other provisions. and we will see where we go with that. but it is rare you get a tax thational issue in might be successful, but we will see where we go with that. i'm doing my best. caroline: so if you are sitting there thinking that your client would not benefit from a 911, i worked on a multinational multimillion dollar case. it just came to resolution and we worked for many months on a very complex case. case, a really difficult because without giving any details the relationships -- >> we are going to leave this discussion on the irs at this point. you can see all of our programs online at c-span.org. we go now live to a discussion on the trump administration's policies towards iran.

live coverage here on c-span. where we wake up and there isn't a big escalation happening in the region. we have seen more than a dozen incidents in the gulf targeting tankers and threatening the freedom of navigation. u.s.-iranian escalations just continues. sanctions last month and iran increased its enrichments of uranium. iraq we have seen two iransions targeting the militia. morning, thet this droneonfirmed that one

was shut down. this is the second incident in yemen since june. with me to discuss this is a very diverse group of experts, and all of them i would call friends. . will start from the far left senior fellow at the foundation for defense of democracy. a senior fellow at the center for american progress. she follows yemen very closely and is a nonresident fellow at the middle east institute. to my left is a senior fellow here at the hudson institute. thank you for hosting. thank you for our c-span audience following this, for

those who are following us on twitter as well. how we are going to do this is we are going to start off by very short opening statements. the "maximum pressure" strategy. is it working, what has changed in the region. then we will have a discussion amongst us and turn it to you for questions afterward. why don't i start with you? since been over a year the u.s. withdrew from the nuclear agreement, the maximum pressure strategy sanctions on almost everything connected to the iranian regime. has it worked? >> i believe it is working. thank you for doing this on such short notice. thank you for being here. thank you all for coming. i believe the maximum

pressure campaign is working despite iranian' is pressured to get europe to cave and find bypass mechanisms to secure u.s. sanctions. i'll tell you what is not working, i believe this is what iran looks like. everyone is caught up with the narrative that war with iran is an invasion of iran with 100,000 american troops. this is what war with iran looks like. what we are seeing is there are very few successful attacks. there are some attacks on oil tankers. there are some rocket and missile launches by certain proxies. ande is this air campaign, what the iraqi militias, and other militias, are realizing is he cannot protect them. we have four explosions in iraq in the last three days against

ammunition depots. one happened yesterday. ammunition depots controlled by iran-batch militias. iran-backedng -- militias. they are being attacked without consequence. static missile storage and rocket storage sites in syria without consequence. as-300 or use that s-400 to protect hassan rouhani's operation. we are seeing provocations by iran that are not working. if you look at the increased capability that the u.s. and other allies are putting in the strait of apartment was hormuz -- the british tankers probably the last successful operation iran is going to be able to conduct

if we do this right. is iran getting to here is resorting to going after tankers that are involved in the illegal smuggling operation. the iraqi tankers seized 10 days ago is theirs. they seized it to show that it was cheating, they knew it was cheating because it was theirs. that is where they are at. it is fun to watch. body, we cantional literally absorb these attacks. this is what war with iran looks like. it cannot do a lot. at the end of the day with regard, russia and china are not interested in the islamic republic violating the nuclear proliferation treaty. it kind of wasn't necessary in a lot of ways. the npt was already there. it was designed to stimulate iran's economy to get it to it's

share in the a middle east to align with u.s. interests to align with the competition we haven't seen play out at all. this is what war with iran looks like, and it is fun to watch. have questions, mainly on deterrence. the deployments in the gulf. the u.s. and british have not deterred iran, and we will get to that in the discussion. also on the jcoa. usima, if you can give insight when you look at yemen, the drone incident today, the second, how has this maximum pressure been seen inside yemen. what is iran doing differently? thank youank you, and to the hudson institute for having me here. hi terms of yemen, the hout

rebels have become iran's favorite proxy. iran-backedebanon, militias cannot take action because they would risk direct confrontation with u.s. forces in the region. in yemen, the ongoing conflict , it has become easy for iran thi's tohe hourt send alize the gulf and message hiding behind plausible deniability, saying it has no relations with the community. lie. a complete the houthis have gotten all of their capabilities from them. it is preventing the yemeni

people from coming to peace. the u.s. has thrown all of its efforts into mediation efforts with yemen. politicaling the u.n. process, but we are consistently -- it is not going anywhere. iran keeps telling the houthis to escalate at a time when it is against its best entrance. if you look in yemen where the arab coalition was going to move port, try to reclaim the inch was basically help terms of elevating the humanitarian crisis, but there was pushback. any type of military

confrontation could have escalated the crisis. have allegedly stated they would be able to withdraw, but the day after they withdrew, they launched the first attack on the airport in saudi arabia. >> you would say that the houthi s feel more empowered? have constantly been empowered by the iranian regime. they are standing alone in yemen. they don't have any allies. the only allies they are looking for is the islamic republic. ther relationship with islamic republic is slowly coming to the surface. this last week the houthis and appointed an ambassador to tehran. this is just an iranian tactic

we are used to. that weall these things often are busy trying to it basicallynd advances its own expansion of interests. militias,ely, these despite any cost that it has at home. have been very brutal in the way that they have governed inside in the amend. -- inside of yemen. there have been 8000 political prisoners detained by the houthi s, and we hear nothing about that in the news. they're using this to their advantage and iran's advantage. the same way that the houthis ha the death sentence for 30 journalists.

the houthis have not generated any attention. any clamped down and follow iranian-type strategy of clamping down on domestic increase tobut destabilizing effects on the region, on the neighbors, whom nis have always had strong ties with. >> give us your unfiltered approach, yourr assessment, of the maximum pressure strategy that the administration has employed. is it working? where do you see things going? thanks for all of you for coming and watching in august. it is summer, you should be at the beach. i am honored.

