to -- they are far ahead on tech for us compared to scholars and policymakers and they also learned how to weaponize youth culture in the -- in a way that we have not quite figured out how to address. they know how to draw people in with humor, with music, with gun culture and style and mixed martial arts. all of those things -- i think john is right, there is definitely recruitment but in this case it i washington journal mugs are available in the c-span store. visit c-span.org. announcer: next, a look at u.s. relations with iran, and what can be done to avoid escalating

tensions. hosted by the arab center, this is an hour and a half. kahlil: good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. my name is kahlil jahshan, i am the executive director of the arab center in washington. i would like to welcome all of you to this briefing for the confrontation in the gulf and rescan escalations, and the prospects of u.s.-iran talks in terms of diffusing the situation. today, we are pleased that c-span is covering this event. so i would like to just simply -- that is the reason i am starting on time, i know we have a few more people coming in in a typical afternoon at the press building. we will welcome them when they get here. but i would just like to ask for your cooperation in terms of

turning your phones off to make sure the ringing does not get broadcast to the whole c-span audience worldwide. and to avoid as much as possible walking in front of the cameras, it doesn't look good for people in the middle of the conversation, kind of going back and forth across from the camera view. view. also, i would like to announce that for those of you who are new, at the arab center, usually our questions and answers are done in writing, every 10 we have a question, feel free to write down your name, identify yourself and write your question. when you are ready, just raise your hand and staff full collect those and pass them onto the then yourhe panel question will be read and

.ddressed if you want it addressed to a specific analyst, please indicate that. let me just say a couple of words quickly about the chairman of the panel, and then just the subject matter, then turn it over to them. i am very pleased and honored that my colleague and good friend for many years, neither one of us want to say how long has agreed to chair this panel particularly with the fact, he's a colleague with us at the arab center and a professor at georgetown, and a long-time resident and active scholar in washington dealing with these issues, mid-list in general -- middle east in general, but

particularly, the issue with u.s. policy toward iran. i would like, for those of you interested, to recommend to you the most recent work for us if you go on our website, the nterdc.org, his most recent paper on tunisia and north africa adjusting to the the president and trying to cope with the transition manner, and also a couple written before that on the subject of dealing with iran. let me just say that aside from the a nonresident fellow at the arab center, daniel bloomberg is a director of democracy and government studies at georgetown university. he is also a senior nonresident fellow at the project on middle

east democracy here in washington. he served as advisor and consultant, special advisor to the u.s. institute of piece between 2008 and 2015. he has worked in various advisory capacities to the u.s. government, including the state department, the agency for international development, focusing particularly on his specialty, human rights, issues., and governance in terms of the subject matter, aside from the questions that are raised on the invitation and the announcement, dan will be talking a bit more i about that in a minute, it has been interesting for those of us who takinglowing the dance

place between washington and tehran. back-and-forth, it is a dizzying tennis match, diplomatic tennis aspectwith a tit-for-tat to it which makes it sometimes very difficult to follow. and it is somewhat chaotic. clearly, the parties have not connected yet in terms of taking the positive reaction many of us would like to see taken to defuse it situation and prevent region, devastating the whether by intention or by mistake. the resolution witnessed in washington specifically and also on the iranian side that makes you thisr,, as my friend morning had an article, an op-ed piece in which he said, is trump accidentally triggering reconsideration in the middle east? it is kind of funny because my

wrotegue who is also here a piece of week ago which i welcome you to look up on our arabiancalled "the irania gulf must not keesleepwalk towards war." and it looks like it is sleepwalking towards war. those talk will be about two questions, is it triggering the conciliation or is it sleepwalking in the wrong direction? with that said, i would like to pass the microphone onto my friend, daniel, to proceed. >> thank you. that was a very generous introduction to the chair, i very much appreciate it. it is true, we have been friends since graduate school, and i will not mention the year involved tha. [laughter]

i am glad to be here today. i remain mystified about the u.s. foreign policy, as so many of us, and i am hoping that in addition to getting your insights, we can find some arenas where we might iffer, because the is to converge rather than diverge but we will see how that goes. said, we will be taking questions, bring them appear and i will be abusing my role as chair and from there we will look at the cards of your questions and have a good discussion. our panelists will roughly talk ten minutes. my job, along with my colleagues, is to enforce those rules, 10-12 minute vigorously so we can finish on time and have the discussion. without further ado, i will briefly introduce the panelists in the order they will be

speaking, which is the order printed on your handout. university associate at georgetown university,. kenneth katzman, congressional research service, he has been written on issues about the gulf for many years. research fellow in the iranian-american council, she is based in california, very happy to have you with us today. and my friend and colleague, barbara slavin, director and senior fellow of the future iran initiative at the islamic council. without further ado, think we will. shari.with >> thank you very much, dan. it seems to me that the order of the speakers is that age goes before wisdom. [laughter] i havet also means that

been doing this whole iran business unfortunately for it seems that 40 years. 40 arduous years arguing about this. i also think academics are like street peddlers, in terms of getting a bit more credentials for my talk, my latest book which is called arab iranian relations, dynamics of conflict and accommodation, is available everywhere. having said that, let me just start with a few points, raise a few points, then hopefully we can have discussions later on. so, i went to say that i got two sets of instructions, one from the organizer of the panel, and the

respected rom a dan.lemen, so what i have tried to do is comene those and hopefully up with something that is not entirely incoherent and has some use for pointing that. one of my earlier instructions of, how serious is the risk war in the persian gulf? iran tryinghat is the other obviously side of the conflict, what is the u.s. doing? i can say with certainty that iran doesn't want war. whether or not the strategy that it is pursuing,

including the so-called tit-for-tat escalation that was mentioned is another matter, and that could happen. sometimesally happen because of the curative effect of such actions. we have to remember history since certainly the first world war, it happened like that. germany did not have a plan to conquer europe, so they were accumulations of certain actions that eventually went out of hand and led to that. but iran doesn't want war. ayatollah khamenei, let me be clear, increasingly, the center of decision-making is .yatollah khamenei and the irgc irgc has become the master of iran.

