the european union potentially putting a different setld of standards on the table. the european union is reassuring us that they will rely on nato's standards. to keep it that way and we want to encouraged our friends in the european nation a least in the short-term as they look to buildout capacity and address some of the shortfalls that we addressed at the top that it continues to look at non-eu member states for ways to backfill. omi understand where the europen union wants to focus on eu

members and building up their defense industrial base in europe but we have to work together. we have to find ways to aggregate demand. we have to look at multinational solutions that will help us produce faster and get more for ourselves and into the hands of our friends. >> thank you. i've got a listed more questions but we are running out of time.n

certainly empathize with his reactions because after all all of that less than five years nato has navigated serious contentions and some were routed inside of nato example are nuclear strategy its structure and operations and others flew from disagreements over policies of our actions by one or more allies outside and regions or outside of nato's purview. and just to give you a flavor of these disagreements during the 1950s the allies were struggling over the questions of germanf rearmament and the succession to nato with a federall republic. they debated the implications of the massive retaliation

doctrine. that approach wasn't a good strategy and their were sharp -- during the suez crisis. 1960s saw intense debates over the flexible response and very and long-lasting incrimination and over france's withdrawal from the nato military structure. to nato allies turkey and greece nearly went to war over the cypress issue and the-year-old missile affair of the 1980s brought to the surface long-lasting contentions and disagreements among allied governments that was fed by massive protests that at times seem to pose an existential threat to the alliance itself. it's important given that background, it's important for

us to keep in mind ultimately the alliance remained strong during and after the cold war because its members do not allod their differences ever to override their enduring shared interest and values and i think it's -- interests and values are at the forefront. apart from this change over the past 75 years the question we have to ask if will the past be prologue and we will have a two-part discussion first sten and suzie will talk about cold war experiences and ambassador smith mentioned the areas of operations and we will then turn our attention to the current and potential future challenges facing the alliance and i have the clock here and i hopefully

have 30 minutes for questions of the audience. let me start with sten congratulations on your book but as was mentioned already during the first two decades of the first cold war period nato did shift largely into crisis management and counterterrorism in areas of operations. russia's full-scale invasion in 2022 certainly has put deterrence is at the center of nato's priorities. looking over the cold war period how his nato approached the deterrence and collective defense during the cold war period influence its structure

assessments and policies. basically what has changed fundamentally and what happened? >> thank you for that question. first of all i want to say what a pleasure just to be here in georgetown today. changing continuity. it's obvious to any way be tempted to about corporate security and now we are back and nato has come home. its chair there are many parallels in one of the parallels that i like drawing on his back in the 80s the europeans would always say you are lucky in america because you have president reagan's bob pope and johnny cash europeans say we

have governments that no hope and no cash and here we go again. so there are many parallels. defense forward reinforcements to commission a defense to nuclear deterrence managed front of central planks managed below the threshold threats from the me of the series so essentially managing escalation. i would put my emphasis on this continually emphasized the due to the fact that for those 30 years of time management and corporate security the memory of nato defense and force structures became much smaller much lighter. they were deployed out of the area for the balkans were

especially sent to afghanistan and nato was not set up to defend itself. it wasit no bunker a collective defense organization in capacity. of course and name it was and now that it's reinventing that collective defense capacity they involve 16 allies in 1990 to 32. there's a warr going on which ws not the case back then. europeans are waking up to the demands of not only mobilizing their defense with germany but further east and the logistical challenges so much greater. for 30 years of cooperative security with russia meant in large nato did not move western forces or military infrastructure. there was nothing there except

portions of the new allies limited as it was. and there's a very poor connection between defense today and nuclear deterrence. it's still a weapon of last resort. it was much more integrated in its strategic thinking during the cold war where you had that theory of escalation that may have been imperfect and controversial but it least it was coherent theory. today they are having to invent that. all of this have to happen and an alliance that is more complex not only for its allies that there is so much else going on with the alliance. there's a southern flank and if anything has caused a lot of headache and nato in 2010 it's

really not crimea in 2014. it's the civil war in syria and how that strained turkey the u.s. and france in president voc moot said nato had become friends. the southern flank is a lot more difficult than here in the cold war. on top of that you have china now a strategic concept. the need to develop partnerships with key u.s. allies in the indo pacific. that was always nato partner policy and provide a framework around u.s. allies elsewhere. all this at a time when russia is conducting a major war in europe. the complexity compared to the cold war is much greater and

it's low to nonexistent in the need for leadership is therefore much greater. i think there's a limited amount of leadership. when i say leadership i mean clear priorities on nato to managing its complex agenda. can't simply address all these issues and say now there's leadership. it has too prioritized and that's a work in progress. >> you mentioned the nuclear subject and let me turn to suzie. nato of course does not own nuclear weapons. it's the weapons of the three nuclear allies united states france and the uk that formed

the basis for the nato strategy. the goals of nato's early nuclear policy which were deterring russian and reassuring our nuclear allies has not fundamentally changed during the cold war of but the strategic balance has changed during that time and nato would have to make important sometimes difficult adjustments. you chronicled some of these in your excellent book which i would recommend to our audience here on the-year-old missile saga in the 1970s and 1980s. it's a long and complicated subject that i would like to ask you if you could describe the key considerations that shaped nato's nuclear posture and its policies during the cold war and how those have evolved during the first 20 years or so of a political war period. up when you talk about nato's

