the national archives hosted

this 90-minute event. >> good afternoon. i'm david faria and it is a pleasure to welcome you to the national archives this afternoon. we're glad to have you with us today. whether you're here at the theater or watching us on c-span or joining us on the archive youtube channel. today we present a roundtable dialogue of melvin laird 1969 to 1973. this volume highlights records from across the national archives, the ford library, one of 13 presidential libraries within the national archive's laird papers on topics including the 1964 republican party platform, the 1964, '68 and '72

presidential campaigns. the vietnam war and a wide range of defense department procurement and planning policies, regional and global. other records consulted include records of the joint chiefs of staff, records of the office of the secretary of defense, as well as many different records series from the richard nixon presidential library and the presidential materials staff. in to 12, we presented a discussion based on the previous volume in the series and pleased to welcome back dr. aaron mann who will moderate today's discussion. it's also a pleasure to welcome our keynote speaker, john warner, former secretary of the navy and senator from virginia. our moderator for today's discussion dr. aaron r. mann is chief historian for the office of the secretary of defense

since 2010. previously she was worked in the center for the study of weapons of mass destruction at national defense university and historians office at the u.s. department of state where she was an editor of the foreign relations of the united states series. dr. mann holds a phd in history of the university of virginia and most important credential is service on the national historian preservation and records commission which i chair here at the national archives. ladies and gentlemen, please welcome, erin mann. [ applause ] >> thank you, david, for that kind introduction. and thanks to the national archives for graciously providing this venue for the event. and hosting the osd historical office newest publication. i also want to thank tom nastic and members of my own staff,

namely corbin, marshal and glen for handling the logistics. we on stage often know that these events are not possible without the hard work of those behind us. and they really make it happen. my own brief comments mirror david's because government history prom prams such as ours in the office of secretary of defense could not produce comprehensive books twout assistance of the national archives which processes and houses the voluminous documents used in our series. our two organizations are natural partners in the construction of official histories. the goal of my little history shop inside the vast pentagon bureaucracy is to produce books like this that we're recognizing today that are well researched, balanced and as much as possible objective narratives that will stand the test of time. to that end, we are writing them about four decades after the

period they cover so that we can make use of the resources as they finally get declassified or at least that's what i tell my bosses when they ask why they take so long. especially when it's 40 years behind the curve. but that necessary time lag also precluded secretary laird from being here himself. he's no longer able to travel but i'm very pleased that his son david laird and his grandson harry were able to be with us today. thank you for coming. [ applause ] melvin laird is the first living secretary of defense to have one of our official volumes published during his life time and some say that the secret to longevity is cultivation of a lifetime of healthy relationships and that is very true of melvin laird. richard hunts melvin laird of the foundation of the post-military vietnam 1969 to 1973 is a seventh volume in the secretaries of defense

historical series. the series obviously focuses on the secretary, but also, on the wider office of the secretary of defense. and their combined role in developing national security policy. we think dr. hunt's book is a great addition to our series. his book focuses heavily on the final years of the vietnam war and in particular on the implementation of vi etnaization and addresses other major subjects such as laird's attempt to reoesht the department on the core security challenge of the soviet union, his struggles with recapitalizing a worn out force in the face of a shrinking budget and a host of critical personal issues from the end of the draft and implementation of the all-volunteer force to making the services hospitable environment for women and minorities. i turn now to our keynote speaker. the honorable john warner. senator warner is one of those rare individuals who served on active duty in both the navy and

the marine corps. having experience in both elements of the naval services, perhaps made it -- made sense that he would one end day end up being secretary of the navy under secretary laird. he served in the senate for 30 years as either chairman or member of the armed services committee. he is a rare living individual to have a navy service ship named after him. it's a nuclear class attack submarine delivered a few weeks ago, three months ahead of schedule. we very much appreciate his participation today given his firsthand perspective on secretary laird. thank you, senator warner, for those -- we'll thank you in a minute but i want to turn the stage over to you now. [ applause ]

>> thank you, ladies and gentlemen, for coming and attending. i'm grate to feel the archivist. i explained to him i worked my way through law school partially by working in the law library. my wages for $1.25 an hour. and to the distinguished historian of the department of defense and her wonderful staff who have together with others put this book together, thank you. and i say thank you from my heart because this was an incredible chapter of american history that you had to record and do it with accuracy and

preserve it for future generations. we have two other distinguished guests here tonight that are -- i guess it's morning. secretary of navy charles bowzer and general percently. do i see you right there? both of you. i'll -- during question and answer period, maybe put a question to you. because you stood beside laird. this man mel laird was bigger than life. i hear from him frequently and i dutifully called him yesterday to have a final discussion about several points i wanted to discuss and he promptly agreed to them all. said, fine. i said, do you have any final thoughts? yes, i do. long pause. warner, don't screw up. that was character eeristic of

leadership in the department of defense. yes, he was a rough, tough, swaggering old destroyer officer in world war ii. receiving the purple heart. but when it came to the administration of that building, he had that wonderful management of skill of knowing where firmness had to be applied, where compassion was needed, and where those needed help. and he was together with a man he absolutely loved, david packard, formed the laird packard team and we entered that building in january of 1969. now, mind you, mel laird in his lifetime, of course, he had his naval command experience at sea. but other than that, his largest responsibility of staff was

somewhere between 30 to 40 to 50 staff people on capitol hill. capitol hill was his love of life. let it be no mistake. next to his family, his love of life. and he would often sneak out of the building as richard capen, one of the assistants he had that worked with us used to tell us to go to capitol hill for a hair cut but we knew that he was going back up there to take the pulse of the congress. and when i say the congress, it was a bipartisan approach. he didn't just go to his republicans. he went to the democrats. and he took with him the confidence that what he was trying to do was in the best interest of the whole nation. and it was not a partisan challenge that he was posing. that was one of his greatest

