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seat to democracy. >> coming up a conversation about russians diddle of a space-based nuclear weapon, with assistant secretary of state for arms control mallory stewart, hosted by the center for strategic international studies, this is about 45 minutes. [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] >> good afternoon, everybody. glad you're here on a friday afternoon. not that many people do that

anything i put it in the sarasota golf shows you're all very serious people. i think the commute my name is john hamre. on the present here at csis and want to say a hearty welcome to all of you. we are in for a very unique opportunity. assistant secretary stewart is, this doesn't normally happen, when something is kind of a breaking, very serious development, we don't normally have the opportunity toe hear from a senior policymakers in the state department, anyplace, to share with us the thinking of the government about a big development. this is a big velvet. so we're really very fortunate. i don't know, was it a week ago, ten days ago? jake sullivan and a press availability made note that we

think russia has put a nuclear device in orbit. now, i mean, for 50 years without what are called rpg's, power sources, that are used to provide electricity for satellites. they the nuclear, there's aso nuclear core to those but this is different, okay? this is an application there's now a weapon in orbit, or could be a weapon in orbit. that's a very profound thing. first of all it's a violation of international obligations. any, but nuclear weapons in space are really profoundly different from nuclear weapons here on planet earth. where used to thinking about blast effects and there's the shockwave and all that sort of thing. all of that is a product of an earthly environment, but in

space a nuclear detonation has no environment to transform the energy. and so it becomes x-rays that haveve astounding reach. and so it's a threat not to something that is five miles or ten miles away. as a threat to think that a 100 miles away. when we think of how space is becoming the ubiquitous platform for so many both companies and countries and companies, this is a profound threat, it's a real serious issue so we will explore that today. i did want to say thank you to you, secretary stewart for joining us today. it supposed to have you here at no many, well, government employees who work on a friday afternoon, but not that many of us civilians are working friday afternoon. clayton is working friday afternoon. clayton swope is going to run

this meeting. let me turn at you, clayton. let's get this started. thank you so much for,, sector. >> thank you, dr. hamre for the introduction. my name is clayton swope, deputy director of the earth-based security project you're at csis. thank you again secretary stewart for joining us today. coincidentally this is national space a day come to discuss is very important topic i want to thank everyone who's who in person and it went online. as dr. hamre noted space thisng important part of our everyday lives. place and crazily critical role in economic and national security. as many of those watching may know, the project producing annual report on space threats that we're here today to discuss russia's development of a nuclear anti-satellite weapon which which was on' of the most concerning talbots and most recent report released just two weeks ago. we haveou heard a lot of speculation based on few confirmed details about what russia maybe working on since february snooze. we know the united states is working with alliesrk and partns

come particularly at the united nations throughgh a recent security council to push on this issue. to start off, stacker to work, could you tell us what more the u.s. assesses that russia's developing and how is he was working to address this threat? >> thank you, clayton and dr. hamre. really, really happy to be a today on this particular day for may 5 to market even more special. the united states is extremely concerned that russia may be considering the corporation of nuclear weapons into his counter space programs. based we deem credible. the united states has been aware of russia's pursuit of this sort of capability dating back years. but only recently have been able to make a more precise assessment of their progress. russia has claims the satellite is for scientific purposes. however, the orbit is in in a region not used by any other spacecraft.

that in some was somewhat unusual. the orbit is a region of high radiation than normal low earth orbits. but not high enough of radiation environment to allow accelerated testing of electronics, as russian has described the purpose. i also want to take a moment to consolidate here what we've said previously, just remind you. what we want to clarify is that this is not an active capability that has already been deployed. all the russia's pursuit of this capability is deeply troubling, there is no imminent threat. we are not talking about a be used to can attack humans or cause structural damage on earth. instead, as assistant secretary plum said yesterday from his testimony, analysts assess that a detonation in a particular

placement in orbit of the magnitude and location would render low earth orbits unusable for certain amount of time. of course the broader thing here is placement by state parties, outer space treaty of a nuclear weapon in orbit is a clear violation of the article iv of the outer space treaty. this is something that we've been discussing. we have been emphasizing and we've been trying to raise awareness.f, we also as clayton mitch and pursued the u.n. security council resolution to affect come to thises effect, to try to strengthen the outer space treaty and to try to reinforce states parties commitments to article iv conficker because ofl the extraordinary result and risk to buy documentation,

scientific capacity, meteorological capacities, agricultural, commercial and, of course, national security capabilities that satellites in this orbit would support and would be immediatelypp eradicatd by such a violation and use of such a weapon. so you ask what we are doing and i be happy to talk about that. the president has directed a series of actions, specifically with such grave consequences to the international security and a long-term sustainability outerspace environment that we decided to take this issue to the u.n. security council. there is no other forum right now in the international arena for implementation of the outert space treaty. it's different than some of the other arms-control treaties and that there isn't a body set up t specifically to implement this particular treaty. given the great consequent as other potential violation we thought there should be a u.n.

