of state for the bush ministry should talks about the conflict between the countries, the impeachment inquiry of president trump, sanctions, and u.s. military aid to ukraine. this is one hour and 15 minutes. >> i would like to welcome everybody to russia and eurasia seminar. we do it every two weeks. as you know, and today we, given the speaker we have and the topic he's going to deal with, we had the pleasure of welcoming c-span here, which is broadcasting this event, as far as far as i can tell, on c-span2. i'm charles gati.

these seminars. i say very little, because i want the speaker to have as much time as possible. just to give you a little background, he sails from massachusetts. he went, studied soviet studies , at harvard. before that got his ba also in soviet studies and political science from tufts university, at harvard he studied with legendary adam olam, and that tufts with old friend of mine. she left washington after some 24 or 25 years, and now he's a professor at, in florida, at the program for human rights and

diplomacy at florida international university and the move is shrouded in mystery, because few people do that, but, perhaps, he will tell us. one day, we will have some declassified information that will allow us to figure out why time,t washington at this just in may of this year, and he has a very nice suntan, as you can tell. so i don't know if he actually works there. i suspect the people in florida have better things to do. but he is very active. he has an op-ed in "the ," which, ipost think, we have copies available as you leave, printed out,

enough copies for everybody. it's that get in the paper but it's on the internet and i suspect it will be the next day hopefully in the paper itself. just briefly, after 25 25 years -- what he did in these 25 years in washington, he worked extensively in the state department. he was a deputy assistant secretary of state for eurasia, including ukraine and russia of course. he was also an assistant secretary for democracy and human rights there. he's worked on the policy planning staff and was an advisor for the undersecretary -- thank you, indeed. very distinguished background, indeed, and he has arranged this current crisis in after i invited him to

speak here so that c-span would show up and all of you would be coming here, which is another major achievement that i figured i ought to mention. david is also a friend of mine, a friend of my wife's, who is here, and you are most welcome here. we are very pleased that you can be here and look forward to your presentation. >> great. charles, thank you very much. it's great to be back here at sais. you had me here a few years ago, i think, and i flew in this morning from miami, where i am now based, and, fortunately, it is not that cold here yet, so one of the things i do not miss about washington. as charles mentioned i'm in , florida international university now in the stephen j green school of international and public affairs and am the new director for the european and eurasian studies program, as

well as with the program on human rights and diplomacy. i'm dual hatted down there and it's been a great move and a good time for a change of scenery as well. so the topic today is "trends in russia-ukraine relations and the role of the west," and it is, as you said charles, a very timely subject these days, where we see developments on both sides of the atlantic, and i will try to touch on all of those and also look forward to your questions and comments afterwards. but let me start with a few points that i think are essential for understanding the situation when we look at the russia-ukraine crisis and the role of the west. in 2014, russian forces under the order of vladimir putin invaded ukraine. this was not a civil war. it's not an integral conflict. it is aggression committed by mr. putin against his neighbor, ukraine. there is no ambiguity about

this. you should not use the term "civil war." you should not talk about "separatism." this is something that mr. putin launched against ukraine. the nato enlargement which is sometimes cited as the reason for mr. putin's aggression had nothing to do with what was happening in 2013 and 2014. nobody in 2013 and 2014, whether in ukraine or in europe or the united states, was talking about ukraine becoming a member of nato. the issue at the time that triggered moscow's reaction was ukraine's intention to sign agreements with the european union, including an association agreement and a deep and comprehensive free-trade agreement. that is what triggered this, not any talk about nato enlargement to include ukraine. third, this isn't a frozen

conflict. this is a hot war, where ukrainians are being injured and killed on a daily basis. the violence has subsided a little bit as result of some cease-fire agreements, but more than 13,000 ukrainians have been killed as a result of mr. putin's aggression. more people have been killed in this conflict since the signing of the minsk agreement in february 2015 than were killed before the signing of that agreement. so any notion that the minsk accords, as they are called, has brought about a cessation in hostilities is simply not true. fourth, those in the donbass, and by that i mean the so-called areasleadership in two are not separatist. , they are either russians themselves or russian-backed forces who are trying to destabilize ukraine.