skills. and it reflected by secretary bowzer whom he asked to stay on. bowzer had been with the democratic administration appointed by the democratic administration. but mel laird skillfully in putting together that team decided to retain six or eight persons who had been under mcnamara, clark clifford, to stay there because of their skills. politics be damned. let's get the best and most knowledgeable of skills to run this department at a time of critical history being made. at a time where the first week in office an aide pulled him to the side and said, mr. secretary, the casualties figures for last week in vietnam were over 500 killed. that was a greeting he received

when he arrived. that put him on a mission to do everything our country could possibly do to resolve the conflict in vietnam and at the same time keep focus on the emerging picture of the threats facing america in the future. now, mind you, this was the cold war period. war period and the soviet union was challenging the united states on the high seas all over the world. i was privileged to have been given the task by laird and secretary of state bill rogers to go right in the middle of the cold war and travel to moscow on a number of occasions and negotiate an executive agreement so that our ships wouldn't collide trying to collect

intelligence on each other or the airplanes wouldn't crack up and precipitate a greater conflict that was not the intention of either the soviet union or the united states. that was europe. pacific across focused on the conflict in vietnam. so this so this man gave up what he loved most, the congress of the united states, full knowing if he did his job right, he would never be able to return again and probably survive a public election. and i am deeply humbled and primaried to be by his side in all those years. apart from a formal relationship, we had a bit of a social relationship and it was

an interesting one. just to give you an example of the intensity in which this man would work. he would bring me up. we all worked on saturday mornings. he would say, warner, we're going to have mission number two this afternoon leaving here promptly at 3:00. yes, sir, i'll be ready. 3:00, i would be down in his limousine and out to a golf course where we would play golf. and then, after golf, he would have one, underscore one, one drink, a manhattan. and then he would get back in the limousine with me. he would go back to the department of defense. i would grab my car and scoot home and stay there and work in solitude or with others well into the night. seven days, seven nights a week. this man labored.

and it's laid forth in this excellent book. there's a ronology of all the key things that he achieved. but most all, i think, was the all volunteer force. he felt very strongly that such draft mechanisms that we had at that time were inevitable, that things of women and minority to advance through the rank of the military needed to be adjusted and he felt that if he take the gamble and convince america that the concept of volunteerism, which goes back to the earliest days of our republic, that concept would glue together this nation and bring about an even stronger military. and, folks, those of us who were there during this period as we were formulating and testing the

various chances to do this and the military stood back in awe and said this is going to be a high risk. but it was melvin laird's determination to try it, to drill it through, and it took root. today, i can testify having spent 30 years in the united states senate supporting it, funding it, it has worked and exceeded all expectations. the vision, the courage of one man to make that decision. there are many others that i could recount, but today we're going to have a full discussion. other persons far more informed on this book than i will address you. but i simply want to close by saying that you've got to remember at that point in time 360 degrees of critics circled

the department of defense. laird had to continuously debate -- i'll use that word -- there's a stronger word, but i have to restrain myself with the department. he had to deal with the congress knowing that one vote on some missile program, one vote on something else could cripple and pull apart his matrix of thinking to guide america on beyond vietnam to meet the challenges of the world. he really never lost a single important vote in his four years in the congress. again, because he would slip up and get his haircut and sit there just man-to-man or man to woman with his colleagues he knew best, urging them to=.z res in him the confidence to make this decision. he even had to take on the white

house. how will i remember that. i had been sociologied with the nixon campaign team for two elections. but he said to his staff and the pentagon, i and i alone will do the congressional relations for the white house. none of you are to be over there unless you're specifically carrying your pocket an authorization slip signed by me to go. and that, in the end, was a -- to this individual, a great protection. i won't go into the detail on that. laird reminded me yesterday, warner, i saved you from abstention. yes, sir. anyway, this is a momentous event. each of us who are part of it and now i respectfully and humbly yield the floor to our framework speakers and perhaps i'm joining them. is that correct? i'm joining them up here.

but thank you, all, once again for joining us and i hope we have a good lobbying discussion. thank you. >> thank you, senator warner, for your very decisive remarks. i'd like to move to the next face of our program and invite other speakers to the podium.

let me noe now introduce our distinguished panelists who will speak for about 10 to 15 minutes. i'm allowing time for questions from the audience. during that phase, i do ask that you find one of the standing microphones on either side of the auditorium to pose your question. first i'd like to introduce dr. jeremi suri, who holds a distinguished chair in global leadership at the university of texas at austin. professor suri is an expert covered in the laird volume. the author of six books, including "henry kissinger and the american century" published by harvard press in 2007, he has recently published a new edited volume entitled "foreign policy breakthroughs, cases of successful diplomacy" recently released by oxford university. dr. suri and i were contemporaries in graduate

school. i long ago predicted what the smithsonian magazine named him, which is one of the top innovators in arts and sciences. professor suri's remarks will be followed by dr. george herring, alumni professor of history ee mayor tuesday at the university of kentucky. no graduate student passes through a doctoral program without reading his highly acclaimed standard survey of the conflict "america's longest war: the united states and vietnam, 1950-1975" which is in its fourth edition. professor herring has won countless awards and fill lowships, including those from the national endowment of humanities and the fullbright program. our third panelist is the author of the book, dr. richard hunt. given that the vietnam war was front and center during secretary laird's tenure, dr.