the sanctions come of a crippling sanctions, as hillary clinton put it, have actually increased the power and especially the rule of the irgc in the economy. lead toconomic problems the potential for social tensions, the regime will have to resort to some kind of pressure, and i think this is where the irgc will become more important. fromf something comes ayatollah khamenei, we can credit that. were as with hassan rouhani, increasingly i think he has become like a bag carrier, not even a respected bag carrier. i was much better tweeted when i used to carry the bag of the prime minister. anyway, that is something we have to keep in touch, iran

doesn't want war soviet the other hand, he has also said that we don't want talks. and -- a while, honey zarif say that they don't want to talk about that up, wethe time comes will talk about that. he also said, we don't want talks. as i said, foreign minister is a presidentrif runny have said that if the americans return to the j.c.p.o.a., we will talk, but i don't think the trump administration is going to j.c.p.o.a. j.c.p.o.a. in order to have talks with iran, unfortunately. it would be wise, but maybe some in between measures that can be think upon, but i don't

that is going to happen the other thing i think i see chris and we happening is that, the issues and problems in the persian gulf are becoming much more internationalist than they have been before, in part because the trump administration, together with the policy, the more aggressive policy towards iran has also picked fights with both china and russia. ,ne thing that to me personally i am off a generation of iranians, i come from a region that has been very much pressured by russia historically, for at least 300 years, what is alarming to me is the growing closeness of iran and russia. if some rumors are to be believed, iran might allow

russian bases in the country. if that happens, their dream will have become realized. as it happens with the syrian conflict, it is no longer iran versus the united states, it is becoming internationalized. iran and russia are going to have joint maneuvers towards the end of the year. we shall see what happens. i am trying to say, the more we delay some compromise with iran, the more this becomes internationalized and we will s trying to get rringthe sti of the soup. the other question i was asked to address, what a war would mean for the region.

it is quite obvious, and everybody has said, iran cannot win a conventional war in the sense of bombings and so on and so forth. but when you are fighting for your life or if you think you're going to be destroyed or obliterated, think that was the word president trump used, then you will try to do whatever you can to extend the damage. deterrent, which sword,uble-edged including the strait of hormuz, the biggest deterrent is what i call the samson option. in other words, if i go down, i will bring the temple down with me. if indeed there is a war in the region, that iranians would, with whatever means they have, they will create as much chaos as possible. but most importantly, even if iran doesn't do anything, the very shock of the war to the

global economy and so on will negatively affect everybody globally. but certainly come countries in the region are going to suffer a lot more. iran strategy in the persian gulf, downing the taking shipsne, and so on, it is to show , ifcally, and this is right you want to use the strait of hormuz, we have to use it too, and part of that is that we have living. will to have a . and with all the sanctions and so on, our living is completely disappeared. let me add, i read a very interesting analysis about the intakes of svp, whatever, it was excellent. i never had any hope for this.

, but it shows how chapter and verse, this cannot hold. aboutnot be complacent the potential damage that the war can do in the surrounding areas, it may not be limited just to the potion gulf -- to the persian gulf, it would impact iran. thank you. so yes, i think it would be to the u.s.ng, economy and also the global economy. the other thing i would like to add is that -- i think i covered the view for iran. now i will talk about the. talks. let me first say, talks are not a panacea. one of the things i have been surprised in recent times to see his a dichotomy has been

created, a false dichotomy , as if war and diplomacy the two are absolutely separate. or is a type of diplomacy, as it is said, war is diplomacy by other means. diplomacy is also conscious of power and how one can get what one wants. the question becomes, under what conditions in he talks between ben and the u.s. can productive? here comes the issue of what the united states wants, and what iran is willing to get. why don't we call it the way it is, what is it we are complaining iran is doing, iran's nefarious regional activities?

the most important problem is i think iran's attitude toward the arab-israeli conflict and its actions within the levant, whether it is support for hamas, to me, it is unacceptable talk, although it is talk about israel but does not have a right to exist politically, or in the middle east, and so on. these are the main issues. . i think there are a lot of tensions in the persian gulf that derive from that. this has always been a connection between the levant and the persian gulf. anyway, i don't want to go too much into that, this is a problem of age, too many historical memories. i think that as long as iran is not willing to change policy, and i don't think they are yet willing to do that, it

is going to be difficult to talk. the iranian regime does not show any sign that they are willing to do that. they are willing to come to an agreement with the arab states, all arab states, from egypt to even saudi arabia. recently, there have been lots of talks, maybe eve bin salman is changing, but that would mean leaving the persian gulf politics from the labonte politics. -- from the levant politics. arabs all iran might make them more accommodating to israel and so on. i think iran is just lost in this, they don't know what they are doing. iranof the problem is that unfortunately, in an article

recently argued that the iranian regime needs a new basis for its political legitimacy. i said they have to change the revolutionary framework into a framework that is basically national, not nationalist, but national, which means that iran's interest, safety should be their priority, not the -- whatever it is they are doing. but that would mean doing away with the irgc, doing away with ayatollah khamenei, and a lot of iran.clerics leading so i will end it with this up, i my two minutes are will finish with a quote from

the former commander of the irgc . he said, if you talk to america, nothing will remain of revolution. so the problem becomes that we have to find a way of trying nk persian gulf politics and eventually in time, things will work out. of thele question problem with iran has become one of pride. iran is, forgive me for using the metaphor, but iran is the rebellious -- but so far has escaped punishment. iraq is gone syria more or less is good,, but iran has yet. so the iran elements in the -- there are elements in the united

states who want iran to cry uncle. they would prefer if they do that. through talking. that is why you have 12 points. this has been a constant policy in the united states at least since 1988. 1987.d go even to it is not really a trump problem. if we think of it in terms of trump -- unfortunately, iranians are thinking in terms of trump. i keep telling them, they shouldn't expect anybody else to do anything better until and unless they change some of the domestic issues. you can't challenge a country and its interests. , you can say you are going to drive the united states out of the middle east, and hope that they will give you the lead to do that. i think that is what you are seeing, a gradual combination of the crisis that has been going on for 40 years. i will stop here and hopefully

later in questions, i might add a couple more things. thank you very much. daniel: thank you very much, mrs. hunter. hand,, for issue at them it would be the end of the revolution. obama's solution was focused on the nuclear issue and trying to break them apart, but now that policy has been jettisoned. which is the link to engage in that particular issue? n, go ahead. karin: thank you. sometimes i am in a crs capacity, sometimes i am not. today, i am not in a crs capacity. i will be speaking in english. [laughter] host: i like that.

