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liberation of the crime tunisia, and ukraine's military and humanitarian needs. from the hudson institute, it's about an hour. good morning, ladies and gentlemen. thank you for joining us for this second and final panel discussion for our event today, looking at the situation in ukraine in 2023. we have a very distinguished and experienced panel today that i will be introducing in a moment.

i just wanted to first though take an opportunity to thank the hudson defense team and our tech team for their hard work putting together this event. final some were here over the weekend. if you ever want to stress out your tech guy, tell him you want to incorporate, as part of your event, a live stream with a commander on the frontlines of a war zone. that will do the job, but it all worked out. it all went off without a hitch. so i want to thank my hudson colleagues here for their hard work. [applause] the focus of this panel is on the military situation in 2023, and specifically crimea. as our soon to be speaker, ben hodges, has been saying crimea is, in his words, decisive

terrain in this conflict. i would also say it's a decisive terrain in the great power competition that we face around the world. russia has used crimea as a springboard to launch its operations in places like libya and syria. for as long as russia controls in -- and illegally occupied crimea, ukraine will never be safe. that is why we are focusing specifically on this issue today in this final panel of this event. i will introduce the three speakers. then we will go to the rounds and then we can open it up to q and a. our first speaker will be lieutenant general retired ben hodges. he really needs no introduction. former commanding general of u.s. army europe it currently now senior adviser at human rights pursed, which is a

leading international human rights organization that has been around since i believe the late 70s. i think 70 or 79 that it was founded. our second speaker is maria tomak, she is the head of the crimea platform department at the mission of the president of ukraine in the autonomous republic of crimea. maria has been, before taking on this role, maria has had a very distinguished and courageous career focusing on human rights and documenting evidence of russia's war crimes and crimes against humanity. in her current role, she's focused, laser-like focus, on the situation in crimea. then last but not least, my dear colleague bryan clark, who's a senior fellow at the director of the center for defense concepts and technology. at the hudson institute.

brian and his team have done amazing work analyzing some of the more technical aspects of the war in ukraine, analyzing what platforms are needed, what systems are needed, really focused on the capability the ukrainians need. oftentimes we talk in terms have the equipment platform names like patriot or abrams, but his team and him dive deeper and talk about what capability needs to be delivered to ukraine, and how to best get it to ukraine. with that, i will kick it off with ben. thank you for joining us, ben, live from germany. during your very, very busy schedule this week. >> thank you, and i'm grateful for the opportunity. you've already said the most important thing, that crimea is decisive. the donbas is important, but if crimean forces were to liberate all of donbas right now, that would not necessarily change the outcome of the conflict for

the long term future. crimea will, and i think if ukraine is able to liberate crimea, which is feasible this year, by the end of this summer in fact, if we do certain things then donbas will follow. why do i think crimea is decisive? obviously, as long as russian forces occupied crimea it will be able to use it as a launching pad for their next attack. so there's some sort of peace settlement or agreement where russia was allowed to keep crimea, then ukraine would never be safe because russia would be able to use their black sea fleet, their air force, the logistics, other things. it would be a place from which they would start their next iteration of this war. that is surely what they will do. they will wait for us to lose interest over two or three

years, repair their mistakes and things they did wrong, and then it will be game on again. so that is part of the reason i think it's decisive. it's also decisive, and by the way because we have not given ukraine anything with the range beyond 90 kilometers, the rockets fired from himars, crimea is in fact a sanctuary for russian forces even today. it's also decisive because i think it would be impossible for ukraine to rebuild its economy as long as russia controls crimea. obviously, they would not allow ukrainian vessels to go in and out of the azov sea, so even if mariupol is liberated, and it will eventually be liberated, russia will control the access to the azov sea just like they did in 2019 when they intercepted a type three ukrainian navy vessel attempting to head towards the kirk strait.