hunt's scholarly background made his a logical correction. he served as a historian with the army and while on active duty he was assigned to the military assistance command vietnam history office. as a civilian he or shen for the u.s. army of centure history, he worked on historical studies for the vietnam war. his most notable book before this one, of course, is pacification: the american struggle for vietnam's hearts and minds" which analyses the u.s., south vietnamese efforts to stem the vietcong insurgency. i now turn the floor and the micropho microphone, or you can speak from your chair if you prefer. dr. suri. >> it's my pleasure to be here and honor to be on stage with a senator who i revere and two historians who have been models for me in many ways, but most

importantly to be here with my friend, aaron maha fl. aaron has done more for public history than almost any other historian. she brings a seriousness to her work, which is so important. and she does a great job, an unmatched job of connecting the world of politics with the world of policy making. i also have to say how glad i am to be here to talk about secretary laird. i had the opportunity to talk to him on a number of occasions. i used to teach at the university of wisconsin before i moved to the university of texas. and secretary laird was very generous to me on many occasions. he even blushed my book about henry kissinger which is quite a story because his relationship with henry kissinger is not always the nicest of relationships. it was interesting how that happened. i learned so much about secretary laird and i'm honored to be here with members of his family and please tell him that i said that. i want to really raise a couple of points about this terrific book that richard has produced

for us here. mel laird and the post-vietnam military in the united states is a book that takes us through what i think is one of the most important turning points and this is a point that the senator made. one of the most important turning points in american military and political strategy and also one of the most important turning points in american society. and the american military was one of the places where american social change occurred. part of this book is about not just the vietnam war, but also the changing composition of the u.s. military, the changing role of the u.s. military and american society, the struggles with drugs and rape in the american military as well as the struggle with fighting a war in vietnam. i want to raise three issues for us to think about today, three areas where i think this book enlightened my thinking and where it can enlighten all of us and hopefully give us more issues to discuss in our conversation that will follow. first issue, what is the role of the secretary of defense? what role should the secretary

of defense play? of course, when the office was created in 1947 with the national securities act, it was a major change in the american constitution. i have to remind students of this all the time, that the constitution speaks of a war department, right, and a navy department that we've had a war and a navy department from, really, the 1780s through the 1940s. and then, of course, for my students, there was no air force at that point early on. they sometimes forget that. and the national security act of 1947 creates the unified secretary of defense, the unified office. what role does the secretary of defense play? what this book shows better than anything else i have read is that secretary of defense in laird's case played a major role not simply as a policy adviser to the president, but as a policy leader for congress. the role that laird played in educating the congress, in informing the congress, in making the congress part of the policy process. this is something the senator referred to. i think it was much more than

fairfax, obviously. this book brings that out quite forthrightly. laird spent time not simply with congress, but also time managing the military bureaucracy, which by this point had become the largest bureaucracy in the united states and the world with his partner, deputy secretary of defense david packard. together, they set a model for a public informant -- public information and policy making in line with other members of congress. if i might say so, it appears to me reading this volume that often they were replacing the reporting role that the national security council or the white house might have otherwise played. that time, the drves department became the primary information source for the congress and for the american public and the book goes through a number of occasions where this is true. cambodia and louse being one of many. what role should the secretary of defense play?

what role should he play within the white house national security establishment? for nixon and kissingers, laird was a secondary policymaker at best. it's not that he wasn't accessible to the present, but that he often made policy as the book shows. and louse would be another example of that. where should the secretary of defense fit into the policy process. the volume shows that laird found a way to get his policy positions into the policy process, but he often had to do it despite the white house. despite the white house. second point, vietnam, gornl, i'm sure we'll talk a lot more about this. i think the book makes a very strong case that laird was not only the author of the vietnamzation strategy. that we knew, i think, but that he made an important effort time and again to pressure and in many cases to force other members of the administration to follow through on this process.

and that he played a key role in trying to build up the south vietnamese military. the book is very strong showing laird's budgetary efforts to get allocations of resources from a congress that did not want to allocation resources to these purposes. it shows repeatedly how he tried to stabbed in the way of ecsalatory moves that were advocated by kissinger and the jcs and others. and, in fact, to my astonishm t astonishment, it shows a time where the jcs tries to undermine laird's activities in this area. you could argue that at times the vietnamzation policy that laird was pursuing was up against the the odds of almost every other policymaker in the white house at the time. and i think the book shows very well that the de-escalation of american forces, which i think was crucial to removing the united states from the war was turning over to the south vietnamese was something laird played an instrumental role in.

i think it's clear in the book that others might disagree with me. it's clear that laird did not expect the south vietnamese forces to fight successfully on his own. i think one of the lies that we tell ourselves now is that the south vietnamese military could have survived and could have won woudz the united states. i think the vietnamzation strategy was a strategy of withdrawal and it was a strategy of the south vietnamese government ultimately collapsed. and i think laird recognized that. that's not said in the book. that's my interpretation of what's in the book. final point, the all volunteer force. i agree with senator warner on this and reading this book i would argue that chapter 14, the chapter on the all-volunteer forces is worth the price of the book undo itself. that chapter, i think, provides the best account i have seen of the politics behind the creation of the all volunteer force. i learn so much reading that chapter alone. it shows how crucial laird was in managing the gate commission which is, of course, the blue

ribbon commission created to look into the all volunteer force. it shows his role working with martin anderson and the white house. george schultz, milton freedman and others, things you would not expect the secretary of defense to do. it shows quite inclusively how important the pay increase was, the 20% pay increase that was given to military service men and women. the lottery, use of the lottery and the end of draft calls on july 19th, 1973. the volume shows that laird recognized senator warner said so well that the american military would fight better and that there would be a better relationship between the u.s. military and the american public if it moved from what was a somewhat arbitrary and unfair draft system to an all volunteer system. and he managed that process. but i was also moved by a particular passage in the book. i want to read this passage because it captures some of my own reservations. i think the reservations many

