destroyed by bombs. thank you very much. thank you very much. [applause] >> and you've you been wg booktv, television for serious readers. every sunday on c-span2 here from nonfiction authors discussing their books and watch your favorite authors online anytime at booktv.org. you could also find us on facebook, youtube and x at booktv. according. >> c-span is your unfiltered view of government. we are funded by the television companies and more including charter communications. >> charter is proud to be recognized as one of the best internet providers and we are just getting started building 100,000 miles of new infrastructure to reach those who need it most.

>> charter communications supports c-span as a public service along with these other television providers giving you a front-row seat to democracy. >> remarks now from the u.s. ambassador to nato, julianne smith. she and foreign policy analysts are commemorating the 75th anniversary of nato at georgetown university. live coverage on c-span2. [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations]

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>> all righty. welcome to the nato 75 charting a new course conference. posted by the georgian center for security studies and sponsored by the institute for the studies diplomacy, the bmw seven for german and european studies, and the european center for international affairs. our program and will begin shortly. please take a moment silence any cell phones and a reminder we follow georgian universities speech and expression policy which can be found on the georgian student affairs website. with the exception of the afternoon keynote, there will be a question-and-answer portion at the end of each session during which you may come to the mic stand at the end or middle of the middle aisle and ask questions here please be sure to phrase your comments in the form of the question, and in interest of time we ask that each person be concise and ask only one question. so the question and answer portion of the afternoon keynote

supreme allied commander of europe, please submit your questions in advance using the qr code displayed on the screens on either side of the stage. additionally, we will have several breaks during the day. you are welcome to use the restrooms located on the fourth floor and first solar during these breaks. the doors will close at the beginning of each session. out of respect for our keynote speakers and panelists please be sure to return probably for each session and do your best to minimize distraction. and finally the our elevators located to the far right of the stairs should you need them. thank you for joining us today.

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we were at georgetown university waiting for remarks from the u.s. ambassador to nato julianne smith. she and foreign policy analysts are commemorating the 75th anniversary of the nato. we expect this to get underway shortly. live coverage on c-span2. [inaudible conversations]

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>> the point of going. i am a faculty member in security program at school foreign service. i am delighted to welcome you all both those joining us in person here this morning at the historic gaston hall as well as those turning in virtually from around the world to our conference on nato at 75 charting a new course. 75 years ago last week not too far from where we're meeting now representatives from 12 north atlantic countries came together in downtown washington to perform the resolve to unite the efforts for collective security and defense, a preserve the peace and security of the atlantic community. an association board of war, designed to fortify peace. in the words of secretary acheson who signed the treaty on behalf of the government and people of the united states, the purpose of the north atlantic pact was twofold. for those who seek peace it is a guide to refuge and strength, a

very present help in trouble. for those who set the feet up on the path of aggression it is a warning that if it must needs be that offenses come, then woe unto them. this duality of purpose a desire for peace while being prepared for war has guided the alliance ever since. peace through security. indeed the nato flag and emblem featuring a star representing compass symbolizes the peaceful purpose of the north atlantic treaty organization. as explained by lord ismay delight to first secretary secry general the compass start guides me towards peace while the circle signifies the unity among the latest members. as political military alliance nato is also used in that it's memset pleasantly to uphold the principle of collective defense and guarantee each other security, but also the shared determination to safeguard the freedom and prosperity of their peoples. a freedom founded on principles of democracy, , individual libey and it will law.