forks to mike and hudson having me here. i have a different view then mike and we talk about this a lot. discussions like this that include different views are rare. i you disagree with me, and hope you do, we will do it respectively in the way that mike and i do. wearing a red skin tie. abour warences are also humanbut we are beings. thank you to hudson for doing this. often you don't have people from different persuasions. before i answer your question, when i talk about iran, i have never been to iran or talked to iranians. one thing that is missing in d.c. think tank

panels are the iranian perspective. my friend here will give us -- >> from new york. >> but there is a range of perspective. the point i want to make is simple, but important. when we talk about iran we think about it as a piece on the chessboard which we will execute policy against. it is a country with people. there is an amazing exhibit at the gallery. i went with colleagues at lunch. my iran, six women photographers. go. you aat this will give full appreciation of what a complex society like iran is, but look at the photos. there is a quote from one of the photographers, but it is important. the complex, diverse abuse from within iran are not often represented.

she writes, "these images will not change anything, nor will they help anybody. what i hope is that they visualize a generation marginalized by those speaking in their name." i offer that with a sense of humility as an analyst who looks goess. foreign policy who to the middle east all the time. there is a limitation to what i say, i haven't explored the full depth of what iran is, and it is a country with people. my main response to your question is, no. the strategy is not working. i think it is a disaster. my friendly amendment to the title is trump maximum pressure campaign rally to battle iran. my friendly amendment, trump's aggressive appeasement confuse

allies, attack each other. appeasementessive of iran confuse allies, and let's just attack each other. foreign policy is increasingly about dividing ourselves. aggressive appeasement. what do i mean by that? we have a president who we see every day uses rhetoric with effect. on the way here i got a call from a danish journalist. anyone want to ask what he was asking about? greenland. the words of the president of the united states, .o this day, very seriously that is all i'm going to say about that topic. iran, if president on it is monday, wednesday, or friday he says one thing. tuesday, thursday, he and his team are saying something else,

but it is often quite aggressive . reminiscent of the phase in early north korean policy -- if you want to call it a policy -- of fire and fury. policy is not just statement. it is action. after years of trying to pull u.s. troops back from the region and rebalance to where we were in the 1980's and 1990's, we are sending more troops to the region. -- to the middle east, saudi arabia. >> to airbases? are not be clear, we talking about syria where the actual fight against some of these forces in iran are. there but for the grace of tucker carlson, two months ago phoning the president of the united states, we may have had some sort of military action. at warys we are already and he said "it is fun to watch." respectfully, i disagree.

war is never fun to watch. it is a good point to debate. if we are at war, we should tell our congress and the american people about it. they need to have a voice in this and of the authorizations for the use of force when we send our most precious national security assets into harms way, they need the support of a democratic society. we are living now, and thank you for coming in the summer, in a haze where most of the american public can't keep track of it. it is a dangerous precipice because it is a complicated situation. aggressive appeasement. why appeasement? if you look at secretary pompeo's speech from last year where he had 12 requirements, which he called very basic, about what he would like to see in iran. as an analyst who has been in the scene for a while, it reminded me of benchmarks that members of congress wrote about ago.10 to 12 years

sort of a wish list, a plutonic ideal of where we would like to secretary pompeo's perspective. yesterday he spoke at the u.n. as well. he asserted that the policy, like mike asserted, is working. when a u.s. official has to repeatedly say that the policy is working, he is arguing against the basic set of facts and reality that people don't believe. of sort be a function of our policy environment or political environment, but again, aggressive appeasement. appeasement in the sense that if you look at the middle east as i see it, i don't see it closer to an equilibrium. i don't see iran, though hurt by these sanctions. let's be clear, maximum pressure is having an impact on the people of iran. i'm not sure if it is having a strategic impact on the leaders, but it is having an impact.

theink in this environment, way that i look at the trump team itself, this is where the center of gravity is -- there is a whole another discussion about and national security that is worth happening -- but in the trump team ic division from the top down. it was easy to get everyone onboard board to impose maximum pressures. i don't see any glimmer of the strategy of what's next. as a policy analyst, that concerns me. wherever you stand on the positions. i was in favor of the jcpoa and thought that it could be improved in a better way than the trump administration has done. think iranran -- i does things that destabilize the region. some of our closest partners do as well. that we would be better advised to use our state craft in a better approach than under trump. we are in a weaker position,

more isolated in the world. we have some of our closest allies not backing us. we have a thin veneer of trump rhetoric plus troop movement that could get us into some sticky situations, but the absence of a coherent strategy. >> i would like to follow up. the only iranian-american on the panel. you follow what is happening inside iran. you follow every drone attack that happens in the region, every missile that flies off saudi.men to the where do you see things? what is your take on what you have heard so far? is there a strategy when you look at it? is it working? >> strategy?

[laughter] thank you, for that question. thank you to hudson and mike for posting and michael panelists for sharing the stage and for you for turning out. you make it sound like an interesting life choice, tracking flying tubes all the time. it can get redundant, but i'm using the word redundant because to briefly follow-up what brian was saying, what the strategy is going to be is more of the same. we are going to see more of the same. cycle, thein the new iranian method of escalation, the u.s. response, and the tit-for-tat. we are reaching a new normal. it has been the summer of escalation as we move towards political highlights, the g7, iran's self-imposed deadlines to violate the limits imposed on the program by the nuclear deal.

we are locking in position. you are seeing a very public negotiation, and i have thoughts on what the americans are saying publicly and with the iranians are saying publicly. let me rephrase and say how we got here. the maximum pressure campaign started in earnest when washington left the iran deal last may. a may 8, a few days short of deadline to impose deadlines for more sanctions relief, and washington began to reimpose sanctions released by the jcpoa deal. i found that to be a responsible strategy for escalation. since then washington has ramped up the pressure. iran's response, it wasn't said publicly, but you saw it in the behavior. shelling talking about education through deed and not word. we are learning how iran is communicating with their deeds.

