>> order.

the chair recognizes the gentleman from california, mr. cárdenas for five minutes. thank you, madam chairwoman. i appreciate this opportunity for this committee to have this important hearing regarding tiktok and its effect on the american people, especially the american children and the potential effect, not potential, but the effects it has had and may have in the future when it comes to our democracy and

misinformation and disinformation that permeates on tiktok. it is unfortunate that, i think, most americans or most parents think tiktok is this innocent little thing where kids get on there and do a little dance or something like that. tiktok as much, much more, as some of my colleagues, and i thank them for bringing up some of these serious issues, literally life and death issues, that tiktok is right in the middle of. and also, what i would like to witness to acknowledge is that it appears that my colleague, miss cammack, brought up those two posters and since then tiktok has taken them down. since then, not before then. are you aware of that, mr. chew? >> i was briefed during the break that they were taken down, congressman. >> how do you feel about the fact that it was up for apparently 40 something days, 41 days, and yet in the middle of this hearing it was brought directly to your attention, and

as a result, it has been taken down so quickly? >> it goes to show the enormous challenge that we have to make sure that although the vast majority of users come for a good experience, we need to make sure that bad actors do not violate. >> yes, and the way that you can make sure, mister chew, is you can make sure that you choose to invest more resources, more money, into more ability to pull down damaging and deadly information from your platform. are you investing more and more and more every day into bringing down that kind of content? that is my question. are you? >> yes. and i'm committed to investing more in this regard, to stay on top of it. >> right here in the united states, many languages are used and spoken. for example, tiktok in the united states is being used in many languages. specifically when it comes to spanish language, are you dedicating more resources today than you did months ago or years ago, on making sure that

you are combing through that content to make sure that if the content is dangerous or damaging or deadly, that you are bringing it down as quickly as possible? >> yes, we are investing in more spanish language content moderation. and yes, once we identify violating content, we take it down as soon as possible. >> thank you. and your testimony today is not the only opportunity for you to commit to answering questions to this committee. so i would like you to forward to this committee. again, i'm not asking for trade secrets, what i would like to get some semblance of understanding as to how much you are investing with the number of bodies and the number of people at the number of resources in making sure that you are investing more in pulling down content that is either deadly or dangerous on your platform. can you forward that to the committee? >> i will check with my team and get back to you. >> thank you very much. i appreciate that opportunity. as was mentioned earlier, it might sound a little funny, but you have in fact been one of the few people to unite this

committee. members, republicans and democrats, to be in agreement that we are frustrated with tiktok. we are upset with tiktok. and yes, you keep mentioning that there are industry issues that not only tiktok basis, but others. you remind me a lot of mics ochberg. when he came here i said to my staff, you reminds me of fred astaire. a good dancer with words. and you are doing the same today. a lot of your answers are a bit nebulous. they are not yes or no. so i would like to ask you a question. yes or no, is your revenue going up at tiktok month over month? or year over year? >> yes, our revenue is going up year over year. >> and with that, some of the answers i would like you to forward to this committee are, are you investing more and more money to make sure that the content that is dangerous and or deadly, that you are investing more resources in that aspect of your expenditures and your commitment to your users and

your organization? >> yes, i commit to that. we are investing more and we will continue to do that. >> okay. my last question is this, are you a chinese company? >> tiktok is a company that is now headquartered in singapore and los angeles. >> okay. >> we are not available in mainland china. our users are not -- in a lot of countries around the world. >> okay. is there a corporation that has any authority above tiktok? >> tiktok is a subsidiary of finance, which is founded by a chinese bit -- founder. >> and bytedance is a chinese company? >> bytedance owned many businesses that operate in china. >> is it or is it not a chinese company? >> congressman, the way we look at it it was founded by chinese -- >> i'm not looking how you look at it. fact, is it a chinese company or not? for example, bill is an american company. they have activities all over the world. is it a chinese company?

>> i frequently have these discussions with others on what is a company that is now global. >> that's okay. i prefer you would answer the question and stop dancing globally on it. madam chair, my time has expired. thank you very much. >> the gentleman yields back. the chair recognizes the gentleman from california, mr. obernolte. >> think you very much. mr. chew, it's nice to see you again. if i could bring us back to 30,000 feet for a moment, i want to talk about what we are afraid of here, what we fear might happen. social media companies and tiktok is not unique in this, gather a tremendous amount of user data and use powerful a.i. tools to use that data to make a really accurate predictions of human behavior. then they seek to manipulate that behavior. that is something that is not just tiktok, it's all our social media companies that are doing this. ultimately, the solution is to an comprehensive federal privacy legislation that will prevent that kind of behavior, or at least allow users to consent to it.

that is something i know the chair is working on, the ranking member. i hope this committee will act on that this year. the specific concern here though is in regards to tiktok. that this type of capability falling into the hands of foreign countries, is something that has national security implications. that is why congress is getting involved on this issue. so i know that you have proposed project texas in an effort to alleviate these fears so i want to ask you some specific technical questions about project access, and the way you believe it will solve this problem. one of the things that you have said in testimony is that part of project texas will have engineers at oracle going through the source code for tiktok. how large is that kobe's? >> well, it's not small. but it's not just oracle, congressman, we are also inviting other third-party monitors. we are in the process of figuring out the best partners. >> we are talking millions, tens of millions of lines of code, how big is the base? >> it is significant, but it's

something that we believe can be done. again, i want to say that i have not heard of another company, american or not -- >> i understand. >> to have this happen. >> you are in a kind of unique possession to answer these concerns of congress. so are they going through the code project the app, or the app and the server code? >> i can get back to you on the technical details, but it's comprehensive including the software that powers, a lot of the software, that powers the experience. >> along with that take? >> i need to get back you -- to you on the timeline, but we are progressing quite well on project texas. whenever we hit a milestone, i commit to be very transparent about it. >> okay. so i'm wondering, because i'm also concerned as a software engineer, about the process in which new code is introduced into the code base. do you use a software configuration management system at tiktok? >> the way we plan for new code to be done is that, even before the code becomes like, it has to be reviewed. the changes have to be reviewed.

>> okay, so you are talking about a code review. that's another question i have for you. that's good. so the code review, is it done with the team of engineers or just with a single engineer? >> it's going to be a team effort. yeah. >> okay. and that's going to be done at oracle or elsewhere? >> it's going to be done in one of our transparency center so that, we still need to make sure the code itself is secure. so yeah. >> what i'm hearing you say is that even though the coat might be written by someone not in the united states, before the code is integrated it is reviewed in a code review by a team of engineers within the united states? >> that's the plan. >> okay. and back to the question about the software configuration management system. how do you manage the integration of that code change into the rest of tiktok kobe's? >> the long and short of it is we have built a team of american postural with security conduct -- credentials. who you believe worked for the secret service. >> what solution is it? >> i would need to check and

get back to you on the details. >> okay, specifically what i would like to know is to make sure that this isn't something that the top has created custom. many companies do that. that would mean you would have to review the source code for that as well for security. >> yes. >> how do you protect against threats like the malicious actor being hired, not by tiktok, but by oracle, for example, or by u.s. ds? >> the approach that most companies take these things is to have several layers of monitoring to make sure that everything that someone has reviewed, there's a secondary review. so one malicious actor is not able to create the damage. but you rightly point it out, these different problems are industry problems. every company has to deal with them. >> let me ask you a specific question about that. in thinking about, if i were a malicious actor, a software engineer on one of your project, how i would go about writing malicious code. i would not put it right there

and say, hey, i malicious. i would put unrelated lines of coded different sections of the code that work together to do something malicious. how do you think that could get caught? >> again, we have to rely on third-party experts. i think there are enough experts to catch these things. the work on data security, all data security, is never perfect. but we can have a lot of oversight to keep it safer than any other experience. >> i appreciate the effort, my concern is that i don't believe it is technically possible to accomplish what tiktok says it will accomplish through project texas. i just think there are too many back doors through that process to allow that to be possible. and i think a malicious actor would succeed in inserting malicious code in there if they wanted to. i'm out of time. i hope we get an opportunity to talk more about this. i yield back madam chair. >> the gentleman yields back, the chair recognizes the gentlelady from michigan, mrs. dingell. >> thank you, chairman rodgers,

and member pallone, for holding this meeting, and mr. chew for testifying today. as screen time increases, so do inherent risks. and with our liberation and popularity of new social media platforms, so does the potential to reach dangerous, provocative, and often caramel -- harmful content. my fear, the abuse of collected data. so represent -- as a representative from the state of michigan, i can speak from experience on how social media has been used to target members of the michigan delegation, including a plot to kidnap our governor, and how it can be weaponized to perpetuate harms towards individuals and communities. and you saw it firsthand how it targeted the chair of this committee. today, many of my colleagues on both sides of the aisle have raised legitimate concerns about protecting children online, misinformation and

securing our data. concerns that i share, that has been said by many of my colleagues, our bipartisanly shared. i think in many ways, these myriad of issues highlight the need for comprehensive data privacy legislation that would ensure the safety and -- integrity of every american's data, on every social media platform, and mitigate potential harm's. one important area of concern i have regarding data collection is geolocation data. how it can be abused. i've seen it abused. i have seen women die because it has been abused. the subject has dangerous implications for survivors of domestic violence, people seeking medical care, and protecting children from potential predators. mr. chew, in your testimony you wrote that current versions of the app do not collect precise or approximate gps information from u.s. users.

yes or no answers, please. mr. chew, have any prior versions of tiktok's app collected precise gps information from u.s. users? yes or no? >> yes, from back in 2020. about two years ago. >> are there currently tiktok users still old old versions of the app that collect precise gps information from u.s. users? yes or no? >> there could be, but it's a small percentage. >> still dangerous. >> has tiktok, at anytime, had precise gps information collected from the u.s. users into algorithms to serve user ads? yes or no? >> i would need to check on the details because we do not currently collect that, so i need to check on the details. >> yeah, i'm short there is a yes there. has tiktok at any had precise gps information collected from u.s. users, into algorithms, to

make inferences about users? yes or no? >> i'm not sure of the specifics. >> i would like answers. yes or no. has tiktok at anytime sold precise gps information collected from u.s. users, yes or no? >> we do not sell data to see data brokers if that is the question. >> and you have never done that? >> i don't believe so. >> has tiktok at anytime shared with third parties, influences that were made using, in part or in whole, precise gps information collected from u.s. users? yes or no? >> congresswoman, i need to check on the specifics. but i can tell you is right now we do not collect precise gps location data in the united states. >> all right. does tiktok still use inferences that were made using, in part or in whole, precise

gps information collected from u.s. users? >> i'm sorry, could you repeat that? >> does tiktok still use inferences that you have gained, that were made using in part or in whole, precise gps information collected from u.s. users? in your algorithms. >> that would be a very technical question that i would have to check to get back to you. >> has tiktok at any time provided the chinese government with either precise gps information collected from u.s. users, or inferences made from that data? >> that i can give you a straight answer. no. >> mr. chew, even if congress were to ban tiktok, i am concerned china or others would still have access to u.s. consumer data by purchasing it through data brokers. will you commit not to sell any of tiktok data to data brokers now or in the future? >> we do not do that.

we do not sell data to data brokers now. >> will you commit to not do it in the future? >> there are certain members of the industry to do this. i think this has to be broad legislation to help the whole industry address this problem. >> i think i'm out of time. thank you. madam chair, i yield back. >> the gentlelady yields back. the chair yield five minutes to the gentleman from alabama, mr. palmer. >> think you. when the chinese communist government bought a share bytedance, it's been described is the chinese communist government's way of quiet reform control. and companies have little choice and selling a stake to the government. if they want to stay in business. what i'd like to know is, when the chinese communist party moved to buy shares of bytedance, were you informed beforehand? yes or no? >> no, congressman. bytedance hasn't -- >> where you or anyone at tiktok asked about your opinion

of the sale of shares of bytedance to the chinese communist government? yes or no? >> this hasn't happened. >> did you or anyone employed by or affiliated with tiktok state any objections or concerns about the possibility that the chinese communist government, once they had shares in bytedance, exercising control over content, using your platform for conducting misinformation campaigns, or restrictions and showing nothing is posted reflect badly on the chinese communist government, or for surveillance and data collection for use against anyone? did any of you or anyone affiliated with tiktok raise any concerns about that? >> congressman, we do not -- >> i did not ask you the. >> we do not promote -- >> did you raise any concerns about it because that is why we are here? >> we do not promote or remove -- >> i did not ask you that. on behalf of the chinese government. >> if you communicate in any form or fashion with the directors of bytedance, that

there might be concerns about government control over content, yes or no? you either did or you didn't. >> congressman -- >> you did. >> i want to make this clear, we do not remove or promote content at the request of the chinese government. >> tiktok insiders have already said that the company is tied at controlled by bytedance. it even gets down to the hours they work. so obviously you didn't say anything. there is a serious concern by chinese companies, privately held companies, about doing anything against what the chinese communist government wants. i want to ask you this. does tiktok scream against manipulative content from child predators? yes or no? >> we screen, yes. >> do you screen -- >> we do. -- >> how about drug cartels? >> drug cartels, child predators, this is all violated. >> the drug cartel is engaged in a police chase with spanish authorities and posted it on tiktok and got over 1 million views. why wasn't that taken down? and are you doing it with human

traffickers are terrorists? do you withhold content from nations that might be committing crimes against humanity? yes or no? >> congressman, our platform is based on freedom of expression. >> yes or no. i know you talk about that, but yes or no? do you screen against content from nations that commit crimes against humanity? >> congressman, our users come -- >> yes or no? yes or no? >> you can present the points of use you want. >> let me ask you this. your vice president for the americas, is he part of the team that helped you prepare for this meeting? yes or no? >> can i clarify who you mean? >> michael beckerman. >> yes, he is. >> where is he at this moment? >> i'm sorry? >> where is mr. beckerman at this moment. >> he's probably here. >> no, you know he's here. he's sitting right behind you. >> i want to know when mr.

