now, i understand why the european union wants to focus on eu members and building up their defense industrial base in europe, but we have to work together. we have to find ways to aggregate demand. we have to look at multinational solutions that will help us produce faster and get more for ourselves and into the hands of our friends in ukraine. >> well, thank you. i've got a list of more questions, but we are running out of time. so, we will have to save them for the run-up to the nato summit or something like that. but i thank you for spending all of this time both in your prepared remarks and your very candid answers here and i hope that we've given the-- a good startoff for what looks like a really promising and interesting day. >> thank you very much, david and thanks to all of you for coming out this morning. thanks to georgetown university and i hope the rest of the day goes well.

thank you. [applause] defense. please join me in welcoming the panel. [applause] >> welcome. >> thank you very much. when mark twain, the humorist and essayist was asked by a reporter about rumors of his failing health, twain famously answered, reports of my death have been greatly exaggerated and i think that nato officials can certainly empathize with twain's reaction because over the past 75 years nato has had to navigate many serious tensions among its members. some of these were rooted in differences inside nato, about, for example, nuclear strategy, the alliance structure and its

operations and others flowed from disagreements over policies of or actions by one or more allies outside in regions or on issues outside of nato's purview and just to give you a flavor of some of these not so important disagreements, during the 1950's, the allies were struggling over the questions of german re-armament and the succession into nato was the federal republic. the debate of the implications of a massive-- what was called the massive retaliation doctrine and that approach to nuclear strategy and very sharp divisions among washington, paris and london, during the 1956 suez crisis. the 1960's saw intense debates over the concepts of flexible response and very bitter and long lasting recriminations of

france's withdrawal from the integrated military structure. in the 1970's, two nato allies, turkey and greece, nearly went to war over the cypress issue and the euro missiles affair of the 1980's brought to the surface long lasting tensions and disagreements among allied governments. this was fed by massive public protest that at times seemed to post an existential threat to the alliance itself. but it's important, given that background, it's important to keep in mind that ultimately the alliance remains strong during and after the cold war because its members did not allow their differences ever to override their enduring shared interests and values and i think interesting values are both important, both are

important to nato. of course, a lost has changed over the last 75 years so the question we have to ask is will the past with prologued and that's why we are going to have a two-part discussion, first sten and suzie will have more to say about the gold war and heidi will reflect on lessons learned from nato's post-cold war experiences and as mentioned out of area operations. we'll then turn our attention to the current and future potential challenges facing the alliance and i have the clock here and i intend to reserve hopefully at least 30 minutes for questions from the audience. let me start with sten. congratulations on your recent book. as mentioned and it has been mentioned already, during the first two decades of the

post-cold war period, nato's emphasis really did shift largely to crisis response and crisis management and counterterrorism in area of operations, but russia's full scale invasion of 2022 certainly has put deterrents and collective defense back at the center of nato's priorities. so kind of looking over the cold war period, how has nato's approach to deterrents and collective defense during that cold war period influenced its structure, its assessments and its policies and actions today? basically, what's changed fundamentally and what's happened? >> thank you for that question. and let me, first of all, say what a pleasure it is to be here in georgetown today and to be on this panel with heidi and

suzie. change in continuity, in a way to bracket about 30 years of cooperation and security and say now we're back and nato has come home, it's collective defense. it's true there are many parallels and one of the parallels i like drawing on is back in the '80s we used to say that the europeans would say you're so lucky, america, you have president reagan, you have bob hope, you have johnny cash and europeans would say we have our heads of government, but we have no hope and no cash. and here we go again. and so there are many parallels, defense forward, reinforcements, group of commissions for the nuclear deterrents. manage the central front and the flanks, manage the

threshold and threats from the adversary, soviet union and russia. and essentially manage escalation. all of this is back, but i would put my emphasis on this continuity. and this has to do with the fact that for those 30 years of crisis management and cooperative security, the muscle memory in nato of collective defense went away and four structures became much smaller, much lighter. they were deployed out of area, and then especially to afghanistan, and nato was not set up to defend itself. it was no longer a collective defense organization in capacity. of course, in name, it was. and now that it's reinventing that collective defense capacity they've gone from 16

allies in 1990 to 32. there's a war going on, which was not the case back then. there's limited defense. europeans are waking up to the demands of not only mobilizing for defense in the middle of germany, but further east. the logistical challenge is so much greater and the 30 years of cooperative security with russia meant that in large, nato did not move western forces or military infrastructure eastward. there was nothing there, exis september the-- of course, the military forces of the new allies, limited as it was, all of that has to be invented. and there's a very poor connection between conventional defense today and nuclear

deterrence. it was a weapon of last resort and strategic thinking during the cold war where you had, again, a theory of escalation that may have been imperfect and controversial, but at least, it was a coherent theory. today, there is really no theory and they're having to invent that as we heard ambassador smith say in slightly different words. all of this has to happen in an alliance that's more complex, not only 32 allies, but there's so much else going on the alliance. there's the southern flank, which is about terrorism, and if anything has caused a lot of headache in nato in the 2010's, it's really not crimea in 2014 annexation, it's the civil war in syria and how that estranged turkey, the u.s. and france and left president macron to say that nato had become brain dead. that --