framed asyear was strategic patients. where thes vision supreme national is sitting and iran's defiance to the first year of maximum pressure with the obvious couple of exceptions. god isonic injunction is with the patient. the first year of maximum pressure the iranian strategy was to wait out the trump administration and choose not to do things that would drive europeans to the americans, to do things that would keep the transatlantic community apart and the un security council divided. it would make america look more isolated and not put iran in formal violation of the deal. they would cultivate ambiguity but not invite a response. thinking like most of washington that american unilateral sanctions could not accomplish significant damage to the macroeconomy of iran when it

took multilateral sanctions almost a decade. fast forward one year, the conventional wisdom in most of washington and most of the regime is wrong. american unilateral sanctions by the same standards of the macroeconomy, oil exports, gdp, inflation -- you have stagflation in iran, the value thehe real relative to american dollar. by those indicators max pressure is a success. iranian decision-makers decided to amend their strategy of patients and engage in gradual escalation. talking about yemen and how the iranians feel safe that they can engage in yemen and escalation in yemen, i would largely agree. in the first year of strategic patients what you saw the iranians do was when you have partners, proxies, or allies engage in escalation -- take a

new territory, use a new weapon, choose a new target -- they did so because of battlefield conditions. because the battlefield necessitated they escalate. you have seen since the spring of 2019 the opposite. there is a political directive to escalate. there is someone likely calling, tehran saying please do this. which explains why you see militias, proxies, partners do things that don't yield military dividends for the proxy, militia, partner, but political dividends for tehran because it can be interpreted as a signal of resolve against washington. to be specific, it is when the u.s. sanctions designated the irgc? the revocation of the oil waivers and approaching the one-year anniversary of the fall of jcpoa.

it is in response to these forces that iran is trying to communicate with washington. we are not going to take this lying down. because they know that the strategy is driven primarily by sanctions and coercive economic measures, iran is going to need sanctions relief at some point. in my view it is a success of max pressure. it may sound perverse to say, but if you take the polaroid a bad.oach, it looks the iranians are testing more missiles before, it is escalating more. there is no policy to counter those things before. there is a bipartisan foreign policy failure to push back on iran since the jcpoa. the success of max pressure is clearly in the macroeconomy of iran by those indicators. the shortcomings are diplomatic, meaning we have diversions with our allies. australia will be joining the

maritime policing coalition in the persian gulf, gulf of oman hormuz, and it has setbacks like the tank in gibraltar. it needs a diplomatic win and a regional win. >> my question to the panel is -- is the point of sending warships and aircraft carriers to the gulf to deter iran? the attacks have only increased. whenalk about deterrence, you talk about close gulf allies who now have to watch over their back, their ports are threatened, how can you say that the strategy is working? iran is not deterred. has not come to the table to talk to the u.s. administration. >> i'm speaking as a veteran of

three wars. i know what deployment to afghanistan and iraq look like. we have put in defensive capability in the middle east to absorb the attacks. air systems in iraq, saudi arabia, and the uae to protect our allies and the american effort. that is what i mean by this is what war with iran looks like and it will be fun to watch. at the end of the day it is the conventional military that can't project. it is a special forces-intelligence hybrid that is capable, but it is iraqi militias that are afraid. they're getting hit. they are not attacking americans like they said they would. an increasedshowed capability, and all of a sudden the arms depot was destroyed. what i'm saying is we put in the defensive capability to absorb, and a offensive capability to respond. we haven't responded yet.

i don't think the tucker carlson tulsi gabbard influence on the president has nothing to do with the non-attack that the president did not conduct against iran after shooting -- the operators of the radar site saw an imminent american attack, and stopped, it was followed with a cyberattack to shut down the radar screen and left those operators vulnerable for 30 minutes, believing they were going to die. that led to the president saying gc,ould have killed 150 ir and chose not to, that's the equivalent of someone filming you in your bedroom, send you the vhs tape last night, and say i could have killed you. it's effective, the right way to intimidate a paper tiger in a lot of ways. that's what i'm talking about.

the technology is cut off with the islamic republic. show the seizure of an oil tanker in international waters, we can show that to international community. that theyaintains were yelling when it went with the two minutes initially. -- but iran maintains -- i was the only one maintaining the two minutes originally. but i will wrap up. that is onhe ability par with our technology. we have methods of capability as well, we have dropped drones with a cyberattack, we have set down -- shutdown radar with cyber attacks. governmenthe iranian that we would not do something like this, which is what i mean by saying this is what war looks like with iran and it would be fun to watch, because we are --ing does ration, but the

because we are seeing what they do. -- during the iraq war we would be going to eat something, there would be a rockets tie -- strike and we would feel delayed. but they are not after -- >> there have been more targeted attacks on joint basis. >> but you have to kill americans press to respond and they know not to do that. >> but to my question, is iran deterred, yes or no? >> yes. >> then why are they doing more tax? attacks.re not more >> more than 12 in the gulf waters, there's an iranian ship openly andl

blatantly violating sanctions, when we said here -- sit here and argue from our comfortable spaces that the maximum pressure is working, how is it working -- still iraneing is operational. >> i would love to be an iranian winning,aying we are have the american press and public is on our side, the europeans will cave, let's continue to do this and tout it as a success, but it's not a success. they are not successfully doing -- >> it's not a zero-sum game if the u.s. or iran is winning, is iran deterred? is the strategy working? >> 30 seconds. >> successful attacks are

destroying militia arms in iraq. successful attacks are being able to thwart and shoot down drones, those are successful, iran has done things but they are not successful attacks. that's the difference. the rewards of this policy, with the risks that are quite high. i don't to the payoffs yet. you may be right. i am skeptical that this snapshot where we are now may produce something produce some -- may produce something different. but to answer your question i don't see them deterred, i see them provoked. and your comments indicate that. they are testing the women -- the limits on how far they can go. there is a broader field in the tactical military. when i look at places, not just yemen you talk about

where there is a coalition split in the uae is repositioning itself. the trick -- the team that trump tried to build does not look so cohesive and strong. all the weapons that have flooded the zone does not seem to -- >> i would draw a line with what's happening in yemen, you have the dynamics of the conflict, but if you look across the gcc there's high anxiety about iran. there's legitimate security that even others have talked about. there are two fronts in yemen that you reference when you talk is itsaudi dissidents about iran or yemen? >> yemen, but there's a difference between the tone and approach with the uae meeting