beckerman was on with jake tapper on cnn and asked repeatedly to condemn chinese communist government's treatment of the uyghurs, when the treatment has been classified by the united states as a genocide, but you don't report classifies it as a crime against humanity, why after multiple questions, mr. recommend refused to address that? are you afraid of the chinese communist government? >> no, because you can find the content on our platform. any content -- >> why couldn't your vice president of public policy, that is set up public policy pretty americas, in an american, on american television news channel, what can he say, why couldn't he condemn that? >> i think it's very important to look at our platform. if you use and open our app and search for any -- >> i'm not asking about your personnel now. personnel is policy. everyone in this room

understands that, except maybe you. let me just conclude with this. and i hate to bring this up, because this is part of the step of said, deception is fundamental to the chinese communist party's political, intelligence and military strategy. and you have repeatedly used the word transparent throughout this hearing. and every time you said it, what i've heard is deception. i yield back. gentleman yields back. the chair recognizes the gentleman from texas mr. veasey for five minutes. >> thank you madam chair. i have got to tell you -- as mr. chew, a father of a 16 year old that likes social media a lot of your evasiveness today in answering many of these questions really disturbs me. i can tell you that the teenagers of today, they really don't want to be on facebook. they want your platform. you are asked to come before this committee to testify about many things.

a lot of us are worried about our kids, our personal data. as the co-chair of the congressional voting rights caucus, i'm also worried that tiktok is the world's most powerful, and extensive, propaganda machine, allowing the chinese communist party to use tiktok's platform to influence public opinion and undermine the integrity of our democratic elections. i have a report called, tiktok and facebook failed to detect elect election disinformation in the u.s. while youtube succeeds. this was published by the non profit -- society team at nyu. the purpose of the tests to detect platforms like tiktok and whether or not they can detect and take false political ads targeted at u.s. voters, young voters, ahead of last year's midterm elections. according to this report 94% of election disinformation ads tested were approved by your platform.

again, that is 90% of ads containing false and misleading election information went undetected on tiktok. just to add some color to the type of misleading ads that were approved by tiktok this included ads that we're live on tiktok that said the wrong election day. and i can encourage people to vote twice. you do know that voting twice as a felony, mr. chew? you do know that it is illegal to vote twice? >> congressman, any misinformation that comes around political action is something we take very seriously. >> i am particularly troubled by this type of information because it can run rampant on tiktok. given that tiktok, again, y'all are appealing to a very young and diverse user base. that is exactly the people that we have seen targeted, time and time again, with voter suppression campaigns run by malicious actors. mr. chew, do you agree with me that it is completely unacceptable that 90% of these

ads were undetected on your platform. can you detail for us, right now, tiktok's policy regarding election misinformation and paid political ads and how the company monitor such information and how you plan to get that number down to zero? >> and while, tiktok is a place where i use it to come and express their points of view freely. we do take dangerous misinformation, particularly around election, very seriously. we will work with third-party experts to identify misinformation -- >> you call allowing 90% of false political content on your platform to be, you call that, you define that as, taking it seriously? >> i need to look into the specifics. i am not sure where that number came from. i can tell you, congressman, i'm the only platform that i know that doesn't actually take political ads. we do not accept money. i don't think other platforms can say that. >> mr. chew, can you detail how

you responded to that report? did you respond to that report i just mentioned? >> i need to look at the specifics of the report, congressman. i can get back here on that. >> mr. chew, i want to shift to project texas. i know that we have discussed this initiative throughout today's hearing but i want to dive deeper into your notion that promises about project texas should give us any confidence in tiktok's ability to localize u.s. data and discontinue access to that data to bytedance employees and china. why? because we have already had a tiktok executive appear before congress and give sworn testimony about the comfort we should take in tiktok's u.s. based resources. while tiktok data security practices were being scrutinized by the u.s. government, unfortunately we have since found out from a -- from journalists in recorded conversations that those assurances were worthless. in your testimony you also mentioned that oracle has already begun inspecting tiktok

source code and has access to the platforms recommendation algorithm. why should this give the american public any great assurances, particularly given that oracle now owns a stake in tiktok and stands to gain militarily the more revenue tiktok and its algorithm generates? >> not only is tiktok unprecedented in protecting user data in interest, we are inviting for politics to come in and monitor this. we will be transparent in that process. this is beyond most, all companies that i know of in our industry. >> thank you madam chair. i am out of town. >> the gentleman yields back. the chair recognizes the gentleman from florida for five minutes, mr. done. >> thank you very much, madam chair. mr. i am aware that arriving in d.c. this week you arrived on tiktok. you had 150 million u.s. users. 5 million u.s. businesses. that represents a lot of data. you also referenced your

appearance before this committee as a chance to share all that tiktok is doing to protect americans from using the app. mr. chew, has bytedance spied on americans at the direction of the chinese communist party? >> no. >> madam chair, i would like to enter into the record this october 20th 22 forbes article entitled tiktok parent bytedance plans to use tiktok to monitor physical location of specific u.s. citizens. >> without objection. so ordered. >> thank you. the project is citing that this beijing league team we're going to follow individual american citizens. i ask you again, mr. chew, has bytedance spied on american citizens. >> i do not think that spying is the right way to describe it. this is -- >> we can differ on the. >> this is ultimately an internal investigation. >> any tiktok a bytedance data that is viewed, stored, or

passenger china is subject to the law of china. one party authoritarian state hostile to all american standards of privacy. china's court system reportedly falls under the chinese communist party. like fentanyl analogues which we know are also manufactured in china, although they are illegal there, i fear tiktok will grow into a much bigger problem. a cancer, if you will. i'm deeply worried that it may be too late to stop the spread of this cancer. like fentanyl, another china export, which causes addiction and death, dangerous algorithms in the chinese communist party are not good for americans. not good for our families. and definitely not good for the united states. mr. chew, prior to serving as the cfo bytedance, you served as the cfl director operations from shelby from 2015 to 2021. is that correct? >> are you asking me in 2015,

would you mind repeating that? >> madam chair -- i would like to enter another article into evidence. this is from the national cybersecurity center in lithuania. >> without objection, so ordered. >> this report outlines numerous data security risks including the privacy of european years was violated in clear cases of on authorized collection of user data by show me. this is exactly what many of my colleagues have been talking about today. worse yet, show me phones sold to europeans had a list of 449 words and phrases which would be automatically censored on the device. censored phrases included, the voice of america, and democratic movement, among others. this analysis was conducted on devices that were manufactured and sold europeans while you were the head of operations for show me. it does not follow that you

expect us to believe that you would not censor, on behalf of the chinese communist party, since you have already done so. >> i want to be unequivocal on this. we do not move tiktok content -- >> you strive on your mission to inspire creativity bring joy to american users. i assure you that that is not the mission or goal of the chinese communist party which runs the peoples republic of china but tiktok's parent company bytedance is domiciled. and >> charm and you can check with our users to see the experience that they are getting. >> the knee you have not given straightforward answers. we do not find you credible on these things. with that, madam chair. i would like to yield the balance of my time. >> congressman you've given me no time and your questions. i reject the characterizations. >> who are you appealing to, dr. dunn? mr. obernolte? >> i thank you, madam chair. mr. chew i would like to continue our discussion on project texas, if we could.

part of the project texas was interviewers in oracle would -- confirm that they were free of foreign influence. i have a question about that. we are talking about a i, i very generic term. do you use machine learning to influence the algorithms at tiktok? >> this gets very technical, we have published several blocks about this which i can forward to your team. yes it is mainly based on interests signals. >> here is my question, how could looking at the algorithm confirm that it is free from floor and influence? the algorithm is neural that architecture -- how do you train that? the influence is an external factor. i would appreciate it if he could give us -- i see we are out of time again. a written answer to that. again, i'm concerned that what you are proposing with top project texas just doesn't have the technical capability of providing us the assurances that we need. i yield back, madam chair.

gentleman yields back, the chair recognizes miss castor, miss custer is not here. miss barragan for five minutes. >> thank you, madam chair. >> mr. chew, tiktok warns users when content is graphic and disturbing unlabeled state affiliated media counts to ensure the viewers are not seeing propaganda. does tiktok provide similar information to spanish speaking users, as well as english speaking users? >> i believe so, congressman. i will have to get back to you on that. >> okay. do you know if tiktok has a specific strategy for tackling spanish language content that violates its trust and safety guidelines? >> we do. i can get back to you on the specifics on that. >> when offensive english language such terms are

hashtags or block for violating community guidelines in english, it's a spanish translation of the term of psych automatically blocked as well? >> i believe so. but let me check the specifics and get back to you. >> do you have any idea how many people you have light working at tiktok that addresses spanish misinformation? >> i know ballpark it is quite a significant team. i can get back to you on the details. >> he said significant, are you saying it's -- you have a ballpark at all that you can give us? would you say 10% of your force or, it is an important number so i want to be precise. i can go back to you. do you happen to know how tiktok, if tiktok effectively ensure that spanish speaking either is between the ages of 13 17 and not being targeted by ads promoting harmful content? >> we have very strict policies for our users who are in the teenage age group.

regardless of what language they speak. we want to make sure that they are given a very safe experience on our platform, regardless of language say -- >> i know. i am trying to ascertain resources you may be putting into spanish speaking, and spanish language. last year the congressional spanish congress met with tiktok. this was one of the conversations and a source of the discussion, addressing spanish language disinformation and misinformation. it remains an urgent priority for the congressional hispanic caucus as hispanics across the country increasingly turned social media for violent formation. we heard earlier in the hearing that there was video -- a tiktok post threatening the chair of the committee. it took some 40 days to take it down. i guess i am a little concerned. if your team doesn't have the resources and the capability to flag that, what kind of capability is it going to have

to bring down misinformation, disinformation, two spanish speakers, which i am assuming is a smaller fraction of the workers that you have tiktok. >> to talk is a place for, all of our users to come and express their very diverse views. we are open to all ethnicities, we are open to everyone to come and express their views. it is our commitment to ensure that the safety of those users, regardless of the language, of course the spanish language user base is super important to us. we need to make sure we continue to invest in that. >> you don't have an answer them? okay, i will look forward to you're coming back. we have heard a lot about the concerns about children who may be on tiktok. mr. chew, at what age do you think it would be appropriate for a young person to get on tiktok? >> we have three different experiences here in the united states. there is an experience for under 13 -- >> i'm asking what you think

would be the appropriate age to have a child get on tiktok? >> our approach is to different different shaded experiences for different age groups and that the parents have a conversation with their children to decide what is best with their family. >> so you think that there is a sufficient safety mechanism for an eight year old to be able to access tiktok? >> an eight year olds experience would be so highly restricted that every single piece of content that he or she will see will be dictated by common sense, or third-party child safety experts, and the eight year old will not be able to post. the eight year old will not be able to see any person live feed. zero advertising in that experience. i believe, yes, it is an appropriate experience for the year old. >> why don't you let your eight year old child on tiktok? >> i have seen these news articles. i would like to address that. my kids live in singapore. at singapore we do not have the under 13 experience. if they lived here in the united states i would let them use the under 13 experience. >> you're saying it is because

the country you live and doesn't have those same mechanisms? is there a reason you do not have the same mechanisms everywhere? >> in principle we want to provide a good experience for our users in general. we do not want to monetize from people under 13. in the u.s. we are -- compliant. part of that we would deem, i would like to get the specifics right, we would deem particular type of audience, it's a mixed audience at. i want to make sure that that's right. as a result of that we have to provide are under 13 users, as well. >> my time is expired. thank you, yield back. >> -- yields back. the chair recognizes the gentleman from utah, mr. curse. >> mr. chew mine children are getting ready to run a marathon. i notice that they will be running for about as long as you'll be sitting in that chair today. unfortunately i only get you for five minutes instead of a marathon i would like to do a sprint with you. i want to go back up to that 30,000 feet level.

