have increasingly placed our trust in international institutions to safeguard our future. international bodies have not generally performed well. indeed, we have learned that they can't perform well unless we refrain from utopian aims and give them practical tasks and provide them with the means and backing to carry them out. let's have a look at these institutional bodies and their failure. perhaps the best example of utopian aim is what's called multilateralism. this is the doctrine that international actions are most justified when they are untainted by the national interests of the countries which are called upon to carry them out. multilateralism briefly became the document of several western powers in the early '90s with the united nations security council was no longer hamstrung by the soviet veto.

it seemed to promise a new age which the united nations would act as world policemen to settle regional conflicts. of course, there was always a fair am of hypocrisy embedded in the multilateral doctrine. the haiti intervention by united states forces acting under a united nations mandate, for instance, was defended as an exercise in restoring a haitian democracy that had really never existed. it might be better described in the language as the continuation of american immigration controls by other means. the honest multilateralism without the spur of national interest has led to intervention without clear aims. no one could criticize the main impulse to step in and relieve the suffering created by the

civil war in some molsomalia. it could be clear the humanitarian effort could not enjoy long-term success without a return to civil order and no internal force was available to supply this. hence the intervention created a painful choice. either the united nations would make somalia into a colony and spend decades engaging in nation-building or united nations forces would withdraw and somalia revert to its prior anarchy. since america and the united nations were unwilling to govern somalia for 30 years, it followed that the job of feeding the hungry and helping the sick must be left to civilian aid agencies and private charities. conclusion, military intervention without an attainable purpose creates as many problems as it solves. this was further demonstrated in

the former yugoslavia where early action to arm the victims of aggression so that they could defend themselves would have been far more effective than the united nations half-hearted multilateral intervention. a neutral peacekeeping operation lightly armed in an area where there was no peace to keep. so maybe to consolidate the gains from aggression. eventually, the united nations peacekeepers became hostages used by the aggressor to determine more effective action against him. all in all, a sorry and tragic episode. ended by the croatian army. nato air power and american the combined effects of inventions in somalia has been to shake the self-confidence of key western powers and to

tarnish the reputation of the united nations. now a dangerous trend is evident. as the haiti case shows, the security council seems increasingly prepared to widen the legal basis for intervention. we are seeing, in fact, that classically dangerous combination of growing disproportion between theoretical claims and practical means. compare this hubris with the failure to act effectively against the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and the means to deliver them. as i have already argued, these are falling into dangerous hands. given the intellectual climate in the west today, it's probably unrealistic to expect military intervention to remove the source of the threat. as, for example, against north korea, except perhaps when the

offender invites us to do so by invading a small neighboring country. even then, as we now know, our success in destroying saddam's nuclear and chemical weapons capability was limited. and we can't be sure that the efforts by inspectors of the international atomic energy authority to prevent saddam putting several nuclear power to military uses have been any more successful. we may reasonably suspect that they have not. what then can we do? there is no mysterious diplomatic means to disarm a state which is not willing to be disarmed. as frederick the great observed, diplomacy without arms is like music without instruments. arms control and non-proliferation measures have a role in restraining rogue states but only when combined

with other measures. if america and its allies can't deal with the problem directly by preemptive military means, they must at least diminish the incentive for the saddams, the gadhafis and others to acquire new weapons in the first place. that means, my friends, the west must install effective ballistic missile defense which would protect us and our armed forces, reduce or even nullify the rogue states' arsenal, and enable us to retaliate. so the potential contribution of ballistic missile defense to peace and stability seems to me first, and most obviously, it promises the possibility of protection if deterrence fails or if there is a limited and unauthorized use of nuclear missiles. second, it also preserved the

capability of the west to project its power overseas third it would diminish the dangers of one country overturning the regional balance of power by acquiring these weapons. fourth, it would strengthen our existing deterrent against the hostile nuclear superpower by preserving the west's powers of retaliation. and fifth, it would enhance diplomacy's power to restrain proliferation by diminishing the utility of offensive systems. acquiring an effective global defense against ballistic missiles is therefore a matter of the greatest importance and urgency. but the risk is the thousands of people may be killed by an attack, which forethought and wise preparation might have prevented. it is, of course, often the case in foreign affairs that statesmen are dealing with

problems for which there is no ready solution. they must manage them as best they can. that might be true of nuclear proliferation, but no such excuses can be made for the european union's activities of the end of the cold war. it faced a task so obvious and achievable as to count as almost an explicit duty laid down by history. namely, the speedy cooperation of the new european union democracies, poland, hungary, slovakia within the european union's economic and political structures. early entry into europe was the wish of the new democracies. it would help to stabilize them politically and smooth their transition to market economies. it would ratify the post cold war settlement in europe. given the stormy past of that

