russia and china pose in these areas. this is just over two hours >> good morning. the committee meets today to receive testimony from general anthony cotton, commander of u.s. strategic command or stratcom. and generals steven whiting,

commander of u.s. spacecom or spacecom. gentlemen, thank you for your service to the nation and extend our thanks to the men and women who serve with you. as in the past we have asked the commanders the stratcom and spacecom to testify together. until 2019. spacecom was a part of strategic command. mr. reed: as spacecom continues as an independent command, it's important to identify any gaps or seams that emerged during the transition. on the global stage, russia continues to behave recklessly. recent press reports state that russia is considering violating international space treaties and endangering the global use of space for vital communications and sensing. further, putin has stab staged the strategy stability and arms control policies both our nations have respected for decades. over the past year, russia has

suspended its participation in the star treaty and the comprehensive test ban treaty. russia continues to develop new third strike nuclear weapons ranging from multimegaton nuclear war tore paoedzos to cruise missiles. at the same time, china is advancing its missile capabilities. they are quickly expanding its land base missile silos, pwaoeulding new air and sea nuclear platforms. and completing its nc-3. these developments may have significant impacts on stability in the indo-pacific and america's commitment to our allies in the region. since we are now in a try lateral -- tri lateral era. general cotton, i would ask for your thoughts on how your command is handling this challenge and how you plan to adjust your structure to deter both russia and china while minimizing the potential for escalation.

chair read: there has been in nonrecruited reach which means the program must undergo reviews and analysis for cost overruns. for this year 2024 ndaa require an assessment of the operational impacts of these acquisition delays and would ask for an update on the situation. general whiting, the threats to the united states and allied space systems continue to increase. as we are seeing in ukraine, dominance in the electromagnetic spectrum plays a vital role in modern warfare. we have seen large swaths of the battlefield in ukraine incomparable due to g.p.s. denial for precision weapons, as well as the disabling of commercial slight systems that both militaries use.

china for its part has invested heavily in jamming the electronic and connect kwreubg technologies that could be used to disability our military and civilian lights. we are in a race to dominate this field because any future conflict will involve a constant battle to control the spectrum and cripple the adversary's communications command and control. i would ask for your roles and vulnerabilities in these systems and lessons learned from the conflict in ukraine. space command has announced it's reached full operational capability. i remind you that does not mean full commission readiness. as a war fighting domain, space requires new battle management cape inters, especially the ability to detect a threat in space and relay that information to a weapons system. this management directs our ability to protect troops on the ground and spacecom must continue to integrate fully with the commanders. i hope you'll update us on this

concept and what the committee can do. finally, i would note the missile defense mission was transferred from stratcom to spacecom. this mission set has never been more important for our troops around the world as we have seen threats increasing in the red sea, middle east, and ukraine. i would like to know how you are integrating missile defense into your command and what capabilities you need to protect our war fighters. thank you again to our witnesses for appearing today. i look forward to your testimony. i would note from my colleagues that there will be a classified briefing immediately following this session in room 217 to continue our discussion. let me recognize the ranking member. >> thank you, mr. chairman. mr. wicker: thank you to the witnesses for their service. senator wicker: last year's strategic posture commission issued a report that was disquieting. its conclusion was that the united states must fundamentally

update our nuclear and space programs if we have any hope of countering growing threats from russia and china. unfortunately, the current administration has naively maintained the status quo. i am choosing my words carefully. in making this statement. while the united states has stayed complacent, russia and china have advanced by leaps and bounds in their nuclear and space programs. as we enter the third year of putin's war against ukraine, russia remains a major strategic threat to the united states. moscow owns the world's largest, most modern nuclear arsenal giving it a 10 to one advantage over the united states in tactical nuclear weapons. russia has also developed new weapons unlike anything in the u.s. inventory. it stocks nuclear powered transoceanic, autonomous

torpedoes and intercontinental cruise missiles against such weapons we are currently defenseless. as bad as this sounds, china is rapidly becoming an even greater threat. beijing is phodendizing and expanding its nuclear forces at breakneck speed. it will likely outpace the united states in the early 2030's. already it successfully deployed an operational strategic triade of nuclear missiles, bombers, and submarines. over the past three years china has tripled its arsenal and pwaeult network larger than ours. the chinese have flown a missile that can drop nuclear warheads from orbit anywhere onert *et with virtually no warning. both russia and china are also openly developing and testing counter space capabilities. each country has used ken nettic weapons -- kenetic weapons to

owe phreut rate -- obliterate orbiting satellites. when this is done the blasts scatter thousands of debris fragments, endangered hundreds of other satellites, and preview a frightening future. unfortunately, these aggressive actions only scratch the surface of their real capabilities. one would expect these threats to generate a sense of urgency in washington. today's nuclear and space danger should prompt us to reassess our assumptions about the threat, environment, and realign our resources accordingly. this is the unanimous recommendation of the bipartisan strategic posture commission. unanimous recommendation of this bipartisan commission. instead, we see more of the same. the current administration consistently delays nuclear and space modernization programs. it chooses to doddle in12ed of

actively confront a pair of dire truths. the united states' nuclear capabilities are falling behind. and the future of war will extend to space. collaboration with congress and the white house could replace that inaction with progress. we can start reclaiming lost ground by following the recommendations of the strategic posture commission. the unanimous recommendations of this bipartisan commission. we must accelerate the national security -- national nuclear security administration restoration by basic industrial capabilities. the current slow pace is out of touch with reality. likewise we must make progress on the sentinal icbm and columbia submarine programs. they require sustained investment and innovation. but the benefit is worth the price tag and the elbow grease that it will require. the advances made by our

adversaries demand vote defensive and offensive military solutions. i would like to hear from our witnesses about how this committee can help create a sense of urgency. when it comes to accelerating the modernization of our strategic arsenal and adapting our forces to the new threat environment. thank you, mr. chairman. chair reed: thank you, senator wicker. general cotton, your comments, please. general cotton: good morning, chairman reed, ranking member wicker, and distinguished members of this committee. it is an honor to be here today alongside general whiting. and a privilege to represent the service members and civilians of the united states strategic command. this is my second year appearing before you as a stratcom commander. and i'd like to thank this committee and congress for their support not only to national defense but to my portfolio. i have submitted my statement for the record. the most important message i

want to deliver today is that the forces under my command are ready to deter our adversaries and respond decisively should deter rents fail. no adversary should ever doubt our capability today. as a global war fighting command, stratcom sets missions across the gold as the ultimate guarantor of national alleyed security. our forces and capabilities underpin and enable all other joint forces operations. we do this in the face of challenges unlike anything america has ever encountered. we are confronting not one but two nuclear peers. the russian federation and the people's republic of china. this reality combined by missile developments in north korea, iran's nuclear ambitions, and the growing relationships amongst those nations adds new layers of complexity to our

strategic cal includes -- cal includes. it -- calculus. it raises possibilities of simultaneous conflict with multiple nuclear armed add --adversaries. projections indicate the p.r.c.'s nuclear arsenal would encompass approximately 1,000 warheads by 2030. as russia's unprovoked invasion of ukraine enters the third year, its reliance on nuclear forces increases as its conventional forces adrift. beyond russia's traditional strategic triad, it is expanding and modernizing nuclear options not covered by international arms treaties. last friday, president putin stated that 95% of russia's strategic nuclear forces have been modernized. in short, our competitors are improving their position against the united states and its allies

in multiple domains. far exceeding the pace we have seen just a few years ago. while our legacy systems continue to hold potential adversaries at risk, it is absolutely critical we continue to -- at speed with the modernization of our nuclear triade. including land-based icbm's, the b-21, the b-52, the columbia class submarine, the nuclear sea launched cruise missile, and the nlrso. as well as numerous related systems. while also focusing on the nc-3 enterprise with its upgrades and cybersecurity. i urge congress to continue supporting these critical national security capabilities. their associated infrastructure, and the sustainment of legacy systems during the phodendization period --

modernization period. let me be clear, while modernization will continue to be the priority, stratcom force are ready to fight tonight. my components will always be ready to fight tonight. i thank you. and i look forward to your questions. thank you. chairman reed: thank you. general whiting, please. general whiting: chairman reed, rahm wicker, and members of the committee. thank you for this opportunity to testify. i'm pleased to joined by my long time friend general cotton. i'm honored to represent the 18,000 professionals of the space command. our people are the most valuable asset of national space power. u.s. space command working with allies and partners has a moral responsibility to the joint force, the nation, and our allies to provide space capabilities through all levels of conflict. since desert storm, the joint