so that part of ukraine's economy will never get going again, and of course it's an economy that depends on the export of grain, iron or, other materials and so on. then of course odessa, already there are more than 100 ships loaded with grain in and around odessa waiting to go through the straits, that they can't because of the russian black sea fleet and disagreement that is in place requiring russian inspectors to approve each vessel before it can go. so this is only possible because of russia's ability to operate out of sevastopol. russia will continue to lay claims for exclusive economic zone around crimea, which means ukraine would not be able to explore or exploit the gas reserves that we all know are underneath the black sea. so decisive for those reasons. that's why it's impossible to

imagine any sort of scenario where russia is allowed to keep, i should not say that way, i cannot imagine that we would want ukraine to have to accept crimea as belonging to russia in any sort of the circumstances. now, what do we do about that? first of all, we've got to get clarity on what our strategic objectives are for this conflict. there's still so many senior people, including our own vice president, when the security conference said we will stick with ukraine for as long as it takes. what does that mean? what is it? we've got to hear from the president, the vice president, the secretary of defense and state, and our strategic objective is for ukraine to win. what does win mean? total restoration of all of ukrainian sovereign territory. and of course, immediately

someone would say to that mean crimea? well yes, it's like florida's part of america. bavaria is part of germany. so you have to deal with this mindset but people think somehow crimea has a special sort of status. it doesn't, it's part of ukraine. so when it means sovereignty of all ukrainian territory. it also means bringing back the thousands of ukrainian children who have been deported, to bring them back home. it means accountability russian war crimes. it means ironclad security guarantees. we can't invest in a martial plan if there's not an ironclad security guarantee for ukraine. that means as long as russia occupied crimea, there will not be a martial plan. there will be no serious investment in ukraine as long as russia occupies crimea.

that's a problem not only for ukraine, that's a problem for europe because that means 4 million or more refugees will continue to live in germany and poland or other places in europe. so what is needed? how do we do this? first off, of course, all of you are already very familiar with ukrainian geography. there's really two land lines of communication into crimea. one goes over the coach bridge, which has already been severely damaged. i would anticipate ukrainian general staff will revisit that bridge when the time is right. they want to keep the russians from being able to repair that bridge. the other is the so-called land bridge that connects crimea to russia via sevastopol and mariupol and into rostov. so you have to isolate crimea first. you do that with long-range precision strike capability

that keeps -- off the cross bridge, and can begin to sever the land bridge, that knocked out bridges along that route. then to further isolate, what i anticipate will happen probably late spring or early summer is the next ukrainian counter offensive. it will be an armed force that will attack on a narrow front, penetrating russian defenses, in the direction of melitopol. that is where they are going to go. i believe. what is happening around bakhmut's terrible fighting, but the general staff can see that there has been a success at least stopping or limiting what russia is able to do despite months and thousands of russian casualties and continuous effort. it was largely the territorial defense force and national guard units, so they can reserve and build up this armored force that i anticipate

will be somewhere between three and six armed brigades, armored brigades rather, mechanized infantry, thanks, self propelled artillery, and field engineers. we'd be in adequate force against russia's linear defenses. once that is done, then you can start bringing up the long range precision weapons close enough where they begin to make the crimean peninsula untenable for russian forces. when precision weapons start landing inside sevastopol, the russian black sea fleet will have to relocate somewhere else. the same thing for the large logistics -- a dozen or so other places for russian military facilities on the crimean peninsula. this can all have been by this summer if we decide we want ukraine to win and if we deliver what they need, which is long-range precision strikes. it could be drones. there's various other solutions for long-range strikes. that to me is the priority at

capability that is required. blasting them will say, of course, is people have heart attacks when we say we have to get crimea. they will say, wait, won't that make them angry? isn't it special? what we cross a red line? something where the russians would use a nuclear weapon? yes, it will make them angry. yes, they think it's special. no, they won't use a nuclear weapon. and we are the ones putting red lines against ourselves. we are deterring ourselves from doing it for an entire year, we need to stop it. we need to stop this. i think there's almost zero chance russia uses a nuclear weapon if we were to enable ukraine to liberate it. i think the russians believe president biden, that there

would be in fact catastrophic consequences for them if they use in the clear weapon. they clearly want to use a strategic nuclear weapon. the only choice really is a tactical nuclear weapon which offers no advantage. it won't change anything on the ground. it will kill innocent people, but from a purely operational standpoint gives them no advantage. none at all. so i think you try to imagine how they would think about this. of course, i don't assume the kremlin uses western legit but there is no positive outcome for them in any scenario. so this is why i think those russian nuclear weapons are really most effective, when they don't actually use them, because they can use it to deter ourselves. >> thank you for that fantastic overview. a lot of food for thought there.

