his department. watch the entire hearing from the homeland security committee tonight at 9:00 eastern on c- span 2 , on our mobile app, or online at c-span.org . since 1979, in partnership with the cable industry, c-span has provided complete coverage of the halls of congress from the house and senate floors to congressional hearings, party briefings, and committee meetings. c-span gives you a front row seat of how issues are debated and decided with no commentary, no interruptions, and completely unfiltered. c-span, your unfiltered view of government .

c-span is your unfiltered view of government. we are funded by these television companies and more, including wow. the world has changed, today, the fast and reliable internet connection is something i want to live without. two and tesla's automation safety concerns, it is about two hours.

[inaudible conversations] >> good morning the u.s. senate committee were having a hearing on the national transportation safety board investigation and good morning, the u.s. senate committee on commerce and transportation will come to order. we are having a hearing on the national transportation safety board, investigations, and reports. i welcome the chair safety board director jennifer homendy . thank you so much for being here. ntsb is the nation's safety watchdog, ensuring that safety is a top priority for the transportation industry and u.s. apartment of transportation. through its impartial investigations into transportation accidents, the board makes recommendations that have transformed

transportation safety. ntsb's recommendations prompted action to require railroads to use positive train control passengers to use seatbelts in commercial airlines to have well rested crews. however, there needs to improve safety are ongoing. for instance, run when he messes -- runway near misses are far too weekly and we must do better. east palestine derailment, and the inspections that have been less than lacking the requirements to make sure that we really are looking out for these longer trains and improvements. and that is just frustrating, given last saturday's norfolk southern derailment in pennsylvania where three trains collided. we are seeing the crisis in our nation's roadways in 2021, the latest data we have fatalities are the highest since 2005, in my home state, fatalities have increased 40% since the pandemic

, and 70% in the last decade. while all of that is enough to think about, we are urgently in need of an ntsb that is operating at full strength and investigators that will use that expertise to help us plan for improved safety. that is why this committee has passed out our aviation bill with a reauthorization of the ntsb, and i want to thank you for your hard work in eliminating backlogs that we have seen at the ntsb, but clearly, you need more investigators on the job to help. the faa senate bill, advanced by this committee, also requires that the faa finalize their 25 hour cockpit recording rule, also flight data recorders and improve with safety inspectors from the faa. i think these are important reforms that would be critical to the ntsb, that is why we are

working hard with our house colleagues to finalize the house bill and send it to the president's desk. obviously, the safety concerns of the flying public is probably the main focus of this morning's hearing. serious questions remain unanswered about the door plug accident on alexa-- alaska flight 1282. we need to be satisfied that manufacturers have strong quality controls and the faa oversight is robust. faa and manufacturers, in my opinion, should look listen to professional engineers who are asking for a stronger safety culture, to improve safety, and production quality. and we need to do everything to make sure they are not intimidated on the job to just keep the line moving. members have been brief about the accident and will continue to do its oversight role. on february 6, 2024, you, the ntsb released its luminary

report regarding the flight 1282. i appreciate its prompt investigation of the accident and its preliminary findings. the committee continues, though, to be concerned about the deficiencies in safety culture. i think probably also articulated, or eliminated by the individual report that was required by our bill, and delivered just a few weeks ago. the report implies that the boeing facilities may have significant-- now i am saying your report, to be clear, implies that boeing facilities may have significant deficiencies in recordkeeping, investigation contingent to determine what documentations were used to authorize the opening and closing of the left, mid-exit door plug during rework, in particular, we want to know about the disclosure of records that may show why or

how it was improperly installed, and what caused the accident of 1282, which raises questions that we will ask in the q&a period of whether the documents even exist. these are important issues that we need to get to the bottom of. there are lots of people in the northwest, not just those who work at boeing, but those involved in an aviation culture around our state. we want to get this right. so, i look forward to asking questions about this. we also, in my opinion, need to continue the final report on the east palestine , that was helped informed by senators brown, vance in the railway safety act. we need to include feeding speeding out the phaseout of legacy cars and flammable liquids that provide states with information about hazardous materials, and we need to pass the senate bill that highlights many of these things. i look forward to hearing more

about the status of these investigations and what else we can do to make sure that the ntsb is fully operational and capable of doing this investigative job. thank you, and now i will turn to the ranking member. >> thank you, madam chair. we are here today to have a conference of discussion about the work of the national transportation safety board, or ntsb. i want to thank chairwoman jennifer homendy for being here today and for her strong leadership at the ntsb. i certainly recognize, and i am sure my colleagues here would agree, the magnitude of the task of investigating complex and tragic incidents thoroughly and impartially, and ntsb's arduous task is only made more difficult by the lack of a full board, a situation i hope these in its own rectifies. naturally, we all want answers from an investigation as soon as possible, but proper

analysis takes time. i am grateful for your work, madam chair, and the work of all the members and staff at the ntsb. the ntsb served the important function of identifying the causes of transportation incidents and making recommendations to prevent similar, future ones. both have been a public sector transportation operators learn from ntsb's investigations and recommendations. the ntsb does not have regulatory authority over transportation safety, whether the ntsb's recommendations are considered by congress, placed in regulations, or voluntarily adopted by companies, depends on the credibility of the board to conduct thorough investigations without prejudice to a conclusion. maintaining that credibility is essential. i look forward to hearing from chairwoman homendy about the investigations before the ntsb. americans are rightly concerned about the pressurization events on alaska airlines flight 1282.

concerned about runway incursions, such as the one that occurred in austin, texas, and the derailment in east palestine, ohio last year. i recognize that the chairwoman may not and should not guess what the board's recommendations will be, or discuss nonpublic information from these investigations, however, i hope to hear about the status of those investigations and any pulmonary information that is appropriate to share at this time. relatedly, i plan to ask the chair about a recurring problem of oversight of the transportation incidents that are currently under investigation at the ntsb. in some cases, companies that are party to ntsb investigations have cited ntsb's confidentiality agreement and regulations as restricting with those-- what

those companies can provide members of congress and win. that is of course incorrect. administrative regulations and nondisclosure agreements do not trump congress's constitutional power of inquiry. and i look forward to hearing the chair's opinion on the matter as a current congressional staffer herself. this committee also needs to hear about the ntsb's authorizing statute, as well as the reauthorization proposal of the ntsb submitted to congress. members of this committee must have the opportunity to comprehensively examine the ntsb as an agency, and contemplate any changes to the ntsb's authorizing statute. let me be clear, the ntsb is a critical agency that does vital work. i support that work and i am happy to engage in a thorough discussion about its authorities, in addition to the funding it needs. without that discussion, i think the senate would be failing to meet its responsibilities at a time when

the importance of the ntsb could not be clearer. fortunately, today's hearing is an opportunity to begin such a discussion. thank you. >> thank you, senator cruz. now, we will hear from the chair . thank you for being here. we look forward to your remarks. >> thank you, good morning. thank you for the opportunity to appear today to discuss the ntsb, our needs, challenges, and critical safety measures. throughout a typical year, the ntsb works on about 2200 domestic and 450 four cases. we expect the number of cases annually to remain high and continue to increase in complexity. some investigations, understandably, get more attention than others, but all our investigations are critical to improving safety. i understand that members of the committee have a particular interest in our highest profile investigations, including the in-flight structural failure of

a boeing 737-9 and the norfolk southern train derailment in east palestine. these are critically important and i am happy to answer as many questions as i can. i do want to emphasize that these investigations are ongoing. there is still a lot of work to do to understand what led to these events, so i want to be careful not to undermine the work of our meticulous investigators. unlike the alaska 1282 investigation, two dockets are open to the public on east palestine. they contain over 600 pages of factual information, which i can discuss at length. with that said, these are just two of 1200 active, open ntsb investigations in 47 states and puerto rico, in addition to the 140 open foreign investigations in over 50 countries. we owe it to the families of those involved, to the communities where events

occurred, and to the traveling public to find out what happened in all of these tragedies to prevent them from reoccurring. that is as true for alaska 1282, as it is for the recent natural gas field home explosions and fires in mississippi that killed a woman in her home, or for the multivehicle crust in ohio on november 14th of last year, which included a motorcoach carrying high school band members and killed six people, or for the hot air balloon accident in arizona january 14th that killed four. over the last year the ntsb has completed many significant and complex investigations and issued safety recommendations to prevent these kinds of tragedies. there are currently over 1000 open safety recommendations that we have made across every mode of transportation. in 2022, and 2023, we issued 159 new recommendations and closed 261. of those closed, 80% were closed acceptable,

meaning, that the recipient took action to implement the safety recommendation. this success rate demonstrates the value of our recommendations , and we appreciate the efforts of recipients to address them. the ntsb is also pleased that this committee has included provisions and faa reauthorization to address a number of our recommendations. that work will save lives, and we think you for it. we also appreciate the committee's efforts to reauthorize the ntsb as a part of the faa bill. our authorization expired at the end of fiscal year 2022. we are incredibly grateful for the $140 million that was just provided to us in the fy 24 appropriations that is before the house and senate under consideration. we are a small agency, relative to our federal partners, both in terms of the size of our

budget and our workforce. as the numbers show, our impact is profound and disproportionate. i like to say we are a small agency with a big voice and everyone at the ntsb as a role in ensuring our transportation safety. continuing the preeminent safety, the gold standard and develop recommendations without delay, we need more resources. as proposed in the frankly devastate our agency. in fact, it is unprecedented, and reversed the progress made on enhancing and preparing our workforce for emerging challenges and our workforce investigations. as you work through conference, i strongly encourage your support for the ntsb's ability to carry out our critical safety mission now, and in the future. before i close, i mentioned

loss earlier. life is not new to the ntsb. we are-- know all too well how precious life is. when it hits home, it reminds us once again what is truly important, our relationships with each other. the ntsb is in mourning this week from the sudden death of our director of marine safety, captain morgan terrel. morgan began his career at ntsb in 2003 as a nautical operations investigator. he left in 2007 to serve as vice president of marine investigations for princess cruises, and returned to the ntsb in 2010. in 2014, morgan became chief of investigations in our office of marine safety. three years later, he was promoted to deputy director, and then to director in 2021. morgan was a marine safety expert. he was a proud graduate of the u.s. merchant marine academy and served as a licensed deck officer, including

master on a variety of commercial vessels and he was an incredible advocate for improving safety on our waterways. his last words to me on february 11th were, i am surrounded by my family. morgan was very close to his family. and we are fortunate to have been a part of morgan's. he was an incredible person. he was so kind and thoughtful, a mentor, teacher, and a friend who so many of us at the ntsb, the coast guard, the navy, and merchant marine academy, and he will be missed. as a mom, i cannot imagine a greater loss than the loss of your child. i spoke to morgan's mom yesterday, and she said that there will be a piece of her missing forever.