shireen isink correct that iran doesn't want my analysis, iran is in the strongest position i have seen in many years. they have basically rescued assad from the brink of extension. his border is stronger than it has ever been. iraqi shia militias in many ways the preponderance of our in iraq. the uae has in some sense left yemen, leaving the campaign in yemen hanging by a thread. iran has backed the houthis that is very clear. iran doesn't want war, i totally at. iran is being, than, itsby shanks oil exports are 10% of the baseline of 2.5 million barrels a day it has, been shut out of

the international banking system and it is estimated that the gdp will sink about 6% or 7% this would be a severe recession, not a mild recession. it would be a severe recession. so iran is. feeling, in my estimation, extremely confident that it can make a tremendous amount of trouble for the united states if there is a conflict, and iran is going to go to the mats to try to achieve the lifting of sanctions. a succession of mediators appear to have taken their chance and struck out. there was not a tremendous amount of active mediation appearing to bear fruit. i want to talk a little bit this puts act that countries on european

who continue to countries who continue to support the j.c.p.o.a., the nuclear agreement. they feel this was a victory for european diplomacy. they saw no real incredible rationale for the u.s. to leave the accords and yes they are trying mightily to preserve it and they may succeed and they may not. i will talk a bit about what they are trying to do and what others are trying to do to keep this agreement in place and perhaps salvage the situation and maybe pull us back from the brink of conflict, which i think is the point of our meeting today, to talk about, are we on the brink of conflict, and can it be avoided? instex aentioned european union vehicle, sort of like a border exchange. -- barter exchange.

it has not yet completed a transaction and is so far limited to humanitarian affairs and issues, goods which are not sanctionable under the u.s. sanctions law. it is a vehicle whereby basically european exporters to iran will be paid by european importers, and iranian exporters will be paid by iranian -- the money stays on each side of the divide. the money doesn't go from iran to europe or europe to iran, it stays on each side of the divide, and therefore, presumably, it avoids dollar transactions, and avoid sanction ability. that is the thesis. now, it is going to have difficulty. the europeans are considering ways to make it more effective

and viable. they are considering expanding it to oil transactions, very difficult because indirect transactions, if somebody buys iranian oil, that is a transaction. whoever took the delivery of iranian oil could be subject to u.s. sanctions. difficult,e a little but it is under discussion. the other near-term option is , is if thered europeans appear to be exploring a plan where he will be pumping capital into the transaction. they will make advance payments to european exporters so they are not waiting for iran importers to pay. it is a little hard -- i am trying to make sense of it myself, but what the europeans are doing is they are trying to pump capital into the mechanism to accelerate it.

the other issue under discussion is for others outside europe to join the vehicle. china is talking about joining the vehicle, obviously, china is flush with cash. other ideas -- china still does buy iranian oil, a lot less than they were, however, you know the u.s. and china are in a very significant trade conflict now. is it beyond thought that china as a way of messaging the trump administration might try to buy more iranian oil? that certainly is on the table, i would say. they has basically said are going to continue to buy iranian oil. there was a chinese company , i willed last week have to look up the name, they

were sanctioned a few years ago for selling gasoline to iran, a minor chinese company. it was sanctioned last week for the transactions they were on. then, let me just briefly discuss another idea that is out not in aen though i am aeorist capacity today -- in today, i cannot recommend options. i can talk about them but i can't recommend anything. so the trump administration left the j.c.p.o.a. last year, after that, the e.u. announced a $20 million development grant to iran. it is a very small amount. $40 billion orbe $50 billion a year because of oil.

they would need to be staked to about 40 or $50 million, is my estimation. can the europeans simply pump cash into cash into the iranian economy, 40, 50 billion a year? tough. probably not. could china dump half of that? probably, yes. is injecting capital into the iranian economy through cash grants sanctionable? i don't see that it is. there is a sanction for countries that aids countries on the terrorism list, which iran is on the terrorism list the un's sanction would be to cut aid, to that country. china does not get u.s. aid, the europeans do not get u.s. aid, so i don't see a way that pumping capital into the iranian economy would be sanctionable.

i am not an attorney, this is my first assessment. these are ideas out there. the europeans did pump some capital i believe into the turkish economy for the refugee issue. again, i am not speaking on turkey, i don't cover turkey. my point is, there are ideas out there. and my saying they j.c.p.o.a. can be salvaged? i am not assessing that, that is not my base case right now. among the ideas being explored, yes. could these ideas potentially salvage the situation, possibly. and i think i will end there. thank you. daniel: that is really sobering. i think what it recognizes that iran's regime depends on the sale of oil. if you can't sell oil, you have a gun put to your head essentially. if none of these arrangements work out, particularly in terms

of oil sales, iran has very few options. walking away from the agreement is one option out on the table now and escalating the gulf, as a response predictable to this situation. so i think that is really very important. all right. >> i would like to thank the arab center for giving me the opportunity to platform to share with such respected people in the field. i will take a slightly different approach to what we are talking about and talk about the framing of the issue. the reason i take that approach is i think one of the things that has informed the way we have a discussion -- i believe a discussion like this is important to have, because hopefully we are trying to gain a resolution, or else this is just an exercise in us talking. gain an trying to resolution, we have to a full understanding of where the problem comes from and stems from and how we talk about it is quite important. the framing we have seen in washington and in the media very years, when last 40