would you agree with me that section 230 was created to protect platforms like yours from lawsuits when you distribute information? >> -- >> don't overcomplicate it. >> i understand. yeah. >> so would you agree that there is a line drawn between publishers of information and distributors of information, specifically in the section 230 language. >> i think that 2:30 the re-complex topic. >> remember, but remember we are at 30,000 feet. you're platform distributes content that other people content. one of the early challenges to section 230 was when a well-refused to take down a post of somebody that had inappropriately put down a phone number, associated the phone number with oklahoma city bombings. the courts ruled a whale was not liable for that post, because of section 230. i want to do a hypothetical -- who i'm going to do the absurd to try to make a point. here let's suppose, hypothetically, that aol,

instead of just posting that actually wanted to magnify that voice. they took out an ad in the wall street journal linking the phone number with the oklahoma city bombing. but supposed and stop there, but they went further and they took out a super bowl ad linking that phone number to the oklahoma city bombing. let's suppose, hypothetically, they didn't stop there. they sent a flyer to every home in america linking that phone number to the oklahoma bombing. i guess the question is, would aol have moved from a distributor to a publisher in this made-up example? >> congressman, respectfully i -- >> i think everyone can see that they would. this is not our question, moving that far away from intent would've moved into publisher. my question is, platforms are protected because they post content. but i want this room to see, not just view, that the protection has limits. if a will move to a distributor,

instead of a publisher, they move outside of those limits. let's talk algorithm super quickly. we have thrown that word around a lot today. let me hear again, 30,000 feet, we will use another platform so it's not sensitive. pinterest. i like to go on pinterest. my wife and i are building a home. building a yard right now. if you went on my pinterest page you would see swing stats and things made for my grandkids. another hypothetical, let's suppose that there is some dubious intent inside of pinterest. they decide they want to influence john curtis with these algorithms. they want me to believe it is the end of the world. all the sudden now i'm buying bomb shelters instead of swing sets for my kids. have they become a publisher? and should not be protected by section 230? if you don't confident -- i'm pretty sure the room understands that they across the slant. you can tell me if you think they have or not. >> congressman, i would have to study that specific example and go back to you. >> it's a hypothetical but you can see that at some point they

have crossed a line. they have become a publisher and a distributor. we have touched on this today but i want to be super specific. is it possible that tiktok had enough data, could get enough data on me but you could use artificial intelligence, and your algorithms, and machine learning to write an algorithm that could persuade me to change how i view a policy issue? >> does that possibility exist? >> -- i will stay very high-level. the way we look at it is our users come in and express whatever views they want. >> that is not the point. the point is you could write an algorithm that could change. we've actually seen the washington post reported to stop the mueller campaign shows how tiktokers are attacking climate change. i think that is fine and good unless somebody has interjected into that and magnified or diminished voices in that. what i am proposing to you today is that pushes them across the line from a distributor to a publisher if

they make those decisions. serious allegations have been made against your platform, and others. many of them here today. you are not new to these allegations. this is not a platform. sometime ago there was an allegation that a platform recommended isolated videos. we have talked about the weight loss. videos we didn't talk about it but stealing the elections. whatever the motivation, i am trying to point out that as you move by a publisher by manipulating this data with algorithms the move out of the protection to 30. do you see that logic? >> this is a very complex -- >> i understand it's very complex. but do you see the logic? in your mind, has tiktok ever stuff to cross the line from e distributor to a publisher? >> congressman, again, this is a very complex topic. i would need to get back to you on the. >> i understand that. finally, very quickly, you produced a video that is now

well known about your beauty here today in washington d.c.. can you tell me, 100%, that no tiktok employees manually manipulated that to get no views? >> i tracked. as far as i know there was no boosting. i went viral organically. >> madam chair, i'm sorry i am out of time. i yield my time. >> the gentleman yields back. the chair recognizes miss rochester for five minutes. >> thank you madam chair. mr. chew, as i am sure you know, this hearing is part of an ongoing effort by a committee to examine data security and other concerns with social media companies broadly. i have to tell you that i came to this hearing interested to hear the actions that tiktok is taking to combat misinformation, protect our young people, and ensure our national security. i have not been reassured by anything you said so far. i think, quite frankly, your testimony has raised more

questions for me than answers. and some of my colleagues have already noted, flat forms like tiktok and easily manipulate and undermine user autonomy with addictive features, invasive data collection practices, and disseminating misinformation and disinformation. that is why i will be reintroducing the detour act to mitigate this harm. mr. chew, yes or no, would you oppose legislation that banned the use of intentionally manipulative design techniques that trick users into giving up their personal information? >> in principle -- >> it's just a yes or no. >> in principle i agree that that kind of practice cannot -- >> can tiktok users opt out of targeted ads, yes or no? >> at this moment in time we believe it is a very important part of the experience. >> yes or no. time is ticking. >> it is an important part of the experience. >> even if someone wants targeted ads, do you give a

user clear opportunity to prevent tiktok from using tools like pixels to collect their data and track them off of the tiktok platform? >> we give our users a lot of tools to control their privacy settings on our app. by the way, if you are below 16 it is private by default. >> as of 2022 response to a letter i wrote to your company on abortion misinformation, tiktok asserted several actions to address abortion misinformation. in light of recent attacks on safe and effective medication abortion, i remained worried by this misinformation. following on the jets questioned, how many postage actually take down that contained abortion misinformation? >> content and views on both sides of abortion are allowed on our platform. it is just freedom of expression. if it is dangerous misinformation we rely on third-party experts to identify and remove. them i can get back to you on

specifics. >> please get back to us on the specifics. mr. chew, in your testimony you indicated tiktok has taken several steps to implement project texas. you said you spent, in your testimony, 1.5 billion dollars. you have hired 1500 full-time employees. can i ask for some specifics about the implementation? this 1.5 billion dollars, what was a use for? the employees? where the people you already have that you transferred over? what types of rules do they have? >> okay. this billion and a half u.s. dollars are spread across many things including the infrastructure we have to build, the migration of the data to a new cloud infrastructure, all of the third party security partners we are hiring, and of course the new employees. this team will now be run by a gentleman who used to be -- who spent his career as a chief security officer with other companies. another gentleman who used to work, i believe -- >> if you could just follow up

with us? that would be very helpful. >> i will. >> we would really like to understand the details. where is the money going? how many people? what will they be doing? as i put a finer point on this, one of my concerns is, we came here hoping to take some actions that would alleviate our concerts at fears we. have family members, we have a lot of folks here that our constituents who are content creators. for us we were looking for action. we wanted to see, make us feel like we really can trust, as you use the word. what i leave here with is thinking about the fact that your company -- i learned that you have personalized data advertising for kids as young as 13. we have heard until project texas is supposedly stood up engineers and to have access to personal data. that means the engineers and china have access to personal data of 13-year-olds in the

united states. i think but that really summarizes why you see so much bipartisan consensus and concern about your company. i imagine that that is not going away anytime soon. thank you madam chair, i yield back. >> the gentlelady yields back. yield to the lady from arizona, ms. lesko for five minutes. >> thank you madam chair. mr. chew, do you agree the chinese government has persecuted the uyghur populations? >> congresswoman, if you use our app and you open it you will find our users who get all sorts of content. >> that is not my question. do you agree that the chinese government has persecuted the uyghur population? >> it is deeply concerning to hear about all accounts of human rights abuse. my role here is to explain what our platform does. >> i think you're being a bases. it is a pretty easy question. do you agree that the chinese government has persecuted the uyghur population. >> congresswoman, i'm here to

describe to talking what we do as a platform. as a platform we allow users to freely -- >> what we heard today, well, you didn't answer the question. earlier today chairman rogers asked you, and i quote, have any moderation tools been used to remove content associated with the uyghur genocide, yes or no? your answer, we do not remove that kind of content. yet, in 2019 tiktok suspended the account of feroza as these, and american 17 year old after she put out a video of the uyghur genocide. your answer, sir, does not align with history. >> that particular case was a miss moderation. i believe the video had a photo of osama bin laden. i believe -- >> no i looked it up that was a different post that they ban. my next question, india banned the use of tiktok in 2020 new

zealand has banned the installation of tiktok on devices connected to the country's parliamentary website canada banned the installation of tiktok on government devices. the united kingdom has banned the tiktok app from government on devices. belgium banned tiktok from government phones. european union banned the installation of tiktok on government devices. all sided security risk with the company's data collection in connection to the chinese communist party. recently, our u.s. fbi director, christopher wray, said about tiktok, quote, this is a tool that is ultimately within the control of the chinese government. it, to me, screams out with national security concerns. mr. chew, how can all of these countries and our own fbi director have been wrong? i think a lot of risks are

pointed out our hypothetical and theoretical. i have not seen any evidence. i am eagerly awaiting discussions where we can talk about evidence and we can then address the concerns that are being raised. >> yes. my next question revolves around an article, india banned tiktok in 2020. march 21st forbes article revealed how troves of personal data of indian citizens who once used tiktok remains wildly accessible to employees at the company and its beijing based parent, bytedance. a current tiktok employee told forbes that nearly anyone with basic access to company tools, including employees in china, can easily look up the closest contacts and other sensitive information about any user. this current tiktok employee also said, quote, if you want to start a movement -- if you want to divide people,

if you want to do any of the operation to influence the public on the app, you can just use that information to target those groups. why would a current tiktok employee say this if it wasn't true? >> this is a recent article. i have asked 19 to look into. as far as i know -- we have rigorous data access protocols. there's really no such thing where anyone can access the tools. i disagree with a lot of the conclusions when that. >> madam chair i request unanimous consent that the forms much running for a 2023 article be added to the record. >> without objection. >> i would like to turn over the rest of my time to mr. abernethy. >> thank you, madam chair. mr. chew, i would like to continue asking the question we were -- around a time last time. as part of project texas, you're going to have engineers at oracle review the algorithm -- the machine learning algorithm that tiktok uses to ensure they are free from foreign

influence. as you and i were discussing, reviewing the algorithms don't do anything. the simple -- the secret sauce is in the data used to train them and the outcomes you are asking them to predict. would you agree with that? >> no i actually believe that with the recording monitoring you can identify a lot of the motivation of the cone. with enough third-party experts you can identify a lot of what the code is designed to do. >> how would you verify that you couldn't ask the algorithm for a different outcome than the one that the rest of the source code is asking for? >> the algorithm, again it's very technical, it would be trained based on ways for example. those are things we can verify. you can use on likes or not. >> if you could give us a written response on that out appreciated. thank you madam chair, i yield back. lady yields back, the gentleman yields back. the chair recognizes the, for five minutes, the gentleman from florida mr. soto.

>> think you, madam chair. the genie is really out of the bottle on this now, so to speak. 150 million americans are now on tiktok. that is almost half of america. they are expressing themselves with their are, music, poetry, short films, comedy, among other creative expressions. many of them are inspiring talented young people. we also in the committee recognize that there is a darker side to it, right? the violence, adult themes, drugs and alcohol, sexualization, suicide. all major issues on tiktok but also twitter, facebook, youtube, and other social media platforms. the solution, as i see, is to regulate tiktok and other social media platforms. that job, mr. soto, as you know really falls to us. there are real concerns by pipe partisan common ground we have had a federal device band that was voted on by partisan

omnibus. i co-introduced a bill with my dear friend, representative cammack about that federal -- madam chair i think the first lady's privacy. we have to pass congress got out of this community but eluded us in the last congress. i am really hoping that we can get that done i am really excited about hearing about that from folks. the other thing is tiktok needs to be an american company with american values. its ties to the chinese communist party -- this is something that will be critical as we look and go forward. we all agree that we have to protect our kids. the committee should consider banning the use under 13 of not just tiktok but all social media. empower parents. in addition to have rules of the road 14 that a 13 17 so families can do what is right for their families. for privacy, that is on us.

internet privacy is on us. as far as being an american company, mr. chew as you know the committee on investments and the united states at the department of treasury refused foreign investments that affect national security. right now they are negotiating with their company about the oracle setup where you talked about servers in the american company in america, texas. oracle would then monitor the algorithm. pressure is mounting. mr. chew wood ticked up be prepared to divest from bytedance and chinese communist party times it's the department of the treasury instructed you all to do so? >> congressman, i said in my opening statement i think we need to address the problem of privacy. i agree with you. i do not think ownership is the issue here. with a lot of respect, american social companies do not have a good track record with data privacy in users security. look it -- was just one example. so, i do think that it is not all about ownership.

it is about making sure we have frantic texas. make sure we are protected and firewall-ing u.s. user data. from online foreign access, giving third parties coming in to have a look at this and making sure that everybody is accountable. we are giving transparency and third-party monitoring. that is what we are doing with tragic texas. >> well, i would at least encourage you all to start having the dialogue should that be where the president and congress ends up going. the third thing is on parents. i had a constituent on -- a parent of two teenagers, 14 in 18 years old, both of whom have been harmed by social media. tiktok's algorithm supply my 14-year-old son with a continuous cream of inappropriate content and have negatively influence his perception of all females. i noticed the attention span of both muntean says change to decrease dramatically. social media have made my daughter insecure leading to a eating disorder and ultimately depression. what safeguards do you have?

