and on sunday, at 11:00 a.m., author rebecca fraser and her book. on american history tv on c-span 3, saturday, penn state university history professor matthew resto on the u.s. capitol's art and architecture. sunday, the groundbreaking ceremony of the dwight eisenhower memorial. this weekend on the c-span networks. >> a debate about the electoral college. theng a forum held by claremont institute in san francisco. after that discussion, a look at the history and future of conservatism. ♪ >> good morning, everyone.

it is about time to start now. i am a doctoral student. i am the chair of this morning's panel, the electoral college, time to reevaluate? thank you for coming out at 8:00 a.m. on saturday. thank you to the claremont institute for sponsoring our discussion. our speakers today are david frist, resident fellow at the alexander hamilton institute, adam carrington, assistant professor of politics at hillsdale. we will have 20 minutes for each speaker to deliver his remarks. ton we will open up questions and general discussion. if you do have a question, please bring it to the microphone in the center so you can be on camera. i think we are being recorded by c-span this morning. without any further a do, david first.

david: thanks to all of you for coming out this early morning. be defending the .lectoral college equally important, when we talk about a major change, discussing ae dangers of any -- really common to almost any plans for alternatives. there always has to be an alternative. it seems to me that there are advantages to the electoral college, which have been stated by its defenders over the years, which have more anding power than others, less dependent on the course of

history or where we are right now. an of those i think, argument made by judith best in the mid-1970's in a prominent book defending the electoral --having a that the election direct mandate, that is a president who is always guaranteed to represent, at least at first -- keep that in mind -- a plurality of the people, would have a greater moral claim against the legislative ranch than they -- branch than they do under the electoral college system. this was in the 1970's, days of concern over the imperial presidency. i do not think that it had all that merit back then. it's more powerful now.

. i can give other examples if we have time. i think the most powerful arguments for retaining the are, first,llege it's requirement -- its requirement for a more geographically distributed majority coalition. majority or- coalition. president under a direct vote system, conceivably one who depends on his metro areas. how you define them are not always so clear. we face the very real prospect that, if the electoral college were to be abolished, a

president elected by the two c oasts, which of course are blue come are democratic, or major metro areas, same story. i am quite sympathetic to -- and , again, i see a lot of staying, a permanence in just best's argument -- in judith best's argument that we have the creation of political majorities that are cross-sections, not sections of the nation. better,section is much a geographical cross-section. the other argument that hard topowerful and answer is that you have to

torantee or do your best guarantee a candidate who has much less support than any other presidential candidate has, somebody in the low 30's. you have to have some kind of screening messianism -- screening mechanism to ensure the ultimate winner is at least in the 40's. well, if you have a runoff, you end up with the majority, but you end up with a rather strange majority potentially. been proposed that the way you prevent an extreme minority resident dennis president, again, somebody with only 30% support, if you have a 40% rule, something in that

neighborhood, if someone does not cost that threshold in the election, there is a runoff. i am pretty well persuaded by the argument that this does not only some third-party candidacies, but ine third party candidacies any given year, an imitation of that when a third-party candidate enters, others get into it as well. you could easily end up with a runoff between two candidates who have significant support, to be sure, among the public. incensed support. but arese support, basically factional, marginal candidates in terms of public opinion. i don't want sue use overly loaded words like extreme candidates, but that is something that might well be

truly extreme. you could easily have a choice extremeoff between two candidates, both of which you have a substantial number of votes, but who the majority of the country really is opposed to. and therefore, you are the -- everyone who chooses to vote in the runoff is left with a choice between two people they really don't like. an intensification, quite possibly, of the lesser two evils' experience that people in presidential elections under our current system, but potentially in certain elections be more obviously a lesser of two evils kind of situation. the argument also that this direct vote, particularly if there is a runoff involved, would badly weakened parties by

turning the initial vote, in which you do not become president unless you cross the 40% threshold, turning it into a national primary. it would replace the party conventions. not whatventions are they were back in the 1970's or late 1960's when the electoral college was a hot issue after the 1960 election. -- they areventions now social media shows, tv sho ws. somehow it represents a bargaining process and a moderating process, that is no longer persuasive.

