the house select intelligence committee hearing is nearly three hours. [inaudible conversations] >> the committee will come to order. without objection the chairman to click a any time. today, we come together to discuss the intelligence communities to 124 annual threat assessment. we begin with an open session and is been broadcast live and stream on the committee's you tube channel. the open session is entirely unclassified, all participants are reminded to refrain from discussing classified information or other information protected from public disclosure. on the conclusion of the open session we were recess and resume in the closed session in the committee hearing room at two p.m. or immediately following the first vote series currently scheduled from

1:30 that you can come pick it his intention to proceed with us and without any disruptions. any disruption of the committee will result in the united states capitol police restoring order and the protesters will be renewed and arrested. it is my pleasure to welcome a renowned group of intelligence community leaders during today's proceedings with with her e honorable avril haines director of national intelligence, the honorable william burns director of central intelligence agency, the article christopher wray director of the federal. investigation. general timothy hauck, director of the national security agent and command of u.s. cyber command, and lieutenant general geoffrey kruse, director of the defense intelligence agency. i want to pause for a minute to get my personal thanks to director burns into director haines. a man and what you work with this commit over the past over a year now in both a bipartisan way, working with jim himes myself and all of our members making certain we have the information we need and being available for discussion on important issues. agreed appreciate your

contributions to the success of this committee and he wanted to recognize that. the annual threat assessment hearing provides intelligence community an opportunity to opt e-commerce and the american people and she is threats to. intelligence committee exist to protect the american people by informing policy and decision-makers of the threats posed to national security which includes critical infrastructure, economic security, cybersecurity, food security of several of the components of national security. each year the world evolves growing more interdependent. our . our adversaries are aligning and emerging technologies are changing the operational and vibrant. we are in the midst of a shifting geopolitical landscape with strategic competition at the forefront. now more than at any other time at least not since the cold war, nation, state threat to dominate the united states national security concerns. regime, moscow and tehran are anti-american and working together drastically regionally and internationally. these common adversaries overlapping interest and

approaches, example code russia's invasion ukraine, hamas' attack an issue and continued iranian proxy assault in the region of the people's republic of china regular military show of force threatening taiwan. also concern is killing gangs recent test of the north green intercommunal ballistic missile based on the missiles flight data, south korea and japanese assets are at risk and it has the potential range of striking the united states. this is a flagrant violation of united nations security council resolution. over the last year the committee has conducted numerous engagements both in and beyond the scif. one area that seems fragmented and make is a foreign domestic divide. there are heightened threats at the border in the home and is under constant assault, whether it be from cyber attacks, counterintelligence threats for foreign malign influence. what is not clear is how the intelligence community communicates those threats to other federal, state, local tribal or private sector partners. the lack of clarity on this

issue raises a question of whether the federal government is organized appropriate and prepared to defend the united states against the kind of threat seemed to be faced from our foreign adversaries here. on more than one occasion some of your publicly warned a threat still might security from the people's republic of china, the prc's compromise and maintain persistent access to u.s. critical infrastructure. as stated in unclassified cybersecurity advisory published to the public last month, drc's targeting and as compromise telecommunications, energy, transportation and water sectors. to quote this advisor, in some cases the cyber actors had n living inside information technology networks for years to pre-position for disruptive or destructive cyber attacks in event of a major crisis or conflict. remember, the advisory states that this activity has been going on for years and that really if i think the threat we need to rise to is an understanding that this is not a new phenomenon of the prc targeting assets and

infrastructure of the united states. in addition to pre-position in critical infrastructure, china seeks to be a world power in science and technology by any means possible. this possesses, this, this poses a significant counterintelligence threat. china is attempting to advance as a technology superpower by offering investment and inquiring or stealing intellectual property in feels like power and energy, artificial intelligence, biotechnology, agriculture, quantum computing and semiconductors. russia continues an unjust war against ukraine's sovereignty bolstering its defense production by leveraging relationships with china and iran. we should not forget north korea munitions factories are supplying russia with weapons and artillery shells to use against ukraine. we look forward to further insights on russia's nuclear posture directed energy weapons come at a selected those in space and ground based at the satellite missiles designed to target u.s. and allied satellites. iran does also benefiting from

closer ties with china and russia has built and funded and network of proxies to promote iran's regional objectives. iran's support of hamas' attack in israel continues to back hamas. i ran provides weapons and intelligence for terrorist attacks on u.s. personnel installations in the region and terrorist attacks on the global supply chain transiting the red sea. last year during the annual threat assessment hearing i set forth the committee's plan for the reauthorization of fisa section seven at you. and the next amount of committee work has been into our bill reforming fisa. we produced a strong bill that puts in place the appropriate compliance guardrails and provides the tools necessary to protect our country. we know the importance of this authority and we know the danger to america and our allies if the intelligence committee does not have the capability to produce intelligence from fisa 702 collection. there is a perceived lack of accountability that is the most troubling aspect for congress and the american public to trust the intelligence community and that the intelligence community is doing the right thing

reporting wrongdoing, taking responsibility, correcting actions and monitoring actions. that is what our fisa bill aggressively reforms the fisa process to address past abuses. in the face of all these challenges the core mission stands which is give 54 threats and provide warning to protect americans. our committee oversight work takes this racers and we continually examine areas for improvement and provide bipartisan legislation solutions as needed. today with her questions from our members on various interest areas and the respect the time ask all of you be direct at the scene. with that of affording the answers from our esteemed panel at a vacant eyes by ranking member for his opening remarks. >> thank you, mr. chairman and welcome to our distinguished panel and in particular general hawk and general accrue sort joining for the first time. this annual hearing is a vital part of our oversight. it's a unique chance for the public to her directly from each of you about the icy assessment

of a range of threats and issues. the stuff we hear every single day behind closed doors. the world can sometimes feel as though it's straining under the weight of conflict. putin's ongoing assault and you can come the peoples republic of china saber rattling a democratic taiwan, the ongoing crisis in gaza come to dream situation in haiti, i could go on. my point is we need the public to see a dedicated and objective intelligence community that can soberly present these complicated threats and challenges based on fact and rigorous analysis. we are fortunate to see this daily on on a classified basd in no your parents today will help reinforce that. i will return to this dreamlike questions but we we're amid another presidential election. in previous federal campaign cycles we know foreign powers have attempted to interfere and the latest, the assessment by the ic says it's a possibility that they may do so again.

we need to ensure and in no way do i discussed any of the catalog of foreign threats that the chairman lee.com i agree with them in their entirety but we need to ensure in particular that foreigners stay out of american elections, period. and we need the community to credibly collect against and what the public when they determine such malign activity targeting our political process are occurring. we will be focused on this threat in the months ahead. please this committee was the opportunity to receive a classified update next week at the working level. as the eye sees assessment layette we've seen pass interference efforts by russia, china and iran among others of different sorts and with every reason to believe that some or l of them will try again. i'm particularly concern that putin is exploring opportunities because he has already done so in part and because he has a lot to gain. i hope you'll give us a sense of what the russian leaders calculus may look like as will a set of other potential actors.

i'll also note that this will be the first general election in the air of generative ai, which can create realistic video, photos, audio and text at a scale and sophistication that was unimaginable just a year ago. we need to be ready. the ic's job is to focus its collective powers outward to protect our nation but i feel strongly some of the greatest threats to our security and the world security unfortunately our home grown. i fear we are slouching towards an election in which decisions will be made based on what excites us, what enrages us, what in raptures as, that we will substitute for the critical faculties that are essential for a citizen and democracy, a self-satisfied scratching of our prior beliefs and political opinions. i, constituents regularly that you will all work very hard. we will work hard you try to take down the temperature and

restore civility and intelligence of our politics, but at the end of the day americans and their decisions about how people act as citizens of a democracy will get the democracy that they deserve. we are faltering with a continued failure to support ukraine. the russian leaders has been emboldened to believe he can snatch victory from the jaws of defeat. our ukrainian partners have fought with incredible courage against the russian war machine and then when victories that were beyond anyone's expectation. it appears, however, that we have lost our nerve at the critical juncture. director burns, you recent return from another visit to kyiv. i hope you will share some reflections on what's at stake and urgency with which we need to act. finally, as the chairman said and in the category of self-imposed crazies, i am deeply concerned section 702 of fisa expired in just over a

month and thus congress ask because he icy winds can attest, 702 is her most important intelligence authority and wendy to reauthorize it right away. i appreciate all the work the witnesses at the table and done to help make that the case but we're not done yet. before getting back to the chair but i like to touch briefly on technology adoption and innovation in the ic. i've long championed this work and also to report on the topic some years ago. for all of china's strengths they cannot compete with the entrepreneurial culture and innovation that we regularly achieve here in the united states. getting that innovation into the ic's mission and judith dod's mission is going to defy our success over the next decade. we spent a lot of time in this place abating with a capital should flow, how ip should be protected, whether we should shut down a chinese own social media platform. the merits of those efforts are open to debate, but if we continue to integrate the way we always have, we will win.

so i thank you all for being here. i look forward to what will hopefully be a very alley procession for the american public, and i yield back. >> i will now turn to april 8 come director of national intelligence will be presenting the opening statement. >> thank you so much, chairman turner, ranking member himes, members of the committee. thank you for the opportunity to be here alongside a wonderful colleagues to present the ic's annual threat assessment. before i start i want to public thank the people of the intelligence community from the collector to the analyst and everyone in between. we are presenting the results of their labor at this hearing. they worked tirelessly everyday to keep our country safe and prosperous, and we're all very proud to represent them. and also want to take the opportunity to thank all of you for the extraordinary support that you shown to the intelligence community. the ic's relationship with its oversight committees quite obviously is critically

important edge all work with us on a bipartisan basis that is especially inspiring in today's environment, and we're grateful for your encouragement and for your wisdom. today, the united states faces an increasingly complex and interconnected threat environment characterized i really three categories of challenges. the first is an accelerating strategic competition with major authoritarian powers that are actively working to undermine the rules-based ruln international system that the united states and our partners rely on for trade, commerce, the free flow of information and accountability to the truth. the second category is a set of more intense and unpredictable transnational challenges such as climate change, corruption, narcotics trafficking, health security, terrorism and cybercrime that often interact with traditional state-based political, economical and security challenges. the third category is regional and localized conflicts that

have far-reaching and at times cascading locations, not only for neighboring countries but also for the world. and all three challenges are affected by trends in new and emerging technologies, environmental changes and economic strain that are stoking instability and make it that much more challenging for us to forecast the development and their implications. these dynamics are putting unprecedented burdens on the institutions and relationships that the united states relies on to manage such challenges, and perhaps more than ever highlight the need for sustained u.s. leadership to uphold the rules-based order. and i will just touch on these three categories of challenges starting with strategic competition in china. in an effort to provide some context and highlight some of the intersections. president xi continue to envision china as a leading power on the world stage and chinese leaders believe it is essential to project power globally in order to be able to resist u.s. pressure for their convinced that the united states

will not tolerate a powerful china. nevertheless, the prc seeks to ensure china can maintain positive ties to the united states and will likely continue to do so this year. as this seeks to build a relationship is to the capacity to attract our direct investment. fact boosting the domestic economy is a fundamental priority for president xi yet he appears be doubling down for long-term growth strategy that will deepen public and investor pessimism over the near-term with youth unemployment around 14.9%, no major stimulus aimed at consumption forthcoming, massive local dance and a property market contraction 2024 is likely to be another difficult year for china's economy, all against the backdrop of an aging and shrinking population and slowing economic growth. president xi is counting on china's investment in technologies such as advanced manufacturing and robotics, official intelligence, high-performance computing to

drive productivity gains and spur growth in the future. yet he's increasingly concerned about the united states ability to interfere with china's technological goals. consequently an effort to protect and promote china's capacity to compete technologically, which president xi views as fundamental to his long-term growth strategy, prc leaders modified their approach to economic retaliation against the united states over the last year imposingly some tangible cost on u.s. firms even as they continue to moderate such actions to avoid domestic costs. and chinese leadership is for the more pursuing a strategy to boost china's indigenous innovation and technological self-reliance, expand their efforts to acquire steel or compel the production of a lecture property and capabilities from others, and continue to engage in coercive behavior to control critical global supply chains of relevance. in the meantime president xi is emphasis on control and central oversight is unlikely to solve

the challenges posed by china's endemic corruption, demographic decline, and over the coming year tension challenges and china's aspirations for greater geopolitical power will probably become all the more apparent. give it its ambitions beijing will continue to use its military forces to intimidate its neighbors and to shape the regions actions in accordance with the prc's priorities. we expect the pla will feel more advanced platforms, the ploy new technologies and grow more confident in joint operations with a particular focus on taiwan and the western pacific. the role and tender for china's growing dr. ford's and cyber capabilities in this effort and ultimate intent behind unprecedented growth in these areas remain priorities for us in the ic and are not unrelated to the actions in russia. president putin's war of aggression against ukraine continues unabated.