it comes to iran specifically but also the broader middle east , we have a baseline assumption bad actor and the u.s. is a good actor. when we talk about this in this useless dichotomy, we don't get the nuance of understanding, why is iran behaving this way? onlyy that they are behaving this way because they are bad actors, we have no way of getting a resolution because we assume they are irrational actors. but if you look at what is happened over the last year, what he will seize a very rational approach from the iranian side. there's also a bizarre paradox in talking about iran. on one hand we have the argument that it is so powerful, it is controlling everything in the middle east, and yet, it is so weak that we can with one or two strikes, take them out. that paradox is again, problematic in finding a resolution. interesting thing but the paradox is it's steeped in

history of orientalism. this is the exact type of orientalism discourse that has long been used talking about the docile, week,g effeminate even, and simultaneously hyper masculine, aggressive and dangerous. it is not something you to the discourse, it is something we have seen. and in the same reason that orientalism impeded our ability to have a conversation, it is still problematic in this framing as well. i talked about why i think the framing is important in trying to gain a resolution, today, what i would like to talk about is, we have two threats that are global and can threaten our species. what is climate change and the other is nuclear weapons. what the j.c.p.o.a. did was address not climate change, but the idea that both these things cooperation.al

the j.c.p.o.a. is a model for global cooperation and a model for nonproliferation. it should have been something it, rather than abandoning we should have used it as a model of how to denuclearize the entire middle east, to make sure it is used globally and tackle the problems we are going to face in the next 10, 20, 50 years. we are seeing data out of the unit of nations that talks about -- data out of the united nations that talks about food scarcity, water scarcity. these are the things we should be discussing instead of having a sideshow about iran and how ,ran is simultaneously a threat and the no threat at all because we can take them out easily. the crisis we are currently in is based on the framing, and that is whether trump administration have an incoherent policy. they don't have a coherent framing. the other reason we have an

incoherent policy is because his policy advisers are not aligned with his vision. we talked about how iran doesn't want a war, and i agree. absolutely. the violations, the small breaches that iran has gone through in the last few months are easily reversible. if iran wanted to abandon the followedy would have through with the u.s. a year ago. but they did not. trump has made it clear he doesn't want a war. unfortunately, his advisers arguably do. so incoherent policy is coming out of the fact that they have a vision but it is not aligned. , and we will get into this more when we have questions and answers, but i think there is some concern of, iran has said they don't want any talks area at ayatollah khamenei has said he doesn't want any talks.

while that mentality is potent within the hard-liners in iran, of course, iran did negotiate and talk with the u.s., we did have a nuclear agreement, so it is not an impossibility to return to that status quo, it is that we in the u.s. are not acting in a way that would make it possible. if you look at the iranian side as a rational actor, we see one year of doing nothing but complying with the deal, because they wanted to stay within the deal. this is what we call strategic patience. we want to talk about the view from tehran. i spent personally 10 years doing field research in iran during my phd program. from my understanding, as someone who has done field research in iran, the iranians are suffering currently under sanctions and while they defensely have rightful

and disagreement, and disdain even for the government they , what the united states is doing is actually helping them to unify with someone they don't necessarily like. that is what is so frustrating for iranian-americans in the diaspora to watch. to see people who are outspoken against the government now thinking, at least they are protecting us. we see things like drone strikes, tanker seizures, the assumption is iran is the aggressor, that is the problem in the not understanding why they are behaving the way we are. in fact, our drones, our tankers are close to iran. none of this is taking place anywhere close to the united states. so from their point of view, this is something i heard from a friend in iran after the drone strike, they were happy to know that they could defend their borders. a war in iran is not a far-fetched memory. war on their soil occurred in

the 1980's. a generation was defined by the war. they still remember it and still understand it. the fear of not being able to defend their borders was a very fear. now they are seeing their government having stepped up and being able to defend their borders is not something that is negative. we would never want to feel that our borders are not being protected by our government. what i am hoping it's in the rest of the conversation that we can answer more details of how we can actually move forward. but i believe that the point of origin has to be the united states, because the point of origin that put us on this path was the decision by the united states to abdicate the deal. if we want to talk to iran. negotiate a more formal deal, we have to go back to the origin and reconcile that. the iranian side has to come back into full compliance, and

then you can have a discussion about more for more. daniel: thank you very much, that was tremendous. it seems to me that whatever the ang-term framing of iran as bad actor in the u.s. is a good actor, the d.c. framing these days is that the trump administration has provoked this problem and in that sense, it's not positive. this seems to be the widespread point of view and maybe fox news does not share that point of suggests the narrative that the ending of the decision by the u.s. to exit the nuclear deal was a precipitating factor of getting us to where we are now today. barbara. sure there isnot much left for me to talk about, but let me try. ank michaemy

co-panelists. i agree with a lot of what they said. i wrote a piece the other week for the axios websites, that said basically, when it comes to iran the means has become the , end. i think that is what we have seen from the trump administration. there is disagreement within the administration about iran policy. although not as much as there was at the beginning of the trump administration when he had h.r.e like jim mattis and mcmaster actively urging the , president to stay in the nuclear deal. the president fired those advisers got new advisers who are more hawkish on iran, but there are disagreements for whether military action can be taken. john bolton is hawkish, and secretary of state mike pompeo is more hawkish apparently than the president. but the one thing they seem to agree on is more and more sanctions. not just iran, if you have been following venezuela, now

venezuela is under embargo as well. to me, it represents frustration on the part of the administration that their policy is in working. iran has not returned to the table, there are no negotiations on a new and better deal, and if you remember the 12 demands that secretary of state mike pompeo put forward little more than one iran's policies and activities are arguably much worse than they were then when the united states was still in the deal. when the u.s. was still in the deal, there were no tankers being sabotaged in the persian , tankers being seized, drones being shot down. in thean was active region, but i would argue that it has to do more with the u.s.'s mistakes like invading iraq in opening iraq to a influence, then some

sort of diabolical iranian hegemonic impulse. nefarious and malign behavior has gotten worse since the u.s. left the deal, and it makes perfect sense because iran is signaling that it will not sit there and have its economy completely choked off and have the international community pay no price. what is surprising is that iran was patient for a year until the united states decided it was going to issue no more waivers for iranian oil exports and it would try to reduce around oil exports to zero. all of this is quite predictable. sanctions, sanctions and more sanctions. last week was simply the height absurdity. the united states, which claims it once new negotiations with iran sanctioned the one individual who would lead such negotiations, foreign minister javad zarif.