force has become reliant on these systems. and force size according to the assumption of always having access to space capabilities. this is why u.s. space command must protect and defend our space systems to ensure they are available in the face of the growing threats against us. inherent in this responsibility is our ability to protect the joint force from space-enabled attack. our principle strategic competitors, the people's republic of china anti-russian federation, now hold at risk the united states and alleyed space capabilities because they know our joint force relies on space to fight the way we want. precisely, lethally, effectively, and efficiently. to put it plainly, the p.r.c.'s and russia's actions have transformed space into a contested war fighting domain. additionally, p. c.r. military operations in particular have become increasingly enabled by space at all levels of warfare. and the people's liberation army

is improving their force's lethality and effective tphr*es by leveraging space -- capabilities. as of jab, 2024 -- january, 2024, the p.r.c. more than tripled its presence since 2018. with the space and counter space systems they have dramatically increased their ability to monitor, track, and target u.s. and alleyed forces both terrestrially and orbit. russia continues to develop, test, and demonstrate their counter space capabilities, despite not having achieved their war aims from their invasion of ukraine. this ongoing ground war has revealed military reliance on space and space enabled capabilities. to be sure, russia's war in ukraine has established space as an indelible enabler of terrestrial warfare. today u.s. space command seeks to expand competitive advantage over p.p.r.c. and russia by

leveraging every available asset, the rest of the joint force, allies, and partners, and u.s. industry and academia. the united states remains the best military space power in the world,ent our current architecture is opt tim mizeed for a benign space environment. to ensure success in the space environment we now find ourselves in, it is vital that u.s. space command is delivered improved capabilities and capacity. fully tested and with trained personnel by 2027. while a conflict in space is not inevitable, it would certainly be devastating and disrupt our use of space for decades. so we must be ready if deterrence fails. simply put, the p.r.c. is moving breathtakingly fast in space. america must rapidly increase the timeliness, quality, and quantity of our critical national space and missile defense systems to match china's speed and maintain our advantage. with the u.s. space force, as well as the army, air force,

navy, and marines and other combatant kpwapbdz commands and agencies, we have known -- specifically, u.s. space command's top five priority requirements that are key to delivering on our unified command plan responsibilities are, one, resilient and timely operational command and control. two, integrated space fires and protection. three, modernized agile electronic warfare architectures. four, enhanced battle space awareness for space warfare. and five, cyber defense of space systems. absent commitment to long-term investment in these integrated requirements, we risk seeding advantage to our principle strategic competitors in the space domain. with delivery of capability and capacity assured, u.s. space command will attain the required, enduring advantage over any adversary determined to

conduct war in outer space. thus ensuring defense of our homeland, protection of the joint force, and our allies. i am grateful for congress' support to u.s. space command and investments to advance america's leadership in space. with your continued backing, the united states space command will ensure space remains sustainable, safe, stable, and secure for all. chairman, i have submitted my statement for the record. i look forward to questions. chairman reed: general cotton, what force structure changes you anticipate in order to maintain our deterrence now that we have a tri lateral nuclear competition with russia and china? can you comment on that. general cotton: chairman, that's the lemon i walked into when i took command of stratcom. as i said in the last hearing and my confirmation, that was

one i was going to jump on as soon as i took command and took the flag. what we have done along with the comments of the ranking member in what we are seeing in the strategic posture commission results, we have done work internal to stratcom to see what is going to be the requirements in regards to what we need as a fighting force. the n.p.r. actually gives me the opportunity to do just that. i am staying within the confines of the administration when the n.p.r. says what we want to have is a triade, i absolutely agree with that notion that we must maintain a triade. i agree there is now time for us to look to see what do we do with the program of record that we currently have to ensure that i can cover not only one nuclear

adversary, but two. within all legs of the triade we are having that conversation right now. and there is actually studies going on in which my teammates are part of at stratcom within the department of defense that goes after looking at the recommendations that the strategic posture commission, that validates many of the notions that stratcom came up with even before the release of the commission. chair reed: general whiting, you reached full operational capability in december. which is welcome news, congratulations. however, the question is adequate readiness posture to support operational capabilities. they are two different topics. are there particular areas the commission should be aware of that must be enhanced? general whiting: my predecessors declared full operational

capability as you noted. that was to say our headquarters now can function as the other combatant commands and execute our primary responsibilities as laid out in title x and the unified command plan. as i noted in the opening statement our forces today are optimized for a benign space environment. the systems were either built or the requirements were largely laid down during a time we didn't face the threats we see. we have to focus on making sure we have the systems to protect and defend our existing architectures, even as we make our current ones more resilient. and we have the systems o to protect the joint force from the space enabling capabilities we now see the p.r.c. developing for example. and then we have to have the testing capabilities to assure us those new system will work anti-training capabilities so our personnel have the reps and sets if you will be to be ready. that's where we need to focus is on continuing to deliver capabilities to allow us to operate in the contested domain. chair reed: thank you.

general cotton, the program is encountering difficulties. the columbia program is slowing down rather than speeding up. we have, i think, some good news with the b-21. the basic mission is to maintain a triade and not something less. can you comment, particularly with respect to the sentinal program in terms of what we have to do at this juncture. i know they are evaluating it. general cotton: in regards to sentinal and where it stands i think i'll answer this way. there is no change in the requirements that i currently have on the modernization of all three legs of the triade. that absolutely has to be done. i think what's really important

for folks to understand is i think i'm probably the only combatant command that can't have a gap in my capabilities. because a gap in my capabilities, credibility as well as safe, secure, and effective weapons systems is key and foundational to deterrence. as you talk about all three legs going into potential delays, we must ensure that we never have a gap in the capabilities amongst those three legs of the triade. and that's what i look and study every single day to ensure that we don't create a gap in that mission set. whether it's land, sea, or air. chair reed: thank you. senator wicker, please. senator wicker: let's just follow up on that with regard to the triade, general cotton. i appreciate you meeting with us

earlier to discuss this. we've got the land based. and the air based. let's talk about sea based. your testimony points out that it involves the ohio class ssb fleet. and the trident 2 strategic weapon system, s.w.s. are we where we need to be on that? general cotton: all three legs of the triade are past system life. the good news is the men and women that are maintaining those systems are doing an incredible job to do that. the problem we face and the problem i encounter every single day with legacy system is ensure i have the required numbers of

ssbn's available as well as the required number of weapons that are available for the ssbn fleet. as we make the transition to the columbia class, as i mentioned to the chairman, what's going to be incredibly important, senator, is that we ensure that there is no gap between the transition of the ohio class weapons system to the columbia class weapons system. senator wicker: yes. at least with regard to this there is no talk -- there is no feeling in your mind that we can die vest so we can later in-- divest so we can later invest. that's nonsense in terms of what you're talking about. general cotton: that's correct. that's why i make that statement on ensuring that i don't create a gap as we do the transition from legacy to a modernized system. i will always have to be able to cover down the requirement with

the legacy systems. senator wicker: on page 11 of your testimony, despite the fleet's accomplishments and ability to achieve the mission today, it faces continued sustainment challenges that could impact its availability until fully replaced by the columbia class in 2042. are we asking for enough resources for you to get where you need to get on time? general cotton: i don't know that resources is necessarily the issue here. i think what i really see is the ability for the industrial base to be able to produce and not drive the gaps. so as we look -- senator wicker: to the extent that we are -- we are proposing to appropriate some $3.4 billion

extra for submarine industrial base, that will be helpful, will it not? general cotton: it will be. on the phodendization. toy -- modernization. to your point, we need to ensure that the legacy systems have the sustainability available to them so i can maintain the legacy systems as well until the new systems arrive. senator wicker: thank you very much. serious challenges in your bailiwick, i would say. general whiting, you talked about a vulnerability window on page 3 of your testimony. there is a vulnerability window communicated by our competitors and highlighted as we watch conflict unfold in ukraine and israel. what are we learning there? and state for our audience what the vulnerability window is.