nato's posture be start from these two principals core objectives on the one hand deterrence and aggression in the north atlanticre treaty area and then as a complement to that providing reassurance to each and every signatory regardless of their size or geographic location. the objective of these areas is incrediblyat hard to project. if you have landed and you were a martian in the land on earth in the late 1940s and you could design an alliance nato was the last thing you would want to do. you don't want your most powerful actors or the guarantor of security the furthest from the flank you are trying to

defend. what those two components mean in deterring aggression and providing reassurance change and evolve over time. in part that's because the landscape changes. get the changed nuclear weapons policies and capabilities as well as threat perception particularly of the unions and its core successor of the russian federation of 1991. the alliance needs a to adapt. there are a few different areas are key themes we might look and innate nato's nuclear posture the first being changes in doctrine and strategy. at the time of the signing of the north under treaty in april of 1949 the united states is the only nuclear power on the planet. that changes only for a month later when the soviet unions got an atomic weapon in a force a

different landscape if you think about how you'd deter russia or provide reassurance. by the early 1950s nato had decided to rely heavily on nuclear weapons including u.s. battlefield weapons in the u.s. and provide them the strategy we have referred to as a massive retaliation. throughout the 1950s and 1960s the viability of that massive retaliation strategy was heavily debated and suggested as many allies wondered whether changing strategic balance of the soviet unions united states and changing weaponry meant that massive retaliation would protect them. by 1987 deadlines adopted in the strategy in response based on the principals of the used of these rather hokey metaphors to describe it a chain with various links connecting it and my

favorite a seamless robe that had no snags with it. at the end of the cold where the alliance's nuclear posturele changes dramatically and was considerably reduced in the overall protections. the nuclear weapons ever at nadir -- nato's disposal and a move to extend them as weapons of last resort something that is still lingering to this day. we have these changes in doctrine and strategy and it's only one piece of the posture puzzle. the other is reassurance and reassurance is not easily calculated. tonight that the holder and ever-changing and as large and i'm guilty as nato you have a lot of factors and different

ideas of what will in fact reassure them. nato's nuclear posture shaped by a series of proposals, successful and failed, ove the years to share control and serve greater and put in the alliance about what weapons would be deployed and of course howling wind they might be used. the atomic stockpile proposal of 1950s and atlantic nuclear proposals that failed in the early 1960s. instead the alliance decided to create a committee of the nuclear planning group which is still with us. instead it move towards other forms of reassurance. we could take her example of the station of u.s. weapons in europe in the early 1980s. arms control played a central role in nato's nuclear posture.

it signals allies in t tension often nato has relied on approach where they were modernizedhe fielding new weapos but also proposed arms control talks alongside that to manage the cost of those deployments. that's trying on a broader principle and ali thinking that was tried in the hormel reported in 1967 dialogue and defense. if this approach that formed the basis of 1 the dual-track decisn which calls for the deployment of those russian weapons. focusing on the cold war. not because nuclear posture so much less important. its centrality in the alliance. this is something we are grappling with now for the

nuclear weapons and the theory of deterrence. we are trying to figure out how much of the old cold war context can and should inform the conversation today. >> we will come back for the second round here about looking ahead to some of the nuclear challenges. it's been mentioned this period at the end of the cold war which was arguably two years ago the russian full-scale invasion of ukraine and nato is focused heavily out of operations in these include tot remind everyoe air campaigns in kosovo bosnia and training efforts in afghanistan. one could add training of the

iraqi security forces and just remind you we all suffer from a bit of amnesia here could the nato-led operation in afghanistan included approximately if of the more than 130,000 military. 9000 of whom are american and 40,000 of allies 30,000 strictly from allies canada and the europeans. there were at 1.6 of our nato allies that suffered through at a more killed and wounded in action. certainly not to minimize the contributions and sacrifices of the american forces but we shouldn't forget and the losses

were not a monopoly of united states. it was a very long war. i think it is fair to say this operation has had mixed results and you have written a book to look at how nato went about trying to learn from these operational experiences and as an organization and let's start with the question to the allies even agree on where they have made strategic errors or what they accomplished through these operations one of which of course is still ongoing and that's the nato presence in kosovo although much reduced since the post-war period. >> thank you for the opportunity to be here to speak to this point about learning. one of the things in doing the research on learning in a nato

context is that nato relative to other international organizations that are out there does have quite significant institutionalization. we do have a lot of different multiplend you have places within the organization's bureaucracy for opportunities to learn and an entire nato learned lesson in what i was surprised despite a strong military and a strong alliance so much of the learning happens in the corridor in the informal spaces and there was actually and i think i interviewed 120 officials and the alliance a.c.t.s and nato headquarters etc. was that much about learning was through these interpersonal networks and red line heavily on old-timers many of whom as we heard earlier have