i love the optimism. i completely agree with you. when you said that this summer the ukrainians could liberate crimea if we decide we want them to win. it is so crucial. we have to start wanting ukraine to win more than we hope russia is going to lose. we have to start arming and planning that way. is our next speaker up? yes? perfect. all right. maria, thank you again for joining us. you just heard what ben had to say. as the head of the crimea platform department, what is your take? what are your opinions about the situation in crimea and the prospects of full liberation of crimea and the near future? >> thank you so much. good evening, or good morning, everyone. first of all, i would like to

thank you for having me at this panel. it's an honor to be a part of this panel with such distinguished speakers. although i'm not an expert in military issues, when rather specialized in humanitarian issues. indeed, prior to shifting to working for the government of ukraine, within the presidential administration, i used to work for a long time as a human rights defender at activist. i was witnessing the process of occupation of crimea. at some point i was also witnessing within the ukraine case versus russia at the european court of human rights, bringing my materials and testimonies supporting the fact that russia was in crimea prior to the so-called referendum of march 16th of 2014. that actually rushes little green men, so-called, where they're at russian army was there at least since late

february of -- throughout this years, actually, international community supported ukraine, our key allies, the general assembly of the united nations, supported the fact that crimea is ukraine basically. the territorial integrity of ukraine. paradoxically, what we have been witnessing throughout the past month or two months is that after deliberation occupation of her's own, crimea started to be highlighted within the international expert community.

all of a sudden we have seen a kind of fear, or even a mindset, that the previous distinguished speaker mentioned. that it seems like crimea, quote unquote, has always been russian. and that is the cause that i think we lack currently. we lack the support of the international community for the occupation of crimea. i'm not saying this in order to judge or condemn someone, but it's an interesting thing that we try to combat in our day-to-day work. it's just to change that mindset which, interestingly, is a result of russia having -- policies, and that's actually how russia sees crimea. somehow that vision, that prism, was absorbed by the western public. in reality, i think that, i mean, and it's great because not only for ukrainians are

telling this, but some international like the head of ukrainian studies in cambridge, also ukrainian -- not ukraine, he's a british researcher, but he really studied very deeply ukraine and crimea in particular. you just have to look at the map to see that crimea is actually part of ukrainian mainland i mean. and it has been a part of ukrainian step land throughout the centuries. i don't want to go deep into history because maybe it's not the proper argument, but if you consider those linkages that russia has to crimea, you can see those linkages are actually the output or consequences of the annexation of crimea. all the atrocities that were committed by stalin, by soviet authorities in crimea, and then actually eliminated all of the

crimean tatars, which are the key indigenous people in crimea that have been the majority in crimea but for the first annexation in 18th century. now you can see russian policies and crimea are really similar, even in details, because when i try to learn, for instance, what policies have been used by moscow during the times of the russian empire in order to bring ukrainian russians, because there were no russians in crimea prior to that annexation. so they used the same kind of tools. they brought their people, but they also used various incentives to bring back civil population, and to actually change the demographic composition of crimea and colonize it. that is pretty much the same thing they are doing now. at the same time, as a former human rights defender, but also now as a citizen of ukraine, and a person who works for the government, i think that this argument of this support of ukraine space, and crimea being

a part of ukraine by the crimean tatars, fly the indigenous people of crimea suffered a lot, who went through of all things and put so much effort in order to go back to crimea. and now, they are again forced to flee because of the mobilization. so the fact that crimean tatars at large are supporting ukraine, the absolute majority i would say, including their representative body of cramming into cars, this fact i think makes this a legal effect, of crimea being a part of ukraine, a very important one. just to prove the legitimacy is absolutely fair. what frightens me in the whole situation also is that even the legal and political argument behind the fact that crimea is a part of ukraine, i mean they