there remains a serious danger of badly weakening parties and ,ncentivizing factional extreme, whatever you want to call them, candidacies in presidential elections in a direct vote system. so that is something i think we have to be quite wary of. i would like to say a few words about this: concept of one , and the suppose it evils of what is sometimes called a runner-up, like trump last time or george w. bush in 2000. got the second-most popular votes, not the most votes, became president. 1970's, when this was debated, at least some of the people involved in defending

the electoral college said, well, it hasn't happened since 1888. it is no longer mope possibility. you have to take into account the fact that there have been two minority winners, losers of the popular vote, in the last decade in a half, both of the same party. i think, however, we should -- as defenders of -- those of us who do defend the electoral college, although obligated to recentlyunt of those related developments and frankly the pain on the other side, the how-can-this-be, we have to take this loosely. on the other hand, i think

defenders of the electoral college should not shy away from questioning the extent to which we, as a people or participants valuelic discourse, itarianism.r of an ohio and's -- ohioan's vote or the isridian's vote valued more hard to distinguish from arguments that your vote as a californian in a senate race and you are the minority party count, and then

shared number of other votes that your vote is pooled with. evencountry this size them for a districtwide election for the house of representatives, your vote counts more than another if you live in a competitive district. the truth is that the individual just doesn't matter that much under any system. swamped byutely other votes. ati think you have to look other questions, such as the ones i've raised. yes, there is some difference between a candidate receiving , clinton --it, 48% a shade46% or just

under 46%, yes, that is less than hillary clinton got. how important is the difference? the fact is he got a great many votes. thing easily overlooked in this, the popular vote, even under a system, is none the less counted. of therefore has a degree moral weight. it does for me -- in our public discourse. won moreary clinton votes than donald trump. i think there was a general moreness that gore won

votes than george w. bush. --is politically significant who wins the popular vote is a significant factor, politically valuable for the winner of the presidential race to win a popular vote and not just be legally qualified for the presidency by winning the electoral vote. a lot of the purpose of moving to a direct vote is a really already served. i did a fair amount of grassroots political work in california. people would say, my vote doesn't count. i would say, for political reasons, it is best for the winner to win the popular vote. california is just as good as a

vote in ohio. time, i willst of but i wouldp there, encourage anyone who is involved in discussions of the elect oral college -- it is not an easy justify -- electoral college -- it is not an easy thing to justify. i suppose the advice would also go equally for opponents of the who not onlylege, have to get an amendment through congress, but get it approved by three fourths of the state. it is not like it would happen in the near future. they want to make the best argument they can, on both sides.

to focus on the weightiest arguments in the news. mostnes that have the permanent importance, as opposed to the contingent arguments, the arguments with the significance more speculative in nature. the determinants of who becomes bad -- is-- isn't so it so bad that the presidency in a truly close election, let's , is that so florida bad? record as swing states, tipping point states,

they are diverse, cross-sections. no state is a perfect cross-section. think about the roles of the iowa caucus and new hampshire primary. they represent more of the united states as a whole, demographically than ohio or florida. nonetheless, i think iowa and as hampshire can be defended outsize players in the presidential nominating process, because they have civic of closely

scrutinizing candidates. enough to require which is aticking, useful test of some aspects of presidential leadership, and of one's likely quality as a national nominee. we have to look at the whole picture. tocan't be too quick acquiesce in simple majority majoritarianism, the idea of everyone's vote counting equally.

we really want to create a national administration of elections by creating a truly national election for the first time. that opens up a can of worms. there is a great unknown there. thanks for your time. [applause] >> i would like to thank you all for coming out this morning. --ould begin by saying psaends, americans, a attendees, lend me your ears. i come to bury the electoral college, not to praise it. the electoral college is an honorable institution. i will not seek to ultimately -- unlike julius

caesar, what i come to bury is not dead. the electoral college is very much alive. to defeat, i must slay. i can do so through three main arguments regarding three audiences relating to the electoral college. to the elites and originalists, that it does not operate as originally intended. pragmatists, it does not deliver or place justifications apologists give. and it does not conform to the populism and nationalism be supporters of our president hold dear. let me begin to the elites and originals. choose thes would