its hybrid political military identity as a time -- within the alliance, over the course of the past seven and half decades the lights has often had to navigate the delicate balance between political and military priorities as it sought to fill its chief purpose and safeguardy of its members. attention that persists within the alliance today and one of your will do more about over the course of the day. following the end of the cold war nato added two core task and cooperative security to its original focus on deterrence and defense. for a brief time nato could direct its attention and energies towards out of every operations and expedition emissions, securing the belief that europe was wholly free. but history is now caught up with the allies and today russia is once again threatening europe and the wide atlantic community. as a consequence of the alliance returned to its original purpose, deterring and defending the euro-atlantic area. at the same time the alliance

faces of the threats and challenges, the persistent threat of terrorism and the grilling assertiveness of china whose impatience and coercive policies as at that conflict stated directly challenges the interest, values and security of the alliance. along with managing these challenges nato must also confront one of the defining issues of our time, the impact of climate change. that's quite a crowded agenda. there been other significant changes along the way as well. 75 years on from its on the light is larger than ever having added 20 additional numbers in the intervening decades most recently sweden last month and so the partner countries like the ap four and as we will hear this morning and afternoon delights is not a larger than ever but it is also actively working on becoming stronger than ever. navigating the complex and often turbulent waters of today's international security environment while learning from past expenses and remaining agile enough to adapt to future

contingencies is nato's central challenge today. over the course of the day we will have the privilege of hearing from many distinguished alliance practitioners and nato scholars, each offering big unique insights and perspectives on the use and other pressing issues. minimum will have the opportunity to her directly from u.s. permanent representative to nato ambassador julianne smith who will share her perspective and provide insights on last weeks nato foreign ministry on beating as well as a preview of the upcoming agenda for the july washington summit. following her prepared remarks ambassador smith will take questions from the audience in the room. the afternoon keynote address will be delivered by supreme allied commander general christopher cavoli who will also take questions from those in attendance here today. and to facilitate were excited to introduce a new format for audience members to submit their questions in advance. at least it is true for me. the qr code you see displayed

before you on the screens enables you to submit questions throughout the day ahead of this afternoon session entry we can incorporate as many questions from the audience as possible during our brief time with chris kovalic i could just make use of this opportunity entities break in progress. organizing organizing events of this caliber and size of century can imagine requires all hands on deck and their many individuals are involved in making today possible. i want to begin by thanking my colleagues special professor stephen flanagan and heidi irvin, they have in my north stars since we started planning this converts nearly ten months ago. and along the way they've offered steady direction and been in constant source of advice for which i am deeply appreciative. i also want to express my gratitude to abby from the center for security studies who have done an outstanding job a candidate for reality and, frankly, they've had to put a parchment emails from me in the process.

i am also grateful to professors daniel bynum and rebecca, director and associate director of the center for security studies for the support along with the many staff and student volunteers from the program who are helping here today. thank you all. i also want to thank the many colleagues from across the school of foreign service and the wider church and university community for offering their assistance and support and a particularly like to think jackson from the events and jack from event management services. thank you both for all of your work. finally what extend my extend my gratitude toward georgetown partners the center for international studies, the bmw center for german european studies for their generous financial support for today's programming. it's my pleasure to help introduce will offer few remarks before introducing our first keynote of the day, ambassador julianne smith, dean, the film is yours. [applause] -- the helm.

thank you, sarah, think of all the work you've done in organizing what i know will be a fascinating adventure an important day. i want to welcome you to george takei seems like a particularly ous day because of what we're going to see climactic as well as what we will discuss in the room. i'm going to see whether the staff can actually get as classes to look at the eclipse as with lots of people leaving for about 15 minutes in the afternoon. i don't know if stain classes also a a protective way of log at eclipse. but it does feel, gives this day a little bit more significance. let me welcome you here for those who have never joined us here on the georgetown university campus school of foreign service. let me tell you little bit about her school because it is such an honor of privilege and indeed for us very consistent with the nationwide the school is

greater. you are here at the school of foreign service searching university which is the oldest school of international affairs in the united states. it was created in 1919 in the immediate aftermath of world war i with a very explicit mission, are found on that very day at inaugurating the school said and i quote unprepared as we were for war we are resolved never to be unprepared for the peace and for over 100 years this school has been training generations of leaders engaging through our scholarship research and teaching on the core issues that will preserve the peace, both in the last century and going forward. so what is very much in line with our mission to welcome this discussion on a critical alliance, a critical set of relationships, a critical organization that has worked very much in accordance with this mission to preserve the