historians had about the all-volunteer force. this is at the end of a long chapter by our author about the all volunteer force showing how successful laird was with it. but it raises important questions for us today, questions i ask myself when i look out at my undergraduate at the university of texas today. this is the author. should military service be regarded as a commodity, as the economists believed, or did an individual have an obligation to one's country that transcended economic consideration? the end of the draft, pie your neared by laird, raised profound issues about freedom and the obligations of citizenship. young americans now had the freedom once again to choose not to serve and to plan their lives without fear of being drafted. the nation would have to wage war with volunteers. that's what we've done. with no shared open investigation for military service from the larger society, the military hence force would be a source of professionals who

alone would bear the physical and emotional costs of fighting. persons outside the military would be spared, but most of the hardships and consequences of war. as a result, might have less personal interest in opposing or protesting an unpopular or unjust conflict. i think we've seen the evidence of that. there's much more ambivalence and much more interest in our wars because most of our young people are not serving in those wars. the issues that arose when conscription ended in 1973 had been departmented in 1917. others at the time protested that conscription would erode the traditional american ideal of individual freedom and volunteerism. the lesser engagement of the public in initiating and conducting war conferred on the nation's leaders, particularly the president, greater discretion in making decisions about war and peace. with the end of conscription in 1973, the all-volunteer force would constitute a test of

whether the needs of national security during the cold war could be met without recourse to conscription. and i think as senator warner said, and as the book shows very well, the united states military became a better fighting for as an all volunteer professional fighting force. but the question for us is it would become a better society. it would become a better society. i am moved by this account of secretary laird's time at the office of secretary defense by his commitment to public service, by his mastery of the issues. by his recognition and deep belief in the democratic process. that's what he was doing at congress. but i'm struck by what a different world it is from today, what a different world it is from today and the relationship between citizens and government in the relationship between parties and governance and most significantly, in the public engagement with these issues. i wish we had people like secretary laird back because i think our policy is less

fruitful, let well thought out, less effective because we lack leaders of that kind today. thank you. >> my thanks, too, to erin and the historical office for having me here today. i welcome the opportunity to say good things about a book from which i learned a great deal and, in this case, about a public servant i have come to have a real liking for. now, i've been teaching and writing history for 50 years and i think, looking back on it, that what has kept me going more than anything else is the people i have taught and written about. and one of my favorites happens to be melvin laird, the subject of debate gathering. i have to confess also that my

historical acquaintance with laird is recent and somewhat accidental. not too many years ago, jeremi suri invited me to talk about laird at a symposium in madison, and i must confess, when i accepted, i knew very little about him at that time. so i had to do a lot of work to educate myself and the more i read, the more i came to see what an interesting character he was and to appreciate his vital role in the first nixon administration. i don't need to emphasize in present company that the position of secretary of defense may be at least the second most difficult job in washington. and we know it took a huge toll on many of its occupantants, james barstall, louis johnston. clark clifford served less than a year and later commented that

his less than 12 months seemed like five years. laird brought extraordinary credentials to the office. members of congress for 16 years with long service on the house defense provisions subcommittee. he was an aduplicate bureaucratic operator, president elect nixon worried on one occasion about his appointee's reputation for being, say, at least a tad devious. of course laird is devious, former president eisenhower assured him. but for anyone who has to run the pentagon and get along with congress, that is a valuable asset. in his memoirs, henry kissinger concedes his admiration for laird's skills as a political infighter. the nixon administration could be a gloch of back biting that makes the word byzantine seem benign by comparison and laird held their own.

there are many stories and i'll tell just one of them here. one of my favorites. kissinger thought to exclude laird from a presidential meeting with the pope. the protocols called for nixon to fly on a military aircraft from st. peters to an aircraft carrier in the mediterranean. so laird brought the helicopter to st. peters an hour before nixon was due to arrive. given the noise level below, the pope couldn't help but observe the aircraft. so he invited the passengers inside. imagine kissinger's shock when he arrived and found laird already there. kissinger concedes in his memoirs that in tangles with laird he lost as often as he won. he also concedes that laird operated with a buoyantsy and good humor that made working with him as satisfying as it could be on occasion maddening.. i think maybe that's in my heart of hearts why i've taken a

liking to laird. now, it's an impression of mine, nothing i've measured scientifically, and until very recently laird has not got his due. the index to the first edition of my book, america's longest war, for example, contains two citations to laird, both references to his and william rogers' unsuccessful opposition to presidential initiatives. richard hunt's history of laird stewardship of the pentagon, i think, is a superb corrective. it's most impressively resear researched. i'm one of those weird characters, maybe some others of you out there who sometimes reads footnotes for fun. imagine that. as i was pursuing the notes of this volume, i could only envy the citation of documents i assume are still unavailable to me.. the book is well organized and

clearly written. it upholds what i have come to view as the high standards of the series. it persuasively argues the sen tralty of melvin laird's role in national security policy in nixon's first administration. obviously, in the time allowed here, i can't deal with everything or indeed with many things, so let me just address a few matters. i was most impressed with dr. hunt's analysis of laird's crucial part in nixon's vietnam policy. to understand his role at that time, i think it's useful to begin with the nixon president. at the time lbj americanized the war 350 years ago this month, laird was one of his most vocal critics.