president based on their own judgment. why would they do so, instead of having a popular election? the reasons had to do with setting up an aristocratic-like institution, with aristocratic-like qualities. they would feel better having this kind of institution for several reasons. this would be a complicated inquiry, many factors to take into account. these persons, unlike the population in general, would be the most likely to process the information requisite. they would be most likely to know the person and situation. they would be the most wise, the most likely to possess the

discernment requisite. they would have the moral and intellectual virtues, above and beyond what the common populace these kind to make of determinations to refine and at large with the public would do. they would be in the best situation, they would be acting under circumstances favorable to deliberation, meaning they would be able to work together, to discuss and refine their own choice. uplifting reason, not passion. refining their opinion as it was a refinement of the people's. this was from the perspective of a federalist -- a republic aware of its own weaknesses, with checks from other regime types,

something we lost in the discussion of the mixed regime. what is the situation? there he different. -- very different. a series of popular votes with the electoral college rubberstamping those votes. you could argue the political parties took over the work of james caesar. -- julius caesar. the party would choose the two candidates that would be voted on by the electoral college. hisin van buren, that being lasting contribution to american politics. this would allow for the same , by therefinements founders perspective, inferior. that is not true now.

party conventions are beauty pageants. where is it decided? where do we decide who is going to be the candidate? primaries. they played to the same issues. if the electoral college isn't doing remotely close to its intended purpose, which is to refine elections more than the popular vote while giving popular participation, what does remain is the underlying point -- popular choice. scrapn't we be honest and the no longer working edifice going with the underlying principle of popular vote? we could change this without amendments. the states are allowed to

allocate their electoral however they want. they could say if the national league wins the world series this year, the votes will go to a republican. groundhog doesn't see his shadow on groundhog day, the votes will go to a democrat. there are other factors, but -- nothingt being stopping this is the constitution. how about to the pragmatists? i would say it does not help in the replacement for alternative justifications itsapologists -- apologists. justification can create a larger majority among the popular votes as far as what a popular vote lead would be.

this allows for more of effective governance. -- more effective governance. between myselfme and one of my colleagues -- every shot i make is worth four points. every shot my colleague makes is worth two. those are the rules and we both agree. can i win that game? i have a very good chance. ien if i made less shots, could rack up a commanding lead on the scoreboard. if we were tied, i would double him. you see the problem. it is with the rules themselves. many would still find my when illegitimate -- when illegitimate -- win

illegitimate. the real test is you could make more of the same kinds of shots. why would that not be the case for the electoral college? how with the electoral college enhance the legitimacy of a close, popular vote? hillary clinton won by 3 million votes. i don't see how that is much larger of a majority than the elect told college victory that president trump won. this would get candidates to pay attention to rule areas -- rural areas. they should. let's take candidate visits as a marker. visitstrump and clinton to pennsylvania in the final three months of the campaign were either to philadelphia or

pittsburgh. all the visits were to grade rapids or detroit -- grand rapids or detroit. what matters are media markets, which are based in metro areas. votershe appeal to rural is made in that way, and i don't see how a popular vote would require you to try and hit out -- get out to rural voters. to the populists and trump thankfuls, they were the electoral college was in operation this past election. it meant donald trump became president. if you are a champion, you should oppose the electoral trumpian, you should

oppose the electoral college. the electoral college is anti-populist in its roots. these reasons lead to a bowing of elitism. eldridge jerry said, "a popular election in this case is radically vicious. the ignorance of the people of menut it in the power dispersed through the union and acting in concert to dilute them into any -- delude them into any appointment." the people are uninformed and would be misled by a few designing men. natural trigger for the choice of proper character of chief magistrate to the people as it would to refer a trial of

colors to a blind man. they would be led by a few active and designing men. people are stupid, ignorant, vicious, and they will choose people of the like dem erits. of aast this to the voters popular vote in the constitutional convention. "an election of the first atistrate by the people large is convenient and successful." elect,e people should they will never fail to refer some man of distinguished her -- character." that might speak of continental reputation." these popular votes defenders compromised, there is a precedent for compromising on

issues that were wrong. now, we can make the union more perfect by following their original desire, not compromising the elitists of 1787 or 2017. we have already move toward eliminating these kinds of compromises. --have the 17th amendment that no longer let's state legislatures select, that allows the people to do so directly, serving progressive populism of the times. we did get amendment-level support for that change, and have had it for 100 years. it is deeply ingrained in the its principal of populism is deeply ingrained into the popular psyche.

we can say it is anti-populist in the way it operates today. that it undermines the principle of consent. the source of government purpose rights,otect individual and the source of its power is the consent of those individuals, institution-like states exist to fulfill that end. privilegesal college the means at the extent -- at the expense of the end. we give power and status from the basis of being a state and in doing so, we dilute the consent of the governed, the quality among individuals.

