent state anchored in western institutions and has the time and the security to recover while russia saw has to live with the long-term -- russia as to live with the long-term consequences of putin's foolish and bruti invasion of ukraine. >> last question. are there -- there are people in congress who support aid for

ukraine but believe i believe misthis is not at a create call juncture, that we can take our anytime approving this aid. director burns director haines, are they mistaken? >> i think as a i said before, mr. chairman, the ukrainians are running out of ammunition. i saw that in the description of what happened, they're running out of munitions for both air defense and artillery. one of the ukrainian brigades that fought, i was told in the two days before they were the forced to withdraw at a grand total of 15 155 munitions for the entire by e divide of something like 500 personnel. another brigade that a grand total of 42 mortar rounds. it's not that they didn't fight with courage and tenacity, it's that tehran out of ammunition. you can already seeitary rationing ammunition. you can already see them becoming more absolutely number to russian attacks from the air from drones, from missiles, from

aircraft. and that's the future we're going see i think without providing them the munitions that they've used so effectively in and which i believe are the key to a serious negotiation down the road. >> director haines? >> no, i have nothing more to add to that. i mean, i think it is urgent. >> [inaudible] >> thank you, mr. chairma and i particularly appreciate your highlighting the urgency of this house acting to support the ukrainians.much is in the balance so thank you for doing that. i do want to turn my attention to the topic i previewed election interference. but since the chairman brought it up, i want to just spend a minute or two on the southern border. and let me state the up front that every country needs a secure border, but i also think it's important that we put hearing called worldwide threats what the threats are from the southern border relative the north korea pandemics, russia. >> china cyber attacks you

name it. so director wray, i guess i'll start w a time period, choose a time period, 5 or 10 years over a 5 or 10-year period what percentage of domestic terrorist attacks in this country were undertaken by groups of undocumented? >> of domestic attacks here -- >> domestic terrorism. >> you mean attacks here in the united states -- >> exactly. >> right. i don't have a percentage. if a large number of them have been conducted by what we call hvs, home grown violent -- >> what's the number one category of those who perpetrate domestic terrorist events, number one category? >> well, again the number one category of terrorist attacks here are lone actors in small cells or small groups with using readily-accessible weapons -- >> i'm asking, what i'm trying to get at a here, lone actors, are they undocumented?

what percentage of domestic terrorist attacks are undertaken undocumented? >> i don't have a percentage. >> can you -- is it 50%? >> no p. >> is it 25%? >> i would be surprisedded. okay. what percentage of the fentanyl that enters this country comes on the backs if you will, of the undocumented relative to that percentage which comes in through legitimate ports of entry? >> again i don't have the program, but -- >> the majority? >> i would say the vast majority of the fentanyl in this country obviously comes from mexico, t >> right. but it is my understanding and contradict me if i'm wrong but the vast majority comes through legal ports of entry. is that the you understanding as well. >> a i've been told that. [laughter] >> okay. would it surprise you to know that southern border in the third year of this president's presidency, in the thursday year '23 were about the encounters

with known or suspected terrorists in the third year of the previous president, do you know what that number is? it's a cbp number. >> new york i don't have those numbers. i know -- no, i don't have those number but i know the numbers e over the last five years is the information i have, over the last five years. >> >> right. well i'm making a comparison here, and the answer is in the third year of the biden presidency encounters on the southern border with known or suspected terrorists is 80, in the third year of the previous administration, the number is 280. i'm sorry we have to talk about it, this is a serious issue. i would just put it in the context of the many, many threats that we have. i'm sorry we need to talk about this because the chairman and i the cabinet room when then-leader mcconnell said to the speaker you not get a better border deal if donald trump is president and if they call the house what a lost opportunity to address the problems that my republican friends make such hay over. with that, i want to turn to what i really am concerned about

which is, in particular, foreign interference in our election. the unclassified threat assessment before us, the latest in a string of i.c. analysis going back years documenting foreign amb influence our elections. i'm pleased that the committee's assessment leans forward to describe these threats in such plain terms because do our defense is ensuring that americans across the political spectrum are informed and ware of the range of adversaries and what they may do. so i want to use the remain orer of my until the chairman gavels me down around three questions. what does the threat look like? and, by the way just to prompt that discussion, i have reproduced what the new york times reported on last week which was they were a little hazy about who they the attribute thed to the russians setting up four completely fake newspapers if online, the d.c. weekly the interestingly named new york news daily not the daily news,news daily the chicago chronicle and the miami chronicle. and the new york times reported

these web sites have since been taken down, they mix local news with actual kremlin propaganda. i'm just putting that out there to prompt what i'm getting at here is what can -- how can americans identify what foreign interference may look like? specifics. we've read that, you know, russians may seek to start faux grassroots common strayses so, again, i have three -- demonstrations. that's one question. number two and this is really important, what are you doing about a it. and, are director wray, i'm going close with you because every american has a right to know that what you're doing about this is also a consistent with their protections of expression under the first amendment. so let me devote some time now to part one. what exactly should americans expect to see if there are attempts to interfere if with our elections beyond what i've posted back here? >> thank you. start. sir, i think -- so thanks for obviously, raising this issue

because it's ofe to us. and as you noted we have our intelligence community assessment on in that's been -- on in that's been unclassified on these issues. i think during, as we look back at the 2020 the u.s. cycle, russia engaged in a multipronged effort intended to really heighten broad sociopolitical tensions and sow distrust in democratic processes. and russia's online influence actors really sought to amplify mistrust in the electoral process by denigrating pail-in ballots, highlighting alleged irregulargies. russia continued its efforts during the 2022 election cycle probably with the intent to disracket and weaken the united states -- distract and reduce u.s. support targeting specific demographics with tailored messaging intending to elicit responses about strongly held beliefs or moral and obviously, you know, the point