ukraine's retreat and a struggle to stave off further territorial losses in the past few weeks have expose the erosion of ukraine's military capabilities and the declining availability of external military aid. the assistance that is contemplated in the supplement is absolutely critical to ukraine's defense right now, and without that assistance it is hard to imagine how ukraine will be able to maintain the extremely hard-fought advances it is made against the russians, especially given the sustained surge in russian ammunition production and purchase from north korea and iran. meanwhile, president putin is increasingly, increasing defense spending in russia, , reversing his long-standing reluctance to devote a high percentage of gdp to the military as a looks to rebuild. and in many ways this is profit by the fact russia has paid an enormous price of the war in ukraine. not only has russia summit or military losses than at any time since world war ii, roughly 300,000 casualties and thousands

of tanks and armored combat vehicles setting them back years, it is also precipitated finland and sweden's membership in data which putin this requires an expansion of russia's ground forces. putin continues to judge that time is on a site and almost certainly assumes that a larger better equip military will also serve the purpose of driving that point home to western audiences. such messaging is important because putin's strategic goals remain unchanged. he continued to see nato enlargement and western support to ukraine as reinforcing his long-held belief that the united states and europe seek to restrict russian power and undermine him. and, of course, in the meantime russia continues to modernize and fortify its nuclear weapons capability even though it maintains the largest and most diverse nuclear weapons stockpile, and we remain concerned moscow will put at greater risk long-standing global norms against the use of asymmetrical strategically destabilized weapons, including

in space and in the cyber domain. another critical intersection where monitoring is the relationship among the governments of russia, north korea, china and iran which is evolving as these four countries expand collaboration through a web of bilateral and to some cases bilateral arrangements. this growing cooperation willingness to exchange eight in military, economic, political and intelligence matters enhances their individual capacities, enables them to cooperate uncompetitive actions, assistant to further undermine the rules-based order and gives them each some insulation from external international pressure. nevertheless, we assess these relationships will remain far short of formal alliances or multilateral access, parochial interest, desire to avoid entanglements, and wariness apart and stability for each other's actions will likely limit their cooperation and ensure it advances incrementally, absent directing coffee between what of these countries and the united states. nevertheless, the power dynamics

are shifting among them and this is creating new challenges. in particular russia's need for support in the context of ukraine has forced it to grant some long-standing concessions to china, north korea and iran with the potential dynamite among other things long-held nonproliferation norms. and as a noted in the beginning, intensifying transnational challenges or interacting with his more traditional threats. for example, with the advent of generative ai, state and nonstate actors were interested in conducting for one polite influence operations no longer need to master a new language or create potentially come to create potentially believable false content. and the threat of maligned actors exploiting these tools and technology to undercut u.s. interests and democracy is particularly phone as voters go to the polls in more than 60 elections around the globe this year. we have also a massive increase in the number of ransomware attacks globally which went up roughly 74% in 2023 from 2023

from what it was in 2022. use entities with the most heavily targeted. many of these are conducted by nonstate actors with their russia-based cyber criminal group, like bed, , remain the mt popular ransomware services as a provider. sorkin ransomware is a service provider. locket was responsible for nearly a quarter of all claimed attacks worldwide leading to a joint effort by 11 countries to seize its resources and take them its online domain. transnational criminal organizations in human smuggling operations increasingly exploit migrants through extortion, kidnapping and human trafficking. and in particular the threat from illicit drugs remains at historic levels with mexican transnational criminal organizations supplying and moving large amounts of synthetical goods such as that no into the united states. more than 100,000 americans have died from drug related overdoses during the past year and most of those deaths have been attributed to elicit fentanyl. as such the threat from fentanyl

and other synthetic drugs to the health and welfare of everyday americans remain a top priority for the intelligence community. in the third category with multiple regional conflicts with far-reaching implications press no more obvious even in the middle east. the crisis in gaza is a stark example of a regional development have the potential for broader and even global implications. now, having lasted for more than five months, the gaza conflict has roiled the middle is with renewed instability present new security paradigms and humanitarian challenges while polling in the range of actors. the conflict has prompted new dynamics even as it is entrenched old one. we continue to assess that hezbollah and iran did not want to cause an escalation of the conflict that pulls us or even a dent into a format war. yet, the houthis entered the war and were willing to do so without iran acting first, becoming one of the most aggressive actors in the conflict. the iranian aligned militia groups and if i can see that of an attacking our forces have more focus on the united states

and israel using the conflict as an opportunity to pursue their own agenda. moreover, the crisis has galvanized violent and range of actors around the world and what it is too early to tell it is likely the gaza crisis will have a generational impact on terrorism. both al-qaeda and isis inspired by hamas who directed supporters to conduct attacks against israel and u.s. interests, and we seem how it is inspiring individuals to conduct acts of anti-semitism and islamophobic terror worldwide. in this third category of regional and local as catholics, we have many more we might discuss include haiti, sedan, what is happening in eastern democratic republic of congo and the list goes on. this brings me to section 702 of the foreign intelligence surveillance act as was mentioned, which will expel on april 19 with that congressional action. the intelligence gathered pursuant to section 702 was essential in preparing this annual assessment and is absolutely fundamental to every aspect of our work. section 702 provides unique

insights into foreign intelligence target such as for emphasis, terrorist organizations including hamas, weapons proliferators, proliferators, spies, malicious cyber actors and fentanyl traffickers. it does so at a speed and reliability that we simply cannot replace any other authority. as congress pursues reauthorization, we understand there would be reformed and we support those to bolster the complaint and oversight regimes in place today while preserving the operational agility that is vital to keeping the nation safe and we know how much this committee has worked on that option. we thank you very much and look forward to your question. >> thank you, director haines. i also want to thank director burns, director haines, directorate and, of course, former director of nsa nakasone or your assistance and the process that this committee undertook in drafting our 702 reforms will and reauthorization. the reforms that are in that bill, this can you worked very

diligently responding to each of the areas and will be found abuses, and this bill not only continues the ability for the intelligence community to collect intelligence on foreigners abroad, not american citizens, foreigners abroad, it also addresses the concerns that we had and the concerns that been part of the public discussion in congress of the abuses. i appreciate the fact that you have not only cooperate with this but you've assisted us in the overall process of drafting that, and in advocacy for it. ..

>> people who want to do america harm have entered the country illegally and are here. now, you have continues to cite that warning, and i'd hike -- you have continued to cite that warning. and you believe that we are at a significant risk right now, here, from the possibility of a terrorist attack. >> i believe that the terrorist threat level that we're contending with right now is at a whole other level from an already heightened terrorist threat level that we were seeing even before october 7. and i say that before a variety of reasons. first, you've seen a veritable rogue gallery of foreign terrorist organizations calling forrist attacks against us in a way that we haven't seen in a long, long time. and these are terrorist organizations, as this committee knows very well, which can often don't see eye to eye on much, but they seem to see eye to eye on this. i would add to that, that we are very concerned about the risk of

inspire spd attacks, lone actors here, inspired be by some of those same calls for violence from over in the middle east. and so this is the a time not for panic, but for heightened vigilance given the rice -- the racing. director,. >> director, i'm going to scu you a couple questions about the fbi's role in designating individuals as known terrorists, suspected terrorists and on the no-fly list. when there are concerns that an individual might be affiliated with a terrorist organization or have the intent to undertake a terrorist attack, there are designated categories, known terrorists, suspected terrorists, no-fly list and selectee. could you describe the fbi's role in those designations? >> so the fbi maintains the so-called terrorist watch list, the known or suspected terrorist list, based on information that comes from a variety of sources. that could come from fbi investigative work, but very often a it comes from information from our, from our

intelligence partners. or from other sources, other agencies. and so that's when the so-called drog, the derogatory information about the individual, puts them on the list. and then armed with that list, that's what allows us to engage with dhs as a running -- as they're running names when they come in. >> who with designates someone on the no-fly list? >> well, the difference between no-fly list and the selectee list i guess i would say is they are both individuals who based on the list don't fly or shouldn't fly, and then there are those who are identified for heightened screening. and it, an interagency process determines who's in which category. >> what's the fbi's role in that? >> well, the fbi contributes its own threat intelligence, and obviously, maintains the watch list itself. >> and the no-fly list is

maintained by the fbi? >> that's my understanding. >> have any individuals who are known terrorists, suspected terrorists or who are on the no-fly list presented themselves at the southern border or been apprehended crossing illegally into the united states? >> we have seen over the last, i think, five years an increase in the number of ksts or known or suspected terrorists attempting to cross the southern border. >> have individuals on the knownist list, suspected terrorist list on no-fly if list presented themselves at a u.s. airports once entering the united states, attempting to fly? >> i believe the answer to that is yes as well, although i don't have that right in front of me at the moment. >> have they known? -- flown? if. >> well, there may have been instances where as part of an investigation if in close coordination in order to be able to potentially ap apprehend somebody, somebody's allowed to

fly in order to see where they're going and then take action. but not intentionally. >> have individuals on the no-fly list been permitted to fly? >> i believe, again, depends on what time period you're talking about, but i believe there have been individuals where, in coordination with investigators and other agencies, an individual that we want to see where they're going is and be able to potentially arrest them, that there may have been situations where somebody's allowed to fly in that situation. >> does the fbi have a role if someone presents themselves at an, a u.s. airport with the intent to fly that is on the no-fly list, the fbi involved in permitting them to fly or down graigd their status the for them to fly? >> not. no. well, we provide information to the agency, the dhs agency that's involved at the airport screening, but the decision to allow them to fly is not ours.