so, i want to extend our deepest condolences to morgan's mom, catherine, morgan's father, brian, and his older brother, john. and i also want to extend my deepest condolences to all my colleagues at the ntsb for such a tragic loss. thank you. >> thank you, chair homendy, and thank you for remembering him this way at the hearing. i think you represent today an organization that is all about the culture of the inspectors behind-the-scenes, doing incredibly important work. we only know the results of, we don't get to see the faces. they don't come before us in this way. thank you so much. we are so sorry for the ntsb's loss in this individual. i'm going to let my colleague, senator fisher, asked the first

question and i will come back in a minute. >> thank you, madam chair. thank you chair homendy for being here today. i appreciate it. last year, the university of nebraska at lincoln campus conducted a first of its kind crash test of an electric pickup truck to study whether current highway guardrails adequately protect against the growing number of those heavier tvs that are on our roads. at 60 miles per hour, the 7000 pound electric truck tore through the barrier, without offering any protection to the traveling public, or reduction in speed. i recently heard from first responders that are also concerned about responding to electric vehicle fires. 40% of firefighters have never had ev fire safety training. and i have heard of instances of more water needed to extinguish

vehicle batteries and increase in those toxic gases from lithium batteries. what has ntsb found in its investigations on the ev crisis that are unique , compared to the internal combustion engines? have you begun to condense that data so -- educate us on what is happening here. >> just a few years ago, we issued a report on the risks of lithium ion battery fires in electric vehicles to first responders and second responders. we define second responders in the report as truck operators. we had done a number of operations-- investigations where there were significant risks to first responders in terms of stranded energy in the vehicle and battery, and its components and self.

the amount of work it took to extinguish the fire's, and the potential for shock to emergency responders themselves . in fact, we did an investigation in mountain view, california, where the first responders had to reach out to the auto manufacturer to ask them to come to the scene of the crash. they were lucky they were three miles away. when you think about volunteer firefighters, who may be in a rural area, that is not something that is readily at their ability to get people on scene. in this particular one, we saw ignition several times of the electric vehicle. we have with others, not just on the scene, but also on the tow truck and up to five days later, in the tow yard itself. they are a significant risk in terms of battery fire.

they are a significant risk for emergency responders. while we have not done an investigation involving electric vehicles and the weight, i have raised a red flag numerous times to say, it is an impact on safety. you mentioned the excellent work done by the university of nebraska. our guardrails and crash attenuators, they are rated up to 5000 pounds. many of these go up to 10,000 pounds. one of lithium ion battery alone ways the same weight as a honda civic, 3000 pounds. so, if that has an impact on safety, not just on infrastructure me making sure that people in the vehicles are safe after there is a crash, but vehicle to vehicle, those outside of the vehicle, and as i said, those vehicle

infrastructure, it will have a significant impact on safety. >> i wanted to follow-up with your comments when you talked about the weight of these vehicles. currently, we have governmental regulations that stipulate the use of the male crash test dummies in vehicle testing. it does not mandate any inclusion of female crash test dummies. this is despite the data that is out there, revealing 17% higher mortality rate, and a 73% higher likelihood of serious injury among women who are in these vehicle crashes compared to men. given the statistics that are out there, just on regular vehicles, not even on ev's with exponential increase in the weight there. don't you think we need to look at female crash test dummies as

well, so we can start to gather data there, and do you have any information on the different size vehicles that women may choose to drive compared to men? >> women typically pick larger size vehicles, sport-utility vehicles, minivans, the larger vehicles. whether it is an electric vehicle, or gas fueled vehicle, we are seeing increasing sizes in weights of vehicles across the industry. crash test dummies right now for adults are based on really back to the 70s, on an adult male that is the height of about five feet nine, and weighs about 175 pounds. that is not applicable to most females. i don't know how many of us have gotten into a vehicle as a female, i am 5'4", and that the bill comes across

my neck. it was not until i had my most recent one to me where i could put up the seat for me it comes down. that has our stature, the statue of different types of people need to be taken into consideration. i am really thankful for your work in this area, by the way, and very pleased with the gol's report as a result of that. i really do it hope it takes us up upon that and takes recommendations seriously to really look at the different types of people operating in our vehicles to ensure safety. it is not just the safety of individuals, it is also making sure that those vehicles are structured so they are the crashworthiness of the vehicle. >> think you very much. i hope when you gather the statistics on the threats that are first responders faced with these vehicles, you make that available. >> yes. we will make sure that your

staff gets our report and i'm happy to come in at any time and give the issues. thank you so much. >> senator cruz. >> thank you, madam chair. as this committee has investigated transportation incidents from the derailment in east palestine, ohio, to the depressurization incident on alaska flight 282, a common refrain from parties to ntsb investigations is that they need advance approval from the ntsb prior to providing documents and information to members of congress. madam chair, is that true? >> that is not true.>> as you know, this committee has significant oversight authority and responsibility. does the ntsb's confidentiality agreement with parties to ntsb investigations restrict access by members of congress to documents and information in any way? >> absolutely not. parties should not use the ntsb as a

shield. >> inc. you for clarifying. i agree, but that is important to have that on the record, i appreciate that. >> you have a right to that information and should get that information. >> turning specifically to alaska airlines flight 1282, i am deeply concerned about safety issues with the boeing 737 max 9. it is essential that ntsb's investigation into the bottom of this and identify any safety issues and potential issues. to that end, it is equally the parties to the investigation cooperate fully with ntsb, congress, and others investigating the incident. madam chair, how cooperative have the parties to the investigation been to the ntsb, and have you gotten timely access to documents, information, and witnesses you need? >> there are a number of parties to the investigation. some parties have been very cooperative. for supper, the federal

aviation administration. boeing has not provided us with the documents and information that we have requested numerous times over the past few months, specifically with respect to opening, closing, and removal of the door, and the team that does that work at the renton facility. >> wow. are you telling us that even two months later, you still do not know who actually opened the door plug? >> that is correct, senator. we do not know, and it is not for lack of trying. it is not unusual we don't get information immediately in an investigation. i can point to numerous investigations where this occurs and it takes months and months to get information. for this one, it is two months later. we know for a fact that there is a team that deals with the doors in renton. there is an entire team of 25 people and a manager. the manager has been out on medical leave. we have not been able to interview that

individual. we have asked for the names of the other 25 people, have not received the names. we have asked for records with respect to what occurred. we have asked for what shift it occurred on, we think we know what days the work occurred on, but that is only because our investigators' work looking at pictures and emails to try to get to the bottom of that information. we don't have the records. we don't have the names of the 25 people that is in charge of doing that work in that facility. it is absurd that two months later, we don't have that. our investigators right now are at the renton facility, and they are conducting interviews. those started on sunday, and they will continue for the rest of the week. one example, while we were out there, we investigated both the spirit aerospace employees that did the work on the ribbons, while we don't know who did the

work on the door plug. for the spirit air place employees, we were just informed last week, they are actually not spirit aerospace employees. they are contractors. they work for 3 different firms. all three in the state of washington. all three people work for 3 different entities for spirit aerospace. those were not told to us by spirit aerospace. that information was told to us through the individuals who were being interviewed that contacted us directly. i have engaged-- we have engaged our attorney on this matter, just so you are aware. >> i will just say, that is utterly unacceptable. the parties being investigated by ntsb need to cooperate fully . congress expects them to cooperate fully, because you have an obligation to the american public to get to the bottom of what happened. today is march 6th. i will ask you to inform this committee in writing one week from today whether or not boeing

has cooperated. i expect you to have that list of 25 names. i will ask you a week from today to inform this committee in writing whether they have those 25 names or not. that investigation is to get to the bottom of what occurred and what caused that accident. >> thank you, i will provide that to the committee in writing. the 25 names, it is not just be 25 names. we would also like to get, and we have repeatedly requested from boeing the documentation that went along with the work of opening the door plug, closing the door plug , or any sort of removal if that exists. >> these include that information as well when you respond in writing a week from today and let us know the level of cooperation you are seeing. thank you, madam chair. >> thank you. following on the expert review panel found that boeing employees are still afraid to speak up and report safety

issues. there is a way for employees to speak directly to the faa. is there a way for people to speak directly to ntsb to aid in this investigation? >> yes, in fact i received a whistleblower report myself anonymously. we received some information that i made sure our team has. it also went to our team. we do have a couple of ways. the best way for people to reach out to us at the website of witness@ntsb.gov. witness@ntsb.gov and we will make sure to follow up on that information. >> were you able to get from the company what specific procedures they have for identifying storing, projecting, and richie bring-- retrieving quality records, where they forthcoming on that? >> we have not received that information. >> both the fact that boeing does not produce these