general whiting: ranking member, the vulnerability window is the fact our competitors, p.r.c. and russia, have invested in counter space capabilities having studied us for decades to hold at risk our ability to fight the way we would like. so now we have to make our current space capabilities that provide satellite communications, positioning navigation and timing, those functions we have to make them more resilient against those threats and provide protect and defend capability to help protect them. those investment have been made. but we need to make sure those programs deliver. and that we continue to invest to assure that we can support the joint force with those kind of capabilities notice face of these threats. senator wicker: until they are delivered, there is a window of vulnerability. general whiting: that's correct. senator wicker: are the

requesters asking for enough resources to address this vulnerability window? general whiting: i think we laid out all the requirements we need. we know the programs we need. now we need to make sure those are delivering on time and pulling them as -- much to the left they can. senator wicker: they need to be pulled to the left. i would like -- senator wicker: explain to people who aren't accustomed to washingtonese what pulling to the left means. general whiting: that means to deliver earlier than we expect. senator wicker: that is a very important need, is it not? general whiting: i would like to have as much as i could right now. chair reed: senator kaine. senator kaine: thank you to our witnesses. general cotton, in your posture statement you mentioned continued congressional support is critical to overhauling the

sub industrial base to advance the navy shipment efforts. and the execution of the submarine bill plan is national imperative. i'm following up on senator wicker's questions. i completely agree with this. especially given the additional commitments we have now taken on with pillar one. how critical are the submarine industrial base investments like those included in the supplemental to ensure that the columbia class submarines are delivered on time? general cotton: thank you for the question. i'd like to say thank you to -- know there was, even yesterday in regards, many of the members that are before us today were part of that, thank you for the support in addressing the industrial base problem. the northwest it is a wicked problem -- in the northeast it is a wicked problem. the ability -- i do not have

capacity to lose one leg of the triade. and the ssbn, and slbn weapons system is critical to the triade and my operational plans. and the forces that i must present to the commander in chief if warranted. critical. as i would state for the land-based leg as well as the air leg, absolutely critical that we continue to press and ensure, just like my colleague said, if we can get things earlier, that would be incredibly advantageous to us as a fighting force. senator kaine: we did have a hearing yesterday on manpower issues generally. when you were asked a question about whether you needed more lee sources. you said it's not a resource problem. my colleague here said it's a welder problem. there is a manpower problem. we are experiencing it. australia is experiencing it.

the u.k. we have to be very creative in addressing this manpower issue if we maintain the pace you need to kept triade intact and effective. you talked in your testimony here about the four allies, principally russia and the p.r.c., also in the nuclear space, iran and north korea, and the growing relationships between them. do you see those relationships going in ways that really impact the stratcom domain? or are their growing activities in concert more in other military demands? general cotton: i see it in my domain as well. remember, part of my portfolio is strategic deterrence, that includes nuclear. but even in a nuclear deter rent space, let's have a conversation in regards to the relationship that we see that transactional relationship between russia and the dprk has manifested itself

in different ways over the past eight months. we are looking at that differently on what that relationship is actually -- what does dprk gain with that new relationship that they have with russia as an example. senator kaine: general whiting, in your written testimony you highlighted collaboration with al least, and commercial stakeholders. as a key advantage we have in space. i was at wall kwrops -- wallops island recently. and a commercial provided rocket lab to discuss government capabilities in this area. how are you thinking about the importance of collaboration with the commercial space industry? general whiting: i think u.s. commercial space industry is not just an advantage in space, it is an advantage for this nation, period. it is an advantage that is widening over our competitors. we absolutely need to continue to partner with u.s. commercial

space industry to leverage the cost curves they are on, to leverage the speed which they are operating to take advantage of as much as of that capability as we k the space command is partnered with the space force as they look at new ways of contracting with commercial industry such as the commercial augmentation space reserve they are looking to start next year. we are excited about those. senator kaine: i'll offer this question for the record. if in the course of us working on the ndaa this year there are any policies that you think we should embrace in the ndaa that would enhance our ability to collaborate in the ways you describe we would love to hear that. with that i hand it back. chair reed: thank you very much. senator fischer, please. senator fischer: thank you, mr. chairman. last october the bipartisan, bicameral congressional commission on the strategic posture of the united states released their final report on america's strategic posture.

its findings were sobering. we face two major nuclear adversaries for the first time in history, we are woefully underprepared to address this future threat environment. in their report the commissioners also unanimously endorsed 81 recommendations. if we can act upon most of these, the united states should retain the capability and the capacity to maintain a safe, reliable, effective, and credible nuclear deter rent -- deterrent throughout the next several decades. over the coming months i'm going to be working with my colleagues on this committee to include many of these recommendations in f.y. 2025 ndaa. general cotton, i appreciate our earlier conversations about this report and your very careful review and consideration of their findings and recommendations. do you agree with the

commissioner's statement that, quote, the nuclear force modernization programs of record is absolutely essential although not sufficient to meet the new threats posed by russia and china, and that the elements of the programs of record should be completed on time, expedited wherever possible, and expanded as needed? general cotton: i do, senator. senator fischer: can you please provide the committee with your views on which of those economiesers' recommendations you think are the most importan' recommendations you think are the most important or prioritizing? general cotton: thank you for the question. i was probably one of the first to receive the brief when it came to the results of the commission. it validated many of the things that we are looking in house and strategic command in regards of

what do we do with the current arsenal and the stockpile. i memorized what i would consider pages 48 and 49 of the commission, which has 81 recommendations. of those, i have prioritized what i think should be things that we get after first. i do believe that we need to take serious consideration in seeing what uploading and remerving the icpb looks like and what it takes to do that. i do believe that we need to have a conversation in regards to how do we have -- because part of that report also says the importance of having a credible and effective conventional force. part of that is looking at and ensuring that we have the right long range standoff, conventional weapons as well. that can be placed on a bomber

as an example. and then the look at what does all legs of the triade look like in regards of capacity and how can you expand capacity. how do you build the modernized force that has modularity and where we can always keep pace as opposed to the current system we have that it's hard to do that. senator fischer: senator kaine and i oven referred to the nc-3 of-r as the fourth leg of our nuclear triade. and the president's ability to command, control, and communicate with our nuclear forces, that's essential in maintaining that credible nuclear deterrent we must have. if nc-3 fails, then the deterrent fails. we have previously discussed, general, the importance of moving forward quickly with nc-3 modernization and building out that road map with a clear and

achievable near and long-term goals. i appreciate you briefing our subcommittee on that earlier this week about your plan. but in this setting, can you please share with the committee how stratcom is working with the services, with the undersecretaries of acquisition and sustainment and research and engineering to integrate new technologies and new systems into that nc-3 architecture? general cotton: i'd love to. one of the things that was first on the agenda for us was to ensure as we articulate the modernization of the nc-3 force we look at it in different bends. the first thing we must do to your point is ensure that the nc-3 system currently available to the president of the united states and to decisionmakers of the united states has the ability to fight through. so we want to make sure we looked at systems today and

ensure we are taking care of systems today. the other piece that we want to make sure we did is look at the midterm and, to your point, we have collaborated -- thank you for hosting us to present that, you and the senator for allowing us to present that to the subcommittee. and show the relationship that i have with a and s. our abgcy wigs and sustainment, dr. laplante, the increased relationship that i have with r and e dr. heidi shoe. that was missing prior. and then the relationship that i have with our c.i.o., mr. sherman. because of that we are able to coalesce and be able to come up with a plan that's executable. we are able to brief that to the deputy secretary of defense last summer in which the service components were also in the

room. now they have measured milestones to grade themselves against where that was missing in the past. we still have a lot of work to go. but i'm pleased with the work we have done so far. senator fischer: thank you. chair reed: senator king. senator king: we think about what's going on here in this room. this hearing is undoubtedly being watched in real time in moscow and beijing. general cotton, the focus of this hearing will naturally be on gaps and work that's under progress and what the problems are. but i want you to restate what you stated in your opening testimony for the benefit of our audience far away. you are ready to fight tonight with an awesome response to anyone who attack this is country, is that correct? general cotton: the men and

women that represent the united states strategic command are ready to defend if strategic deterrence failure happens tonight. we are ready today. senator king: the capacity of the triade right now is at an actionable level. we are not -- i don't want anybody to get the impression we are somehow crippled in terms of our nuclear deterrent. you have the forces you need to defend the country and also to impose unthinkable costs on a potential adversaries. general cotton: i do. senator king: one of the problems on the budget we have here, it always surprised me, we don't have a capital budget. our budget of the united states government is a cash flow budget. and the recapitalization of the nuclear triade is a capital investment. we are talking 40 and 50-year assets. one of the problems we are

facing in our budget is, it all comes out, it looks like it's in the defense budget. i call it the pig and the python. there is this bulk of nuclear phodendization that should be considered capital investment. i think that's important for people to realize when you look at the defense budget there is a piece of it that is really something that probably should have been done over the past 30 years that we are trying to do in a hurry. is that your reading? general cotton: it is, sir. the way like to describe it is i am responsible for maintaining and the components under me are responsible for maintaining national systems on behalf of the president of the united states. senator king: general whiting, you talked about -- we have the best space capabilities and have for many, many years. that's the good news. the bad news is, the dependency that we have on space, which makes us vulnerable in terms of the relationship with these