peace nato at 75. we are deeply grateful to be able to host such an extraordinary range of panelists to talk both about the history of nato but more importantly about the future of nato at such a critical moment. as we all know nato has been challenged like never before with an invasion in europe that was almost unimaginable a few years ago, and yet nato's resolve has shown to be well beyond the expectations, the unit of nato, the expansion of nato has been true to the very mission by which nato was created. but there are many challenges ahead and this is an extraordinary opportunity to begin for this challenge is to understand the challenges to begin to set the stage for the next 75 years of nato's efforts to preserve peace. and with that we want to begin with somewhat of course the nose

these issues from the inside out as you say, we are so pleased to welcome today ambassador julianne smith. she is as you know the u.s. permanent representative to nato, a position that you took on in november 2021. following a long and distinguished career in multiple positions both engaging in an analyzing the transatlantic relationship. prior to its position she served as a senior advisor to secretary of state blinken. before that she was director of asia and geopolitics programs at the german marshall fund of the triticum also directed the transatlantic security program at the center for a new american security. she also played a number of roles in government. she was acting as a screen advisor and deputy national security adviser to the vice president of the united states. she served for three years as the principal secretary director for european and new policy in

the pentagon for which she was actually awarded the secretary defense medal for exceptional public service. and, of course, she has held for right of positions in research institutes here in washington and the on the center for strategic and international studies, the german marshall fund, the american academy in berlin. so she is uniquely capable of giving us both a perspective on nato's past, and, of course, a glimpse into how the u.s. is thinking about nato's future. and we are pleased to moderate this discussion first in a fireside chat and then for questions to have a truly distinguished member of the international press corps, david sanger. he's the white house and national securities correspondent for the "new york times," and one of the organizations most senior writers having spent 42 years at

the "new york times." during which he was associated with a team that has won multiple pulitzer prizes. his new book, the fourth book that he is published will come out in april called fittingly new cold war, china's rise, russia's invasion, and the struggle to defend the west. he's also written to make of the "new york times" bestsellers. he's been very cheap in tokyo, washington economic correspondent, the white house correspondent during the clinton and bush administration and indeed the chief washington correspondent. so we couldn't have a better and her locker and moderator for this conversation. and with that it is my pleasure to welcome ambassador julianne smith and david sanger to the stage to begin the case proceedings. thank you very much. [applause]

>> well, good morning, and thanks for coming out early on a monday morning. and thank you to joel for that lovely introduction. it is a real pleasure and an honor to open this conference, nato at 75, charting a new course that i'm very much looking for to your questions in the few minutes. for three-quarters of a century nato has been a cornerstone of international peace and security, united nations in a collective commitment to mutual defense, and to our shared values. nato's success story really is remarkable, and it's one that was by no means preordained. the fact that in 2024, 75 years

after it was founded, the alliance is bigger, stronger, and more united speaks to the alliances adaptability. it speaks to nato's resilience. but it also speaks to the commitment and the courage of millions of soldiers, , sailors, aviators and operate together under the nato umbrella. but i think it also speaks to the attractiveness of nato's core values, democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law. now, i don't have enough time this morning here had to gh all of nato's many achievements over the last seven decades, and there will be sample panel struck that they were folks will be allowed to look at the alliance from different angles, looks like a superb conference and series of discussions, and i congratulate the organizers. but what i do want to do this morning is i want walk us

through all that has happened inside the nato alliance over just the last two years, since russian launched its unprovoked war of aggression in ukraine. these last two years have in many ways been transformative, and don't use that word lightly. i don't think there's a better word to describe what's happening across the nato alliance since the war started. and i think they have showcased time and time again nato's agility and its innovation. so let me walk you through five big changes that we've seen again just in the last two years. years. first, after many, many years of focusing on expeditionary operations or you remember in the 1990s they were often referred to as out of area operations, the alliance has come home and returned to its core mandate of collective defense. and it's taken a series of