there wasn't a separatist movement in either of the donbass or in crimea before russia moved in. which leads me to the next point, crimea is part of ukraine. it was recognized by the international community as part of ukraine with the breakup of the soviet union under the accords in the organization for security and coordination in europe, and under the budapest memorandum signed in 1994. i'll come back to the budapest memorandum in a minute. the west, in my view, should never recognize what is widely considered the illegal annexation of crimea. moreover, we should be paying more attention to the situation in crimea with the human rights conditions are absolutely where crimean tatars who have been victimized many times over the decades are being

victimized once again. mr. putin in my view bears responsibility for the over 13,000 ukrainians killed in this conflict, some 2 million who have been displaced, enormous economic damage, and, i would of thethe shoot down malaysian airliner in july 2014 in which 298 people were murdered. in my view, mr. putin has the blood of ukrainians and others on his hand for what he has done here. and last point to start things to set the stage, i haven't seen anything that mr. putin has done that deserves an easing of sanctions, a membership in the parliamentary assembly of the council of europe, which russian was allowed to rejoin back in the spring, or certainly a return to the g8. russia still occupies and threatens ukrainian territory. russia has not withdrawn. mr. putin doesn't deserve any

breaks from the sanctions and actions that were taken by the international community. let's fast-forward to the current situation with the impeachment inquiry and the scandal that we are witnessing here. even before the phone call that president trump made to president zelensky on july 25 of this year, he, according to media reports had a very , negative view of ukraine. "the washington post" reported, for example, that it a former senior administration official who were people he discussed the issue with president trump said that the president thought "what we were doing in ukraine was pointless and just aggravating the russians." the official went on to say the president position basically is we should recognize the fact that the russians should be our

friend, and who cares about the ukrainians? times" had a similar report, saying that president trump has had harsh words about ukraine, and they are terrible people, he is quoted as having said. they are all corrupt and they try to take me down. and it is this sense where the president and his personal attorney have been arguing that, in fact, it was ukrainian collusion with the democrats and the clinton campaign, not russian collusion with the trump campaign that should be the focus of investigation. in addition, mr. giuliani has been trying to push for further vista geisha and of former vice president biden son, hunter biden, and his role with the barisma company. this despite being one of the first leaders president trump is one of first leaders to

congratulate newly elected president zelensky after his landslide victory, 73% of the vote at the end of april of this , year, also despite the fact president trump in contrast to his predecessor, president obama, president trump was the one who agree to provide lethal military assistant to ukraine to help it defend itself against aggressive russian forces. i strongly supported this decision by president trump. i think is right thing to do and i strongly criticize president obama for his refusal to allow this kind of assistance to ukraine as russia was moving in. and yet, despite all of this, it seems more recently that the president, president trump, has been giving ukraine and president zelensky a cold shoulder. in his congratulatory call after president zelensky's victory in april, president trump promised an oval office visit for president zelensky, and ukrainians have been waiting for this to happen. in addition, as you know from

reports, there was also additional military assistance that was supposed to go to ukraine in the amount of $391 million. and it appears that for whatever reason, and depending on who you listen to, there are different explanations, that aid was held up because of concerns either about corruption or because the president wanted to use it as leverage to push for an investigation. it sends the wrong signal when we look at lessons we're trying to convey about rule of law. when we stress the importance of depoliticizing the judicial process, when we try to say that you shouldn't seek revenge against political opponents, these are messages that president putin might send, not an american president. the role of mr. giuliani has painted a terrible image of ukraine. he seems unconcerned with the

damage he's doing to ukraine and its relationship with the united states by smearing it as a country that is helplessly corrupt. ukraine, for sure, has a huge corruption problem, but to say it is hopelessly corrupt i think is a mistake. all of this is music to mr. putin's ears. the release of the memorandum of the telephone conversation also caused problems for president zelensky with germany and france, where he is quoted as making some fairly disparaging comments about european governments. all of this leaves ukraine and y with a sensensk of abandonment, where he looks and sees he does not have

friends coming to his aid, after winning with 73% of the vote, after seeing his party, the servant of the people, when a majority for the first time majority inwin a the parliamentary elections in july. you would think this would be a time where they are embracing him, engaging him, helping him. dealing with challenges inside of the country, including the return of an oligarchy, but, , and i, mr. zelensky think many ukrainians, are feeling abandoned and confused, and that, unfortunately, plays into the hands of mr. putin. we have seen, early september, the release of 35 ukrainian prisoners who should have never been held including sailors that attack onnapped in an ukrainian vessels last november. in exchange, russia got 35 people returned to their

country, including someone reportedly connected to a shootdown of the malaysian airliner. argue,ensky, i would probably feels he has to make the best of a situation if he senses that western countries are not there to back him up and support him. but he has also discovered that that can prove problematic on the home front, where we saw protests this last weekend with turning out on the streets that he was making too many concessions to mr. putin. there was an agreement struck, tentative agreement, at, at least on october 1 to provide a framework on event you'll elections in the regions. in which they would also receive special status if those elections were held according to ukrainian electoral standards.