retired as sten mentioned old-timers who are becoming very important for the knowledge that they have and the so-called cold war warriors. what does that mean? it means learning still matters. the advantage of having lesson learned processes is that it encourages people to think and talk p about learning in one of the big takeaways is that we should maintain these peer democratic structures but unfortunately we see a large reticent to sit down and to answer your question yes there is consensus and yes there has been numerous strategic lessons that have been put out. i think my to the valueou i woud say is in some of the internal documents and speaking in my personal capacity since i worked for the state department nato at

the time of the invasion but that in itself is very important. learning toces for happen even though you have extreme time pressure and nato has a reactive culture to maybe reference what you are mentioning. what are some ofnt those lessons they that came away from my research? first of all when we think about afghanistan in particular one of thest questions they asked was what do you think and interviewing all these different officials is the biggest strategic weapon and specifically the biggest or to take failure that we should look into the clear this clear this was done before the taliban took over several years back but the key take away with civilian casualties. we underestimated the importance of civilian casualties but what's interesting about that is subsequently we have seen

throughout the research that's comemeha out that shows on the subnational level scholars have been able to trace how specific incidences of violence against civilians translated to higher rates of radicalization in those areas within afghanistan. certainly we need to start from the premise c that civilian casualties matter for clear moral reasons and additionally for operational effectiveness. that was something that came out very clearly. i would very much implore anyone who is continuing to look on data today to not forget afghanistan. they have been like i said these lessons learned processes. some of them have been eareferenced by former secretary-general. get a piece in the atlantic council which i would encourage many of us to read and if you're interested i would encourage you to read my book as well.

.. it also lessens from the libby operation. but that libya -- another issue is a cigar report. that is something that in interviewed folks very few people had interviewed has looked at those reports. >> explained the acronym. >> sorry, this is a chance for's special investigator general of afghanistan. maybe you can help me with the reports. some i can fax to check me on .it. i should probably know, right [basically this is a special office that is set up for the purpose of oversight of this afghanistan operation. it's part of the og but was meant to have some independence so it can exercise oversight. so if they would sent in, individuals out in the field and do interviews and i've

interviewed folks myself the frustration they have talked about. just getting blocked along the way trying to get access to information. part of the reason why this is really relevant today is not just because nato spent two decades in afghanistan. also only think about security assistance that we are providing for ukraine. you might think about the continued presence and kos of oh, a lot of those mistakes that were made on the ground are things we can absolutely o translate into these other outs of the area at context i woulday just say, maybe to conclude is that another key take away that came out from nato responding to crises and more broadly since mite researchers looked at crises in a broader context as we have should not underestimate president putin extensive, at

this point, and disinformation campaign. in his broader desire as he stated fort lee unifying the soviet union. in the interviews i had conducted at the time this was shortly after crimea had happened. the annexation of crimea. many nato officials were lamenting the fact russia status has eight nato partner had not shifted. even a strategy and thinking towards russia -- mike there was hesitance to shift that. maybe that speaks to broader issues about cohesion that nato is continuing to struggle with today. plus you have given me the perfect opening prayer i like to reverse the order now and come back to you to pick up on that. based on your research and some government experience as well, i

have learned, what challenges pose the most serious problemss you think going forward to nato's cohesion. i will just mention a couple. we have seen indications of democratic backsliding among some of the -- a small number but significant within nato's ranks. although nato leaders routinely emphasize the importance of protecting democratic values. what is called a rules -based international order. so a bit of tension there. according to its strategic concept in 2022 it's quite interesting language quote cannot discount the possibility of an attack against a light sovereignty and territorial integrity. i do not recall seeing that in the previous strategic concept. the russian disinformation efforts that have been mentioned already a couple of a times seed

to in these are aimed at undermining the credibility of article five distrust among the allies and among governments and andthe public sprit this campain seems to have intensified so much. there could be other external shocks to cohesion and nato. i am thinking possibly some of the fallout from different perspectives on the ongoing conflict in gaza or the security impact of climate change. how can the political military alliance of 32 sovereign and independent countries -- what ntcan nato do to better anticipe and tackle such a diverse range of threats and some opportunities as well. >> one advantage of thinking about nato returning to

collective defense is that we have really seen an emphasis on the core values. and so i would argue that in the aftermath the immediate aftermath of the full-scale invasion of ukraine and 2022 we saw in domestic publics across the alliance, solidarity as ambassador smith had referenced. complete support for not just the alliance but for ukraine the blatant disregard of ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity. so, as a result on that piece we continue to see cohesion on some of the democratic values. but i would argue on this issue of democratic backsliding this is always been an issue. i would say since the origins of the alliance.