don't work. so we live in this world of -- post-truth. somehow, russia manages to meddle in this discussion. even though we have a decision of european court of human rights that crimea is occupied. even though we have multiple, multiple resolutions of the u. n. g8 on human rights, that crimea as ukraine, and that it's occupied, even though we have the international criminal court involved. you have a range of arguments, but political ones, like i'm not even mentioning all this statements from the side of the government. i'm speaking about purely legal that unfortunately, very sadly, they just don't --

it's interesting because now, i mean yesterday i was in kyiv, but today i'm in warsaw and my colleague -- are heading towards the south east asia. it's our first kind of working trip to the region, to the global south, and i should say for ukraine crimea -- to talk about colonial imperial policies from russia. what because commanded ours far -- and it's important for the history of oppression, of repression, of elimination, in prime yet to explain the history of ukraine and the history of crimea via this history. also for ukraine it's a window to the global south. but if you look at russian

perspective, for them crimea is a window to the west, so to say, but in a military sense. they use crimea in order to attack ukraine, as mr. hodges correctly stated, and also they use crimea in order to threaten the whole mediterranean at region, and actually the whole west. so it's a perspective of how ukraine sees crimea, as a place with diversity, and by the way just to mention that during soviet times there were not only crimean tatars where deported, but there were greeks who were deported, bulgarians were deported, german people were deported, and i'm really glad that this issue is also being raised frequently. for example, by the crimean platform in august of the previous year and, we mentioned russian chauvinism has targeted not only ukrainian, not only indigenous people, but people who have been living there for centuries.

they were deported suddenly by russia. so i will stop here because i don't think that i have to develop more on the human rights violations taking place in crimea because i think it's more or less widely known. but if needed, i can talk about it this more. i really think that it's now important to change again the mindset, because we have to decolonize this imagination and perception of crimea, and also the perception of ukraine. thanks to our military, thanks to ukrainian army, the fact we are supported by our allies, but we still i think have the problem with the economizing the perception of crimea, which remains in the long shadow of the russian empire and its legacy. thank you. >> great. thanks, maria.

how interesting to learn that you are in warsaw now to head out to the so-called global south, to southeast asia, to try to meet with your colleagues and interlocutors in this part of the world to explain that colonialism isn't just something that europeans did to africa or southeast asia. this is happening today in europe by russia against your country. so it's a great message and hopefully it's a message that will resonate. i'm also glad -- i thought you were in ukraine, so all of the times i center for this event i was using the ukrainian time.

so i'm glad it all worked up. anyway, brian, thank you for joining us here in person. you've done a lot of writing on the military aid to ukraine. one thing you have been saying, which i completely agree with, is that we have to start allowing and arming ukraine to fight russia like we would be fighting russia. >> or like nato would be fighting russia, so i hope that you can expand on that a little bit in your comments and give us an overview of how you see the situation developing. >> yeah, thanks, it is great to be here. i appreciate the opportunity. it is great to be with my hudson colleagues, all of you. so, to get to your point, and ben brought up a great point. crimea is being used as a sanctuary by russia, so they employ that as a strategic rear area, as a strategic depth so they can launch attacks from there but also bring their troops back for reconstitution. they use it as a logistics hub, because that is where they are re-supplying the ships, that is where they put missiles into ukraine, so there are a lot of benefits to crimea operationally for russia right

now. and, if ukraine is going to be able to regain that territory or that territory in the east, they are going to have to start fighting like nato would. so not this battle of inches, using artillery in duels across very short battle line, but instead, start reaching back into your opponents we are areas and undermining his logistics, his command of control, his ability to keep troops re-supplied and reconstituted at the front. and nato never built up the kind of inventory and in munitions that we are seen being used in ukraine because nato really never intended to fight this war. because if we were going to be fighting russia, it was going to be long-range strikes, taking out russian transportation networks, taking out russian information networks, undermining the ability of russian troops to stay provided for at the front, and we would just start taking territory back in big chunks and then maybe even leave pieces of that russian trip off to the side and oscillate it sort of like an island campaign of world war ii. so that approach to warfare, we are going to start taking up the adversaries main nodes and then watching the rest of them fall apart is more of the