documents, or that ntsb investigators have not been able to retrieve them, indicate they do not exist or ever existed? >> they may not. there are two options, either they exist and we do not have them, or they do not exist, which raises several different questions, depending on which one is the right answer. >> if you don't have that documentation, what does it say about the quality assurance program? >> we have been told, let me back up on that, we have been informed that they have a procedure to maintain documents on when work is performed and including when door plugs are opened, closed, or removed. we have not been able to verify that. without that information, that raises concerns about quality assurance, policy management,

safety management systems within boeing. >> that is why i asked the first question about procedures for identifying, storing, and protecting. everybody knows out at boeing that the workers think that the plane will fly when the paperwork weighs more than the plain. that is their way of saying, a lot of paperwork exists. people know that you don't move the line without paperwork. it is just a part of the process. the question is, are you looking at those procedures? you are saying, they are not forthcoming, even on procedures? >> that is correct, but we are looking at those procedures. we go very in depth and very in broad. we look at procedures, policies, we will also look at other work that was done around the same time, or within the last several years to see if there are concerns with other work or records that may be missing. we go in depth, and we are also

going in depth on safety culture, safety promotion, safety management as a whole. >> and so do you-- and is the faa in their aviation safety investigation helpful in this, or not helpful? >> if aa has been very cooperative and very helpful to us in the investigation. we appreciate them. they have been a partner in this throughout the very beginning. >> i am saying, do their aviation inspectors on site have data or information on site about what processes or procedures may have existed, or did not exist? >> that is something i would like to follow up with our team and get back to you on. >> back to this point, every shift is documented. you know the workers that were involved in this particular area, you can get their names. you can ask for interviews with those individuals, and you are saying that that has not happened? >> correct. we have gone through emails, we

have gone through text, we've looked at pictures to begin to get a picture of the date in mid-september for the two dates in mid-september we believe the work occurred. we have not received that information directly from boeing. we also believe we know what shift it occurred on, but we still-- there is one team, one team that deals with the doors of 25 people. why we don't have those names today, two months later, is really disappointing. >> it is beyond disappointing. we have an entire economy that depends on people getting this right. i thought that the ceo said, they would cooperate to the fullest. it seems like this information is now starving your investigation. and it seems that it is knowable and you should at least be able to talk to the

individuals there. do you have any concerns? there was a report about there could be an additional-- because there was a descent-- consent decree that was about to expire , any kind of other investigation by department of justice would impact your investigation? >> i do have concerns. our attorneys also have concerns, only from the aspect, we don't want to tell any agency what they should or should not do. where it becomes a concern for us, we will get the information at some point. where it becomes a concern for us is when employees and others don't feel safe to speak to us. so, they begin-- that is occurring now. what do we need to do to make sure people feel safe and secure? that is a part of the expert report to me part of why we passed to make sure there was no retaliation. what else can we do?

we can't have a viewpoint that, i just had to keep the line moving. that is not a viewpoint we want. we want employees who are saying, i have a concern about this, to be listened to and to be backed up by those faa asi's . that is what we want. in this case, we want to understand whether that kind of retaliation still exists, and what we can do to make sure that these people feel free to speak to you and to others who are investigating. >> i completely agree with that . the aviation industry is so safe, because we do encourage, the industry has encouraged anonymous reporting. through anonymous reporting, address risks proactively, and encouraged employees to speak up . that is how we have addressed safety and got into our gold standard safety record we are in today in the aviation industry. without that, there is a significant concern. i am aware

of the concerns with boeing, which is why we are delving into safety culture and safety management. >> have you discussed this? i know the faa administrators have had a five hour meeting with them last week, do you think this is a part of the discussion? >> with faa? >> yes. >> i imagine so. >> senator moran, and then senator rosen. >> thank you, madam chairman. i appreciate that and i say thank you to my colleague. i want to thank you for coming to tennessee recently. i want to thank you for your hands-on approach as you are dealing with these issues of crashes. i know it has been more hands on then-president biden and i appreciate that. i also want to say thank you for the outreach. this week, we

had a plane crash in nashville, and for your forthcoming information that has helped us, the press conference you held. i would like to ask if there is any additional information that you can supply today on that plane crash? >> the only additional information is that we moved the wreckage to a securitization -- location in tennessee and we are beginning to look at the wreckage. our deepest condolences to the family. two adults and three children, it was very tragic. as we receive more information, i will make sure that you continue to remain informed on this. >> i appreciate that, and indeed, we extend those condolences and what a tragic situation. as we discussed yesterday, gratitude that no lives were lost on i-40, when that plane crashed. i do want to add to

the comments of the ranking member and chairman about our concern over a lack of cooperation and what we perceive is lack of cooperation on these investigations. i know that is a source of frustration for you and your team. it is for us, because we hear that some of the manufacturers are not as cooperative as they should be. the maintenance organizations are not as cooperative. madam chairman, i would add that it is not only the planes, it is also trains. it is also other entities that are involved in the fine-- flying public. i did have one other question i wanted to ask you about. i have advocated for the lead experience pilots fly. when we look at the number, what is happening in aviation

and the need to get these claims in the air, on time, on schedule for the flying public, and i recently offered that as an amendment. it failed. i know the unions are against this. i know the union bosses that reached out to the faa to lock this raising the pilot age from 65 to 67. keeping these experienced pilots flying. yesterday, my flight coming in, we had turbulence. i was glad that there was a guy with experience in the cockpit. i would just like to know if the airline pilot association has reached out to the ntsb to stand against. i know you can't take a position on the issue. i want to know if the union has reached out to the ntsb,

requesting a position? >> no. senator, the union has not reached out to the ntsb, requesting a position that they know that the ntsb bases its recommendations on the facts around a particular investigation, and we don't have a recommendation in this particular area. >> of course, i think for the administration, for the union to reach out to the administration and the administration to have a position like the faa had on this is completely inappropriate. thank you so much. i yield back my time. thank you, madam chairman. >> thank you, senator. >> senator global char, i thought senator rosen would be next, but senator signed in. we will go back to senator moran. >> thank you for your work. i wanted to start out with just

railway safety, something you know is big in every state. the ntsb determined that the cause of that derailment in minnesota, appreciate your interest in that, was a broken rail section of a track near the town. can you talk about investment in the track and how important it is and the importance of the railway safety act? >> investment in rail and rail infrastructure is an investment in safety. certainly, i would strongly support investment in rail. on the railway safety act, we are appreciative to the committee for including a number of current recommendations on rail, including expanding the definition of high hazard, flammable trains, providing more information to local communities to responders, making sure they have the gear, and the training they need to

conduct their important safety mission, and certainly addressing the ot 111. we would ask that d.o.t. 111 be extended even further to eliminate them from all hazmat service. one particular thing out of the raymond, minnesota investigation, i will just mention, we found out with the d.o.t. 117 tank cars, we thought that the gaskets around those particular tank cars, especially the bottom outlet file, and some others melted. the lady came out, the material came out. that is something we recommended to be addressed in a couple of our investigations. happy to provide more information on that peers >> is you know, the rail-- they were on the scene, immediate cleanup, we were fortunate, then what happened in ohio, and the town handled it, as to your

agency well. >> the sf --bsf did a great job on that as well. and i was pleased to be with them on the scene as well. >> thank you, i remember that. it was a cold day. >> it was cold. great community, though. they all came together and brought us lots of warmth, cocoa, you name it. >> exactly. i think i will ask on the record, the ntsb's recommendations on rail crossings? something i wanted to mention and moved to another part of air traffic control hiring. i've talked with mr. whitaker about this, we have a very active airport, a great airport, but it best in north america the last three years. could you talk about focusing on training and hiring more people? or as he told me, there is going to be a look at using military people, hiring them more often, and the importance of that for safety. >> hiring is key. the faa has

set goals for hiring. what we are not talking about is the people who leave every ear, which is about half. it is a constant catch up. investment in the faa, also besides the ntsb, robust, sustained investment, long-term is key for faa's success and air traffic control, making sure people are hired and trained. with respect to training, we have been advocating for meaningful, value added training, and training personnel to proficiency. the one concern i would worry, with respect to the aviation industry, and really across the transportation industry, is we have gone through this death by powerpoint in training. whether it is ipads, computer-based training, there are great simulators. when i just went to at dcf a, with respect to air traffic control, a great tool, have one

for air traffic controllers, which they deserve. we have found that it is moved toward ipad, powerpoint training that employees aren't really digesting that well. even training a week ago. it is not just providing meaningful, value, added training, but really looking at how people learn. not everybody can learn well from an ipad or powerpoint. making sure they get the training that they need that is appropriate for their positions. >> okay, very good. last, next generation 911, and the cochair of that bipartisan caucus. the ntsb has issued recommendations related to 911 systems and several investigations in recent years. can you talk about the importance of improving that 911 infrastructure? we all know people aren't just calling in on landmines

anymore. they are calling in on cell phones, want to send pictures, and some improvements across the country, but there could be many more. >> they are the first responders on scene. we are the investigators, making sure they have robust systems, they have the infrastructure they need. people are able to get someone on the other line and 911 as a whole to me we have other recommendations on 911 operators, and also local emergency responders on coordination during an investigation, ensuring there is appropriate coordination. happy to provide you more information on all of our recommendations for that peers >> very good. one glass thing on air traffic control, as our chairwoman has returned, senator ron and i have a bill to boost air traffic training capacity, increase the faa's use of expedited hiring authority. i hope you will look at that. i hope it will be helpful. and, cochairman of the tourism

