years. so obama spoke about strategic stability talks and nuclear view as of april 2010. so don't expect, you know, a result by the end of the seminar. it takes a long time to exchange views, and not necessarily them to come to our views but a meeting of the minds sufficiently, if not a treaty, a common understanding, agreement, code of conduct, rules of the road. so we're not in an adversarial position with them. we don't seek to be in an adversarial position with russia or china on these military issues. but hope this gives you an overall flavor for what was motivate the objective. there has been controversy over the actual effectiveness of the systems, which we can talk about. as i mentioned, they can be overwhelmed, defeated in various ways. they can be confused. specified in the missile defense

review report is the stipulation that before new cap anlts are deployed they must undergo testing assessment under realistic operational conditions. this is because a number of the tests early on were motte under realistic conditions. people said they were rigged. look, there's the target of their missile, go over there. the iranians won't be helping us find them. so there has been an effort in the missile defense agency to establish more realistic conditions. this is stuff i would say is contentious. you can look at the parameters of the test and say it's not realistic. it's a work in progress. the full phase approach isn't expected to be deployed until 2020. we have time, many many tests, iteration, capabilities, deployment plans and the rest to build a confident, high

confidence system. will it be foolproof, perfect? no. could it deter potential adversaries? possibly. could it reassure allies? probably. could it possibly improve relations with russia and china? yes. is it worth doing? in my judgment yes. it's a very thoughtful, carefully constructed approach. that's basically my set remarks and sort of how we -- why we established what we did and where we're sort of headed in policy terms. thank you. >> michael, thank you. that was a very nice setting of the stage. we're going to move more to the technical side. i don't want anyone here to think professor postol or dr. wilkening don't understand the situation. it will seem more technical by

people skilled in the world of political give-and-take. i really like standing room only. it's terrific. i appreciate it. there's no need for people to be standing with four chairs here. i wanted to invite the professor. >> okay. our next speaker is dean wilkening. dean will use slides. i wish you had a laser pointer but i couldn't get one. i've already introduced dean, so we'll move right to the substance. over to you. >> thank you, harold. thanks to the institute for hosting this. also thanks to the audience for your forbearance, since i was

formerly affiliated with stanford. so i hope you'll take that apology. i'm going to go through some slides to give you a flavor of the capability of the phase adaptive approach. let me begin by jumping off where michael ended his comments. in my view, missile defense is becoming technically feasible. we're at the very early stages of exploring this technology and building systems that are beginning to work. there's still some challenges. it is not a perfect system, but this technology in my mind is good technology. this is not "star wars." this is not like the sdi. this is very concrete, potentially quite effective technology. in fact, the hit to kill intercepters, i don't know if you're familiar, these

intercepters work by maneuvering and physically colliding with their target. that actually was developed out of the "star wars" program. there was an experiment in 1984 which was part of the star wars, strategic defense initiative. it was demonstrated, where you could physically collide, have guidance accuracy sufficient to collide with a target in outerspace. that experiment has basically spawned the entire set of interceptor-based missile defense assets we have today. i'm going to focus on europe, as michael said. the phased adaptive approach really applies to any region, northeast asia in particular as well as europe. most of the discussion these days was about europe, so i'm going to focus on that as well. one usually starts with some sense of a threat. and for europe we focus on iran.

iran has a fairly active missile program, largely consisting of liquid propellant missiles. they are doing interesting experiments on solid propel ants. today they have scud and old soviet missile. shahad 3. liquid missile, technology probably received from north korea. this is north korea nodong missile. they have recently test add solid missile with a range of 200 to 20,000 kilometers, somewhere in that range. some people are suggesting we may see a liquid propellant missile in the range of 3,000 kilometers in the not too distant future. so today the threat is really quite -- the missile threat from iran is localized to the middle east. obviously israel is very concerned about it because they are within range.