the interpretation of this agreement has already been very different depending on whether you listen to the russian side or the ukrainian side. there is, unfortunately, ukrainians feel a sense of coming -- a sense of pressure coming from europe and the united states to end this conflict. there seems to be a desire here in this city, among some and certainly european capitals to return to business as usual with mr. putin and with russia. this has gone on too long for many europeans. it has affected our trade. it's affected our ability to get along with moscow. so instead of applying pressure albeit after applying sanctions which they should do, but instead of ramping up sanctions and a significant, serious way, to apply more pressure on mr. putin, and the west seems to be doing it on mr. zelinski. the wrong point to my view. ukrainians are fed up with

corruption. zelinski was victorious in the ukrainian election because he campaigned against corruption. there are concerns, as i , about certain individuals and their ability to influence decisions. the chief of staff of the president is a former lawyer and a lot of questions have been raised about that. the ukrainians are tired of war. they are the ones that should be tired of war, not us in the west. we are not the ones fighting and defending for our country. and yet, putin is is taking advantage, looking to exploit western support for ukraine and taking advantage of what he hopes will be a new president there that doesn't know the ropes. he tried this right after zelinski won where he announced an easing of passports for those

living there. zelensky handled that very well. but there are more tests coming for him that we have already seen. it is worth, i think, stepping back for a moment, to see how we reached all of this how we got , to this point. i mentioned briefly the budapest memorandum. this was an agreement signed in in which the united states, the 1994, united kingdom, kingdom, russia and ukraine reaffirmed their commitment to ukraine to respect the independence and existing sovereignty in the borders of ukraine. the existing borders included crimea as part of ukraine. it reaffirmed those countries ' obligation to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity of the political independence of ukraine. none of their weapons will ever be used against ukraine except in self-defense. it also reaffirmed their

commitment to ukraine to refrain from economic coercion designed to subordinate their own the exercise -- their own interest the exercise of ukraine of the rights inherent in sovereignty and a secure advantage of any kind. i am reading from the memorandum . this was all provided in exchange to give up the nuclear weapons inherited from the soviet union after the breakup. ukraine became the third largest nuclear weapons power after the breakup of the soviet union. in exchange for agreeing to relinquish and turn over those nuclear weapons to russia, russia, the united united states and the u.k. signed this agreement, the budapest memorandum. russia, of course, has violated the budapest memorandum and we have not lived up to our obligations. it is not a treaty, it does not incur article five security guarantees like nato membership but what ukraine relinquished,

weapons iss nuclear pretty significant, to say say -- to say the least. you can also look to 2004. the orange revolution in the prime which minister at the time, sought to to steal an election. in doing so, he was supported by mr. putin who visited ukraine several times, stood with him, and sought to encourage a crackdown on the protesters in that revolution. the president, at that time, decided not to deploy forces and the ukrainian military also would not accept any orders to do so. we saw the orange revolution succeed through a rerun of the election there. fast-forward to 2010. c comesbit -- yanakovi

back. he wins a free and fair election. i was there to observe the second round of that election in 2010. after securing victory in 2010, he launched into a terribly corrupt direction and also cued very closely to a pro russian line. the spark for the revolution of and 2014 that3 came in his first term as president came as a result of , ukraine's intention to sign agreements with the european union. it is the european union, not nato. that was the spark for russia's interference and the fears in 2013. in november 2013, ukraine along with georgia and moldova and armenia, planned to sign

agreements with the european union. russia pressured the armenians to back out of these agreements and armenia agreed. it has subsequently signed them. .t also pressured mr. yanakovic summit tok before a sign them, he agreed not to sign them. after treating the european union as a much lesser evil than nato, mr. putin got into his mind that the european union was bad news for moscow, that signing agreements with the european union meant that these countries were moving in a more westward direction towards deeper integration with the community and he wanted to stop that. he pressured him into not signing these agreements, reneging on these agreements. the result was a social media movement that led a few months later to him fleeing power, going to russia and a new government coming in.

there were more than 100 people killed during the violence. unlike 2004 with the orange revolution, there was terrible violence this time. in downtown ukraine. ovic has the blood of those people on his hands. we then see a sense of panic and -- in moscow, that the revolution, if successful could , possibly spread to russia itself. you have to remember that in 2011 and 2012, huge protests in russia after the elections, and continued up until may of 2012 when putin awarded a crackdown on the protesters. putin was already a little spooked by people turning out in

the streets and his own country and was fearful if ukrainians , could bring about the end of the regime, maybe this would spread. but of course it was not , ukrainians who were responsible for this in his mind, it was the united states. about the 2011 protests in russia accusing state hillary clinton of sending a signal. he assumed it was outside forces it was the west. particularly, , the united states. putin refuses to believe whether in his own country or ukraine or elsewhere that people on their own could indigenously rise up against corrupt authoritarian government. he has to find a country to scapegoat, a responsible party, and invariably, that winds up being us. you also need to keep in mind putin's views towards ukraine.