caucus, has done a lot as well. >> chair homendy, thank you for your presence again today. thank you for your presence to keep us informed and hopefully helpful in the cause. ntsb released on february 6th its preliminary findings. you hosted several of us at ntsb, where we got to see in a sense kind of hands-on circumstances and hear from your investigators . i think i had a good feel for what i thought transpired at that point in time. your testimony today about lack of cooperation doesn't suggest, it tells me that there is more to be known then that preliminary examination determined. so, what is it that keeps you from being able to issue your final report? maybe you have already said that this morning, but i want to hear it in a concise,

what is missing kind of answer. >> thank you. our preliminary reports that we issue within 10 days to four weeks after an initial event provides factual information that we have so far. but it really is just the beginning of the investigation. when we conduct investigations, such as this, a major, we certainly focus on timeliness of investigation, but it does take time me because we are looking into different areas. when i have you all to our lab, and thank you for coming there, i wanted you to be able to see the door plug in-person, to put ice on it, rather than looking at a picture or diagram. i think putting ice on something makes it that much more real, and you can understand what we are looking at. i wanted you to be able to see what we had reported in the preliminary report with respect to which bolts were missing. there are a lot of bolts, and a

lot of that hold components on this door plug and on the frame. there are four safety critical retaining bolts. their sole purpose is retaining this door plug on the airframe. so, what i wanted you to understand is what we saw is, there were no four bolts there. and how we were able to determine that with our lab equipment, and then later confirmed it through some pictures that we received from boeing. i also wanted you to be able to see that there were 154 flights in total that had occurred. we could see at the top of that door plug, how that door plug was migrating upwards , until it only came out on the 154th flight. i wanted you to

be able to see that with your eyes. since that time, we have received all the information, and thank you to the faa administrator for this. we asked him for all the information that they had gathered with respect to the inspections of the other door plug that outside of alaska 1282 , we were able to confirm that we were talking about different bolts. they're both, the bolts they were talking about that were loose, were around, again, holding components on the door plug, or one the frame itself, but four bolts that we are talking about, with the exception of a few missing cotter pins that they called, the four bolts that we are talking about were safety critical. those were not the ones that faa had identified in their

work. now just transitioning to the full investigation, we have different teams that are digging into different pieces of investigation, our structures team, our operations team, survival factors team, our maintenance records team, is mainly what i am updating you on today, which is in renton right now, interviewing a number of personnel. spirit aerospace contractors, three of them, and then we have a number of other personnel who work for boeing who we understand were doing work around the area, around the same time that work with being done on the rivets and door plug in about mid september to try to identify the list of 25 people, because it is important that we begin to dig into those procedures, those policies to understand where we need to go on this investigation. we have asked repeatedly for

this investigation-- information. again, this is not something specific to this investigation. we find this on other investigations, where we repeatedly ask and don't get information, but we continue to ask. is not for a lack of trying. or interviewing people who i do not understand how we could get the names at this .2 -- down the road. not for lack of trying. now we are interviewing people who were in the area. we asked for security camera footage. renton has security cameras all over. the facility. we have security camera footage so we can understand who did the work. >> what is the reason you have not received the information? i guess it is boeing? >> we are the be there not gotten an answer or they are saying they are trying to provide a but can't find it. on the security camera footage,

all the security camera footage is raised within 30 days and overwritten. done? >> that is correct. three different entities for the three different people. >> information regarding that circumstance? >> we are not at this time. it was a surprise to us we were not told before being contacted by the individual employees that they were contractors and who they were contractors for. but we do not have other information missing right now from spirit air space to >> we were not told before being contacted by the individual employees that they were contractors and who they were contractors for.

we don't have other information missing right now from spirit aerospace to my knowledge. >> two quick questions i want to ask before my time expires further. the ntsb, and you make interim recommendations as far as safety. even though your final report is not done, are their things occurring at your recommendation that makes flying more safe? >> we can issue further recommendations, urgent safety recommendations at any point if we believe they are warranted. we have to base those urgent safety recommendations on factual information. so when we believe we need to, we do not hesitate doing that. we don't wait until the end. >> is there any difference in the ntsb findings to date or the faa findings to date? >> no. we have not identified any differences. we have some differences and

work that we have done and differences and responsibility. but i will say that they have been very helpful throughout the course of the investigation. we appreciate that work. >> chairman, while it is not as much money as you would have requested, this week, we are expected to pass the appropriation bill that funds the ntsb and it is an eight take a 2% increase which is significantly higher than most other agencies within our capabilities within a budget that is less spending this year than last. >> i want to say thank you. it is really appreciated. many times, at the ntsb, we have to look at trade-offs. we have a number of lab equipment that is ending its useful life. often times, i'm looking at, can we train somebody or can we replace lab equipment? that is not a trade-off i like

to make. and so that investment is a direct investment and safety within the ntsb and i want to thank you so much for providing that and also for including the reauthorization bill in faa. thank you so much. i know i'm a strong advocate on the funding and i appreciate you hearing the needs of our workforce. >> thank you. senator rosen. >> thank you chair cantwell and chair jennifer homendy. thank you for your hard work and your commitment to safety and finding out the causes of everything going on. i want to talk a little bit about, not necessarily what happened with this plane but the aging infrastructure overall that impacts aviation safety. because aviation professionals are only as effective as the infrastructure and technology that they rely on and the average age of in faa air route traffic control center, the actual center, is over 60 years old.

the facilities regularly operate with degraded technology systems resulting in an inability to access accurate wind speed, the failure of radar frequencies within congested airspace is really hurting them sometimes and we have malfunctioning runway lights. many airports also lack functioning service systems used to track airborne and taxing airplanes as well as airport ground vehicles meaning some controllers have limited visual awareness of the aircraft they are directing. in leiu of a functioning radar system in the air traffic control facility, many controllers are actually filling the gaps by resorting to using public flight tracking websites that are not approved by the faa. perhaps most alarming are the reports that the faa lacks the funding to install runway warning system to help prevent these runway collisions. only a few dozen of the nation's commercial airports

have service surveillance collision warning systems. so chair homendy, how can we improve existing aviation technology infrastructure to reduce this potential risk? manage this complicated airspace. it is not just the air traffic controller staffing. we know that is important. but how does this all fit in? this is another piece of the safety that we need to worry about. >> i would just say what i have said previously in other testimony which is robust funding for the faa. the faa needs funding for all -- whether it is the d.o.t., modal administration or the ntsb, that investment is an investment in safety and they need that support in terms of funding, whether it is for runway lights or whether it is for technology to prevent runway incursions. there is also technology that we have advocated for and

recommended going back 23 years and asked the faa to require airlines to include technology in the cockpit of an airplane to alert pilots when there is an impending runway incursion. that is something that they could act on right now without having funding but the other side of that investment in technology in the towers, to ensure safety and to supplement safety for the workforce. >> thank you. i hope that we continue to get more infrastructure money for our airports. because we have a lot more emerging aviation technology on the forefront. i know that we have a lot of this going on in nevada but it is going on across the country and it is new and exciting. we have air taxis delivering a tremendous promise and drones that are going to do delivery for your packages. maybe your medications. this could help in urban and

rural settings. we know that is being tested across the country. all of these new technologies and airspace really raise an additional layer of aviation safety concerns as u.s. airspace becomes much more complex with all these new entries. i know we need the investment. maybe the airlines need to do something but we need to do our part. how should the aviation community, how should we realistically look at integrating these new technologies like air taxis, the unmanned air vehicles for drone delivery, into the aging system like you said that is just dealing with so many near misses and other technology because it is aging? how do we integrate this and move forward? >> i can speak to what the ntsb is doing. on the safety side, we just need to make sure that innovation isn't number one. safety has to lead. safety always has to be number one.

when it comes to the ntsb's work with emerging technologies, whether it is aam or drones or any other type of technology that is emerging, we just need to be ready. so the investment -- and i appreciate senator more on and his advocacy and senator cantwell and others on this committee advocacy for ntsb's funding for fy24 in the reauthorization bill. that will help prepare us for when we are doing our investigations for any of the emerging technology. we have done recent ones. there are advantages to some of those investigations where we have looked at doing investigations even in testing and in development to make sure that the industry understands our investigative process a while also, for us to make sure we are keeping up with the

technologies out there. >> thank you. in light of what you said, i hope that the ntsb is not going to retire its most wanted list of safety priorities because i think that is really important for all of us to know as far as what we need to invest in going forward. thank you madam chair. >> senator schmidt. >> thank you madam chair. good to see you. i did have some questions. i know senator fisher mentioned some of this earlier as it relates to electric vehicles. the weight of some of these vehicles, including -- i know you mentioned the battery alone can be the weight of a honda civic or a toyota corolla. and there are certain layers safety issues as relating to guardrails or other vehicles on the road, you would agree with that, right? >> yes. >> there are also issues that i want to talk about with infrastructure. the weight of these vehicles, the strain that it can have on

parking garages, roads and bridges and the amount of money that will be expended to either reinforce or repair, who is looking at this? we have a mandate for auto manufacturers to produce 50% of their fleet to be electric vehicles by 2030. another is a new rule in the works to have that number increased at 65%, or 75%, by 2032 being considered. it seems to me we are entering this phase as it relates to the mandates for electric vehicles. and all of these repercussions, all of these ancillary concerns -- i don't know who was addressing it. i'm asking you, are you guys looking at this? who is looking at this? because it seems to be a disaster on the horizon for the american people and the infrastructure. i don't hear a lot of talk

about it. >> thank you, senator. i have raised this consistently over the past year and a half, starting with the transportation research board where i raised concerns with respect to increasing size and weight of all vehicles but particularly the weight of electric vehicles that we really needed to look at the safety impact, not just on crashes but to the infrastructure as well. and protecting people. the whole reason we have a guard rail is to protect people when there is a crash that it wouldn't withstand. some of the crashes with some of these high weights of heavy vehicles including heavy electric vehicles as demonstrated by the university of nebraska. somebody needs to take action here. we have repeatedly flagged it. it is within the department of transportation's purview to do that and i encourage them strongly to get ahead of it. we are behind right now. >> i know that, as it relates to first responders who are

responding to crashes or other -- that lithium batteries are involved with, what is your take on the safety for our first responders as they are responding to these ev crashes? >> it is a significant danger. we issued a report of years ago raising concerns regarding a number of crashes that we investigated involving electric vehicles and the risk to emergency responders from stranded energy inside the battery and components. and the potential, the significant potential for shock. we also raised concerns with respect to secondary responders which are the tow truck operators. we saw many of these vehicles reigniting on the tow truck and up to five days later, in the tow yard. >> i guess the last question i have, you have raised these issues and flag the issues and particularly weights of the electric vehicles to the department of transportation.