-- theecotality equality among individuals. in certain idea that places, your vote is worth more in the electoral college than other places. the district of columbia -- nearly three times the voting power of its popular vote. if you are satisfied with this because states you like get to youror get more power, equality is merely that you don't get to be part of

the elitist group. thend being anti-populist, popular vote is more nationalistic. it decides as a country. comes first from a worry about sectional division, going back to the beginning of our founding. does a state-based election still do this? we are in a cold a civil war today, which shows it sparks and heat. does not the electoral college perpetuate this war? california versus west virginia. you can say we are able more able -- we're more able to -- definitively section off entire portions of the country against each other.

malia versus west. could this lead to a kind of identity politics that would ingratiate itself within these regions and become more calcified? the reality, apart from the electoral college -- in many states, both candidates received or for 40% of the vote. -- over 40% of the vote. trump got 33% of the vote. west virginia, hillary still got over a fourth of the vote. takeopular vote might these distinctions with less partisanship better into account. anti-nationalism of the

electoral college may contribute to a newer concern among populists, globalism. locales and fomenting distinctions from other parts of the country identify with people from other countries. thatxample of this is park."w show, "south when san francisco is under a someone ismug," and walking through in a hazmat suit so they are not contaminated. the characters here to men in a cafe saying, san francisco is not an american city, it is more european. allows lessvote

balkanization. thirdly, i would say it's what donald trump wants, or at least wanted in 2012. electoral college is a disaster for democracy." i would say supporters of president trump should stand with him. a full or better representation of his own principles, as a statement of his own beliefs. such stands my case against the electoral college, as a representative of that view here. originalists it there's no resemblance to the main intention in its creation. for pragmatists, those who care about what works, it doesn't

truly achieve the alternatives. it does not create a mandate. moral -- moreve attention to rural areas. individuales equality in favor of states in a form of elitism. it is not nationalistic. anthony, to to mark americans i say, let it work. take what course thou wilt. for the electoral college is an honorable institution. thank you. [applause] >> good morning.

thank you for coming out this early hour on this saturday morning. amend what was said in introducing me. job, as ae a day professor of government and politics at the claremont graduate university. proceed., let me the place to begin in understanding the of role college-- the electoral is with the remarks that senator john f. kennedy made in the 1956 6 in defending the electoral college in its conservative critiques. you cannot change the electoral college without changing an

awful lot of other things in the political and constitutional system. says, it is a sober system you are dealing with here. he had in mind the relationship of political parties to geographic in the way in which the electoral vote is distributed geographically. were worriedts about a system that would alter because it was, in the hands of the urban , sorities at the time necessary to democratic votes and john f. kennedy. there is a larger solar system one alluded tohe by john f. kennedy, the solar

system of james madison's constitution. of what the left -- of which the electoral college is apart. the classic indictment of the electoral college system began in the early 1820's. thomas attacked the result oftem as the an appeal between henry clay and adams, which contrary to the will of the people produced a favor iny in adams's 1824. states did not have any popular electoral provision for the election of

the president. yet been fully't democratized, which would occur under jackson over the next eight to 12 years. the democratic party, led by van secured the presidency for the democratic candidates by encouraging the idea of a winner take all. this was not anticipated by the framers. the device of winner take all represents some of the virtues the framers sought to achieve by means of allowing electors. could say this was an aristocratic element.