with representatives from iran. they have different interests and is a fractious bunch. but you mentioned iraq, syria is the biggest place where you see an aggressive appeasement strategy fully in place. , one of the requirements from secretary pompeo is no iranian presidents in syria. it isit to you that shameful that israel feels the need to conduct regular strikes inside syria and iraq where we have a true presence. outnot saying we should go conventional offense of war with iran, that would be a disaster. i would say they are playing a multilevel game where they have splat -- spread their influence and deepened it in lebanon, syria, iraq, yemen, and using multiple tools, media, cyber,

and other things, to punch above their weight. where u.s. and their allies have conventional tools and we are not shaping the dynamics to our favor. >> but isn't it a bipartisan approach? we seem to continuation from the obama administration until now to work around. priority for the last administration and it's not a priority for this administration. isis was the of number one goal in syria, and we , people can haze say we are going to end endless wars as a slogan and ignore the facts of terrorist movements like isis still having deep roots. never an antithesis to policy, if isis

reemerges as a factor, that was one of the things that led to this tactical cooperation with iran and places like iraq. if that emerges again, that places another conundrum for those in the trump administration who are trying to impose maximum pressure against iranian forces. to bring in fatima. backu want to take a step and look at the iranian role in yemen, how widespread is it today? are the iranians a full proxy? and what other options are there for the golf countries and the u.s.? >> i've heard some interesting things in the panel, i would say iran has been extremely patient.

and yes, it drives asymmetrical warfare, not a conventional one, it drives by deploying militias and creating that strength that is so difficult for us to respond to, given the fact that it would create so many devastating consequences if you respond to it conventionally. and the that patients s andty -- that patience to reassess at every juncture. it's not so different with the iranian crisis where president so many deals to iran, including lifting the sanctions, and iran decided to negotiate with what they perceived as the losing side. when reagan took over it was within weeks that the practice

resulted. i think they're doing the same thing. waiting and i would say, if the maximum pressure campaign is not working, it's partly because of our response and attitude. i see a very divided europe in terms of agreeing with us. way irannk perhaps the has behaved in terms of seizing ,he ships and assert dominance that the europeans are finally waking up to be that this is really a dangerous power, and it's not behaving rationally. and it's an increasingly tactical power. in terms of yemen, i've written there hasout this,

been increasing belligerence support --he belligerence about support. they know we have nothing to do with iran. the interesting, if we say maximum pressure campaign is working or not, but funds have ton raised from yemen actually support has ball a -- lah, which hezbol tells me the maximum pressure campaign is working. and iran has historically only caved in when it saw either military stress or economic stress. >> what you mean by caved in? >> this is the only way that you can get iran to the table. >> the national security prerogative of the islamic

republic has only a handful of times where they have changed a fundamental national security prerogative. the iran-iraq war. an eight-year conflict, it looks like they are sometimes up sometimes, down sometimes, depending on how they prosecute that conflict and the strategy at play, and the faction in iran that has ascended. all of these variables. let the conflict be the god, that war took eight years, it was devastating for the region. but those who advocate restraint love that war, those in american foreign policy who advocate for the policy of restraint love that war. i would use this example to say now, even the policy of restraint has's. look at what happens when you try to step back.

but going back to this point, seven .5 years of regimer -- 7.5 years of change is not a bush administration phenomenon. it was the eye -- the article of belief that you could export the revolution to baghdad. and it's because of that conflict that iran intervenes in iraqi affairs three they don't want a strong and stable neighbor to the west again. because of the way the war went on and the military successes, because of increasing western and international involvement, it was said that if there was any dignity before god, and he likened excepting the u.n. mandated cease-fire to drinking from a poison chalice. the entire art of american foreign policy is how do you make his successor drink from the same poison chalice and

except something he does not like? it's going to be tricky and take a very long time, it should not be a partisan topic -- proposition. it should be driven by the conclusion that iran only yields when faced with unrelenting pressure and let iran make mistakes. it was saddam hussein targeted international shipping, but we always remember iran as the one using chinese supplied cruise missiles and other boats to harass international ships. so just like iran is doing these attacks now, the more they escalate, the more they risk driving europe, the more they violate the deal the harder it will be for europe to say these are not only violations of the deal but of the comprehension of and othergreements treaties that iran is a party to. it has a capbind,

for escalation. there strategy was predicated on patients and so does our strategy. time is being weaponize, and is the u.s. policy going to be fundamentally based on sanctions alone or have something else, that's why mention for maximum pressure to be successful to get iran to the table you need a regional component and a component. >> is there any sign that the regime is internally going to cave-in? >> there was a visitor to the states twice, each time he floated the idea of prisoner swaps and missile talks, so yes, iran is negotiating publicly. that's a measure of max success. changed, sayhave multiple different things, we will only negotiate with america -- if they remove the oil waiver, if we are

treated with respect, which is it? the country is publicly negotiating and this is a public measure of their negotiation. like any country, like north korea, they are doing military things to build leverage for when they come to the table. point, waiting it analogy during the hostage crisis, do you see it as an option now for iran? insight?u see it as an a crowd is saying wait it out, wait for 2020. when you hear the nuanced language coming out of the democratic candidates for pregnancy, they are concerned about sunset clauses and ballistic missiles, they are concerned about iran supporting terrorism. these things are not in the

jcpoa, but i think there should be a renegotiated jcpoa. anotherregime survive 14 months of maximum pressure? yes. would it hurt? yes. could they survive this for another four years? i don't think so. ran -- i have i never been to iran, i asked to go and they said no. i would write a really interesting book if i went and survived. jasper --ten to the diaspora, the regime is in trouble, and the only thing united states can do is mess it up. we should not get involved and keep up the mash and mom -- maximum pressure campaign. i visited some regional allies and they said the supreme leader

gets a brief every morning, it's the price of eggs, chickens, right there with the status of militias. that's telling. imagine making $6,000 a year and paying six00 in a -- dollars an egg. that's a big deal. i have my faith inconsistency of foreign and something brian said, and aggressive appeasement. one day it's right in the next day what are you saying? or doing? one quick point and then i will stop and not talk anymore. we are bound to mess this up, and i think we should, that's why we have brian here. in the next administration, brian is going to be a voice in the national security council.