have you gotten a response from secretary pete buttigieg or has anyone responded to that? is there any momentum? what do you need from us? >> we have not issued a specific safety recommendation. but we have raised it as an emerging trend and a problem that they need to take seriously . i have not had further interaction. >> okay. we look forward to working with you. thank you madam chair. >> thank you. senator peters. >> thank you madam chair. thank you for being here today. we certainly appreciate your advocacy as well as your leadership at the ntsb. i serve as the service transportation subcommittee chair of the committee and i strongly support reauthorizing the board and as a member of appropriations committee as well. i know how important it is to provide robust funding as you have mentioned already and certainly that has to happen on a yearly basis and you have to understand exactly what that money is, or the amounts and then it will continue for you

to plan accordingly. in particular, i know that you have called for increased year- over-year funding for your authorization request reflecting the need for more resources in the coming years because of staffing and capacity needs including relating to changing realities on the ground in the transportation system. one thing i particularly am interested in is ensuring that the ntsb is able to meet the challenges of more connected and automated transportation systems. i believe the conductivity and autonomous systems have the capability to reap huge rewards in terms of safety in the years ahead and we have to do that obviously with oversight and investigations. all of that requires resources to make that happen. my question for you, ma'am is can you discuss the importance of having ntsb reauthorization and robust appropriations were ntsb specifically to enable the board to meet the demands for

cutting-edge transportation technology and increased capacity needs related to data analytics in the coming years? >> right now, senator, we are a small agency. before the cr, we had 444 people. when i came in as chair, we had 397 and i rapidly fill the vacancies. as a result of the cr, we have a hiring freeze and we have gone down to 429. we cannot bring another person in. where that is a significant issue is our employees are investigators and are doing more with less. so if you just take our structural engineer, the lead structural engineer on alaska 1282, he is on duty 50% of his year. 50% he has one trainee right now. but it will take her -- is excellent, but it will take her 1-3 years of training just to handle a major on her own. so we need the people.

not just in order to do the work and do the work well but we also need the people to make sure that we have timely investigations which i think congress and the american public deserve. i was able to work with our team to reduce the backlog that we had of investigations over two years. those were almost 500 over two years when i took over as chair. we hit zero on october 1st. we are in a cr situation, having gone down i think pretty significantly on the aviation team. we are back up 15 over two years. this is the direct result. not to mention the fact that i am making daily choices with our team on, how do we deal with $14 million of requests internally for needs on

training, for needs on new lab equipment which is at the end of its useful life? or do i fund because before i became chair, our entire electrical av and streaming system in the public board room which provides information to the republic -- public, when we hold a public board meeting, how do i get that information out if that equipment is working? we have to put out feelers for how much that will cost to replace and i get back between one second two, 2.5 billion dollars. to invest in that so the public can watch the board meetings or do i invest in training that our people need or do i invest in our people? these are the tough choices we have to make every single day. we are looking at these numbers every single day and very cognizant.

the ntsb is the world standard when it comes to investigating accidents, crashes and other events. we need to remain the gold standard and the way we do that is through investment and not starving us. and so we appreciate your support. i will tell you without reauthorization what happens is , we don't have a number out there so appropriators say, you don't have a number so come up with a number. i personally went to omb. i went to the white house and said, i need 145. i need 154fy25. i personally did that because that is what we need to do for the agency. but if we don't have those numbers and we don't have the authorization, people just pick what they think is right but it is not what we need. with that said, i very much appreciate the 140. it is a significant increase of

above where we are now. but in the authorization bill on the senate authorization bill for the following four years, he leaves it at 1:45 -- 145 for each year and we need to increase that over time. the flat funding would hurt us. >> thank you madam chair. >> thank you chair homendy for being here and all your work. i know a lot of folks focused on the alaska airlines questions are going to focus on the train derailment in east palestine. specifically madam chair, i want to focus on this question of whether the controlled burn was actually necessary in east palestine and sort of recap for folks the mushroom cloud, the chemical mushroom cloud that captured headlines across the country was a result of a controlled burn her with those of us focused on the issue were told that if you hadn't done the controlled burn, there would have been an uncontrolled explosion because the situation

on the ground was just incredibly chaotic and dynamic. you had to do the controlled burn to prevent the uncontrolled explosion pick your team has done a very good job. i commend you and your team on actually looking into whether this was necessary. and you will forgive me for requesting brief answers to questions because i have a lot of them. and i just want to walk through, in detail what you folks have found based on public reporting that me and my team have gone through. february 3rd, 2023 derailment of the train, is it true that norfolk southern percent contractors monitor temperatures on one of the chemical tank cars on the afternoon of february fifth and the afternoon of february sixth which is when the controlled burn happened and communicated initial readings to the shivers in charge of the vinyl fluoride cars. >> that is accurate, senator. >> is it true that these initiated an internal temperature of 145 degrees fahrenheit at 4:00 p.m. on fairbury fifth which eventually declined to 126

degrees fahrenheit at 9:30 a.m. on february 6 at which point it stabilized? >> that is correct, senator. it was stabilized well before the burn. many hours before. >> declining temperatures, you would think and stabilized temperatures are consistent not was something that needs to be exploded but was something that can be dealt with in a slightly less catastrophic way. at least that is my read on it. is it true that the chemicals does the ship for occidental's concluded that the stabilized temperatures were too low for a run week chemical reaction meaning the sort of thing that will lead to an uncontrolled explosion? >> that is correct. they had testified that polymerization was not occurring. in order for polymerization to occur which was norfolk southern and the contractor's justification for the burn, you would have to have rapidly increasing temperatures and some sort of infusion of oxygen, neither of which occurred. >> just to be clear, you would need both of those things. it is not either or. you need both of them to

precipitate polymerization which would lead to the uncontrolled situation. >> correct. >> it is true that the norfolk southern contractors testified to the ntsb that they were not certain the chemical reaction was occurring in the derailed tankcar? >> they testified to that, yes, it. >> is it correct that the chemical shippers testified there was no free radical agent or sufficient heat trajectory to justify the norfolk southern contractor assessment that a chemical reaction was occurring? >> that is correct. >> so from this assessment, is it your understanding that norfolk southern's contractors lacks scientific basis to support the conclusion that polymerization was occurring in the drilled museum tank? >> yes. in fact, they were informed by roxie vinyls of the information that should have been taken by the contractors in their decision-making. but yes. they did not have that. they lacked the scientific background to address that.

>> let me just go to one final question here. with all these facts together your reporting thus far conclude that the norfolk southern contractor's liquidation to conduct a controlled burn lacks sufficient -- sufficient scientific basis, temperature data and contradicted expert feedback from the shipping form on-site. this was all told to decision- makers on the ground that they had to make a decision in less than 13 minutes to blow up all five of these toxic chemical cars without any other voices being included to offer a contrary. is that right? >> that is correct. >> again, i appreciate your work on this. to sort of summarize, this is an extraordinary finding. we were told effectively that there were two bad options. the uncontrolled burn -- excuse me, the controlled burn, or the uncontrolled explosion. and it seems, based on the data

we have, that there was not a ton of reason to do the uncontrolled burn and that of course is what spread toxic chemicals all over this community and in the surrounding region. it is really an extra night finding. he goes to highlight the importance of your work. but i also have to note that, residents on the ground talk about the fact that immediately after the uncontrolled burn, they moved the tank cars and train traffic was moving through their town and to their community. i won't ask you to speak to motivations here but when you have been unnecessary, uncontrolled burn that poisoned a lot of people that then lead to rapid transit of train traffic, a lot of people including we are wondering, did they do this not because it was necessary but because it allowed them to move traffic and freight more quickly? and if so, that is an extraordinary thing that i think requires a lot of further work from this committee and from others. we will stop there because i see my time is up. thank you chair homendy.

>> may i add something to that? >> sure. >> senator, i would say the factual information in our docket shows that foxy vinyls was on scene and providing information to norfolk southern and their contractors on the fourth, fifth and the sixth. they informed them that they believed perlmutter's -- polymerization was not occurring and there was no justification to do the burn. rightfully, norfolk southern's contractors ruled out hot tapping and transloading because it would have been a potential safety issue for their employees. but there was another option. let it cool down. it was cooling down. we know for a fact that when that pressure relief device went off come that it had to have been above 185 degrees. later, much later. over the course of 22 hours,

that tankcar was cooling. not to mention the other four tank cars that were only between 64-69 degrees. so oxley vinyls was on the scene providing information to norfolk southern's contractor who was in the room when the decision was made and when advice was given to the governor of ohio to the incident commander. they were not given full information because nobody was told that foxy vinyl was on scene. they were left out of the room. the incident commander did not even know they existed. neither did the governor. they were provided incomplete information to make a decision. >> go ahead senator vance.