there is another way to look at it. achieveit you seek to in putting a man in the office of the presidency? it is the devices used to guard against -- vices you seek to guard against. this is what people often fail to understand. recall that eloquent sentiment voiced in the very first paragraph of the very first federalist paper, it wasn't possible to establish a government from a reflection of choice, but whether men were forever destined in their constitutions to rely on action instead of the force. it raises questions about the stability of the democracy

characteristic of all political thought of the serious sort, until the 18th century, when the systemstates developed a that would enhance and limit the .ices of democracy the electoral college has to be seen in that context. as madison points out, there is a tendency in democracy for the majority to turn in on itself, for the majority to oppress the majority and produce the same debilitating results of what you would get in a despotic charity. however you empower the majority limit tyrannical

tendencies is the central dilemma. by awas a dilemma faced constitutional body that derived all of its power from popular sentiments. had you enhance democratic procedures but not in a way that turns back on itself? the will of the majority is to prevail, with that will to be rightful, it must be reasonable. the minority also possesses equal rights, to deny it would be tyranny.

the majority would be less likely to tyrannize over minorities. his understanding of democracy is the proper understanding. it is simple, quantitative, majoritarianism the american regime is dedicated to. majoritarianism of the sort that will enhance the likelihood of a reasonable majorities, now and in the future. together, bicameralism, separation of powers, independent judiciary, representation distributed through a geographic system -- as madison said, this is a

compound republic. thepresident is not president of a regime of an undifferentiated home, but a regime that is a compound the statesf which are essential. want a president a product of quantitative majority presidentsm -- a that is a product of majoritariansim, you can get an election by slightly disguised means. residential elections are the way to get it. demagogy in the democratic regime is an ever significanter, very

with the 24/7 news media. certain to temperaments of a particular kind to wish to take an of large crowds -- advantage crowds contrary to the interests of people in ways that are understood. do you produce you majorities, that simultaneously reflect a general riansimnt of majorita that are less likely to produce consequences for those who don't accept that? r-take-all accomplishes this by forcing candidates of on major parties to compete

the same stages. candidates to move toward the center. it tends to moderate their rhetoric. he said this forces that effect. consequences is of a geographically distributed majority, such that the winner , which represents the whole in a differentiated kind of way, quite different from

intosenting the whole stopping when you got to 50% plus one. nothing like a flat election has ever been tried in a regime of this size. if direct election says do what try it in a you country of this size, you are going to get demagogy. it ist worth mentioning,

better than the alternatives, people of concerned disposition from time to time means that votes and be cast in accordance with congressional districts. there are big bad coastas on either side. dealer portal votes would be divided in accordance with the split vote -- the electoral votes would be divided in accordance with the split vote. a popular vote would not be guaranteed as they distributed

the electoral votes generally. this is produced in the same way the congress of the united states produces that anomaly. if you make a case against the electoral college because of that disproportion, you must make the case against the senate for the same reason. you must make the case against bicameralism. if you are a quantitative thatrat, it is intolerable there should not be a greater say in the house of representatives. have elections en great without distinctions, all the way down to one national vote.

we will all sailed merrily into the 21st century. one has to be careful about the consequences in the light of what the alternatives might be. alternative tor the electoral votes is the idea of the direct election. how do you limit the number of candidates? what are the virtues of winner take all? it produces an incentive for the formation of third parties. winner take all tends to massively discourage them.

in any given direct election system, there will be multiple candidates with an unproductive plurality system. again, this would not be too much of a bad improvement over the status quo. this has partisan and ideological affects. if you look closely at the conservative attachment to the or the embracing of the direct election with the national popular vote plan, these are partisan interests. they expect a change in the system to produce a result

conditional to their ideological and partisan interests. there is no such thing as a neutral division of the presidential election system. alter theseek to system in a way that enhances their particular interests. my final word, this compound madisonian republic. majoritys to create a at times, we exaggerate the importance of presidential elections. it would be nice if we could guarantee slam dunk electoral

votes, that the electoral votes winner would be the popular vote winner. the explosion of state primaries is a second issue. primaries make parties less powerful institutions in ways that they limit the kinds of nominees that run for office. reflected in the electoral vote system cast, and we had misfires in 2000 and last year. the electoral vote winner was the popular vote loser. mrs. clinton's advantage in the popular vote was composed entirely of california and manhattan. this doesn't make her any more representative of the body politic.