that was syria, that was not russia. so the southern flank is a lot more than during the cold war and then on top of that, china now in the strategic concept answer again, we heard ambassador smith say that, emphasize this, and the need, therefore, to develop partnerships with the key u.s. allies in the indo-pacific. and that was a frame work around u.s. allies and elsewhere. all of this at a time when russia is conducting major war in europe. so the complexity compared to the cold war is much greater. the muscle memory is low to nonexistent and the need for leadership is therefore, much greater. and when i say leadership, i don't just mean in the high pace of summit that nato has come to depend on. i think there's a limited amount of leadership in those summits. when i say leadership, i mean clear priorities for how nato

is going to manage this very complex agenda. it cannot address all of these issues and say, now, that's leadership. it has to prioritize. and that's a work in progress. >> well, you mentioned the nuclear subject and let me turn to suzie. nato, of course, does not own nuclear weapons. it's the weapons of the three nuclear allies, the united states, france, and the u.k. that formed the basis for the nato strategy. the goals of nato's early nuclear policy which were to deter aggression and nuclear allies did not fundamentally change during the cold war, but the strategic balance has changed during that time and nato had to make important, sometimes very painful

adjustments. you've chronicled some of these in your excellent book which i'd recommend to our audience here under your missile saga of the 1970's and the 1980's. it's a long and complicated subject, but i'd like to ask you if you could describe the key considerations, that shaped nato's nuclear posture and its policies during the cold war, and how those have evolved during the first 20 years or so of the post cold war period. >> yeah, it's-- so when you think about nato's nuclear posture, and we start from these two principles. the core objectives on one hand of deturing aggression in the north act streety area and then as a compliment to that, providing reassurance to each and every significant tri of the treaty regardless of their size or geographic location and when we put it in those terms,

it's simple, except that the geography of the treaty area is hard to defend. ... >> now, what those two components mean in deterring aggression and providing reassurance change and evolve over time. in part that's because the landscape changes. you have changes in nuclear weapons technology, , and capabilities as well as in the threat perception particularly of the soviet union and then of course its core success of the russian federation after 1991.

and so the alliance as in so many places needs to adapt. there are a few different areas or in key themes we might pull out in nato's nuclear posture over the years. the first being changes in doctrine and strategy here so at the time of the signing of the north atlantic treaty in april 1949 the united states is the only nuclear power on the planet. that changes only a few months later when the soviet union detonates its first atomic weapon and, of course, that's a very different landscape if you think about how you deter aggression or provide reassurance than ones with the use nuclear met. by the early 1950s nato decided to rely heavily on nuclear weapons including stationing u.s. battlefield weapons in europe and relied on a strategy leo refer to of retaliation. essential you going to go from zero to 60 very quickly.

throughout the the 1950s, te 1960s the viability of that massive retaliation strategy was heavily debated and contested as many allies wondered whether the changing strategic balance between the soviet union and the united states, the change of weaponry meant that massive retaliation would really protect them. by 1967 the lights had adopted a new strategy of flexible response based on the principles of escalation. they use all these hokey metaphors to describe it, , a ladder with various wrongs, a chain with various links connecting it. my favorite british system, a a robe, seamless robe of deterrence. there were no snags within it. at the end of the cold war, the alliance's nuclear posture changed dramatically and was considerably reduced given

changes in the overall threat prevention cups of significant cuts to nuclear weapons at nato across fidgety weaponry down the battlefield weaponry but also a move treaty nuclear weapons as weapons of last resort come something that is still lingering in nato's nuclear posture today. so through all these changes and doctor strategy that's only one piece of the posture puzzle. another is about reassurance. and reassurance is not easily calculated. it is in the eye of the beholder and ever-changing, and data lines of large and unwieldy as nato you have a lot of actors with different perceptions of what will, in fact, reassure them. so nato's nuclear posture is shaped by a series of proposals, successful and failed over the years to share control and ensure greater input in the alliance about what weapons would be fielded, , where they would be deployed and, of

course, how and when they might be used. i could point to the atomic stockpile proposals of the late 1950s or the multilateral force and atlantic nuclear force proposals that failed in the early 1960s. instead, the alliance decided to great a committee of nuclear piney group, or in pg, which is still with us. and instead move towards other forms of reassurance. so we could take him for example, the station of u.s. weapons in europe in early 1980s like the contentious -- the other piece i would like is that arms control has played a central role in nato's nuclear posture. in large part to signal allies intentions. and often it has relied on a paired approach with their modernize or feel new weapons also propose arms-control talks alongside that to manage the cost of those deployments. that's really drawing on a broader principle an ally to

thinking that as long roots but was enshrined in the report in 1967, pairing dialogue and defense. and so it's this approach that forms the basis of the 1979 dual track decision which calls for the deployment of those i mentioned a second ago. as a concluding note i would say i focused primarily on the cold war. like because nuclear posture so much less than born in the post-cold war period. it's centrally the alliance receives considerably in the 1990s. i think this something we are grappling with no sort of nuclear weapons and nuclear questions, the theory of deterrence is back to work i did forget how much, much of the old cold war context can and should inform the conversations today. >> we will come back and a second round here about looking

ahead to some of the nuclear challenges. id mentioned this period -- heidi -- since the end of the cold war up until arguably two years ago with the russian full-scale invasion of ukraine. there's been this parentheses were nato is focused are heavily on out of area operations, just remind everyone bostick a complaint in kosovo, serbia and libya, and stabilization and training efforts in afghanistan. one could add training into iraqi security forces. just to remind you, we all suffer a little bit from amnesia here, at its high point the nato-led operation in afghanistan included approximately a little bit more than 130,000 military personnel.