it is not something new. does not mean we shouldn't take it seriously. the absolute should. there have always been his struggles in maintaining support for democratic institutions. within some of the allies at any given time. what we have seen what we think about cohesion maintaining support for ukraine. at this moment which is such a critical moment is the concern about the domestic support. making reference to the public opinion polls as investor smith hasn't mentioned over the decades there has been strong public support for nato across the alliance. we have seen since 2014 he took of the public opinion polls some partisan shift slightly but even among conservatives you still see a majority of conservatives here in the united states who

are supportive nato. but the concern links back to the disinformation campaign. one study recently found it was looking at 10 different allies and found a quarter of respondents in the 10 allies, including the u.s. citedng natos a cause of the ukraine war. and of course much of the russian disinformation campaign has been focused on the linking nato to ukraine and basically trying to focus on nato as a cause as a justification for the full-scale invasion. despite the fact it's very important to point out that russia itself has signed multiple international agreements. recognizing, acknowledging, liturgy demising the sovereignty ofof ukraine. in terms of some of those merecommendations of how to

confront some of these challenges, at this point every high-level person and nato should be talking about this issue. i think unfortunately it has been underestimated within the alliance that nato public diplomacy divisioniv has done a fantastic job that needs to be more speaking up and really clarifying because there seems to be so much confusion. i've given several talks for council relations in different venues as i imagine many of the speakers here on the panel have done. there continues to be confusion and misinformation about what nato is. what it does, and how this invasion of ukraine fundamentally threatens the broader collective defense we are thinking about them andprotecting the alliance and moving forward. also really relying and going back on the old timers the

lawyers that had the deep expertise. not just in terms of the knowledge but just their familiarity thinking about the eastern allies. thinking about finland's. that really have the experience just because they are small allies they don't have something to bring to the table. that is of real t value. some of the other challenges since you asked about some of the other big challenges n that nato is facing above and beyond the clear threat we are all talking about today of russian aggression against other eastern european countries the existential threat of climate change for something and work out right now a lot of my research is focused on nato adaptation but how it is changing overt time.

in a cult author of mine have interviewed 63 officials from across the alliance to try to get a sense at why and how is nato adapting in the way it is to climate threats? it is just important to point out as an existential threat climate change is a threat to deterrence but it's also a threat to nato's ability to be interoperable. as we see individual allies that are supposed to beat meeting these pretty significant climate targets, they are moving and sometimes different directions mand adopting different types f technologies but how does that effect to go back to the initial question how does that affect nato's ability to be effective in its operations? can a british tv plug in as we start thinking about bolstering the eastern flank. our nato defense plans, are these incorporating climate threats? having climate security is o tht

part of the planning process? or climate threats part of tabletopop exercises? are they built into wargames? these kind of i things. there is still a challenge among many folks in the military in particular. as a broader resistance to thinking about climate because of the stereotype of climate is a tree hugger type phenomenon when in reality we can see and others are living ite every day the ways in which it's compromising the ability of the alliance to really do its job. >> thank you. we'll probably come back to this i would anticipate at least a question or so on that issue. i want to come back to the nuclear topic. of course in response to this increase in a russian nuclear saber rattling as we call it, at

least in part in response to that but also for russian modernization and changes of doctrine and deployments. nato summit declarations have become progressively more ivfast-track progressively stronger i would say in their language. describing theib importance of e deterrence role of nuclear weapons importance of things we wouldt call that nuclear sharing arrangements within the alliance. things like that. the u.s. allies are doing something about it to modernize dual capable aircraft. deployed by several allies. older u.s. gravity bombs in europeom are being replaced by more modern reliable, effective weapons. nato has become more transparent as well in its nuclear related exercises. and to the newest members

finland and sweden are members of the nuclear planning group. looking ahead, do you see a stronger consensus on nato nuclear issues that we have had in the o past? we have to be alert to possibilityrt something could happen to change to that consensus. doocy risks as a well that we have not mentioned so far? >> yes. it is clear nuclear weapons remain central to the alliance you do not need me too tell you that. ambassador smith told you that already this morning. the strategic concept is explicit. nato's defense and deterrence is based on a mix of nuclear, conventional along with adjacent cyber and space capabilities. but that does not get at this

question, is it stronger?ay i would say certainly in the wake of her full-scale invasion of ukraine in february of 2022 we have seen more talk about nuclear capability. more willingness to be explicit in terminology as long as nuclear weapons exist in the world nato will be a nuclear alliance. that may sound obvious but to even get such clear language is often hard and in alliance like nato. just because the language is more explicit the historian in me cannot help but point out that does not mean it is stronger per se. i would point to one t particulr risk area i see. the current consensus around nuclear weapons in their place in the alliance but allied defense and general is predicated on a fundamental. it relies above all on u.s. leadership, u.s. capacity and

u.s. willingness to continue playing that role. it relies on the protection of the u.s. nuclear umbrella. i think the diplomatic thing we could say is not every leader in the alliance of the 31 member countries looks at politicians in washington and assumes that will last forever. and so that opens up s the possibility or potential for proposals forfo other allies to consider how they might reduce or leave it behind their reliance on the united states and on the american nuclear deterrence but i don't think it is a coincidence we have seen d talk of proposals that sound suspiciously like things i read about in the archives from 1963 or 1964 about european sharing schemes both conventional and infant occasionally nuclear in nature. so nato is ambassador smith told