in some respects, this makes her less representative. i don't think you ought to be impressed by mere mathematics. one of the things that happened in this complicated madisonian this is a president for the time being, only. we needed to remember that. thanks to mr. madison, federalism, and the separation of powers. president who the does not reflect the sense of the people. the presidential election is a freeze-frame in a very

complicated motion picture. we decide we are going to cast a ballot for a particular person, with all the convoluted structures of governmental systems. this continues for the next four years. trump, or is donald clinton, or george bush, a president has to wrestle with all those other devices once in office, produced by the same people that produced the electoral vote system. he has to do so in a much more complicated and deliver it way -- and deliberate way. this is the beginning of the story, and not the end of it.

a president has to wrestle with those congressional constituencies, with very public opinion polls. look atave -- if you what happened to bill clinton in in 2006,george bush obama in 2010, this is the madisonian republic of the people expressing against an inumbent president, complicated and infuriating ways, the complicated character of what it means to be living in a reasonable, as opposed to quantitative majorities.

thank you. [applause] [applause] we now have time for questions or discussions. if you have questions, please come to the microphone to ask them. >> a question for professor carrigngton. an important point was raised on an area of agreement with you, the electoral is not accomplishing its original design, to directly refining the popular vote. the winner take all system is likelyaccomplished -- accomplishes that by other means. i would be curious to hear your response. amendment as17th an example of success in tinkering with the structures,

not a very good argument. the collateral damages that have resulted from that are pretty significant, playing into the point that this is a solar system. you tinker with one aspect of it, the collateral effects may be profound. something similar like that. the one concern at the electoral college's skill provides and that i would like you to address have a national popular vote with a close election like we had in florida, one of these things the electoral college now does is to confine the chaos to a small area, which allows us as the largest superpower in the world do have a transition of power without chaos eating perpetuated over months and months. if that had happened on a national popular vote, every

precinct would be in the middle ability to, and the affect transition would be potentially catastrophic. does the electoral college perform a useful function in serving to avoid that risk? might be more like mark anthony to julius caesar on the electoral college. this asked to do someone to make the argument against it. this needs to be made regardless of my opinion. easier to make the anti-electoral college argument. even the answer to your 17th it reallyquestion,

does come from a very fundamental premise about government. that fundamental premise -- one reason it is hard to make a case is that we like politics today as well reflection -- will refl ection. we don't like the ideas that we might structure our institutions to do things better than we would otherwise, we just want to to reflect us -- we just want it to reflect us. the response -- that is not what government is suppsed to do -- do, it is supposed to reflect popular well -- po pular will. one of the problems with the electoral college is the inability to accept that premise. make a practical point,

if florida happened everywhere. ways, the question of how close would it have to be, because al gore won by 500,000 votes. people don't always think of proportions. byyou said someone won 500,000, would there be the legitimacy to pursue that? you have to have the contingency. votesf out of 120 million it was 500? the response from the popular ite angle would be, if really is true the popular vote tothe most just, we have deal with that contingency in the interest of justice.

that is a good, practical point. i had no idea how wise professor carrington was, in the selection of reading materials. the florida example is a good one, in many respects. the difference in that election, you have to go to the third decimal place, to distinguish between the national vote for bush and gore. it is one of those statistical freaks that just happened. what it means is that i can sign the governed? and they can claim the sense of the people behind them. thesupreme court accepted closeness of the election in the

general sense of a public that thought it would be as fair of a result as it was going to get and that the issue was going to be decided at the end of the day by a court of some kind, which proved its incompetence to the task set before it. in those 27 days, the supreme court stood back and showed the anomalies within the florida system and the unlikelihood anything better would come out of florida if all of the ballots were counted, very slowly by some local and corrupt regimes. resultlic accepted the and it underscores the final to bei made -- bush had careful about how he governed, because there was a cloud over his election. he had to prove he was a

legitimate ruler of the nation. that happens so often we don't think about it. 2000 and showed it. 2000 showed it. i would argue the same thing about trump, this encourages his opponents. you will get deep the rally in the popular vote under direct election. lity -- plurality in the popular vote under direct election. pluck, but iour would like to pylon a little more and raise a few other objections -- pile on a little

more and raise a few other objections. these are points that ought to be made. professors all collegeat the electoral does not work remotely close to the way the constitution contemplates. correct if the wastitution, the last word the 1788 constitution, but the last word is the 12th amendment, after there had been for presidents that were hotly presidents inour the matter of being hotly contested.