90,000 of whom were american, and 40,000 from allies and partners. 30,000 strictly from allies, canada and the europeans. and the were at one time were six of our nato allies that suffered per capita more killed and wounded in action. not to minimize the contributions and sacrifices of the american forces, but we shouldn't forget that bravery and also the losses were not a monopoly of the united states during this, what was a very long war. i think it is fair to say felt that is operations had mixed results. and you have written a book trying to look at how nato in about trying to learn from these

operational experiences. let's start with the question did the allies even agree on where the mitchard teaching errors? or what they accomplished through these operations? one of which of course is ongoing and that nato presence in kosovo. although much reduce since the postwar period. >> thank you again for the opportunity to be here to speak. to this point about learning, one of the things that was quite surprising for me in doing the research on learning in nato context was nato actually relative to other international organizations that are out there does have quite significant institutionalization. you do have a lot of different offices. you have multiple places within the organizations bureaucracy for opportunities to learn here

and entire nato lesson process but what a surprise about that was despite of course a strong military culture in this political military alliance is that so much of the learning happens in the corridors in the informal spaces, and that there was actually, despite i think interviewed 120 officials across the alliance in act, aco, nato headquarters, et cetera, was that much of that learning was through these interpersonal networks and relying heavily on old-timers, many of whom as we've heard earlier have retired, sten mention come at a rotating out. old-timers who are becoming suddenly very important for the knowledge that they have as the so-called cold war warriors. what does that mean? well, that means that learning still matters. the advantage of having lessons

learned processes is that it encourages people to think and talk about learning. i think one of the big takeaways is we should maintain these bureaucratic structures, but, unfortunately, we see a large reticence to seek out and read the state. so to answer your question yes, there is consensus. yes, there have been numerous strategic lessons that have been put out. i think much of the value i would say is in some of the internal documents. i would just that i'm speaking of my personal capacity since i work for the state department, nato desk at the time of the ukraine war, but that in itself is very important. having and creating spaces for learning to happen, even though you have extreme time pressure and nato has a quite significant reactive culture to maybe reference what you were mentioning. what are some of those lessons

they came away from my research? so first of all when we think about afghanistan in particular, one of the questions that i asked was what do you think in anything all of these officials is a biggest strategical,, biggest failure that we should reflect on? and typically this is done before the taliban took over. this is several years back. but the key take away was civilian casualty, , that we wod address that the importance of civilian casualties. what's interesting about that is subsequently we've seen scholarly research that is come out to show that on a subnational level scholars have been able to trace how specific incidences of violence against civilians then has translated to higher rates of radicalization in those areas within

afghanistan. so certainly we do start from the premise of sabina casualties matter for clear moral reasons. i would say additionally civilian casualties matter for operational effectiveness. and that was something that came out very clearly. i would very much implore anyone is continuing to work on nato today to not forget afghanistan. there had been like us that these lessons learned processes pick some of them have been referenced by former assistant secretary general apiece in atlantic council joe would encourage industry. if you are interested i would encourage you to read by potential since there's countless, countless quotes of folks talk about his lessons from afghanistan. it also lessens from the libby operation. but that libya -- another issue is a cigar report. that is something that in interviewed folks very few people had interviewed has looked at those reports.

>> explained the acronym. >> sorry. this is a think stands for special investigator general of afghanistan. >> yes. >> help me with the our, reports. summit can fact check the audit. basically this is, i should probably know, right? basically this is a special office that is set up for the purpose of oversight of this afghanistan operation segar was specifically part of deity but was meant to have some independence so that it could exit oversight. so the rescinded individuals out of the field and try to do interviews. i interviewed folks myself and frustration that talked about about just getting lost along the way, try to get access to information. part of three why this is really relevant today is that just because nato spent two decades in afghanistan but also because we think about security assistance i were providing for ukraine, when we think about

nato's continued presence in kosovo, a lot of those mistakes that were made on the ground for things that we can actually translate into these other out of area context. i would just say may be to conclude is that another key take away the came out from nato's responding to crises more broadly survive researchers looked at crisis a kind of a broader context that we shouldn't underestimate, we shouldn't underestimate president putin's extensive at this point disinformation campaign and his broader desire as he stated for reunifying the soviet union. in the interviews i conducted at the time this was sort of shortly after crimea have happen, the annexation of crimea, and many of the new officials were really limiting

the fact that russia's status as a nato parter had not shifted. that even strategy and thinking towards russia, there was some hesitance to shift that. maybe that speaks to some other broader issues about cohesion that nato is continued to do to struggle with today. >> well, you've given me the perfect opening. i would like to reverse the order now and come back to you, heidi, to pick up on that. based on your research and some government extremes exe learned, what challenges pose the most serious problems do you see going forward to nato's cohesion? and of which is mention a couple. we have seen indications of democratic backsliding among some of the, small number, but still significant within nato's ranks here although nato leaders