us this morning it's investing off this old theory of deterrence. i think in a cursory review of nato's history during the cold war should be a pointed reminder that nuclear posture was almost always contested. that's because it's not based on firm easily quantifiable and agreed-upon things. it's based primarily on emotions, psychology, ogperception, confidence what i was a bucket together as the fuzzy stuff. and plenty of other issues beyond posture shape that sense of confidence or whether an ally is reassured. in the 1970s nuclear debates about whether or not the united states could be trusted or impacted from everything from the conduct of the vietnam's policies. policies. all of those things bore on

washington's allies a understood that u.s. commitment to nato. and whether it was reliable. i think nato's history also reminds us sustained attention on the alliance nuclear dimension and nuclearar capabilities can provide some degree of reassurance. it also elicit broad concern about a world with nuclear weapons looks like. if we look at nato's history during the cold war the recurring episodes of ban the bomb campaign. uprisings we u should not assume those are inherently relics of the cold war. we still live with nuclear weapons. they can still do a mensa damage we should not be surprised some people do not unquestionably share the logic of deterrence is the best way to preserve their safety. and so if that consensus remains fragilens today i do not think that's should surprises but

rather it should be something we see very clearly from the alliance. managing that consensus will require as it always has careful and ongoing calibration to adapt to new circumstances and views for that is been true for seven decades and i think it will be as we move forward. >> stan, i want to come back to you as the european on our small panel here to talk about the figurative elephant in thet roo. i am going to be less diplomatic perhaps an art moderator david and remind and february the hime allies heard a former president of the united states claim to have told an allied leader quote you did not pay, you are delinquent, no i would not protect you. in fact i would encourage them he's referring to russia, to do whatever they want."

our allies have also witnessed his loyalists in congress drag their feet and providing critical military assistance needed by ukraine. i know you cannot speak for europe but i'm going to ask you to take a stab at this anyway. what is the effects? from your perspective of such statement and actions on european thinking about the credibility of u.s. commitments to nato? can europeans put this in error quote trump proof the alliance as some have suggested in recent articles.ic >> we are sent with nuclear issues except the political kind of. [laughter] there is no question secretary-general is trying to trump proof the alliance on ukraine. setting up a policy that will be durable whatever comes in

november. however the impact on european thinking i would say is considerable. it is on precedented in the history of the alliance. we have seen concerns with the russian or soviet behavior before and obviously russia is on a warpath. we have not seen this level of concern with the american commitment to t europe. come what may in november could be trump could be bided there is a if biden winds will be the last truly transatlantic president of the unitedtl state. trump is not just trump it's a political movement that has reached into congress. that has captured a segment of the american population.

as a sense this is here to stay. however it expresses itself in american it's a fact and europeans will have to live by it. at a time when russia is trying to impose this is obviously shaking european politics in a big way. the most obvious example of how this is change europe finland brought themselves into nato. i would never have thought it would happen in my lifetime. i'm not that old. this is absolutely stunning the finished precedent saw what was happening inst russia it's so dangerous we need to get into nato. in the back the swedes admitted in as well. something is really up.

back in the 80s apparently like the 80s. the american colleague of european o defense it was sort f like a room full of filing cabot looking at each other. things are not that bad. it's a lot to be done to see how they react to this. let me mention a few good things in the nugget to some things i think are more worrisome. the european unions, and security defense policy hasef collapsed. it's being rude school. the old version which was very much about autonomy and crisisbo management and reaching out of area is clearly not the answer to the collective defense a challenge that europe is facing.

there's a lot of energy being put in europe enter retooling e you instruments at the defense industryns level. ambassador smith spoke to this. a lot of money is being put on the table. 80% of what the europeans are buying today is being bought in the united states. they want that to be 50% by 2030. more collaboration because of this is europe's pentagon of mom if all this works out the defense industrial strategy of the you europe will gain a pentagon motor while and

european defense industry. that will be huge. we also see it with the european peace fund. a facility is called which is all about funding crisis management and north africa. it is now become a security assistance fund for ukraine. so it is making his way into the eu and the eu is working very well with nato on resilience and how this is going to play together. or i think the bad news sort of begins is, this has to be translated into european capacity. operational capacity for defending themselves, ourselves. and things are moving slowly. i said that earlier. there's a lot of defensive money in europe going towards nato planning process capability

targets for individual nations. and that is fine. that is good. getting those targets to be operational capacity we do not have an answer to that yet. i am a member of the group eight network of experts. we put out a statement on this. i could go into further depth but moving from capability targets to capacity is europe's next challenge conventionally. since he mentioned europe nuclear deterrence and how we are getting back to some sort of shsharing scheme something is going on with nuclear deterrence that's ultimately how we guarantee each other's collective defense. if the u.s. pulls out a little bit, a lot, entirely, someone is going to have to fill in that

gap nuclear -wise. wise. that debate is happening. you saw the president talk about friendship boots on the ground in ukraine. he did not have in mind trench warfare for the french army. he had in mind putting a european nuclear power into the game. someone who russia could not cae by the threat of escalation because they have nuclear weapons. this is truly very important for europe. the germans would know it. they know however much they built up conventionally, they will be coerced by it russia because they cannot go to the nuclear level. who is going to have germany's back, nuclear wise, that's a key question. a rapidly emerging german debate. france has more nuclear weapons than britain. they have no street reputation for protecting others in nuclear