why should retail brandy of lake nonna about how we can help her protect her children? >> we have differentiated experience. i mentioned the experience below 13 that is very restricted. if they are below 13 or 17, congressman, we have a whole series of things. first, the content that you see -- we make sure that we remove things that could be mature themes from your feed. we also, by default, do not allow under 16 to use direct messaging. we do not allow under 16's -- we said their accounts the private by default. they cannot go viral. if they are below 18 we shut off some features. you're not allowed to post ice dreams. neither are you allowed to send virtual gifts. we take this very seriously. we want to continue to build and ensure we are giving under 18 teenagers on a platform -- today, we are not a minority of these debates that we still take it very seriously. >> mr. chew, i encourage you to

continue thinking on how to get the world out to get the word out on some of these tools, as. well as we craft a privacy law that will help provide well needed regulation to social media companies across the nation. thank, you i yield back. >> the gentleman yields back. the chair recognizes the gentleman from indiana, mister pence, for five minutes. >> thank you chairwoman, rogers. ranking member pallone for holding this hearing. i love both of your opening remarks. as my colleagues have discussed today my increasingly regional world leaves hoosiers and other americans in the dark about who has access to information. four tiktok users that could be third-party data brokers, advertising with the communist chinese party. tiktok aggressively feeds addictive content and content users to glean massive amounts of personal data that is worth a fortune. for hoosiers watching at home this isn't just data about your favorite sports team. if there really are 150 million users in the u.s., this suggests to me that the ccp has

a finger on the possible most half our nations population. i find that hard to believe this week i decided that i would ask my constituents in southern indiana to share their stories with me. i went out monday night and we got 800 responses in less than 12 hours, okay? let me share a couple of those with you. my constituents shared, quote, i'm a mental health counselor. most men teenage clients are on tiktok. they spent hours on line being negatively influenced by others. i've seen kids experience self harm, gender dysphoria, and many mental illnesses they have picked up from tiktok. i will not allow my children to have tiktok. i will algorithms are affecting our children. children are suffering more anxiety and depression from screen time but they do not care. they will not change their algorithms because it is

financially lucrative for them to keep their kids addictive. other parents say we let our daughter try it out. the feed was continuously suggesting sexually explicit, stupid, involved or videos. we discontinued it within a week. there have been many more. like i said, 800, okay? in your testimony, mr. chew, you walk through a number of supposed actions taken by a company to create a safe environment and empower parents to oversee content seen by the children. virtually everything we have heard reflects the opposite. some of your answers are little confusing. you know, all of those sitting here and maybe watching on c-span, this is the 32nd hearing we have held about privacy and big tech. each hearing i have been part of we have heard the same stories about our constituents

experience and the same promises for big tech to do better. the truth of the matter is, this disgusting and dangerous content littered across your platform is not just justifiable. it is uncontrollable. american data is not safe. big tech is doing nothing to protect the. putting aside the dangers of the ccp involvement, and after these 32 hearings, i believe it is actually time to change the narrative. change the focus, change the outcome by talking about the money you are making at tiktok. mr. chew, i have a question, how much revenue generated per user? >> congressman -- private company we're not gonna tell me. does each user receive a comparable benefit from the amount of profiteer data brings to the company? >> we share revenue some creators who produce one minute plus info on content.

>> when am i going to get paid for the data you are selling, or you are getting revenue from advertisers, when am i going to get paid for the data you are getting from my children, my grandchildren, my neighbors? i think that is the only way to get your attention. to talk about the money you are making. maybe that will get you all to do what you are supposed to do. >> i respect and understand your opinion. the vast majority of our users have a great experience. i sent a video recently. i got hundreds of thousands of comments. >> what am i getting. it's a great experience? what about these 800 bad experiences of people in the indiana six district have been getting? >> we will look into that -- >> you're gonna look into it? this is my 32nd big tech hearing. you are always gonna look at. essentially, i think you are all stalling is what you're doing. you are just trying to buy time while you're making the 18 billion, perhaps, whatever you're making. >> the majority of our users

have a great experience on a platform. it is a duty to keep it safe, i agree with you. that is why our commitment to make sure is safety is a priority. >> i think it's your duty to pay attention to what you're doing. maybe, maybe you pang people for the information you are getting from them as a way to get that done. thank you, i yield back. >> the gentleman yields back. the chair recognizes the gentlelady from washington, miss schrier for five minutes. >> thank you for being here mr. chew. i am really concerned about everything we are hearing in this conversation today. i appreciate your good intentions. the actions are really falling short. as a pediatrician, and the parent of a teenager, i am particularly concerned about how social media generally, and tiktok specifically, is affecting our kids and teens. we heard a lot about this from testimony from psychologist. last year the american academy

of pediatrics sounded the alarm about our children's mental health crisis. as a pediatrician i know that this has been going on for more than a decade. in fact, attracts perfectly with social media engagement. during the pandemic, teens who are missing out on in-person interaction turned even more to social media to connect with friends. social media is designed to be addicting. your platform is the most addictive of all this endless scrolling keeps teens away from relationships. here's what's important, it keeps teams awake all night well past their bedtime. -- in a time that is critical for brain development. sleep deprivation, annoying content, can cost brush and, anxiety, social withdrawal, inattention, poor coping skills, and academic failings. so mr. chew, i want to follow up a little bit about what my

colleague was discussing. it is your business model to keep eyes on the app. to keep it addictive. i know you likely have experts who have advised you on how to design this to keep those eyes on your platform for the longest possible time. i want to know if you have psychologist or other health experts on staff looking at screen time, hours of use, and sleep? >> we worked with a digital wellness lab, congresswoman, at the boston children's hospital. we came up with the 60 minute default limit for any users under 18. a first in our industry. >> that is an opt out. i can tell you, they will immediately opt out. it is addictive. it's like asking a chain smoker not to take the next cigarette. it is not gonna happen. by the way -- i have a question and then i will go back to boston children. mr. sarbanes asked earlier, what is the percentage of teens who actually adhere to the 60

minute limit? >> i would need to check on those numbers and go back to you. >> i appreciate that. i'm guessing it is an incredibly low percentage to actually heed that. as far as boston children's go i know you are referring to them as a source to be ideas to go outside, get some air, take some time out. i can tell you as a pediatrician i'm guessing there suggestions were a little stronger than that. i am wondering, what is the next step? what are you doing when you find out that almost nobody is opting out after 16 minutes? to take this burden off of the kids and off of the parents and change your algorithms to make them not-so-hooked. >> we give our parents, as you pointed out, the family parent tool. in that tool, if you pair it with your teenagers phone, you can set the restriction. how many minutes. we believe it is very important for parents to have these conversations with their teenagers so they can decide what works best for the family. congresswoman, a lot of people come to our platform to have a

really informative experience. like i said, there were hundred and 60 billion pieces of content on stem. we are creating a fee dedicated to that. book talk has 150 billion -- >> we also heard today that will over 20% of the information is misinformation. we heard that about medical remedies that are not really remedies. we have heard it about mental health topics. this becomes a dangerous, especially when people who are not trained to think very critically are being given information and thinking it is true. you've said many times that the destructive information is not available to kids, but it is. we keep seeing examples here. i'm just wondering, what are you going to do with the algorithms? just because you remove something that says anorexia, believe me, or eating disorder, that doesn't do it. if you show girls repeatedly skinny bodies and advice on how to cook meals that are less than three and a calories, that is dangerous. >> >> we have worked with, first of all, anything that

glorifies eating disorders we remove them from the platform as violated. we are working with experts right now. it is a challenging problem for integers three. we are identifying some of the themes we are talking about. trying to build models wear the kind of content is not change for the younger users. it is something we take very seriously. >> we are seeing in a disorders and elementary age kids now. i need you to expedite that process as much as possible. parents out there are worried. i'm worried as a pediatrician. parents cannot take themselves off these platforms. kids, there is no way they are going to take themselves off. we need you to do your part. it may affect your bottom line. but it can save this generation. >> i share your concerns. our committee -- >> thank you. >> gentlelady yields back. the chair recognizes the gentleman from pennsylvania, mr. joyce. >> thank you chair rogers and ranking member pallone for holding this hearing. according to an august 2022 article in the new york times tiktok's in-app web browser can

track every individual heatstroke made by user. we have heard today about the various ways that the apps code can be used to monitor or track users. likewise, we have her concerns that this data may not be fully isolated from access by the chinese communist party. that said, i would like to know more about the historical non public u.s. personal data that your company has already amassed. mr. chew, you have publicly stated that the non public information of tiktok users in the united states as being transferred towards oracle based cloud infrastructure because of safety concerns. will that be completed by the end of this week? by the end of this month? what is the outline for dealing with that data that you have already amassed? >> all new data is already stored, by default, in the orchid cloud infrastructure -- >> i'm talking about the data that you have already amassed? >> we are in the process of

deleting -- >> what timeline with that data be able to be stored? >> i believe we will be able to get it done this year -- >> this year. thank? here it's not going to occur anytime soon. to be clear, until that data transfer happens user data remains accessible to the chinese communist party. on march 1st of this year, the committee asked you when you plan to delete non public historical u.s. user data. are you aware of this? >> congressman, i disagree with this assessment. the chinese government can get access to the data. it is really for -- a private company. chinese employees -- >> you responded in writing to this committee, i have the response, that we got back from you on march 7th. just six days later. your attorneys wrote that the company -- i am quoting, the company plans to begin the process of the leading non public historic user data this month. in anticipation that the process will be completed this year. you came up with a supposed

planned in the summer of 2022. specifically based on our concerns that the communist chinese government was spying on u.s. users. you only just came up with the idea to delete historic non public u.s. data just two weeks ago? let me read it again. on march 7th, your attorney zero, and i quote, the company plans to begin the process of the leading non public historical data this month. and into debates the process will be completed this year. mr. chew, did you just come up with this plan only because we asked about it on march 1st? >> no, we started to leading -- this >> that is what it looks like to. me >> this is incredibly disappointing. when you agree that awaiting even minutes for this personal privacy to detection is absolutely wrong? and it is not in the best interest of users? >> congressman, respectfully there are many companies that use a global war force, we are

not the only one. we are just taking action. >> what we've already established about the ability of the chinese communist party to access personal you're data, would you agree that no u.s. government electronic devices should have access to tiktok platform, as your lackluster security currently stands? >> i disagree with that characterization. >> do you think any individual should be utilizing that on any government platform? >> i think the government should have no social media apps, not targeted to us. >> during this hearing you have mentioned several times that there is a, quote, different experience, your words, for children under the age of 13. >> that is correct. >> a different experience. do you allow your children under the age of 13 to participate in tiktok? yes or no? >> i did just explain this in detail, this doesn't exist in singapore where my children live, if my children lived here,

then yes. >> based on what we have heard today it's clear to me that tiktok as a company cannot be trusted. and that americans remain significantly at risk because of the tiktok app. i still contend that tiktok is the spy in americans pockets. i want to acknowledge that tiktok does have the ability to make those changes. but unfortunately, we have not heard that from you today. we have not heard a commitment to be able to protect the personal privacy that americans expect, and that americans deserve. thank you madam chair. i yield the remainder of my time. >> gentleman yields back, recognizing miss tran for five minutes. >> thank you, madam chair. mr. shou zi chew, many big tech ceos have sat where you are sitting today and tried to run out the clock like this one, trained not to answer questions

and wait for the news cycle to pass so they could get on with business as usual. those same executives want this moment, tiktok moment under the microscope to distract congress, the american people from the very real issues that exist on their platforms. you have an opportunity to turn the tables on them. while u.s. based social media giants have regressed on protections for children and teens, protecting our data privacy, and on the racing transparency, you can lead and you should. last month you announced that tiktok would expand access to its researcher api but i am concerned that the policy could be more bark than bite, that it won't actually lead to the rigorous research that we as lawmakers and that parents and every day tiktok users need. in fact your terms of service demand that researchers delete their data, that tiktok's unilateral direction. it puts restrictions on how researchers findings can be

published and it only allows access to public data. which researchers already have access to within the app. in order to actually address the content moderation and algorithmic amplification concerns that my colleagues have raised here today, and then i have heard about directly from parents in my home state of massachusetts, independent research is not other -- algorithm is making decisions to promote content. will you commit to expanding your api, to include data that would let researchers investigate how your algorithm is pushing content to users, whether it's showing up on your for you page, the hashtag page or somewhere else? >> one of the commitments i gave in the opening statement is a commitment to transparency and third-party monitoring. congresswoman, i will look into the details of that and get back to you. >> as well of the algorithm, including data, on what types of users were targeted by the

algorithm so that researchers can fully understand what content is being prioritized, and what's being pushed to. >> again, we have a commitment to transparency, these are very important questions and i will get back to you on the specifics. >> under the same proposal you have inquired that researchers give tiktok quote, worldwide, free, nonexclusive and perpetual, and quote, rights to their papers. threatening to clash directly with well-established practices of exclusive publication writes in research journals. why does tiktok need those rights? >> i will need to get back to you on the specifics if that's okay. >> i don't see how we can expect researchers to do their work under these terms and then tout transparency. i will shift gears with the time that i have remaining, i would like to talk about tiktok's efforts to protect children and young users. in 2021 the uk's age appropriate design code went into effect, mandating 15

standards that companies like you need to follow to protect children on your platform. you still operate in the united kingdom, which means you should be in compliance with this code. so my question is simple, will you commit to extending the protections currently afforded children in the uk to the millions of kids and teens who use your app here, in the united states? >> we take the safety of the younger users on our platform very seriously. >> this is a good way to prove it. >> every country is a little bit different in context, so let me look at the specifics and bring some of the best practices across the world, -- >> those best practices are being executed around the world. we just want the same for our kids here in the united states. when we spoke a couple of weeks ago, you indicated interest in taking steps to earn trust, our trust. and to me, it has not happened today so far.