potential adversaries. what are we doing to think about alternatives to space? for example, i understand recently they are now teaching see lesstryial navigation at annapolis. we need to think how do we reduce our reliance on space assets given the development of anti-space capabilities of our adversaries. talk to me how we mitigate this risk. general whiting: we have gone to space because of the advantage it brings us. it allow us to operate globally intetherred to -- senator king: we were unopposed for years. general whiting: yes, sir. to your point, i know all the services are thinking about this, what do we do when our pre not available. in space command it's to make sure it doesn't happen. the service vs. to train what their secondary plans are and

all of them have those plans in place. and to your point are training those to their people. several of the services, such as the army, navy, and marines also have relatively small but dedicated cadres of space personnel to help their commanders understand the benefits and vulnerabilities of space so they can understand when those times might be they have to go to those secondary plans. senator king: i'm going to talk about those gaps i mentioned at the beginning that i don't want to overemphasize. you have partial responsibility for missile defense. it bothers me that we have been very slow on the issue of directed energy. we are using $2 million, or $5 million missiles to knock down 200,000 or $300,000 drones. this should be a task for directed energy. i hope that's part of missile defense, missile awareness, and all branches, not you

necessarily, but all the branches should be working on two things. missile defense and hyper sonic defense. those are strategic game changers that i think we have been slow to develop. is directed energy going to be part of the future? general whiting: two weeks ago i was in huntsville meeting with the missile defense agency. we talked about directed energy. i know that is something they are looking a i agree with you. i think it needs to be part of the future. senator king: i want more than looking at. i want development and soon. i think we should be having a capability in the red sea right now. this is an opportunity to use that capacity. finally, i want to associate myself with my co-chair, senator fischer, on nc-3. that is part of the triade. i congratulate you on the work you are doing. but urge you to accelerate and continue. the whole idea -- the

cornerstone of the defense of this country is deterrence. the adversaries -- adversaries detect a weakness, we are vulnerable. i congratulate you, but want to prod you to keep going ernestly -- earnestly and accelerate the progress. chair reed: senator cotton. senator cotton: thank you for your testimony and thanks to alt men and women who serve under you. general cotton, since deping took power over a decade ago, china's nuclear paragraphsal has increased by more than 100%. by 2035 the department anticipates that china's nuclear arsenal will have increased by 500%. how would you characterize the threat posed to the united states by china's rapidly growing nuclear arsenal? general cotton: as my predecessor said, i love this

term tpho* tkpweu -- terminology, the breakout that we saw and the advancements and how quickly the advancements that we are seeing on china to rapidly create a viable triade is breathtaking. senator cotton: unprecedented? the pace at which they are expanding? general cotton: it is. senator cotton: your statement says they have a triade today. is that correct? general cotton: that is correct. senator cotton: may not be the most cutting edge. they are working on stealth bombers. general cotton: correct. senator cotton: do you think a nation that multiplies its nuclear arsenal as rapidly as china does, especially when governed by communists, is doing so with peaceful intent? general cotton: i think the minimum deterrent strategy that we used to hear that china

unlinks themself with as far as their -- that their strategic policy i find hard to believe that that can still be a policy with the way they are building out there. senator cotton: for years china had minimum deterrence, but they also are well-known for a policy called hide and bide, hide your strength and bide your time. do you think it's fair china is shedding that strategy? general cotton: senator, they are showing us their capability and how fast they can grow. senator cotton: they also have had a long declared, formal, policy no first use. does it make sense to expand your nuclear program by 500% and retain the no first use policy? general cotton: i go back to using that as the opening for a minimum deter strategy. that probably is in alignment.

what we are seeing not so much. senator cotton: big investment of natural resources to expand by nuclear weapons if you plan to keep a no first use policy. wouldn't you say? general cotton: even though we haven't heard them say that. you are correct. senator cotton: it will shock everyone to hear the chinese communists have a history of lying. not just about their nuclear weapons. the tibetans would probably have something to say about that. let's look what we are doing to counteract this threat. first, let's stay on the threat. how does china's nuclear arsenal compare to ours today? general cotton: today we are still superior. but like i said, i think the reality is we are going to have to continue to modernize our current system. we are superior today. senator cotton: today. if china continues on the pace

which the department projects by 2035, will they have achieved parity with the united states? general cotton: in the realm of their land basis thames, yes. senator cotton: what if you combined the total forces of china and russia by 2035, would those two countries combined have nuclear overmatch against the united states and the current pace? general cotton: weapons count would be larger than our weapons count. senator cotton: what we are tkoeg. is the b-21 moving quickly enough to meet your future deterrent requirements? general cotton: the limited production rate of the b-21 is the only thing i wish we could do quicker. the fact that that is an incredible sixth generation platform all indications are that that weapons system is moving along at a great pace as far as delivery.

. the ability for production. as a war fighters i'd love to have it. senator cotton: be nice to have more than 100? general cotton: yes, sir. senator cotton: let's look at, i guess, a first generation aircraft, the b-52. i think it's 79 years old now? general cotton: 70. senator cotton: almost as old as some senators. we often hear criticism like, well, we're flying aircraft that are older than general cotton. we are flying aircraft that these generals' grandparents for flying. i'm of the, if it ain't broke, don't fix it philosophy. it's highly effective. why is it critical that the air

force re-engine b-52 for your needs? general cotton: thank you for that question. it gets picked on quite a bit on its age but as we look at what the capacity and what the capable is of that weapons system that platform, it's amazing. and what that will be able to do for us, and i said earlier, we need to think about thible for it to carry lrso. this is the platform that will carry lrso. it's the platform that has a lot of mass as far as capability. i want it to have a long-range strike standoff samebility -- capability even greater than it has. senator accountton: if it's well-maintained, it seems like a big part of our weapons.

>> senator warren? senator warren: strategic command is responsible for strategic deterrence including nuclear weapons. we were already planning to spend $2 trillion to modernize and maintain those weapons over the next 30 years. now we are learning that the cost for those programs are going to be even higher than we anticipated. general cotton, i know you are not responsible for managing these programs, but we turn to your command for your best military advice on what these programs will mean for our national security. general cotton, do you agree that decisions about how to build our nuclear posture should be based on the most accurate information we have at the time?

general cotton: senator, can you rephrase -- senator warren: should we base our decisions based on the most accurate information we've got when we're making the decisions? kip absolutely. senator warren: ok, good. d.o.d. did motte do that for the sentinel program which will replace all land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles. they have already concluded that the base assumptions for the cost quote quote, weren't particularly valid. when i requested d.o.d. contract with a respected group of outside experts in 2021 to determine the technical feasible of extending the minuteman 3 missile program, instead of buying expensive new weapons, i was told they didn't have contract authority to do so. that was not true. they just department want an honest assessment of the real risks of sentinel.

and since then, the cost of the program has soared. we initially thought the price for sentinel would be about $95 billion. now the air force reports that it will be $132 billion. nearly 40% more. by law, that kind of increase triggers a mandatory review of the program's viability. now i'm glad that this review is happening. but we need independent experts, people who will ask hard questions. we need to ask about the sentinel program, taking a look as well. yen cotton. would you oppose an outside review of the sentinel program if it helps enhance our national security? general cotton: i agree with the previous assessments done with the last three administrations in regards of where we are in replace ovment the minuteman program. as i said earlier in my opening

comments, what i cannot endure as a combatant commander that has to provide for the commander in chief, i cannot endure having a gap or a drop in the reliability of a current platform we currently have as part of the triad. senator warren: i appreciate that. what i'm talking about here, i want to make sure what we're replacing it with has been fully vetted and is the right direction for us to go. you know, even before this latest cost breach, there were bright blinking warnings that this program was not on track. the air force's aggressive schedule meant they were relying on immature technology which the g.a.o. warned at the time created additional risks of cost increases and schedule delays. now, best practices for budgeting these types of complex

programs is to develop what's called and integrated master schedule. analysis that's going to break down project into steps, resources and budget needed to complete it. sort of budgeting 101. sentinel did not have that. general cottop, you warned of the complexity of the sental program. i'm quoting you here. will challenge air force and industry partners in ways not seen for a generation. so let me ask, do you think it is important to have basic program management guardrails in place to help us prevent delays abcost overruns? general cotton: senator the rest of the statement, you're absolutely right, i've said it numerous times, it is going to be a mega project we haven't seen since the early 1960's. i'm a taxpayer as well.