dramatic steps to enhance its deterrence. before the war even started, nato allies were moving force posture into eastern europe. you will remember that nato just a few months after the war started announced four new multinational battalions on the eastern flank that were paired with the four that were created in the three baltic states and poland right by doctor rut into crimea in 2014. in the trance and some less to the alliance also rolled out new regional plans that provide clarity to all allies in terms of what's required to protect every inch of nato territory. we are also working on an entirely new command-and-control structure which a suspect general cavoli will talk about in his remarks later today, and we just finished conducting our

largest military exercise since the cold war, steadfast defender, with 90,000 nato troops. and that exercise for the first time in a long time enabled us to exercise north american troops moving across the atlantic and into europe to defend nato territory. so that's number one. dramatic shift or a coming home of sorts to collective defense and enhance deterrence. secondly, burden sharing has increased significantly in recent years. you will remember that in 2014 all allies pledged to spend 2% of their gdp on the own national defense. that pledge was to last ten years. that that brings us to 2024 when we started the pledge ten years ago we had three countries in the alliance spending 2% 2% p on defense, and by last count we don't know where we're going to end up by the end of this

calendar year, but right now we have 20 allies that are meeting the 2% pledge. 20 allies. that is a significant increase over a decade. of course we wanted to be all 32, and we're going to keep pushing until we get there, but the movement that we saw over the last two years, particularly by countries like germany that put an extra 100 billion euros on the table for their own defense after the war started speaks volumes about where we are as a subject of burden sharing. but when we talk about burden sharing, it's not just about 2% of gdp spending on national defense. sharing also takes us to the question of ukraine. and here we are also seeing remarkable level of burden sharing across the alliance. the united states over the last two years has provided roughly $74 billion worth of support to our friends in ukraine.

our european allies collectively have provided somewhere around the order of the $110 million worth of support to ukraine. every single member of the alliance is providing assistance to ukraine, economic, humanitarian, and security systems. so burden sharing is something that we've seen and everywhere we have seen tremendous positive shift just over the last two years. third, nato has added two new members. you will remember right after the war started in the spring of 2022 the was a knock at the door and to make countries that had hundreds of years of non-alignment decided to shift the national policy and request formal nato membership. pot in five years, not in a decade come not in two years but immediately. they wanted to start the process immediately. as you well know finland became an official member last spring, and sweden just joined officially, and now it is taking

its seat at the table just a couple of weeks ago. and those two allies already making meaning meaningful contributions to the lights h and every day. number four, nato rolled out a new strategic concept in 2022. this is nothing new. nato rewrite the strategic concept. its core mission statement about once a decade. what was a new about this particular strategic concept was that in addition to mentioning the two core threats the alliance is facing, russia and terrorism, for the first time in nato's history the strategic concept mentions the prc, challenges associate with the prc, for nato member states, and the importance of deepening our partnerships with our friends in the indo-pacific. now, why is a native doing this? does it have aspirations to become a global alliance and add the members in the indo-pacific?

absolutely not. that's not the plan. our indo-pacific partners don't have an interest in joining the alliance, , and the alliance is not looking to go global. but what we see is increased utility in working together with our friends in the indo-pacific on a number of shared security challenges that really have no geographic boundaries. this information, malicious cyber attacks, or emerging and disruptive technology. we view the security challenges increasingly in one theater and not limited to just the atlantic or the pacific. and so nato is moving out while it is focus on the war in ukraine, it is moving out to deepen these important partnerships with our friends in the indo-pacific to share best practices and insight on those shared challenges. finally, nato, while it is been addressing the challenges in ukraine and coping with the russia threat, , has taken a

series of unprecedented steps to address a wide range of emerging and future challenges. and i'll give it a couple of examples. we have new initiatives across the alliance in two new domains, cyberspace. you will remember when nato was created we focus on land, sea and air. now increasingly the alliance is moving out to focus on security threats that exist in cyberspace and in space proper. nato also recently announced a c1 1 billion euro innovation fund to protect our collective technological edge it nato is in the process of building something called the defense innovation accelerator for the north atlantic which has a handy name of diana, to solve critical defense challenges both with the private sector and with academic institutions. we have expanded our work across the new alliance on climate security but also resilient. we have identified a key areas