but rather you have ducked behind industry standards and comparable to your competitors. which we know are woefully insufficient. i strongly urge you to consider these terms, these commitments, make the case for why you are different from your american competitors. and do better on, then them, on transparency. what you have mentioned countless times today about which we don't really have any tangible to point to. >> i don't want to make excuses for our industry of ourselves, i think there is a lot of work that needs to be done. we take this very seriously. it's not perfect, we need to keep investing to stay ahead of our growth so i agree that we need to prioritize safety and continue to do that as part of our company. >> i look forward to getting back your comments on your commitments and those updated terms of service when you write back to the committee. thank you madam chair, i yield back. >> gentlelady yields back.

chair recognizes the gentleman from north dakota, mr. armstrong. >> thank, you madam chair. we have heard today about independent court reviews, locations and the corporate independence between bytedance and the ccp. but i think there is something a little more telling. when you are asked about chinese censorship you pivoted immediately to drug use in singapore. you have absolutely tied yourself in knots to avoid criticizing the ccp's treatment of the uyghur population and i think it begs the first question, before we ever get to project texas which i will get to in a second. if the ccp demanded that bytedance hand over all information on u.s. users, and bytedance refused, i wonder what would happen? i wonder if jack mott might have an opinion on that and i wonder if he would be allowed to give. it let's talk about project texas for a second. it envisions a new u.s. faced

tiktok subsidiary. you have stated that this is unprecedented, i would argue that it's because it requires continual oversight and monitoring by the u.s. of a private business because it poses a national security threat. the new subsidiaries board would report to and be approved by stuffiness. cps would also specify hiring requirements, as well as interacting with oracle. that is an extraordinary corporate government structure. i have questions on whether it complies with corporate law and fiduciary duty to shareholders. the core concern is that the court proposes unparalleled integration with the u.s. government with a private company, which would require significant government resources. all of that to allow a continuing operation of a social media platform that has serious national security implications. the workload has already dramatically increased in recent years with a 30% increase in declarations and a 45% increase of joint involuntary notices.

there is bipartisan consensus that it needs to be expanded as we speak. can you identify a similar corporate arrangement that allows the >> -- to monitor and alleged national security risk? >> i am not an expert on this matter, i believe that there are certain ones but i'm not an expert on this matter. >> the only one i could find is the uk created huawei cybersecurity evaluation center, who assessed huawei's tech, to detect malicious activity in uk's networks. that has worked so well, that the uk is planning on picking huawei out of great britain. you have stated that tiktok has invested 1.5 billion dollars to project texas. are you aware of any discussions or proposals that entail tiktok funding or offsetting the cost of xiphias rule? >> those discussions, i need to get back to you on this but to

fix but i can tell you, yes, we did spend approximately 1.5 billion u.s. dollars. >> you agree that if xiphias takes on this role they will need a massive influx of dollars on human resources, right? >> i cannot speak on behalf of them. >> should the u.s. government expense such resources to create this extraordinary arrangement for tiktok, especially alleging the alleged national security risk? >> i can't speak on behalf -- >> project texas as you guys have proposed it does not work without xiphias involved. >> the idea behind project texas is, -- overseen by american personnel and we will invite third-party monitors to monitor this. that in essence, at least as far as i know, is the majority of the cost because it will rely on not just us building

the infrastructure, but just finding in hiring these third-party monitors, to come in and monitor the structure. >> you talked earlier about the shareholders ownership of tiktok, 60% global investors, 20% employees, and 20% is original founders, are all of those voting shares the same? >> the founder has waived the voting rights as is common in our industry. >> as far as a voting block of shares owned by bytedance, do you know if the chinese communist party, do you know what their percentage of the actual voting bloc of bytedance is? >> the communist party does not have voting rights in bytedance. >> chinese communist party members, a different question. do the founders control the voting bloc of bytedance's shares? >> i do know that the founder himself is not a member of the communist party, but we don't know the political affiliation of our employees because that's

not something we ask. >> does the chinese government know the political affiliation of their chinese citizens? >> i cannot answer the question on their behalf. >> i yield back. >> gentleman yields back. yield to the gentlelady from new hampshire, miss kuster. >> thank you, madam chair. i want to say i agree with all of the comments of many of my colleagues, that we need to take a closer look at whether tiktok poses a national security risk. for today i will focus my limited time on how tiktok can better protect its youngest users. i think a number of us have identified as parents today and have serious concerns as we relate to you. just this week i heard from a parent in my district in nashua, new hampshire whose child was served harmful content on tiktok and needed counseling as

a result. this experience is not unique to this family and it underscores the need for better child protections on your app. i would like to dig further into tiktok's current safety and privacy controls for children. i understand that tiktok restricts certain app capabilities for users under age 18, and has additional restrictions for users under age 16, or 13. such as limiting who can interact with them on the platform. however, these protections are worthless if any savvy child can easily buy past these age restrictions by deleting their own account, and creating a new one with a different age. and by easily, i mean you can literally go in and open another account using the same email address. so i have been made aware by child safety groups including fair play for kids and common sense, that it is that simple for young users to bypass the

age restrictions on tiktok. yes or no, are you aware of this issue? >> i apologize. i think that's a great question that you raised. if a user is blocked, my understanding is that if the user tries to do it again within a short period of time, i won't disclose publicly -- >> we did it in our office yesterday, you can go right back in, use the exact same email address and open a new account. can i get your commitment that you will at least fix that bug? >> i will go and have a look at it, yes. >> thank you. we are here today to talk tiktok and not other platforms but i'm happy to look at legislative solutions. in the interim, tiktok has a responsibility to do more to protect its young users, and i will accept your commitment to take a look at fixing that issue.

let's see, sorry, i recognize that tiktok has made efforts to provide parents and guardians increased options to monitor the activity on the app including family pairing and time limits, but i still have concerns. in order to access family pairing, parents then must download the app on to their phone. and this sounds like a design to lure more users on the app, rather than a practical safety feature. for them, downloading the app might not be a viable option for many parents. will tiktok commit to developing other methods for parents to monitor their child's use of the app, without having to download the tiktok app on their phone? >> i can look at that specifically and get back to you but the family pairing that you mentioned is a very good tool that we developed, i encourage parents of teenagers

to use it. >> it's not a perfect ball and let me just say that one of my concerns is that, the minimum time limit tiktok lets parents set for their children's 40 minutes, which for a young child is a very long period of time. giving parents control would mean providing them the freedom to set the screen time, that makes sense for their family. i have a copy of the app page that shows just the four options, would you commit to adding an other option, so that the parent can easily set their own screen time limit? >> i can take a look at that. >> i think it's important, i think parents are looking for control. they are looking to allow their family to use these apps, without tiktok taking over their child's media use.

i have heard reports of users struggling to access the future, and i will look forward to hearing back from you on adding an other so that a parent can add a custom limit. finally i ask that you commit to report back to this committee and the american public on how tiktok addresses the safety issues, and the steps that you are taking to devolve children's accounts to the most protective possible settings. and with that i yield back. >> gentlelady yields back. the chair yields to the gentleman from ohio, five minutes mr. balderson. >> thank you, madam chair. thank you mr. shou zi chew for being here today. i would start by inserting into the record a report, by tiktok bytedance and their ties to the

chinese communist party, published by the australian parliament over a week ago. >> no objections, ordered. >> thank you, madam chair. mr. shou zi chew, we know that your companies -- has been exposed for delivering videos to china that encourages them to develop eating disorders, promotes challenges that have caused children to accidentally commit suicide, glorifies the use of drugs and pornography. despite the constant media coverage of this issue, your company continues to feed our children this dangerous and harmful content. can you explain to parents back in my professional district why it should be their burden and not tiktok's, to set up the guardian parental controls for the children so they do not view content which encourages eating disorders or committing suicide? >> congressman, i take these issues very seriously. if the user is a teenager on our platform, we actually have a differentiated experience, including certain models that we are building with experts to help identify certain content

that is not inherently harmful but could lead people to eating disorders. anything that glorifies eating disorders is violated from our platform and we remove that. and i want to assure you that i take this very socially. this comment. >> mr. curtis my colleague, mentioned the use of a heating tool on your platform to make videos go viral or get more views. a cooling tool where they can manually limit the implication of content that tiktok should hide, content that promotes eating disorders, drug use or suicide among children. >> the only promotion tool that we have is approved by the local teams, in the u.s. by the u.s. team and it's for commercial purposes, like taylor swift, when she onboarded -- >> would that be a yes or no? >> i just want to make sure i am answering your question with specific. >> if this tool exist, why is it not being used to cool the

spread of dangerous content? why is it still happening? >> dangerous content that violates, we remove them when we see them, from the platform. >> the fact of the matter here is that despite whatever action you take, that tiktok is taking to prevent teens, wouldn't you -- there is something inherently wrong with the algorithm of your platform that it employees? >> i do respectfully disagree with that. the algorithm drives a great user experience for many users. i talked about stem content, that was 160 billion views. one more, book talk, a trend that happened on our platform is to encourage people to read, it's fantastic. i have heard people telling me that they are reading more because of booktok. if there is a lot of good and joy and positive that can be derived from the tiktok experiences. yes, there are bad actors who come in and post violated

content and it's our job to remove them but the overall experience is a very positive one for our community. >> it's your job, to remove them, it's been said about the 41 days that that video stood up, addressing the chairwoman. >> after this i will go and look into the specifics of that. >> thank you. madam chair, i yield back. >> gentleman yields back. chair recognizes the lady from texas, miss fletcher, for five minutes. >> thank you madam chair, and thank you mr. chew for appearing today. it's been a long day but we are here to learn about a complex set of issues that relate to tiktok and how to address them. i think that is what we are hearing from colleagues on both sides of the aisle today, a real effort to grapple with the challenges that we see for national security, and for the safety and protection of american citizens. especially our children and young adults. and we have already covered

today, a lot of the information about the extensive use of the app. the number of users who are children and young adults. but i think it bears repeating, that tiktok is the preferred platform of young americans and they use it for all kinds of creative and important things, and we have seen that. but there are also some dangerous things that we know it has, and continues to be used for. and that also, that the data that is collected is posing additional dangers, that is what we are here for. most people using tiktok to not realize that tiktok is collecting data about their keystrokes or about their browsing history on other sites and so much more, and i agree with my colleagues that we need a comprehensive set of data privacy laws, and we have heard some very good ideas today. you have mentioned several times today that these are industry wide issues. and i agree with you, that our

industry wide challenges here. but there are also some specific things relating to tiktok that i want to focus my questions on, and really i want to understand where there is a difference on how we can craft legislation that addresses the very real challenges that we have been hearing about today. as you know, states across the country have joined an ongoing investigation into possible violations of consumer protection laws, by tiktok. as they pertain to tiktok's effect, on the mental health of american children and teenagers. as part of this investigation, states have requested to review internal tiktok communications that takes place on lark, the primary instant messaging system, is that right? >> yes. >> and as every tiktok employee have a lark account? >> it's very similar to companies that use slack or any other instant messaging tool. >> but it's a proprietary instant messaging tool, it's not slack. >> it was something that is developed by us.

>> by tiktok? >> no, by bytedance. >> so a couple of questions stemming from, that is it true that lark video conferencing has a translation future in which chinese is translated to english text and vice versa? >> that is correct, it helps with global cooperation. >> and those translators conversations are saved into the lark system? >> i will need to get back to you on the specifics. i will get back to. >> that would be great to know, i neglected to ask but does every tiktok employee have a lark account? >> yes. >> including you, do you have one? >> yes, i believe so. yes. >> there is some kind of profile for your instant messaging system so every employee identifies their manager and their department, who they work for, what they do, is that all included in their lark profile? >> it's very common for companies to have enterprise

messaging tools. >> sure. >> tools. >> it does, i'm asking about lark, whether it includes information like identifying who for example, your manager is? do you know whether that is something that is identified in lark? >> yes, again, some of the hr futures are built into a lot of enterprise tools that we use. >> so for your own profile, does it identify who your manager is? >> yes, it does. >> who does it identify as your manager? >> i report to the ceo of bytedance. >> so that is -- as your manager? the former ceo? >> he has stepped down from the board. as the ceo. >> so mr. rubo is identified now? >> yes. >> it's not just used by tiktok

employees, by bytedance employees as well? >> i think clark is selling it, it's a good tool for instant messaging. >> lark is available to third parties outside the bytedance system as well? >> yes. >> >> and do you personally ever use lark to communicate with bytedance? >> with employees at bytedance? yes, i do. >> i'm running out of time and i'm sorry to say because this is very interesting, i do think it underscores some of the concerns that have been raised in this hearing, i think it's clear we have work we need to continue to do here in the congress, to address data protection and privacy and with that, madam chairwoman i thank you and i will yield back. >> gentle lady yields back, committee stands in recess and we will reconvene immediately following the third vote being called.

to prohibit targeting marketing

to people, americans under the age of 17? >> congressman, we have actually stricter rules for advertisers in terms of what they can show -- >> i am one of six texans on this committee. i am over here. when you invoke the name of texas, you get my attention. when you are the cfo of bytedance to the chinese government structure you on how the content muss to be monitored on going in or tiktok, yes or no? >> sorry congressman, would you mind repeating that question? >> when you are the cfl of bytedance to the government test you on how content to be moderated on dorian or tiktok? >> i was not in charge of that. >> reports have shown that tiktok accounts, managed by media links tv, a propaganda

arm of cctv -- yes or, no has the ccp coordinated or utilized tiktok or influenced users to algorithms state paid content creation or in any other capacity? >> no. they do not do that. we do not promote or remove any content on behalf of the chinese government. >> you don't. but did the chinese government, do you have any knowledge of that? >> congressman, we have only one process of removing content on our platform. the process is done by our content moderation team headquartered in ireland and the u.s.. and we would only remove content if it violates our guidelines. that is something that we audit. or if there is a valid legal order. >> several reports hearings and leaked internal documents have indicated that tiktok has repeatedly censored or the amplified content that is

critical of the communist party policies in the u.s. and abroad. are you aware of this reports? >> i don't think that is accurate. >> are you aware of those reports? >> there could be some reports that say that, but that action itself -- >> your testimony here today is that you can keep up with stuff and make it as clean as possible, quote unquote, are you aware of those reports? >> i want to make it very clear that there is content on tiktok that is great and fun, that is critical of china. >> that's not what i am saying. are you aware of the reports citing that fact? >> like i said, if you go on to our platform you will find content that is critical of china. >> we will talk about that. this committee is looking at reforming section 2:30 of the communications decency act, already mentioned here today, do you think that censoring history and historical facts, current events, should be protected by section 230, good

faith requirement? >> that is a more complex topic, congressman, i would mean just speak to my team and get back to you on the specifics. >> is your team behind you? >> it is the broader team. >> it's always good to have folks behind you. here are my concerns with tiktok. fewer claims are hard to believe, no secret to us that tiktok is still under the thumb of ccp influence. tiktok is indoctrinating our children with divisive, walk and pro ccp propaganda. all while threatening our national security of chinese spyware. in fact, let me look at my notes here, you had an exchange with and as you, and you said that quote, extreme fitness videos should not be viewed too much. do you remember that exchange? here today? >> what extremist videos? >> out of california, an issue.