>> are you notified if someone prosecute no-fly list shows up and wants to fly? >> certainly most of the time, that's my understanding, yes. >> thank you. director burns, director haines, ukraine is a significant issue for the united states as we are, unfortunately, in a position where we are caught up in the legislative process that has not yet resolved the issue of continued u.s. support for ukraine as they struggle on the battlefield against russia and ukraine, russian aggression. director burns, there are still individuals who claim that this war, this aggression by russia where they've invaded ukraine, is about russia wanting to prevent ukraine from being in nato or perhaps if even that russia instigated this incursion

by russia or that russia itself is trying to counter nato in ukraine. this conflict's much more than that, isn't it, director burns? if help us understand this conflict -- you've served as the u.s. ambassador to russia, you know putin well. you've seen the intelligence. you have been active in working with ukraine and this administration on this issue. what is this conflict about, and what is putin seeking in ukraine? >> i think what vladimir putin seeks, what caused him to launch his brutal and unprovoked invasion about two years ago was his fixation on subjugating ukraine and controlling its choices, much broader than the issue of nato. i think putin, and i've heard him say this many times in the past, believes that ukraine isn't a real country, that it's weak and divided, and what ukrainians have done is

demonstrate that a real countries fight back. and so i think there's a great deal at stake today in the supplemental assistance that the congress is considering. there's a great deal at stake not only for ukrainians and european security, for our long-term interests around the globe including in the indo-pacific. >> do ukrainians want to be part of russia? >> i'm sorry? >> do ukrainians want to be part of russia. >> the vast majority of ukrainians especially reinforced by putin's brutal invasion want to be a part of a sovereign and independent ukraine. that's why they've fought with such bravery and valor with our support which has been incredibly important and remains incred write important to their success. >> in other words, if there was support in ukraine for russia, wouldn't we have during this conflict seen is an insurgency, some uprising of individuals who were carrying the cause of russia is? and we've not seen that in ukraine, have we? >> no. what you've seen is incredible bravery and valor, as i said

before, on the part of ukrainians which have demonstrated their commitment to a sovereign, independent, democratic ukraine. >> in the areas where russia has taken ukraine territory, has there been peace? are the people there safe? how is russia treating ukrainians once they incorporate a territory? >> they are treating them as second class citizens with a fair amount of are -- of repression as well. just like, i would add, they treat many of their own citizens. >> director burns, tell us of some of the war crimes that have occurred against the ukrainian people. >> i think, you know, one of the most vicious of those crimes has been the illegal transportation and abduction n effect, of ukrainian children. i think that's the one that, you know, i think strikes at all of our hearts as well. >> if this is about nato, director burns, would putin be kidnapping children in ukraine? >> no. as i said, i don't think this is just about nato, it's about that a wider fixation that putin as

about subjugating ukraine. >> director haines, tell us what in your review of the intelligence, what is this conflict about? >> oh, i think director burns stated it well. certainly about the subjugation of ukraine, but also, i mean, one of the things that's very consistent with in that putin believes the greatest tragedy of the 20th sent arely is the breakdown of the soviet yoon on. he perceives that they lost a tremendous amount in that context and, i think, does not want to be the leader that loses even further influence over those states that were a part of the soviet union and, in fact, wants to bring it back to its former glory. and i think the other aspect of this that is behind, you know, the importance of our conning to support ukraine in their extraordinarily courageous acts in countering russia is china is also watching what's aping here.

and i think's one of those scenarios where it's -- china sees that we're able and we already overexceeded, i think, their expectations in terms of coming together with europe and actually countering russia in this scenario. but they see that resolve weak within and and our inability the maintain assistance, that is going to be a lesson that they're going to learn for the future for their own assertive efforts in their region. >> director haines, tomorrow if ukraine or nato or the united states said no nato for ukraine, would this be over? >> no. >> director burns, we have, unfortunately, taken a significant amount of time for congress to act for ukraine aid to be approved. we have stood by ukraine, we have provided the weapons that they have needed, that they have fought, we have not fought, they have fought to counter russian aggression with great loss.

what is our a delay costing now? if what is happening on the battlefield, and is ukraine at a discuss advantage because we have not approved aid in. >> yes, is the short answer. you know, i came back a couple of weeks ago from if my tenth visit to ukraine during the course of the war and in conversations just with president zelenskyy and with our intelligence counterparts and ukrainian military officers, i was struck by several things. first, ukraine is not running out of courage and tenacity, they're running out of ammunition, and we're running out of time to help them. i was briefed on a battle which caused a rushed withdrawal of the ukrainian forces about two days before i arrived in kyiv. and one of the senior ukrainian partners within the battle told me that our men fought as long and hard as they could, but we ran out of ammunition, and the russians just kept coming. and what i worry about in '24

without supplemental assistance is that you're going to see more of these cities. ukraine is going to lose more ground. notwithstanding their courage and tenacity. and and maybe significant ground over time. and as director haines said, i think that that has consequences for american interests that go well beyond ukraine and european security, they go directly to our interests in the indo-pacific. i think they're likely -- that kind of an outcome will stoke the ambitions of the chinese leadership, and their going to undermine the faith that our partners and allies in the indo-pacific if have in our reliability as well. with supplemental assistance, however, i think it is possible to cement a strategic success for ukraine, for the west and a strategic loss for vladimir putin. to defeat him in his goal of subjugating ukraine and controlling its choices. to put ukraine in a position whereby the end of 2024 it can

regain the initiative on the ground, but even more importantly negotiate from from a position of relative strength. with putin's russia. i don't think putin is serious today about negotiating. he may be interested in the theater of negotiations, but he's not interested in compromise he's interested in negotiations where he can dictate the terms. without supplemental assistance, i think that's the future that a ukrainians could face a year from now. with supplemental assistance, i think it's possible to puncture his arrogance, his confidence that time is on his side and put ukrainians in the position where they could negotiate an outcome from a position of relative strength, an outcome in the which, as i said, putin's goal is defeated, ukraine remains a sovereign, independent state anchored in western institutions and has the time and the security to recover while russia saw has to live with the long-term -- russia as to live with the long-term consequences

of putin's foolish and brutish invasion of ukraine. >> last question. are there -- there are people in congress who support aid for ukraine but believe, i believe mistakenly, that we have time, that this is not at a create call juncture, that we can take our anytime approving this aid. director burns, director haines, are they mistaken? >> i think as a i said before, mr. chairman, the ukrainians are running out of ammunition. i saw that in the description of what happened, they're running out of munitions for both air defense and artillery. one of the ukrainian brigades that fought, i was told in the two days before they were the forced to withdraw at a grand total of 15 155 munitions for the entire by e divide of something like 500 personnel. another brigade that had a grand total of 42 mortar rounds. it's not that they didn't fight with courage and tenacity, it's

that tehran out of ammunition. you can already see the ukrainian military rationing ammunition. you can already see them becoming more absolutely number to russian attacks from the air, from drones, from missiles, from aircraft. and that's the future we're going see, i think, without providing them the munitions that they've used so effectively in the past and which i believe are the key to a serious negotiation down the road. >> director haines? >> no, i have nothing more to add to that. i mean, i think it is urgent. >> [inaudible] >> thank you, mr. chairman. and i particularly appreciate your highlighting the urgency of this house acting to support the ukrainians. much is in the balance, so thank you for doing that. i do want to turn my attention to the topic i previewed, election interference. but since the chairman brought it up, i want to just spend a minute or two on the southern border. and let me state the up front that every country needs a secure border, but i also think

it's important that we put into context in a hearing called worldwide threats what the threats are from the southern border relative the north korea, pandemics, russia. >>, china, cyber attacks, you name it. so, director wray, i guess i'll start with you. give me a time period, choose a time period, 5 or 10 years, over a 5 or 10-year period what percentage of domestic terrorist attacks in this country were undertaken by groups of undocumented? >> of domestic attacks here -- >> domestic terrorism. >> you mean attacks here in the united states -- >> exactly. >> right. i don't have a percentage. if a large number of them have been conducted by what we call hvs, home grown violent -- >> what's the number one category of those who perpetrate domestic terrorist events, number one category? >> well, again, the number one category of terrorist attacks

here are lone actors in small cells or small groups with using readily-accessible weapons -- >> i'm asking, what i'm trying to get at a here, lone actors, are they undocumented? what percentage of domestic terrorist attacks are undertaken by the undocumented? >> i don't have a percentage. >> can you -- is it 50%? >> no p. >> is it 25%? >> i would be surprised. >> be surprisedded. okay. what percentage of the fentanyl that enters this country comes on the backs, if you will, of the undocumented relative to that percentage which comes in through legitimate ports of entry? >> again i don't have the program, but -- >> the majority? >> i would say the vast majority of the fentanyl in this country obviously comes from mexico, the ore side of the border. >> right. but it is my understanding, and contradict me if i'm wrong, but the vast majority comes through

legal ports of entry. is that the your understanding as well. >> a i've been told that. [laughter] >> okay. would it surprise you to know that encounterers on the southern border in the third year of this president's presidency, in the thursday year, '23, were about 80? do you think what the encounters with known or suspected terrorists in the third year of the previous president, do you know what that number is? it's a cbp if number. >> new york i don't have those numbers. i know -- no, i don't have those number, but i know the numbers e over the last five years is the information i have, over the last five years. >> >> right. well, i'm making a comparison here, and the answer is in the third year of the biden presidency, encounters on the southern border with known or suspected terrorists is 80, in the third year of the previous administration, the number is 280. i'm sorry we have to talk about it, this is a serious issue. i would just put it in the context of the many, many threats that we have. i'm sorry we need to talk about this because the chairman and i

were with the president in the cabinet room when then-leader mcconnell said to the speaker you not get a better border deal if donald trump is president and if they call the house what a lost opportunity to address the problems that my republican friends make such hay over. with that, i want to turn to what i really am concerned about which is, in particular, foreign interference in our election. the unclassified threat assessment before us, the latest in a string of i.c. analysis going back years documenting foreign ambitions to influence our elections. i'm pleased that the committee's assessment leans forward to describe these threats in such plain terms because do our defense is ensuring that americans across the political spectrum are informed and ware of the range of adversaries and what they may do. so i want to use the remain orer of my time until the chairman gavels me down around three questions. what does the threat look like? and, by the way, just to prompt that discussion, i have

reproduced what the new york times reported on last week which was they were a little hazy about who they the attribute thed to the russians setting up four completely fake newspapers if online, the d.c. weekly, the interestingly named new york news daily, not the daily news,news daily, the chicago chronicle and the miami chronicle. and the new york times reported these web sites have since been taken down, they mix local news with actual kremlin propaganda. i'm just putting that out there to prompt what i'm getting at here is what can -- how can americans identify what foreign interference may look like? specifics. we've read that, you know, russians may seek to start faux grassroots common strayses so, again, i have three -- demonstrations. that's one question. number two, and this is really important, what are you doing about a it. and, are director wray, i'm going close with you because every american has a right to know that what you're doing about this is also a consistent with their protections of

expression under the first amendment. so let me devote some time now to part one. what exactly should americans expect to see if there are attempts to interfere if with our elections beyond what i've posted back here? >> thank you. i can start. sir, i think -- so thanks for, obviously, raising this issue, because it's of absolutely critical importance to us. and as you noted, we have our intelligence community assessment on in that's been -- on in that's been unclassified on these issues. i think during, as we look back at the 2020 the u.s. election cycle, russia engaged in a multipronged effort intended to really heighten broad, existing sociopolitical tensions and sow distrust in democratic processes. and russia's online influence actors really sought to amplify

mistrust in the electoral process by denigrating pail-in ballots, highlighting alleged irregulargies. russia continued its efforts during the 2022 election cycle, probably with the intent to disracket and weaken the united states -- distract and reduce u.s. support to ukraine. targeting specific demographics with tailored messaging intending to elicit responses about strongly held beliefs or moral issues. and what we do about it and, obviously, you know, the point of saying they have a multipronged attack is you may see things along the lines of what you've described in "the new york times", but they also use, for example, commercial firms, others that are sort of go betweens. they will hold a series of different ways of approaching effectively their information operations in the space. and what we do in the intelligence commitments, we've stood up an election -- communities, we've stood up an election security group. they have different leads from different elements that participate, and these elements

