states and alaska and hawaii, you can't intercept those icbms. to threatenicbms from interceptor websites icbm has to be above 5 kilometers a second, closer to 6, something like that. so just to summarize, the kinds of observations i'd like to draw from this. engage on remote is absolutely essential. the sensor architecture and battle management system to tie all those assets together is key to this system. if you don't have it, the system doesn't work. phase 1 ships, 2, 3, would launch on remote. same with phase 2. phase 3 things get interesting, supposedly engage on remote will be available. two sites cover europe. turkey outside that defended area, especially that radar. you would need to deploy thaad.

the follow on discussions with the turks, how about accepting a few interceptors. you have to be about 5 kilometers a second to protect united states from a european launch location. if you do get above 5, 5.5, 6 kilometers per second, the problem is you start potentially poseing a threat to russia. you cannot have your cake and eat it to. you can't defend from europe against iranian icbms without potentially encroaching on russian capability. though in my mind you don't encroach on it very much. most of the concerns are political. airborne infrared, space-based infrared, good sensors.

you need more than one or two radars and nato radars, by the way, the french are developing radars, germans, others, hopefully they will contribute to the system. multiple radars and rapid control system. i think that's it. yeah. so that's the kind of capability the system could have. there's several key pillars required to really make this thing work fairly well, which i believe it could. >> thanks. >> thank you, dean. that was very helpful. i'm personally left with the question of you've given defense every benefit of the doubt, everything works as you said, yet it doesn't threaten russians very much until phase 4. i tend to come down where you come down, russian objections are much more political than

technical. there's that flash of brilliance i warned you about. i'll stop at that point. ted, would you take it from there. >> where do i begin? >> ted, i'm more concerned about where will you end? >> i haven't been doing any of the talking so far. let me start out by telling you about a way to protect you. i'm going to put airport security in place to protect you from terrorist attacks on the airplane. however, i'm not going to let anybody x-ray your luggage or anyone else's luggage.

i'm not going to let anybody look into the luggage. i'm not going to let dogs sniff the luggage. i'm simply going to let people look at your luggage and decide, based on whatever they think matters like color, shape, whatever, whether or not it's got a bomb in it or gun in it or whatever. this is basically the level of discrimination capability that these missile defenses have today. in fact, you don't even have to have a suitcase because a suitcase would actually weigh something. since you would put a decoy in a near vacuum in space and inflate it and there's no air drag, this thing could tumble along. to a distant radar operating at thousands of kilometer range or infrared sensor operating at

hundreds of kilometers range in some cases, it would be be an object that potential ly does o does not carry a nuclear weapon. period. so when i start talking about counter-measures later on, keep in mind that hitting the target is not the easy task. is not the hard task. the hard task is finding the object thrown at you. if you think decoys are difficult to build, let me give you a general analogy before i go into some facts that is worth contemplating. imagine you have an adversary that has the technical capability to build a long range missile or icbm. they have the ability to build a nuclear weapon and reentry vehicle with a fuse that would

properly detonate the nuclear weapon but they can't figure out how to inflate a balloon and deploy it along with it. if you believe there is such an adversary in the world, i have some bridges to sell along with the missile defense. now, i was a little surprised michael worked on the ballistic missile review because this is something near and dear to my heart. i do not see any evidence the domestic missile review had any technical input of any kind. i think the document is amazing for the statement it makes. let me give you some. i wrote a rather elaborate article on it at one point. i can't remember anything normal

normally. this one i remember. here is the assertion. the u.s. is currently defended by the ground-based missile defense system deployed in alaska and at vandenberg air force base. it's currently defended and will continue to be defended for the foreseeable future, although we should do work to make sure it stays that way. this is clearly and unambiguously stated in the ballistic missile defense review. the last test failure in the missile defense program was an experiment called ftg 06 followed by a replication of that experiment, the ftg06a. those two experiments were set up so as to make it easier to intercept the warhead. i invite people to ask me questions. i want to give you a little bit of an overview here.