>> any content with extremist content is not allowed on our platform. >> was that also true about the garden video that you saw today? was that extreme content that should have been taken down? >> i would need to look at the specifics of the whole video, there was a bit of lag, we could not see the whole video. >> threatened, our committee chair here. >> that is unacceptable. >> you are aware of that extreme video. why did it take 40 plus days to get it down? does it take an act of congress, should we plan to have a committee hearing every day, every time there is something brought up so that we can limit the content on tiktok? should congress planned to do that? >> we work very hard to remove violated content on our platform. >> let me move on. congressman hudson asked you about your wages and stocks, you said you prefer to keep that information private. now you know how we feel about

american public information, we prefer to keep it private as well, we don't think tiktok does that. madam chair, my time is of, and if this committee gets its way, tiktok's time is up. >> gentlemen, gentleman's time is expired, chair recognizes mr. louise from california. >> thank, you madam chair. i recognize my colleague's comments on the health of the american public. as a doctor and the ranking member of the select subcommittee of the coronavirus pandemic i am -- with medically inaccurate information including dangerous misinformation and the intentional disinformation about the covid-19 and vaccines. tiktok community guidelines state that the company will remove content or accounts that involve quote, misleading

information that causes significant harm. however, since the early stages of the pandemic, tiktok has been used as a platform for people pushing misinformation, disinformation including by those casting doubt on the safety and efficacy of lifesaving vaccines. despite tiktok's pledge to address harmful misinformation, these videos are being viewed millions of times. for example, the institute for strategic dialogue, found that a sample of 124 tiktok videos containing vaccine misinformation we reviewed 20 million times. media matters found that example of 18 videos with covid-19 misinformation were viewed over 57 million times. here is another shock study. the journal of american medical informatics association found that when searching hashtag coronavirus on tiktok, almost 30% of the videos that came up

contain misinformation. videos in that sample containing a high level of misinformation reviewed a median of 9.4 million times. why are these dangerous videos falling through the cracks of your company's efforts to enforce its own community guidelines and remove harmful misinformation? >> before i answer that, in my response -- >> you are on my time, answer my question. >> i understand. i would like to clarify. >> i have five minutes. my time. you are on my time now, answer my question. >> any dangerous misinformation is, we partner with third-party experts to be able to identify and help with subject owning expertise. and with the expertise that we recognize we rely on those to develop policies, recognize and remove content. >> your efforts have failed. and they are dangerous. it's public health risks that you are putting millions of

peoples lives at risk, for not being able to do a better job. and i am concerned that tiktok's features make users uniquely vulnerable to the spread of this misinformation, for example tiktok makes it extremely easy to reuse audio and videos to create content. which allows misinformation to quickly spread through the platform. and tiktok's algorithm to recommend videos, means that i use reviewing one video containing misinformation can easily result in their quote unquote for you page becoming filled with videos containing similar misinformation. this is a dangerous feedback loop. is tiktok taking any action to modify these features so that they no longer facilitate the spread of the misinformation, or this feedback loop? >> congressman, again, any dangerous miss or disinformation, we work with third-party and it is proactively removed from our platform. it doesn't need to get into

those loops at all. >> i can go back and review the data, the journal of american medical and informatics, 30% of videos after searching for hashtag coronavirus had misinformation. almost one out of three, your third party, in your company, missing almost one out of three videos. you are telling me what you are doing, i'm telling you that the data shows that you are grossly failing at that effort. the other question i have for you is, tiktok is also in spanish. and spanish speaking populations have been specifically targeted to misinformation, when it comes to many aspects, especially medical misinformation and as chair of the congressional hispanic caucus we reached out to you last congress on this issue. so what is your intent, how does your team look to address spanish versus english?

how many stuff do you have, focusing on spanish prices how many staff do you have focusing on english misinformation? >> congressman, like i explained just now, the spanish speaking population is very important to our platform. we do have spanish speaking moderators. >> so how many spanish speaking staff versus english making staff on misinformation do you have? >> i can get back to you on the specifics but misinformation, dangerous misinformation is moderated in every language. >> not to the degree that it needs to be. when there is misinformation, people base their decisions that oftentimes put them at risk. and exposures, their families at risk. with the coronavirus, prior to the vaccines, the risk was their life. thank you, i yield back. >> madam chair i would like to clarify something, in the question to representative --

bytedance buying on behalf of the chinese government. my answer to that question should be a no, because it came very rapidly. >> gentleman's time is expired. the chair s th gentleman from idaho, mr. fulcher. >> thank you, madam chair. a lot of questions have been answered and a lot of them have not been answered. the primary thing i want to do is share some thoughts of what i have seen, and learned today. been exposed to. first of all, i have to compliment you on having a product that is impressive. it is very influential, it is addictive and that is what you want users to be exposed to,

something addictive, and it is at data gathering masterpiece. so clearly it has the potential to sell products. connecting like-minded people with the artificial intelligence capability. in a viral fashion. and perhaps spread information quicker, better than anything else that has been in development out there. i'm just going to tell you, i am not a subscriber, or a willing subscriber. but probably in that database somewhere is my preferences with colors or foods, who i have spoken to or what i have said or my favorite newspapers. i don't know. that is available to be sold or given to whomever or whatever, and the whatever is what bothers me. i use myself as an example. and if for whatever reason i became a target in this, i

became someone you didn't like, i know that would be hard to believe because you have to like me, let's say you didn't, or your company didn't or for whatever reason i became an app target. that artificial intelligence algorithm could be shared or spread selectively. to a targeted audience with negative information, that maybe has been paired up with that knowledge and that app, to make me look really bad. or, to the converse, same thing could be done to make me look really, really good. here's the problem. it's someone else or some artificial intelligence algorithm that has inordinate power to subjectively combine strategic data with strategic audiences, to shape whatever

thoughts and news they want. and i have equipped it, not even knowing it. that process could apply to anyone or anything. there is the danger. it could be the president of the united states, their kids, a company, a political party, a news outlet, anything could be targeted for that select viral spread of just some information. this maybe genius, but that doesn't make it fair, it doesn't make it good and it doesn't make it accountable. i wouldn't want my government to have that ability. i wouldn't want a company or a political party or my friend august here or my mother-in-law to have that capability and i certainly don't want that to be accessible to anyone in china.

there is no question it has immense value. and as proof of that you are here, because this has not been a fun day. i know that. it has not been a fun day for us either. artificial intelligence is difficult to manage once it's on auto cruise control and it's nearly impossible to wall off data. i know the idea, i know a bit about databases, corruption of those databases, it's very difficult to wall things off. and unfortunately, there is this thing in human nature where there are dark components from time to time, a temptation to monetize things, or perhaps use these tools for nefarious purposes, and they can have absolutely devastating

consequences. so i will wrap up my comments and just say that, this is so attractive, tiktok poses as a mr. rogers neighborhood but it acts like big brother. and that has to stop. madam chair, i yield back. >> the gentleman yields back. >> gentleman yield. >> one second. >> gentleman yields. >> gentleman yields to mr. morgan griffith. >> i thank you for yielding. >> -- filed as an exhibit last week with the sun in australia. if you have an income and i would like to get out of this paragraph on the summary, our research confirms beyond an implausible doubt -- bytedance is subject to all the

influence and de facto control to which the chinese communist party now subjects all plc communist parties. -- the party state have extended their ties into bytedance to the point that the company can no longer be accurately described as a private enterprise. you keep calling it a private enterprise but all the countries in the world are saying, it's not a private enterprise, it's part of the chinese communist party. what say you need, yes or no, is it part of the party as everybody thinks or are you still living in some mystical world? >> i disagree with many conclusions. >> you are living in the mystical world, i yield back. >> yields back, chair recognizes the gentlelady from minnesota, miss craig for five minutes. >> thank you so much madam chair for yielding. i am probably like a lot of parents who are also members of congress out here, i know a

number of us, when you testified earlier today you mentioned that the over 35 segment was a growing group of potential users. as if over 35 is old and i realize that my own children thing that i'm ancient, my four boys. but like a lot of us up here, we understand that there is some potential good, and of course many of your influencers are doing what they are doing for all the right reasons. but one thing in your testimony you said a lot, was safety. but as a mother and a member of congress, and as someone who is very concerned about drug use in our country, i was surprised that that didn't come up once in your testimony, no real reference to it here today.

i have raised my concerns in general about social media platforms serving as an illegal marketplace for drugs in prior big tech hearings, and i plan to continue that focus during today's hearing. march 8th, 2023 article in the washington post detailed the fact that tiktok has made little progress in combatting the sale of illegal drugs on your platform. in fact, colorado attorney general phil wiser said that getting drugs on a platform like yours was nearly as convenient as using a phone to order a pizza or call an uber. that same article mentions that law enforcement agencies have been frustrated by tiktok's lack of competition in the form of data sharing. in my view, tiktok has taken little action in response to this crisis. according to a may 22, blog post from tiktok, you donated $125,000 or 0.001% of your 2022

revenue in an anti drug effort, in the form of ad credits. you also directed hashtag drugs, hashtag fentanyl and other obvious hashtags away from post selling drugs to a community resources page as if a teenager looking for drugs is going to look for them at hashtag drugs. drug dealers have easily worked their way around this using emojis and slang to communicate that they have drugs for sale. to this day, it is possible for anyone to log into your platform and acquire drugs. and the consequences of that can be fatal. what are you doing to move past these token efforts to prevent teenagers from accessing drugs on your platform? as parents up here today we may not understand everything about your platform, i am not a tech guru.

many of us up here might not use exactly the right language but we know when our kids are at risk. and our kids are at risk on your platform. so what are you going to do to move past the previous token efforts? >> congresswoman, we do take illegal drugs content on our platform very seriously, it violates our guidelines, proactively identifying and removing them. as you pointed out if anybody searches for any drugs on our platform we do point them to resources, to help them with that. at the same time, we have also taken product changes. for example we don't allow under 16 users to use the right, direct messaging. and that's because we want, there was a trade-off here and we believe that it will protect these younger users better from getting contacts from people who are trying to push illegal activity. we will continue to work on it.

no company can be perfect on this. >> with all due respect, the no company can be perfect line, has been used way too much today. i will reclaim my time. clearly in the three plus hours you have been before us today, what you are saying about project texas just does not pass the smell test. my constituents are concerned that tiktok and the chinese communist party are controlling their data, and seeing our own vulnerabilities. if you were an american company we could look at your ten k, we could see who your shareholders are, the answer you provided earlier today, you would rather not tell us, what your compensation is or how it is derived, no american ceo would like to tell us that. but they have to. because they are an american company. so what you are doing down in texas, it's all well and good but it is not enough for us to

be convinced that our privacy is not at risk. how can you say that you are protecting american users privacy with the ccp being so heavily involved with bytedance? it's not possible. china won't even carry your product. how is it that you can convince us that our privacy is not at risk? and more than that, our kids privacy is not at risk. in this country. >> in my opening statement -- >> thank, you madam chair. >> the gentlelady's time is expired. we will have to continue. one gentleman from georgia, recognized for five minutes. >> thank you, madam chair, thank you mr. chew for being here today. september 2020 when the wall street journal published an article titled how tiktok serves up sex and drug videos to minors.

a chilling depiction of the types of content that tiktoks algorithm is curating for our children. this article claims that your application served an account that was registered as a 13 year old quote, videos about drug use, it referenced to cocaine, meth addiction and promotional videos for online sales of drugs. we all grew them was also found to have delivered countless videos depicting pornography and other adult content. to the device of an account that was registered as a 13 year old. could you please explain to the members of this committee and parents across the country why your company teams that acceptable for such inappropriate content to be prominently featured on a child's for you page? >> i'm one of the content that you mentioned are violated of our own guidelines.