security council resolution reconfirming states parties commitments to article iv and taking several other steps. i can talk about that. one is to consider a u.n. security council resolution at the same time to engage bilaterally with russia, bilaterally with other countries, and as o secretary blinken and i believe jake sold with himselfke have mentioned, e did discuss this directly with china and with india. we have been discussing this with other countries that have vested interest in the sustainability of the outerspace. vibrant and at the u.n. so going to our u.n. proposal, the u.s. and japan jointly proposed, j and with ultimately5 cosponsors in total, a u.n. security council resolution that reconfirms the importance of the outer space treaty, that

recommitted states parties to the treaty to abide by article iv, preventing the orbit around earth of nuclear weapons or other wmd. thatat reaffirmed the importance of the peaceful uses and sustainable exploration and access to space and encouraged those member states of the u.n. that were states parties to the outer space treaty to consider joining and supporting this. also importantly, that called upon states to not develop any nuclear weapons or wmd for placement in outer space. so went a step be on but it was a request, calling upon courage to do this. the outer space treaty is unique in that it prohibits the placement in orbit or around earth of these weapons, but it doesn't talk about the development of weapons or other arms-control treaties do in

certain circumstances so without adding the effort to call upon states to not develop such weapons would be useful. we thought it was a very nonpolitical evenhanded approach to remind the world and to reinforce the outer space treaty and its commitments. and we took a forward again with a total of 65 cosponsors to you it's a good counsel. as you you know russia vetoed it. as was noted by our ambassador to thehe u.n., this was inconsistent with putin's statement that he intended not to place a nuclear weapon in outerspace. we found, it raise questions, quite frankly, asked why he felt the need to veto this u.n. security council resolution, which also incorporated the idea of additional steps, points that combating talkal about this in more detail into a comp points that both russia and china made. the idea of taking additional

steps through either legally binding mechanisms or non-legally binding to reinforce, to support, and to build upon the commitments in the outer space treaty to prevent an arms race in outer space. our u.n. to get yells resolution works to support, preventing an arms race in outer space to these mechanisms, especially when wee can develop essentially credible and reliable means to verify such additional steps. we try to accommodate the comments we heard from many, oath onn the u.n. security council and off, and we amended the resolution, doubling the number of preamble paragraph and anadding paragraphs reflect some of the comments we heard. we engaged with both russia and china numerous times. we tried to accommodate and incorporate the suggestions that we could agree to, but russia in

particular really relied upon their effort to insist on additional parameters as they proposed in their amendment to the resolution that was not agree to, and as they sexually proposed in their resolution that followed ours at the vetoed. so again, next steps, on monday may 6 there's going to be a discussion in u.n. general assembly it is of russia's to talk about the circumstances for that veto at the u.n. security conference of look forward that brings forward all members to hear their thoughts and understand their concerns oner this issue. and then again continuing to engage bilaterally and multilaterally and to use all the diplomatic tools in the context of were actually mentioned by both china and russia, but specifically china in his expedition to vote for our in u.n. security council resolution, the conference on disarmament, the u.n. first committee and other diplomatic forumsso in which these exact

issues are beingn discussed, ad we hope to continue to have his conversations there. >> they, secretary stewart for theer information. what the u.s. is doing and plans to do. looking at what language we've heard specifically today from u.s. government on this capability, it's been very precise. it's referred to this as a device and not a weapon. it's been couched in very specific terms. today you just mentioned one of the red flags with this capability was what it would be placed in orbit. could you maybe unpack some of the statements today on whether by means and what would be the effects of satellites and why we should really beul concerned about? and that have preciselyan which relates to this position today. >> yeah. i mean, we always have to be careful when we're talking about releasable language and the context in which we are dealing with intelligence operations and

discretion. there has been some carefully chosen language. i ended up reading of the more to make shock of the language right, so appreciate you letting me do that. but what i think john plumper effect of the committee carried yesterday in his testimony is that the particular placement where concerned about and analysts have been looking at what potentially entail again the limitation of low-earth orbit for a large or certain amount of time for all satellites. the application of any satellites in that orbital arena as such, it's such a weapon replace with a certain magnitude in a certain location. ii don't know that we know that much more about the potential consequence, it will depend on all the parameters analysts on the get and what ultimately is the placement and the magnitude, but there has been an evolutionh in our talking points to reflect growing concern on the issue but