back to ad to get bipartisan approach to our adversaries and stop the what about is him. anytime you talk about the islamic republic it would be nice to have a conversation about the islamic republic instead of saying what about saudi arabia? >> it's nice to know that i have the michael endorsement. pressure, i am against it, i think it has put us in a weaker position and a more precarious position. if you're going to put pressure, and there is hurt and cost on iran, i want to know what next? the reason i say this policy is confusing allies and dividing ourselves is that i don't see a figment of what the next step is , and we are doing it at a time where there is likely to be a leadership transition. i'm such a great analyst and i can look at actuary tables and predicts that the supreme leader

probably will not be with us in the next five to 10 years, maybe sooner. in our current approach, i don't see -- what is our diplomacy with allies in the world, nor , it's hards at home to build a consensus in america, easier said than done when the foreign policy debate has become so predictable that i think artificial intelligence and algorithm could actually replace . lot of us which i hope we are not doing here. watching -- ie assume you're watching the democratic debates, when you who 20 out of 24 candidates ,gree to go back to the deal

isn't that a signal for iran? goals that a realistic when you look at the arms embargo and other stuff on its way to expiring? >> it's a signal of a certain perspective, but there is nuanced there. it depends on the candidate and what's going on. policy, i wrote a decade plus ago about ending the war in iraq. and i believed in those and it was used politically. but there's is more nuanced, once you get the job, what i see as the political point is that there's more nuance among democratic voters about iran. about publicy attitudes on a range of foreign policy questions.

like maximum pressure, about a third of trump space supports it. the rest support a diplomatic approach with a strong backing, when we asked people what do you think of iran among a number of different countries, a friend? an ally? an enemy? a competitor? 71% of americans say an enemy, i think that's a product of a lot of propaganda. there is maximum space to create what mike talks about, a bipartisan consensus to deal with iran in a full spectrum. trump did not use that approach. his demo every day with his own is to dividery day and fragment but not divide and conquer. and i don't think we have a ,ormula coming in from reaction

there's actually a lot of room between jcpoa and maximum pressure. >> i want to go to fatima to look at theen you gulf countries and the current tension, what options do they given the trump administration is increasing sanctions and putting measures in place? when iran shut down a u.s. drone , there was no military response that some had anticipated. dynamic?hat change the where do you see the gulf countries today? >> they are in a weak position, and part of it is because there is no -- this is international reluctance in terms of what to do with iran, and how to respond.

objectiveot a unified or vision. people don't even know if people think of iran as an enemy. people don't know whether it's a friend or foe. there's a significant problem analystsd policy usually underplay the role, which i feel has been a reason .or policy support errors and i feel like the only way we can abandon a military solution and pursue a more reasonable diplomatic solution is if we really pressure the iranian regime. and i feel like trump could have he decidesn yemen if to focus on bringing an end to that conflict.

but as we are talking about all iran andthinking about the role of its militias overse thewe rarely talk about human cost of these militias and their respective countries. a big part of the humanitarian catastrophe in yemen is driven behavior, andthi they have no incentive to negotiate. iran has crippled many negotiations and coming to an agreement with the peace talks in kuwait, and it continues to do so. so until there is real pressure on iran, and a strategy, i'm to see thisointed democratic upset over the iranian deal is taking place without addressing what are the

challenges in the iranian deal that led us to reconsider. the use of the militia, the ballistic missiles there. these are the components that i would like to see democratic candidates address. we don't want to see a continuation of iran's behavior. we see this in an academic conference, i was struck because there were so many europeans and others who were saying that iran has no choice but to use militias. that's a defensive strategy, it's not an offense of one. and frankly that's ridiculous. we have the choice to do .ascular -- to de-escalate it's feeling threatened because , ands behavior overseas because it's directly challenging our interests.

to include iran, and i would like to pursue that. >> given the leverage in yemen, wouldn't you have to? >> of course. i would not like to see yemen because as cop -- become as complicated as syria, when there are so many players in the mix that it's foil syria. but we cannot just talk about them independently, which is what all of the analysts have been saying. in considering the human so again,e conflict, one of the examples i give to people are the child's shoulders -- soldiers. there is enforce conscription's i kids eight years and older,

will use a game of thrones analogy. i think they would be happy to they could down if be the king of the ashes. and that's the issue. winning,o content on and it is what it wants, it's ready to overlook the cost of humanitarian suffering. paper, it read every will tell you that it's the american responsibility and i >> we are really getting to the point where we have to turn to the audience, but i want to ask you a final question. betweenere to predict now and the u.s. elections, do you see either a pompeo's reef

eting or a trump --pompeo zarif meeting. quickly, yes or no? to dowould be a mistake anything that legitimizes the regime, but it will possibly happen. >> yes, unless i can change minds. >> i think iran would wait it out for the next election. , no for now -- no for now. >> i think it will be yes. if iran did a complete assessment of the trump administration and president trump himself and how he has acted on north rea, he would want to get a republican president to get a deal that is like his nafta deal which is not all that different. jcpoa won't be all that different, it will just have trump's name on it. a political party will just go along with what trump says, and

that is a more sustainable framework from iran's perspective. when middle east perspective was they saw a man who once flattering, so they fighter him -- flatter him. >> this is the limits of politics. how many will not engage with turkey,nlike rea and with when the trump administration coming into office, unlike north korea and turkey, which when trump came into office ought to decide -- divide trump from his constituents. they are saying trump is a manifestation of hubris. now, maybe they are peeling away little bit and i think they are trying to rope a dope some of the jcpoa states. they were talking about the three b's. concern is none of this