of saying they have a multipronged attack is you may see things along the lines of described in "the new york times", but they also use, for example commercial firms, others that are sort of go betweens. they will hold a series of different ways of approaching effectively their information operations in the space. and what we do in the intelligence commitments we've stood up an election -- communities, we've stood up an election security group. they have different leads from different elements that participate, and these elements are working collectively, effectively, to identify this type of, you know, information provide is it largely to the department of homeland security and to the fbi for them to act and to interact -- >> let me stop you there because i really want to focus on what it looks like. something you said caught my attention. accusations that the system isek corrupt, that elections are rigged which are a hallmark, obviously, of the previous

president's speeches and to be fair, most recently raised by a california senate candidate on the democratic side. those statements that the systems are rigged may be designed to cause meshes to confidence in their electoral system. is that fair of me to emphasize? >> yes. they have for year, the russians have for years in their information operations been trying to basically discredit our, the legitimacy of our processes and ultimately, our democratic system. that is one of their main objectives. >> are any of you aware in the last certain years of any material evidence that american elections are rigged? can i get a -- >> no. >> thank you. okay. no evidence that in the last seven years any american elections have in any material way been rigged. thank you. director haines,ou're doing for it, but what else? we've got fake news sites, i hate to use the term, but we've got accusations that the smyste

government is being weapon needed against americans. what else? >> sure. there is also efforts to go after particular policy positions, to stoke acquisitions -- divisions in society in effect -- >> how do you stoke divisions amongst americans? >> so you effectively take where there's real content where there's disputes within american society, socioeconomic issues or otherwise, and then you effectively lift and highlight those divisions up. it's one of the more challenging things for us to identify what the impact is because largely it's an exacerbation of an existing division, in effect. and so it's areas where they seek to focus. >> so let's spend a minute or so on what you're doing about it. you were starting to say that you talk to dhs and directer wray we're going to close because i think these efforts that you make against these attempts at misinformation and division are critical, but there

is a very hazy line between identifying those efforts going after those efforts and compromising constitutionally-protected freedom of expression and speech and. so director haines, give us a sense for what you're doing about it. >> sure. and iat you have time just to hear from system of my other colleagues, i mean, i think all of us are involved in this in many respects in supporting the fbi's efforts. we stood up in odni the election threat executive in 2019 which was incorporated into the foreign malign influence center. and if that center is responsible for integrating intelligence on foreign malign influence or interference targeting u.s. elections. it also strategy chi manages i. collection and analytic resources on this issue and fosters partnership with other government private and foreign entities x. in 2022 we added the position of a national intelligence officer for foreign malign influence and the national intelligence council for leading analysis across the

i.c. on foreign infliebs for u.s. elections -- influence. andt' as we work with different groups and as i mentioned dhs and fbi obviously, director wray can talk about fbi's foreign influence task force and their work on this, but dhs has an office of intelligence analysis, and they provide support gardingea u.s. election infrastructure as well as u.s. organizations campaigns, public officials. and they work closely with and infrastructure agency which is charged with aeasiesing election officials and -- assisting rex officials and their private sector partners to mitigate risk and enhance the election facilities and equipment. and maybe just turn it to -- >> yeah. of thank you. these efforts are critical, director wray. it is essential that americans have confidence these issues are identified without the fbi or to on their constitutional rights. so how can -- give us 90 seconds of why we should be confident that you can do that. >> so our focus isur focus is on the

actor, the foreign actor. and that's a key distinction tings. we're not the arbiter we don't seek to be the arbiter the of what's truth or fake. what we are doing is trying to identify the hidden hand of foreign adversaries foreign intention services, fake accounts fact, belong to some is foreign adversary and and alerting the right people to that. that's the primary category in this foreignspace. there is a second category that is important in an election year which is lies about where and when to vote, for example is a form of voter suppression and that's a, can be a crime and there's criminal investigation that would ensue there. and we alert the appropriation election officials so that they can make sure people know where they actually can vote and what the times the polls are open andthat kind of thing but that's a separate category. >> thank you. of well, i appreciate that. i will yield back, but i've been doing this now for almost a decade and have seen, like you every manner of threat out there

s. and though i have seen every manner of threat out there and appreciate their severity, i still believe what lincoln said in 1838 in a speech he gave. lincoln said america will never be destroyed from the outside. if wete freedoms it will be because we destroyed ourselves. yield back. >> thank you. as a point of privilege for the chairman the u.s. customs and border protection encounter statistics for the years fy-17 through fy-24. my queions that were directed to director wray did not include a time period or a criticism of the administration. however, since the comparison was made, myed the numbers of individuals that were encountered on the terrorist watch list in the third year of the last administra administration. those encounters for the field operations encountered at land borders are thehe i believe you were citing. this is the ones that relate to the ones you used which are 280

in fiscal year '19 80physial year '23 which would have been the third year of the biden administration. those are actual hand ports where there is a field option where someone presents themselves at the border people are seeking to cross. for those years of comparison, fy-19, fy-23 the actual aggregate in the third year of the trump administration was 533 at those land ports and forden administration was 564. relatively consistent. over the category that's to below that, which is why i'm entering this into the record, is encounters between ports of entry. >>s where it's not a specific field operation but they're crossing the border. for the third year of the trump administration, which was fy-19 this report indicates that on the southwest border is number was zero. and so the number for the biden administration fiscal year '23 was is 69. i somewhere this into the record without objection and i call on

dr. wenstrup. >> thank you, mr. chairman. thank you all for being here. it's a pleasure to be with with you today and have the opportunity to work with you now and and over the years. i greatly appreciate it. i want to go back to something i brought if up a couple years ago in the events of june 14th, 2017 the baseball field. i won't go into as much depth as i did a couple years ago but there were 136 rounds fired that a day at the baseball field where if steve scalise wasn't there and capitol police weren't there, he could have easily killed 20-30 members of congress on the republican side, i might add, which would have led to a change in the balance of power in the house of representatives. i guess we didn't use the term that much back then, but i guess you would consider it an insurrection. this is someone who came to kill our names and our descriptions in his pocket. odn if i and dhs came out and determined that this was lent is extremism yet the fbi claimed that it was