routinely emphasized the importance of protecting democratic values, what's called the rules-based international order. some bit of tension there. according to its strategic concept 2022, it's quite interesting language that nato adopted, said nato quote cannot discount the possibility of an attack against our allies sovereignty and territorial integrity. i don't recall seeing that in previous strategic concepts. but the russian disinformation efforts that up and mentioned already a couple of times seem to, and these are aimed at undermining the credibility of article v and seating distrust among the allies and among government and among the public come this campaign seems to have intensified somewhat. and there could be other shocks, external shocks, to go eat in

nato, and i'm thinking possibly some of the fallout from different perspectives on the ongoing conflict in gaza raven the security impacts of climate change -- in gaza. how can the political lines of 32 sovereign and independent countries, what can nato do to better anticipate and tackle such diverse range of threats and some opportunities as well? >> one advantage of thinking about nato returning to collect a defense is we have really seen an emphasis on those core values. and so i would argue that in the aftermath, in the aftermath of the full-scale invasion of ukraine in 2022, we saw in domestic publics across the

alliance solidarity as ambassador smith had referenced, complete support for not just the alliance but for ukraine and the blatant disregard of ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity. so as a result on that piece i think we continue to see cohesion. on some of those democratic values. but i would argue on this issue of democratic backsliding this has always been an issue. i would say since the origins of the alliance. it's not something new. it doesn't mean we shouldn't take it seriously. we absently should but there have always been struggles in maintaining support for democratic institutions -- absolutely -- within some of the allies at any given time. what we had seen, when we think

about this cohesion around maintaining support for ukraine, at this moment which is such a critical moment, is the concern about this domestic support, right? making reference to the public opinion polls, ambassador smith mention, over the decades there has been strong public support for nato across the alliance. we had seen since 2014 if you look at the public opinion polls some partisanship slightly that even among conservatives still see a majority of conservatives here in the united states who are supportive of nato. but the concern links back to the disinformation campaign. so once they recently found, it was will get ten different allies and found that one quarter of respondents in those ten allies, including the u.s., cited nato as a cause of the korean war.

and, of course, much of the russian disinformation campaign has been focused on linking -- the ukraine war -- linking nato to the ukraine and basically trying to focus on nato as like i said as a cause, and enlargement specific as a justification for this full-scale invasion, despite the fact it's very important to point out of course that rush itself had sent multiple international agreements recognizing, acknowledging, legitimizing the sovereignty of ukraine. and so i would think in terms of some of those recommendations of how to confront some of these challenges, i mean at this point i think every high-level person in nato nato should be talt this issue. i think unfortunately it's really been underestimated within the alliance. i think the nato public diplomacy division is doing a fantastic job but needs to be more speaking up and really

clarifying because there seems to be so much confusion. i've given several talks, council on foreign relations at different venues as i imagine many of the speaker on this panel have done, and there continues to be confusion and misinformation about what nato is, what it does, and how, how this invasion of ukraine fundamentally threatened the broader collective defense that we're thinking about in protecting the alliance moving forward. also really rely relying ag back on those old-timers, those cold war warriors who have deep expertise, not just in terms of the knowledge that they bring to the table but also just their familiarity i would say with russia, the russian playbook. so thinking about the eastern allies, thinking about finland, these countries have really have

that experience and the thinking oh, just because they are small allies acted have something to bring to the table. that is of real value. on some of the other challenges that you as what some of the of the challenges that nato is facing above and be on the clear threat that we are all talking about today russian aggression against other eastern europeans, countries, is the existential threat of climate change, something working on right now. a lot of my research is focused on nato adaptation. how neat is changing over time. and so a co-author of my jackie burns and i interviewed 63 officials from across the lines to try to get a sense that why and how is nato adopting in ways that is to climate threats. i think it's important to point out as an existential threat, climate change is a threat to deterrents tickets also threat

to nato's ability to be interoperable. so as was the individual allies that dispose be meeting these put a significant climate targets, they are moving and sometimes different directions at adopting different types of technologies. so how does that affect them to go back to the initial question, how does that affect nato's ability to be effective in its operations? can a british tv plug in in estonia, for example? as a start think about bolstering the eastern flank. our nato defense plans, are these incorporating climate threats? our old plan sapping climate security, is that in the compass apart of the planning process? are climate threats part of tabletop exercises? are they built into wargames? these kind of things. i think there's still this challenge among many folks in the military in particular, this broader resistance to think about climate because of the

stereotype of all, climate is kind of a tree hugger type phenomenon when in reality we can see a people living it every day the ways in which climate threats are compromising the ability of the alliance to really do its job. >> thank you. i think we were probably come back to this and i will anticipate a question or so on that issue. susie, i want come back to the nuclear topic. of course in response to this increase in russian nuclear saber rattling as we call it, at least in part two russian modernization and changes in doctrine and deployments, nato summit declarations have become progressively more, progressively stronger i would say in their language describing

the importance of deterrents for all of nuclear weapons, the important things like what we call nuclear sharing arrangements within the alliance. things like that. and allies, the u.s. and allies or do something about it. there are programs now to modernize the dual capable aircraft, diploid why several allies. older you was gravity bombs in europe are being replaced by more modern reliable, effective weapons. nato has become more transparent fiscal in its nuclear related exercises and its new members finland and sweden are members of the nuclear planning group. looking ahead, do you see a stronger consensus on nato nuclear issues of the have on the past? and i mean, we have to be alert