western way of war, and we would argue, it is more consistent with precision strike warfare that we have executed against iraqi troops and anticipating executing against the soviet union in the cold war. to equip ukraine to be able to execute that kind of fight has been said, they need long-range strikes. so one thing i think that gets often lost in the conversation about ukraine is how effectively they have created what we call in the, west battle networks, or the ability to take information in from surveillance sources, turn that into targeting, and then convey that information rapidly to people in the field that can take action on it. so in the case of ukraine they don't have the kind of long range missiles or the aircraft they would use so they are doing this with artillery, without rockets, so they have been very effective at being able to take information in from a variety of commercials. their own unmanned vehicles as

well as u.s. government sources, and to synthesize that, social media, which is a very effective source. so the challenge is always fusing that into something that is operational lee useful. and then quickly conveying that to a convey -- commander who has got control over a high marge battery or a artillery battery. so what they've been able to do is using a commercially thriving software, there is been companies, the united states can help with that. using these commercial information sources, and using starlink and other satellite communication systems. they are able to get communication rapidly to command centers and out to field leaders to be able to execute these killed change in relatively short order. and, more importantly, at the timing of the executed. so the timing in orchestration is really important to affective warfare. and it is something the west is sort of pioneered and we have honed to a fine degree. and to previous conflicts. the uk has had to do this on their own, because we have failed to acquit them in a way to do this on their own. so they have built this whole ability to be in command control, an isr, very effectively.

they lacked the weapons to then exploit it fully. so without the attacking's or longer range missiles to attack, then without the strike aircraft like the a 16 that could drop weapons deeper into suicide russian help territory, they are just kind of fighting a very effective, very efficient battle of inches at the front. and so, that is why we have seen, even though russia has a much larger military, came into the fight with much more capable systems. we have given them some equipment. so even though there are evenly matched in the capability perspective, the much mauler ukrainian military has fairbury well against russia, and that is because of its ability to more effectively employ their forces due to their use of surveillance, targeting, and

command of control that they have built on their own. so we've got to honor that investment on their part and given the capability that allows them to exploit it to really execute precision strike warfare as a scale that nato would if we are going to fight russia. that is the only way you're going to get back into crimea and take away rushes sanctuary they have been employing very well to execute strikes on ukraine. the reason russia needs that sanctuary, both in crimea and in the eastern part of ukraine 's because before the war, and even today, the russian military was more or less defensively constructed. >> so it is constructed to protect against russia coming into invaders to russia, it was really designed to go and take some other territory and hold it very rapidly. so that is why you've seen for, example, logistics were not a high priority in the russian military. they were very defensively oriented, focused on sensors and attacks against me, they don't have the ability to defense -- defense or protect other countries. they have a long race strike

capabilities, but they don't have the ability to rapidly redeploy troops. so if they attack a note of the u.s. or ukrainians are using, they really can't take advantage of that because then there is no way for them to get troops out there. whereas nato would do that. so if we take out a note of theirs, we are going to go in on that and take that territory, even if it means we have troops in side enemy lines and then will eventually cut them off and isolate them. so the russians have been unable to really do, it that is why you see russia is slowly attempting to gain territory, and you need the sanctuaries to continue to funnel troops and carry to the front, because they have no other way to rapidly deploy forces and into enemy held territory. so there are some things that i think sometimes get missed in the conversation here. so one thing is one f-16s an air power. and the argument is, well, the airspace over ukraine is largely denied. nobody is flying airlines. but that is because nobody has air suppression capabilities, so the u.s. would never say, i'm going to think about this for the russians, and we are not going to fly into ukrainian airspace. we would use electronic air craft radars to go jam those air sensors and then we are going to take those missiles that air defense radars an air defense systems.

there is a whole defense military of the nato militaries that we don't see being used and we don't see being used in ukraine today because ukraine is not equipped to do it in russia is not equipped to do it either. so if we were to get ukraine f-16s, they are going to do capability of jamming to sign in. we are going to equip them in a way, that would let them strike these air defense systems to let them get these missiles, which is how nato would do it. so you could have the ability to have this airspace. you have abilities to get these -- to restore the ability of ukraine to do these long wait right with your plants or muscles by taking out these air defense systems that russia has put in place and then allowed to operate in an unfettered manner. so that is something that i think sometimes gets lost in