not only did they sanction him, website, theyarsi put out an item that has an extremely ugly picture of the zarif. he was in a fight with hard-liners at the time, but he looks very angry and menacing. and the text in farsi zarif a pimp for the iranian government. now let me ask you, if you want to have negotiations with the iranian government, is this the way to go about it? is this designed to encourage negotiations? one of the questions we have now is whether he or even hassan rouhani will come to the security council for the meeting in september. will the united states provide permission in time so they can make their preparations?

will it impose such humiliating conditions that iran will boycott the u.n. general assembly in september? it is entirely, possible in which case in the diplomacy goes out the window. i think that u.s. policy, like many other policies undertaken by this administration is maximum noise, maximum pressure, and minimum result. things get worse, they don't get better, and we don't find solutions. as somebody who has been following iran also for 40 years, although perhaps less intimately than shireen hunter, this is very frustrating because we were in a better place as has been pointed out,. not only did we have negotiations with iran during the period that led to the j.c.p.o.a., but we had talks with iran under almost every administration, one sort or another. sometimes they have been covert

and sometimes overt, but there have been talks and efforts at de-escalation. . what we have now is a situation where there are no talks, no channels, and we are putting sanctions on the foreign minister of the country. last point, and this is a lewistion from the wa carroll that i first heard the formeriran by deputy assistant secretary of state of a run, and a former hostage of iran, one of my favorite people. it goes like this "when you don't no where you are going, any road will take you there." [laughter] daniel: thank you very much. i will lead off with a question but anybody who has a question, please write it down on the card and my colleagues from the arab center will be collecting them and bringing them appear. one of the things barbara said

about sanctions is, sanctions have two purposes. one is to force or encourage your adversary to come to the negotiating table and the other is to destroy your adversary. the purpose of sanctions is to engage in a strategy of regime change, of course, iran has no incentive to come to the table, and we're all sitting up here scratching our heads wondering what is the policy coming from the administration in that regard. here is my question on that particular score. where is trump in all of this? , buts like an odd question it is an interesting situation when you are apparently 10 or 15 minutes from an attack, a u.s. attack, we learned that our president decided that it is not a good idea. but my sense is that the president wants to negotiate but he doesn't know how to get there particularly because he is

surrounded by people who don't this is certainly agree with him. barbara andon for anybody else in the panel who would like to address this, what do we make of this -- not sure how to characterize this -- strange bifurcation in the white house? is it possible for this administration to negotiate, possible for trump to find his way towards offering negotiations and not take steps as barbara described, to completely upend any idea that we could have talks? i'm trying to look into the soul of this administration and understand what the prospects are here which is after all what were talking about. >> i will start, then we can maybe go in the opposite order down the line -- one thing we have to stress is how much this is a domestic political issue for trump. he left the iran nuclear deal because his supporters supported

that. they wanted more pressure and sanctions on iran. , the arabia wanted it emirates wanted it, the israelis wanted it end of the big donors to his campaign wanted more pressure on iran. so it is domestic politics for him, and i can see him coming back into the j.c.p.o.a., see him making concessions toward iran that would make it easier for iran to agree to a new talks. you have to put something face-saving down on the table for iran to return to the talks and not simply try to wait until 2020 elections because we should point out that all the democratic candidates with the exception of cory booker has have said pretty much bet they would return to the j.c.p.o.a. if there was a j.c.p.o.a. to return to, which gives iran an incentive to try to hunker down and somehow stay within some aspects of the deal until 2020. .t is hard to imagine

zarif, ourns on colleague robin wright wrote in the new yorker that rand paul, another one of the emissaries to the iranians, met with him when he was in new york and invited house.o the white and when zarif said he had to check with his government before he could come, and will pretty much turned down ther the reque, he was sanctioned. and according to zarif, he was threatened with sanctions if he didn't come to the oval office. these are mafia tactics. these are not the tactics of a great superpower. and again, what is in it for iran? if trump will make no concessions and they won't even restore any of the oil waivers , why should they return to talks? there is simply no rationale for it that i can see. i don't know what the others think. >> just a couple of footnotes to this.

i may be a little bit off and i would not use the word dissent because that is a bit too strong , but i think the iran-u.s. problems go beyond trump. trump is the culmination of a andess that started, frankly, on this i have to say, depending on who started what, it depends when in history you want to start. i mean, there are a lot of things it depends on the date you choose,. the first example was from iran, the hostage crisis, then khomeini's thing. of course, the sanctions started because of hostages, then after that with the clinton administration. in my humble opinion, the united lost the best

opportunities to have a comprehensive talk with iran. the best time was in 1988. i know this for a fact. i don't want to go into that. iran was very traumatized. . the iraqi troops were still in iranian territory, and they had indicated to the united states that if they got iraqi troops out of the region, they were willing to have all kinds of things. the other thing was during the third bush administration. now, there is no counterweight to the ayatollah. ayatollah come in a was nobody was nobodyh come in in the 1980's, the irgc did not have that much power. barbara has written about this, and i like the book immensely. then in 2003, u.s. policy actually consistently has regime

change without war -- has been regime change without war, except for the brief period of euphoria between afghan and iraqi war. i remember reading an article that said real men go to tehran, which was that we should have gone to tehran, and not baghdad. a number of things changed, but iran was on the hit list. so trump is the culmination of all this stuff. let me say on the other side, what is happening with khamenei and all of that; the problem i have personally, as someone who puts iran ahead of islam or any other religion, the survival of iran and is prosperity for me is the most important. ayatollah khamenei sees himself as the leader of the islamic world.