to possibilities something good happen to change that consensus. do you see risks to that consensus as well that we haven't mentioned so far? >> yeah. i think it's clear that nuclear weapons remain central to the alliance's posture, i do not need me to tell you that. ambassador smith told you that already this morning. the strategic concept is explicit, that it is the nato defense the deterrents is based on a mix of nuclear, conventional missile defense along with adjacent cyber in space capability here but that doesn't get at this question, is it stronger? so i would say certainly in the wake of our -- in february 2022 we have seen more talk about nato's nuclear capabilities, more willingness to be explicit in terminology that as long as nuclear weapons exist in the world, nato will be a nuclear

alliance. that may sound obvious but to even get such clear language is often hard in an alliance like nato. but just because the language is more explicit, the historian in me can't help but point out that doesn't mean it's stronger, per se. and so i would point to one particular risk area that i see, which is the current consensus around nuclear weapons in the place in the lines but around i iolite defense in general is predicated on a fundamental target. never lies above all on u.s. leadership, u.s. capacity, and you was willingness to continue playing that role. it relies on the protection of the u.s. nuclear umbrella. editing the diplomatic thing we could say is that not every leader in the alliance of the 31 member countries looks at politicians in washington and assumes that that will last

forever here and so that opens up the possibility or potential for proposals for other allies to consider how they might reduce or leave behind their reliance on the united states and on the american nuclear deterrence. i don't think it's a coincidence we've seen talk of proposals that sounds suspiciously like things i write about any archives of 1963, around 19 cigie for as a european sharing scheme both conventional and even occasionally nuclear in nature. so nato is returning to the past, and investing on this old writ of deterrence, but i think any cursory review of nato's history during the cold war should be a pointed reminder that that nuclear posture was almost always contested. and it's because it is not based

on firm, easily quantifiable and agreed-upon things. it's based primarily on emotions, psychology, perception, confidence, right? what i would bucket together as the studies stuff. and plenty of other issues be on the nuclear posture shape, that sense of confidence or whether an ally is reassured. so in the 1970s, nuclear debates about whether or not the united states could be trusted or impacted by everything from the conduct of the vietnam war to jimmy carter's human rights policy. right? all of those things on how washington's allies understood the u.s. commitment to nato, and whether it was reliable. i think nato's history also remind us that sustained attention on the alliance's nuclear dimensions and nuclear capabilities can provide some degree of reassurance to public but it can also elicit broad

concern about what a world with nuclear weapons looks like, right? if you look at nato's history during the cold war there are recurring episodes of antinuclear uprisings and we shouldn't assume that those are inherently relics of the cold war. we still live with nuclear weapons. nuclear weapons can still do immense damage and we shouldn't be surprised if some people do not unquestionably show the logic of deterrence as the best way to preserve. if that consensus remains fragile today, i don't think that should surprise us, but rather they should be something we can see very clearly from the alliance's past. managing that consensus will require as it always has careful and ongoing calibration to adapt to new circumstances and use. that's something that's been true for seven decades and a think will be as we move forwar

forward. >> sten, i want to come back to you as the european on our small panel here to talk about the secretive elephant in the room. and i'm going to be less diplomatic perhaps than our moderator, , david sanger, just remind the audience that in february allies are a former president of the united states claim to uphold and allied leader, quote, you didn't pay, your delinquent, no, i would not protect you. in fact, i would encourage them, he's referring to russia, to do whatever the hell they want, end of quote. our allies have also witnessed his loyalists in congress dragged their feet on providing critical military assistance needed by ukraine. i know you can't speak for you but i'm going to ask you to take a stab at this anyway.

what is the effect, from your perspective, of such statements and actions on european thinking about the credibility of u.s. commitments to nato? and can europeans, , up with ths in error quotes, trump proof the light as some have suggested in recent articles? >> so the worst thing with nuclear issues, the political kind. there's no question that stoltenberg, general sector stoltenberg is try to trump proved the alights on ukraine. he is setting up a policy that will be durable whatever comes in november. however, the impact on european thinking i would say is considerable, and it is, it is unprecedented in history of the alliance. we have seen concerns with

russian soviet behavior before and obviously rush is on the warpath. we have not seen this level of concern with the american commitment to europe. and come what may in november, could be trump, it could be biden, there's widespread sense that biden if he wins will be the last truly trans-atlantic president of the united states. and trump is not just trump. it's about a political movement that is reached into congress, that has captured broad segment of the american population, and there's a sense that this is here to stay. however, it expresses itself in american politics, it's a fact and europeans will have to live with it. at a time when russian is trying to impose great lyrical change on europe by way of war.