in fact, in the process of trying to make the warhead easier to hit, they inadvertently spewed out material that caused the x band radar to fail because the material acted much like what is known as radar chaff, which we know defeats this system. there is no argument in a technically sound community. i want to be clear on this. chaff defeats the system. the ballistic missile defense also says the new breakthroughs in missile defense technology that allows for ballistic missile defense is particul paa to have a chance of working. in fact the president i his speech december 17th, 2009. let me be clear, there are no

new technologies in the paa. none. no propulsion technologies. no sensor technologies. there are no material ballistic missile defense technologies that give this system greater capability. i'll have something more to say about that shortly. the paa is a proven and effective missile defense. the president said that december 17, 2009. yet if the paa has never been tested against the tumbling target. now, that means something because in the gulf war of 1991 where incidentally the patriot was originally represented as 96% successful and our group showed it was almost 0% successful, so we went from pk equal to one to pk equal to

zero, which should tell you about this community and its ability to tell the truth, they were tumbling targets at high altitude for reasons i can explain in the question-and-answer period. the missile had design features, not flaws, i say features, that caused it to tumble at high altitude and behave very irregularly on reentry and there by completely defeated the patriot. incidentally it would completely defeat the patriot pac 3 as well. we've examined that, actually studied it. if a target is cut into pieces, i take a warhead, i take a missile. instead of cutting the missile -- if you have a two-stage missile you cut the first stage away from the second

stage, you can just as well cut a single stage missile bo many pieces. the radar and infrared sensors are totally incapable of telling which piece is which and whether there's a warhead or not. so basically the counter-measure problems that both ground-based missile defense and phase adaptive approach phase are the same, the technology. they are different, one has smaller interceptors, slower interceptors but both are useless if they face counter-measures of the kind already described. now, let me tell you -- this is, of course, something i've been talking about for really more than a decade. although the new stuff on paa has been the last few years. the department of defense just published a report by the

defense science board. in fact, the report was asked for by ash carter when he was assistant secretary. now he's deputy secretary. n so ash carter asked for this report. let me tell you what i think happened. i'm going to be cynical here. so don't be too shocked. i think the defense science board inadvertently hired some contractors to do the study, who actually did a study, because the people who sign these documents when under the circumstances into the pentagon you know people who sign these documents have nothing to do with actually what the study is. . they were so careless. i say careless, because i'm describing a motive of concealing from you, the american people. they were so careless that when the unclassified version of this document was put out, they inadvertently spilled the beans. let me tell you with this

document, the current deputy secretary of defense asked for and is out there in the open. incidentally, send me an e-mail. i will send you the letters that a colleague and i wrote to the national security adviser just a month ago. we haven't received a reapply to it. there's going to be a newspaper article on it. the defense science board report stated the following. none of the radars in the phased adaptive approach, none of them, are up to the job of supporting the system's workability. none of them. they are too short ranged. i will show you a chart, if necessary, that will show you the radar cross-section of a rather large and rather typical cone-shaped warhead is at least 10 times smaller than what dean showed is the case, at least at

x band. at l band, it is a tenth of the square meter. if that radar cross-section is smaller, that means the range of the radar is not only determined by the power of the radar, its antenna size, the gain of the antenna, radar cross-section of the object, radar reflectivity of the object, which is in control of the adversary is what determines the range of the radar. if an object is a very small radar cross-section, and in this case you can typically expect an unsophisticated warhead with where there's been no effort to make it stealthy to be 1/100 square meter all these radars have shorter range than what people are claiming. and i would like to point out it's not hard to make the radar cross-section thousands of square meters at x band. this is one of the grave

problems x band radars have. you can easily make it stealthy. department of defense report the deputy secretary asked for also made an amazing statement. it said something that i've been saying for more than 10 years. what i've been saying for 10 years is that if you have those suitcases out there and just inspecting them with your eyes, you can't tell whether or not there's a bomb in them by just inspecting them with your eyes. you're going to have to sniff them, open up the suitcase and look around. even then you might fail. certainly you're not going to be able to identify which suitcase is a bomb by simply looking at it. this is not a profound statement to say. there's a lot of technical detail behind this very simple statement, which is correct completely in terms of the analogy i'm giving you.