we take this very seriously, i mentioned this, this is an industry wide challenge and we are investing as much as we can. we don't think it represents the majority of the users experience on tiktok that it does happen. some bad actors try and come in and post this content and we are doing our best to invest as much as we can to remove them. >> i would say you are not doing enough. i have 14 grandchildren, do you personally believe that such content is appropriate for minor children to consume? >> a lot of the content that you mentioned, porn for example is not allowed on our platform. so no, i do not think that it is acceptable for young people to consume. >> earlier this week the wall street journal published an article titled, tiktok chinese partner has another wildly popular up in the u.s.. this app is called cap cut, a video editing tool to help users go viral on tiktok.

for obvious reasons most of our attention is focused on tiktok and bytedance, but other companies and their applications are also continuing to explain the privacy of americans. tiktok, capcut, lark, face you, all controlled by bytedance. and posed serious privacy concerns. in 2022, the top buzz, an international version of bytedance censored chinese news app was used to spread pro china messages to americans. when it comes to the data privacy of americans we must have a clear set of guidelines to ensure americans data is protected, and not passed along to unknown third-party actors who could pose a threat to our security. i urge my colleagues to continue to work together to pass a national data privacy bill, not just one of the house energy and commerce committee but also through the house of this congress. it is the only systematic way

we can address privacy concerns. unfortunately i have been given no reason to believe that tiktok does not pose a threat, and cannot be trusted to follow our laws when they conflict with the desires of the chinese communist party. your firewall that you are talking about, if you had a bad actor in your texas initiative, could get through that fire wall and sent any information that they wanted to send anywhere, direct to the chinese communist party. would you deny that? >> congressman, this risk that you talk about exists for every company. >> i'm talking about tiktok, sir. >> the risk is lower for us. >> it is a risk, correct? >> the risk is actually lower

than most companies in the industry. >> that is why we have to deal with your company, and with that madam chair i yield back. >> gentleman yields back. chair recognizes the gentleman from california, mr. peters, for five minutes. >> thank you, madam chair. mr. chew, thanks for being here today. your testimony discussed an effort, your company is named project texas. including a firewall between united states user data and entities in china, susceptible to influence by china's government. with your company's recent announcement by xiphias, it has instructed tiktok to separate itself from bytedance or face a ban. tiktok's commitment to retaining this firewall is not a crossroads. i want to ask you questions about your company's long term plans to ensure the safety and security of american data. this is the cross of the concern for me. does the chinese government need to improve, approve

project texas for tiktok to agree to it? >> congressman, we have designed project texas to move forward in the united states. this is something that we have described a length, in the written testimony and in my opening statement. the firewall of american data, on american soil by an american company, overseen by american personnel. this is designed for the united states. >> does the chinese government need to approve project texas for you to agree to it? >> we do not believe so. >> how is tiktok considering the future of project texas in the adventure of a sale or other changes, the elements that tiktok would change prior to, or? >> i cannot speak on this hypothetical, on potential owners, who i cannot represent. >> you don't know. okay. >> i don't know, yes. >> despite project texas's planned project changes it does include several broad

exceptions that would allow large amounts of u.s. user data to routinely leave the country. i want to know about these exceptions so i can understand whether project texas can live up to its promise, protecting americans user data. i understand under project texas business data and public data will be permitted to regularly leave the united states, is that correct? >> almost all the data is, that is not public, is under the definition of protected data. this accepted data that you mentioned, i can get back to you on this, it's really for -- to make sure that the business can still operate on american users are still getting the benefit. >> where the data goes and how it is used by the company? >> it would travel outside of the united states, i can get back to you on the specifics. it's stated that cannot be used to identify users so it really is data that has the -- >> we would want to have some

understanding of how we will have it be enforced. >> -- >> will you discuss where the data goes and how it's used by the company, how and at what point of data transfer does the u.s. data feed the prc algorithm used by tiktok? >> tiktok is not available in china. >> the prc developed algorithms used by tiktok, how does u.s. data get fed by that? >> the algorithm that leads to the u.s. up is in the infrastructure, trained by the u.s. and global data. tiktok is not available in mainland china. >> how can we trust that these exceptions for project texas

won't be used or abused by the chinese government or foreign adversaries? >> third party monitors including the definitions of these exceptions, we can be very transparent and how they are used. >> i guess my question will be, you want to get back to me in writing, that is fine. but how we would distinguish between the data or interoperability you suggest needs to be shared, with what data wouldn't be shared. >> again, first of all, public data, it's not part of the protected data definition because public data is what users want to share globally so we can post a video, and you want someone to france, to see, it it has to leave the united states. there are certain aggregated, not advised data sets useful for interoperability for advertising for example. part of what we are talking about. i can get back to you on the specifics. >> i also want to know how, what oversight and enforcement we can count on.

>> i can get back to you on the specifics. >> thank you, i yield back. >> gentleman yields back, gentleman from south texas mr. flutters recognized for five minutes. >> thank you, madam chair. i have to hand it to you, this has not happened with the exception of maybe vladimir putin. you have unified republicans and democrats, if only for a day we are actually unified because we have serious concerns. this tiktok support good? is tiktok a platform for good? yes or no? >> i believe yes. >> support freedom of speech? >> yes it's one of the commitments i have given this committee. >> do you personally support the first amendment? >> congressman, i'm here to talk about -- >> as the ceo of tiktok. >> as the ceo of tiktok. >> i am here to talk about tiktok. >> does the ceo, does tiktok support genocide?

>> no. but -- >> i am reclaiming my time. i'm going to go to a video now, i'd like you to see enes kanter freedom, he spent his entire career fighting against human rights violations within the chinese communist party. go ahead and play this video which highlights a situation that allegedly shows human violation rights inside china. [screaming] this was a video that was posted on tiktok by enes kanter freedom, are you familiar with this basketball player? >> i'm not familiar with the specifics. >> are you familiar with the player? >> i am not familiar of this. you just have to open tiktok and search for this kind of content. >> i have read the moderation policy, let me quote, you have talked about content moderation,

tiktok has a moderation policy, yes? >> we have community guidelines. >> one of the guidelines says, material that in the sole judgment of tiktok is objectionable, is this an example, banning annex kanter freedom, is that an example of objectionable material inside the chinese communist party and mainland china? >> we do not take down content simply because it's critical of china. >> it was banned not one week after this video. >> we do not do that, -- >> if you need a note, go ahead. >> the note says he's not banned. >> his account was taken off one week after. >> we can check on the specifics after. >> we can check. let's get some other questions. thank you for the slide. your privacy policy states that you collect data, keystroke patterns, happenings and titles, sometimes approximate locations, u.p.s. location.

our keystroke patterns and rhythms part of the data gathered by tiktok? >> if you are talking specifically about keystrokes, we do not engage in keystroke logging, it is to identify bots. it's for security purposes. this is a standard industry practice. >> you gather a lot of data, it is safe to say. >> we don't believe more than any other social media platform. >> your value proposition as you sat in my office and told me was to connect people to each other, around the world. you told me this in my office. so you gather data on what they like and what they don't like and then you show them things that they don't know they like, but eventually they may. you told me this. >> i don't think that's what i said. what i said is that we connect people together, yes. that doesn't mean the -- >> are you aware of instances of distributing content from chinese state media? >> i'm sorry? >> are you aware of instances of tiktok distributing content

from chinese state media on the platform? >> we will label them clearly to foreign users to understand that. >> do you disagree with fbi director wray and and as a director when they said that the ccp could have the capability to manipulate data and send it to the united states? do you disagree with their statement? >> the statement says could. >> do you disagree with that? >> no, i don't disagree with that. >> so it is possible that the ccp, under the auspices of bytedance your parent company which you get paid from, has the ability to manipulate contact that is being shared with 130 million americans, he has? >> congressman, i want to make sure i'm understanding of the questions, i don't disagree that data risks in general, that's what i meant. >> are there engineers located inside china that work on tiktok? >> we are not the only company that has that. >> are there engineers inside mainland china currently on the

algorithm for tiktok. >> like i said, there are other companies, as i told you in your office. >> i will reclaim my time. please rename your project, texas is not the appropriate name, we stand for freedom and transparency and we don't want your project. i yield back. >> the gentleman yields back. the gentlelady from tennessee is recognized for five minutes misses harshbarger. >> thank you madam chair and thank you mr. chew for being here today. both president trump and now president biden have foreseen tiktok to sell to an american company, however the chinese communist party has put export controls on algorithms, bytedance that powers tiktok. creating a gauntlet of regulatory hurdles in china and the u.s. that prohibit the sale of tiktok. has a long time business owner i want to tell you that waiting until your hands are forced will only drive down the price

of your app, and right now both of your hands are tied, and you are going to have to make a decision about whether you choose freedom from the ccp or you continue to be an agent of the ccp. and i will tell you why i say it that way, as a former member of homeland security, i point blank ask fbi director wray, is tiktok a national security threat? without hesitation sir, he looked at me and said, yes, congresswoman it is. now, how much data is bytedance collecting through tiktok that is worth continuing to fight this regulatory conflict? why not take the money and run like any other company would do? >> congresswoman, we build project texas in order to safeguard, and we listened to the concerns that have been raised, building something that is unprecedented, no other company is offering, to protect user interests in u.s.. we believe that it is robust, and we are offering third-party

transparency, monitors to come in and verify this. i have not heard any good reason why this does not work. i have heard a lot of rhetoric, but i have not heard a good reason why it doesn't work. i look forward to these conversations, by the way. >> let me go down this road. one tiktok was unveiled to the public's business model was solely based on generating revenue from advertising, bytedance operated separate app called douyin for the chinese marketplace. it's embarking on becoming a super app, in other words it's a one stop shop with everything you do represented. it's reported that tiktoks algorithms are so powerful that owner bytedance has begun to license it to other companies. tiktok's recommendation engine drives usage on the platform, this leads to promises of quick exposure and fame that leads to even more people joining.

and when you sign up, tiktok starts collecting data about you, your location, your gender, your age, your facial data, the user never gets to the end of the content and that is by design. and obviously that makes you a lot of money. i know that the chinese communist party is preventing bytedance from selling tiktok due to export restrictions on the technology, and this causes me to question, how are you going to power tiktok with your oracle servers looking into the u.s. with that texas project, with bytedance technology, if it can't leave china? how is that going to happen? i just want you to explain how it's going to happen. >> the way that we design this is so that any piece of software that is impactful to the code, that enters, there are technical details around this, will be reviewed by a third party or a few party

monitors, just to be sure that we are comfortable with the code. i want to say this again, i don't know of any other company in my industry who is offering this level of transparency. >> why are there two different versions of apps, one in china and one in the united states? >> it's just a different business. >> i think we all know the reason that the chinese get a different version, because bytedance put china first and america last. tiktok has, with everything we have heard today, when you see 13-year-olds, 16 year olds, you have seen the degradation that is happening to our youth and our society, it is deceptive, and it is destructive, and the worst thing is that it is deliberate. that's not acceptable. with that chairwoman i yield back. >> gentlelady yields back, gentlelady from iowa,

miller-meeks, represented for five minutes. >> thank you, madam chair. mr. chew, having been in the hot seat before when i was in state senate, i know how challenging this can be and thank you for your demeanor throughout all of this. but certainly as you can see in a bipartisan way we have concerns and those concerns are valid. this is a yes or no question. does tiktok track users individual keystrokes? >> only for security purposes. for example detecting bots, but we don't monitor what users say. >> so the only purpose that you would monitor keystrokes is for security purposes? >> i can get back to you on more specifics but this is not unlike many other companies in the industry do. >> so the keystroke monitoring does not go beyond what common industry practice and comparison to platforms like facebook and instagram use? >> yes, i believe so. >> and this tiktok keep records

of users credit cards and passwords? >> i'm not aware of that. you don't need that to log in, i can get back to you on the specifics. if you make a transaction on an e-commerce platform. but all of the u.s. data will be stored within the project texas firewall. within the oracle cloud infrastructure and overseen by american -- >> so you would store credit card and passport information? >> i need to check on the specifics, we are launching a pilot e-commerce plan and we are making sure that data is very secure, within the oracle cloud infrastructure. >> i think you have made a point of saying that your platform is not different than other platforms on social media. and therefore are no more responsible than facebook or instagram, or twitter, or any other social media platforms. the concern, however, homes with where the technology is generated, and whom it is owned by. and in the case of other companies, it is generated in

the u.s., under u.s. guidelines, under u.s. privacy laws, with certain parameters, versus generated through a parent company which as we know is susceptible to the laws of the chinese communist party which has access to all of that data information. i understand that tiktok has just reinstated in eight kantor's account. recently so the question i have for you is why would china or the chinese communist party be opposed to a sale of tiktok? >> i cannot speak on behalf of the chinese government, i can say that we designed project texas to take it forward here in the united states. and again, i believe in office, unprecedented protection for u.s. user data. >> i think the problem is when

there is a lack of transparency that leads people to believe that there is something more enough areas and that there is in fact data that is captured, stored, and poses a risk not only to children in the united states but also as national security. i yield the rest of my time to my colleague. >> i think the gentlelady from iowa for yielding. i would like to continue our discussion about project texas and the technical details about what you are proposing to do. you are migrating all storage of u.s. user data to the oracle cloud infrastructure, and you think that will be done by the end of the year, is that right? >> again, i can get back to you on the technical parts of it, the migration by default, all new u.s. data is stored. >> i'm just using what you said in your testimony in your opening here. >> it is stored by default, what i said in my testimony is

i'm deleting legacy data. >> who, when this migration is complete, will have access to that data? >> right now a team called tiktok u.s. data security, by american personnel, we have access to that. we have begun these operations already. >> but the app itself has access to the data, correct? >> only through them. any employees that have the data -- >> what i mean is, if i lose my iphone and i reinstalled the app and i put my username and password, my app will connect to the mothership and download some of that data. >> that's not the way it works, no, it would go through the oracle cloud infrastructure and that team. >> i realize that. let me ask you this. what would prevent them, someone with detailed technical knowledge of the way the app is constructed, from creating an almost identical version of the app that could also access that data? >> we are giving you third-party monitors and transparency. >> but they are monitoring the source code for your app. bytedance, these engineers have been working on this up for

years. what would prevent them from making enough that could also access that data? >> i think we are going into the era, what if there is a hacker, what, if there is this. this is a common industry problem. >> i see my time is expired. illustrates the point. i'm just skeptical that you will be able to do what you promised. >> i recognize that we have run over, i appreciate your time. we have a few members left and would appreciate the chance for them to get to ask for five minutes worth of questions. gentleman from virginia. >> you share legal counsel lawyers with bytedance. yes or no. and you testified that you prepared for this hearing, yes or no? >> with my team including some of --