they look at iran as if it were a staging post for going after this. that is i am worried about the irgc. i think the people who consider war, either by accident or design should remember that a minority of them may actually war.an apocalyptic increasing the, with all the pressures, one thing that is very troubling to me, increasingly, people are talking about getting ready for the coming of the messiah. so we have to understand, and of course, it is ayatollah khamenei 's personality. in the same way with trump, he is very stubborn, very proud, and i don't think he cares. he missed opportunities to deal even withmi and

rouhani. it seems to me that if the united states really wants to, it falls on the united states. the other thing is that the u.s., and it started with clinton, but clinton started it without use of military force, it started on what i call a transformative policy for the middle east. you can't transform. any region completely, it is not a mechanical thing. therefore unleashed in dialectic process that we are here. me oneback, it seems to way of doing things is also to look at iran as part of this bigger middle east puzzle. my one recommendation would be agreementreach an even without open talks on

the specific issues, for example, shipping in the persian gulf. one step would the to allow the process of reconciliation between iran and the gulf arabs to go forward. for that, i think iran is ready. even if they said they have nothin no problems with saudi arabia. preconditions put for iran rather than looking at it as a process, the end of which would be iran stopping it nefarious activities and all the other things. priori, theo a clinton administration and others did that, but you have to accept these things then we can talk, that is not negotiation, that is amending surrender, and i think that is very difficult with any kind of party.

add to the question .ad about trump i think it is interesting because he wanted to coin the ."rase "you are fired done alreadye has some returns in his administration, to fire the people guiding his policies. to be fair, he is not a policy expert. he is being fed information by people who he has entrusted with guiding his policies were he doesn't know what to do. so i think at a certain point, it is incumbent upon him, if he generally does not want a war, which he has said, to fire the people putting him on that path and bring advisors like tillerson, who at the beginning was not putting him on that path, which is why he argued we should remain in the j.c.p.o.a.

i really think that is a simplified way of looking at it. but being advised by people who actually have the same vision as you would be the path to take if trump wants to fit into this. it is really the question of, when he claims he doesn't want war, i just want iran not to have nuclear weapons, yet we had an agreement that prevented exactly that and we pulled out of that agreement. to get cohesion, he needs to find people who have the same region as him. out andto round it botnet up i think the administration from what they say points to the maximum weakening iran to the point where it's regional activities are diminishing or will diminish. , and addressee ordence of that weakening

that iran has shifted any of its activities in the region. and i don't see any evidence that iran's economy is about to collapse, so whether iran will capitulate because of economic downturn, let's be remember, the iraqis shut off iran's oil exports entirely during the iran-iraq war. when you talk about getting. iran to zero, the iraqis had it at zero but he did not collapse. it russian food and goods, but it did not collapse -- it goodsned food and but it did not collapse. to get iran to a point where it surrenders, i don't see evidence for that right now. >> i think it is important also to note that the iranians see president trump, not only does he not want another war in the middle east, but he wants to withdraw all u.s. forces from the middle east. you remember it was only last december he said he was leaving

syria and backtracked on that . now he has his envoy trying to get an agreement with the taliban so the u.s. can drastically withdraw troops from afghanistan. so yes, there is maximum economic pressure, but the u.s. is not really eager to put boots on the ground, which is another reason for the iranians to continue to test the united states with provocative actions in the persian gulf, to pressure chinese,o pressure the the russians, and others, and essentially without trump. pres. trump: thank you very much. n's articleay, ke is recommended reading. >> it is on the atlantic council website. >> it reminds us of a strange idea that if a country is having economic struggles it has to defend national interest which is very bizarre assumption. here is an interesting question that i will read for you president macron proposed an

initiative in iran and acting as mediator for the u.s. and iran, and a number of countries have proposed playing that role. trump tweeted today that tehran is giving mixed signals macron.g foufor he tweeted that nobody can represent the u.s. does this mean mediation is doomed? what do you make of this statement? this is for ken and barbara. barbara is this something that's : tweeted today? he stopped beating up on beto o'rourke? [laughter] trump wants a photo op meeting with an iranian. you know, this is a clear goal. he wants to replay the. tape with north korea, not that that has gone so well. maximum pressure, fire in theory, then a summit in which thousands of the world press are

in attendance. that is what he wants with iran. but the situations are so different. first of all, north korea is a one-man dictatorship. iran is not. iran has politics, it has foreign policymaking through consensus. what is the percentage for iran? iran is already a major power in that part of the world, it doesn't need legitimization from donald trump, in the same way that a 33-year-old north korean descendent, grandson of the founder of the regime needed legitimization by donald trump. it is simply not there. also, the region in northeast asia want peace and wants north korea to be brought out and a reintegrated into the region. at least until recently, the feelings in the middle east were different. . i think there is a hopeful sign, i agree with my fellow panelists.

the united arab emirates has sent an emissary to iran, even the saudis seem to be toning down the rhetoric somewhat. if the region understands that donald trump is not going to save them, is not going to get rid of the hated regime in tehran, that they will be stuck with this regime for a long time, maybe they can sit down and start to sort out some of their problems together. trump has shown he simply cannot be counted on to solve the problem of iran for the region. daniel: thank you. and i would add to that, when you are playing a game of chicken and hoping that the rest of u.s. action will bring iran to compliance, you are left having to rethink your approach. that is probably what they are doing in dubai right now is reconsidering whether that will work out, because otherwise, it doesn't seem that the u.s. will war, or thato to iran will take the bait.