escalation. my concern is what happens if the u.s. goes for premature diplomacy as opposed to productive diplomacy. their goal, you want to bigger, broader, better deal. you can use pressure for that. my two cents of the president would be don't swerve yet, because all of this escalation is designed to limit military utility, a political strategy. it is designed to get america to lower the pace of the sanctions, which are effective, to seize the enforcement, which is effective, and to roll the sanction, which is effective. -- incentivize americans to come to the table, to get something that isn't bigger, isn't broader, isn't better, but is just a new deal. they're trying to incentivize mutual diplomacy. >> no meeting. >> no meeting. >> with that, we are going to go to the queue and day -- q and

a. let's start with my colleague at sky news. you wantn mention who to address your question to. >> my question is for brian. [indiscernible] >> was the nuclear deal working? it was working according to the terms that were defined. >> was the nuclear deal working or not? >> the question is whether the 2015 nuclear deal was working or not. i would say it was working according to the terms that were negotiated and agreed upon. it did have weaknesses, as we have all pointed out. one of the biggest weaknesses,

which i agree with, was iran's ,ctions in the region destabilizing neighboring countries. the leaders of the gcc to camp david. there wasn't anything, in terms of a real strategy. under trump, this notion of an arab nato, tell me how that is working out. there were weaknesses in it. my point was that there was a better pathway, here at home and in the world. to strengthen the agreement and address iran's destabilizing actions. we have not chosen the strongest pathway to do that. we have confused and divided our allies in the world, and a little bit in the region, as you understand. we have divided ourselves even more, because everything today partisan issue.

it's something for republicans and democrats to go after each other on tough issues like iran. that would be stronger than finding a policy for america and countries in the region. so yes, the deal was working according to the terms that was agreed upon, and it could have been improved upon over the last two to three years. we just happened to choose a pathway that puts us on a riskier escalation to war and we can do some of our partners in that region. >> just one minute. if the united states didn't , 2020, the united states in the world would be able to control iran in 2023. >> such a hypothetical, but my diagnostic is unity at home. unity of purpose, and this is not a new thing. this division within our own country on issues, i'm not

optimistic because the reference to iraq in the 2003 war, it is not even like apples and oranges to compare what is going on right now. it is like apples and bicycles. 2003, there was a bipartisan consensus to go in there and it was a huge mistake. today, we are in a riskier environment where trump has fragmented himself, even with his own party, on things like saudi issues. we don't have that unity that is required of a democracy to address tough, complicated questions like iran. my biggest fear is that it will become less and less of a factor. you have think tank analyst from left and right saying let's leave it alone. let's step back from the region. that i think is going to make things even more complicated. >> why don't we go to the back?

glasses. in the you, stanley kober. i'm looking at an op-ed. he american hegemony in the middle east will come to the middle and it argues with tosident trump's failure check iran. this realization has become competent -- commonplace. the united states is important. if the maximum pressure campaign is working, why does an analysis like this appear in the jordan times? i think we have addressed this with other different views on the panel on whether the mexican pressure is working or not. >> let me give them a little.

what i would say is that the maximum pressure campaign is focused on iran. it is working. does it stabilize iraq or syria? victories are in fractured companies. iran is seriously fractured. yemen is fractured. the pressure is to lessen the ability of iran to further fracture these countries. are we successful, no. every two years, we change of the strategy. it is a red skin analogy. we run wars like daniel snyder runs the redskins, change of the team every two years and we never get there. and whether or not it is in the jordan times, why not? it is a newspaper. to the gentleman

with the mustache. [laughter] once upon a time in washington, d.c. >> i'm so glad i decided to grow this yesterday. [laughter] real quick, big kudos. my name is guy taylor and i'm the national security editor at the washington times. this panel is pretty rare these days. it is so important. a lot of people know that. with regard to the reports this morning, of another down to u.s. perhaps yemen, four and -- for banam perhaps or possibly , is this something the humans would have ordered or something the hootie's would have done on their own? the second thing, brian, you mentioned arab nato, but i'm

hoping to hear more from any of you on this. there is this critique right now that's is the administration is abandoning the 79 nation obama era counter ices coalition and trying to twist it into a counter iran coalition. is that what is happening and what other potential pitfalls or benefits from such an approach? thanks for calling on me. >> it could have been downed by iran themselves or operatives in yemen. the capabilities have come from has below or iran. ezbala-- has below -- h and iran. ronco attackck in whichrred last week

the hootie's claimed 10 drones have landed into saudi arabia where it was actually able to destroy a small part of the ,lant in a remco and -- aramco and had they hit explosives as part of the plant, that could have been devastating. there were saudi and american workers in the plant. it is devastating. i was in the company with the many people who said they wish americans died that way america could take this seriously and understand the hootie's are real threat to deal with. why do we have to wait until it escalates and we find american blood on their hands for us to respond. we need to find a way to pressure iran to behave into pressure the hootie's.

i want to mention the u.n. envoy could take a much stronger theme and holding accountable. it is not just a yemen conflict, civil war, but using this to clearly help iran gain more leverage is devastating and the ui needs to act on this. >> a footnote of thought to my -- >> very quickly because there are many questions. >> it was reported that it was sam -- saan essay six six sam. if he did have it, it is not iran provided. there is plenty things in yemen that was iran provided, but it is a wash in soviet, russ equipment.her

there things iranians have helped them get from surface to air to service to surface. , wet is true about the sa6 have to see if they have it. >> and it is still epoxy that launched it. -- entity that did it >> it's able -- it's easy to label me a big talk on iran, and i am, but houthis are not a proxy yet, they are a full-blown partner. the more you say they are a full-blown proxy, you risk thaty to split the houthis doesn't involve iran. they're going to have grievances. there were houthis in the arabian balint snow -- arabian peninsula. >> it's not a monolith, but at