>> your legal counsel. did they tell you about the report to the australian senate of march 14th that i referenced earlier, they tell you that that report was out there? yes or no? >> i cannot recall how i found out about the report. >> but you know about the report. >> did they tell you to cite the citizens lab in your written testimony today, yes or no? >> congressman, i need to get you back on specifics. >> they help do with preparation of your written statement, didn't they? ? >> a team prepared, yes. >> did they tell you that the direction, the director has called out your company for misrepresenting their report, repeatedly and did so as late as yesterday. did they tell you about that, yes or no? >> -- which is what i have been trying to do for the last four hours. >> but you cited it favorably as saying it did positive things for you. let me ask you this. you keep talking about transparency. but you have not been

transparent with us here today. you were asked earlier by mr. hudson if you owned stock in bytedance. you said you didn't want to reveal that. we are trying to figure out what the tires are between bytedance and tiktok. i'm not going to ask you how many shares you own, but do you own shares in bytedance, sir? >> yes, i do. >> there you go. how about in tiktok? >> right now, all employees own shares. >> i expected that. i just don't understand why you didn't tell mr. hudson that, transparent earlier, you made us drag it out of you. all right, now, let's talk about the kids. you told several of our folks that there was a 60 minute deadline and that if you are under the age of 18 you could not access the live option. so i texted my 17-year-old and my 15 year old, and i basically got scoffs back, when i said, are you on limited to 60 minutes? my older son said, there is a

notice i get from time to time that said i shouldn't be on more than 60 minutes, but it's never kicked me off and my younger son said, i'm on as long as i want to be. whoever informed you, particularly if it's your legal team, that is not accurate, that they are on for more than 60 minutes and they can access the live section, i believe it was mr. carter that you said, under 18 you can't access the live section. he has done it, so whatever it is you think you are doing, it's not getting done. let's talk about the law for a minute. you share a legal team but you keep talking about how you have a firewall between you and bytedance. you can't have an effective firewall under the united states interpretation of such, if you are sharing legal counsel because everything you say to your legal counsel they can share internally. if you have the same lawyers, maybe you have two different

teams of lawyers in the law firm but that is not what you said to us today. you said you share lawyers. there is no firewall, legally. i'm just telling you. so if you want to clean it up and be transparent, you need to do something about that. wouldn't you agree? yes or no? that you need to do something about that? >> congressman -- >> yes, you've been looking into it the whole time. when asked if you are employees were members of the chinese communist party had access to tiktok data from the u.s., you said you didn't know who was a member of the chinese communist party. but then to congressman walberg you said the ceo of tiktok was not a member of the chinese communist party and congressman kelly, you said the founder of tiktok was not a number of the chinese communist party. sir, either you know who isn't or is a member or you don't. which one is? it i summoned that you know and you just aren't giving us the straight story. clearly, you know, but you

denied that. >> i can ask one or two people, but we don't have a policy for our employees. >> but it's reasonable to assume that with a significant number of members of the country, of china being members of the chinese communist party, that logic would tell us, you are a logical man i assume, that there are a fair number of your employees who are members, who have access to this data. >> again, like i said, i can ask one or two people. we don't have a policy. >> you're living in some kind of cloud world. because either you know or you don't know. i yield back, thank you ma'am. >> gentleman from south carolina, chair recognizes for five minutes. >> i think what's been revealed, there's a degree of separation between binance and tiktok, i would like to the heritage -- tiktok generation ccp official in every pocket.

>> without objections to order. >> i like to yield my time to kelly armstrong from north dakota. >> thank you, madam chair. mr. chu, the tiktok privacy -- extensive data -- one line states that we may collect information about you from other publicly available sources. what publicly available data is tiktok collecting and adding to the profiles of users? >> it will be publicly available, i can get back to you on specifics. >> what is the purpose of obtaining even more data on who uses beyond the data from the platform? >> we collect did -- a lot of transparency on what data we collect, choices on the controls of the privacy settings. it is to serve them a better experience. this is the reason why so many people love the app. it's a great experience. >> so, how does the non-tiktok related data service provider relate to the service provided. >> i need to check the specifics and understand the question and get back to.

>> okay. do you think the average tiktok user knows that you are, and understands, that tiktok data collection extended information outside the use of the app? >> we do give transparent information on this, like i said, i don't believe we collect more information than most other social media platforms out there. >> the reason i ask this, i'm gonna go back into the -- you described that tiktok is a subsidiary of -- mr. griffin just said that you guys share the same lawyers. you have stated that you you have a direct report -- you've also stated that at certain levels, tiktok operates without direct daily control from -- you've used content moderation as an example for that. tiktok's privacy policy states that you may share user data within your corporate group. is that corporate group include bytedance? >> if you're talking about that one entity that has four

chinese media latency if you talk about that entity, the government share, the answer is we have cut off access of u.s. data sets to that. employees of the entity. >> but your user privacy, bytedance is part of your corporate. >> bytedance is the top company. you're talking about the other entities within the group. >> so, you just testified that you firewall this, does that so you're saying the tiktok's executives that operate independently with bytedance, does that statement not hold for sharing access to data? >> well, i was talking about that one entity that has many of you have raised some concerns, that's the entity that i'm talking about. the entity with the chinese government's investment that is for the purpose of chinese internet listening, for the chinese business. >> let me ask in a different

way, what other entities have access to the tiktok user data? >> after project texas, we're gonna move it so that only tiktok user data security has control to access of the data. >> okay, so, we can bring you back either after project texas has done, right now, what other entities have access to tiktok user data today? >> only by requirement, certain employees may use -- require some access of data to help build the product. but for u.s., we have moved it from project texas, and by the end of this year it will be firewall the way. >> this is your privacy policy today. i understand what you're telling us, what's potentially gonna happen in the future, i have concerns again about government involvement, private organization, all of that. i'm just saying, this is your user agreement today. so, your user agreement says that you share access with your corporate group. you're telling me what's gonna happen whenever project texas

gets done, i'm asking you today, who has access to the tiktok user data? >> our near user agreement, congressman, our privacy policy we also added a link so that users in the u.s. can be informed of our projects, the link is there. >> the link is there, i understand what you're trying to do moving forward, i have my own concerns about that. but we're sitting here today, in a hearing, and your privacy policy is different than your testimony. your privacy policy specifically says that you can share use a debt it within your corporate group. so, you're saying even though your privacy policy says that you're not doing? >> like i said, i don't think there's any contradiction. like i said, project texas when it's done, we firewall off the data, we still have some legacy data in virginia and singapore that we started -- and will be done by the end of this year. >> at the end of this year, you won't share it. does that mean you're sharing it today? >> i don't believe so. but there is something. >> when you change the truck privacy policy? why haven't you updated it? >> we did update, and we give users more information on

project texas. we did update. >> >> gentleman yields back, gentleman from texas. chair recognizes mr. grimshaw. >> thank you, madam chair. mr. chu for bringing republicans and democrats together, appreciate that. i want to get right to the critical point of concerns, tiktok is able to collect massive amounts of personal data, we all know that. that means it could, if it desired, to use the state to influence narratives and trends, create misinformation campaigns, and courage self destructive behavior, purposely allow drug cartels to communicate freely in organized human and drug trafficking. to be fair, all social media companies could do that. here's the difference, it is only tiktok that is controlled by the chinese communist party, all these other social media companies are not. mr. chew do you agree that tiktok is controlled by the ccp?

>> no. >> i thought you'd say that. i disagree. as you thought i might say. here's why i disagree, your parent company is bytedance, right? >> that's correct. >> that is correct. many of the workers who work at bytedance or communist party members, right? >> i wouldn't know. >> i think, for example, the chief editor at bytedance is -- the communist parties secretary, correct? >> he works on the chinese business, not on tiktok. >> right, he worked for bytedance? >> on the chinese business. >> the parent company of tiktok? the >> chinese business is called -- >> it's also with bytedance, right? >> bytedance owned a number of businesses. >> you all report to bytedance, that's part of bytedance. okay? do you know of any other employees that work from bytedance that are part of the chinese communist party? >> like i said, bytedance owns chinese businesses, they operate in china. you >> don't know how many, but you know how many must be card

carrying members of the ccp, right? >> in the chinese business, yet. the >> ccp holds a golden share in bytedance, that allows the ccp to control one board seat in bytedance, that's publicly reported? >> that's not correct. >> they admitted to it. >> on our website, we've updated it so we have can give people more transparent information on this, they have a share in the subsidiary that is only for the chinese business, and nothing to do with tiktok. it is for the purposes of contact licensing in china. >> there's not internal ccp committee which is regular thing that happened in china, they have a ccp committee internally inside the company? >> i run tiktok, i cannot represent chinese business. >> i'll talk about bytedance. no arrangement in bytedance? >> here's the main point of concern, china's 2017 national intelligence law states very clearly, quote, any organization or citizen shall support the citizen cooperate with state intelligence working in accordance with the law, and maintain the secrecy of all knowledge of state intelligence

work. in other words, bytedance, and also your tiktok employees that live in china, they must cooperate with chinese intelligence whenever they are called upon, and if they are called upon, they're bound to secrecy, and that would include you. so mr. chew, if the ccp tells bytedance to turn all over data that tiktok escalated inside the u.s., even within project texas, do they have to do so according to chinese law? >> congressman, first, i'm singaporean. >> that's fine. their employees of yours in bytedance in china? >> we understand this concern, in my opening statement we said, we hear those concerns. we did not try to avoid trivialize them. we built something where we take the data and put it out of reach. this is what we did. we put it out of reach. >> they own you. >> we put it out of reach -- >> bytedance owns tiktok, if bytedance -- if the ccp owns bytedance, because the ccp owns everybody in china. by law, they can make them do whatever they want, and they say that by law, they can't tell anybody about it.

their make your head over that data, is that correct? >> did it stored here, in american soil, by an american company, but. >> we thought that, but leaked audio from 80 internal tiktok meetings that u.s. user data has been repeatedly access from china, even he says it has it. here's the other thing, falling back on my colleagues line of questioning, in your own privacy policy it says the can share information with your so-called corporate group, is bytedance part of that corporate group? >> if you talk about the shared entity with the share, look at short of the previous -- >> is bytedance part of the corporate group. >> biden is a holding company. it's part of the corporate group, yes. >> so, your own privacy policy as you have to share data with bytedance. and if the ccp says, hey bytedance, you're gonna do it we say. you can't on what about. because by law, according that 2017 national intelligence law, they have to do it. that's our concern. maybe haven't done it yet, but my point is, you might have to. and that's where concerns come

from, over 300 tiktok employees have worked for china state run propaganda media, that's just from looking at the linkedin profiles. okay, my last point is this i want to say that all the teenagers out there in the tiktok inflators who think we're just olden at of touch and oh no we're talking about trying to take away your favorite app. you may not care that your data is being accessed now, but it will be one day when you do care about it. here's the real problem, when data comes power, they can choose what you see and how you see it, they can make you believe things that are not true, they can encourage you to engage in behavior that will destroy your life. even if it is not happening yet, it could in the future. the long term goal of the chinese communist party is the demise of the american power, and that starts with our youth. at any moment, they can demand all of tiktok's data be used to design an a.i. algorithm, with the sole purpose of promoting chinese interests in destroying our society from within. you are know why that's democrat, why democratic republicans have come together on this? that's why we are so concerned. thank you, and i yield back. >> gentleman yields back.

i remind the members they have ten business days to submit questions for the record, i ask our witnesses to respond to the questions promptly, pursuant to committee rules, i ask unanimous consent to enter the documents from the staff list into the record. without objection? ordered. members should submit their questions by the close of business on april 6th, without objection, the committee is adjourned.