the conversation about giving airplanes or long range strike capabilities to ukraine. in the last thing i will say is that both maria and ben sort of got this is that long term crimea is a strategic benefit to russia in a lot of ways it lets them allow in turn the black sea into more or less a russian lake, the black sea fleet with a couple dozen -- it is the largest force in that region,. other nations sort of just give way to the russian forces. and that is because they've got a warm water pour in ukraine that allows them to deploy the ships and maintain them in the black sea. it is also, as we said, though strategic depth for russia to allow them to conduct strike operations in ukraine, but it is also the main russian warm water port in the region. so it is technically a few russian port in crimea, but it is not a very hospitable region. so if they were to lose crimea and the port there as an ability to get to the sea, you have really constrained rushes options right from the maritime domain.

so losing crimea is an important element of trying to contain russian aggression in the future, as well as deal with them in this particular conflict. >> and that's a great point for you to end on, in america, we have to view crimea as not only being important to ukraine, but for our own national security and our strategic interest as well. ben, i want to go back to you for the opening question. based off your experience as a commanding general of u.s. army in europe and all of the experience that led you to that point, based off your contact and what you are seeing and hearing on the ground has russia's offensive started. or are they still prepping on the battlefield? >> it's interesting, with respect which is filled up a lot in the past battlefield, i think that says something about their great offensive, not being sure that it's actually started.

>> i think it has, and i think their offensive, with so much talk about, it remember, people would come at 500,000 russians over the border and all that up. and this weekend i heard that people were anxious because they heard russians were stealing aircrafts out of storage for this -- >> i think, if you were to give me a russian aircraft that had been in storage, -- must have a condition that thing isn't. so i think it has started, honestly. but i think it really has taken the shape of a fusion of more poorly led constructs into the meat grinder along for the -- i don't, see so far, and of course i'm not looking for cross border relations but i don't see the sort of thing

that you would expect for a good defense offensive. it is not a big red arrow coming in from a different direction, concentration will capability, forces that could exploit some sort of a breakthrough. and, even if bob moot fell tomorrow, then what? i mean, there is nothing that could exploit that. so i think, i could be totally wrong, they could be deceiving this. there could be a colossal intelligence for us as well as ukraine could be giving us a large capable force for us out of nowhere. it is trained and ready for us to actually do something. i think they are giving their own struggles right now, there are those that are constantly lining about not getting supported by the russian general staff.

of course they're not being supported by them. he spends a long time criticizing them, and they actually want to see him fail and they want to see their own forces succeed. thank goodness that they still have that figure out after nine years of conflict, they join innovated command structure that ensures unity of command and unity of members. you've got -- who hates these other guys, and then you've got [inaudible] , you don't see any videos of dead -- out of there. he is keeping them out of the fight, he is keeping them out for their protection. and when he sees an opportunity, he is seeing himself as the savior. and so i saw several excellent points were just made about russian capability,, if we launching an offensive, we obviously are going to get to

that job done. and then we are going to sever the enemy's ability to reinforce the resupply. so after the lines of communication. just like we did in 1944 in the months before the invasion of normandy, we rolled our force in the u.s. army air force was daily bombing the out of german and french railroads, and trains, so that they would not be able to come out the way they started. i don't think the russians could destroy a single train or a single convoy bringing things from poland into ukraine. , i mean, how could it possibly be and i think it is because i don't have the dynamic to do targeting where they could have an aircraft waiting and then start to a target. .

that are obviously well known fixed targets for. you could launch a multi million dollar prism again. so i don't think these kind of problems tell me that, yes, they probably have started their offensive, it is going to fail, i think they are going to culminate by man, probably, and then they have to be ready to strike. >> thanks, ben. i -- maria, i wanted to turn back to crimea. since 2014, we have seen tens of thousands of crimeans leave crimea, kicked out of crimea, forcibly removed from crimea. we have seen probably a similar number of russians brought into crimea, of course, this is nothing new for crimea's history. as you alluded to, this has been going on since the time of catharine the great, but when ukraine liberates crimea. there will be some sort of

humanitarian situation, humanitarian crisis. you are going to have a lot of russian civilians who probably want to get the out of their overtime you are going to have a lot of ukrainians who have been forcibly removed who want to go back home, which will create a very high level of expectation for the ukrainian government to deliver on that. >> and you are going to have, presumably, at least in the medium term, fighting going on elsewhere against russia and inside ukraine. so what sort of thinking and what sort of planning our is being done now to think about these challenges that might happen when crimea is liberated?