the same time there are ideological links that go far back with the founder of the movement. >> absolutely, but let's be careful. , theis why the attempt visit to tehran matters so much because there was a houthis spokesperson that says he recognizes is guardianship. >> go get them. >> if they were a full-blown proxy from years ago, this statement would not be new. the longer the conflict continues, the more we drive them into the irani and hands. >> i would add to this -- irani and -- iranian hands. >> i would add to this. it's the same language that has below -- that hezbollah is using. , it wasthey go on tv the houthis who started this movement and they would not have taken this turn from the

movement of the believing youth, which was a movement if you do and if iran was not investing in them. i would recommend reading the paper i wrote. >> i will read it and recommend reading it last september, which is when you're looking at iran's proxy strategies, it is everything -- easy to call everything a proxy. may another panel next week. we still have many questions. to your question about the arab nato, i hate to see it ignored. it is not entirely a new idea. i happen to have assigned the story nine times. it started in 1953, and then the obama administration attempted.

it hasn't worked. egypt has recently withdrawn itself, that being the biggest definitely into the whole concept. they haven't agreed on a concept, but there will be another meeting coming up. side of thes audience. [indiscernible] >> thank you. i have a question about -- you were talking about whether the strategy is working or not, but what is the end goal? it seems like there is different end goals. sometimes trump wants to talk about them not getting a nuclear weapon, and then pompeo talks about the intervention in different places and 13 lists. you hear reporting about bolton and he said he doesn't like the whole regime because he can't

change the regime pattern of behavior. you need to change the regime as a whole. what is the end goal and how realistic is it? it would be great if i had somebody like ryan to tell me that, even from the -- what would be the democratic administration's and colby == end goal be? ben will go to 12:30 on that. >> only because you skipped him during 11:30. >> go ahead. >> i'm not being snarky here, and i don't know precise end goal of this administration because there is so many statements across the map. when i said confusing allies, that is based on my research based on countries that want to see a more assertive approach against iran but are not sure -- trump is the man without a plan. what the ideal would be is an approach that introduces more stability in the region and

like nato failing multiple times, i wrote a paper on the sentry foundation. it is not a bad idea, just hard to implement in a reality of a region that is quite fractured. it is an excellent idea for an america that want the right size approach for the middle east. easier said than done. an approach that make sure all of the pathways that iran has to a nuclear weapon are cut off, that deals with destabilizing action of iran, as well as other countries in the region, some of our closest partners, that have undermined the stability of the state system in yemen, iraq, syria. the platonic ideal that is different from mike pompeo is one that i think is a more sensible approach that needs more than just a military approach and aggressive rhetoric's, or different speeches, or the same agreement from 2015. >> just a quick 20 seconds on

this. 17 seconds, roger. it is regime change without saying regime change. look at the 12 points. iran doesn't have to adhere to all 12. if they adhere to three of them, the regime collapses. two of them, the regime collapses. the 12 steps were led out -- were laid out to be something the regime can't accept. if you look at any of the 12, pick any combination, the regime would collapse if they accepted any of them. it is regime change without saying it, does that mean it will happen? the best thing we can do is have hands-off. the reigning people are blaming the regime for sanctions and not the americans. i'm not talking about the progress he my iranians, i'm talking about the people complaining about eggs, chickens, blaming the regime for squandering opportunities of the jcpoa. they want to steal -- they want to see a strategy and they believe the strategy is regime

change without saying regime change. that's the strategy irani and's hope we have. we are saying it without saying it, and we are bound to mess it up. go to the lady in the front. >> want me to take over? >> hi, sarah from middle east troop. i would like to hear from other people besides brian about whether or not they really believe the jcpoa was working. shamess like everybody trump from leaving the jcpoa but there were certain provisions that the irani's were great achieving at, such as military sites were supposed to be unopened to the iaea. and the iaea, for some reason, did not go in. we found out that they were enriching uranium there.

if i were an uranium regime, i would use military sites. what are other people's us about the jcpoa? >> wasn't working or not? very quickly so we can get -- >> it was working for iran well and they messed it up. president obama was right saying iran would never get a bomb on my watch, and then he left office 12 months later. it was working. >> and the other views? a lobar to, jcpoa is say you have sealed off all of the pathways for iran to get a nuclear weapon. ,here are times where the jcpoa which is heavily slanted in iran's favor, they still pushed things. they did violations of u.n. security route -- security resolution 221. --re is an induction

injunction on iran. there is a you and blacklist knowing that he is not supposed to travel, you see him take selfies in iraqi and syria all the time. it appears the iraqi military to americanre next and british expos. >> is around closer to a nuclear weapon that it was? >> they are beginning to violate the tenant in the jcpoa. it is beginning to put a knife to one of the key achievements of the throat of the jcpoa, the one-year breakout. by beginning to grow its capacity and quality and quantity of its centrifuges, it can shorten the timeline and make itself closer. it is incrementally doing this because it is trying to keep both sides of the atlantic apart from now. >> the gentleman with the redskin.

>> take the microwave from her. -- mike away from her. and to to the redskins the panel. chris, former air force officer and dhs, and former contractor at an air base owne i had my experiences with the pm use -- p mu's. didn't mean to cuss you out like that. anyways. and fl l rivalries aside, we know about iran's capabilities to attack commercial shipping vessels. that said, if the proverbial church it the fan, how are their capabilities as far as threatening our naval assets,

particularly our submarines? >> if they take first strike capability, they will be able to inflict damage. hopefully, there is enough of a deterrent to prevent it from happening, but anytime, we could decimate the navy. but what happens then? that is the calculus. the conventional war will be a naval war, it won't be a land force one. there will be no invasion of iran, no 100,000 american troops on the ground. we are not good at those things. it will be a naval confrontation, which, if they have a first strike, we will incur losses and decimate it. then, everything will be a calculated measure response based on what they were doing. especially --ent >> i like that there is a team of rivalries in the national security discussions, in the administrations. as brian said, they all disagree. that is a good thing.

the washington post made a mistake of making president trump look like the adult in the room, coming down bolton. i think it is great. these cyber attacks that the u.s. has used against iran are huge. those are offensive capabilities, those are militarized strategic pinpoint surgical, i don't combining those things, very successful. >> we are going to go to the gentleman with white shirt. >> thank you. i'm simon with the wisconsin project of arms control. i have a question for michael. you mentioned you have faith inconsistent foreign policy, i believe in the context of continuing -- >> i have no faith in u.s. foreign policy is what he meant to say. but you can answer your question, i will give you the opposite answer.