region, inhabitants are said to produce more histories than they can consume locally. every should wish to see it settle economically and politically inside a stable european structure. why was this not done? why was every obstacle put in the way of the new market democracies? why were their exports subject to the kind of absurd quotas that have until now been reserved for japan? why is there still no room at the inn? the answer is that the european union was too busy contemplating its own naval. both the commission and the majority -- [ applause ] both the commission and the majority of member governments were committed to an early beating of the european union. that is, centralizing more power

and the supernational institutions. they felt a widening of it, that is admitting new members would complicate, obstruct or prevent this process. while the deepening went ahead, they arranged to keep the central europeans out by the diplomats' favorite tactics, negotiations to admit them. in making this decision, the european union put extravagant and abstract schemes ahead of practical necessities. as a manner of doctrine projectors from jonathan swift down to the president. and the usual disasterous results. the visionary schemes are deepening, either have failed or are failing. the fixed exchange rates of the european exchange rate mechanism have made the yo-yo seemed like a symbol of rigidity.

they crashed in and out of it in september 1992 and have shown no signs of obeying the dictates of brussels since then. the next stage of monetary union agreed the single currency is due in 1999, when member states will have to achieve strict budgetary criteria. go, only luxembourg my see tests. attempts by other countries to meet them on time pushed up unemployment, hiked interest rates, depressed economic activity, and created civil unrest. and for what? across the continent, businessmen and bankers increasingly question the economic need for a single currency at all. it is essentially a political symbol. the currency of a european state and people which don't actually exist, except perhaps in the mind of a brussels bureaucrat. these symbols were pursued at a

real political cost in central europe. the earlier enthusiasm for the west and western institutions began to wane. facing barriers and quotas in western europe, the central europeans began to erect their own. those politicians there who had bravely pursued tough-minded policies of economic reform, believing they were following the advice of european leaders, found themselves left in the lurch when the going got rough. only the czech republic under the very able leadership has remained on course to a normal society. in the last few years, the democratic reformers have fallen one by one in the former communist satellites to be replaced by neo-communist governments promising the impossible, transition to a market economy without tears. this is a tragedy in itself and

an avoidable one, but with russia lurching politically into a more authoritarian nationalist course and the central membership of nato still unsettled, it has more than merely economic implications. which brings me to my last example of institutional failure. mercifully only a partial one counter balanced by some successes, namely nato. nato is a very fine military instrument. it won the cold war when it had a clear military doctrine, but an instrument can't define its own purposes. since the dissolution of the warsaw pact, wisdom statesmen found it difficult to give nato a clear one. they have shilly-shallied on four major questions facing their lives.

should russia be regarded as a potential threat or partner? russia may be about to answer that in clearer fashion than we would like. should nato turn its attention to out of area where most of the post cold war threats such as nuclear proliferation now lie. should nato admit the new democracies of central europe as full members with full responsibilities as quickly as prudently as possible? should europe develop its own defense identity in nato even though this is a concept driven entirely by politics and has damaging military implications. such questions tend to be decided not in the abstract, not at intergovernmental conferences convened to look into the crystal ball, but on the anvil of necessity and in the heat of crisis. that is exactly what happened in the long-running crisis over bosnia.

at first, the supporters of the european foreign policy and the european defense identity declared the former yugoslavia europe's crisis and asked the united states to keep out. the united states was glad to do so, but the european unions involvement only made matters worse. after a while was effectively abandoned. then the united nations became involved and asked nato to be its military agent and its peacekeeping operations. finally, when the united nations nato personnel were taken hostage, the united states intervened, employed nato air power with real effect, forced them to the conference table and for better or worse imposed an agreement on them, and heads a large nato contingent that is enforcing it. in the course of stamping its

authority on events, the united states also stamped its authority on the european members of nato. and since the logistical supply chain goes through hungary, it drew the central europeans into nato operations in a small way. whether nato will apply the logic of this crisis in future strategic planning remains to be seen. but for the arm chair theorists who would close passive and divided nato, bosnia has been no end of a lesson. these various institutional failures are winding up in their own terms and our own times, if we look further to the end of the 21st century, however, on alarming and unstable future is on the cards. consider the number of medium to large states in the world that have now embarked on a free market revolution. india, china, brazil, possibly

russia. add to these the present economic great powers, the united states and japan, and if the federalists get their way, a european superstate with its own independent, foreign and defense policy separate from and perhaps enimical to the united states what we see here in the year 2096 an unstable world in which there are more than half a dozen great powers, all with their own clients, all vulnerable if they stand alone, all capable of increasing their power and influence if they form the right kind of alliance, and all engaged willy-nilly in maneuvers to show their relative positions improve rather than deteriorate. in other words, 2096 might look like 1914 played on a somewhat larger stage.