suicide by cop. now, director wray, that was not on your watch and we've had this conversation. they made this determination without talking to the witnesses or the victims and two years ago after i spoke on this in this hearing you responded to me and i appreciated that, and you changed that from suicide by cop to domestic violent extremism. but, you know, we have serious players on this committee today and i think that we well together, we want to work with with the intelligence community as one nation if. finish two years ago i said we need walls around us sometimes but not walls between us. and i'm afraid that's still what we're finding. we have the responsibility of oversight. matter of fact, i'm committee. and, you know, we fund your agency. and so that's an important thing to keep in mind. and our efforts can only be productive if we can proceed with the speed of trust.

and that requires that we have process where there's accountability. and, you know, or when you have the leading investigative body in the united states of america that conducts an investigation they don't talk to the witnesses, they don't talk to the victims and they reach a bizarre conclusion that no one else could even -- even -- reach, we have to have accountability when the process is curiously insufficient here. make sure that there's integrity professionalism, appropriate methodology that's a taking mace. but yet as i'm -- place. as i'm seek ising information as far as who made this decision to call it suicide by cop and who went forward with it, how did they conduct their investigation, we're being blocked. it's inappropriate. i don't even think it's lawful. and i know that there's time to that comes out of the department of justice. that's a memo. that's not the law. it isn't the law of the land. we are a country of we, the

people and we're the representatives of the people. and especially on this committee when we inquire what's on in the fbi and who's doing what and how is the process fraud in an effort, we want to make it better. but we can't dot if you won't talk to us. if you won't give us the information we need. and don't allow us to investigate. ites very contemptuous. against this body and the people and that's a and i want to continue to move forward so we can have a better process in place and make sure that our agencies are functioning at a high level of professionalism and competency. but you have to work with us. so i'm going to ask you and maybe it can be in a classified setting that we do this and that's fine, but with would you commit to providing to this committee the name of the person who practiced this gross negligence and potentially

politically-motivated decision -- i don't know, because we can't investigate -- as well as any punitivesons involved may have faced so that we can investigate further maybe create a better with process? will you commit to that with me? if. >> well, congressman let me just say first as we discussed before no conversation on this subject should proceed without first saying how much i respect your harrowism on the day -- heroism on the day in question. and i've appreciated our corporation i know we provided all sorts of information in a variety of settings to you and your office, many of which was not something that normally would be shared -- >> well, let me -- >> so we will continue to try to work with you. i will double down on our efforts to see if there's more information we can provide to be more responsive. i don't want to have to take further action. i want it to be an acquiescence that we can work together because, look, the law says the -- this is under general congressional oversight is. the congressional intelligence committees are kept fully e and

currently informed of the intelligence activities of the united that's to be insured it says. so the linder memo means nothing. it's not law. you can't write laws for yourself. congress writes the laws. i appreciate that. there's things that i'll talk about more in a classified setting that are of grave concern to me such as biothreats and fentanyl, and i just want to how grateful in those arenas i have been in working with director haines and director burns. thank you very much. i think there's a lot more we can do so that we can be better in the future and seel we've done on so many things already. and and we'll do more in the classified setting. i yield back. >> mr. carson. >> thank you chairman. director haines, odni last year published the i.c.'s annual demographics report for fiscal

year 2022. i'm concerned ma'am that despite progress the report once again highlights ongoing disparities for minorities and women employed in the i.c. compared to the rest of the federal work force. this includes decreases in the number of pay grade increases highest pay grades and promoting and retowning these officers -- retaining these officers as they approach leadership ranks. i'd like as responses from the cia and dia, nsa and fbi on the following questions: ma'am when will we see when will we finally see sustained documented progress on these key benchmarks? wh the i'm sorry c. back? where can the i'm sorry c. improve in its recruitment efforts specifically? if do you feel comfortable how the i.c. is engaging with underrepresented communities and institutions of higher learning such as through centers for academic excellence?

also what additional resources could be used to effectively improve recruitment from all backgrounds and and walks of life? >> thank you so much for your -- so this is i'm obviously quite passionate about, and i know we've had conversations on as well. i think there is no question that we are not where we want to the representation that we see minorities and women and persons of disabilities -- with disabilities in the i.c. in terms of it reflecting the broader country. and as we we note in the report and in the last report, w some intersectionality to show some of the challenges that exist across these groups. we also see that representation when you look at the i'm sorry c. as a whole, is one thing -- i'm sorry c.. when you look at the upper ranks, youally sees the significantly lore in a number of specific minors. -- lower. and so here's a couple of things that we're doing. first of all the recruitment

piece is a piece although that is a place where we've seen it get better in the sense of what you see in terms of applicants is actlly a fairly robust demographic mix in a sense for the i.c.. that doesn't mean that we need -- that we don't need to continue to improve that. and we've been trying to get out to different parts of the country. and you mentioned the certains of these are grants we give the key universities. we basically work with those universities to have programs that help us to recruit from those schools and from a are attached the them. coalition. and one of the things that it was intended to do was to help us get to more diverse tions across the united states. and if what we're doing right now is actually trying to apply metrics to it do demonstrate it's working and where it may not be and see if we can you know sort of take advantage of best practices where we do see is improvement. so that is one piece. but another key element and and you'll see this in the demographic report that's just