such as our telecommunication networks, our health systems or continuity of government that must remain resilient in the face of any potential attack. and last summer we just announced something called the defense production action plan to ensure that nato has the industrial capacity and the capabilities that it needs to support its defense plants. so taken together, what does all of this mean for this alliance? the enhance deterrence, the new resourcing we're seeing, the new members that are still trying to join this alliance, the deeper partnerships with our friends in the indo-pacific, and all of the new initiatives that we are rolling out to cope with future challenges. well, it tells us that at 75 this alliance remains relevant. it remains resilient, and the remains ready for the future. and that's why we look forward to hosting this year's

anniversary summit right here in washington, d.c. july 9 through the 11th where we will no doubt celebrate 75 years of historic achievements, are strong transatlantic bonds and nato's vital importance in defending against future threats. now an addition to the celebrations we of course will be spending a lot of time at the summit focused on ukraine. i can't predict, none of us can, with any certainty what the world will look like come july, but here's what we do know. all 32 heads of state will be traveling to washington, d.c. in july to showcase their unwavering unity, their unwavering resolve in helping ukraine when. we will send a strong signal to president putin that he can't wait us out. we are not distracted, that we are not looking away, and we remain focused on ukraine's immediate and future security

needs. and we will take concrete steps at the summit to move ukraine closer to the alliance and build a bridge to nato membership. and, of course, in addition to ukraine the allies will be making a series of new announcements on many of the subjects i just mentioned. we are rolling out new initiatives as it relates to cyber come to resilience, to climate security, and yes defense production act will. so let me close just with this. sometimes i encounter folks that wonder whether nato's 75 years, whether or not that some sort of liability. and i the very short answer on those types of questions. nato's 75 years of experience, that is not a liability. that is an asset. 75 years of working towards consensus with our closest allies day after day on nato's core mandate and our future mandates has made unity our

greatest strength. yes, working with 31 other allies day in and day out as have its challenges. it's not always easy to get 32 nations to agree around the table. but when allies put their full weight behind an issue or a position or a new initiative, there is no question that it has both regional and global implications. i think madeleine albright, former professor here of course and a first female secretary of state said it best when she said we know that when democracies, with the democracies of europe and america are divided, crevices are created to which forces of evil and aggression may emerge. but when we stand together, there's no force on earth more powerful than our solidarity on behalf of freedom. and that's it right there. it's our solidarity, the solidarity that makes nato stronger and is made nato one of

the most successful alliances in history, and one that is made the alliance ready for tomorrow's challenges. thank you very much. i look forward to your questions. [applause] >> well, thank you, ambassador smith. thank you, everyone to beer. i'm davidson, "new york times," and just so that you understand the order of the next few minutes. ambassador and are going to talk for about half an hour, and then we're going to go out to questions for everybody. there are a couple of microphones lined up, or at least i see here, where you can stand for your questions. so thank you for this. thanks for coming. >> thank you. >> great to see you again, in a previous life we had offices next to each other.

>> indeed. >> but it was hard to imagine then that you would be ambassador to nato. i'm still doing the same thing i was doing. so let me start with your comments about what it is that we've learned in the last two years, because it is been an extremely moment for nato. i think you summarized it well, that there were years, decades really where they were doing expeditionary out of area operations. a lot of debate within nato, is this really what we were created for? there was some debate, , do we need nato anymore? there were my favorite conversations that i dug up when i was working on new cold wars. the book you would reference before, the intro discussions mostly in the bush administration about the integral -- what he could bring rush into nato and the russian

nato council gave them at office inside the nato headquarters. i think that's gone. >> it is gone. it is gone. >> yeah. so that take you to the question of what we have learned, what we were surprised by and what we've learned. so you gave us some of the great strengths that have come together. there are three things that strike me that took nato by surprise and wanted to run them, run through them. because it will give us a sense of how they reacted. in the opening days of the war, or in the run-up to the war i should say, a lot of european leaders, even the weekend before the war at the munich security conference, were telling me, were telling you, were telling secretary blinken the russians are just bluffing, they are not really going to do this. the economic interests are so great in providing gas and oil