the one with the most electoral votes won. once the system had switched to glitch, whichs a led to the attempted coup by aaron burr after the 1800 election. there is a statement by jefferson in which he says, i like this is what we will have, and we have to fix up the constitution to deal with it. i would say the constitution contemplates the electoral college about the way it is working. on this national popular vote plan, when you paraphrase on the power of the

state, you paraphrased it in a way that almost everyone ever does, inaccurate, in a way very relevant to this question. appoint in such theer as the legislature allocated number of electors. appoints the manner in which the state appoints is determined by the legislature. i submit that if the legislature how the pope can decide state process electoral votes that would not, be a manner in which the state makes the appointment. if they said, the queen of

england shall do it, that is not the state. if they said the united nations should do it, that is not the state. the majority of voters, that is not the state. the majority of voters in our state, that is the state doing it. governor, -- if they say the governor, that is probably the state doing it. but the elector is not. national popular vote plan is unconstitutional. i would like to make another point -- this occurred to me after the senator from new jersey in the early 2000's who won the democratic primary got involved in a campaign finance

scandal, which meant he couldn't win the election. and was replaced by a former senator who was quite popular. another wrinkle, it was clearly and ite under statutes -- believe it's better if each party has a candidate -- the onreme court could be relied to weigh in the interests of the democratic party, related to the statutes of new jersey. is, you have a situation after the election in which something horrible emerges with respect to the nominee or

the winner of the election. it could be health-related, some it's not too likely -- >> can you ask a question place? >> will any panelists comment. to point out the electoral college is suited to deal with that situation, because the people are selected for their loyalty to that candidate. if they decide this person can't be the person, it will not be a coup d'etat. it is a political solution to a political problem that i think cannot possibly be improved. >> there's a lot to respond. question -- if it were to work as it was intended because

of the 12th amendment, and we do account that political parties formed almost immediately, although they were supposed to be the party to end all parties. debatele a regime level as far as they thought it was. it was van buren who conditioned permanent party distinction. , howat's the case seriously are we to take federal 68? utterly wrong in how it was going to work, was he being disingenuous? he was one of the ones who wanted a popular vote, president for life. that's one question i would ask. state appointments, something i would like to discuss more, maybe i am missing it. the legislature is acting for the state, i'd -- that's

something maybe i should talk more on. aren't they saying how it should be done? i don't think my examples would ever happen, i made them as ridiculous as possible. the way i understood it is because those are massive political constraints, not legal constraints, necessarily. i could be missing it. goes, as new jersey everything is legal in jersey. the fact that he was corrupt enough that that happened is saying something. you would need to have contingency plans in case that happened. >> i have nothing in particular on the. i would liek to m -- i would like to make a couple of responses.

basketball analogy, whereby ,ou have a skewed rule eventuate in in a commanding lead on the scoreboard for the winner who was not the real winner of that basketball game. trump did boast that he had a commanding electoral vote majority. as we know, that's not really the case, but it was certainly ,arger than it might have been larger than george w. bush in 2000. people are aware that that comfortable lead in electronic votes was the results of very narrow wins in three states.

think that really does much for the debate. the other point about candidates in reality not paying much attention to rural areas does seem to be true. that's not the most important thing, that does not eliminate the argument for geographical distribution. it's not strictly speaking rural areas which are not much of a population anymore. country.ons of the that's what we are finding by saying the electoral college is valuable in part for its very strong tendency to require something more than regionally bicoastalrities, or

majorities. that is muchthink less desirable than winning a set of states around the country. that will vary from election to election. representing adrian graphical slic -- a geographical slice of the country is reality, not just rs, notr of rural vote just a matter of whether they campaign among rural voters. voters andr rural other flyover voters have a -- are guaranteed a significant role, which they may not be in the future if we get to a direct popular vote. i didn't say anything