coming to congress, will be here this month that one of the key challenges we're finding is actually retech in that sort of -- retention in that sort of first 5-year period of diverse employees. and that's an area that we're really trying to sort of dig into. and this is where resources matter. so let me explain what i mean by that. why we're having challenges with retention particularly of diverse populations, we need to collect data,ing we need to do more essentially exit interviews, do a rarity of barrier studies other things -- a variety of barrier studies that help us understand what'sappening across the i.c., and that's something we've requested money for in our deia budget for the i.c. and that will help us then understand what's happening so that we can actually address the challenges and see if we can actually promote programming that helps us. and we haveeen some places where the sort of cycle that we're trying to create which is

gather the day understand what's e happening and then t action to try to fix it and see whether or not that works is actually having is an impact. and i think for example director cruz may tell you a little bit about what's happening in dia as an example of this. but it is a very long-term process. this is something that is going to take a while. so to your question of when are we going to see it, i think in years it is longer e than any of us want it to be. it is something we push very hard on, but i am also just very, you know, appreciate your advices and thoughts on things that we can do better in this area as let me let others talk as you like. >> sure: sure, congressman i'll be very brief with. you know, i share and and have years i've been direct or at cia a high priority attached to make ourselves a more diverse institution. and that's not just the right thing to do for us as americans it's the smart thing. dia operates in a lot of

extremely diverse landscapes around the world so we're making progress. last year, for example we had one of the highest percentages in terms of new officers we've ever had of women a underrepresented community officers 48% women 30% minority. and equally important in terms of promotion and to the senior intelligence service the senior jobs at cia a we had an historic the inhigh over the more than three-quarters of a century of cia 47% women 27% minority. because the key to retention asive a -- i've learned the got to show people that if their work merits it, whatever hair background, they can get promoted to the most senior jobs in the agency. so this is just a step. we've got to continue this so it's not just a blip, it becomes a pattern earn. but that's what we're determined to try to do. >> gentleman's time's expired. mr. crawford? >> thank you, mr. chairman. thank you all for being here today. this is important that we is have these conversations

periodly out in the -- periodically out in the open because i think it's important for the american people to understand we have the responsibility of overseeing your agencies. and get right into a couple of questions here. director wray, do you still believe that the biggest threat to the united security is domestic violent violent extremism? >> i believe that the most significant terrorist threat toe united states is lone actors acting with readily-accessible weapons targeting soft targets and and that includes extremists and what we call home grown violent extremists which are jihadists typically isis-inspiredists. >> so is i have some concerns, and i -- about the potential for be attacked national security industries, for example agriculture. in the last ia we were able to get basically to bring usda into the i.c. through title 50 authorities so that today become

a member of the i.c. and with all the subject matter expertise that that imply plies and how important that is in the safeguarding with of our food supply. concerns about other industries, for example. i read an article earlier this week about chinese manufacturers of cranes at our ports. manufacturers of cranes. we don't build those types of things unfortunately in this country. but the chinese have sought to seed our supply chain with all a manner of surveillance devices and so on. the cranes were found to have been seeded with some devices. we've seen this with the manufacture of commuter rail, we've seen it with other supply chain components that they've seeded into our supplies. do you have some concerns about that? and if so, what are you doing to reach out to the industry to make sure th a we're safeguarding existence those kinds of things from happening? >> thank you. you've put your finger on a very important point. it's something we refer to typically as the hybrid

commercial threat which is essentially what could otherwise be with legitimate businesses, but that are can be leveraged the chinese government to engage in espionage or prepositioning for potentially disruptive action and so forth. and it's something that we talk about a lot and we've talked about, i've testified about it in terms of cyber penetration of critical infrastructure, but there are other ways -- and you're putting your finger on one of them -- to get kohl over critical infrastructure which is -- control over critical infrastructure which is through ordinary business transactions. authority title 350 authority in usda -- 50 authority. can you think of some other agencies we might need to consider that same perspective? >> let me give some thought to that and would love to circle back with you on in this, because i think this is one of the maybe less talked about but maybe most important dimensions of the china communist party threat that, i think does deserve attention and does requ you're talking about activity that is the itself for the most

part lawful but still presents vulnerabilities that the chinese government can ec loin. and we -- exploit if. and we need to figure out a better way to tighten that up. >> while i've got you director or wray, i have to say that we've had some terroristty over the last few months -- difficulty trying to really tap into the expertise that your agency brings. your organization comets to hold the role of lead for counterintelligence within the i.c.. you have a lot of very experienced counterintelligence agencies within your workor and they bring a valuing bl perspective to the table. and if even so this committee has really struggled to be able to get access to those indivi asked the f if bi to participate in hearings. -- fbi. so my question is why are we only allowed to hear from yourna approved talking the points? >> i'm not aware that that is a restriction that we have. >> well, i hope not because that's the presentation we got in our engage9ment with the -- engagement with the fbi which was unsatisfactory p. why

does the agent briefing this committee a v have to defer to headquarters and analysts to so -- provide -- [inaudible] on perceived threats? >> for the -- i mean, our south counterintelligence is a headquarters division. are you referring the people in the field office? >> what i'mereringing to when we bring someone in as a witnessan they say is, i'm sorry i have to defer or to headquarters, why are they here then? we can them to come in so we can learn what's taking place out there, and yet we get stonewalled and there's a back and forth about how they can't say this or that. in a secure setting might add. they've even suggested you're not cleared for that. and i have toy saw -- to say again, we are cleared for it, be oversee the agency. so i find if it insulting when i hear someone suggest we're not cleared to hear or see certain information in the ci space or any other space that the you have purview. >> so, obviously what you're saying concerns me greatly and met me have any my staff follow up so w can get specific

examples and i can see what we can do to mitigate that. >> thank you. i appreciate that. by time's expired. >> mr. kessler. >> thank you chair today. director burns thank you so much for your effort on achieving a peace agreement with the return are of the hostages and a cease fire. thank you to the president for calling for a ceasefire and the administration. i want to ask you about part of your testimony yesterday in the senate. in regards to gaza and the situation there. yesterday the senate select committee's hearing you said reality is there are children who are starving and that, quote, they're malnourishedded as a result of the fact that humanitarian assistance can't get to them. can you speak to what impediments there are to humanitarian assistance getting to civilians in gaza and who is respon i think the challenge is a very real one and i think it's just a fact that, you know, children face incredibly difficult circumstances. in fact, desperate spanishs especially in north -- circumstances, especially in north gaza. it's partly a function of