turkey could be concerned about it but turkey is a friend of iran, which is one reason they resisted nato attempts until very recently and agreed to deploy a radar which you'll see on future maps right about here in turkey. in the next, say, several years, five years, missile ranges starting to encroach on southeastern europe or could be southern russia as well. or other regions. saudis are concerned about missile range capability. let's say in a decade or so, iran can probably have the capability to launch missiles that cover the entire european continent. the bush was worried about icbms either from north korea or iran. in my view they got the order

backwards. it's these medium ranged missiles pro live rating quite widely. interrange ar far-term threat. however? how long will it take before iran gets them? who knows. on the order of a decade, maybe two. so this the threat that an mates the european phase adaptive approach. mind you without a nuclear warhead on these missiles they don't pose much of a threat. they can be a political threat, conventionally armed missiles in the middle east in the gulf war, in my mind without some mass destruction nuclear warhead these missiles aren't particularly -- i wouldn't be spending buffaloes dollars to defeat them. of course iran does have a suspect nuclear weapons program. you've been reading a lot about that in the newspaper recently. the concern is, we don't know

the timeframe. they can build a nuclear device to stick on top of a ballistic missile with ranges like this and could potentially threaten europe. that's what's animating european phase adaptive approach. michael talked about it. obama phased adaptive approach, not icbms first. they use this language, emphasis on proven technologies. that's because the theater or terminal high altitude defense system is a mature theater defense system. we used to call theater missile defense systems. the language has changed a little bit. the standard missile three, naval system is quite mature. the ground-based interceptor in alaska people talk about. the least reliable of hit to kill intercepters we have. this has been failing in several test flights for a host of

reasons. not only is it less reliable, it's more expensive on the order of $70 million per interceptor, whereas these ones here are down in the thaad, 10 to 15 million. these architecture built on these more mature missile defense assets is going to be less expensive. most people talk about the intercepters. that's what captures the public's imagination. the most important asset or technology behind missile defense is the sensor architecture and control system. the sensors are radars, the spy-1, cruiser and forward-based x band radar or tpy-2. this is the radar associated with the thaad missile defense system. both are mature.

thaad and tpy-2 are sophisticated and effective radar. infrared and space-based optical systems are maturing quite rapidly, and these have figured into the phase adaptive approach. not only these types of sensors, but they are all going to be supposedly a large number of them. they are all going to be netted together. so the data from any one sensor can be shared with any shooter, interceptor in the system. that's an extremely important attribute i'll show you in a second. there are four phases again, as michael mentioned, based on different variance. the block 1a out on shapes. 2011. that timetable was met. block 1b, same interceptor, missouri sophisticated, undergoing flight tests right now. that's supposed to be deployed

on ships and in romania, devesalu. that's the base michael said was negotiated. this jointly negotiated with united states and japan. as i said, japanese is cooperating on this venture as well. this is a jointly designed system. that's supposed to be deployed in poland. then finally block iib, a more advanced version on ships and on land around europe in 2020. funding for this missile was just cut recently. the 2012 budget, because congress was concerned there's too many concurrent development projects under way, so they have axed the funding for this. the netted sensor architecture, important aspect, multiple radar, spy 1, tpr-2.

maybe nato radars. if one gets into the discussion about russianan population, possibility fof russian radars tied into the system. infrared tracking, airborne or space-based. then a command and control system to tie all this together, as i said. any shooter can launch off of any particular sensor data, track data. here is the evolution of the standard missile. 1a, 1b, iia, ii b, launched onoff these cruisers. some is spay-1 radar. the top of the aegis cruiser. you can't see it very well. just this radar face here. this is a picture of the thaad radar. this is the power van, cooling equipment, and other things. this is a movable radar, mobile,

very powful high-frequency radar. if you look at europe, and i start placing these various radars, there's one located in israel today. the one in turkey is located about here. this is a picture of what that radar fan could see, the volume of space it could see against a radar cross-section. this tells you how large the object is to the radar. this is a fairly small cross-section but sort of representative of what might be coming off the end of iranian ballistic missiles. this suppose spay-1 coverage. this has four phases. this is a ship in the mediterranean. this is not quite the exact location but the phase 1 deployment was an aegis ship in the eastern med. so this ship moves around here, could be deployed down here to

help protect israel in the case of conflict. now, there's been some debate about whether this is a land-based sight, spy-1, naval base 3 are assets. the question is operating ships 24/7 is fairly expensive. they talked about putting it on land to try to reduce cost. what's the radar that goes with it. i've shown it here with a spy-1 radar. you can see the range of this radar is fairly small. it's probably not the best radar. there have been other people that talked about using thaad radar or other systems. to some extent the jury is out about what should be coupled with that system. in any case, the radar coverage is fairly small. this is airborne infrared system. this is a drone, ball down here.