are working collectively, effectively, to identify this type of, you know, information operations. and what we do is we provide is it largely to the department of homeland security and to the fbi for them to act and to interact -- >> let me stop you there, because i really want to focus on what it looks like. something you said caught my attention. accusations that the system is corrupt, that elections are rigged which are a hallmark, obviously, of the previous president's speeches and, to be fair, most recently raised by a california senate candidate on the democratic side. those statements that the systems are rigged may be designed to cause meshes to lose confidence in their electoral system. is that fair of me to emphasize? >> yes. they have for year, the russians have for years in their information operations been trying to basically discredit our, the legitimacy of our processes and, ultimately, our

democratic system. that is one of their main objectives. >> are any of you aware in the last certain years of any material evidence that american elections are rigged? can i get a -- >> no. >> thank you. okay. no evidence that in the last seven years any american elections have in any material way been rigged. thank you. director haines, i do want to talk about what a you're doing for it, but what else? we've got fake news sites, i hate to use the term, but we've got accusations that the system is rigged, the american government is being weapon needed against americans. what else? >> sure. there is also efforts to go after particular policy positions, to stoke acquisitionn society in effect -- >> how do you stoke divisions amongst americans? >> so you effectively take where there's real content, where there's disputes within american

society, socioeconomic issues or otherwise, and then you effectively lift and highlight those divisions up. it's one of the more challenging things for us to identify what the impact is because largely it's an exacerbation of an existing division, in effect. and so it's one of the areas where they seek to focus. >> so let's spend a minute or so on what you're doing about it. you were starting to say that you talk to dhs and, directer wray, we're going to close because i think these efforts that you make against these attempts at misinformation and division are critical, but there is a very hazy line between identifying those efforts, going after those efforts and compromising constitutionally-protected freedom of expression and speech and. so, director haines, give us a sense for what you're doing about it. >> sure. and i welcome, to the extent that you have time just to hear from system of my other colleagues, i mean, i think all of us are involved in this in

many respects in supporting the fbi's efforts. we stood up in odni the election threat executive in 2019 which was incorporated into the foreign malign influence center. and if that center is responsible for integrating intelligence on foreign malign influence or interference targeting u.s. elections. it also strategy chi manages i. collection and analytic resources on this issue and fosters partnership with other government, private and foreign entities x. in 2022 we added the position of a national intelligence officer for foreign malign influence and the national intelligence council for leading analysis across the i.c. on foreign infliebs for u.s. elections -- influence. and it's also, like, as we work with different groups and as i mentioned dhs and fbi, obviously, director wray can talk about fbi's foreign influence task force and their work on this, but dhs has an office of intelligence analysis, and they provide support regarding threats to u.s.

election infrastructure as well as u.s. organizations, campaigns, public officials. and they work closely with dhs' cybersecurity or and infrastructure agency which is charged with aeasiesing election officials and -- assisting rex officials and their private sector partners to mitigate risk and enhance the election facilities and equipment. and maybe just turn it to -- >> yeah. of thank you. these efforts are critical, director wray. it is essential that americans have confidence these issues are identified without the fbi or to anybody else stepping on their constitutional rights. so how can -- give us 90 seconds of why we should be confident that you can do that. >> so our focus is not on the content, our focus is on the actor, the foreign actor. and that's a key distinction tings. we're not the arbiter, we don't seek to be the arbiter the of what's truth or fake. what we are doing is trying to identify the hidden hand of foreign adversaries, foreign intention services, fake accounts that, in fact, belong to some is foreign adversary and

and alerting the right people to that. that's the primary category in this foreign malign influence space. there is a second category that is important in an election year which is lies about where and when to vote, for example, is a form of voter suppression, and that's a, can be a crime and there's criminal investigation that would ensue there. and we alert the appropriation election officials so that they can make sure people know where they actually can vote and what the times the polls are open andthat kind of thing, but that's a separate category. >> thank you. of well, i appreciate that. i will yield back, but i've been doing this now for almost a decade and have seen, like you, every manner of threat out there s. and though i have seen every manner of threat out there and appreciate their severity, i still believe what lincoln said in 1838 in a speech he gave. lincoln said america will never be destroyed from the outside. if we falter and lose our freedoms, it will be because we

destroyed ourselves. yield back. >> thank you. as a point of privilege for the chairman, the u.s. customs and border protection encounter statistics for the years fy-17 through fy-24. my questions that were directed to director wray did not include a time period or a criticism of the administration. however, since the comparison was made, my esteemed colleague used the numbers of individuals that were encountered on the terrorist watch list in the third year of the last administration, the third year of this administration. those encounters for the field operations encountered at land borders are the numbers that the i believe you were citing. this is the ones that relate to the ones you used which are 280 in fiscal year '19, 80physial year '23 which would have been the third year of the biden administration. those are actual hand ports where there is a field option where someone presents

themselves at the border people are seeking to cross. for those years of comparison, fy-19, fy-23, the actual aggregate in the third year of the trump administration was 533 at those land ports, and for the biden administration was 564. relatively consistent. over the category that's to below that, which is why i'm entering this into the record, is encounters between ports of entry. >>s where it's not a specific field operation, but they're crossing the border. for the third year of the trump administration, which was fy-19, this report indicates that on the southwest border is number was zero. and so the number for the biden administration fiscal year '23 was is 69. i somewhere this into the record without objection, and i call on dr. wenstrup. >> thank you, mr. chairman. thank you all for being here. it's a pleasure to be with with you today and have the opportunity to work with you now and and over the years. i greatly appreciate it. i want to go back to something i

brought if up a couple years ago in the events of june 14th, 2017, at the baseball field. i won't go into as much depth as i did a couple years ago, but there were 136 rounds fired that a day at the baseball field where if steve scalise wasn't there and capitol police weren't there, he could have easily killed 20-30 members of congress on the republican side, i might add, which would have led to a change in the balance of power in the house of representatives. i guess we didn't use the term that much back then, but i guess you would consider it an insurrection. this is someone who came to kill republicans, he had our names and our descriptions in his pocket. odn if i and dhs came out and determined that this was domestic violent is extremism, yet the fbi claimed that it was suicide by cop. now, director wray, that was not on your watch, and we've had this conversation.

they made this determination without talking to the witnesses or the victims, and two years ago after i spoke on this in this hearing you responded to me and i appreciated that, and you changed that from suicide by cop to domestic violent extremism. but, you know, we have serious players on this committee today, and i think that we all work well together, we want to work with with the intelligence community as one nation if. finish two years ago i said we need walls around us sometimes but not walls between us. and i'm afraid that's still what we're finding. we have the responsibility of oversight. matter of fact, i'm the oversight chair for this committee. and, you know, we fund your agency. and so that's an important thing to keep in mind. and our efforts can only be productive if we can proceed with the speed of trust. and that requires that we have a process where there's accountability.

and, you know, or when you have the leading investigative body in the united states of america that conducts an investigation, they don't talk to the witnesses, they don't talk to the victims and they reach a bizarre conclusion that no one else could even -- even -- reach, we have to have accountability when the process is curiously insufficient here. you know, we want to make sure that there's integrity, professionalism, appropriate methodology that's a taking mace. but yet as i'm -- place. as i'm seek ising information as far as who made this decision to call it suicide by cop and who went forward with it, how did they conduct their investigation, we're being blocked. it's inappropriate. i don't even think it's lawful. and i know that there's time to cite the memo that comes out of the department of justice. that's a memo. that's not the law. it isn't the law of the land. we are a country of we, the people, and we're the

representatives of the people. and especially on this committee when we inquire what's going on in the fbi and who's doing what and how is the process fraud, in an effort, we want to make it better. but we can't do it if you won't talk to us. if you won't give us the information we need. and don't allow us to investigate. it comes a across as very contemptuous. against this body and the people and that's a problem. and i want to continue to move forward so we can have a better process in place and make sure that our agencies are functioning at a high level of professionalism and competency. but you have to work with us. so i'm going to ask you, and maybe it can be in a classified setting that we do this and that's fine, but with would you commit to providing to this committee the name of the person who practiced this gross negligence and potentially politically-motivated decision -- i don't know,

because we can't investigate -- as well as any punitive actions a person or persons involved may have faced so that we can investigate further, maybe create a better with process? will you commit to that with me? if. >> well, congressman, let me just say, first, as we discussed before, no conversation on this subject should proceed without first saying how much i respect your harrowism on the day -- heroism on the day in question. and i've appreciated our corporation conversations. i know we provided all sorts of information in a variety of settings to you and your office, many of which was not something that normally would be shared -- >> well, let me -- >> so we will continue to try to work with you. i will double down on our efforts to see if there's more information we can provide to be more responsive. >> i don't want to have to take further action. i want it to be an acquiescence that we can work together because, look, the law says the -- this is under general congressional oversight is. the congressional intelligence committees are kept fully e and

currently informed of the intelligence activities of the united states. that's to be insured, it says. so the linder memo means nothing. it's not law. you can't write laws for yourself. congress writes the laws. i appreciate that. there's things that i'll talk about more in a classified setting that are of grave concern to me such as biothreats and fentanyl, and i just want to publicly comment on how grateful in those arenas i have been in working with director haines and director burns. thank you very much. i think there's a lot more we can do so that we can be better in the future and see how well we've done on so many things already. and and we'll do more in the classified setting. i yield back. >> mr. carson. >> thank you, chairman. director haines, odni last year published the i.c.'s annual

demographics report for fiscal year 2022. i'm concerned, ma'am, that despite progress the report once again highlights ongoing disparities for minorities and women employed in the i.c. compared to the rest of the federal work force. this includes decreases in the number of pay grade increases, representation at the highest pay grades and promoting and retowning these officers -- retaining these officers as they approach leadership ranks. i'd like your response as well as responses from the cia and dia, nsa and fbi on the following questions: ma'am, when will we see, when will we finally see sustained, documented progress on these key benchmarks? what is holding the i'm sorry c. back? where can the i'm sorry c. improve in its recruitment efforts specifically? if do you feel comfortable with how the i.c. is engaging with

underrepresented communities and institutions of higher learning such as through centers for academic excellence? also what additional resources could be used to effectively improve recruitment from all backgrounds and and walks of life? >> thank you so much for your -- so this is an an issue that i'm obviously quite passionate about, and i know we've had conversations on as well. i think there is no question that we are not where we want to be in terms of the representation that we see minorities and women and persons of disabilities -- with disabilities in the i.c. in terms of it reflecting the broader country. and as we we note in the report and in the last report, we started to do some intersectionality to show some of the challenges that exist across these groups. we also see that the representation, when you look at the i'm sorry c. as a whole, is

one thing -- i'm sorry c.. when you look at the upper ranks, you basically sees the significantly lore in a number of specific minors. -- lower. and so here's a couple of things that we're doing. first of all, the recruitment piece is a piece, although that is a place where we've seen it get better in the sense of what you see in terms of applicants is actually a fairly robust demographic mix, in a sense, for the i.c.. that doesn't mean that we need -- that we don't need to continue to improve that. and we've been trying to get out to different parts of the country. and you mentioned the certains of academic excellence. these are grants we give the key universities. we basically work with those universities to have programs that help us to recruit from those schools and from a cohesion of schools that are attached the them. coalition. and one of the things that it was intended to do was to help us get to more diverse populations across the united states. and if what we're doing right now is actually trying to apply