humanitarian assistance just not getting there in the quantities that are required. it's partly a funk of it not being -- a function of it not being distributed in conditions in which conflict is still going on. and if that's why as to emphasize yet -- yesterday i think it's so important that we continue to work with our partners in israel, car car that -- qatar and egypt to try to produce a deal, an agreement which would involve not only the release of a significant number of hostages and ultimately all of the hostages, because you know they're in desperate circumstances and so are their families but it would also provide for an exchange with a number a defined number of palestinian prettiers held by israel. it would allow for at least a 6-week ceasefire. and as a step toward more enduring arrangements. and, i think in terms of you mantarian assistance it would how practically $humanitarian only a very significant surge in humanitarian assistance coming in but under the conditions of

a ceasefire you could actually district it effectively. >> let me ask you director, and i appreciate all of that work. i think it's the the incredibly important in the dire situation there. but you are intimately familiar with what's gown on on the ground. you were in the middle of negotiations. you're longtime diplomat and a skilled negotiator. and is on top of all of keeping that humanitarian assistance from getting to the starving children of gaza? >> i think anybody who has an interest and i think all of us feel this deeply, to produce the kind of humanitarian assistance that so obviously is required has an interest in trying to get this deal done. i think as the president has a made clear israel has the right to defend itself especially after the brutish attack that hamas and nobody, nobody disagrees with that. >> right. and, but at the same time as the president has made clear israel has an obligation to try to protect civilians particularly innocent women and children. >> i have to get to one more issue after this -- >> can i just add one thing? if. >> sure, of course.

>> hamas also bears responsibility for that as well. >> sure. >> and if hamas if is interested in, you know, the fate of women innocent civilians in gaza, it will also work hard to pry -- to try to produce this kind of agreement. >> but you agree e that even in wartime, there are obligations by all sides that humanitarian assistance reaches civilians is that correct? >> yes i do. u.s. law and the hue a mantarian aid act -- quote when it is made known to the president that the government of such country prohibits or otherwise restricts directly or indirectly the transport or delivery of the united states humanitarian assistance is. so let me ask you a quick follow-up. as the president's principal advisors on matters of intelligence has the president made aware of the government of israel directly or indirectly prohibiting or otherwise restricting u.s. humanitarian assistance to gaza? >> i think and you know, director haines can speak to this too but of course we provide, you know, every that we have about -- >> sure. >> -- that issue.

like i said, i have one more question an important declassification question. has the president been made aware of this? math if9 miller made a very clear comment that israel did have some role at least in blocking assistance. does the president know that? >> mine, i think the president's -- i mean, i think the president's made clear that israel and should do more in terms of assuring that humanitarian assistance gets in. >> thank y'all. director wray and direct or burn in recent decades the united states intelligence community has worked to reform practices that led to the illegal disruption and infiltration of peaceful civil rights movements particularly in the 1950s '60s and '70s. i'm sure you're aware of some of the most e egregious examples including fbi's corporation against the reverend martin luther king jr. and cia's operation chaos. yesterday i sent a letter asking your agencies to declassify and release to the greatest extent possible materials related to --

of latino civil rights movement in any of your holdings, and i want about to ask whether you'llmmit to working with me to improve the historical record and insure or that u.s. intelligence agencies can correct the mistakes of the past with regard to surveillance of latino civil rights organizations. >> yes. >> we'll see what we can provide. >> thank you. i appreciate it and i yield >> director wray, have you read robert hur's special. counsel report? if. >> i have reviewed it. >> do you believe joe biden mishandled classified information? >> i'm not going to discuss the report. that's and the special counsel's report and -- >> in your opinion as director of the fbi do you believe he mishandled classified information? >> again i'm just going to refer to the report, and the special counsel can speak for himself. >> are you aware and this is breaking news, are you a aware there's an audio reporting of joe biden saying to the his goat writer in february 2016, quote i just found all the classified sufficient down stairs, end quote? are you aware of that a audio recording? >> i would respectfully refer

grow to the -- >> i'm asking you are you aware as the director of the fbi? >> am i aware of what? >> whether the audio exists of joe biden saying, quote i just found all the classified stuff downstairs, end quote -- >> again i'm just going to refer to the special counsel and his testimony and his report. >> it sounds like you might be aware of it then. in front of this very committee your predecessor jim copemy, testified -- comey said is he did not -- the crossfire hurricane, the counterintelligence investigation into president trump in 2016. toddress power by the fbi this committee included direction to the fbi in the iaa requiring notification to congressional l of any if counterintel investigation into a federal candidate for office. is there any counterintelligence investigation into either joe biden or donald trump? >> i would just say i'll refer

you to counsel -- >> it's not a question about the special counsel. that's a requirement of the iaa of the fbi. is there a counterintelligence investigation into either joe biden or donald trump? >> no investigation that i can confirm here, no. >> is there a counterintelligence investigation? >> again i'm not confirming any investigation into east candidate. >> are you aware that that you're required by the iaa to notify if congress of any if counter-- >> and we will, we will only ply already or complied with the law i? >> i believe we have been in compliance with the law. >> you believe you have been or has there been a notification to congress of any counterintelligence investigations of a federal candidate? >> i believe we have complied with the law. >> been a counterintel assessment conducted on either president biden or president trump? >> again there's no assessment that that i would confirm here way. i believe we have been in compliance with the law. >> how about on an immediate family member and by that i mean spouses or children? of either president biden or president trump?