this the drone being used over in afghanistan. the idea is to take this sensor ball and look up with it and use it to track ballistic missiles. again, this is sort of off the shelf system you can use right away. in that configuration, not exactly what you want for missile defense. it's the beginning. whoops. in fact, if you designed a better airborne infrared system than that picture i just showed you, this shoes you sort of the area of space looking down on the earth that an infrared system can see. if you're familiar with infrared systems, it depends on the temperature of the object you're looking at because these things detect black body radiation. the heat coming off the object. so for warmer objects, 300 kelvin, that's room temperature. you can see quite a ways, 1,000 kilometers or more with one of

these infrared sensors. for colder objects, 250 kelvin. that's minus 50 degrees or so or minus 30 degrees centigrade. the detection range, tracking range is not quite as good. you can see three orbits in and around europe. you get substantial coverage. why is it important? if i go back to the radar picture, here is an intermediate range 400,000 kilometer, intermeddiat range central missile out of iran towards eastern europe and these are those radar pictures. that forward based x band radar, the trajectory flies through that fairly reliably. the problem is the aegis radar, target flies over them, doesn't even see them. this is one of the main roles for the infrared, over lay this and put infrared in the black

sea off the coast of romania, now i get good three-dimensional coverage over europe. it's this sensor that starts providing the track information for me to consummate my engagements. okay. now let me talk a little about the defended area. this is one way i look at whether the system is effective or not. can you defend an area as large as europe with a handful of interceptor sites? this is based on calculations i did at stanford some months back. i want to introduce three concepts which are extremely important to the phased adaptive system but rarely talked about in the newspaper. so you can -- it's quite easy to misunderstand it. the radar associated with the interceptor carries out tracking, guidance and

communicates to the interceptor and cons mates the engagement but itself. no external sensor helps out in the process. stand alone operation. launch on remote is a mode where -- actually i'm going to show you here. i'm going to show you maps of how wide an area a standard missile 3-like system, sort of a notional standard missile 3 and i have a couple of different speeds for these missiles. i'm going to show you the area you can defend. so here is stand alone operation. here is looking at devesalu. here are bands, assuming it's spy-1 in romania. this forward-based turkish radar picks this up. you're going to see something coming in. it cues this radar where to

look. this radar starts scanning the eye, detects the object, tracks it, launches the interceptor and has to carry out this intercept before the object falls too deep into the atmosphere for the interceptor to work properly. when i operate in that mode, i can defend an area on the ground that looks like this yellow pad you can barely see down here. it's a very small defended area. it tends to be behind the interceptor site. this is sort of a standard mode of operation, also fairly ineffective for protecting large areas. launch on remote is where i use track data from some other sensor, in this case forward-based radar in turkey. it tracks this object. i send that track information to the interceptor here. i launch by interceptor based on this radar's track, then i consummate the engagement within

the field of view of this radar. in other words, this radar has to watch the target, watch the interceptor and tell them approximately how close they are getting. that's called launch on remote. you launch the interceptor on remote track data. this mode of operation has been tested out in the field. they have had success so far. but if you can see, this is europe here. the defended area is certainly growing compared to stand alone but still not that large. the real -- the most effective mode of operation and the one the european phase adaptive approach is heading towards is called engage on remote. engage on remote, i have some forward sensor in this case, this radar here picks up a track. i launch my interceptor based on this track information and i consummate the engagement, that is to say some other sensor, a second sensor, the airborne infrared here keeps tracking