this is obviously shaking european politics in a big way. the most obvious example of how this has changed europe is a fact that finland brought themselves and sweden into nato. i would never have thought that it would happen my lifetime. i'm not that old. this is, this is absolutely stunning, that finished president some was happening in russia and said this is a dangerous for me to get into nato -- finnish. and the fact that the swedes made in as well. something is really up. back in back in the '80s,i like the '80s, an american colleague wrote of european defense that it was sort of like room full of filing cabinets looking at each other. things are not that bad, but there's a lot to be done in

order to see how europeans would react to this. let me just mention a few good things and delicate to some things i think i'm more worrisome. the good things is about the european unions defense policy has collapsed. and when i say that, i mean it is being retooled. the older version which was very much about autonomy and crisis management and reaching out our area, it's clearly not the answer to the collective defense challenge that europe is facing. so there's a lot of energy being put in europe into retooling you instruments for collective defense at the defense industry level. and ambassador smith spoke to this. a lot of money is being put on

the table. 80% of what the europeans are buying today is being fought in the united states. they want so 20% in europe. they want that to be 50% by 2030 am building up the defense industry because that is where capacities come from. more collaboration defense and usher collaboration, more defense openness, more competition. you can say this is europe's pentagon moment. if all this works out, the defense industrial strategy of the eu, the u.s., europe will gain is sort of pentagon motor engine in european defense industry. that will be huge. we also see with the european peace fund, facilitate a skull, which is all about funding crisis management in north africa but it is to become a security assistance fund for

ukraine. so collected defense is making its way into the eu, and the eu as i think working very well with nato on how this is going to play together. where i think the bad news sort of begins a little bit is this has to be translated into european capacity, operational capacity, for defending themselves, ourselves. things are moving slowly. i said that earlier. there's a lot of defensemen in europe that will go towards meeting the native defense planning process capability targets for individual nations. and that is fine. that's good. that getting those targets to become an operational capacity, we don't have an answer to that yet. i am a member of a network of experts and we put out a statement on this, i can go into

further depth on this, but moving from capability targets to operational capacity is europe's next challenge, conventionally. suzy mentioned europe and nuclear deterrence and how we're getting back to some sort of sharing scheme. i entirely agree. something is going on a new creatures because that is ultimately how we guarantee each other's collective defense. and if the u.s. pulls out a little bit, a lot, entirely, someone is going to have to fill in that gap nuclear wise. of that debate is happening. and you saw president macron talk about french boots on the ground in ukraine. he did have in mind trans warfare for the french army. he had in mind putting a european nuclear power into the game. someone who russia cannot coerce

by the threat of escalation because they have nuclear weapons. this is truly very important for europe, and the chairman's they know it. they know however much they build up conventionally, they will be coerced above all by russia because they can't go to the nuclear level. who is going to have germany's back nuclear wise? that's a key question. that's emerging, rapidly emerging german debate. france has more nuclear weapons than britain, but they have no street reputation for protecting others nuclear wise. they do not extend their concerns. nor does britain, and they have fewer. how is this going to happen? that debate could work out well, and it could open europe for a competitive space on nuclear deterrence. and if i was poland, i would

probably consider giving my own nuclear weapons if the u.s. pulled out. so it's a very dangerous situation. very important, very dangerous. let me finish off by saying trump. he is a phenomenon of north-south policies, and we have that in europe, too. it's about immigration. it's about identity. it's about border, secure borders, and how you speak to popular concerns conces happening to our society. and europe's political center is as beleaguered as your political center. it's not holding very well. the fringes are mobilizing. there are all kinds of issues taking a stab at the political center. and the political centers are keeping the east-west axis against russia together.

and so transformation,, conventional bilat, nuclear debates, with a political center that is not doing well here that's europe's condition. and so let me finish that by quoting donald trump. we would to see what happens. >> touché. we have, i have broken a promise. i said maybe 30 minutes. we have fewer the net for questions, but i would invite members of the audience of questions, please. i which is say let's try to keep in brief mistake to at a time. -- and let's take two at a time.

>> i am a european-american, belgian american i know brussels. that's where i grew up. i think the united states and its allies have not won a single war since world war ii. what makes you think you will win the next work against russia and china, considering that the other wars were ruled against small nations? >> is there a second one? why don't we take a turn? who would like -- >> i think the answer to that question is, no one wants to fight a war with russia. they want to deter it. and we want deter by conventional defense. europe will be impenetrable. they cannot get in but even if they could and then there will be deterrence to punish that

penetration. there's no desire to fight that war. the war with china is going to be economic and technological. hopefully. and more at the level between dasher war at the level between russia nato, u.s. china is going to be so catastrophic that the parable to what went on in afghanistan iraq, libya, kosovo, it's just a different ballgame. and you would hope that deterrence works. >> i will just out on to that to say that there is an war underway, and that's an informational war. and that's one of these

concerns, right, that we're talking about here is who is going to win that information war? and that's could help decide who the next president is here in this country. that's going to decide who is elected in terms of some of these governments in europe where as we heard the center is a little bit wobbly. and there's also a cybersecurity war going on, right? as we heard earlier with ambassador smiths reference come every single day that are cyber attacks on nato, and allied governments by many of these large actors with whom we are talking about. and we hope as we just heard that w don't end up with a conventional or a nuclear war, and that deterrence works. >> anything, susie? >> heidi mentioned a few times information and the misinformation and

disinformation landscape today and i think we are recalling an old problem. so yes, it is a key today, but the allied leaders of 1950 worried deeply about the popularity of damn the palm campaigns and popular sentiment in terms of nuclear some rather than support for building up what became nato after north korea invaded south korea, right? there is a long tried-and-true information gain serenity alliance because leaders by merrily in moscow have known that kalish is one of the most valuable things for the alliance, and in an alliance of democracies turning public opinion against allies and publics against their governments is an easy source of leverage. so i think when you talk about having, talking to the old-timers, right, part of it is