also to reflect the need for more information. i think as we talk with other governments and hear their concerns and we hear sort of russian responses, we understand there's a need for as much information as possible so that we are not raising alarm bells without somee explanation for wy we feel this seriously about this potential threat. >> you imagine the engagement with other countries and also at the u.n. but outside of the u.n. what is your biggest take away use effort to discourage russia from pursuing this capability? are there any surprises? taken without a a vote playedt at the u.n. >> yeah, i mean, thank you for that. we were surprised actually to be able to get 65 cosponsors in a very short period of time. we were heartened that it was one country vetoing in one

country a standing at the book. so 13 countries agreeing with us that our resolution was important for national security, for , for international stability, security of long-term sustainability of outer o. it reflects the seriousness with which governments are considering this issue, that 13 governments agreed this was the responsible and appropriate approach here again, one country vetoing and one country abstaining. but iit think it's really good o know that countries were able to see the potential threat so significantly and in such a short period of time. >> and can you say anything publicly about what china, how china looks at this issue? we haven't heard them say anything or be very vocal about this. seems like have just as many space equities as the united states in somesp cases, and as much of thend reason economicaly to want to reserve the use of space. how are they approaching this

issue? >> i'm not going deeper china and i should be clear when i say we got the 13 cards are bored. it's to reinforce and support the outer space treaty and recognize the importance of the treaty. ultimately the first sort of approach to this is recommitting to an outer space treaty after t for almost 50 years has provided theid backbone of the sustainabe legalhe architecture for the outerspace environment and for our use in long-term security of that arena. szilagyi specifically to china's response and explanation with respect to their abstention, they agreed in importance of this and he specifically said we agree with the need to reinforce and to build upon the structure of the outer space treaty. they acknowledge and appreciate the prevention of an arms race

in outer space language come the idea in our usica becomes resolution that the cd has also been discussing these issues and is of one body right now stems a legally binding mechanisms associate with the arms control and architecture here. but they abstained and then supported the russian amendment. so again i don't know what their internal thinking is. i can only comment on what they themselves have said. in expedition of votes, they said they supported the russian amendment, , which i should be clear, it specifically calls upon states for all time to prevent the placement of weapons in outer space. and then, and then talks about the prevention of force with the threat of force against space, from space to earth, or earth to space. this is a topic that is been

actively discussed for many years in the disarmament context. context. we had to make open-ended working groups coming up in the next several yearsed to discuss more forcibly how we prevent an arms race in outer space but hoi would really get our heads around other politically binding a legally binding mechanism to discuss this, how we solve a challenge of definition which is what is a weapon in outer space? there's disagreement on that. could one country you a peaceful satellites for weaponized purposes? how do you really encapsulated this?y so china's said they wanted to incorporate that amendment, and the challenge there is several. but they are trying to sort of the site an issue that hasn't been decided even though it's been debated quite openly and assertively in other contexts for many years. so several examples. in this in the cd we've hn open-ended working group, a

conversation about the provincial placement weapons of our space treaty of russia and china supported the challenge in the context is it the finds weapons in outer space -- sorry, it doesn't find it. it's as where preopening weapons in outer space without a definition of weapon. the concern for many countries is what about those earth-based weapons that can be used in at the satellite against satellites in space? we have seen president putin himself talk about his space laser in 2018 and 2019, 19, and the deputy foreign minister talk about subsequently to that was used both in ukraine and has the capacity to dazzle satellites in 1500 kilometers in orbit around earth. so they talked about space-based combines our earth based at the satellite capacities for some time. the concern was if your talk about preventingco a placement weapons in our space when there's no definition of weapon and you're not covering the whole of the category of anti-satelliteut capacities,

there's a lot of disagreement about how that would play out, what you're trying to do and how do we implement it and, of course, verified. again in the absence of definition and the absence of covering an entire range but also the use of force or threat of use of force in space as the great thing to the use of force is on the u.n. charter itself discusses. there's a lot of debate. i'm sorry to take you down a a deep dive of specifics but we didn't want the amendments that russia proposed to decide this issue, which is being actively debated. we specifically limited our resolution two very clear-cut support for the outer space treaty and obligations of states parties to that treatycl pixel limit it from some of the political space, from ongoing tactical debate centered not decide thede countries something they haven't already agreed upon. that is focusedso on the amendmt doing at that's what china supported in this explanation of the vote and subsequent the russian amendment. chinace also reference a previos