metrics to it do demonstrate it's working and where it may not be and see if we can, you know, sort of take advantage of best practices where we do see is improvement. so that is one piece. but another key element, and and you'll see this in the demographic report that's just coming to congress, will be here this month, that one of the key challenges we're finding is actually retech in that sort of -- retention in that sort of first 5-year period of diverse employees. and that's an area that we're really trying to sort of dig into. and this is where resources matter. so let me explain what i mean by that. in order to understand why we're having challenges with retention particularly of diverse populations, we need to collect data,ing we need to do more essentially exit interviews, do a rarity of barrier studies, other things -- a variety of barrier studies that help us understand what's happening across the i.c., and that's something we've requested money

for in our deia budget for the i.c. and that will help us then understand what's happening so that we can actually address the challenges and see if we can actually promote programming that helps us. and we have seen some places where the sort of cycle that we're trying to create which is gather the day, understand what's e happening and then take action to try to fix it and see whether or not that works is actually having is an impact. and i think, for example, director cruz may tell you a little bit about what's happening in dia as an example of this. but it is a very long-term process. this is something that is going to take a while. so to your question of when are we going to see it, i think in years it is longer e than any of us want it to be. it is something we push very hard on, but i am also just very, you know, appreciate your advices and thoughts on things that we can do better in this area as well. let me let others talk as you like. >> sure: sure, congressman, i'll

be very brief with. you know, i share and and have shared over the three years i've been direct or at cia a high priority attached to make ourselves a more diverse institution. and that's not just the right thing to do for us as americans, it's the smart thing. dia operates in a lot of extremely diverse landscapes around the world, so we're making progress. last year, for example, we had one of the highest percentages in terms of new officers we've ever had of women and minority, underrepresented community officers, 48% women, 30% minority. and equally important in terms of promotion and to the senior intelligence service the senior jobs at cia a, we had an historic the inhigh over the more than three-quarters of a century of cia, 47% women, 27% minority. because the key to retention asive a -- i've learned the hard way is you've got to show people that if their work merits it, whatever hair background, they

can get promoted to the most senior jobs in the agency. so this is just a step. we've got to continue this so it's not just a blip, it becomes a pattern earn. but that's what we're determined to try to do. >> gentleman's time's expired. mr. crawford? >> thank you, mr. chairman. thank you all for being here today. this is important that we is have these conversations periodly out in the -- periodically out in the open because i think it's important for the american people to understand we have the responsibility of overseeing your agencies. and so let me just get right into a couple of questions here. director wray, do you still believe that the biggest threat to the united states' national security is domestic violent violent extremism? >> i believe that the most significant terrorist threat to the united states is lone actors acting with readily-accessible weapons targeting soft targets, and and that includes both domestic violent extremists and what we call home grown violent extremists which are jihadists,

typically isis-inspired extremists. >> so is i have some concerns, and i -- about the potential for important industries to be attacked, national security industries, for example, agriculture. in the last ia we were able to get basically to bring usda into the i.c. through title 50 authorities so that today become a member of the i.c. and with all the subject matter expertise that that imply plies and how important that is in the safeguarding with of our food supply. i have some concerns about other industries, for example. i read an article earlier this week about chinese manufacturers of cranes at our ports. unfortunately, they're the only manufacturers of cranes. we don't build those types of things, unfortunately, in this country. but the chinese have sought to seed our supply chain with all a manner of surveillance devices and so on.

the cranes were found to have been seeded with some devices. we've seen this with the manufacture of commuter rail, we've seen it with other supply chain components that they've seeded into our supplies. do you have some concerns about that? and if so, what are you doing to reach out to the industry to make sure that a we're safeguarding existence those kinds of things from happening? >> thank you. you've put your finger on a very important point. it's something we refer to typically as the hybrid commercial threat which is essentially what could otherwise be with legitimate businesses, but that are, can be leveraged by the chinese government to engage in espionage or prepositioning for potentially disruptive action and so forth. and it's something that we talk about a lot and we've talked about, i've testified about it in terms of cyber penetration of critical infrastructure, but there are other ways -- and you're putting your finger on one of them -- to get kohl over critical infrastructure which il infrastructure which is through

ordinary business transactions. >> we've put this authority, title 350 authority in usda -- 50 authority. can you think of some other agencies we might need to consider that same perspective? >> let me give some thought to that and would love to circle back with you on in this, because i think this is one of the maybe less talked about but maybe most important dimensions of the china communist party threat that, i think, does deserve attention and does require engagement. you're talking about activity that is the itself for the most part lawful but still presents vulnerabilities that the chinese government can ec loin. and we -- exploit if. and we need to figure out a better way to tighten that up. >> while i've got you, director or wray, i have to say that we've had some terroristty over the last few months -- difficulty trying to really tap into the expertise that your agency brings. your organization comets to hold the role of lead for counterintelligence within the i.c.. you have a lot of very

experienced counterintelligence agencies within your work force, and they bring a valuing bl perspective to the table. and if even so this committee has really struggled to be able to get access to those individuals when we have asked the f if bi to participate in hearings. -- fbi. so my question is why are we only allowed to hear from your intelligence analysts with approved talking the points? >> i'm not aware that that is a restriction that we have. >> well, i hope not, because that's the presentation we got in our latest engage9ment with the -- engagement with the fbi which was unsatisfactory p. why does the agent briefing this committee a v have to defer to headquarters and analysts to so -- provide -- [inaudible] on perceived threats? >> for the -- i mean, our south counterintelligence is a headquarters division. are you referring the people in the field office? >> what i'mereringing to when we bring someone in as a witness and we ask them questions and they say is, i'm sorry, i have to defer or to headquarters, why are they here then? we can them to come in so we can

learn what's taking place out there, and yet we get stonewalled and there's a back and forth about how they can't say this or that. in a secure setting, might add. and so much so they've even suggested you're not cleared for that. and i have toy saw -- to say again, we are cleared for it, because we're the ones who oversee the agency. so i find if it insulting when i hear someone suggest we're not cleared to hear or see certain information in the ci space or any other space that the you have purview. >> so, obviously, what you're saying concerns me greatly, and met me have any my staff follow up so we can get specific examples and i can see what we can do to mitigate that. >> thank you. i appreciate that. by time's expired. >> mr. kessler. >> thank you, chairman. thank you all for your testimony today. director burns, thank you so much for your effort on achieving a peace agreement with the return are of the hostages and a cease fire. thank you to the president for calling for a ceasefire and the administration. i want to ask you about part of your testimony yesterday in the

senate. in regards to gaza and the situation there. yesterday the senate select committee's hearing you said regarding gaza that, quote, the reality is there are children who are starving and that, quote, they're malnourishedded as a result of the fact that humanitarian assistance can't get to them. can you speak to what impediments there are to humanitarian assistance getting to civilians in gaza and who is responsible? >> i think the challenge is a very real one, and i think it's just a fact that, you know, children face incredibly difficult circumstances. in fact, desperate spanishs especially in north -- circumstances, especially in north gaza. it's partly a function of humanitarian assistance just not getting there in the quantities that are required. it's partly a funk of it not being -- a function of it not being distributed in conditions in which conflict is still going on. and if that's why as i tried to emphasize yet -- yesterday, i think it's so important that we continue to work with our partners in israel, car car thay

to produce a deal, an agreement which would involve not only the release of a significant number of hostages and ultimately all of the hostages, because, you know, they're in desperate circumstances and so are their families, but it would also provide for an exchange with a number, a defined number of palestinian prettiers held by israel. it would allow for at least a 6-week ceasefire. and as a step toward more enduring arrangements. and, i think, in terms of you mantarian assistance it would how practically $humanitarian only a very significant surge in humanitarian assistance coming in, but under the conditions of a ceasefire you could actually district it effectively. >> let me ask you, director, and i appreciate all of that work. i think it's the the incredibly important in the dire situation there. but you are intimately familiar with what's gown on on the ground. you were in the middle of negotiations. you're longtime diplomat and a skilled negotiator. and is on top of all of this,

who's responsible for keeping that humanitarian assistance from getting to the starving children of gaza? >> i think anybody who has an interest, and i think all of us feel this deeply, to produce the kind of humanitarian assistance that so obviously is required has an interest in trying to get this deal done. i think as the president has a made clear, israel has the right to defend itself especially after the brutish attack that hamas if -- >> sure. and nobody, nobody disagrees with that. >> right. and, but at the same time as the president has made clear israel has an obligation to try to protect civilians, particularly innocent women and children. >> i have to get to one more issue after this -- >> can i just add one thing? if. >> sure, of course. >> hamas also bears responsibility for that as well. >> sure. >> and if hamas if is interested in, you know, the fate of women and children and innocent civilians in gaza, it will also work hard to pry -- to try to produce this kind of agreement. >> but you agree e that even in

wartime, there are obligations by all sides that humanitarian assistance reaches civilians, is that correct? >> yes, i do. >> and u.s. law and the hue a mantarian aid act -- quote, when it is made known to the president that the government of such country prohibits or otherwise restricts directly or indirectly the transport or delivery of the united states humanitarian assistance is. so let me ask you a quick follow-up. as the president's principal advisors on matters of intelligence, has the president made aware of the government of israel directly or indirectly prohibiting or otherwise restricting u.s. humanitarian assistance to gaza? >> i think and, you know, director haines can speak to this too, but of course we provide, you know, every bit of intelligence that we have about -- >> sure. >> -- that issue. like i said, i have one more question, an important declassification question. has the president been made aware of this? math if9 miller made a very clear comment that israel did have some role at least in blocking assistance. does the president know that?

>> mine, i think the president'k the president's made clear that israel and should do more in terms of assuring that humanitarian assistance gets in. >> thank, y'all. director wray and direct or burn, in recent decades the united states intelligence community has worked to reform practices that led to the illegal disruption and infiltration of peaceful civil rights movements particularly in the 1950s, '60s and '70s. i'm sure you're aware of some of the most e egregious examples including fbi's corporation against the reverend martin luther king jr. and cia's operation chaos. yesterday i sent a letter asking your agencies to declassify and release to the greatest extent possible materials related to -- of latino civil rights movement in any of your holdings, and i want about to ask whether you'll commit to working with me to improve the historical record and insure or that u.s. intelligence agencies can correct the mistakes of the past with regard to surveillance of latino civil rights

organizations. >> yes. >> we'll see what we can provide. >> thank you. i appreciate it and i yield back. >> [inaudible] >> director wray, have you read robert hur's special. counsel report? if. >> i have reviewed it. >> do you believe joe biden mishandled classified information? >> i'm not going to discuss the report. that's and the special counsel's report and -- >> in your opinion as director of the fbi, do you believe he mishandled classified information? >> again, i'm just going to refer to the report, and the special counsel can speak for himself. >> are you aware, and this is breaking news, are you a aware there's an audio reporting of joe biden saying to the his goat writer in february 2016, quote, i just found all the classified sufficient down stairs, end quote? are you aware of that a audio recording? >> i would respectfully refer grow to the -- >> i'm asking you, are you aware as the director of the fbi? >> am i aware of what? >> whether the audio exists of joe biden saying, quote, i just found all the classified stuff