wise. they do not extend their concerns nor does britain and they have fewer. how is this going to happen? that debate could work out well and it could open europe for a competitive space on nuclear deterrence. and if i was poland, i would probably consider tooting my own nuclear weapons if the u.s. pulled out. it is a very dangerous situation. very important, very dangerous. let me finish off by saying trump. [laughter] he is eight nominal ofno north/south politics. we have that in europe too. it's about immigration. it is about identity. it's about secure borders. and how you speak to popular concerns about what is happening to our society. and europe's political center is

a short political center. it's not holding very well put the french are mobilizing. there are all kinds of issues taking a a stab at the political center. the political centers are keeping the east/west access against russia together. and so the key transformation, conventional buildup, nuclear debates with the political center that is not doing well. that is europe's condition. and so, let me finish that by quoting donald trump. we will just see what happens. [laughter] >> touche. i broken the promise. i said maybe 30 minutes. we have fewer than that for questions. i would invite members of the audience you have questions to please -- i would just say let's

try to keep them brief and take them to at a time. [background noises] my name is i met european american, belgium, america. i grew up in belgium. i think the united states and allies have not won a single war since world war ii. what makes you think you will when the next war against russia and china considering the other wars really against all nations? >> provocative. [laughter] >> is there a second one for now? if not.

why? who would like to? >> the answer to that question heis no one wants to fight a war with russia. they want to deter it. and they want to deter it by conventional defense. this is going to be impenetrable. they cannot get in. even if they get and there is the nuclear deterrence to punish that penetration. war. the war with china is going to be economic and technological. and more at the level between dasher war at the level between russia nato, u.s. china is going to be so catastrophic that the parable >> parallel that went on in afghanistan or iraq or libya -- it is just a different ball game.

and you would hope deterrence works. >> sure i will add on to say there's a war underway and that's an information war, and that's --at one of these concerns. right that we're talking about here. is who is going to win that information more and that's going to help decide who the next president is here in this country that's going to decide who is elected in terms of, you know, some of these governments in europe where as we heard the center is a little bit wobbly. and there's also a cybersecurity war going on. right as we heard earlier with ambassador smith reference every single day there's cyberattacks onom nato on allied governments. and we hope as we just heard

that we don't end up with a conventional or nuclear war and that deterrence work -- >> i would just pick up heidi mentioned a few times information and -- theew misinformation and disinformation landscape today -- we're recalling an old problem so yes it is acute today. but -- the allied leaders of 1950 worried deeply about the popularity of ban the bomb campaigns, and popular sentiment in favor of neutralism rather than support for building up what became nato after north korea invaded south korea right and so -- adthere is a long tried and true information game vowngsding alliance because leaders in moscow have known that cohesion is one of the most valuable

athings for alliance and in alliance of democracies turning public opinion against allies and publics against their governments is an easy source of leverage so i think when you talk about -- having talking to the old-timers right part of it also just remembering our own history the alliance has a long history and it isur not all good or instructive. but it can help us think through the challenges of how previous generations of policymakers grappled with not always the same but similar problems overtime. >> please -- >> teach security studies at m.i.t. this great panel especially appreciated engagement with nuclear issue and i want to press you harder on nuclear deterrence question i'm an old dog i walked on competition back in the day, and it was very clear that --

nato right up to the end was relied he have lis on the threat of relatively first nuclear weapons as a key part of its deterrent posture and through everything but the kitchen sink in terms of nuclear weapons that's how we got up to 600,000 warheads in europe allies were quite ---- insistent that it remain this way right we could not get them buy more than 30 days worth of conventional is tohe stocks to e to fight conventional war and they wanted to be front and centernu so -- i'm trying to come up to today and ask you to speculate a little bit on -- how this issue may play out because as you have correctly said, in our narrative we talk about a fairly extended nonnuclear campaign we rely very

heavily on the new clear shield and the conventional shield and the nuclear sort is meant to come out very late if at all -- and it is not clear to me at all whether countries have reallien engaged with implications from enforce place planning that this change has -- right, nato forces are still stuck in the size and organization that they generated for the last 30 years. there are no reserves. no reserves of people not just weapons but reserves of people but this is a high hill to climb and i wonder just this is future telling youd know, how do you think this is playing out as people really beginin to engage with these issues that raised like planning real capabilities

through real wars. >> thank you. could we have a second question and i would ask use -- sorry to try to keep them brief so we can get in at least a couple more here i realize it is a complicated subject -- >> thinking about perhaps differently in 1970 i'm sorry in -- 1989, i believe pepsico purchased russian submarines, and sold them to sweden. do we think there's any creative approaches leveraging private sector todayg understands the capabilities but perhaps not wanting to add to -- the shipyard graveyards that we've seen -- accumulate in india, for example, is it really a -- build more capabilities question or are we also looking at aging infrastructure across the board with all nato and u.s.