i see him at this point as a gold water hawk who firmly believed in the efficacy of air power and in the concept of win or get out. in 1965, he advocated expanded bombing of north veet natural. he staunchly opposed increasing u.s. ground forces. and when johnson was contemplating doubling the number of u.s. forces in june, july '65, laird urged republicans to withhold support unless the president told them what i was up to. fat chance of that happening at that time. laird was also challenging the more moderate and compliant jerry ford for leadership of house republicans. so in 1965 in the summer, i had been working with lbj's phone conversations and laird appears

briefly, but prominently. fascinating phone conversation with ford, june of 1965. lbj suggested half jokingly, only half jokingly, that laird was off his rocker and urged ford to put a muzzle on him to engrashate himself with ford the president then proposed that his dissident senator wayne morse be traded to the republicans for mel laird. as secretary of defense, laird, as already had been mentioned was the architect and even coined the name for the policy of vietnamzation. his major accomplishment, hunt contends, was getting the united states out of vietnam. and the book documents with which detail how he did this. his single minded commitment often put him at odds with president nixon who i think appreciated fully the political importance of what laird was

doing, but also had some problems with it. .henry kissinger who did not always appreciate it. they pure cysted in seeking peace with honor. code words for an independent, noncommunist south vietnam. their negotiating position called for mutual withdrawal of u.s. and north vietnamese troops. they hoped to use troop withdrawals as a bargaining effort with hanoi. laird viewed the war from the perspective of domestic politics. he was certainly it could not be won. he saw his tasks with getting the united states out as quickly as possible and repairing the damage at home caused by the war. by the fall of '69 through skillful maneuvers, he brought the united states to what dr. hunt calls the verge of irreversible unilateral withdrawal. and from this point, he employed

all the tricks of his trade to get u.s. forces out of vietnam as quickly as possible. he used mounting pressure to cut the military budget as leveraged speed. time and again he outmaneuvered him. laird was convince d, hunt concludes, that there could be no slowdowns in seeking to end u.s. combat in vietnam. while getting americans out, of course, he pushes hard to prepare south vietnamese forces to take over the fighting. laird's dogged and ultimately successful pursuit of the role in vietnamzation raises, i think, some interesting questions, some difficult problems. it certainly provides another example of the dysfunctionlty of the nixon administration with a stronger president or maybe a

weaker secretary of defense, might not have happened. and certainly in sympathy with laird's urge to get the united states out of vietnam, but it's also clear that unilateral withdrawal did weaken nixon's negotiating position and as jeremy suggested, south vietnam's ability to divide. i'm not sure of it, but my sense is that he dealt with this contra decision by persuading himself despite abundance evidence to the contrary that vietnamzation would work, that the south vietnamese would be able to defend themselves. if this was his belief, of course, he turned out to be wrong and he clung to this belief even after 1974, '75, vietnam's deficiencies became all too obvious. in his interesting 2005 article on vietnam in iraq, he blames the fall of saigon on the u.s. congress cutting aid to south

vietnam. a charge that i've never been convinced by. now, i thought the laos chapter wasn't particularly fascinating piece of work, which reveals a whole lot of things, the dysfunctionlty of the administration's policy making process. above all, 719, hunt concludes the basic questions about the accomplishment and the durability ott vietnamzation as well as the competence of the government to wage war on its own. what i think has to be remembered, and i would add quickly and emphatically from this point, that this excellent book deals with a lot more than the wars in southeast asia and that, i think, is its real strength, bringing to the fore things that aren't usually taken into account in the history of

these years. i think from the standpoint of time, i will stop right there and stop with a conclusion which i was particularly drawn to and i think particularly well sums up what we're talking about today. here is the way hunt sums it up. laird, he says, exercises considerable autonomy in a sometimes dysfunctional administration that sought to stifle him. fortunately for nixon and kissinger, he goes on to say, they failed to staifl him. the book makes clear a public figure who has gained little notice played a pivotal role in a number of key areas. he not only survived in a difficult post but accomplished a great deal in an administration that often tried to marginalize him.

he did it with clear vision, well defined goals, dogged determination and a large dose of good humor. my conclusion, not the author's, perhaps the smartest thing laird did was to get out of washington before the creaky edifice that was the nixon administration came crashing down amid the wreckage of watergate. thank you. >> i would like to thank the organizers of this session that

many architects who helped me and the two osv historians that helped make this possible. before he retired, al goldberg gave me the opportunity to work on this project. the current historian, erin mahan provided unwavering support and sage advice. melvin laird was a major fixture in nixon's a firm term. he advised the president elect in 1968 to nominate democratic senator henry jackson to the post. when jackson backed out, nixon turned to laird. laird accepted on condition that nixon let him appoint his own officials. to laird's surprise, nixon agreed. laird exercised this authority throughout his tenure. for his deputy, laird selected david packer without first notifying the president elect. when informed, nixon raised no options, but was somewhat displayed because i had recruited packard for a cabinet

level position but was turned down. he wrote lighter in 1972, quote, i struck out. end quote. perhaps no single appointment was important to d.o.d. in this area than that of packard. among other things, he handled acquisition reform and the preparation of defense budget. laird entered office intent upon changing from the conflict. he planned to withdraw forces from vietnam while improving and modernizing south vietnam's a military so it could become capable of continuing the struggle against north vietnam on its own. this became known as vietnamzation. vietnam was costly with money, equipment and political capital, support for defense programs declined sharply during nixon's first material. in addition, the war delayed modernization of weapons and equipment and weakened relations

with asian and european allies. under robert mcna mr. ara, the pentagon shifted troops, equipment, ammunition to vietnam from other command, including nato weakening readiness. years of vietnam combat severely frayed, of course, exposing racial division and growing drug abuse. this defection in the ranks weakened morale and discipline. laird and nixon set up programs to improve opportunities for women and minorities and to provide education, amnesty and drug rehabilitation programs to help those with addiction problems. to build a future, laird worked in the draft and established an all volunteer force. laird served during a period of shrinking budgets, anti-military sentiment and serious inflation. the pentagon critics call for greater spending on social programs and less on defense. this environment made rebuilding the defense program even more challenging.