the report actually says the department of defense has not demonstrated the ability to tell warheads from decoys. this is the unclassified report that deputy secretary of defense carter got asked for a couple of years ago. it also says that a capability the missile defense agency has been talking about for a long time called shoot, look, shoot has not been demonstrated. let me explain this simply. i have an object. i want to destroy it. if i don't have time to shoot it, see if i destroyed it and shoot it again, i typically would shoot two intercepte eror

simultaneously i have a problem. what's happened, there's been a lot of talk about shoot, look, shoot. you need battle space, reach out early enough you can shoot a second intercepter, time to shoot a second intercepter if the first fails. but this report states, and i'm sure it's correct, the shoot, look, shoot is not possible because the department of defense is not demonstrated if they hit a target they will know they destroyed the warhead or able to tell the warhead from other debris created if and when they hit a target. lots of pieces of debris coming at you. if you can't tell a piece of rocket motor that broke apart in the intercept attempt or warhead, a warhead or piece of debris, you can't execute shoot

clearly and makes the important fact ral statement, unless they are lying to the september department of defense is not demonstrating this capability. now what this rpo is releases interesting intelligen intelligence. the intelligence shows adversaries are already testing missiles that release objects that could be decoys within tens of seconds of the end of powered flight. now, of course, if you can build a rocket and deploy a beble to loon. this should be no surprise unless you can't to buy that bridge from me this is what we're currently facing. let me make a general policy

statement. i shudder to do so. here is the argument in the ballistic missile defense review. we're going to make it so hard for these people to use ballis actually going to deter them from using it. we're going to cause them to throw up their hands and give now, that could be true. i'm not opposed to the use of military force in all he milita and i have great admiration for what they do and how they do it, some things, of course. but you can only deter an adversary if you have credible capability to do what you claim. if you don't have a credible capability to do what you claim, you may actually encourage the adversary to go ahead and build.

if you want to cement relations you're defending them, and they wind up withhead shoved down their throat because they've been told that they can deal with it. statements that i was not intending to make when i first -- you can stop me at any too violent. i don't bite, i just kick. so i want to just make a few points that i had actually planned to state and i'll will cut them short because obviously i've taken time on this other matter. howsh system. what the adaptive approach does

is substitutes a very large number of smaller and slower interceptors for a very small number of very large interceptors. that's a very simple minded way of stating it. now, these interceptors are on mobile platforms, except, of course, when they're on these few sites in europe. it is not true that you need a five kilometer per second intercepter to defend the united states with this system. at least in theory. incidentally, i agree -- well, you actually think it would work. y i don't think it would work at all, which is why i'm concerned about it and a question i should ask. you c a 4 1/2 kilometer per second does even better. and there's very even uncertainty in the public domain about the speed of this interceptor. it's 4 1/2 kilometers per second. i've spoken to numerous people in the department of defense, the white house, congress who

has access, nobody has suggested this interceptor is 4 1/2 kilometers per second. let me make clear, you cannot determine whether this interceptor is 4 1/2 kilometers per second because the nature of the design is that it is a very inefficient rocket system because it's designed mostly for safety because people in our navy don't like to get blown up by their own missile it is you have an accident on their own ship. i generally agree with them. having work with the navy, i think their strategy on that point is quite good. so let me ask the question, is the current b and b strategy based on sound fundamentals? i would argue, no, not in terms of the logical reasoning that somebody who is trying to a strategist would argue because