in 2008, he famously said to president bush, george, you have to understand ukraine is not even a country. part of its territory is in and a greater part was given by us. in putin's mind, ukraine does not even exist as a separate independent state. for him to trample on that was not such a big deal. the invasion of ukraine as well is important to keep in mind. putin not the , first time russian forces had been used against neighboring states. in 2008, russian forces invaded georgia. in august of that year. russia has used economic and energy tools as weapons, including against ukraine and the violation of the budapest memorandum. the cyber attack against estonia and then from there we see much more brazen attacks in the so-called hybrid war tactics that russia uses.

putin's number one goal is staying in power. his number two goal is staying in power. guess what is number three goal is. staying in power. he will do whatever is necessary to achieve that goal, including if necessary invading a , neighboring state to undermine the possibility of a successful revolution that could represent in his mind a threatening alternative to his model in russia. ukraine became a victim of putin's determination to stay in power. his dismissive attitude towards the country was also a factor. putin initially denied that russian forces were in crimea. until of course he admitted otherwise. we had to take unavoidable steps so that events did not develop as they are currently developing in southeast ukraine in april 2014.

of course, our troops stood crimea'simea has -- self-defense forces. in december 2015, almost two years after the initial invasion, putin acknowledged the presence of special forces in the region. we never said there were not people there that carried out certain tasks, including in the military sphere, he declared trying to draw a distinction , between uniform, regular russian troops and specialists , or even volunteers. people on vacation, he would would try to explain. putin's invasion of ukraine starting in late february 2014 marked the first annexation of one european country's territory by another since world war ii. it threatens the entire order and stability and peace in europe.

in one stroke putin thumbed his at the helsinki accords 1997 russia-ukraine treaty, paris charter of 1990 and the budapest agreement i talked about already. the post cold war order was torn to shreds. the concern was if putin's brazen act was left unchallenged, other authoritarian regimes would think that they, too, could engage in this kind of activity and get away with it. if not stopped in ukraine putin , might move into other countries. so rightly, the eu and the united states and other countries, canada among them, imposed a series of series of for thes on russia invasion of ukraine. those sanctions had not been orped up much since 2014

2015. in order for sanctions to be effective, the target has to think that he will get hit with more sanctions unless he changes his behavior. otherwise, the target of sanctions can get adjusted to sanctions, and that is more or less what has happened. sanctions have had an impact on the regime and russia. i do not think there is any denying it. most observers would agree sanctions kept putin from going , further into ukraine. they have not changed the overall russian behavior under mr. putin. sanctions have been linked to the minsk accord. there were two versions of this. in september 2014, the other february, 2015. both badly flawed agreements. the ukrainians were forced to sign these accords because they were under tremendous military duress from approaching russian forces. neither version, but the

february is now the one people 2015 refer to, neither version refers to crimea. there is no reference to crimea whatsoever. that is sort of left for another day. there is talk about elections one day. areas that are essentially controlled by russian forces. that is where mr. zelinski made some agreement or overture in this regard, recently with with russian officials. the problem is, you cannot conduct elections there under current circumstances. under current conditions. ukrainians do not control those areas. russian forces are present. there have been over 2 million people displaced. how will they vote in these elections. who is going to observe them?

mentioned -- the ose has been mentioned as an observer. conducting elections on the current circumstances would disenfranchise those 2 million people it would not be according , to standards and it would not be under ukraine's control. ukraine has now been saying these elections will not take place as long as there are russian forces on ukrainian territory. the kremlin, not surprising, has a different interpretation of this. they say the elections should take place and they should be granted special status once the elections are over. what putin wants is for them to have veto control in a federal system which ukrainians have rejected. in order to veto the aspirations to integrate more closely with the eu and nato. zelinski is under growing pressure not to yield to these demands. as i said, i think the sanctions

that have been imposed are the right thing to do. i wish we would see more of them. i was starting to see that ambassador jon huntsman in an op-ed yesterday criticized the sanctions that are in place for russia. i have not heard a convincing argument including reading that , op-ed of critics sanctions on what we should do in place of sanctions. if we say that putin's invasion of ukraine is unacceptable, then we have to do something about it accept it. we sanctions was our way, this is unacceptable and this is the price you pay. i welcome anyone here, if you think sanctions are a bad idea, what would you do instead to demonstrate to mr. putin that his invasion of ukraine is unacceptable and will incur

significant costs? lastly, we see in the current controversy the role of vice president biden. and his involvement in ukraine matters in the previous administration. he, in my view, played a very positive, constructive role. keep in mind that president obama never visited ukraine. despite the fact that it had been invaded by russia during his presidency. he did visit once when he was a senator. president obama never visited. vice president biden was instead designated as the point person for ukraine policy. and in 2016, he, along with the entire u.s. government many , european governments, imf and others, advocated for the dismissal of the prosecutor