>> my question, want to be clear, not a criticism of the incident commander or the governor. i think it is a criticism of the people in the ground that provided inadequate information and provided inadequate information i think to the great detriment of the community on the ground. it is extraordinary work by your team but this is a really troubling set of circumstances. this town very well may have been poisoned to facilitate the rapid -- the rapid movement of freight or at least poisoned for reasons that we can't identify. that should concern every person on this committee. >> senator vance, cannot wait to get your bill on the senate floor. as i said in my opening comments today, this is so critical because it requires this kind of reporting. so that local communities can plan appropriately. and they should disclose what they are pushing through a community. i hope that we can get this done. >> thank you so much. >> senator baldwin. >> thank you madam chair.

chair homendy, thank you for coming before the committee and for your tireless dedication to safety across all modes of transportation. i would like to discuss for a moment our worked to improve the safety of helicopter tours. in 2019, the crash of an air tour helicopter in hawaii killed six passengers and the pilot including a mother and a daughter from madison, wisconsin. for that reason, it has become a real priority for me and i know it has also been for senator shots. the ntsb final report on that accident in may of 2022 sites several safety recommendations that are still outstanding by the faa. and also issues new recommendations. and i was

pleased to see the faa proposed new safety improvements in august of 2023. and i worked closely with senator schatz and chair can't will on safety improvements for the faa bill that passed the committee just a few weeks ago. i'm wondering if you can provide a status update on how you view the current safety standards for helicopter air tours and do you believe that the safety provisions included in the senate version of the faa bill would improve the safety of these tours? >> thank you very much for your work on this issue and for senator schatz's work on the issue. i think it is critical. the ntsb believes in one level of safety. and before i became ntsb chair or before i worked on the committee on transportation and infrastructure, if i showed up with my family to take an air tour, i would not know to ask,

what are the qualifications of the crew. what are your operating standards. what your operating rules. what are your maintenance procedures. you would normally ask those questions. if you are someone that shows up for a parachute jump flight, you think my biggest risk is jumping out of the plane and not getting on the plane which also crashed in hawaii. so we believe that you are paying passenger on part 121 or part 135 or part 91, you deserve the same level of safety. and we have advocated strongly for a set of regulatory standards that address just that. we have seen no action on that. this is something that i have been extremely passionate about since i have become -- since i came to the board, whether it was flying into new york where

we literally listened to some people's last moments that were strapped into a helicopter on an air tour with a home depot horniness -- home depot harness. and they could not unhook it. they drown. that was horrific. and so still, we don't have the standards we have recommended. we did an entire report on ensuring safety and revenue passenger operations under part 91. we looked at accidents, terrible tragedies in hawaii, arizona, new york. connecticut. with a b17 historic adventure flight that crashed. each time, we continue to say that safety needs to improve in each time we have been ignored. the public deserves better.

the faa should issue standards to ensure their safety. >> thank you for your work. >> thank you. >> i know several of my colleagues have already raised the issue of train derailments and real safety. i'm very concerned that the derailment rate of the largest class one railroads have increased by 23% in the last decade. while not nearly as devastating as the derailment in east palestine that was just being discussed. my home state of wisconsin saw a few train derailments over the last year as well including one in desoto, wisconsin that led to some of the rail cars temporarily ending up in the mississippi river. would you be able to speak to your belief as to why we are seeing an increase, not a decrease, in derailments and,

in the past decade. and specifically what we need to be doing to confront that challenge? >> thank you for the question, senator. one thing that is of particular concern, the derailment rate is sort of a combined rate from the mainline track and for the yards. we are seeing a significant increase in derailments and tragedies in the yards. that is where we are very concerned about employee safety. we have seen that repeatedly. we have issued a number of recommendations. we have a lot of open investigations. for norfolk southern alone, we have eight investigations that are currently open and we are also doing a safety culture review separate from east palestine. in particular, we have 190 safety recommendations that we have issued that are currently open to improve rail safety, whether it is preventing

fatigue or providing for increased inspection or new technologies to supplement, not supplant workers but supplement. the 190 have not been acted upon. happy to provide those for the hearing record but they can be today and i hope they will. >> thank you senator baldwin. senator duckworth, thank you for your leadership as the chair of the subcommittee. we appreciate your help. >> thank you madam chair and thank you for your leadership and getting the faa reauthorization bill out of committee and in a bipartisan way. i also want to thank chair homendy here and for your work on the next line investigation. i have a few things i want to say a statement before ask you some short questions. it is because i'm particularly concerned about the ntsb finding that pilots on flight 1282 were unaware that the cockpit door was designed to

automatically open during the kind of rapid depressurization event that took place on that alaska airlines flight when the door plug fell out. as a pilot, i cannot convey strongly enough how critical it is for the flight crew to be fully informed of the features on the flight deck. and in-flight emergency is not the time for a flight crew to first learn about something like this. also, as we saw, pilots not knowing about a flight deck feature can be deadly. this is even more alarming considering that this is the third time, the third time boeing has kept information about max flight deck features from pilots. and the faa in the past has let boeing get away with it the first two times. this has become a dangerous pattern which the faa absolutely needs to break. at the start of the max program, boeing remove mcast from the flight manual with the of a blessing. subsequent investigations raise questions about how candid boeing had been with faa about the significance. despite this, when evidence

emerged of an internal planet boeing to intentionally downplay the significance of mcas to regular -- faa to not investigate so reducing the significance to regular concern. these are internal boeing -- i have my poster here which is the internal e-mail within boeing itself that says this. these are internal boeing meeting minutes showing employees planning to not use the term mcas outside of boeing because -- and i quote "if we emphasize mcas as a new function, there may be greater certification entering the impact." they also show a member of the boeing organizational designation authority, the oda, approving the plan yet, faa took no action in response to this evidence. according to the department of transportation inspector general, faa did not even consider finding out who this oda member was to make sure he

or she was not authorized to perform certification work on behalf of the faa. boeing also intentionally hid from pilots the fact that the aoa alert on nearly 80% of the boeing 737 aircraft was not functioning. when boeing discovered the defect, it did not reported to faa or inform airlines or pilots, opting instead to keep it a secret. and keep producing planes with the same known defect and wait years to fix it until he planned a software update in the future. boeing's plan was disrupted however when the first 737 max crashed in 2018 and worldwide attention began to focus on aoa sensors. they were forced to admit that they disagree alert was not functioning on most 737 airplanes and that they knew about it. unlike mcas, this was not a safety related issue. however, this was a clear violation of the max's approved flight design. and this is from the u.s.

department of transportation office of the inspector general. the d.o.t. inspector general recently looked into this and said -- and i quote "all features included in the type designer mandatory, whether or not they are required for safety thus while the disagree message was not necessary to meet faa safety regulations, he was required to be installed and functioning as part of the approved type design." yet, faa took no action against boeing for this brazen, intentional and repeated disregard of its approved type design. if faa is not going to bother to enforce its own regulations, why would boeing ever obey them? so chair homendy, here are my questions. would you agree that, as a matter of safety, pilots need to know what features are on the flight deck? >> absolutely. it is a matter of safety. they need to be fully informed and fully informed so they know what to expect. >> thank you. would you also agree that it is

dangerous for pelts to first learn about features on the flight deck during an in-flight emergency? >> yes and i would extend that to the entire flight crew including the cabin crew. one member of this particular flight was hit by the door as it blew out. there was a lot going on at the time. it was complete chaos. they need to know what to expect and this was a complete surprise. >> thank you. you are referring to the alaska airlines incident? >> yes. alaska 1282. >> thank you. >> if they do not enforce the type design company think that would make a manufacturer more or less likely to abide by the type of design? >> this is a difficult one for me to answer because this is not something we have investigated in. >> thank you. i'm over time. >> thank you so much. >> thank you chair homendy. >> senator welch. >> thank you very much.

the question of safety is obviously incredibly important. the question of cost is also very important. my understanding right now, you are making assessments of safety, you are focused solely on the safety and not on cost. i know that some of my colleagues think that you should be responsible to make a cost-benefit analysis as you are considering safety factors. i'm a skeptic of that. i think that the decision should be made after the recommendation is made. and i just want you to comment on that. both are legitimate concerns. i think all of us here would agree that safety has to be paramount. so if there is a proposal that you would just that your agency would have to make the cost- benefit analysis, how would that affect safety?

>> significantly. the ntsb is founded on safety. the entire mission is safety. we don't consider cost-benefit of any particular recommendation. it is a recommendation, 80% of which are adopted acceptably. voluntarily, by the recipients. which show a pretty high success rate as it is what i will say, when it comes to the recommendations, the recipients have a choice. you either implement them or you don't. it is a recommendation. it is not a requirement. we hope you do. but it is certainly recommendation. what i will say, the regulator, if they choose to take on one of our recommendations and it requires a regulation, they go through cost-benefit analysis. that is their authority. i have heard this number of times.

the ntsb's mandate is to save lives. so if i'm out there, if our investigators and i are out there at a particular scene of the terrible tragedy, can you imagine if we do an entire investigation based on facts and then have to sit there and determine, what is economically feasible that would prevent this from happening again? that is terrible. what the public deserves, what you deserve, is to know what would prevent it from happening again. what would prevent that tragedy from reoccurring? then you can decide. you can consider the recommendation and determine whether you should move that forward. so the public deserves to know what is right. what is the right thing to do. also i will mention that if we ever have to do cost-benefit analysis, it would take another year to issue another report. to talk about timeliness. that goes right out the window. >> thank you. i agree with that. i also think that the cost

issues, you have to look to the manufacturer to figure out a better way to do that and maintain safety. and so it would be an inappropriate shifting of the burden on your organization committed to safety if we impose that obligation on you. it would be a real conflict. >> can i just add, also, why should we evaluate the safety of what -- the economics -- if we issue a recommendation to an entity that was part of an event, why should we consider what is feasible or cost- effective for them to implement versus what is right? i agree with you, senator. thank you for that question. >> i know you have been asked a lot about boeing. let me ask you this. how can congress support the ntsb efforts to enhance the agency's understanding of boeing patients quality and safety management system as we consider ntsb reauthorization?