the armed forces declined by a third during his tenure on a 3.4 million and fiscal year 1969, to $2.2 million in fiscal year 1973. the president and congress suddenly cut spending. outlays fell from 78 billion in fy '69 to about 73 billion in fy '73. but measured in inflation adjusted dollars, outlays declined by 27%. thanks in part to his political skills, laird was able to fend off the even more severe cuts many in congress sought to impose. laird forged his basic views. he had groan uneasy over president johnson's vietnam policy. to laird, the war weakened the u.s. economy and its armed forces and was peripheral to

core security interest. u.s. involvement in the war provided an opportunity for the voeft union to enhance conventional and strategic power. moreover, johnson's policies produced a stalemate in vietnam and needlessly wasted lives and treasure. from the start of the administration, nixon and -- believed they could negotiate a settlelity. they wanted the joint chiefs of staff somehow to intensify vietnam operations without al n alienating the public. laird disagreed. ever sensitive to domestic reaction, he argued the public expected the war the wind down, more aggressive operations would increase american casualties and caution further loss of political support. after laird's trip through south vietnam in march '69, he recommended that president nixon acceleration and expand plans to upgrade south vietnam's forces..

the operative plans only prepared south vietnam's military to cope with vietcong guerillas. if american troops were to withdrawal, south vietnam needed to be capable of fighting north vietnam's regular forces, as well. at the end of march 1969, nixon embraced vietnamzation, expanding the u.s. program to grow and modernize south vietnam's forces so that they could bear the full burden of combat. laird advocated vietnamzation as militarily feasible and politically pragmatic. it was his major policy contribution. he assumed that the new administration had a short breathing spell before war critics resumed their attacks. laird doubted a negotiated settlement could materialize before public and congressional opposition became irresistible. under vietnamzation, south vietnam's a armed forces doubled in size to over a million while

the u.s. military presence in south vietnam dropped from $540 tlous in 1969 to under 24,000 at the time the paris peace agreement was signed in january '73. by the way, january of '73 also saw the end of conscription and laird's departure from office. laird had agreed in 1969 to serve just for four years pep offers his resignation to the president in november 1972, effective 20 january 1973. and accepting the resignation, nixon paid tribute to the secretary calling him, quote, the indispensable man, the right man at the right place at the right time, end quote. no doubt, the president was trig of laird's efforts to fend off catastrophic budget cuts, his handles of morale and social cuts in the armed forces, his

role in ending conscription and most of all, the change in policy of vietnam that led to the withdrawal of u.s. forces. thanks in part to laird's efforts, vietnam did not become a major political liability for nixon in the 1972 presidential election. u.s. forces in vietnam had shrunk to a small number. draft calls were down. and the public had less reason to protest. even kissinger, laird's rival, placed him, quote, calling, saying, quote he preserved the sin ewes of our strength and laid the basis for expansion. this was a major achievelity, end quote. laird's successors would not have to wage war in vietnam but would have to ensure that the all volunteer force remained viable, prepared to fight and that it provides equal opportunities for minorities in women. laird improved race relations,

improved opportunities for women in the military and handled the drug issue represented initial solution toes issues that would require more extensive resolution over time. however, those policies helped established a foundation for nixon's a second term. on veet natural, there was no firm foundation. the collapse of south vietnam's a forces in 1975 raised questions about the real accomplishments of vietnamzation. despite the u.s. withdrawal, there was no resolution disagreement over the vietnam war. thank you. >> all of our panelists provided observations about the important book and the important man. they've done a very good job of allowing ample time for you to ask questions. we have about 30 minutes. if you run out of questions, i

can fill that gap. but please go to the microphone and ask away. >> let me start a question. >> okay. >> i think each of us in this room recognize that the democracy is not a spectator sport. and it's tough. in my 30 years in the senate, i have watched the congress go from a fairley friendly working relationship in times of election that are partisanship that goes with the job. but when the elections are over to try and reconcile and find a common ground of the common benefit of this great nation.

and that has been a struggle and i think in many ways congress has not succeeded. but melvin laird, to me, stands out as a single individual that could take the partisanship and deal with it and then bipartisanship management in his own building and i'd like to ask charles bowser, why did you agree, because you had a distinguished career before coming to the pentagon and a distinguished career after that you were willing to continue and say and serve three more years with the republic. that got your attention. >> first, let me say, it was a surprise that they asked me to stay. i was a democrat from chicago. you know, if you grew up in chicago right after world war

ii, you either voted democrat or you didn't get your garbage picked up or your snow removed in the wintertime. so we were all democrats. and i came in there under mcna mr. ara. i was the last presidential appointment by mcnamara. and then i did that one year, john points out. and then the republicans came in. i was out in chicago negotiating to go back with a firm. and i got this call from my marine ace, colonel kaufman, who said, you know governor chafee of rhode island? and i said no. and he said, well, keep negotiating. so i didn't expect. i came back, we had lunch with chafee. he asked to see us individually. and when he came in to see me, he said would you stay for a few weeks? because i don't have a financial guy in that and i'd like you to -- okay. so i arranged to do that.

but i really assumed found that the laird, tag art, chafee warner team were terrific and they were on the right course because getting out of vietnam, i think, was essential. i told a story yesterday over at the pentagon that when secretary clifford did not approve general wes moreland's request for 200,000 more troops after, why, i call a call from major general chayton. he was kind of like the thirty ranking general at marine headquarters and he had been westmoreland's chief of operations in vietnam. he said to me, on the phone, he had, the commandont would like me to come over and explain this situation a little more to you. would you have time? and, of course, i said i did.