and i want to ensure that we're -- that one, i have a weapons system that can deliver the capabilities i need to deliver. i also need to make sure that the don't create a larger gap in having assessments that would drive us to now question one leg of the triad in regards of, how i can produce or have forces go to it. senator warren: i appreciate that, jeb, but we have to have a plan here that's actually going to work we can't keep burning must be and say at some point we hope to deliver this thing. i am very concerned that pentagon officials are already saying, they're already saying, quote, they will make the trades it takes to keep the sentinel program funded, analysis be dam nervetion d. i'll be watching closely to see if the d.o.d. takes this review

that is required now by law because of the cost overruns, i will be looking to see if they take this review seriously. or if it's just another paperwork exercise to justify throwing more money at more expensive nuclear programs. thank you, jep. thank you, general. >> general, thank you, thank you both for your service and your teams as well. we're talking about some of the most stra teem i think weapon ours country has. while our forces are critical, they're only effective because we have the nuclear deterrents in our strategic weapons system to support them. general whiting, china and russia both understand how vital our space capabilities are to the joint force and they've been developing capabilities to

counter our space assets for years. are we currently postured to win a conflict that begins in or extends into space? when we take a look at this right now, and i really appreciated senator king's comments with regard to the fact that we're ready to fight tonight, but can we win that battle? and what about five and 10 years from now on the current trajectories? wipe senator, thank you for the question. today i'm completely clear in seeing we do have the world's best military and space capabilities. i will use the word general cotton used when we look at what china and russia are doing. they are moving breath takingly fast and so we must ensure that the investments that have been made and we thank the congress for those investments, continue

to -- those programs continue to execute and we continue to invest to make sure that we keep pace with that breathtaking pace. senator rounds: part of that, you provided, and you will provide an unfunded priorities list that likely will be sent to congress over the next month or so. if we were to fully fund that u.p.l. that unfunded priorities list, how would that impact your readiness in the near term? wipe the priorities i expect to be on -- general whiting: that will give us what we need in three, five and 10 years.

senator rounds: if this policy is not changed how will it impact strategic deterrence? general whiting: senator, thank you for that question. you're refer -- general cotton: senator thank you for that question. you're referring to code 2244 alpha. senator rounds: i imagine you're waiting for that one or something. general cotton: you're right. we have been talking about it all morning. you know, you always have plans that show overlap between legacy systems and new modernized systems. and as i stated earlier, when it comes to strategic deterrence,

credibility is foundational to that. and credibility is ensuring that the transition from legacy system, that there's no gap between the transition between legacy system and a modernized system. senator rounds: we're talking about modernizing significant portion of the triad right now. there'll be times when we need to have both system, the legacy system and new system operating and it may need to be for more than five years, correct? general cotton: that is correct. so that law would stipulate you wouldn't modernize dmoafns legacy system if you're within five years what you initially saw as transition to the new system. that could be troublesome. senator rounds: the sentinel program is critical to our deterrent capability, correct? general cotton: modernized replacement to the minuteman three is foundational to the triad. senator rounds: can we afford to delay the implementation of the

sentinel program? general cotton: we are late to need on all three neeforts program. senator rounds: what do you mean late to need? general cotton: i would nudge rather not have to have a transition from legacy to modern systems -- to modern systems from legacy that are past their need. senator rounds: i don't think you can respond correctly about the program even if the cost goes up and the review is completed this is not something we can sit back and take our time on. could you respond if the chairman would allow that? general cotton: we cannot, senator rounds. the analysis and assessments have been done we need to make the decision on regards to what we wan to do as far as the modernization of a

very important leg of the triad and that's the land leg and the icbm of the system. senator rounds: thank you. >> senator hirono. senator hirono: thank you, mr. chairman. this is for -- well beth of you. both witnesses. the 2024ndaa directs the d.o.d. to develop a plan for the missile defense of hawaii and military construction project that will enable the timely depliment of missile defense capabilities across all locations in indo pacom. in december you have some 90 days or so to complete and provide the plan. how is the plan coming along for either one of you? whip i'll take that question.

we took on responsibility for regional defense. at this time i'm not familiar with where that plan is. if i can take that question for the record i can get back to you with specific obs where that is. senator hirono: i've been concerned over time about the missile defense of hawaii. i'd like you to contemplate whether we need to mitigate any particular risk from our nuclear competitors as you both have discussed before, we have this plan, missile defense plan, in place. as you know, we have a major mishap in hawaii which led to my ongoing concerns about missile defense of hawaii. for general whiting, the 2024 ndaa required a study on the space functions of the national guard which must include a cost-benefit analysis for each of the futures of these

units. the options are the creation of a space national guard, keeping the status quo, or transferring the space functions into the space force. general whiting, what is the current role of the national guard in space? and how would you transfer the space function into the space force and what would you need if that is the finding of the study? and the reason for the study was that there were some decision made as to what would happen to national guard space, you could call it space units. there were some decisions made without this kind of plan or study or cost benefit analysis that would be to the three options i mentioned. so what -- what is being contemplated for the national guard space force? general whiting: senator, thank you for the question. from a space command

perspective, we appreciate the great support we get from a number of states that have their guard unions have space missions. it's vital to us that however those options are resolved, that we don't have an interruption to those missions. i would have to defer to the united states space force for the specifics of what options are being analyzed and where they're headed but it's vital to us that we not have any interruption to those missions. senator hirono: as you are probably aware we have a space function in the national guard this hawaii, these are skilled people. i want to -- i think we need to make sure that whatever decisions are made, based on an assessment that takes all of these issues in consideration. for yen white, previously space was only used by the government but has become the domain for new waves of commercial satellite, for broadband communications and remote sensing. yen whiting, are d.o.d. and u.s.

space command specifically and appropriately lef ranling commercial space capabilities? general whiting: thank you for the question. i think u.s. commercial space industry is one of our absolute national advantages and we have leveraged that in the past. i think we can find even better and more innovative ways to leverage it going forward. u.s. commercial space industry is moving incredibly fast. they're widening their lead in commercial space services over other countries. and so we want to make sure we are partnered with them as tightly as possible. senator hirono: what protections exist for satellite for physical or cyber attacks? general whiting: i do have responsibility to protect or defend commercial aspect as directed. as we work with commercial companies we have information sharing agreements with the companies that we are already contracted with for capability and we -- they actually sit with

us at one of our operation centers in california, at the highest levels of intelligence, to know what those threats are. we share that information. and then we want to work with them as well to help them harden their cyber infrastructure so that they're not denied through the cyber domain because that would impact our ability to leverage their service. senator hirono: i think that aspect of protections, the cyber domain, i have talked with private entities where they need to be sure they are up on what kind of protections they need to put in place as they work with you to make sure that we are all on the same page in terms of cyber security issues. thank you. >> thank you, senator. >> generals, thank you for being here. i need more context on a couple of previous points. i'll start with you, general cotton.

in response to a general question from senator fisher you said something to the effect of adequate standoff capability. could you talk about that a little bit? are we short in that capacity particularly on the conventional weapons and if so do you have a solution in mind? general cotton: senator cramer, thank you for the question. i can get a little more detailed on what i meant by that. as we look at who our adversaries are, we would all agree having standoff fires and long-range capabilities will be beneficial for us against the adversary. what i mean by that more specifically, and this is not a parochial statement, it's a matter of fact, is that i think the utilization of bombers and being able to have a bomber carry a long range strike weapon

because range is dependent on size. it's fuel capacity of the weapon. would be at very beneficial for us as a nation to have that type of capability for our bomber force. notus weapons that could budes for myriad of weapons systems that one could be specifically used in a conventional sense for the bomber that gives it incredible standoff and incredible rainle. what that does for us is that actually makes it so it doesn't have to hit a tanker as often as well. so -- and actually keep the air crew and the platform out of harm's way. senator cramer: thank you for that. something in response senator king, using his usual great illustrations of a pig and a python, i believe is what it was, referencing the lack of capital budgeting in our system,

transparency budgets are something that's always frustrated me on this committee. particularly with regards to my favorite, air force. you referenced the role of the -- of your command as national -- as a national role. understandably. united command. can you flesh that out a little bit for me as well? i have long been concerned that we're not adequately -- i don't want to say appropriate, but appropriating credit where credit is due and then cost where cost is due. general cotton: thank you, senator cramer. i think there's a lot of times where there can be confusion even within a service component that they're advocating for a weapons system or platform. that that is utilized in their operational domain. it absolutely is. but when it comes to strategic deterrence weapons, and

strategic deterrence platforms, i think that those are national systems. what i mean by that is that we are -- you know, we are doing the care and feeding on paf of the systems that ultimately belong and i got it, all weapons systems belong to the president of the united states. but in particular when we talk about strategic deterrent weapons, it's much more than the columbia being part of the united states navy or the bomber icbm becoming part of the united states air force. and i think there's probably room for conversation on how do we make that so we cannot have these conversations on funding. senator cramer: that was therapeutic for me if silos within the same services are confused i feel better about my confusion now. i can't help but notice there's a lack of space in your