particularly about the constituted analogy of a popular vote plan. my sympathies are in your direction. the larger point is, among other vices, it's an invitation to litigation that will go on until the end of time. andght even shoot up again get involved. the issue you're referred to about the nature of the power of state legislatures under the constitution is nothing compared to the chief mechanical device of a popular vote plan that would force states to cast all of their electoral votes to the national popular vote winner. imagine in 2004, the state of new york, or california, having to cast their electoral votes in favor of george bush, who won the popular vote, you don't think that will produce litigation? -- suit upo sue up

and we will be in business for the rest of our days. morning. district allocation, electoral college votes and knowing the main and nebraska situation, what with the 2016 and 20 election elections look like if that had been applied across the 50 states, which would still pass and be counted as one? is after theue november 8 election emerged another campaign for electors in the electoral college to vote a different way to what has been -- what had happened.

this seemed to have gained a lot of attention, there were in fact electors, so it was possible for candidate as diverse as colin powell, bernie sanders, john kasich, from different states. just in the sens of looking to the futre, the concept of faithless electors, it has worked in the past. the possibilities do exist that something could happen that would deviate from all that has gone before. i just wanted to hear from you in regard to that. i haven't done the math, i'm all but sure it would have been a larger electoral college margin if everyone did the district level voting that maine and nebraska do.

i think romney actually would have won the 2012 election. i'm pretty sure i saw that because there are so many 8020 democratic districts, it is spread out more. that's partly why even if you have no gerrymandering republicans still hold them in the house because of that. loveless electors, i would that supreme court case if someone got prosecuted for being goeses electric, there that say you have to follow your standard. what do we really think the intent of the electoral college is constitutionally could you tell a faithless elector that he was being faithless? it on top of 50

popular votes? my basketball analogy goes back to what i said before. it's what you think the rules are. not equal votes. fair is to allow for ultimately popular consent. the popular channel consent it has manifested in such a way that it's toward justice. the end of government is the most important thing, consent -- it is a subset of justice. >> a gratuitous assumption on the part of its proposal as it's

always been. in recent years, the argument was revived a bit by the great conservative midgets maker -- mischief maker. sure, i think generally it's true but something you have to bear in mind is whether the voter in casting his ballot for thecongressman would have same cast of mine in casting the ballot for the president. sume an identity, you will certainly get this conservative result. i'm not sure in the long run that would be the case. i think people think differently when they elect presidents than when the elect commerce persons. itproduces the anomaly, doesn't mean the popular vote would be the elector vote because of the anomaly and

disproportion in the distribution of the electoral votes. >> we have time for one final question? associate professor at college of the redwoods. we point i wanted to make, have been encouraging democracies around the world, and as a result of encouraging democracies around the world we have had them and of having voting, but if we try to tell them you should set up some kind of a system like electoral college, or if we told them you set up a democracy but if they end up setting something like an , you are notlege really having a real democracy it may look like something else. they may try to keep a monarch or dictator in power because of the way they set it up even though they are having a vote of

the people. formula is a different result. aren't we basically looking at other countries and telling them to set up a democracy? but if they try to do something like the electoral college would we not say that's not a true democracy? because your formula is not a good formula. >> i'd say yes, we probably would. it's because i don't know if we lack the knowledge of our own founding and convictions or we lack the courage. pushed, when we have , the wisdom of that is its own question. we have pushed them in ways that don't look like our system, i think it's having a darker view of human nature and a higher view of the ends of government

and how we should direct popular will toward that is something we lost the art of trying to construct and have lost the knowledge of how it was constructed for us. this next question underscores my point about the difference between quantitative and quantitative majora journalism. if you want to set up a democratic regime, you have to guard against the likelihood that the majority in your democratic system isn't going to devour the minority. we have enough of long, sad history of democratic regimes that are nominally democratic, but don't produce themselves to predict anyone but only the results of the majority interest. that problem has always been the anomaly and the difficulty of democratic regimes from the time

of the ancients until the late 1800s. the authors of the american constitution for elaborating that distinction and showing the difference between mere democracy and reasonable democracies. toward the end of the production of stable, reasonable democracies that protect everyone's rights, not just rights of the majority. the american constitution is chiefly dedicated, that's what we got to be instructing as best we can. reasonable,jorities that requires some mechanical devices. that concludes our time. thank you to the panelists. [applause] >> thank you all for coming to this claremont institute