general at the time, not because he was investigating berets my risma the company hunter , biden had a position, but because he was not doing his job. in a quick side note, i think hunter biden's decision's decision to take this position showed terrible judgment. i think that it was very inappropriate for him to have had this role at the same time his father was playing such an active role in ukrainian policy. but there are no indications, including from a previous prosecutor general, that mr. biden violated any laws. in fact, he said they had closed the investigation to the extent it was active in the first place. now there is pressure on ukrainian officials to take another look into hunter biden's activity there. again, this is an issue that is

complicating u.s.- ukrainian relations deeply. at the end of the day, with tensions and relations between key have and washington -- kiev and washington the party that , benefits from that is moscow. i think we need to approach all issues very carefully, very openly, very transparently, but recognizing the huge mandate by which he won is deserving of our support, our engagement our , embrace and our help at a time he is facing enormous challenges in his country. i hope that soon policy can get back on the right track so we can support ukraine in defending itself against putin's aggression, helping it deal with the cancerous problem of corruption and recognize that constants of sovereignty which president trump is certainly

talking about are sacrosanct. , with that, let me stop there. thank you very much, david, for this candid, hard-hitting, as well as comprehensive look primarily at the original sources of this aggression against ukraine and the crisis that has since developed there. let me ask you two questions, before i open it up. i think very correctly you responsibilitys for the crisis. especially washington, you you know better than i, it is easy to always blame the united states for whatever happens. as you pointed out, there are reasons for that. i happen to share your criticism of obama's weakness and reluctance to get engaged more

than he did. foreign policy in the second obama administration was not what it should have been. be that as it may, the issue is really as you highlighted, russian aggression. and, yet, today, to talk against which you indirectly spoke so eloquently, the talk is trump, not putin. there are good reasons for this for sure. but trump, the issue on which i would like you to comment are these. trump has declined or refused to criticize putin for the very aggression that you so eloquently and factually described. so going so far as to try to

encourage zelinski to negotiate with russia from a position of utter weakness which is about the last thing he should be doing. this, in addition to all the other facts that i will not detail, raising the question, again, i wonder if you would care to speculate about this -- you are very familiar with the dossier and other things from how do yous -- explain to yourself trump's motives. i understand motives are very hard to discuss. at times, we can't even do a good job of explaining our own actions. is it simply that he likes strong men, as some people suggest?

is it that he has financial interests or hopes for financial interests in moscow or elsewhere ? is it possible that the russians have compromising information about him and that is why he is kissing up to putin as much as he has? i am seeing a little bit more about this, if you are willing to speculate. understanding that you don't know either for sure. none of us can know it for sure. but it would be very interesting for us if you said a few words. the second question has to do with the telephone call. now, i shared the view that this was outrageous. i shared the view that there was and oficit quid pro quo

course, if the remaining parts of the conversation are declassified, where there are the three dots between sentences more and ind out suspect that we will. and, yet, maybe this is too much of a theoretical question. without, in any way trying to approach tomp's zelinski, i just wonder if this is as new as we will pose trump or i strongly oppose him maintain. i recall towards the end of world war ii, i believe maybe in tehran, president roosevelt talked to stalin about eastern

europe. he told him, something to the effect, i paraphrase, go easy on poland, which was guided, of course, by domestic political interest on the part of president roosevelt because of all the, you know, polish american vote that he wanted to have, understandably. he wanted polish americans to vote for him. so he asked stalin, you know, not to impose terror rule or at , least not right away. there was a period of a couple of years after the end of world war ii when there was a period of transition. was that all that different from what trump is doing now? don't we always get some domestic considerations?

maybe too much into our foreign policy or, conversely, isn't it just foreign policy analysts outside of the political round, maybe here in washington people , like you and me to believe that a pure, nonpolitical approach to foreign policy is possible? those are my two questions. >> let me start with the first and answer it this way with at least what i think i know rather than speculate on what i don't know. i think that without question, president trump trump has shown an affinity for strongman leaders. you see this not just with putin. turkey,it in egypt and the philippines, it is a long list. he fell in love with kim which,

i think if if any other president said that would have launched outrage. and, i don't know why, but, he has this affinity for strongmen leaders. and in addition, he has i think , a misunderstanding of what the problem is in u.s.-russia relations. as a candidate and as president he frequently says one it'd be great if we and russia got along. the problem is, that's a the wrong question to ask. the answer is of course it be great if russia and the united states got along. the right question to ask is, is it possible for the united states and russia to get along as long as the putin regime is in power without sacrificing our interests, and other countries in the process? the answer to that question is no. i think the president needs to question, reframe his thinking and understand that