here is an interesting specific question for which i have no clear guidance for anybody who knows about this can jump,. an american aircraft carrier has hormuz the straits of for two months now. could it be it is afraid of entering the gulf because it is afraid of being a sitting duck. also, what is the u.s. strategy in the persian gulf? we haven't talked about what is going on there. it is a real murky set of subjects. in.ne can jump >> a doesn't necessarily have to be in the gulf to be effective. the issue is, what i look at is these deployment that have been announced since it may. there have been several batches, deployments of aircraft, additional defense weaponry. at the air are back

base where they have not been since 2003. the question is, are these deployments deterring iran? i would have to say, not yet, iran is still attacking tankers and seizing tankers. this goes back to what i started with, iran feels very confident because they can make so much trouble for the united states at this point that they are emboldened to push the envelope to get what they want. what i say to people, anybody that thinks a u.s.-iran war will be limited to the strait of hormuz is just not looking at what i i'm looking at, or what anybody at this panel has been looking at. we have to get away from this notion that any conflict with iran will stay limited to a classic clash in the strait of hormuz. daniel: thank you.

i will take this opportunity to throw out a question that echoes some of the other questions here, and that is, in terms of they betnd zarif, their whole career -- zarif but his whole career on this deal. some of us were there in 2013 in the meeting in new york city and zarif was bouncing off the walls, he was so happy. it was a new day. they felt that history was with them. here we are all these years zarif, rouhani, the different forces they represent, do they have a future? how do they survive this very difficult situation in which they have placed all their bets, on this agreement, and now it seems possibly to be dissolving before their eyes. >> may answer that question? i think -- i was going to write an article but then i got busy.

it was going to be zarif between trump and hardliners. you have to see the history of zarif. i have known java zarif since he was interning at the iranian mission. when you are old, you remember things a lot more. [laughter] there is no mystery. him.ays liked i always thought he was very personable. he is certainly very bright. but he fumbled twice. one of the things he fumbled was in the bonn negotiations after the u.s. invasion of afghanistan. he basically gave the house key to the americans and got rid of the legitimate government, and in.wed hamid karzai to come

this was the victory of javad zarif. i think because he speaks english fluently, he impresses the revolutionary guards and others that have never learned a foreign language, at least not to be able to really be fluent. i think that was a one-time. i think what happened after the iran diplomacy, i personally was opposed to what they did in the bonn conference. they give away afghanistan in that meeting, and i think that contributed greatly to the victory of ahmadinejad. for the first time, foreign policy become an issue in the elections. loving concessionary foreign

policy. impacted thing that someone very close to me the other day, was very closely reading the j.c.p.o.a. and he said, didn't iranians have proper lawyers to look at this agreement? loopholest is full of , and that is what has been done. what i am saying is, therefore, as a result of this, and the last coup de grace, was their withdrawal from the j.c.p.o.a. there was a call for the reef's resignation -- there was a call for zarif's resignation. that the iranian government needs him because they don't have a strong enough foreign ministry. zarifsould have 200 instead,, they have this one guy who can actually interact with others.

what zarif has to do -- i was worried about him, i thought his life might be in danger. i thought he should stay in on his trips. but i think what zarif has been doing, and he has been doing quite a bit of tong lashing never seen some of the gestures he has been doing and stuff that he is saved, is very unrealistic, but he has been doing it, embracing --, so on and so forth. so this for him is protection. does zarif has a feature in iran, yes. he is becoming a hero. he has become a national hero. >> because of the sanctions? >> because of the sanctions and because of all these things. in fact he had to go and say, i promise you that i will not run.

, and again, im is will come back when i close -- the united states -- i don't want to go to much into history, but we mishandled the policy with the iranians in the 1970'sm '75-'79, let'sm face it our policies contributed to the iranian revolutionp that was the biggest strategic loss of the united states, more even than the loss of china. there are still the ripples of that. even if iran disintegrated, the ri ripples of that will continue. so we have to be careful. not only because iran is such a no deal or such a wonderful, , but because of where it sits.

something that met collapsing, everything will not remain the same. wherever it is, it will not remain the same. we have to be very careful. the problem is we have never slowly.o deal with iran that comes to the dynamics -- it is part oriental i -- part orientalism. we have to understand these people. without being pejorative towards anybody, these are the dynamics of great power behavior. one of the problems of iran the united states, and also russia -- i am upset that their iranians are accepting russian imperialism but fighting americans; so-called imperialism. to me, russian imperialism is even worse.

the point i'm trying to say is, iran challenged, it has been challenging all the time even when it was very weak,. kabir wanted to buy ships, and he came to america. he asked the american ambassador that the u.s. should sell ships to iran because they wanted to patrol the persian gulf, because the british were using anti-slavery in order to control coast.s piracy in the so these are the dynamics of great powers and regional powers. i don't want to use it in a pejorative way, but the you that a fish once global hegemony, and certainly once it -- the united states wants global hegemony and once it in the middle east. if you make your bed, you have to lie in it.

i am not saying the u.s. has the right to hegemony, but iran also has to realize it cannot fight with the united states and expect not to be punished. this is going to happen. it seems to me that -- the french have an expression, and i have to conference, my basic for , theon is french french have a word, and it seems that at the end of the day, it entranche, at the end of the day, you have to slice things to get to the fundamental issue. wishy-washy, but it doesn't work. i believe the iranian resolution has reached a level that it has to be sliced. either the u.s. accepts iran as

a regional player and in exchange for that, iran also has to become a most responsible player, not going around talking about destroying a country or doing this stuff. or we are going to see more of khamenei, even after comin and trump have gone. daniel: in light of the "tranche r" -- please. >> you talked about him bouncing deal.e walls after the something to bring up while we are having conversations that are only focused on the leadership, zarif was not the only one bouncing off the balls the iranian populace, was happy to have the j.c.p.o.a. and while there were some conversations that try to deny that, it is an undeniable fact.