it's going to be interesting so i got my marine colonel again in and i said, what do you think? i said, oh, i can he's coming over to tell you that the secretary of defense should have supported the general in the field and she shouldn't have given him approval for the 200,000. so when chafee comes over, he to understand folded out the map of vietnam, pointed out that north to south, vietnam is as long as the russian front was east to west. and the idea of putting 200,000 more troops in there and he said what we would do if i have 100,000 in logistics and 100,000 in combat would not in any way bring this war to victory for america. we think the secretary of defense has made the right decision. so in the beginning of the military, beginning to think it was the better way was to come out, come out as best we could

and try to build up. and i thought laird and packard and chafee and warner, they were a terrific team. so i stayed three years. >> somebody -- some of the other democrats stayed on. >> there were eight of us that were asked to stay on by laird out of 30. >> out of 30. >> yeah. that was like johnny foster and bob foster, moot, the controller. he kept the whole financial team. >> yeah. >> because he knew he had to -- a lot of people come in from the business world don't realize that in the government one of the ways you get final decision on whatever you're trying to do is getting it through the congress and the budget appropriation. but mel knew that quite well. so he doesn't want to start over with inexperienced team there. but, anyway, and to this day i feel the three years i spent as part of this team was one of the

greatest three of my career. i've had a great career in both the business community and in my 15 years as controller general, too. so thank you. >> yes. one of the things that the speakers do focus on was the tensions between the nixon white house and laird. i was wondering if there could be any comment about tension tess between laird and the joint chiefs of staff. because it seems to me, from what i've read at least, there were occasions that the joint chiefs were going behind laird's back in dealing with the white house and the white house was very definitely encouraging that. >> first, i want to start off institution

constitutionally, the united states follows the term principal of civilian control of the military. now, when the laird team comes in, whether it's a team that comes in with the next president, you suddenly bring together men and women from the civilian environments that they've been in, presumably successful, and all of a sudden you have an enormous possibility. laird had 15 minutes of his staff on the senate office and committee. he inherited 4 million staff, civilian workers and military people overnight when he took that job. so the point i'm making, you've got to rely on the military to recognize you're the boss, but at the same time develop a partnership. and like any two organizations,

there's going to be some friction and some end run. but basically, this has served america since the time of george washington civilian controls, but it's dependent on a strong bond between the civilians and the military. i would agree with the senator and one of the things that struck me in this book is we knew some of this before, but are dr. hunt has been able to pull out a lot of details. there are a number of occasions. i was struggling to find them where joint chiefs don't inform secretary laird of what they're doing. now, i understand that some of this is politics. but i think it's very worrisome when we see that and very worrisome when an nsc adviser who is not confirmed by congress is encouraging the joint chiefs to do this. and this includes double booking on different air missions, etcetera. i think this is a very worrisome thing and it's something we should worry about when we have

a unified military service. i think we need to be more vigilant about that. >> there are also times when the joint chiefs and laird's office worked together to try to figure out what's going on at the white house. >> right. >> it works both ways. but the divide does get much worse as it goes on. because during the offensive in particular, laifr laird is kind of odd man out and is odd man out. then nixon is working with the joint chiefs and sometimes not even with the joint chiefs. he's picking out certain people to handle certain aspects of particularly of the bombing of north vietnam. >> so it's interesting, each of us take the positions have military assistants assigned to them. and believe me, they are pivotal to your success frl operation of your respective responsibilities.

i had such a fine group all through my career. john percy, you were mel laird's military assistant. how did you watch him deal with this question of the joint chiefs not giving him full support? >> he probably should kol to the mike. >> there's a guy that knows more. >> did a good interview with him. >> no, no, laird was a student in so many ways. and he knew pretty well just by experience when somebody was trying to go around an otherwise perhaps not play the game straight. but first, experience i had with mel laird and this was before he was sworn in. he sent bill, one of his long

time assistants over to talk to me about this relationship of the chairman of the joint chiefs having an envoy to the white house. i was the one that had been doing that kind of a job repeatedly and it was a position that had just stood for quite some time. but depending on the personality of the people and how they were. but in any event, mel is sending bill purudy over was to see if it wouldn't away a good idea to provide a memo to henry kissinger before the new administration came in to argue against having that envoy be part of the program. in other words, let's discontinue that. mel knew the people coming into the white house well enough and he knew henry kissinger exceptionally well because he was the one who had hired henry

kissinger to help him on the republican platform in 1964. he had a long memory above henry. so we felt we better not have this. we put together a memo. it was one of the first things that henry turned down. he thought that was a great idea. but in any event, mel was alert to those kinds of things. and skill in handling people allowed him to handle that. let me just say, carry that and ordered the real forward to the strategic arm limitations talks were posedly jared smith was the main negotiator. it was very clear that henry kissinger was the main negotiator, but mel laird was a student of the higher. paul in this tzel would be his counsel and that was seminol. that is in keeping informed of what the back champs really

were. and he also had noll geiler at nsa, very skilled in letting him know. so it goes both ways. >> communication. he could read it. >> the personality of the joint chiefs goes a lot along the line of the chairman. general weaver was no real problem at all. just by personality. >> may i ask a question? because we've been talking collectively and professor, i'd like to correct you on that. we're not talking about the joint chiefs. it's not bill wesmoreland. it's add mirroral tom moore and he's working with under secretary of defense kenneth

rush. i'd like dr. hunt and dr. suri to comment on how t moore is a towering figure. i think he was a one man -- who disappears sometimes to execute policy and no one could find him. don't you think you understated admiral moore's participation by focussing on vietnam policy, dr. hunt? >> i bring out, i think, quite a bit of moore's end runs and his conclusion with the white house, henry kissinger and particularly in the operational chapter. you know, i would agree that laird worked better with wheeler. but moore could be a real problem. in the episode, mentioned in the book there's an episode and i came across somewhere, i don't know -- a memo, i think nixon