faultless innot this relationship over the years, the vast blame lies in the kremlin and with mr. putin. individuals matter. there were more hopes and possibilities when yeltsin was the president of russia. there may be even worse some hopes at the very outset of putin, although folks like myself were skeptical given his background. i see no hope whatsoever for a relationship that is protective of our values and interests in other countries in the process thee a fruitful one with possibility of a strategic partnership. the second one, administrations

do keep in mind political considerations in foreign policy. it is just human nature. in that case you sided with fdr, he was asking for something with u.s. natural interest -- national interest, not to see poland destroyed. that may have been of interest to polish americans as well, but we had a national interest in seeing those countries be independent and not in control of the soviet union. that got drowned out. stalin did essentially take them over. you have the president is askinf ukraine, in a country where corruption is a serious problem, asking him to meet with his attorney, glare -- blurring the distinction between the two, to investigate his political

opponent, and to look into ukrainian involvement in the 2016 election, contrary to what the intelligence community produced in january 2017. i do see those as very different. thank you very much. the floor is open to question and comments. i would like to call initially on -- if you just identify yourselves and all others come after. please forgive me for that but we do love our students. too at fiu.e >> obviously ask whatever you want to ask. i would like to remind you of professor kramer's request that if you think the sanctions are

or not particularly helpful or effective or whatever and if you have a different view on this, please don't hesitate to bring it up and we will give him a chance to respond. first question here. second year student -- focused on -- i'm drawing --allels to what's going on to the crisis in georgia and it seems again that russia is creating more buffer zones of influence. i do not think the sanctions are working. we saw the russian economy tank.

now it's leveled out despite increasing sanctions. i would like to get your opinion willing, to what the ,.s. and the allies should do especially during the situation where ukraine american relations are getting hit and playing into mr. putin's hands. >> first, i think you are right to raise parallels with trans nic -- georgia.ova and here is thateme you see russian forces occupying s' territories. 20% of georgian territory is occupied by russian forces. about half a million people in

the country, little less than -- what you see is an attempt by putin, although the other conflicts predated putin, but they have not been solved, to act as a kind of defect to veto on these countries' aspirations. the thinking i assume in the kremlin is if you occupy crimea, -- mulled over is not interested in joining nato. georgia and ukraine are. revolutionmaidan in 2008 there was a request for a membership action plan but that is different from actual membership. the kremlin's thinking is if you occupy their territory, there's no way the e.u. and especially

nato will look to deepen ties with these countries. out can you provide article five security guarantees? attack on one nato member ally is an attack on all. so how could you possibly provide article five security guarantees if russian forces are occupying 20% of georgia? what i think needs to be done in thatcase is to make clear russian occupation of another country's territory will not serve as a defect of veto for that country's aspirations. there have been examples over the years, if you look at germany there was west and east germany. 30 years ago. west germany became a nato member state and when the reunification happened, all of germany did. a cypress was another example where there were conditions made because of contested territory. i think you can pursue

integration with nato and the eu in these countries and create some mechanism where article five, at least for the time being, wouldn't extend to those territories. don't be imaginative and creative in coming up with ways to address countries aspirations that want to join these wins.zations, the kremlin they have established and created a to fact a veto over these countries. i read you the part about the memorandum. it is inconsistent with that memorandum. in terms of sanctions, i support the sanctions, i want more sanctions. that is my criticism. it is not that i want to lift the sanctions and try something else. either you do nothing or you send in military force is the alternative. the ukrainians are asking us to send javelin missiles to destroy

oncoming russian tanks and other kinds of lethal assistance. they are not asking us to fight their fight for them. so making sure that we provide that lethal military assistance, i'm glad that the hold on the assistance that was imposed on the summit has been lifted, largely due to congressional pressure and a terrific editorial by the "washington post" on this issue. i think there need to be a lot more sanctions imposed if we want to see this conflict satisfiesn a way that ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity. as we both have said, the impression is the pressure is on the linsky, not putin. ski, not on putin. there really has not been a significant increase in sanctions from the eu or the united states. and less and until that happens,

i don't think you will see russia withdraw. >> should we start imposing sanctions on those that have the highest trade relations with russia as an alternative to directly sanctioning the russian government? >> as you know, there's talk about sanctioning companies involved in the nordstrom to pipeline. straight from russia to germany under the baltic sea. and it would obviate the need for the pipeline that currently goes across ukraine. the pipeline that currently exists from russia through ukraine to other countries that receive the energy brings in to $3 billion a year for ukraine and transit fees. ukraine has made great progress in reducing its dependency on needs for energy, but it that money from transit fees with that pipeline.