strategy ultimately has to be implemented. if you can't implement a strategy, if you don't have the means to i'mplement a strategy, then having a strategy that's not based on realistic means to implement it is simply crazy. especially when it's a military strategy. technically the problems are very severe because you have no ability to tell decoys from warheads and decoys would be extremely effective in reducing the capabilities of this system. let me give you a couple of quotes from this report at the deputy secretary asked for. this is actually out of the report. the successful operations of these defense systems, that's my addition, is predicated on an ability to discriminate in the xo atmosphere. that means in the vacuum space. the missile warheads from

discriminate the missile warheads from other pieces of offensive missile complex such as rocket bodies, miscellaneous hardware, and intentional counter measures. the importance of achieving reliable discrimination is cann be over-emphasize preponderance of the evidence that's the report's statement. and then it goes on the department of defense has not demonstrated this. they have made a stiatement abot what the system requirement is. we sit down, we design a system and say it has to do this well to meet our objectsive and we look at the technological possibilities and if we're being honest, we say, well, this system cannot meet these military objectives and we throw it out and start over and look for something else or spend our resources on a military enterprise that makes more sense if we're just talking totally military. i'm not getting into the

question of whether or not the resources should be spent on other issues. that's a big question and it deserves discussion but i won't treat it here. so why are the russians worried about phase three of this system? phase three is important. it's not phase four they're worried about. they're worried about phase three. and i don't think it's political myself. that's my judgment. i could be wrong though. there is certainly a high political component to this whole game that both the united states and russia is playing. so you have to be deaf, dumb, and blind to not realize that this is so political it's hard to believe. in fact, i think it's so political that the people in the white house don't even care whether or not this system works. they're so woreried about the republicans calling them cowards that that's what's the concern. and let me tell you, i meet with

people in the white house. i don't say who because they -- but that's where the fear is because there are people in the white house who understand exactly the technical facts that i'm describing here. so if the system has no capability, why are the russians worried? well, let me just step back for phase three, why phase three is important. phase three is supposed to come somewhere between 2018 and 2020. it's scheduled for 2018 but it turns out they're so far behind the building the kill vehicle for the -- for the phase three that it probably would be 2020. in 2020 new start comes to an end and united states begins a new arms reduction negotiation with russia. the russians have said, we regard this system as

threatening and we're going to withdraw from all future arms reductions with the united states after new start ends or we might even withdraw from new start at some point because we are so concerned about this. and i can tell you that people i'm working with, and some of them are big pentagon insiders, are very worried about this. and they should be, because i think the russians are very serious. why are they worried about this system because i just told you it's worthless. it's just your money. but after all, wall street took care of that as well and, of course, the people in the white house are protecting you from wall street just as they are protecting you from these foreign missiles. and incidentally, that's not an accident, because i used to be sick over this missile defensor sh issue but then i saw what we did with regard to wall street. i said, people can't deal with

this in our country, how can they deal with missile defense. if they're not concerned enough about this. and i know a little bit about it right now. i've spent some time learning about economics. and by the way, since i've learned about economics, just make a point, i used to tell people that i worked in an area that was distinguished by its intellectual poverty. but now that i know something a about economics, i no longer say that. why does this give you the worst of both worlds? first of all, the other guy building missile defenses unleashes very powerful bureaucratic forces. if i'm in china or russia or, for that whmatter in the united states when we saw when irving occurred when we built all of these multiple warheads that got us all into so much trouble, i point it at the other guys' mise defense and say, hey, we need more missiles. if you don't give me more

missiles i'm going to go and find a way to make my case to your political adversaries or your people and point out that you're not doing what you need to do to defend this country. anybody who looks at this obama administration the way it's behaved when faced with threats should have no trouble understand that this can occur in other political environments. this is not a unique vulnerability of democratic societies. many people think that mr. putin is going to harden up even more because he wants to show his electorate in russia that he's in charge and he's going to build on fears people have. i would be glad to tell you, unfounded fears. but we're dealing with a essential technical political phenomenon here. it's not purely technical, it's not purely social, it's not purely political. it's very difficult for political leaders to resist th