downstairs, end quote -- >> again, i'm just going to refer to the special counsel and his testimony and his report. >> it sounds like you might be aware of it then. in front of this very committee your predecessor, jim copemy, testified -- comey, said is he did not -- the crossfire hurricane, the counterintelligence investigation into president trump in 2016. to address this legal abuse of power by the fbi, this committee included direction to the fbi in the iaa requiring notification to congressional leadership of any if counterintel investigation into a federal candidate for office. is there any counterintelligence investigation into either joe biden or donald trump? >> i would just say i'll refer you to the special counsel -- >> it's not a question about the special counsel. that's a requirement of the iaa of the fbi. is there a counterintelligence investigation into either joe

biden or donald trump? >> no investigation that i can confirm here, no. >> is there a counterintelligence investigation? >> again, i'm not confirming any investigation into east candidate. >> are you aware that that you're required by the iaa to notify if congress of any if counter-- >> and we will, we will only ply with the law. >> have you already or complied with the law i? >> i believe we have been in compliance with the law. >> you believe you have been or has there been a notification to congress of any counterintelligence investigations of a federal candidate? >> i believe we have complied with the law. >> has there been a counterintel assessment conducted on either president biden or president trump? >> again, there's no assessment that that i would confirm here in any way. i believe we have been in compliance with the law. >> how about on an immediate family member and by that i mean spouses or children? of either president biden or president trump? >> again, i'm not in the business of con firming -- confirming, especially not in open hearing, assessments or

anything like that when it comes todown intelligence, ma'am. >> so you will confirm in the classified setting when we ask you this question of whether there's a counterintelligence investigation? because you are aware that according to the iaa you are required by law to notify congress of any counterintelligence investigation not just for presidential candidates, but any federal candidate. >> we will come pry with the law. >> so you will answer this in a classified hearing later today? >> we'll comply with the law. >> and what's yourens -- understanding of the law? >> there's a whole series of oversight requirements we have related to counterintelligence matters. i'm not going to -- >> specifically the notification of congress into a federal candidate, how do you -- what is your understanding of the law? the. >> again, i would wont to refer to the lawyers to make sure i'm appropriately complying with it, but i can tell you we're going to comply with the law, and my understanding is that we have been. >> is your assessment that you're required to notify congress into any counterintel investigation into any candidate? >> again, i'm going to defer to the lawyers -- >> you're the directer of the

fbi. they report to you. what is your understanding of the requirements in the iaa? >> we're going to comply with the law including whatever's in the iaa. >> i want to turn to the search warrants and the search in one with case of mar-a-lago, an unprecedented raid and a search working with joe biden's legal team. were you or your staff the, did you have any communication about either the execution of the search warrant on mar-a-lago or the search of documents working with joe biden's lawyer? was there any communication with joe biden of you or your team? >> not to my knowledge. >> any white house staff? >> by me or my team? >> >> by you or any personnel at the fbi. >> again, i want to the make sure i've got your question right. by me or my staff with who about which? if. >> the white house staff about the execution of a search warrant on mar-a-lago or the search working with joe biden's lawyers of classified

information. >> not to my knowledge. >> what about the attorney general? >> i can't speak for the attorney general. >> no, did -- was there any communication with your staff with the attorney general or you regarding the execution of the search warrant or the search of joe biden's classified documents? if. >> well, any search would be, would be done in coordination with the can department of justice. as to who may have communicated with whom -- >> i'm asking you. >> -- i can't -- >> ooh i'm asking if you communicated. >> whether i communicated? >> with the attorney attorney general, prior or after of the execution of the search warrant on mar-a-lago. >> not. >> do you think it is -- >> hold on. prior or after? >> prior or after. ..

threat? >> i've been very clear about my national security concerns and we began all tik tok on all devices. >> you think it's a national security threat flex macron not weighing in on the, no. >> i agree with you, i think it's a national security threat, you cannot stay here today. >> i think tik tok represents security threats. for us, they should exercise their right to access the account only to the it

national security concerns, correct? >> correct. >> my calendar and i introduced this bill from bite dance the parent company of tik tok controlled by the chinese. interestingly as we introduce the bill, it was marked up in the energy and commerce

committee in the morning about, medication went to thousands of users. stop a tik tok shutdown planning a total shutdown. cutting aside misinformation we are not calling for a ban on tik tok but what is interesting the ad using data associated with minor children to cause them to call many offices with thousands of phone calls. they asked questions such as the following, what is a congressman? let me have my tik tok back. in one case one member of the

committee had; impersonating and to speak with him and asking to come back. he talked about and going back including his ability to mobilize. this push notification popped up committing members of the committee to change from immediate and that is the nature of the threat it was supposed. this is an example of public opinion had control the chinese communist party in this nature. >> is your describing it

demonstrates why is a turn, americans need to understand we take for granted businesses and government and the government itself for all practices and purposes. whether they want to give the chinese government the ability to control the data and whether they get the control to leverage data if they so choose. >> when you were talking about algorithm or example, this probably menu, let me make clear, you cannot rule out chinese communist party ordering

this to get a pop up. >> it illustrates this recommendation the ability to influence operations that is difficult. >> that's the problem, because the ccp ultimately controls bite dance and manipulate the program analyst data. this assessment you said tik tok run by a propaganda arm targeting both political parties during 2022, right? speak up. >> sorry, how just think -- >> tik tok is already been used to influence elections in 2022

in the same page says an attempt to influence elections in 2024 so you cannot rule out because using tik tok is a platform to influence 2024 elections. >> we could not. >> thank you. i yield back. >> i think the witnesses for being here. just to build on what he talked about, i do not feel we have been giving these issuing and all the information, there is a serious lack of transparency. i appreciate what you've done

but being a lawyer by professional former prosecutor, there may be things others and vice a versa so i asked we open up and be transparent, especially since the perpetrator attacked us that day, seven years and he was killed but they but no reason for him it's or anything else, we need to know who they are. the second thing, i'm concerned with what we are catching and even more concerned about those crossing our southern border and medicare which administration, known or suspected terrorist when we apprehend them at the border, what part does the fbi have been tracking, arresting,

are we security -- i think they are here to do us harm but wouldn't the fbi doing but. >> one from was apprehended, your names are run against the terrorist watchlist and we provide the hit back to dhs so they know tn is on the list. for instances where somebody gets into the country the task force is working with local law enforcement has the responsibly of apprehending those individuals.

>> for suspected or known terrorist or one on the watchlist, with the fbi respond to the person who landed to respond? >> we knew someone was on the watchlist in a particular area, there would be dhs and depending on the circumstances deploy to that seen in it depends on the circumstance. >> every interaction we have with the known suspected terrorist or somebody on the watchlist of the southern border or any border the fbi is responding and we know where they are and they are arrested or tracked within the united

states. >> there are different categories we have concerns about. one of known or suspected terrorist at the border, i'm confident there is close up on them. >> the bigger concern is the situation where somebody present a fake identification and there's not biometrics so there is no way to know they are who they say they are somehow we find out there somebody on the list and we tried to find them. >> i only have 39 seconds. i look forward to seeing you

next month in my district. the southern hemisphere and north africa we have a lot of challenges politically, what things do the community need to make a safer in america both the summons southern mr. and all over? >> i'm looking forward to my trip. in those areas we have tremendous challenges and i think the work there is largely making sure we have resources to provide all of the things we normally do to help what's happening in the event that

affect these threats. i recognize given the time i can go through them but if there's anything particular. >> my time has expired. >> russia has committed in ukraine, last year creating a special coordinator and will forward and move forward in the accountability, i understand and working and how my it on model for other instances. >> help us to produce this.

the person we have a long history and knowledge working on accountability issues, maybe a special field the sense that what you're trying to do is understand what information will be useful for accountability and the various so understand the department of justice typically the ones making determinations in this area in order to produce accountability and we got together and provide those ways releasable for folks working on these issues and promote greater

awareness. one thing is working across the i see but also the department of justice consistently in writing on what is needed to produce the flow so it is not context with respect to chinese and according to the law so he's been helping the community of interest. >> director ray, you said there is a gallery of chairs limitations and threats against the united states recently and a surge of those threats including groups who particularly don't get along, common cause and what is causing those threats?

>> these are all foreign terrorist organizations that leverage the conflict in the middle east as their excuse to serve as a rally cry. >> that were is causing this in the united states could you provide more detail? >> is depending on the organization and for example a specific call against the united states so they are invoking both hamas a success in the conflict is on the verge trying to defend itself. >> does that include casualties?

the articulation and leveraging. >> i don't specific groups but some of them, sure. >> national security and helping us fight the war on terror, do you believe it is possible to destroy a terrorist ideology that underpins the terrorist organization with military force alone? >> the military force degrades military troops and it is well-defined. ideology in my experience is with a better idea. >> with those better ideas include in your opinion? >> i'm setting aside for second the understandable goal of the terrorist groups. i think you have to provide more

broadly but the sense of hope and purpose in this case were palestinian so as a way of undermining it. >> thank you, i yield back. >> i want to go looking for your service to our country and the men and women who serve under you allow us to live in the greatest country in the world. want to focus on such bottle to the mall the last 15 months looking at how we extend reform 702 statutory obligation on back to 2018 was created every five years we figure out what to revise and fix how we make 702 better. we did that in 2013 and 18 and now responsibly this time. focus on three different areas,

how we will be fbi accountable making sure the abuses to over the last five or six years don't happen again how we make sure what happened with crossfire hurricane never happens again? and how do we bring more transparency and openness to open up a little bit more? are built does that. we produce the present the amount of analysts porky's inquiries. we prohibit evidence of a crime and treat specific penalties and punitive measures. make fbi all compliance and mandate independent audits of trust in christ prohibit to suppress political forks religious beliefs here. making sure it never happens again, we create enhanced penalties that is for the by the

court. we give the authority to prosecute contempt and prohibit the use of political opposition police reports and order. lastly, for the% of mandate transcripts foreclose on the court. we find counsel to scrutinize surveillance application and require the same judge to rule on extensions. this is the feedback on how we fix this process and i would like to submit for the record a letter to speaker johnson december 72023 that supports our bill from my pompeo, john ratliff and robert o'brien in which they say section 702 must

be preauthorized and they say putting the requirement in the is not what they recommend. there is no doubt the value from the national security for what 702 has brought is immense over the last 15 plus years. we have some of the requirement is a part of this. in my view, county detrimental in the work we've done. can you comment on the requirement that you're engaged in? >> a requirement would get for 702 to protect americans. the reality is the stage of an investigation, it's only after review the information, this is

information in our holdings were looking at. that's when we know for the car. to have a. recently we had information in a foreign terrorist in contact, contact in the united states, we did know the nature of the contract but we knew it was something that caused interest and would not have probable cause for a warrant but we run that information through our holdings and it allowed us to look at the content which showed us this is serious, it's urgent. the individual had weapons components and other

information, i would never have happened and would never have happened is a warrant requirement. >> when we about how exponential 702 has been come up with last nine years, i think about instances like the taking on of the leader in kabul, i think about taking out the iranian general and the leader of an islamic state of iraq and the isis leader and osama bin laden. five instances over the last nine years, can you talk about how essential it was is another counterterrorism action? >> it was crucial in each area you mentioned and another area 2022 united states took out both in kabul but also isis as well

and 702 was crucial in the operation. as you know, including the fentanyl crisis, 702 was an act and crucial. last year 70% illicit drug operation came as a result but there's an expanding area of concerns and threats crucial to the protection of americans that hinge on the application. >> thank you, mr. chairman. you've already outlined the dire humanitarian situation, the urgency of getting humanitarian aid i applaud the president

within the urgency of getting extended cease-fire, four to six weeks, and the visits we have had and others you are negotiating, that is the possibility of finding a long-term solution in the middle east where israeli people can live in purity and feel secure only comes with the ability of. >> in my conversation, it becomes harder and harder. there is urgency to get that

negotiate a longer-term solution, is that correct? >> you are exactly right. >> you got here patiently, let me ask, i would have thought a long time ago would have the supplemental. it may question the funding, is it accurate to say governmental funding will go u.s. production lines and jobs? >> it is accurate to say because

directly to ukraine. it will go to the industries and some of the governmental comes our agencies advise you and what they are being prosecuted for. >> that is very important but while we are defending supporting ukrainian month this is not to give away, it is supporting american jobs and manufacturing, it is very important. he spent a lot of time china we see that they are trying, they

are no longer talking about the implications. can you comment on this setting : your assessment of what's happening? >> given the crowd the environment threats and not getting as much attention. there been a number of rhetorical actions by kim jong-un more provocative in particular aimed at south korea and it is enemy number one calling for an amendment to the

constitution. it is going up in the liaison office between the two countries things that are lifting up tensions and there is anxiety about the potential of military action including the northern women. our analysis is not will engage provocative behavior but it's not interested in escalating into a full on war.