this need not come to pass if the atlantic alliance remains as it is today. in essence, america as the dominant power surrounded by allies which generally follow her lead. such are the realities of population, resources, technology and capital, that if america remains the dominant partner in a united west and militarily engaged in europe, then the west can continue to be the dominant power in the world as a whole. what is to be done? i believe that what is now required is a new and imaginative atlantic initiative. its purpose must be to redefine atlanticism in light of the challenges i have been describing. there are rare moments when

history is open and its course changed by means such as these. we may be at just such a moment now. first, security. my discussion of the bosnia crisis demonstrated, the key lies in two reforms. opening nato membership to poland, hungary and the czech republic, and extending nato's role so that it is able to operate out of area. both reforms will require a change in nato's existing procedures. an attack on the territory of one member must, of course, continue to be regarded unambiguously as an attack on that of all. but that principle of universality need not apply to out of area activities. in deed it needs to be recognized that a wider role for nato can't be achieved if every member state has to participate in an out of

area operation before it can go ahead. what is required are flexible arrangements, which to use a fashionable phrase, permit the fashionable phrase, permit the creation of coalitions of the willing. would nato expansion mark a new division of europe and give russia the right to intervene and stay outside the fold? not in the least. among other reasons, we could hold out the possibility of admitting those countries which subsequently demonstrate a commitment to demographic values and which have plagued military forces up to an acceptable standard. that would be a large incentive for such states to improve democratic reform and french preparedness. nato also provides the best available mechanism for coordinating the contribution of america's allies to a global system of ballistic missile

defense. that is, while providing protection from missile attacks from whichever source it comes. if, however, the united states is to build this global system with its allies, it needs to know that it's a permanent one resting on solid foundations of american leadership. that raises in my view very serious doubt about the passionate idea of a separate european defense identity within the alliance. essentially, this is another piece of political symbolism associated among european pedulists with aspirations in a european state. it would create the armed forces of a country which does not exist. but life is single currency.

it would have damaging consequences in the here and now. in the first place, it contains the germs for a major rift. secondly, it has no religious benefit. in fact t has severe potential military drawback. even a french general admitted that during the gulf war, united states forces were the eyes and ears of the french troops. without america, nato is a political talking shop, not a military force. nor is that likely to be changed in any reasonably foreseeable circumstances. defense expenditure has been falling sharply in almost all european states in recent years. even if this process were now halted and reversed, it would take many years before europe could hope to replace what america presently makes available to the alliance by way

of command of control facilities, airlift capacity, surveillance and sheer fire power. defense policy can't be built on political symbolism and utopian prugts of a nation building that even defy military prudence. but even a big and successful nato would not survive indefinitely along the lines of trade and economics. one of the great threats to romantic unity in recent has been the success sags of trade wars. there was a new lat tank nish, and they were measuring it by stimulating trade and badded

needed new jobs. more specifically, we need to move to a transatlantic free trade area. un uniting -- i realize this may not seem the most proficient moment in american politics to advocate a new trade agreement. [ laughter ] >> but the argument against free trade between advanced industrial countries and tall-throw me feed ones. hopefully it will allow elephant

by american laeb wp. >> syria would create unpair leld interests in world trade negotiations. tnt. it's economic gains are only half the market in a trans lank ski area. stong sfels. . it would be in, and as such the sickened fellow at looeng unit it stl. yufr your laviolette that ha hap

want malt that's more paistic in today's more fluid world. it's one's freedoms, values and vir ttues ideas and ideals, and above all, a common experience of liberty. true, the aging pacific may fast becoming the new center of global economic power. quite likely both the united states and britain take an ever closer interest in developments there. but it is the west, above all, perhaps the english-speaking people of the west that has formed that system of liberal democracy which is politically dominant and which we all know offers the best hope of global peace and prosperity. in order to hold up these things, the atlantic pacific

relationship must be constantly renewed. so we must bring new life into the institutions of the west, such as the atlantic council and the north atlantic assembly. all too often, my friends, they lack influence and presence in public debate. above all, however, loathe as i am to suggest another gathering of international leaders, i would propose an annual sonnet of the heads of government of all the north atlantic countries under the chairmanship of the president, president of the united states. what this all adds up to is not another super national entity. that would be unwielding and unworkable. it is something more subtle, but i hope more durable. a fall of atlantic partnership which attempts to solve common problems for respecting the sovereignty of the member states. in the cause of identifying

these problems and trying to solve them, graduates would discover they were helping to shape public opinion and political consciousness. the reaction 50 years ago to that earlier speech was swift, dramatic and at first highly critical. indeed, to judge the critics, you would think it was not stalin but churchill that had drawn down the iron curtain. it soon became evident that fulton had struck a deeper chord. it resulted in a decisive shift of opinion. the opinion polls recorded that 18. 83% of americans now favored the idea of a permanent alliance between the united states and britain. by speaking when he did, churchill guarded against a repetition of the withdrawal of

america from europe, which after 1919, allowed the instability to emerge to plunge the whole world, including america, into a second war. like my uniquely distinguished predecess predecessor, i, too, am accused of pointing out new dangers in which the president's attitudes are proving unlikely. civilization in my defense. in particular, i believe, tuz churchill's words for there are no better, if all british moral and material forces and convictions are joined with your own in fraternal association, the high roads of the future will be clear not only for us but for all. not only for our