leadership chart. can you speak to that a little bit as i look at the two of you side-by-side and realizing the history of both commands. general cotton: as u.c.p. changed we lost our space billetts and the yert of airmen who were space specific. i will tell you, my colleague here, general whiting, does have a joint force team that assists us. what i'm missing though is a space component officer, like a one-star general, that is a component linkage to the space component. my component that i have a direct linkage with the air component, air force global strike command. i have a direct linkage with the navy component with the joint force maritime command. i do not have a direct linkage. we are in the works though, thah general salter for example, to fill that billett, because you

were also part of the meeting we had here recently. what we want to do, you saw a lot of that was the space layer. how can you have, i want to be able to have experts and one that is at a general officer level, to be able to articulate the requirements especially when it comes to nc-3 if you will. senator cramer: i talked about the vulnerability to space -- i'm over time but if you could elaborate to that point? general whiting: it's important that we ensure that strategic command has all the insights they need as they rely on the space layer for early warning and protected communications. as general cotton noted, today u.s. space command provides a joint integrated space team in his headquarter they sit in omaha, to assist with that planning and make sure that he has insight into what we're

doing so we can best coordinate our plans together. >> senator, i did not realize you were in the room prior to recognizing senator hirono. >> that's ok, i wasn't actually at my seat. i want to follow up on what senator cramer was asking about, standoff capability. general cotton, so two years since russia's invaded ukraine, we've been forced to rethink our nuclear posture and how our own deterrence works with growing nuclear capability of our adversaries. russia has recently rejected a proposal to reopen bilateral nuclear arms control talks. their behavioring their rhetoric, along with chinese aggression, north korea's regular testing of ballistic

missiles and those kind of capabilities, iran, increasing its supply of enriched uranium, this underscores the importance of having a strong deterrence ourselves. the lrso, long range standoff missile system, it's developed in tucson, arizona at raytheon. this will be a critical feature of our nuclear deterrence. the ability to deploy this missile is a powerful message to our allies. so yen, beyond what senator cramer was asking about standoff more broadly, can you expand on the importance of the lrso to our overall deterrence and give any updates you have on its fielding? general cotton: thank you for the question. when we talk about the air leg of the triad, it comprises two of the tasks that are supposed to do. gravity bomb deployment and

release, and the ability to have a long range standoff strike weapon. lrso is absolutely critical for my mission set as a long range standoff nuclear weapon. it will replace the outcome that is currently -- that we currently carry. from the reports that i'm receiving from the component is the -- raytheon is doing a great job manufacturing that weapon for us. once again just like everything else, i -- if i get it sooner than later, senator, that's good for us. as far as maintaining the -- senator kelly: is the i.o.c. of this public or something we have to talk about downstairs? general cotton: i would rather have that conversation with you downstairs. senator kelly: beyond lrso, what

else do you think we could be doing to deter our adversaries we are currently not doing? general cotton: i think, earlier conversation on what do we look as far as posture and sizing of the current triad and what does that look like? it's in alignment with the steady results of the posture commission. it's also in alignment for the work that, to be frank, the pentagon is doing in response to the posture commission. it's work we're doing in stratcom. i can elaborate in incredible detail in the secure session to let you know the work we're doing in that regard. senator kelly: thank you. thank you, general. general white, a different subject. the spice priorities framework aims to see our -- secure our space industrial base including improving supply chains for crucial satellite components like traveling way tubes and traveling way tube amplifiers. in the united states here we

face some challenges in this area with limited domestic capabilities and also competition from china that's often hely subsidized. and this situation leads to supply chain risks for essential national security and commercial satellites. i've got an amendment to the defense bill to support the development of a competitive u.s. source for these components and i'm going to keep working on that this year. general, do you believe it's important for the department of defense to have reliable u.s. source for these critical satellite components to ensure quality, timely delivery and fair pricing and what other risk do you see from having inadequate domestic supply chains for key satellite components. general whiting: thank you for the question, i think it's important we have robust supply chains from trusted sources in the united states. if we don't have that, i think the risk is that this widening lead that our commercial space industry has created for us,

that might be stymied and that would give our competitors a chance to catch up we want to ensure that doesn't happen. senator kelly: traveling wave tubes and wave tube amplifiers are obscure companies, most folks haven't heard of them but they're important to us maintaining our edge in space technology. thank you. >> senator scott? >> senator scott: thank you, chairman. thank you both for being here. thank you for what you do. chairman whiting, can you talk about the -- how much dependence our defense capabilities, our offensive capables are on our satellite systems? general whiting: yes, senator, thank you for the question. the army, navy, air force, marines are terrestrial forces if you will. are sized assuming they'll have

access to space capabilities. because of that we've been able to reduce the number of force we have and can prosecute targets with fewer assets than decades ago. if we don't have access to those space capabilities. if those forces don't have access to those space capabilities we don't have the force structure we need to fight without them. that's why we have to protect and defend against the threats arrayed against them. senator scott: how many are we relying on? general whiting: it's our satellite communications, global positioning system, intelligence systems, weather systems, missile warning systems. it's a host of different capabilities we provide from space. senator scott: so if our adversary was able to demolish 10 of them would it create much debris? general whiting: almost certainly, yes, senator.

senator scott: and if that debris was floating out there, how much of our satellites one at risk because of just the debris hitting them? general whiting: that is a concern. it's why we monitor the 45,000 trackable objects on orbit to watch for potential conjunctions but we don't want to proliferate debris on orbit which would increase the risk to our systems. senator scott: so if you were an adversary, wouldn't that be the cheapest thing to do? if you want to cripple our ability wouldn't the cheapest thing to do be to blow up 10 or 12 of the large satellites out there? general whiting: i don't know the cost of that but it would certainly be incredibly reckless. it would pollute the very domain they're trying to operate in themselves because it's indiscriminate. it impact ours satellites, their satellites, other countries' satellites. it would be incredibly reckless baifor.

senator scott: let's take russia's forces. if you look at our forces as compared to russia's forces, how dependent are they on satellite systems as compared to us? general whiting: they are less dependent for the reason they are a continental power and expect to be able to run fiber and to do microwave shots and those kinds of things. they don't have the same global type military we do. they are less dependent. senator scott: how about china? general whiting: they have replicated in many way what is we have done in space. as they try to push us out if the first island chain and second island chain in the pacific they have gone to space for the advantage it brings. they are trying to replicate what we have done in the past. senator scott: if they were able to hamper our abilities, our satellite system, let's say china, and they were only focused on taiwan, japan or well for sure korea, right? they need their satellite system to do anything with regard to

korea, right? general whiting: senator, i think china, they are getting to the point where all of their forces are becoming space-enabled. so i think in any conflict they would be reliant on space capabilities. senator scott: only the power they want to project was korea, taiwan, japan, that's all they cared about, then they wouldn't need their space capability -- capabilities as much? general whiting: i think they would need those space capabilities because they're looking beyond those countries and looking at the u.s. and looking at where the u.s. would be flowing forces from and that has required them to go to space. senator scott: how about iran? they don't need it. general whiting: iran is not a space-enabled military. senator scott: do they have any ability to impact us in space? general whiting: they have not

demonstrated that ability, but we are watching their space program and ballistic missile program and can only think about what they're thinking about for the future. senator scott: what about north korea? general whiting: they have demonstrated a program that would have an -- that could have an effect on us they should not be launching into space because of u.n. resolutions that say they can't use ballistic missile technology for that. we have to keep and eye on what they're thinking about in the future. senator scott: north korea probably doesn't need access to space. general whiting: they are not space-anibled today. senator scott: but south kree -- our troops in south korea need it? general whiting: yes. >> thank you both for your

testimony today and for your great service to our kun rit. i'm going to continue on the electromagnet i think spectrum. yen whiting you indicated that elect ro maggette net i think operations are top priority. your forces have done amazing work at the air force base in my home state of nevada. but even with the efforts made so far, i am sure that there's probably more work to be done. so what actions do you need to take to ensure that the united states can deter, if needed, and defeat threats across the electromagnet i think spectrum and how can we help with that? general cotton: senator, thank you for the question. thanks for acknowledging the incredible work that team is doing. i'd like to highlight some of that work the team is doing, and that includes the support to the yukon commander and what we're

seeing in ukrainian efforts. thank you for acknowledging them. july of last year is when we stood up, when i was given the responsibility on inso. as you've heard throughout the testimony today, electromagnetic spectrum is incredibly important for us. it is a domain that was uncontested for us over the past 30 years. now that we have a fight, a potential fight with adversaries that, one understand that the domain we rely on, and two have the capability to do something to counter having dominance in that domain and spectrum, it's incredibly important and as we -- the lead component -- or