2 would make that obsolete. do you sanction the western companies involved? that pipeline is almost finished. the german government will argue it is based on commercial interests. stream one is not at full nord stream one is not a capacity why do you need two except to screw ukraine? >> other questions yes. >> i'm a second year student here in the european eurasian studies program. i wanted to ask you about what the purpose of sanctions are and the prospect of regime change in russia. earlier you were mentioning that extensively the point of sanctions is to change behavior

and if we ramp up sanctions, maybe we would see a change and we have not. does anyone expect that if we increase it, putin is going to turn a new leaf and say maybe i was wrong i will work with you? does not seem likely. as long as he's in power it seems like this is going to be the way it is. is the point of sanctions to undermine his rule and provide discontent? if that's the case, i think in russia as you alluded to, they have this idea that any sort of protest is state department sponsored. it seems like our hands are tied . if this is the case that the sanctions are really the best hope is that they're going to undermine this rule, what are the prospects for that and what can we really do without inflaming this narrative that we are meddling and doing the same thing they did to us?

nalvalny, his is asian was labeled undesirable by russian authorities. -- his organization was labeled undesirable by russian authorities. joins adation now pretty long list of organizations that have been so designated as on desirable which makes them illegal to operate. atlantic council, free russia thedation, all organizations that are trying to do some good and help those that are trying to bring about some democratic reform and liberalization, or anticorruption organizations, those are the ones they target. on your question, a strong proponent of sanctions, my interest is not in regime change because i don't think we are capable of regime change. it's not our responsibility to do that. that's for russians to decide if they want regime change or not.

i've heard a number of russians, --luding a friend of mine strong advocates of sanctions. they say a change in regime, that is our responsibility and i fully agree with that. life unpleasant and uncomfortable for putin and his cronies and those that are involved one way or another in the illegal annexation of crimea, the aggression in don bos -- interference in our elections and other elections. i do think there is evidence to suggest that russian forces stop their assault because of the imposition of sanctions. it is a hard thing to prove but i think there is evidence out there of that. you are right. the sanction regime in place for the europeans,

americans, canadians, and others has not brought about behavioral change in the sense of leaving russian forces out. i think putin, if he could, would like to end this thing because i think he feels he's stuck in a quagmire and does not quite know how to get out. crimea is really costly for russia to maintain. they built this absurd bridge that has shoddy construction. i would not be surprised if it fell into the sea. and then of course they will blame ukrainians for sabotage. the treatment of the people living in crimea is appalling. freedom house, an organization i assessesun, rates and disputed regions separate from the nominal countries. crimea is done separately.

authorities don't have control over crimea and they should not be deemed because of the horrible human rights situation. the responsibility lies in moscow. i would like to see more option aboute swift is mentioned. the banking system that most countries use based in switzerland. the united states on its own does not have the ability to impose swiss sanctions imposed on iran that were pretty crippling. i have always been of the view since russia invaded ukraine that you have to ramp up sanctions periodically, otherwise putin and company just adjust to the sanctions in place and they have not -- there have not been new sanctions over crimea in four years. >> yes. --i'm a second-year student kurt volker resigned a couple weeks ago from his position as

the special envoy for the ukraine situation. can you talk about what he was doing with regard to the peace process and moving forward now -- what are the implications of that position vacated? >> in the interest of full disclosure, kurt and i worked together at state department. we have been friends since and i worked with him at the mccain institute. my last place of employment in washington before i migrated to miami. i think kurt was the perfect person for that job. it was an unpaid position, a part-time position. he continued as the head of the mccain institute. i think they could not a found a better person to do his best and trying to bring about a

resolution to this conflict. he had not met with his russian counterpart in almost two years i believe. irkoff i think is an important interlocutor but not the decision-maker on these things. the challenge i think kurt faced is the russian side just like to's -- just likes to sit in negotiation. they never want to get to a resolution of the crisis eerie they like to travel to various meet. and schmooze and i dealt with this when i was in the state department. i had the misfortune of being the u.s. representative in the five plus two process, the biggest waste of time in my life to sit down with the russians and others to try to negotiate a resolution of that crisis.

they weren't interested in resolving it. they are not interested in resolving this although i said putin if he could would like to get out. it is unfortunate that the position is vacant. i have a little trouble seeing who would want to take the position right now under the current circumstances. this is why this situation is so unfortunate, because ukrainians come on a daily basis, are getting injured and killed in this conflict. pressure on zelinski, from europe and the united states, pressure domestically that he's facing. we need as much attention focused on this is possible. these hearings about corruption in ukraine. it exists. i would be the first to acknowledge it and i think every ukrainian would be the first to

acknowledge it. that, to me, is the wrong way to focus. the kremlin may as well hold those kinds of hearings. that's how it plays back into kiev. >> in a more general sense, what do you think of the dilemma that republicans like kurt volker faced with trump? do you think it was a good idea to join the administration, knowing the difficulties of conducting diplomacy while trump is in the white house? hold nothing against anyone who went into this administration out of a sense of duty, public service, and interests to try to advance our national interest.