>> think you, that is a very important question. and i have to say, first of all, that we are not naive in thinking that it will all be very easy. we understand that we have multiple, multiple, challenges ahead of us. we know that this is the process of the information, but we are also optimistic and focused on the operation of crimea because we are already working -- so we think that we might be able. to -- so we understand that there are no easy answers 12 those questions, and those questions that you raise are just a part of all of those problems that we are going to face, and now, actually, we are working upon

the several strategists related to restoration of the government, the ukrainian government in crimea, and another part is related to the economy and infrastructure and that is, i should, say it is a huge priority for the purpose of ukraine itself in terms of the crimean policies in general. they want to do that we present and we communicate with ukrainian citizens in crimea, how do we see crimea after the occupation. so how is it going to look, unlike the current situation, once crimea is isolated, and highly oppressed so to say. we would like to bring another perspective and, as for the first part, we could look into -- what we, going to do with all the court decisions that have been made throughout the court throughout this years. how do we deal with issues like amnesty or actually the situation in crimea is quite unique.

it is in comparing, even to compare to the territories in eastern ukraine that have been also under the occupation for almost nine years. so the situation is somehow different there, distinguishes there in crimea. because they are trying to an exit, and that makes a huge difference, i should say, in terms of the situation in there. so that will require the same situation that is different. and, of course, we somehow lack the clear understanding of what is going on on the ground with crimea, because we have more control, but since we have more control, our citizens in crimea and we try to be accurate and what could be applied after the de-occupation. and as of, now we come up with

some visions and strategies with the state institutions of ukraine and with other members of the other crimeans, and so we are trying to be realistic, but at the same time trying to think about all of those challenges that we would have to face and it commands on the issue of russian citizens in our position is that russian citizens who came to crimea would have to go back to their homelands and they are currently in crimea,, so that on itself is position as a general one,. we also have no preserved guarantees for relating to -- but still, we need to make sure that there is a notification of

the russian aggression in the territory of ukraine, and of course, crimea, and there is almost no certainly going to get rid of maybe you know that now, crimea, and the ukrainian constitution, has mentioned the republic of crimea, has a special status. they should not have the special status, it should just be crimea has some sort of autonomy, but not in the way that it is implemented. now, we don't have the

capability to make any capabilities to have the russians to shun. now it is trying to acknowledge the indigenous people of crimea, as i said, and in general, it is going to have. >> thanks, maria. but in the meantime, brian, i'm going to go to you for a quick question. are we learning, as the united states is nato learning from ukraine's innovative spirit to learn quickly on the battlefield these teepees to keep them alive and keep them victorious? >> i think, i hope we are. it seems like we are. we are learning some of the

lessons and values about commercial technology, about how you can write software in the field to be able to nip together units that would ordinarily not be able to talk to each other. you know, not too different than what you do with an iphone to get a software update that allows a new program to work with it. >> we have time for a couple of questions, i will go to my colleague, peter.

-- >> the friend wave the strike of tech, more expensive weapons in the rear and so they've done is numerous times and it works. you can deplete the enemy air defenses with the chief johnson and then when you're cruise missile comes in, but a lot less to shoot it. i think we're learning that, but the u.s. and nato generally have not investing the kind of cheap drones that would allow you to exploit that approach. that's something we need to think about buying to equip ukraine with, because one thing that i get feedback about that with, things like the switchblade, these high-end emissions, not that useful, they find it the drone does a great job attacking enemy troop for nations, but if we had a sophisticated drawn in the mid size range, where you can actually carry a big enough head, or you put 100 pounds on it and it can go blow something

out of it actually hits it. that's the kind of drawn side they need to build a lot more to help with ukraine, but it's also something that we'd be able to apply ourselves, looking at western pacific and contingencies. >> very good point, trying together and it contingencies facing in the future. we have time for a couple of questions. i will go to my colleague, peter notes to wait for the microphone. peter rowe. peter knows to wait for the microphone. >> peter, out from hudson. i would like to actually stay on that topic, brian, and address this question to you. there was a line of thinking that every system we send to ukraine could potentially weaken our deterrent in the age of pacific with taiwan. you buy that argument, how do you see it, and could you give us an overview of that issue, thanks?