polling, if you look at the 2017 elections in iran, 70% of the population voted and rouhani won by a landslide because of the j.c.p.o.a. so it is important not to ignore the people that are actually propping up these types of leaders. if he has a future, he has a future because the iranian populace was the j.c.p.o.a. they don't want to this continued and consistent aggression we are seeing. he has a future beyond the politics because that is what the population of the country wants. add,ther thing i wanted to shary in, you brought up 1975-19 79 as when the u.s. made a mistake in iran, i would push that further and go to 1953. >> and say that if the us we have to be a will to look at the iranian perspective on this the

economy of the u.s.-iran relations, and if we are talking about u.s. hegemony, we have to also be cognizant of the fact that if we believe and sovereignty, than any nationstate would try to fight that hegemony and naturally do so. >> i just want to comment, i hope nobody lost my remark, which zarif -- speaking on behalf of the special forces, i spent 10 years working on processing the subject of the relationship between the leadership and iran's social-political arena and how the two are linked. . this is it no way an analysis that focuses exclusively on the leadership. i do want to return the discussion to the questions which got us back to 1600 pennsylvania avenue of all places, two related questions which i am sure none of us have answered. what strategy could help trump

save face? what can be done in that regard? we have commented on that. this has been commented on before, and i agree in terms of what could be the solution, but why doesn't trump fire his current foreign policy advisers on iran and try somebody who has views consistent with his whatever that means? i will leave those two questions for our panelists and we will wrap up based on your responses. thank you. >> i think if the president were to fire particularly john bolton, it would send a message to a lot of countries around the world that the u.s. policy might be shifting. has already had how many national security adviser's ? this is number three. another thing trump could do is name an envoy for negotiations with iran instead of trying to have a summit before you have negotiations, have the

negotiations and we have a model . which came from the obama administration, the omanis hosted talks that were private, before we got to zarif bouncing off the walls when he met with john kerry in new york in 2013. rand paul is a possible emissary but there are others. there are a lot of republicans who have worked with iran and worked with them successfully. jim dobbins r who is now atand -- who is now at rand was involved and he got the agreement. our ambassador at the united nations and in iran, he's weeks , and -- he speaks dari knows a lot of iranians. he is very capable.

ryan, distinguished former diplomat, negotiated with iranis in iraq and held talks with them after 9/11 that were about how to manage afghanistan and, and al-qaeda and so on. very capable guy. jim jeffrey, current envoy against isis and in syria, also has had long contacts and experience with iranians. the deputy secretary of state, a man named john sullivan, was a young man in iran during the revolution, his uncle was the last u.s. ambassador in iran before the revolution. so there is no shortage of individuals. we have an envoy for north korea, i don't know that he gets to do much because trump keeps preempting him by meeting kim jong un, but you could go back to that model and eat good work behind the scenes. you could have a realistic agenda, not the 12 demands, and you can get somewhere. it is possible if trump wants to go that route, but we have seen

a no indication that he does. >> it is going to come down to whether sanctions are going to be lifted. this is what i am watching for, is there any indication that they're going to be willing to lift sanctions and so far i have not seen it. >> may i just say one thing that face-saving has to be both for iran and for the united states. torybody needs a fig leaf hide behind, and everybody has to be able -- this is one of the sort of international negotiations 101. you learn that everybody has to get something. one reason for the j.c.p.o.a. was that iran was in a dire situation. when iranians say they did not agree to the dizzy be away because of it is not correct.

that was not the only reason, but it was. made a it recommendation. asking thed been iranian parliament -- they have signed it but not ratified it. it would increase even more than the current inspection and so on. forxchange, at least partial lifting of sanctions, we know iran -- cannot produce nuclear weapons. this is pushing an open door. even though it is weaker, it

prohibits old countries like india and pakistan. they were not members so they were not downed by the limitations. is a are ways, if there will, there is a way. the last thing i would like to add, if i might. a moral dimension to the things the sanctions are doing. essentially killing the country. i am talking about even physically killing the country. alluse of unemployment, kinds of other pressures, people are even smuggling for tile soil across the borders and so on. point, i was arguing

having a more -- war might be more memorable. you will actually finish it rather than a slow death. children don't have drugs, dying of all kinds of diseases. one thing that to me is amazing, we get very upset about certain human rights violations. beings the right to life violated. we have to bring this in. even though i am a realist and i relationswer determined -- that does not mean you have to be immoral. thank you. >> the question comes down to, from the american position, whether we want to live with iran or not. >> the country -- the question of saving face. i think it would be not going to war.

the question is, iran is calling his love. he is putting more and more sanctions. all he can do. he has maxed that out. ran -- i will not get into the entire history because it would be ridiculous -- it is not going to surrender. his are either calling bluff and he'll have to go another route which would be war or he has to reel back and i actually think given reeling back because someone who ran a platform criticizing wars, especially wars in the middle east should get then into one that is -- that was likely going to be worse than anything we've seen so far because of the context of iran, iran and iraq are not comparable situations at all, it actually save face in sort of legacy if he can reel back from this and not get into something that can go on potentially for decades as we've

seen in other conflicts. >> i completely agree. a war is not -- it's not a policy that wins much for apart from horrific implications wins much for our president domestically, it's a policy of peril. we have to recognize that and hopefully he does and he will see his way towards dealing with iran as opposed to simply sustaining the current status quo which will take us down very dangerous path, thanks to the entire panel for this excellent discussion and we look forward to seeing you another time. [applause]

>> c-span have live coverage of the 2020 presidential candidates at the iowa state fair. we are live tomorrow with leon castro, and saturday with senator jay inslee, amy klobuchar, senator kirsten gillibrand, former governor john hickenlooper, senator is lauren, and senator cory booker. warren, andlizabeth senator cory booker. watch live, watch anytime on c-span.org, or listen