>> again i'm not in the business of con firming -- confirming especially not in open assessments or anything like that when it comes todown intelligence, ma'am. >> so you will confirm in the classified setting when we ask you this question of whether there's a counterintelligence investigation? because you are aware that according to the iaa you are required by law to notify congress of any counterintelligence investigation not just for presidential candidates, but any federal candidate. >> we will come pry with the law. >> so you will answer this in a classified hearing later today? >> we'll comply with the law. >> and what's yourens -- understanding of the law? >> there's a whole series of oversight requirements we have related to counterintelligence z0matters. i'm not going to -- >> specifically the notification of congress into a federal candidate, how do you -- what is your understanding of the law? the. >> again i would wont to refer to the lawyers to make sure i'm appropriately complying with it, but i can tell you we're going to comply with the law and my understanding is that we have been. >> is your assessment that you're required to notify

congress into any counterintel investigation into any candidate? >> again i'm going to defer to the lawyers -- >> yf the fbi. they report to you. what is your understanding of the requirements in the iaa? >> we're going to comply with the law including whatever's in the iaa. >> i want to turn to the search warrants and the search in one with case of mar-a-lago, an unprecedented raid and a search working with joe biden's legal team. were you or your staff the did you have any communication about either the the search warrant on mar-a-lago or the search of documents working with joe biden's lawyer? was there any communication with joe biden of you or your team? >> not to my knowledge. >> any white house staff? >> by me or my team? >> >> by you or any personnel at the fbi. >> again i want to the make sure i've got your question right. by me or my staff with who about which? if. the white house staff about the execution of a search warrant on mar-a-lago or the

search working with joe biden's lawyers of classified information. >> not to my knowledge. >> what about the attorney general? >> i can't speak for the attorney general. >> no, did -- was there any communication with your staff with the attorney general or you regarding the execution of the search warrant or the search of joe biden's classified documents? if. >> well, any search would be, would be done in coordination with the can department of justice. as to who may have communicated with whom -- >> i'm asking you. >> -- i can't -- >> ooh i'm asking if you communicated. >> whether i communicated? >> with the attorney attorney general, prior or after of the execution of the search warrant on mar-a-lago. >> not. >> do you think it is -- >> hold on. prior or after? >> prior or after. ..

threat? >> i've been very clear about my national security concerns and we began all tik tok on all devices. flex macron not weighing in on the no. >> i agree with you i think it's a national security threat you cannot stay here today. >> i think tik tok represents security for us, they should exercise their right to access the account only to the it

national security concerns, correct? >> correct. >> my calendar and i introduced this bill from bite dance the parent company of tik tok controlled by the chinese. interestingly as we introduce the bill, it was markede energy and commerce committee in the morning about

medication went to thousands of users. stop a tik tok shutdown planning a total shutdown. cutting aside misinformation we are not calling for a ban on tik tok but what is interesting the ad using data associated with minor children to cause them to call many offices with thousands of phone calls. they questions such as the following, what is a congressman? let me have my tik tok back. in one case one member of the

committee had; imp and to speak with him and asking to come back. he talked about and going back including his ability to mobilize. this push notification popped up committing members of the committe change from immediate and that is the nature of the threat it was supposed. this is an example of public opinion had control the chinese communist party in this nature. >> is your describing it demonstrates why is a turn

americans need to understand we take for granted businesses and government and the government itself for all practices and purposes. whether they want to give the inese government the ability to control the data and whether they get the control to leverage data if they so choose. >> when you were talking about algorithm or example this probably menu, let me make clear, you cannot rule out chinese communist party ordering this to get a pop up. >> it illustrates this

recommendation the ability to influence operations that is difficult. >> that's the problem because the ccp ultimately controls bite dance and manipulate the program analyst data. this assessment you said tik tok run by a propaganda arm targeting both political parties during 2022, right? speak up. >> sorry, how just think -- >> tik tok is already been used to influence elections in 2022 in the same page says influence elections

in 2024 so you cannot rule out because using tik tok is a platform to influence 2024 elections. >> we could not. >> thank you. i yield back. >> i think the witnesses for being here. just to build on what he talked about, i do not feel we have been giving these issuing and all the information there is a serious lack of transparency. i appreciate what you've done but being a lawyer by professional former prosecutor, there may be things others and vice a versa so i asked we open

up and be transparent especially since the perpetrator attacked us that day seven years and he was killed but they but no reason for him it's or anything else, we need to know who they are. the second thing i'm concerned with what we are catching and even more concerned about those crossing our southern border and medicare administration known or suspected terrorist when we apprehend them at the border what part does the fbi have been tracking arresting are we security -- i think they are here to do us harm but

wouldn't the fbi but. >> one from was apprehended your names are run against the terror and we provide the hit back to dhs so they know this person is on the list. for instances where somebody gets into the country the task force is working with local law enforcement has the responsibly of apprehending those individuals. >> for suspected or known terrorist or one on the watchlist with the fbi respond to the person who landed to respond?

>> we knew someone was on the watchlist in a particular area there would be dhs and depending on the circumstances deploy to that seen in it depends on the circumstance. >> every interaction we have with the known suspected terrorist or somebody on the watchlist of the southern border or any border the fbi is responding and we know where they are and they are arrested or tracked within the united states. >> there are different categories we have concerns about. one of known or terrorist at the border, i'm

confident there is close up on them. >> the bigger concern is the situation where present a fake identification and there's not no way to know they are who they say they are somehow we find out there somebody on the list and we tried to find them. >> i only have 39 seconds. i look forward to seeing you next month in my district. the southern hemisphere and north africa we have a lot of challenges politically what things do the community need to

make a safer in america both the summons southern mr. and all over? >> i'm looking forward to my . in those areas we have tremendous challenges and i think the work there is largely making sure we have resources to provide all of the things we normally do to help what's happening in the event that affect these threats. i recognize given the time i can go through them but if there's anything particular. >> my time has expired.