>> as i understood it, and continuing the maximum pressure campaign from this point forward, to have a more consistent policy, what do you think the u.s. decision to withdraw from the jcpoa says to iran about american foreign policy? how does that change their calculations and their willingness to negotiate with us in the future? >> i think withdrawing from the jcpoa did not isolate the u.s. iran.ther isolate is strengthen our position to north korea, because any nuclear deal with north korea must address regional behavior, ballistic missiles, must not have sunset clauses, must allow all military sites to be in spected by americans. the jcpoa didn't allow americans to inspect. anyway. it was the right thing to do to walk away from the

jcpoa. knows thateryone a future negotiation with iran needs to pass the senate 60 votes, needs to be a treaty, so the next president can't it up.ry -- tear way to tryas a week to control iran. if the jcpoa continued and we will still in it, by the second iranof kamala harris, would be able to put a nuclear warhead on the front of a ballistic missile and it would .e allowed in the treaty why would he run renegotiate and concede when they have everything they wanted? when they were a conventional military power and now a nuclear power. that is what they wanted to be, and they won't be now because you walked out of the jcpoa. >> they might acquire nuclear

weapons anyway. >> the russians and chinese will not allow the islamic republic to have a nuclear weapon. >> so this is the deterrent? >> the mpt is strong enough to deter iran from a nuclear weapon. what we need to talk about is ballistic missiles, regional behavior. i would love it -- think about this. the supreme leader issued a career -- a decree that we would never nuclear rise weapon. ash make a new -- make a nuclear weapon. does anyone believe that? no one believes it. that should be enough, but it is not. it is a strategy to attain one -- obtain one. >> [indiscernible] >> we are short on time. you can chat with mike afterwards. he's a very approachable guy. we're going to go here. >> thank you very much. subject dear to our heart is israel. have the sanctions and pressure

on iran increased the danger to israel? i say that in the context of the proxy well of hezbollah and hamas. does that increase the danger and israel will react even more? they keep saying wipe us off the map and that will happen. >> i will throw this to brian after answering for 26 and. hezbollah was no part of this. we have seen it in the rhetoric and actions. they want no part of this irani and-u.s. conflict. they are happy to do it -- iranian-u.s. conflict. they are happy to do it indirectly, but they are not willing to do it. that's why they see has balaam ,- hezbollah tell the iraqis that is huge. they lost a lot of faith amongst his followers is on the sacrifices in syria. he cares about what the lebanese people think of him. he's not ready to go into a war with the united states in israel when iran's logistical land

bridge, they can support it, defendants, and can't keep it from getting hit. >> thanks for your service in the egg department. -- ag department. >> [indiscernible] >> that is an aside, but an important one. not apropos to your question, but on israel, it is unfortunate, the statements we have seen from president trump supporty trying to make or the u.s.-israel relationship a partisan issue. people have been try to do this for years. his statement is the investments those people are doing a very bad thing have paid off and it is bad for israel and the u.s.. i did an article in late 2017 with a colleague of mine at the we went to israel and talk to wereity experts, they

concerned about the changes and fragmenting landscape in syria, lebanon, and in iraq. , i this is where i go back use the phrase aggressive appeasement, there is a deeper analysis there. i top israeli official one said that we used to hear -- fear our neighbor paul -- neighbor's strength, now we fear their weakness, and the chaos and instability, in places like syria, which we don't even talk about. the fragmentation in a place like lebanon has been more exploited by countries like iran , and what i said briefly. are using the tool of statecraft to expand their influence. it's not a long game, we have a game that goes every two years to four years, it's israel and they are doing what they can in

a shifting landscape. with the threats that they see iran backing. i don't think it's in a much better situation with the mutual deterrence we are seeing on the northern border into thousand six is eroding. but at this point, the erratic , i think manyu.s. countries in the region are trying to do what they can with support when they can get it. ourn that note, we conclude very exciting panel. thank you to our audience, c-span, the hudson institute, and hopefully we will continue the conversation another time. [captioning performed by the national captioning institute, which is responsible for its caption content and accuracy. visit ncicap.org] [indistinct conversations]

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>> president trump is delivering remarks today at the american veterans national convention in louisville, kentucky. live coverage starts at 2:00 you could listen live with the free c-span radio app. eastern, anine :00 conversation on climate change from the science center of will planetarium. kathy dello was a part of the event.

here's a preview. are scientists unencumbered by some of the constraints they felt in the past to make these links? >> attribution science, seeing the fingerprints of climate change, has moved along in the past few years. last week our colleagues put out a paper on the european heat wave, saying climate change made this more likely. 10 years ago a reporter would call up and say we cannot just tie an event to climate change but we are past that point and we are seeing heat waves, big fires out west come or i came from, climate change is here, and in our face. >> you can watch this entire event tonight at 9:00 eastern here on c-span. and a reminder that you can follow all of our programs online at c-span.org, and listen with the free c-span radio app. [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2019] livetch book tv for

coverage of the national book augustl on saturday, 31st starting at 10:00 eastern, our coverage includes author interviews with justice ruth bader ginsburg on her book, my own words. david troyer, the heartbeat of wounded knee, and sharon robinson talks about her book, child of the dream. malone, the founding director of m.i.t. center for collective intelligence discusses his book, super mind. the national book festival live eastern on at 10:00 book tv on c-span two. >> up next, a conversation on the potential national security challenges posed by foreign student programs. the center for immigration studies as host of this event.