his advancing as it has and for weapons stand up un security council and of the places to push back actions and clear. the counterprotest you that. >> as we have seen time and time again america is strong and projects that strength, american

gynt and we project, america is less safe in the world is a safe. projected weakness and now coupled with those two, it is weakness. now we have people in this chamber in spite of those threats like to strip us of our most secure tool section 702 of isaiah. i want you address this myth perpetuated about the so-called more requirement which is not at all, as a secondary warrant requirement december exist in u.s. law. it's based on collection of data

in u.s. citizens the protections and does not apply to nationals with projections. it is not apply which some colleagues are trying to do now for data that the database. that would impose warrant requirement on police officer the warrant requirement on a fugitive squad with marshall's and flight manifest for someone you're trying to arrest in the airport. it is the policy for it. in a warrant requirement and last year, that would be 200,000 plus warrants, there 750 judges in the judiciary about nine to

11, we would have to expand the judiciary by five, if not more. in this requirement for america, if you become wealthy actual manifestation would be, brand-new customer existed in american law and the database. >> you put your anger on a number of key points in the first is there is no constitutional legal requirement for a warrant so this will be a

policy choice congress would make to going to the fbi are holding. and we are looking at that information. and it really tells the jury and we have a situation for the known foreign terrorist or individual overseas who had some kind of contact with what appeared to be a person we did the thing you want to do and ran the identifier through our information to drop we are dealing with, is this something to be concerned about or not? we saw content of the communication that's what we realized serious and led to a

quick investigative action and disrupted it. and there is no way he could access that information for we ran that inquiry if we have a warrant requirement. >> across the spectrum, others at the same time advocating for jumping on nation of the 32 a lot of time when our own director suggests through the roof, we would do an incredible disservice to our country.

>> thank you, mr. chairman, i am appreciative of the last statement and its assessment, wholeheartedly an agreement about that. suffice it to say as well that some of our colleagues who may want to increase these requirements and shut down the system of the same individuals for the january 6 insurrection, victims of patriots. we understand that they are not and i understand director right and others here are doing everything possible to ensure we have free and fair elections in foreign interference cannot be part of. we have to stop a and i am grateful for your work to ensure those enemies, foreign and

domestic are dealt with through the systems we have in place. i had a question first for director burns and director burns as well. as many of my colleagues know, i am interested in the ongoing area. i'm interested in and the democracies taking place. we are in a global fight for dominance of our adversaries, both china, russia, particularly the group using africa to extract wealth to the detriment of the african will and the continent.

americans do not think this affects them will the wealth as well as disease, instability, economic downfall of these countries are very much of the american people. in the end like the legs of sodium and additional countries that me all. considering this power vacuum, what can the united states do, how are we relating to implementation this strategy to address these challenges and opportunity? there outside the focus we had on counterterrorism which i believe move away from and focus on instability, democracy and

our fight against foreign adversaries. >> thank you very much, i think the percept is to pay attention and highlight policymakers what you just described. i was in africa six weeks ago and was reminded what's at stake and intelligence as well. three of the several places i visited so this is extremely important in this intelligence community. the challenges you described are very real and there are a lot of predatory players. whatever they come in the future

as well as terrorist groups security like the french being pushed in some ways out of the role they have traditionally played. certainly for us as intelligence, we are determined to sustain that focus. >> you may have some thoughts about this. >> i certainly do want to take time to add from the military intelligence but, it is heartrending what you laid out the contributions from actors that don't have the best interest whether it is the

economic side that may not be of the best interest to create stability, the military perspective, it is a trickle-down perspective. it is be addressed. >> the only thing i would add one of the key points is this terrorism and insurgencies and that is right and one thing we see are taking on the mantle of terrorist organizations and the challenges of these that help us address the problems and the second thing is the challenge we are seeing of various actors

take advantage between and it allows them to alleviate these pressures that would otherwise receive and try to play off each other that gives more space within their own government not adding these good. >> after nearly two hours of testimony will and 40 pages of written testimony on this assessment, part of the boca open border policies, is coming out of the white house the most significant germination security right now. i don't think -- i don't make the following statement which is

more formal today than on september 102001 not just china, russia for the debacle afghanistan and the middle east and national criminal organization but are from border second it's a continuation of the statement last year and these intelligence, failures to convey the vulnerabilities of this open border policy continues to put us at risk. the last year we saw 2.45 million-inch crossings, and december alone we saw 10000 illegal crossings across the border and lincoln probably killed by an illegal immigrant

february 22 not until age 35 after climate change but the border is even eluded to under the terms of migration director came, you know pressures as a reason for this but the reality is we have open for as a result of policies on the white house sent it is now a greater threat than all the other press we discussed that includes russia and china and all terrorist organizations and they are taking advantage of our open silver bullet. all the talk about data from lack of administration here is

data from the numbers of fall protection and 2017 there were two encounters on the screen data center. in 2018 there were six encounters. 2019, there were three. in 2020 there were six and after that, not talking about hundreds of people coming across the border in the last three years, that doesn't include people week not caught so this is the existential threat so i'm disappointed again in this hearing the annual threat assessment we are not talking about open border policies. as mentioned earlier a quote but

the bulk of the last couple centuries but i'll summarize in if we falter and lose making it is because we have destroyed from within. as a direct policy from the white house that has opened our subfolders created migration challenge resulting in a 5000 american dying of fentanyl poisoning teacher and dozens are reported on the hands of illegals and 207 million people unaccounted for court date 2032 timeframe, no idea attached living, victims of slavery within our own borders so my question out why have you failed to impart on this president a level of threat to national security perspective that his policies are creating an is it

not been briefed? is being brief, what is the reaction secretary of defense austin at home and the president of the united states? if anyone has interest in addressing this, why has the president not recognized the southern border policy is created for themselves the biggest threat to our nation security? >> question is, are we providing to the community information was happening at the border? as you indicate, we have challenges you have on a regular

basis. >> that was not my question, why has the president in your opinion not taken is on board? 2022 nonferrous in 2023, 172, he's numbers are exponential in nature, wisest administration not listening to go? 's or someone preventing you from being the status legs judge of the president and his cabinet and the repercussions thereof? >> in my experience, they deeply care they are doing what they think is best. i would hesitate to suggest that i could provide an opinion about what the president things on these issues of white come to

these conclusions he has. >> the results speak for themselves in the care deeply about our nation security. it also scares me when you have a commander-in-chief that doesn't change behavior patterns or policies as a result of this invasion on our southern border. it is very concerning. thank you for the opportunity to sit in public with you all and grateful for the chance to talk about page 32 which is biology. bioterrorism and biotech and you

name it, is on the list of this technology the conversation as policymakers and we talk as we do about a.i. is an example. it is an enormous upside and our competitors cedar. china is trying to get up to this area. i recognize it is more difficult to talk about two things. what are we doing and what can congress do to help you prepare in terms of making sure we have a lineup and authorities and

drugs? >> thank you very much for raising this and i share your concern about this issue, is one we have invested because the workforce, it's not an area we are likely to grow expertise, it's going to reside in the fundamental we have access and brandon we are trying to encourage is where folks would work in this area and come back and an expanded access in the private sector and i'm sure

others will talk about it and your first., one of the challenges by its nature is dual use and they are often providing opportunities for society and can create challenges so being able to understand this nature and finding the greatest priority from the national security perspective and do it in a way that doesn't hamper the science will ultimately serve as opportunities in this.

>> i would just will and offers an enormous promise in this trendline as well and they can invest in terms of passages or the idea building soldiers in the future using biotechnology. we set up a new mission on these issues and one of the highest issues and these threats anticipated. >> we do have a small technology

team and biotechnology and bio security and i think for us it is capacity a level of expertise that requires partnering with industry and we will help to strengthen. >> i would just add not a lot. [inaudible] [inaudible] >> thank you all for being here director pains in september, yourself by the committee and

these agencies to bring intelligence support and identify opportunities for the. steady and for this program? it brought and folks from the community and folks represented but also included not in their intelligence and other folks and treasury and the idea was to see of they have the intelligence community and what treasure is doing the mark to have recommendation? >> they just finalized a report and we can get you a copy. >> how are they utilizing this

to target this? focus on the fact that because it is not categorized within 702, it prevents us from targeting affiliates of the drug cartel, there subcontractors, can you speak to that? >> section 702 this bottle, and so many ways. it gives flexibility overseas in the area we have been successful is identifying precursor chemicals as a transit from china we hit limitations and use that authority. giving an opportunity to pursue additional authorities related to section 702 humor option to

further illuminate what that threat looks like. >> we have tried to make those changes have run into problems. we literally buying our hands behind our back in the effort to battle functional production and trucking and we are not even talking about american citizens, we are talking about foreigners and foreign land. >> what is your, the cost and benefit is a foreign terrorist organization? >> from a law enforcement perspective the principal benefit would be enhancement to go after the money, i don't want to make a comic we don't have

any but the principal effects would be more with other agencies they would have. >> how they battle drug cartel? is us national security apparatus? if you could pick somebody, would be attorney general's office, the dod or eia? >> it's beyond our scope but my senses it needs to be a whole of government strategy meeting

moving forward on prosecutions and they spend their time going after hotels in the network. it is also an effort by treasury and others and dhs to interdict and an opportunity to support that to the intelligence we provide. >> i understand we caught you off guard there. i have more important questions to get to. adversaries have no problem no education for these needs. we do not have a policy or will. i view this as a deterrent

problem and it is the same me as nuclear deterrence. view it the same and should review the records same as nuclear deterrence? these policies in place and ability to engage in the same defense? ... those costs that could be any number of tools available to the

executive branch for anyone that's willing to and we have to be able to perform that. >> i couldn't agree more but we need to be able to impose costs and our enemy needs to know we are willing to impose costs. in well over my time so thank you the chairman for indulging me and i yield back. >> thank you mr. chairman. i just want to follow-up on some of the recent questions from my colleagues related to the border related to the fentanyl crisis. we heard you loud and clear about the importance of 702 winner billy -- ability to understand the sentinel related network but i appreciate it's a public version of the worldwide threat that talks explicitly about transnational criminal organizations their threat to the u.s. and our public health system our financial system and my colleagues questioned saying

that i would assert that we have a policy community and it's also up to us here in congress to legislate in put forth bills that will keep, as you note on page 36, the more than 100,000 annual drug deaths in the united states literature beaded to elicit fentanyl mostly supplied by a-based ecs even as u.s. law enforcement sees record amounts of precursor chemicals and equipment. in china he remains a primary source for elicit fentanyl precursor chemicals. it's a global issue. this is an issue that gets at the heart of our national security overseas and abroad and i look forward to working with my colleagues on this because we are the policy community that should keep solving it. there was a bill in the senate that was proposed moving forward