combatant command to ensure we have the proper training, the proper live, virtual and collaborative training techniques, because as you know, some of what we want to be able to test and train to can be done in the live environment so we continue to work on how do we, i call the reps and sets to our men and women in the armed forces. how do we give them the reps and sets in a virtual environment that shows all ranges of how they can contest that environment. senator rosen: my team will follow up with you on that as we work on next year's ndaa. i'm going to move on to reps and sets and that's modeling simulation we have that for spice space too. general whiting i'm going to keep on that list for a bit. space delta one trains weapons officers, again at the air force

base in nevada. these officers graduate from the pinnacle of training to prepare guardians for what they may need and more. building on what you may need, what you have now, the ability to model and simulate, how does this prepare your forces and what can we continue to do to give you that simulation you need because you may not be able to go up there? general whiting: thank you for the question. i know exactly the great work that happens at that air force base, i was stationed there a decade ago as vice commander of the warfare center vital capability. modeling and simulation is vital for us in space. it's expensive for us to get there, we can't just launch all sorts of things just to do training, though there's an aspect of that we need to do. modeling and simulation allow us to do multiple iterations of various activities and simulate the threats we now see arrayed against us so these weapons officers have the skills that when they go back to their operational squadrons they can share that among thee crew

force. so that modeling and simulation is absolutely critical to us and we want to continue to grow that capability for all space forces because that will support space command as we move forward. senator rosen: we'll work with you on that moving forward. speaking of space, i'm going to continue with you, general whiting. given the collaboration between japan and russia space activities that could challenge our u.s. security, can you elaborate a little bit about what's happening in iran given their progress, how might additional sharing between the united states and our partners in the middle east, we know there's increasing channels going on there, the emerging threats, particularly the iranian threat. can you speak to that? general whiting: our relationships is one of our asymmetric advantages. we have shined a number of space

situational awareness agreements as you allude to with over 30 countries. three of those are in the middle east. as we partner more closely with the countries in the middle east it helps us to have a better understanding of what is going on in space so that when we see potential bad actor acting we can call out that may haver. it builds a set of partnerships to deny those partnerships to countries like russia and iran. it's important for us that we continue to grow them. senator rosen: thank you, spreesht it. senator schmidt: i think -- i believe this is one of the most important committees in the senate for a variety of reasons. certainly our role in advocating for the national defense is important. i think going back home and talking to constituents and having those conversations about what are the threats, hearing from them but also explaining

the things we learn up here. so my two questions are related to that. that would be more sort of conversational about maybe a question i would get from somebody at home that i'd like both of you to address first. we heard earlier as far as nuclear modernization, the price tag of, you know, $2 trillion. potentially over 30 years. a number something like that. could both of you sort of address, you know, i think the perception is that the united states has right now all the nuclear weapons we need to blow up the world into oblivion a thousand times over. right? so if you were trying to explain the importance of this modernization effort, how would each one of you describe that to folks back home? a -- specifically why it's important.

general cotton: i'll start off, first i want to thank you, the men and women of tinker air force base and the work they're doing in tell of the bomber being built out there for one leg of the triad is important. going back to your comment, i think the way we should be able to frame it is, one, it's in the a one-for-one. it's not one of these conversations where we're talking about how you have to have a one-for-one or overmatch or those type of things. as we already know, the russians have more weapons than we have today. but we absolutely hold them at risk. so, so the way i would describe it to people as you need to understand, you know, it's a -- it's a proposition in regards to a cost analysis. i want to be able to deter because my adversary understands that the risk of them taking an

action would fail upon arrival for them to be able to meet their ultimate needs. so it's a cost-benefit analysis model, if kru will. that's what strategic deterrence truly is the way we use that cost benefit analysis tool is three legs of the triad. senator schmitt: as far as the triad itself, if we have everything we need to deter, we can wipe out a country off the face of the earth? general cotton: we must have the ability to have weapons systems and platforms. training environment. etc. that the adversary, because for deterrence the adversary always gets a vote. for the adversary to understand that the cost-benefit of them taking action won't jut weigh and that the modernized systems can hold them at risk.

general whiting: senator, thank you for the question. for space, the challenge is that the american people can't look up and see space systems. they dent realize the way it's enabling the modern way of life. i think it's important we remind the american people of all the great advantages space gives us that we're never lost anymore because of g.p.s., we can synchronize global stock mark, point of sale, precision farming. if we lost all of that, our modern way of life would be at risk. that's why we have to protect and defend those capabilities and make those investments. i think it's incumbent on all of us to help people understand how space is truly a part of our life even if they can't see it. senator schmitt: if you could identify one thing, of course in an unclassified setting, what keeps you up at night about china's capabilities, if you want to explain that threat to folks back home who don't understand the specifics what would that be?

general cotton: for me it's their capacity, capability, to build out their weapons systems and their arsenal. it's that simple, sir. the pace in which they can or -- the levers that they drive or do not drive on whether they go idle or accelerate. they control that throttle. general whiting: my answer is similar. what's most concerning is the wei-chih in a has clinically studies us and our depend -- is the way china has clinically studied us and our dependence on space and are rapidly building systems to hold that architecture at risk. >> mr. chairman, i would suggest the simplest answer is we want our adversaries to be scared so they don't try anything. >> i agree with that. i want to make sure as we talk about the modernization, how does that fit into that discussion. >> we want them to stay scared.

>> senator shaheen. senator shaheen: thank you, general cotton, yen whiting, to both of you for being here this morning. and for your service. senator kelly what we could be doing to deter our adversaries. what else we could be doing to deter our adversaries. general cotton, i appreciated the time we spent yesterday and one of the things we talked about was just how critical passing the supplemental bill and getting a budget process that's regular, that can be depended on is to ensuring that you can accomplish your mission. is that correct? general cotton: senator shaheen, yes, it was great speak with you yesterday and you're right. i think i would even capture c.r.'s, continuing resolutions for us. especially in my platform where everything that i own is being modernized. i think folks are quick to -- quick to not realize that

there's new start programs that are embedded in these large programs that folks will think are already under way. and not -- i just mentioned it to senator schmitt, for example. they're building a new bomber campus for sustainment, not only of the b-52 but the b-21 moving forward. continuing resolution could actually per tur b that. if you perturb anything in a larger program it can affect the program overall. and then we have a conversation of a program slipping. so yes. stable budget. on time budgets. are incredibly critical for us as we're making this modernization. not only across my portfolio but across the entire department of defense portfolios. senator shaheen: can you speak to what's in the national security supplemental bill we passed out of the senate that's critical to our defense industrial base and why that

matters as you're looking at rebuilding, ensuring that the nuclear triad remains credible? general cotton: yes, senator. even though the majority, part of my port 230e8 yoa, but it does touch on the strail stril base, the defense industrial base which touches all of our portfolios, if you will, in regard of how we strengthen that. i think that's foundational for our nation. it's more than even a -- it's more than even a department of defense issue. senator shaheen: one of the things that i think you alluded to was the -- the sort of end-game we're at with russia in terms of bilateral negotiations on any sort of new start treaty or an effort to reduce nuclear weapons.

can you talk about putin's conversations -- putin's recent rhetoric around using nuclear weapons and how concerned you are about that. general cotton: thank you, senator. the conversation we had is, i absolutely am a proponent, you know, of treaties. but everyone has to play. and you have to follow the rules. so yes. what i'd love to see china step up and want to have a negotiation with us, would i love to see russia come back is this absolutely. but i'm also a realist to understand that that may or may not happen. as a combatant commander, my job is to understand how do i built a force i can present to the president if that doesn't happen? but to your point on what we're seeing in the rhetoric, i think what we're seeing is the

president of the russian federation sees that he can use that as a coercion tool. to threaten in regard to what he had as far as nuclear force. senator shaheen: starlink and other commercial satellite ventures have been a complement to our operations in space, but of course there have been some issues around how those are being used and we have to ensure that we have the appropriate mechanisms in police to guarantee access. so how should we be thinking about that? and what are you doing to mitigate the risk that we might have by relying on a commercial source for some of those services? general whiting: thank you for the question. i would point to two aspects that help mitigate that risk. number one is, in all of my experience i have only known that every company we have contracted with for satellite communications and other

service, they have always fulfilled their obligations to us. i expect that going forward. we want to make sure we're writing the contracts smartly on what we need and making sure we get that. secondly, i would point to the thact that in satellite communications, we want a hybrid constellation. we need some built for the exclusive use of the government. in our work this support of general cotton as we provide nuclear command and control, protected communications to ensure the president, the secretary of defense and yen cotton always can communicate to their forces, we want that to be a government-owned constellations. through there are other requirements we can go commercial for. i think it's understanding what the highest priority, you neeblg military rierpts are and then satisfying these through our own systems and using commercial to the max extent we can, that's how we can help mitigate risk. senator shaheen: i have some other questions but i'll save those for the closed session. >> senator budd, please.