>> the ntsb has a lot of authority that we can use and our investigations. we certainly have subpoena authority and we are not afraid to use it. if we need to. we hope it doesn't come to that. we hope that we can get cooperative participation, whether it is interviews or working with parties to the investigation. but it does concern is that we do have certain information that we should have today. and with that said, we have the ability to have that information. i will say one thing about the ntsb and reauthorization and funding for us, is that when a major occurs, that becomes number one for us. they our structural engineer on this one, he handles 15-20 cases a year. what happens to those other 15- 20 cases? they get moved aside so he can focus on 1282. people died in the other 15-20 cases.

this is why we need personnel. this is why we need to ensure the training and why we need to ensure we are investing in every mode and every office of the agency including our critical lab equipment. >> thank you very much. i yelled back. >> i think we need to all -- i think the prompting of that question might be the delay in a real sms system. and i think some people may, in the past, have articulated the cost-benefit analysis of that -- i don't know what the right word is but that you could go with a lesser sms system, a non- real sms system. >> you have to have a robust management system to ensure safety. >> i think his comments were not as much directed toward the

ntsb doing a safety system analysis but this perception that a real sms never got implement it because people argued on the cost-benefit analysis. >> i agree with you. the legislation we passed mandated a real sms and we are waiting for that to happen and we will hold the faa accountable to make sure it is implemented. >> so there is no substitute for that. >> my colleague from georgia. >> thank you madam chair. chair homendy, welcome back. i would like to briefly revisit the tragic and deadly crashes of the lion airflight 610 an ethiopian airlines flight 302. can you remind me who manufactured these aircraft? >> the manufacturer is boeing. >> thank you. ellis revisit the 2023 east palestine, ohio train derailment. can you remind me which freight

rail carrier operated the train. >> norfolk southern. >> and what about the recent recall of 2 million vehicles with autopilot technology that is the subject of a multi-year national highway traffic safety administration review. who manufactures those vehicles? >> tesla, sir. >> finally, an instant we heard a lot about today, the alaska airlines flight 1282, door plug blowout. who was in charge of manufacturing that aircraft? >> boeing. >> i see a pattern here. at the heart of each of these incidents is a massive corporation. a fortune 500 economic engine for the country which also has a deep lobbying bench. and i'm concerned that in each of these incidents, although unique in their circumstances,

may have been the results of a focus on production targets and profit margins over safety related -- to the question my colleague senator welch asked. in other words, insufficient safety culture in the transportation system and among its suppliers and ironically, we have colleagues of mine that are asking whether or not we should do the cost-benefit analysis as a part of your analysis of these, sometimes tragic incidents. chair homendy, the ntsb has investigated each of these incidents and the company patients tasks with ensuring the safety of the products. brought your investigations, have you seen any evidence that these companies may be maximizing profits at the expense of safety? >> we do not have evidence of that either way. >> so what tools does the ntsb have to investigate and improve

the safety culture within these companies and across the broader transportation system? >> with respect to safety culture, we delve in on safety culture in many of our investigations. for nor folk southern, we are doing a separate investigation involving organizational safety culture with respect to norfolk southern because we are currently investigating eight accidents involving norfolk southern that occurred in relatively short time periods. so we are doing that safety culture assessment and we have done similar assessments including on metro-north in the past. we are also digging in on safety culture with respect to the alaska 1282. >> if i can interrupt, what tools do you have? >> we have human performance experts at the ntsb who delve into safety culture within the

agency. so we have expert investigators. certainly we have subpoena authority if we can't get records. we have expert investigators that can identify deficiencies and recommend action. >> you can understand why these incidents are deeply concerning to us or anyone paying attention. let me ask you this. does the ntsb need additional tools from congress to improve the safety culture within these companies? >> our best resources are the people. they are top notch world renowned investigators who know how to evaluate a safety culture within any entity and identify deficiencies. we need people. and we need training for those people. and so that is a direct investment in safety. >> thank you very much.

>> yes madam chair, i'm ready. >> thank you madam chair. >> i want to continue on the alaska airlines flight 1282 questioning of course it is on everybody's mind across the country. it is really on my constituent patients mind given how much we fly alaska airlines which is a very good airline that i fly almost every weekend. let me ask you specifically on that and then i have a specific alaska statement safety question. i think you know that alaska airlines was the first airline with the faa accepted management system. in previous hearings, we discussed the value of the sms

and the scalability for smaller operators. can you talk about the importance of the safety management system, not just in terms of enhancing safety in the episode that you are investigating but in particular, what you envision a more mature sms system being able to be helpful in terms of safety in big airlines or even smaller operators. >> there are four pillars for safety management systems. everything from safety, policy and having the comprehensive safety policies and place. safety risk assessment, safety assurance and safety promotion which gets to safety culture and training at the workforce. having a robust safety management system is key for

any operator. i do agree with your comments on scalability. we do believe that any operator, whether large or small, can proactively identify and address those risks and continue to monitor how they have addressed those risks to ensure that how they address them is effective and continue to reevaluate those risks to ensure safety while also promoting safety among the workforce, whether it is two or three people or hundreds of people. >> thank you for that answer. let me turn to aviation safety in alaska. february of 2020, the ntsb issued a report calling for the faa and the ntsb to take a much more comprehensive approach to improving aviation safety in my state. as you know, whether it is crashes or fatalities, we have

the highest per capita numbers in the country. a lot of reasons for that, not as much infrastructure as we need, challenging weather certainly. this led to the report, your report, ntsb, led to the launch of a very important program. the faa, alaska aviation safety initiative, what we call fasi in alaska and that is what the faa and ntsb and the aviation community in alaska. i want your commitment to continue to focus on the. it is a really big deal. a lot of these numbers are from the lack of infrastructure. my view is that we are all americans and if it costs a little bit more for infrastructure and alaska then we deserve it, because everyone

else in the lower 48 has significant more infrastructure in terms of aviation then we do this by the challenges and alaska. i want to thank the chair, the faa reauthorization bill that we just passed with a very strong bipartisan support and work to address a number of these challenges highlighted in your february 2020 report and in the more broad faa fasi initiative dealing with upgrade and maintenance of weather observation systems and increased utilization of ifr routes an additional ground- based and a whole host of things. can i get your commitment to continue to work with my office, the faa, this committee, to address the issues raised in your 2020 ntsb report to make alaska aviation safer?

again, sometimes we hear, well, it is going to cost more because we have to put more infrastructure. my view is, yes, it is going to cost more. is are americans just like they would be if they were any other state in the lower 48. can you give me an update from your perspective on how that is going, fasi or any other issues we need to be working on. >> first of all, you do have my commitment. i also would like to say that i have been to our alaska regional offices, the director of the office of aviation safety which is behind me. it just came back from the regional office and alaska. i do want to thank you for your relationship, your staff's relationship with our investigators. >> we think they are great. >> like wise. >> it is an incredible relationship and we really appreciate it.

i do think you have unique and great needs, whether it is infrastructure or investment and weather technology or a host of safety needs and you deserve the investments. we will support that. we will support the work of the faa throughout the initiative. it was critical for the ntsb. we made the recommendation. we believe in it and you certainly have my commitment to work on that. >> thank you. i appreciate that. and i want to thank the chair again helping us with a lot of the amendments that we have to the faa bill that directly came from your 2020 report and the fasi initiative. but we are not done yet. thank you both. >> the main transportation system in alaska is by air and we want to get this right and we want to help them in whatever way we can. we have a vote under way a second one following so we will wrap up here soon. senator. >> thank you chair cantwell. chair homendy, thank you for being here today. yesterday the national highway

traffic safety ministries and close the comment period, on the advanced notice of proposed rulemaking on impaired driving technology. and over 17,000 comments submitted. many from victims sharing their own stories on why the technology is so important. in 2021, i was proud to pass the legislation, the halt and right act with colleagues, senator peters, capitol and rick scott as part of the bipartisan infrastructure law. and this provision required that impaired driving prevention technology be in all new cars after 2026. chair homendy, yes or no, does the impaired driving position -- provision of the bipartisan infrastructure law align with the ntsb prior recommendations on the most important tools we can use to address impaired driving? technology out there e

really doing a lot of this worke and i was encouraged to see major automotive manufacturers behind much of the technology as well, that was one of the goals to create a encouraged to see major automotive manufacturers behind much of this technology as well. that was one of the goals here, to create a market so that the innovation would be unleashed. i have seen it happen. chair homendy, yes or no, would requiring impaired driving technology vehicles reduce the number of traffic fatalities on our roadways and save thousands of lives each year? >> yes. those facts i researched. >> i appreciate that. i was proud to also lean on amendments to authorize the ntsb, working closely with the chair of this committee, maria cantwell, where we were able to earn support through the