and we can discuss that at a later date. i want to move to my actual question related to the terrorism issue. specifically recently my colleague congressman houlahan and i nairobi and somalia focused on the al-shabaab threat and the threat of terrorism as it continues in africa specifically with the larger impact with mass kidnapping of nearly 300 school-aged children and women in northern nigeria likely perpetrated by islamist extremists al-shabaab and smelling and capable al qaeda affiliates. these stages series of attacks including the murder of a british couple on the safari and africa continues to be the only continent where -- are growing. my sincere gratitude to every person on the ground both the

military personnel the intelligence community and personnel for working in this fight but you can give us your efforts to combat them contain threats emanating from africa and what threat africa extremist groups pose to the u.s. either indirect attacks or as was the topic of conversation in east africa with money funneling out from al-shabaab to aid other affiliate organizations and any member who would like to take it. >> i will start. i'll be quick. i think your absolute right africa is growing place for terrorism and no isis and al qaeda which we a lot of time on there are more capable of striking u.s. interest in the regions where they operate and that is true whether it's in

africa where rather than the homeland following sustained pressure that we have engaged in on those issues. but this is part of what is creating the environment you describe which is instability and exacerbating many of the challenges that africa already faces particularly in the subset health region so we have done a lot to talk about some the things we are working on. >> i couldn't agree with you more not just in the sahel but in mogadishu and mogadishu and i was there not long after you were there and there's work with all sorts of u.s. officials right now. your reitinger stood -- underscoring the threat coming out of somali. they are flush with money and some of that money has gone out

and importance of our partnerships that have proven to be very effective partner in light of these issues and we can talk in closed session about some of the things that we are trying to strengthen not just in a partnership but another once as well. i think in africa that sense of partnership is going to be incredibly important dealing with what is a growing threat. >> with that i yield back thank you. >> thank you mr. jared ms. spain special counsel hur is on the hill today and he is putting his report that president biden has top-secret compartments of documents knowingly in his basement. he knowingly provided those documents to his author. have you seen those documents?

>> i have seen i think all of the documents that were part of the special counsel. there were special boxes have you seen all of them are part of them? i've seen all of them but i wouldn't say or breadth or all of them. i went through classification review within the intelligence community. it where you provide that review to this committee, this damage assessment, to this committee? will you commit to that? >> we did an overall damage assessment with respect to all of the different documents etc. and that's been provided to the hill to i think a gang of eight and we'll see whether or not we can provide it. >> who has possession of those documents now? >> the department of justice. >> i would look forward to mr. chairman the broader committee seeing the extent of these documents so they could have been fairly benign or they could have been incredibly

serious so i would encourage the intelligence community to brief the committee on the extent that the damage that those documents that apparently have been sitting for quite some time both in the university of pennsylvania center and in this house time with the senate vice president and now as president. switching to afghanistan. the u.n. is reporting that al qaeda has established eight new training camps in afghanistan and list the specific provinces were all qaeda currently has training camps including a new base with stockpile weaponry in the panjshir. yet the threat assessment said al qaeda is not much of a threat. do you disagree with the u.n. security council's assessment? >> can we approach this in

closed session quick. >> i look forward to that. would you say at this point al qaeda's more less of a threat than in 2020? does al qaeda still intend to attack the homeland and the western interest if given the opportunity? >> they continue to have the intent but not the capacity. >> will they grow that capacity if given the opportunity? the mixture. spoon of the u.n. seems to think they are growing that capacity so i look forward to whether you agree or disagree with that's assessment and switching to russia. russia is selling an incredible amount of oil through india through pro curs in china. i think it's safe to say russia benefits when the price of oil is high. does anyone disagree texas is how primarily russia is fueling its business in ukraine and elsewhere.

so i think you'd also agree less oil and gas on the international market drives the price high and therefore both santay round for that matter have their work offers. is anyone disagree with that? so it's safe to say an lng ban on exporting american cleaner by the way more plentiful gas is indirectly fueling that? does anyone disagree with that? i will take that as an know and in fact i will share with witnesses i just sat down with the speaker of the parliament from lithuania on the front lines of fresh and aggressive and and she said we buy 80% of our gas from those in louisiana and at some point they will have to go back to buying russian gas. we are literally our domestic energy policy is creating an

fueling russia's war machine and when we are being asked to spend again by also supporting continued to support ukraine and we should stop putin apps away. we have to enact their own policies with both tehran and the assessment there's nothing on energy policy. in terms of gaza is hamas and honest after? did they tell the truth on a regular basis? >> no. >> okay. so yet we have a casualty figure coming from the hamas health ministry that is continually -- i don't think if putin was talking about a russian run health ministry and their casualties we would take that at face value. do we take the intelligence community take it at face value

or to have some independent verification there are? >> we don't take it on face all you. as was indicated it's not that far off. >> but it is not accurate on its face. you don't take that it face value quick. >> we don't take it on face value. >> thank you nation neither should the present and national television and finally mr. wray on domestic terrorism we have 16 universities teaching as part of their curriculum to book how to bomb oil pipelines, 16 universities. i would consider that facilitate and domestic terrorism. would you quick. >> i don't know. >> i've liked ender into the record reporting how to come universities are teaching students to blow up oil

pipelines and in their curriculum how do bombing oil pipeline. i think you would agree that that's not acceptable. >> totally unacceptable. >> bicester wray can i get your consent to look into what i would call the left-wing domestic terrorism and not only the activities that. >> certainly i'll look into all of the comparisons including funding. >> thank you i'll look for that briefing. thank you mr. chairman. >> you've been waiting the entire hearing waiting to ask questions. >> director haines general burns general cruz i want to be clear i have called for a cease-fire in order to frame all the hostages held by hamas allow

more humanitarian aid to enter gaza to relieve suffering especially the children of hopefully begin to set the stage for a two-state solution for the establishment of an independent palestinian state living in peace next to a secure israel. additionally hamas must not have any future palestinian state especially after october 7 attack whereas they committed atrocities, killing, and kidnapping innocent civilians. i also recognize the hamas leader is not starving or suffering and is using hostages as a way to protect himself and biscuit and if he just turned himself in. so that won't happen.

director burns he recently returned from yet another visit to the middle east to assist in negotiating a cease-fire which will release additional hostages held by hamas while increasing the flow of humanitarian aid into gaza. can you provide an update on how close we are to a deal? >> i think they are still a possibility of such a deal and it won't be for lack of trying on our part. we are working closely with their egyptian counterparts that it's a very tough process and we can't guarantee success but the only thing i can guarantee is the alternatives are worse. innocent civilians who are suffering in gaza and their hostages and their families. we will continue to work very this as i said and they are still a possibility as long as there's the smallest possibility is essential for all of us to work together.

>> what are the major obstacles to achieving a cease-fire? >> there are lot of very complicated issues. it's a negotiation i don't want to go in to all of them. we can do it in closed session as well. i think it's still possible to make progress. there are a number of very confiscated issues to sort through and i think it's absolutely urgent. >> i appreciate that that we don't take any numbers at face value. do they have a reliable assessment of the number of civilian casualties in gaza as well as the humanitarian toll? >> thank you. we really do not have our own collection to be able to tell you what the numbers are. what we look to as indicated the

gaza health ministry and we talk to and largely rely on israeli counterparts and the numbers are not that different. i think the amount of time to roughly 31,000 the idf was actually supporting about 28. so it is in the challenge course is the health ministry is not differentiating civilian fighters in that context so we have a broad range and very challenging for us to independently corroborate effectively what the numbers are. >> additionally what are the issues i mentioned a few weeks ago that there was a concerned about escalating tensions in the absence of the cease-fire once ramadan started particularly in

the west bank. is that a significant concern tax. >> it is one i think the west bank is a combustible place right now for a variety of reasons. there's a spillover of the violence in the west bank. it is in everybody's interest to try to get the cease-fire hostage deal because that is the best way in many respects to calm the situation and iranian proxies from at 11 to the houthis in yemen are feeding off of this crisis and the last cease-fire hostage release took part in the latter part of november and we all observed the cease-fire that resulted.

>> thank you and with that i yield back. >> thank you mr. chairman. it's such an important opportunity for the american people to get a view of the leadership of our intelligence community and to assess the worldwide threat had had views expressed from both republicans and democrats about those threats whether it's from space or from another country or a terror group. of course they are the ones that are most important are the ones that affect the american people in their daily lives and their daily communities. we have heard a lot starting with chairman turner and mr. garcia and mr. kelly and others about the threats we have encountered along our border and these are the people on the terror watchlist across the border better in the united states that we have encountered and therefore we know they are in the united united states and

we have asked them to leave united states that we don't have any idea of how many people across the border with this chaos 7 million encounters that have distracted or cbp uniform people on the border. i'm going to start with following up on your thoughts and isis reported number -- a member of the al-shabaab who is on the terror watch list entered the united states and according to the director when he testified in january quote roamed around the country for a year" and wasn't really apprehended or known about until he used his real identity documents to try to get a job. so drifter wray -- director wray from an oversight point of view

with 160 this fiscal year and 300 from last fiscal year where the people on the terror watch list? is this a priority for fbi, domestic counterterrorism and counterintelligence operations and these people are targets. >> let me answer it this way certainly all of our joint terrorism task force in all 56 field offices have is a significant part of their work focusing on subjects subject to investigations many of whom are people who we have an open investigation whether on the watchlist. >> so it's triggering for the field offices triggered by the homeland investigation. here's my question. we have the counterintelligence director testifying for his recently and if they see a tsa

or cbp encounters these people and they go into our database does that automatically goes to one of our saic that this person is now in the united states even though there's not kahl and open investigation. in other words as a general information matter are refusing that information with our counterintelligence people? someone is on the no-fly list or the terror watch list and they have taken an airlines flight from texas to boston. as the boston saic know that? or are they notified of that? >> the way the system works, they should be and i can't tell you what happens in every instance but that's the way the system should work. the bigger concern frankly or individuals i'll put them into two categories once someone who

is on the list but has fake documents and their biometrics so nobody catches them were somebody who should have been on the list. intelligence wasn't developed to say they should be on the list. >> in the case of the al-shabaab roemer he presented documents to the country. but what concerned us in december alone for cbp said there are 300,000 encounters in that month alone of the border and acknowledged 60 members of congress were there. 6000 people cross the border and one day and there were no documentations no biometrics no photo no interview know looking at the list no checking of documents just passing through to the u.s..

we are concerned on this committee that data is not being shared and i would ask director haynes is it legit to mask you as our director the cba the cbp the fbi coordinating and integrating the data that we have heard about all morning across the border with documents are not or were actually not subject to an open investigation and can i have your promise that we can get an answer to our question because we wrote you and asked what's the status of the 159 people and we have never gotten an answer. here is person one. here's person two presented state documents we pick them up person three we pick them up in chicago. we don't know the answer to the

question but what happens is not public but the number 169th american people are saying where are they? we are just reflecting the common sense question. where are they? me a heavier commitment? epsa we have my commitment to get you whatever information you need and we'll talk about whatever the letter was a cent. >> thank you very much. do we have no other members in the queue? with recklessly want to offer if anyone wants to add any closing comments or comment that they made earlier. seeing then we adjourn until to 15:00. thank you. [inaudible conversations]

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