senator budd: thank you both for being here today. general whiting, your predecessor general dickinson told the committee that space force is working to create asymmetrical advantages around the globe. in a eare cents pre release from space and missile defense command it mentioned that they're operating across multiple commands including cyber and space to support war fighters, especially forward-deployed special operations forces. can you talk about the nexus between space, cyber and that? general whiting: thank you for the question. we do see this as a unique opportunity to help us all thee achieve our meigs. there's time that using space we can create accesses for cyber forces who then can support special operations forces. or special operations forces through their unique ability to gain access to certain geographic locations can help us

in our space mission by executing functions that support us. and so i have spoken to the commander of special roarptions -- operations command about that. as you noted have spoken to our army component about that. we also lef ranled the fact that our navy and marine corps components are also cyber components and so that gives us a unique pairing there as well. senator budd: so it sounds like it's a two-way street. space enables s.o.f. and other forces, s.o.f. also enables space operations? general whiting: correct. senator budd: there'll be reduced passty to fill combatant command requirements. the demand is up, that'll be increased across geographical combatant command. do you anticipate any impacts on your command should those cuts to s.o.f. move forward over the

next few years? senator budd -- general whiting: no, i don't. senator budd: so you don't see how it will impact you? general whiting: i have not been briefed on anything that will impact us. senator budd: shifting gears, i asked your predecessor how he'd use our satellite constellations, especially since they're deployed with the minimum number of satellites necessary. how would you answer that question particularly given recent revealed advance threats? general whiting: i would say today our kons laigs are optimized for a benign environment. as we see threats growing we have to now protect and defend those constellations until we develop the next generation of resilient constellations. that work is ongoing to deploy the next generation of resilient

capabilities but we are still going to have to protect and defend our current ones for years to come. so that's why we have to also focus on the protect and defend capabilities. senator budd: general cotton, i think we can agree that it's important important to continue minuteman's operational ratings. how important is it to conducting retest launches of minuteman to demonstrate the united states nuclear deterrent is safe, secure, reliable and effective? general cotton: thank you for the question. i think the answer is, i want to be able to have an ability to surveil all three legs to include the minuteman as well as my bomber forces and my slbm force as well. senator budd: general whiting, you've spoken about the need to maximize partnerships so why is this partnering so crucial to our national security space

capabilities? general whiting: senator, all the things we have to do in space, it's so much that, you know, no one department, service, command, even country can do all the things we need to do. it's an asymmetric advantage of ours to leverage the stake holders to get unity of effort to achieve our goals. that's why we want to partner as widely as we can with like-minded countries and organizations because it maximizes our ability to execute our mission. senator budd: thank you very much. >> senator peters? senator peters: thank you very much. general cotton, in your written testimony you acknowledged the importance of the refueling tanker fleet in accomplishing the global strike missions so we don't have to -- have to rely on intermediate basing installations. you also highlight the upcoming fueler tanker acquisition, being able to support simultaneous

operations including multiple combatant commands. how does a robust fueling tanker fleet sustain missions and elaborate on how the acquisition of the new kc-46 tankers will expand your global reach and expand your current capabilities? general cotton: thank you for the question. something that makes us incredibly unique as a fighting force is, we have the ability to fly the entire global. -- the entire globe. even at its onset the tanker and bomber were both complementary acquisitions. it gives us incredible reach. that being said, that's why it is such a unique relationship between the tanker force and our bomber force. on my air leg. and absolutely critical to my mission setting with regards to

ensuring that we have sustainable and enough tankers to be able to make that a enduring. so i pay attention to what the availability is of the tanker force. we have a great relationship with the u.s. transcom and jackie is a dear friend as well, to ensure there's no disconnect in the requirements. but you're right, that can be stretched with the requirements that the tanker force has on nonweapon system movement, missions that don't include bombers but includes providing forces forward, etc., etc. we always have to make sure we pay attention and see that those acquisitions, not only the nuclear triad, but those acquisition programs are on time and are healthy as well.

>> i suspect the new kc-46 will be around a long time. that mission is not going anywhere soon and i've told folks this could be a 50-year mission for this aircraft and i'm reminded the b-52's are well in excess of 50 years, accurate statement in regards to the kc-46? general cotton: i don't know how long the community plans on having a kc-46 but if we use legacy as a measure, the kc-135 has been around a long time as well. senator peters: absolutely. general cotton, northern strike in michigan is the d.o.d.'s largest annual reserve component readiness exercise that takes place in the country. over 7,000 service members from over 25 states and several international partners converge at the national aldamine war

fighting center known as nadwic. it's my responsibility to ensure they receive robust funding to support realistic joint force training with our global allies and partners, and part of this realistic preparation for future conflict requires training for our armed forces to fight and win in the electromagnetic spectrum. what role do you see state of the arrested centers like nadwic play in this electromagnetic challenge that only gets more specific? general cotton: what will be key is ensuring that those exercises are given the true challenge they will face and they can drive the techniques and

procedures because some of it is simple as that to counter the threat. having live reflective opportunities on training venues will be incredibly important as well. understanding that probably having a live training venue might not be feasible but having a virtual one is. continued support in having that push for that type of training, then you would be incredibly important. senator peters: thank you, chairman. chairman: before recognizing the next senator, we'll convene immediately after this open session in a closed session in abc-217 and i at this time will pass the gavel to senator shaheen who will preside here and there. senator mullen, please. senator mullen: thank you both for being here today.

first off, i want to thank senator cotton for emphasizing the importance of modernization of the b-52 fleet and keeping it in the air especially since that work is being done in oklahoma at tinker air force base and also will be the site for the b-21's and are building up the capacities and capabilities today to take on that new mission. we're very proud of that. general cotton, a question for you, oklahoma is proud to invest in the investments we've made to support the bomber modernization and maintenance at tinker air force base. can you speak to the benefit this brings to the leg of the triad? general cotton: absolutely, senator. it's absolutely foundational. tinker and the teammates there on the base support that mission leg on behalf of men and women of the air force global strike command that provides that leg to me is absolutely critical. the fact that we're expanding

and building a bomber campus, if you will, in preparation of b-21 is going to be extremely important but even more so, the production of the b-52-j as we go through the commercial engine replacement program for that jet senator mullen: in addition to nuclear, they are strapped with warfare, what is the next frontier for protecting our electronic communications and weapons systems? general cotton: sir, obviously it's protection systems and my colleague to the left also plays an important role in that. but more so, one of the things that we're finding and it was noted through both northern edge 21 and northern edge 23 exercises that it is really having adequate training so the men and women put in those situations understand that there are techniques, tactics, and

procedures that can avoid being susceptible to the interference you might see in that spectrum domain. i mentioned earlier but the realities of recognizing that domain is going to be contestant with the near peer adversaries we have now and being able to identify and find ways to ensure that we can fight in that domain at our choosing will be incredibly important. >> would you like to speak to that? senator whiting: it's the only way to get information back from space, our communication and warning and position navigation and timing. we absolutely have to ensure we can operate there free of behind lance or at least be able to operate through any hindrance that we see. we definitely want to look to technologies that can help us

reduce that susceptibity to jamming, for example. i think things like laser communications can help with that and i'd like to see those investments continue moving forward. >> currently we have a company working on a quantum and physics base communications techniques, is that a help, a big role for you guys? senator whiting: senator, i think that could be. i think that's one of those new technologies that would give us a way perhaps to defeat traditional jamming techniques, so i certainly would encourage the research lab and science and technology community to continue to work on that and for companies to bring mature capabilities forward in that area. senator mullen: is art defense industry capable of making those changes when we're working on a system they say is three or four years out, in some cases most times seven. are they able to pivot when new technology comes on? because obviously this is a

growing space and a growing concern, so there's new finds, new technology that's coming on constantly. are we able to pivot? i'll hold that for both of you all. in defense to say yes, we want to start moving this direction. general whiting: looking at our modernization programs across the portfolio, what we're seeing that's different and the way we want to do business is through modularity. having the opportunity for modularity is going to be critical for us and crucial for us because then we can outpace and stay ahead of the adversary. general cotton: we want to work with the systems that we've even for a long time and help them with the pivot but have a relationship with new startup companies that may not be burdened the way things have happened in the past and can now move right to the future and make sure they have an opportunity to compete for our requirements and help move them

through that valley of death they call it to bring successful programs forward. senator mullen: thank you, guys. we'll see you in a minute. i yield back. >> thank you. senator king, did you have a second round you wanted to do? we're going to adjourn for 15 minutes so that senators can vote and go into closed session in the s.b.c. at this point we'll close the open session hearing. [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2023] [captioning performed by the national captioning institute, which is responsible for its caption content and accuracy visit ncicap.org]