structures and whatnot, and they're alsoct different guardrails that the u.s. and nato are subject to that -- india and israel don't believe were signatories too, for example. >> since i've already broken one rule let's break one more and let's just take third question now and cut it off at that point -- >> please -- >> first of all i thank you all for being here and i was actually in your national relations class and you know, four years ago i know you don't remember me -- >> itt is wonderful to see you. >> so given that how conflicts are shifted in past decade with now even nato getting involved in operation and resolve which is american led operations in iraq and afghanistan, of course, ending recently and now there's a greater focus to united states

to play active role in the pacific how do you see kind of from the panel how do you see nato adjusting to those that potential shift in -- military posture in the pacific with all of the different conflicts going on? does it make sense for alliance that was built primarily for the defense f of north america and europe toil play a greater collective security role in the pacific and does it even make sense that, you know, we are -- kind of elevating all of those nonnato allies that we have in the region a japan, south korea, australia, new zealand for example how do they sit into that example? >> can i ask each of you to maybe take your pick of the questions or parts of the questions but each but responses -- or so and then we'll have time for closeout remarks. >> i'm sorry -- >> sure. so on professor's point i would say that this is a really big concern that concern about reserves and the concern about

people and i would just point differences that you see in here in the united states we have the draft. but we now are -- in a voluntary, you know, armed forces and even though the draft still exist in the form of young men signing up this is not opened f up to young women even though it's been -- discussed numerous times in congress. so i would say that's a real legitimate concern on the last question, thinking about, you know, is it possible to be thinking about -- you know the asian pacific region, and you know, u.s. priorities u.k. priorities are shifting in that direction. does it still should we still be thinking that nato has a presence and really has -- some meaning and some significant contributions to make in -- in out of area operations and i would say yes.

and greatest example of that is what's goinge on in coastvo has nato had a presence in a modest military operation there. and so ethnics tensions have been rising in recent years with -- several significant violent outbreaks and there's been nato has actually contributed more troops and boosted true presence there and so i think in the same sense that we are now reapplicanting back on the consequences of the withdrawal from afghanistan, you know, thinking about what would it look like with a complete shift away -- from, you know, some of the other operations that exist right now is it worth the cost to maybegh maintain that presene in, you know, in kosovo given some of those conflicts are not 100% resolved. we talk a lot in political science about the post conflict

and questioning is the post conflict really post conflict. given the conflicts have a tendency to cycle back up. >> excellent reminder suzie. >> first about the nato rolling into the pacific what that relationship looks like there's always been a tension in ally strategies about whether or not it is fundamental role was regional ors global engagement and so in the 19 50s one of the early pushes was for the creation of a global strategy. the british had made a similar push earlier in the 1950s so the question of -- is the treaty area really the only place that nato should be operating? has a long history and i think we're seeing the latest phase of that. but i would say there are lots of ways that -- nato can be engaged in shaping the strategic landscape and endopacific without suddenly sturning its attention away frm europe to the endopacific.

and so i think we can see that reflected in all of these -- this investment in partnership with new zealand and japan and the like. but also thinking about what -- a stable europe means for the broader international security landscape and t so -- i don't think they're quite as much intention as we often believe they are. on the question of deterrence and sort of future forecasting where we're going. the cold war history of the debates over deterrence give us so much contradiction to parse through. the prevailing european view was yes rapid escalation in nuclear weapons because it makes deterrence more credible and more likely to protect homelands. when american planters talked about what that would look like to use those nuclear weapons most of those europeans said wait, wait, wait i really don't like the range of those missiles you'ren playing to launch you know those 400 kilometers, that

strikes me neighbors house -- a thousand is the country over house -- and so there's about theory and practice and particularly telling this morning that ambassador smith said they were getting back their nuclear i.q. and b so if i had to hypothesize about where we're going, it is that when a lot of what has worked in the last 20 or 30 years is because people aren't paying attention to it and now that the relationship between conventional and nuclear deterrence is back on the table a real way inverted in major ways from what it was -- during the cold war with much tegreater emphasis on conventiol capability, when people start turning over those rocks -- i think people are going to find that the assumptions underneath them are uncomfortable ones and so -- i would speculate that we are --

due for a considerable round of probably very unpleasant debate about what is required -- and what the implications of that will mean because of the fundamental geography of the alliance the sail how things impact volter in omaha, nebraska is not how they impact someone inin central poland. [inaudible conversations] >> thank you on the indo pacific, i think may be that was an accident maybe it was deliberate but you put in the right t terms nato has a securiy role in the indo pacific collectivect security that is talking to the key u.s. allies getting them multilaterallized in a dialogue on technology disinformation, but on collected offense nato is and must remain euroatlantic centric andur cannt

buy its makeup and complexity take on i a collected offense re in the endopacific. it -- it simply would not work, and the way they address china is about china coming to europe -- has said, and then working the multilateral framework with the key u.s. allies in the region. i think this is the future for nato in the endopacific. colleague of mine side -- both russia and china are -- are headline news but russia is above the fold. i didn't quite catch the private market questions so maybe we can discuss this in the break on -- on nuclear issues -- i think we've seen the future and that is the allies will want to play up conventional defense in a way that is bigger than