i was felt you need good people in these jobs. i was never approached about joining. i was a bit of a critic of mr. trump before he was elected. so i did not have to face this dilemma or challenge. i'm glad some people have accepted it. problems are not going to wait around the world while we sort out our own domestic challenges and problems. you need people to address these things. you need them to feel that they have the support of their superiors. and that they can get things done. i certainly don't hold it against anyone who has joined, who is either still there or has gone in and already left. i got a fair number of friends who have been working in this administration and having been at the state department for eight years, i also have a

number of friends in the foreign service, who are also doing their best on a daily basis to advance u.s. national interests. >> there was a hand. yes. >> my question is, what do you think that the u.s. and russian allies can do in the short term to help zelinski? there's a lot of things economist like to say we could do in the long term, but what do you think we can actually do in the short term to help relieve some of this pressure that is on him? >> it's a good question. and it was just in kiev did not conclude the next assistance. helping zelinski -- he's got an impressive new government there. he's brought in entirely new people in the government.

for better or worse, so it's a rather inexperienced government. but helping ukraine get across the finish line with the imf i think is one of the main short-term goals we should have together with them. redirecting the pressure so that zelinski does not feel europe and the united states are looking at our watches wondering and you're going to wrap up this conflict so we can get back to business as usual and focusing our attention more on moscow to bring about a resolution of it. helping him with the fight against corruption. this was one of his key tenants in his political platform to root out the problem of corruption. to deal with it. as i mentioned, he's got some challenges already. there have been questions raised about his chief of staff, about their roles and he needs backing from the international community

to be able to push back on any efforts by these oligarchic weluences to make sure that don't see ukraine slipped back into its old patterns. i would say helping him on corruption, helping him on the with the imf. the imf in particular i think is a short-term one that should be achievable with support from the international community >> >>. we have time for one more question. i am the u.s. correspondent for ukrainian english language kiev press.lled the i would like to note two things. -- we can see one of

his motives while trying to gain information that might undermine biden. do you think that it is another one of his aims might be to try to achieve something that he could present as a foreign policy success or achievement, bringing about some kind of ?eace i don't know whether you think -- i see people talking about ukraine, writing about ukraine, in a manner that they would not about other countries, where ukraine's territory and history

may be belonging somehow to russia's backyard, seems to .reep in somehow, not with everybody, but saying may bele, russia has a point. president trump in fact said something along those lines --ut crimea, saying pro-russian's or russia -- is that still a lingering doubt in some circles about whether ukraine should be independent sovereign country? >> let me try the second question first. there is lingering doubt in mr. putin's mind. i think maybe before you got here i referenced his comments to president bush in 2008 that ukraine is not a real country. i don't think there's doubts

elsewhere in the international community. i sure hope not, because , -- the international community agreed to accept the boundaries that came about in 1991 with the breakup of the soviet union. ukraine played a critical role in the dissolution of the soviet russia,ith belarus and with yeltsin. ukraine should be recognized as an independent state. i don't think anyone is questioning ukraine's independence except mr. putin perhaps and people around him. success at policy ukraine's expense would not be a foreign policy success. i think the blowback from the congress, from the think tank university community, would be so severe that if the president tried to push some resolution that came at ukraine's expense

it would not be sustainable. in order for it to be labeled a success, it can't come at ukraine's expense. , turkey could make some claims on crimea. up until the mid 18th century it was part of the ottoman empire. ukrainianwas given to soviet socialist republic. there was acknowledgment and 1997, withn 1994, the russia ukraine friendship treaty. it's only mr. putin and those like him that want to erase all of that and claim that crimea actually belongs to russia. if we allow that to happen, we are losing our moorings. in my view, the international community should never recognize crimea as part of russia. we never recognized the baltic states absorption into the soviet union and it took until

four plus decades later for those countries not only become independent states and officially regain their status, but down the road to become members of nato and the eu. if it takes 4.5 decades for crimea to return to ukraine, so be it. i hope it's a lot shorter than that. but if we recognize this, putin wins. that is not a foreign policy success in my view. >> i believe we have to stop. thank you very much for your knowledge. you are not reading some of these important facts from your notes. from your memory. >> not what it used to be. >> look who is talking. so thank you very much would like to point out that unless my

memory is all wrong, and if you don't count russia as a european country, this little ukraine that everybody -- or too many people seem to dismiss, is the largest european country. it's a significant country. little -- i don't want to damage your background, but it's not latvia. e.s family comes from ther it is not hungary for luxembourg. it is a significant country. >> 45 million people. >> we have to take it seriously, and you gave us a lesson on why we have to do that. we are very grateful to you. thank you so much.

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