rare laird wrote themselves trying to debate whether he should fire, you know, moore for this. but he's preemptive. laird gets a phone call on christmas morning from the president and it's kind of awkward because laird is trying to figure out, well, why is this man calling me christmas morning? and he wishes laird a merry christmas. and he said, well, i think -- he goes on a little bit and he goes, i think we a ought to keep moore in place. i trust moore. so that was kind of, you know, tied laird's hands on that question. >> i'd like to ask one comment to the point about the relationship with the joint chiefs. when laird came in, he instituted this idea of participatory management. and wanted to improve the joint chiefs to a greater extent than

they had with mcnamara. so i think he made an effort to work with the joint chiefs. >> i get the point i was making -- i agree with everything that was said. but the point i was making was slightly different. when you have a president or administration that discounts people who bring them opinions that are well informed that don't match with what they want to hear and valorize it, who bring them opinions that speaks to their preconceived notions, it creates a dangerous dynamic, a dynamic that undermines civilian control, even when it's the president doing that, because in this case you have the secretary of defense who thought deeply about theser&i issues telling the president and kissinger what they don't want to hear and they're looking to incentivize someone else with a uniform on to tell them what they want to hear. that's a dangerous dynamic. >> do i have any more minutes left on my -- okay.

interestingly enough, the little vignette here, if you were to ask mel today, name at least one mistake or thing that happened that you would have done differently today. and it would be very much to this point. he regretted not nominating leonard chapman to be chairman of the joint chiefs of staff rather than admiral moore. he had already arranged with nixon to cause that to happen and this has been the marines, we weren't even part of the joint chooifs at that time. that would have made the rest of the operation with the joint staff and with the joint chiefs a lot different if that happened that way. leonard chapman was a different

permit, very trustworthy and just an inkred credible military mind. so i think mel would say that. >> if i might back up, we can go back to something that came up during the discussions earlier with our learned guests from academia here, it was my impression, and i would say this just as firmly as i can say it, that mel laird believed that if the objective in vietnam is self-determination, that vietnamzation would work. and he believed that when we went through with the program and then ground forces it was working. where we fell down some was in the support on the air side, it would have been needed and if that could have been extended, he still believed to this day i'm absolutely certain that vietnamzation could have been a success and was a success.

so it wasn't just a way of diminishing and getting out. vietnamzation to mel laird was a derigz of a broader security approach. vietnamzation was necessary in order to resolve a situation that was bleeding us as our author has said during the period of the vietnam war where roughly a third of our national -- or of our defense budget was oriented towards things in southeast asia. the soviet union was catching up rapidly in many strategic ways. and mel wanted to free resources to get us oriented back on enemy number one. part of the national security strategy that mel had in mine involved getting the resources, the vital and tangible resource of major public support. the craft was just destroying in that arena and it was necessary to get that back.

and so all volunteer -- and the start of a program of a an art afully designed program that finally convinced people that the all volunteer force was the most immediate and the best way to solve the ills. so thank you, general, very much. i appreciate that. >> george, would you like to respond? >> well, no, i was just going to say, there were many other arches parts of this that were important. >> the real problem from the time anybody elson takes office is that you have two conflicting things. anything you do to try to improve the situation at home is likely to reduce your ability to deal with vietnam and things you do in vietnam, cambodia, laos, are designed to help in vietnam diminish the port at home. and i don't know how you resolve that. i don't know that there was a resolution to it.

>> well, perhaps not. but going ahead, i think one other major filler of this was the introduction of arms control as a real strength in our whole national security pape posture. that point, 1969, most of arms control had been centering around controlling testing. and then they're a small base, but the major big step was getting strategic limitation talks going and a prerequisite for that was having negotiation and mel single handedly got that. so there were big major steps in this, realizing the whole national security posture of vietnamzation was a big major seminole art was just art. and he said to this day, but that could have succeeded. >> i think we have time for the last, some questions and you've been waiting patiently, sir.

>> appreciate it. thank you so much. i'm curious, secretary of defense laird when he was collected, to take that position, what experience you know of, what he relied on as far as council from other secretaries of defenses that became before him. and even if it was across the line, if he relied on people for counsel during his term. >> i can't hear the question. >> the question was, what other secretaries of defense did secretary laird rely on for counsel as he was preparing to rely on. >> right. did that cause friendships or anything that his positions were swayed, whether they would be for or against what the prior secretary of defense was before him or before them? >> i don't know the answer to that. he had expensive discussions with clifford to help make the transition smooth. and he, laird, said those went

very well. he cultivated clifford in his experience and kept -- as has been pointed out, retained a number of delivereds in all office. >> it's interesting to add there that he and clifford were kind of on the same page regarding vietnam from the beginning because clifford, in 1965, was hawkish on the bombing, but opposed to sending additional ground troops. delivered goes to johnson to camp david right before the final decision is made and with uncanny precedence warns of $a 00,000 troops in vietnam, 50 killed in action. of course, johnson goes the other direction, but his attitude at that point was really rather close to laird. >> here is the question from the naval historian and the crowd

here. the admiral zumwald was controversial we've had in naval history. and it occurs on melvin laird's watch. obviously, admiral, this was not his zmo. and i see zumo per son phasing of the of the themes and transition to the overall volunteer force and maintain that force structure. so we discuss a little bit about the selection of zumwald. i presume that he was laird's man. and, you know, how he reflected the themes we were talking about here in this book. >> well, i was sort of in the middle of that one. because john chafee, i never had a more valued friend in my life. he was an 18-year-old marine

grunt. he was sent off to school and was the platoon leader at okinawa. and then he stayed in the reserves like i did and we all got called up again for another conflict, korea. he was a wonderful man. but i've got to be really careful here. he had a little bit of a liberal streak in him. mel laird had a little bit of a liberal streak in him, that wisconsin water, you know. it produces -- >> we call that beer. >> and string cheese and so forth. and i was very strongly -- and i was three months away from taking over from chafee.