>> russia has committed in ukraine last year crel coordinator and will forward and move forward in the accountability i understand and working and how my it on model for other instances. >> help us to produce this. the person weave a long history and knowledge working on accountability issues maybe a special field the sense that what you're trying to do is understand what information will be useful for accountability and

the various so understand the department of justice typically the ones making determinations in this area in order to produce accountability and we got together andhose ways releasable for folks working on these issues and promote greater awareness. one thing is working across the i see but also the department of justice consistently in writing on what is needed to produce the flow so it is not context with respect to chinese and according to the law so he's been helping

the community of interest said there is a gallery of chairs limitations and threats against the united states recently and a surge of those threats including groups who particularly don't get along common cause and what is causing those threats? >> these are all foreign terrorist organizations that leverage the conflict in the middle east as their excuse to serve as a rally cry. >> that were is causing this in the united states could you provide more detail? >> is depending on the

organization and for example a specific call against the united states so they are invoking both hamas a success in the conflict is on the verge trying to defend itself. >> does that include casualties? the articulation and l. >> i don't specific groups but some of them, sure. >> national security and helping us fight the war on terror do you believe it is possible to destroy a terrorist ideology organization with military force alone? >> the military force degrades

military troops and it is well-defined. ideology in my experience is with a better idea. >> with those better ideas include in your opinion? >> i'm setting aside for second the understandable goal of the terrorist groups. i think you have to provide more broadly but the sense of hope and purpose in thi case were palestinian so as a way of undermining it. >> thank you i yield back. >> i want to go looking for your service to our country and the men and women who serve under you allow us to live in the greatest country in the world.

want to focus on such bottle to the mall the last 15 months looking at how we extend reform 702 statutory obligation on back to 2018 was created every five years we figure out what to revise and fix how we make 702 better. and 18 and now responsibly this time. focus on three different areas how we will be fbi accountable making sure the abuses to over the last five or six years don't happen again how we make sure what happened with crossfire hurricane never happens again? and how do we bring more transparency and openness to open up a little bit more? are built does that. we produce the present the amount of analysts porky's inquiries. we prohibit evidence of a crime

and treat specific penalties and punitivesures. make fbi all compliance and mandate audits of trust in christ prohibit to suppress political forks religious beliefs here. making sure it never happens again, we create enhanced penalties that is for the by the court. we give the authority to prosecute contempt and prohibit the use of political police reports and order. lastly for the% of mandate transcripts foreclose on the court. we find counsel to scrutinize surveillance application and require the same judge to rule on extensions. this is the feedback on how we

fix this process and i would like to submit for the record a letter to speaker johnson that supports our bill from my pompeo john ratliff and robert o'brien in which they say section 702 say putting the requirement in the is not what they recommend. there is no doubt the value from the national security for what 702 has brought is immense over the last 15 plus years. we have some of the requirement is a part of this. in my view, county detrimental in the work we've done. can you comment on the requirement in?

>> a requirement would get for 702 to protect americans. the reality is the stage of an it's only after review the information this is information in our at. that's when we know for the car. to have a. recently we had information in a foreign terrorist in contact contact in the united states we did know the nature of the contract but we knew it was something that caused interest and would not have probable cause for a warrant but we run

that information through holdings and it allowed us to look at the content which showed us this is serious it's urgent. the individual had weapons components and other information information, i would never have happened and would never have happened is a warrant requirement. >> whe about how exponential 702 has been come up with last nine years i think about on of the leader in kabul i think iranian general and the leader of an islamic state of iraq and the isis leader and osama bin laden. five instances over the last nine years can you talk about how essential it was is another

counterterrorism action? >> it was crucial in each area you mentioned and another area 2022 united states took out both in kabul but also isis as well and 702 was crucial in the operation. know including the fentanyl crisis, 702 was an act and crucial. last year 70% illicit drug operation came as a result but there's aanding area of concerns and threats crucial to the protection of americans that hinge on the a. >> thank you mr. chairman. outlined the dire humanitarian situation the

urgency of getting humanitarian aid i applaud the president within the urgency of getting extended four to six weeks and the visits we have had and others you are negotiating that is thepossibility of finding a long-term solution in the middle east where israeli people can live in purity and feel secure only comes with the ability of. >> in my conversation it

becomes harder and harder. there is urgency to get that negotiate a longer-term solution is that correct? >> you are exactly right. >> you got here patiently let me ask i would have thought a long time ago would have the supplemental. it may question the funding is it accurate to say governmen funding will go u.s. production lines and jobs?

>> it is accurate to say because it will go to the industries and some of the governmental comes our agencies advise you they are being prosecuted for. >> that is very important but while we are defending supporting ukrainian month this is not to give away it is supporting american jobs and manufacturing it is very important. he spent a lot of time china we see that they are trying they

are no longer talking about the implications. can you comment on this setting : your assessment of what's happening? >> given the crowd the environment threats and not getting as much attention there been a number of rhetorical actions by kim jong-un more provocative in particular aimed at south korea and it is enemy number one

calling for an amendment to the constitution. is going up in the liaison office between the two countries things that are lifting up tensions and there is anxiety about the potential of military action including the northern women. our not will engage provocative behavior but it's not interested in escalating into a full on war.

his advancing as it has and for weapons stand up un security council and of the places to push back actions and clear. the counterprotest you that. >> as we have seen time and time again america is strong and projects that strength, american gynt and we project america is

less safe in the world is a safe safe.aelns bty a that?