resolution 7821 in 21 in which they talked about this prevent the placement of weapons in outer space, saying exact language with 50 countries disagreed with that resolution and it didn't represent consensus and there was a significant debate as to what that meant in the context of numerous different weapons in numerous different space and earth capabilities. again, trying to limitry the security council resolution to this implementation of the outer space treaty article for and remind the world why this is so important versus taking it down an issue that hasn't been decided and should be decided and should continue to be discussed. we h encourage that in the disarmament open into working group, inn the first committee s those discussions come up and then the other venues in which of these issues are being actively discussed and debated. >> you raise an interesting point about the amendment which is based on a provincial

placement of weapons in space, which arguably goes beyond what the u.s. and japan was asking for in the resolution. how does russia justify that amendment, deposition on that particular text, and then not supporting the u.s. and japanese u.s. security council resolution? >> i can i can only speak from their justification and explanation. i expect what are much more on may 6. their justification essential is theysi don't want to agree to reinforce the outer space treaty or article for specific to have incorporated this issue of preventing all placement ofg weapons in outer space. the challenge for us is we have presented a resolution that would help strengthen the outer space treaty, remind the world of this commitment, , encourage others to join this commitment, and also call on states to prevent the development of these kinds of weapons of mass distraction for placement in

orbit around the earth. we think that goes as far as we cannot issues that correctly can be agreed upon or have been agreed upon because against talk ofus states parties to the outer space treaty and tailoring to this and calling upon other countries to take these additional steps. russia's amendment goes beyond that and want other countries to agree to think russia believes are defined in the appropriate way, limiting it to space-based weapons but not defining what weapons means. and also talked about use of force or threat of use of force pic of the countries have not agree to that formulation nor is that formulation necessarily explain the russia can continue to threaten the use of land base, earth-based weapons against satellites in space, which they've done recently. i will highlight youre, mentionf the space threat assessment report which is wonderful and i think it really accurately reflects the challenge of difficulty and complication of all these issues given other countries work on space weapons and the potential definition of

challenges with respect to these issues. >> that's nice to hear you say. happy to say the name of the report anytime just to plug about were very proud of the work i'm glad to mean something to you, too. i want to make to really quickly we are taking questions on the audience, so feel free to scan the qr code or to go to our event page and submit them that way. i did want to think about how this fits ineb the context of russia's behavior on arms control in general, maybe this information russia on issues which arms control. do you think there is a pattern with basement activities or with resolution those similarly to how they behave on arms control issues? >> i think all of us have been tracking that the russian federation hasra walked away frm numerous, if not all of the existing arms control and nonproliferation architectures to a certain degree.

certainly the legal suspension of the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty in light of its ongoing illegal invasion of ukraine, in violation of u.n. charter reflects its desire to place its personalo ambition above international law. i think we've also seen that in their withdrawal from the csv. we seen that and then sort of challenging international architectures such as the chemical weapons convention, and the repeated use of chemical weapons, and sort of the broad-based sort of effort to delay and challenge numerous architectures that are existing in the international arena. in this context what i find most fascinating is we see in space a reflection of some patterns and elsewhere which is again threaten, as we saw recently by a russian governmental official,

those space capabilities support ukraine, threatened they may be targeted by the russian government for supporting ukraine. so utilizing threats against space-based capabilities, and also probably talk about their laser systems, earth-based capability, and at the same time put forward the provincial placement of weapons in outer space treaty and this amendment and now resolution reflecting prevention of placement of weapons in outer space in a way that seems inconsistent, again, preventing threat or use of force in a manner that seems inconsistent with their activities. it's a pattern we've seen, right? that utilize chemical weapons and are continue against nepali and the scruples are continuing to utilize at least -- the allegations was recently made

and concluded to be rescued about the use of a schedule three chemical weapon in ukraine while they purport to support the chemical weapons convention. it's a challenge we've been seeing across the board, actions that are inconsistent with the international architecture. it seems like a pattern at a think we should be careful to try to prevent their effective disinformation narratives fromn continuing to degrade those international architectures that we need to rely upon for our security of the security of the global community. >> we can move to a couple of questions on ideas, if that's all right. i have one from julian barnes who's from the "new york times." how close is b russia due to pointer at the space weapon and what would it diplomat respond to such a deployment be? >> i don't have an answer for that. for how close they are to the point. i think the more important question is how we can work to prevent that. i think everything we're doing