this, tracks the interceptor missile. the only thing that the radar, in this case the spy-1 does, it's a communication link, communicate to the interceptor and say, okay, the adir, airborne infrared data tells me this is where it's heading, so adjust your track until have you an engagement. this is called engage on remote, so you launch on remote, consummate the engagement based on another sensor and essentially remove the radar in this case that's located with the interceptor site. that's the most effective mode of operation. so now let me turn to defense of europe. phase one. this is what the defended area looked like. i assume launch on remote would work. we have one chip in the eastern

med, this is one the sha hab 3. you could provide localized defense in the middle east and training. you'd need two or three ships. if there was a real war that broke out. maybe some down here defending other assets. but that's what the defense picture looks like today. we have a forward-based radar in turkey, and one ship or a handful of ships using the block 1, a interceptor that is out in the field today. phase ii three years from now largely the same picture. we have the standard missile b, an improved interceptor in devesalu. now, three years from now, the range of missile threats might extend out to 2,000 kilometers, something like that.

so again, fairly localized defense of southeastern europe with two, three, maybe four sites, something like that. things get interesting at phase iii2018. now we're supposed to have block 2a interceptor, supposed to be deployed on land in poland, where the interceptor site is going to be. one of the issue one gets into not a lot of information in the public domain. all these chards are based on public domain operation. we don't know how speed is in this business. what i've done is show a family of curves 3 1/2 to 4 1/2 kilometers per second representing the kind of coverage you would get in poland of europe varying the interceptor speed. maybe it would extend throughout europe. who knows.

i've shown the maximum range at reach to england. this assumes engage on remote. you have to have these sensors, airborne sensors and whatnot to provide all the track data for this to operate. now you get huge areas. from one side alone, you can defend all of europe at the higher interceptor speeds. engage on remote will be implemented down at devesalu. again, a family of curves. maybe the romanian site will remain with a slower interceptor, maybe a faster one in there, who knows. if i put these two together by 2015, let's assume the speed is 4 kilometers a second and i have engage on remote. i have two land-based sites alone. with engage on remote, i can cover the entire continent of europe. in fact, i can get shots from both of these sites for any

missile heading in towards the center of europe. i didn't point this out, but it's clear here in this chart. this radar in turkey, the turks only agreed to put a radar there. no interceptors. out of the area for most assets. aegis has a hard time defending it. romania has a hard time defending it. this asset is an extremely important location. if i put a thaad, radar going with the thaad system, if i just put the whole battery there instead of the radar, this is the kind of defended area you would get. start defending certainly the radar itself if not central turkey. if i don't have engage on remote, all i have is launch on remote, this is what the picture looks like. here is the polish site,

romanian site, didn't put any naval interceptors there. if i don't get engage on remote, the broad defense of europe is impossible unless you start pro live rating all over the place. that highlights the importance of that particular aspect of the defense. i was talking earlier with harold about the issue of russia. i want to at least touch on a little of why the russians are concerned. phase 4 of the european phase adaptive approach is really designed it defend the united states, not europe. up three phase iii that's europe, phase iv tcontinental united states. i assume engage on remote, a standard missile 3 block 2b of different speeds.

this shows the defended footprint going against an iranian icbm. let's assume we have icbm. this is the maximum range i've assumed here slicing through the united states. 4.5 kilometers a second, which is very fast for defending europe. this the defended area in here. you really cannot protect the united states. if i increase that speed to 5 kilometers a second, now i can do a good job defending eastern part of the united states but the west coast is a little bit out of the footprint. i haven't shown you capability of fort greeley, which can defend this whole area. five kilometers a second, forward site could defend east coast, fort greeley, west coast. if you want to cover the entire continental united states from poland, your interceptor speed has to be much faster than any

interceptors we're talking about. at least a kilometer faster. now, why are the russians concerned. this chart shoes you the footprint, the defended area for russian icbms of different flavors launched from all the known laump locations in russia. for a 5 kilometer a second interceptor, which is high for any of the sm-iii interceptors talking about. if i put that sm block iib and has a speed of 5 kilometers a second in poland, which has been the source of much of russia's concerns, you really can't protect the united states. here is maine. only the ss 27s and ss 19s, you might be able to cap them going to maine. but the rest of the