>> we did an overall damage assessment with respect to all of the different documents etc.

and that's been provided to the hill to i think a gang of eight and we'll see whether or not we can provide it. >> who has possession of those documents now? >> the department of justice. >> i would look forward to mr. chairman the broader committee seeing the extent of these documents so they could have been fairly benign or they could have been incredibly serious so i would encourage the intelligence community to brief committee on the extent that the damage that those documents that apparently have been sitting for quite some time both in the university of pennsylvania center and in this house time with the senate vice president and now as president. switching to afghanistan. the u.n. is reporting that al qaeda has established eight new

training camps afghanistan and list the specific provinces were all qaeda currently has training camps including a new base with the panjshir. yet the threat assessment said al qaeda is not much of a thre. you disagree with the u.n. security council's assessment? >> can we approach this in closed session quick. >> i look forward to that. would you say at this point al qaeda's more less of a threat than in 2020? does al qaeda still intend to attack the homeland and the western interest if given the opportunity? >> they continue to have the not the capacity. >> will they grow that capacity if given the opportunity? the mixture. spoon of the u.n. seems to think they are growing that capacity so i look forward to whether you

agree or disagree with that's assessment and switching to russia. russia is selling an incredible amount of oil through india through pro curs in china. i think it's safe to say russia price of oil is high. does anyone disagree texas is how primarily russia is fueling its business in ukraine and elsewhere. so i think you'd also agree less oil and gas on the international market drives the price high and therefore both santay round for that matter have their work offers. is anyone disagree with that? so it's safe to say an lng ban on exporting american cleaner by the way more plentiful gas is indirectly fueling that? does anyone disagree with that?

i will take that as an know and in fact i will share with sat down with the speaker of the parliament from lithuania on the front lines of fresh and aggressive and and she said we buy 80% of our gas from those in louisiana and at some point they will have to go back to buying russian gas. we are literally our domestic energy policy is creating an fueling russia's war machine and when we are being asked to spend again by also supporting continued to support ukraine and we should stop putin apps away. we have to enact their own policies with both tehran and the assessment there's nothing on energy policy. in terms of gaza is hamas and honest after? did they tell the truth on a regular basis?

>> no. >> okay.igure coming from the hamas health ministry that is continually -- i don't think if putin was talking about a russian run health ministry and their casualties we would take that at face value. do we take the intelligence community take it at face value or to have some independent verification there >> we don't take it on face all you. as was indicated it's not that far off. >> but it is not accurate on its face. you don't take that it face value quick. >> we don't take it on face value. >> thank you nation neither should the present and national television and finally mr. wray domestic terrorism we have 16 universities teaching as part of their curriculum to book how to bomb oil pipelines 16

universities. i would consider that facilitate and domestic terrorism. would you quick. >> i don't know. >> i've liked ender into the record reporting how to come universities are teaching students to blow up oil pipelines and in their curriculum how do bombing oilhink you would agree that that's not acceptable. >> totally unacceptable. >> bicester wray can i get your consent to look into what i would call the left-wing domestic terrorism and not only the that. >> certainly i'll look into all of the comparisons including funding.'l thank you mr. chairman.

>> you've been waiting the entire hearing waiting to ask questions. >> director haines general burns general cruz i want to be clear i have called for a order to frame all the hostages held by hamas allow more humanitarian aid to enter gaza to relieve suffering especially the children of hopefully begin to set the stage for a two-stateion for the establishment of an independent palestinian state living in peace next to a secure israel. have any future palestinian state especially after october 7 attack whereas they committed atrocities killing and kidnapping innocent civilians. i also recognize the hamas leader is not starving or

suffering and is using hostages as a way to protect himself and biscuit and if he just turned himself in. so that won't happen. director burns he recently returned from yet another visit to the middle east to assist in negotiating a cease-fire which will release additional hostages held by hamas while increasing the flow of humanitarian aid into gaza. can you provide an update on how close we are to a deal? >> i think a deal and it won't be for lack of trying on our part. we are working closely with their egyptian very tough process and we can't guarantee success but the only thing i can is the alternatives are worse. innocent civilians who are suffering in gaza and their hostages and their families.

we will continue to work very this as i said and they are still a possibility as long as there's the smallest possibility is essential for all of us to work together. >> what are the major obstacles to achieving a cease-fire? >> there are lot of very complicated issues. of them. we can do it in closed session as well. i think it's possible to make progress. there are a number of very confiscated issues to sort through and i think it's absolutely urgent. >> i appreciate that that we don't take any numbers at face value. do they have a reliable assessment of the number of civilian casualties in gaza as well as the humanitarian >> thank you. we really do not have our own

collection to be able to tell you what the numbers are. what we look to as indicated the gaza ministry and we talk to and largely rely on israeli counterparts and the numbers are not that different. i think the amount of time to roughly 31,000 the idf was actually supporting about 28. so it is in the challenge course is the health ministry is not differentiating civilian fighters in that context so we have a broad range and very challenging for us to independently corroborate effectively what the numbers are. >> additionally what are the issues i mentioned a few weeks ago that there was a concerned

about escalating tensions in the absence of the cease-fire once ramadan started particularly significant concern tax. >> it is one i think the west bank is a combustible place right now for a variety of reasons. there's a spillover of the violence in the west bank. it is in everybody's interest to try to get the cease-fire hostage deal because that is the best way in many respects to calm the situation and iranian proxies from at 11 to the houthis in of this crisis and the last cease-fire hostage release took part in the latter part of

november and we all observed the cease-fire that resulted. >> thank you and with that yield back. >> thank you mr. chairman. it's such an important opportunity for the american people to geie of our intelligence community and to assess the worldwide threat had had views expressed from both republicans and democrats about those threats whether it's from space or from another country or a terror group. of course they are the ones that are most important are the ones that affect the american people in their daily lives and their daily communities. we have heard a lot starting with chairman turner and mr. garcia and mr. kelly and others about the threats we have encountered along our border and these are the people on the terror watchlist across the border better in the united states that we have encountered

and therefore we know they are in the united united states and we have asked them to leave united states that we don't have any idea of how many people across the border with this chaos 7 million encounters that have distracted or cbp uniform

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