in the diplomatic arena is working to prevent the russians from going forward with this program. and i think the international response should be outrage if this actually does go forward because it affects everyone, right? every single country. it's indiscriminate in its potential effect. it's much different than efforts to hold risks limited just to view us and our partners and allies. it would affect everyone including china and india and russia's own satellites. so it's extraordinarily destabilizing at a think the international community needs to reflect that concern. >> may be a follow-on that. if we are looking at ways to stop russian from this development, does it make sense to look at the capability like this in terms of an arms control agreement? does it make sense to approach that a different way? with security council work, that is not just a place for control

work happens. is there a new approach that's needed here because it's so different, or does look a lot like a typical arms-control effort from u.s. perspective? >> that's a good point to make is that in the u.n. security council resolution context we try to reform and recommit to existing constructs that keep the global committee say. and i resolution we proposed to work towards either politically binding or legally binding mechanismbi to further prevent n arms race in outer space and work towards some credible way to verify these types of commitments. i think whatmi we need to figure out in implementing the outer space treaty is how we can develop a capability to credibly established that russia is no longer pursuing this program. that's a really hard thing to do. it's not something that i think

anything that we can come up with our ownme will be slightly agree to buy russia. .. had denied his chemical weapos program for a long time until basically the u.s. and russia works together to bring syria into the chemical weapons convention and then worked to destroy a program it had denied historically, we will have to think of creative ideas to figure out how to credibly believe that russia >> russia is not pursuing this program and feel confident that this is not a risk that the world has to continue to focus on. >> and i have a question here from neil wolf at space law, and it relates to that international effort to push back on what russia is doing. this question is about japan's participation in the resolution. so the question, does japan's participation in the u.s. resolution reflect japan going

role or is there another reason japan would be interested in this topic? >> japan has been a very close partner with the united states government in space security and the outer space and japan has, i think, deeply supported all of the efforts, the international community has taken to really ensure the long-term outer space and they're doing amazing things to incorporate greater, you know, scientific capacity and improvement of capabilities and i think japan was a natural partner and in fact, really did a really good job in explaining why this should matter to all governments, not just the u.s. and japan, but all governments that have present or future reliance on outer space and i think eventually that will be

all government so japan was a natural partner for this and deeply appreciate us pushing this forward. >> and this is kind of a similar question about the impact. is there an impact with iss and i'll broaden it a bit and with human space activities, from charles blue at the city university of new york. do you see a direct effect this time on the space operations and add in china space station, crewed space station as well as international scientific operations in low earth orbit or beyond its space telescope missions? is there a broader impact to this that are not national security focused and definitely on the crewed aspect? how does this relate to those activities. >> right, as i mentioned this capability is not presently in orbit.

however, i think the concern is that it would potentially impact all of the scientific, you know, commercial communications, agriculture, meteorology, and space could be impacted by such a program if it goes forward to actual placement in violation of the outer space treaty and those are impacts that would depend on the magnitude and location and that's something that we should all be concerned about. >> and another question along this threat, this is from joshua. how would something like this activity, how would this impact cooperation, what there is left post ukraine between nasa and roscosmos and would it have the impact what is left of that cooperation in the civil domain? >> listen, i think it's important we continue as much cooperation as possible. but i do think, you know, working toward a situation in

which we can credibly confirm nothing is going forward, that would violate that, would be important. but having alerted the international community to this concern, having taken it seriously and addressed it in the u.n. security council resolution, we will continue to push russia to work with us on this, but i don't think that the fact that we're working towards credibly confirming that this is not a program that will continue should necessarily require no cooperation whatsoever. so, as you point out, it's very limited right now, but i don't think that the existing capacity to cooperate, you know, should necessarily be diminished further while we figure out russia is capable of pursuing this capabilities.

we talked about the space station, civil efforts in space, space exploration and one thing i was wondering your thoughts on. how do this continue to rethink, constellations in low earth orbit. is this a way to put those at risk in your mind or is this a different goal if russia is trying to deploy this capability. i know we might not know, just looking how the u.s. government looks at why russia would be doing this and does this mean that we should rethink how we're looking at our space architectures? >> i think it's a really good question. there's a lot of things that russia seems to be doing to potentially hold leverage or hold the u.s. government capacity at risk, but in this context, i would definitely defer you to the department of defense and space force how we could respond or address.

i think we're doing a lot already to address some of the challenges we have in space when you talk about sort of these really, you know, diversified responsive architectures. i think there are efforts we're taking to address some of the space challenges, but certainly with respect to how we change for evolve to do more responsive i would reach for the department of defense. >> maybe we'll do one more question from the audience here and start to wrap up. >> okay. >> this is from the popular mechanics, as an efforts in transparency and nudge russia to provide more information about this weapon is the u.s. willing to disclose more about its space capabilities? >> it's an interesting question because there are