during the cold war. andar it's true during cold war the europeans wanted to exhilarate to get involved the u.s. saw to delay escalation beyond conventional sort of to not be involved in the nuclear weapons, that was then. nato is at point where they're really building up defense and saying defense and deterrence and plans coming out defense planning 300,000 reaction troops, frontline defense, et cetera. it is all about not pushing nuclear issues to a forefront why not? one issue is that in europe that's in the united states but europeans have seen better here -- we havett been through a couplef

decades of hopefulness that perhaps nuclear weapons would go away. the abolitionist movement or president obama global zero -- public opinion has not come back to embrace nuclear deterrence something that is beautiful and nice. and the political center i talked about that is not solid in any case is not about to go more solid if they embrace nuclear deterrence against their own populations so there's -- a great big gap between where the population is and on nuclear deterrence and where the political center is. a lot of political leadership public education -- may change this a little bit, and the europeans will need to have this discussion in order to not end in that competitive space that i talked about who is going to have the nuclear weapons. but -- another fact that has changed in which cannot be changed -- rolled back is the fact that nato is now at the border of

russia. and the cold war the early stages of nuclear escalation were about the space in between the superpowers. so you could devastate parts of western europe parts of eastern europe and still not be strategic by tactical intermediary. that option is off the table today. there's no space between nato and russia. so everything for russia is strategic. so the escalation is much more violent and unpredictable compared to back then and that is a challenge from nato that will not go away. and that is why they will do a lot to maintain a considerable conventional defense component in the defense and deterrence posture but the nuclear conversation will need to be had because it is there at the end of the fence there is nuclear

deterrence. and i think this afternoon -- and i hope most of you can stay, there will be a -- a continuation of the discussion of this very important topic after the panels -- the organizers -- we have to call this to the organizers offered me a couple of minutes to kind of sum up the discussion i think it's been very rich one and yopght really think i need to sum up but couple of things have been mentioned this morning. i do i want to take a minute to discuss personalpl missions smih mentioned that essentially neither nato successes nor shortcomings were preordained and we really can't afford to take the alliance for granted. i served in government and come to theco conclusion it is not unique to me but people make policy. hopefully, with some combination

of foresight shaked by knowledge of history, respect from important values, and openness to compromise and maybe those of humility and we will continue to meet those type of men and women in nato and inside nato government dealing with nato affairs in the u.s. and europe and in canada. so this is mainly directed to the students in the audience, the director from nato in the pentagon for nato policy on september 11th and in few hours allies propose to invoke article for the first time in history and for the defense of the united states. and that proposal came back to washington and it was very quickly approved at the highest levels of discoverment it meant something in the following weeks, nato was an alliance

undertook meaningful steps to help the united states not only to protect our air space but relieve the united states of some of the responsibilities we had around the world so that -- we could redeploy efforts to afghanistan and in those areas, where nato as an organization was not prepared for one reason or another -- to act as an organization you should make no mistake about it. everything that we had done for decades in nato -- into our ability of equipment of thinking -- of exercising and training all of that was vital for the performance of our militaries in bilateral operation and underchallenges but also in the -- became known as coalitions of the willing. people -- put that together. one other example and you mentioned in sweden i've spent a lot of time working with both of

the countries and you know it was remarkable, it was really remarkable how quickly after -- the russian invasions have 22 those two countries said we want to be members and they applied at the same time. in may -- of 2022. and it -- if you look at finland it set a record i believe for the shortest lapse of time between that formal application and seven months sweden for reasons we're aware of foot drag by a couple of allies but as of last month it is a member. people made that happen. diplomats, military officers, ministry of defense civilians in countries worked for decades to make their countries more operable with nato to make their publics more aware of what nato does and get -- rid of some of the old myths. and it worked. and we see the benefits.

people did that. so -- i hope the students in the audience here think of that and think of the world they -- role they have to play and since avi began the session by quoting a -- an american mark twain i think it is only fitting that we close it by -- maybe remembering a little known european expert on transatlantic defense policy used with the brit sir mick jagger of the rolling stones and -- i think of him because, of course, nato is not a perfect organization. but in one of his songs, mick jagger summed it up clear my view s of nato and remember he sang you can't always get what you want. but iflw you try real hard you just might get what you need. please join me in thanking our panels.

[applause], thank you very much. earlier today japanese prime nister gave an address to joint meeting of congress as part of official visit to the u.s. watch his entire speech tonight at 8 eastern on c-span2. c-span now our free mobile video app or online at c-span.org. >> will you -- follow me this way. but in the testimony you're about to give will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth so help you god? saturdays watch american history tvs, congress investigates, as we explore major investigations in our country's history by the u. house and senate. each week authors and historians will tell these stories and see historic footage from those periods and exam exhibit and key congressional hearings this week a senate committee led by

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and that so -- so rural people are not farmers, i mean, statistically speaking much at all they are factory workers they are -- normal truck drivers. they -- they're doing all of these things that are connected to our structural society. steven khan with a book the lies of the land, sunday night 8 eastern on c-span q and a, you can listen to q and a all of our podcasts on our free c-span app. president biden and japanese prime minister held a joint news conference in the white house rose garden two leaders highlighted nation ties and trade and defense announced a trilateral summit between two nations and philippines. this is about 30 minutes.