remembering our own histories. the alliance has a long history and it's not all good or instructive, but they can help us think through the challenges about previous generations of policymakers grappled with not always the same but similar problems over time. >> sir, please. >> i.t. security studies at m.i.t. this is a great panel and especially appreciated the engagement with nuclear issues. i want to try to pressure a little harder on the nuclear deterrence question. i am an old dog and it worked on nato warsaw pact back in the day, and it was very clear that nato white up to the end rely very heavily on the threat of relatively early first use of nuclear weapons as a key part of its deterrent posture. and we threw everything but the kitchen sink at in terms of nuclear weapons. that's have got up to six 7000

warheads in europe. the allies were quite insistent that remain this way. we could not get them to buy more than 30 days worth of conventional stocks, to build a fight in the conventional or because they want the threat of nuclear escalation be front and center. so i'm trying to come up to today and ask you to speculate a little bit on how this issue may play out. because as you have correctly said, in our narrative we talk about a fairly extended nonnuclear campaign. we rely very heavily on the nuclear shield i mean the nuclear shield is meant to come out very late if at all. is not clear to me at all whether countries heavily engaged with the implications

for their conventional force planning, that this change has. right? nato forces are still stuck in the size and organization that they generated for the last 30 years. there are no reserves, and no reserves of people. not just weapons but reserves of people. so this is a high hill to climb, and a wonder, this is future telling. how do you think this will play out as people really begin to engage with these issues which is like planning real capabilities? >> thank you. could we have a second question? i would ask, sorry, try to keep them briefed so we can get in at least a couple more here. i realize it's a complicated subject matter. >> thinking about strategic,

perhaps a bit different. in 1970, i'm sorry, in 1989 i believe texaco purchased russian submarines and sold them to sweden. do we think there's any critical approaches leveraging private sector today, understanding capabilities of press not wanting to add to the shipyard graveyards that we've seen accumulating in india, for example? is it really a build more capabilities question, or are we also looking at aging infrastructure across the board with all nato and u.s. structures and whatnot and there are also different guardrails that the u.s. and nato are subject to that india and israel i don't believe -- [inaudible] for example.

>> since i've already broken one rule, let's break when were a let's just take the third question now and we will just cut it off at that point. please. >> first of all, thank you all for robbing you. dr. colbourn, i was in your international relations class, and about four years ago. i know you probably don't remember. >> it's wonderful to see you get. >> my question is, given that how conflicts are shifted in the past decades, with now even nato getting involved in operation apparent resolve which is american blood operations in iraq and afghanistan, and the recently right now there's a greater focus of the trend to the more active role in the pacific. how do you see, question for the entire panel. how do you see nato adjusting to his commitments, that potential shift in military posture in the pacific with all the different conflict going on? does it make sense for an alliance that was built

primarily for the defense of north america and europe to play a a greater collective securable in the pacific? and doesn't even make sense that we are kind of elevating all those non-nato allies that we have in asia, japan, south korea, australia, out of the state in the structure? thank you. >> can ask et to maybe take, take a pic of questions are part of the questions? if you can keep your responses to say two minutes or so. then we'll have time for a closing. >> sure. so on your point abbasid this is really big concern, the concerned about reserves and the concern about people there and i would just point out the differences that you see in conscription. here in the united states we have the draft, but we now are in a voluntary armed forces.

and even though the draft still exist in the form of young men signing up, this has not been opened up to young women even though it's been discussed numerous times in congress. so i would say that's a real concern. on the last question, i'm thinking that is a possible to be thinking about the asian pacific region, and as u.s. priorities, uk priorities are shifting in that direction, does it still, should we still be thinking that nato has the presence and really has some meaning and some significant contributions to make it are very operations? and i was a yes. the greatest example of that is what's going on in kosovo. if you haven't been following this, nato for many decades now has had a presence in the form of a modest, a military operation of in kosovo. and so as tensions have been rising in recent years with

several significant violent outbreaks, and there's been, nato has contributed more troops and boosted the troop presence of there. so i think in the same sense that we are now reflecting back on the consequences of the withdraw from afghanistan, thinking about what would it look like with the complete shift away from some of the other operations that exist right now, is it worth the cost to maybe maintain that presence in kosovo, given that some of the conflicts are not 100% result? we talk a lot in political science about the post-conflict and questioning is a post-conflict really post-conflict, given that conflicts have a tendency to cycle back up. >> an excellent reminder. susie? >> i will take first nato's role in the indo-pacific and what

their relationship looks like. there's always been tension in allied strategy about whether or not it's fundamental role was regional engagement or global engagement. in the 1950s one of the early pushes was for the and so in the 1950s, there was the creation of global strategy. so this question of is the treaty area the only place nato should be operating and has a long history and we are seeing the latest phase of that and lots of ways, shaping the strategic landscape, to the pacific. you see that reflected in investments and partnerships with new zealand and japan and the like but also thinking about what a stable europe means for the broader landscape.