>> yeah, so clearly our resolve with regard to equipping ukraine plays into the taiwan, china, competition. their rivalry, because i think china looks to see, are we going to be with ukraine as long as necessary and that suggests whether or not we begin with taiwan as long as necessary. there are some parallels in terms of the kinds of weapons that both countries we need to defend themselves and that is caused some problems when it comes to re-supplying taiwan with regard to systems that have been late in coming, so things in short range air defenses. javelin missiles, adventures systems that are based on the stinger missiles, so there have been shortfalls that what we have provided to taiwan for them defense because of what we've been sending to ukraine. so, clearly, there is industrial base concerns of the d. o. d. is trying to wrestle with their. but, as long as they need to resolve, there is probably the more important element, and i think china, certainly, at least from the reports i've been reading,'s been taking away from ukraine that invasions that are a lot more difficult than you probably anticipated they are going to be. especially once you get on the

ground, and i think china maybe did not have adequately incorporated in terms of how the ground war goes on taiwan. i think we have been focused entirely on how you get troops there or not, how do you get there once they arrive on the shores of taiwan. so i think a couple of things though that the u.s. could start to take from ukraine is looking at the effect of approaches that ukraine has used to defend itself. how do you approach and equip taiwan to have that same kind of orchestration and synchronization of operations which they have done so well and built their own software and technology. how can you quit towanda similarly do that, it is going to be hard for the u.s. to impose its own foul numbers, here's how we, do it on taiwan. but taiwan could certainly build up the capability to do it itself, as much as ukraine did. and you could certainly a quid taiwan with a lot of the same kind of drone technology that ukraine has been able to assemble, largely on its own, with some u.s. help. and i think there is an opportunity there to really improve the defense of taiwan using an unmanned system in a way, similar to what you've seen ukraine to with on unmanned boats, for example, attacking russian ships in the

black sea. >> you could see time want to think similar things to defend their own coastline from invading chinese troops. so there is an opportunities there, and that may be a way to circumvent the industrial base shortfalls as we look at these unmanned systems as an alternative or a compliment. >> thank you. yes sir, in the back. if you could please state your name, that would be great. >> -- if bakhmut should fall, and after -- is sending nato troops into ukraine a red line that should be crossed? >> are you talking to me about that? i want to ask the general, actually. >> i'll take, it, actually as

the moderator. i don't think anyone, certainly no ukrainians i am speaking with our even suggesting or advocating or asking for nato troops or u.s. troops into the conflict. and i don't think they're in that policy space. the debate is not even being had, the ukrainians simply want the tools to do the job themselves. they are quite happy to defend themselves and they just want the tools to be able to do so. so even if bakhmut falls as been said, i don't think, strategically, in the campaign, they will have that big of an impact. there is a lot of symbolism that is now been attached to bakhmut by both sides. probably so much symbolism, which has made it a very difficult situation on the ground for all of those involved. but, no, i don't think that has been a point where nato would get involved in the conflict. all right, any final. >> sorry, sorry, just to say that hopefully ukraine would

still be able to join us in time. because that is absolutely now supported by the ukrainians and would reach our strategic goals. so i think that would be important to remind ukraine is really joining unwilling to join nato and would be happy to do so be accepted. >> absolutely, i agree that that would be the most likely instate out of all of this is ukraine's formal integration into the bureau nantucket community. so that concludes our second and final panel for today for our event. keeping ukraine on the path to victory, i want to thank all of our speakers, i want to think again our events team here at hudson. and i want to thank everyone for taking the time out of your busy schedules to come here, you can watch this event again, or share it by going to house and don't work. we're checking out our social media. you can also see some of the fantastic research over scholars are doing here at

houston, not only on these issues about ukraine and russia and european security, but all around the world in all different policy areas. check out brian's work especially on the defensive front. it's well worth your time. again, that is hudson dot org. thank you again and have a good day. [applause]

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