chair's leadership, to be able to get this done. chair homendy, i know that during your tenure as chair, the ntsb has eliminated the pre- existing back laws of investigations and they want to commend you for that , some of which had previously gone and complete for years. yes, ior no. to the increase in staffing levels in the last three years enable the ntsb to enable this? >> it is a combination of the increased in staffing levels and improvements. i set the vision and it was the t team that did the work. i am proud of them. >> congress fails to provide the ntsb with proficient resources, will the impact the agency's ability to close the investigation in a timely manner, will that negatively

impact the ability to get that done? >> yes. i can show you this right now. the nearly 500 investigations that were well over two years, some three and four years, went down to zero on october 1. we did -- we went up from 397 employees to 444 employees. beginning on october 1, we hit a cr. what happened? we went down to -- we were at 429 employees and now we are 15 investigations right over the two-year mark. it is ora direct impact. if we have less employees, our employees are forced to do more with yes. our employees are our greatest s resources and they are our key to improving safety. >> similar to the recent things, we have seen historic levels of traffic fatalities on our roadways. my question is, yes or no, would an increased authorization enable the ntsb to do even more to reduce the

number of deaths each year on our roadways? >> yes. certainly we have millions of crashes that occur on our roads and we have around 30 people on our highway safety office. they need more people. >> questions pertaining to the investigation that i want to commend ntsb in conducting. i very much appreciate the time today and i yield back. >> thank you. as i mentioned, we are running out of time because we have two votes back to back but i did want to submit some questions for the record. i will submit some things on east palestine that i would like answered. i also want to note that it is the 25th anniversary of olympic pipeline explosion in bellingham, washington, which killed three children under thes age of 19. the company's severe that multiple company executives were sent to jail. the judge in the case decry the lack of effective federal oversight. i'm going to submit questions

about lack of investigation in the keystone pipeline but what resources would help the board be more effective in being a pipeline safety watchdog, when -- what pipeline safety would you recommend to the congress that we also do to enhance? just for the record that we have that. i want to say that -- i also am going to send a letter to boeing and the various manufacturers saying that we need this information to ediately as it relates this investigation, also to send that to the faa. not sure why that hasn't happened. one of the reasons we quwanted have you here today is that people need to listen to the ntsb. so often, you have done the painstaking work to actually get the data and information and then the consequences, people don't listen to it.

we are trying to do everything we can to ask for a trend report. part of the trend report is to bolster the recommendations and to say, listen to them and monitor the trends. your appearance here before the committee led to a conference the faa was holding where you had already said that we need to do something about near miss technology at airports and yet, it was not being listened to. the fact that we had you here that day i can make people listen to that voice and resulted in the faa and then the acting administrator at that point in time putting out a directive. so, we are doing everything we can. we need to get this right. feeling your support for the investigation could be helpful. they are also the largest exporter of our country

aviation so we want to get this right. they are a key component of our dod system. we need to get this right. we need to help with the investigation so we can find out what in our system needs to be improved. i don't think it will be a surprise to say that a true safety management system needs to be implemented. with that, i am going to ask that the hearing record remains open for two weeks and any senators submit questions for the record and at the conclusion of senator markey's questioning that we adjourn and he can gavel us out. >> thank you so much. ra >> thank you. since the plug blew off of the boeing 737 max 9 in january, the national transportation safety board has done excellent work to help identify the cause of this incident. many experts believe that the answer goes back much further, to boeing's 1997 merger with the aerospace manufacturer.

it is well documented after this merger that boeing's culture shifted from prioritizing engineering excellence to prioritizing the bottom line. this cultural shift is a systemic rust that allowed the door plug to break loose. in fact, the very subcontractor who was involved in the door plug blowout here at aerosystems used to be a part of boeing itself. boeing sold off after the 1997 merger with mcdonnell douglas and an effort to outsource work and shed manufacturing costs. even then, boeings engineers warned that this motivated strategy put the entire manufacturing process at risk. fast forward to today. those engineers have been proven correct. boeing's weak oversight and failure to prioritize safety has endangered lives of the 180 passengers and crew aboard the alaska airlines flight. chair

homendy, your current and previous investigations, do you agree that boeing's safety concerns stem from a culture that failed to prioritize it? >> i would say, respect to safety culture, safety culture has to be a priority whether it is for boeing or any other organization. for this particular accident or event, we are digging in on the safety culture and it is absolutely critical because they aviation industry's success has really been a result of having a good safety culture where you have people that can really report and stop work if they feel there is a safety issue, where they know

that an entity takes they reporting seriously, follows up and promotes safety. we need that at boeing and any other entity where we conduct the investigations. >> you do have concerns about the overall safety culture, right? >> yes, we do. that is part of why that will be our investigation of the alaska door plug blowout. >> and going beyond this incident, across the entire company? >> yes. we are going to look at safety culture within boeing. >> you are going to look at the cultural concern? >> yes. >> i think that is absolutely critical. >> now, i would like to turn to the significant risk posed by economists. in the past eight years, the ntsb has investigated multiple incidents involving economist driving technology like tesla's autopilot system that are designed to operate on specific road conditions, particularly

on highways. in fact, in 2016, the ntsb recommended the national highway traffic safety administration and auto manufacturers see strict drivers activating these systems outside those road conditions. it is long past time that we take firm control of the wheel and steer toward safety and implement this recommendation. madam chair, can you briefly explain the reasoning for this recommendation? >> yes. impact, i thought this came up -- you are a champion on this issue. i just pulled tesla's statement, which is really their limitations on operational design domain. they worn on their iowebsite th for those who have vehicles, that some of their automation will not work in some areas including areas of poor

visibility, heavy rain, snow, fog, bright light, direct sunlight, mud, ice, snow, interference or obstruction by objects mounted onto the vehicle. narrow, high curvature or winding icroads and damaged or misaligned bumper and extremely hot or cold temperatures, and ski area where the vehicle is not designed to operate with using that technology. who reads that? >> that just means you are backing out of the driveway and then going back into your car again. other than that, you are out on the road. this is not mlike the postal service, rain, sleet, snow. they are saying the sunlight might affect it or the snow might affect it or rainy conditions might affect it. winding roads might affect it. as i am listening to that description, it sounds like, to me, it is not ready to be handed over to people who have grown up with a car that they

drive where they expect the tr brakes or the steering wheel to all work no matter where they are going. by the way, this thing that you just turned on could be extremely dangerous for your two kids in the backseat. >> if it is only designed to be operated in a certain type of environment, it should be limited to those environments. we issued that recommendation to tesla following the 2016 tragedy in florida. we issued the same recommendation again but both have failed to act on those recommendations. >> in 1999, i was successful -- we had to pass a safety bill es after the ford explorer mass. one of the amendments i got was, on your dashboard, a little light goes on if your

tires are underinflated. it seemed like we were asking the industry to go to the moon. how many people now look at that light and they say, oh my goodness, maybe i should go in and inflate a little bit. it is a warning and it is saying this could be dangerous. just listening to what you are saying, it almost is like there should be a little card, a little light saying here is all the ways in which this technology does not, in fact, operate safely on the road, just so people could be seeing it on the ongoing basis. we are saying, yeah, you should know that but, we have to give b people a little extra warning. i think that list that you just read is just something that can't be buried in the fine print. we can't be assuming that people know that it is av dangerous for all those

conditions. for my perspective, i think we have reached a point where, if we have high standards for tesla, we have to have higher standards for any company that will be moving towards autopilot because there are certain assumptions that we make about safety that don't necessarily transfer over. i really do look forward to working with you, madam chair, on this and with all of my colleagues and just one final question if i could. i would like to discuss the importance of ensuring that freight trains have two person crews. over and over we are seeing the safety benefits of multiperson cars. in fact, after the east palestine derailment last year, this committee heard loud and clear that having multiple crew members on the train streamlined emergency response and increased crew and

community safety. madam chair, do you agree that the inclusion of several crew members on the train that derailed and east palestine enhanced safety? >> in east palestine, i have reviewed the transcript from the inward facing camera and it was clear they did a phenomenal job. there were three people in thatd locomotive. one was the e locomotive engine who was focused on operating the train. the conductor at one point got out after it derailed and said, what is going on here there was uncoupling of the locomotives so they could move forward and be safe as they do in standard practice and another one was talking with dispatch. there was incredible resource management there. >> has the ntsb investigated other rail accidents with having multiple crew benefits on board would be sufficient? >> there was one in iowa.

it was a union pacific derailment involving ethanol. it was a significant derailment and fire and one crew member had uncoupled some of the cars right before the derailment and then pulled those cars away from the fire to ensure they were mitigating any damage and ensuring safety. the other crewmember went around and pulled the other cars behind the derailment around from the other end. they isolated just the cars that had derailed in the fire. that is just two crewmembers ex that did that. >> excellent. is very clear that a two person crew is a matter of safety. having that extra set of eyes, extra set of hands to be able to deal with dangerous situations when they occur is absolutely essential. that is why i am so glad for

the effort that the senators and i have made to include that language in the real rate safety act -- railway saftey act which the committee passed last year it mandates the two person crew. i think that is common sense response to the obvious safety benefits that we have identified in having those people on board. i just think we have to pass that legislation. it is very important that the two person crew provision is essential and we will continue to try to work as hard as we can to enhance safety by keeping the vision in all the way. we think you so much for all of your work and i feel like i am all alone here. i could just go

on indefinitely. >> i am happy to talk with you. >> i know you are. it is great to have the expert on all of these issues and i thank you for your great work >> thank you for your work on safety and on behalf of the ntsb.'s we appreciate your support. >> thank you so much. >> with that, i would say, this hearing is adjourned. >> thank you. appreciate it. [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations]

[inaudible conversations]