i don't think there is as much intention as we believe. on the question of deterrence, future forecasting where we are going, the cold war history of the debates over deterrence give us so much contradiction. the prevailing european view was rapid escalation of nuclear weapons because it makes deterrence more credible and more likely to protect the homeland. where an american planners talked about what it looked like to uses nuclear weapons most of those europeans said wait, i really don't like the range of those missiles you are planning to launch, those 400 kilometers, that strikes my km, that strikes my neighbor's house, thousand kilometers strikes my next door over one over's house, there was always a fundamental tension about

impact. i thought was particularly telling this morning that ambassador smith said they were getting back their nuclear iq. i had to hypothesize about where we are going, a lot what has worked in the last 20 or 30 years is because people aren't paying attention to it. and now that the relationship between conventional and nuclear deterrence is back on the table in a real way, it was greater emphasis on conventional capability, when people start turning over those rocks people find the assumptions underneath of them are very uncomfortable ones. i would speculate that we are due for a considerable round of probably very unpleasant debates about what is required and what the implications of that will mean because the fundamental geography of the alliance is the same.

how things impact a voter in omaha, nebraska does not impact someone in central poland. >> thank you. on the indo pacific, maybe that was an accident, maybe was deliberate. let me put it in the right terms. nato has a security role in the indo pacific, talking to the key us allies, getting them multilateral lysed in a dialogue on resilience technology, disinformation, but on collective defense, nato is and must remain euro atlantic centric. it cannot buy its makeup and its complexity take on a collective role in the indo pacific. it simply would not work and the way they address china is about china coming to europe

and working multilateral framework with these key us allies in the region. this is the future for nato in the indo pacific. and american colleague of mine said russia and china are headline news but russia is above the fold. i didn't catch the private market question so maybe we can discuss it during the break on nuclear issues. i think we've seen the future. the allies will want to play up conventional defense in a way that is bigger than during the cold war. the europeans wanted to accelerate escalation to get the us involved. the us saw delay escalation

beyond the conventional to not be involved. that was sent. now nato is at the point they are really building up defense. defense and deterrence. we see the plans coming get out of defense planning, 300,000 reaction troops, frontline defense, etc. . it is all about not pushing nuclear issues to the forefront. why not? one issue is that in europe as in the united states, i know the europeans seem better here, we have been through a couple decades of hopefulness the nuclear weapons would go away. the abolitionist movement, president obama's global 0, public opinion has not come back to embracing nuclear

deterrence is something that beautiful. the political center i talked about that is not solid in any case is not about to go more solid if they embrace nuclear deterrence against their own populations. there's a great big gap between where the population is on nuclear deterrence and where the political center is. a lot of political leadership, public education may change this a little bit and the europeans will need to have this discussion in order not to end up in that competitive space but another fact that has changed that cannot be changed or rolled back is that nato is now at the border of russia. in the cold war the early stages of nuclear escalation were about the space in between the superpowers so you could devastate parts of western europe and eastern europe and it would still not be strategic.

it would be tactical or intermediary. that option is off the table today. there's between nato and russia. everything for russia is strategic. the escalation is much more violent and unpredictable compared to back then and that is a challenge for nato that will not go away, that is why they will do a lot to maintain a considerable defense component posture, but the nuclear conversation will need to be had because it is there at the end of the fence. this has to do, i hope most of you can stay, there will be a continuation of this discussion. the organizers, we have to call

this, the organizers offered me a couple minutes to sum up the discussion. it has been a very rich one and i don't think i need to sum up but a couple things we mentioned this morning. i want to take a minute to offer a couple of personal reflections, julie smith mentioned something important, that neither nato successes nor shortcomings were preordained. we can't afford to take the alliance for granted. i've served in government for a long time and i have come to the conclusion that people make policy. hopefully with some combination of foresight shaped by knowledge of history, respect for important values and pragmatism, openness to compromise and humility. and we will continue to need those types of men and women in

nato and inside nato governments dealing with nato's affairs in the us, europe and canada. so this is mainly directed to the students in the audience. i was the director for nato and the pentagon for nato policy on september 11th and i saw how within a few hours canadian european allies proposed to invoke article 5 for the first time in history for the defense of the united states and that proposal came back to washington and was quickly approved at the highest levels of this government. it meant something. in the following weeks, nato was an alliance that took meaningful steps to help the united states not only to protect our airspace but the united states with responsibilities we have to redeploy some efforts to

afghanistan and in those areas where nato as an organization was not prepared for one reason or another to act as an organization, make no mistake, everything we had done for decades, interoperability of equipment, thinking, exercising, training, all of that was vital for the performance of the militaries in bilateral operations and other channels but also what became known as coalitions of the willing. people put that together. one other example. you mentioned finland and sweden. i spent a lot of time working with those countries and it was remarkable. it was really remarkable how quickly after the russian invasion in february 2022 those two countries said we want to be members and they applied at the same time.

in may of 2022. and if you look at cinnamon, it set the record for the shortest lapse of time between that formal application and accession, 11 months, sweden for reasons we are aware of, some foot dragging by a couple allies but people made that happen. diplomats, military officers, military of defense civilians work for decades to make their countries more interoperable with nato, to make their publics more aware of what nato does, get rid of some of the old myths and worked and we see the benefits. people did that. i hope the students in the audience think of that and think of the role they have to play and since i began the session by quoting an american, mark twain i think it's only

fitting that we close it by remembering a little-known european expert on transatlantic defense policy, mick jagger of the rolling stones. and i think of him because nato is not a perfect organization but in one of his songs mick jagger summed it up i think, my view of nato. he saying you can't always get what you want, but if you try real hard you might just get what you need. please join me in thanking our panels. [applause] >> thank you very much. >> thank you all. a pleasure to be here