they would never take this risk. he's just trying to get a negotiated solution. what lessons have emerged from the fact that while the united states provided the intelligence and the europeans believe the intelligence, it didn't believe our assessment? >> yeah, you're right. this was an interesting time for me because i was confirmed in november of 2021, and that was right in the thick of i think it was early fall 2021 when we had taken, the biden administration had taken this decision to share an unprecedented amount of intelligence with our closest allies let them know what we thought was a clear indication that they were not just bluffing, this wasn't just posturing. they were preparing to go to war. and so i landed in brussels in

late that november, late 2021, and i frankly didn't quite know what to expect. i guess my assumption going in was that the united states putting this information on the table, the debates which shift and that we would all then seen from the same song sheet. but, in fact, what happened is exactly what you're describing. there were many allies around the table that were saying come on, we hear what you're saying, we appreciate the fact that you have shared this level of intelligence with us many times, not just in one instance, but we were keeping the -- >> making public because they were calling -- >> that's right. no, and we were making it public, absolutely. was it just our closest allies. but then one of my most vivid memories is when the phone rang february 22 at 3 a.m., a kind of felt come will talk about the 3 a.m. phone call in the united

states. literally rang around that time, and we went in for the north atlantic council meeting. before the meeting got started one of my colleagues from eastern europe raised his hand, and before we're going to launch in this series, we were activating nato's graduate response but i think the nato response force, flurry of activity, he said i just need to say, put his head up, looked at table and instead i couldn't believe you. i, i -- >> secretary blinken has said similar. >> sorry, but what that did, so the fact that tragically russia decided to go forward with this war, there were several diplomatic efforts you will remember the trips to geneva. there was the nato-russia council at nato headquarters on january 12 around the table at the north atlantic council.

so we had made efforts to encourage them to take another path. they did not. the war starts. there was a shift inside the alliance in that there was suddenly a different approach and attitude towards u.s. intelligence after that moment. it had created a situation where the u.s. had built up a considerable amount of credibility because we had shared the intelligence, called it up, and tragically it come to pass, that from that moment forward as u.s. continue to share intelligence about russians plans, what their strategy, what was happening on the ground and what we envision with the next step, then you can see the allies attention and focus on what was being presented to u.s. briefers. so there was a significant shift from one day to the next across the island. >> do you think, in other words, do think now the intel between

the u.s. and the other nato members, the agreement on assessment has fundamentally change? >> i think it has fundamentally changed, and the changes that we saw two years ago are still ever present today inside the nato alliance, in terms with the seriousness with which allies look at and consider use intelligence. >> there were two other areas that jumped out at me from my reporting on this three. one in the oldest tech and one in the news. europe had pretty much stopped making conventional ammunition of artillery shells at the time. using fired. and the ukrainians, while the u.s. and microsoft, amazon world services and others that if i was job of moving the ukrainian government to the cloud, there have been no planning for how they're going to communicate.

elon musk stepped in and solve this one, but that was not part of the plan. so i'm wondering if you could just sort of bring us up-to-date on both the ammunition side and the communications side burner side. >> yeah. -- cyber side. >> sorry, just had some caffeine you. so two things. first and foremost on what was happening in europe before the war and postwar. one of the hardest lessons i think of the war in ukraine for the nato allies is a deeper appreciation and understanding of the brittleness of the transatlantic defense industrial base, and some of the shortages that we were seeing because of an aging and kind of shrinking workforce across that defense industrial base. and so what we thought were nato

standards that would enable us all to have the stocks necessary to cope with any potential contingency, i think ukraine opened her eyes to reality that first and foremost we need to have a lot more on hand, but also that we need to open up those production lines that we had shattered many, many years ago, and we think about hollywood, we are still the of doing this, not fill the shortages that now exist across the alliance because of the critical insistence that is been provided to our friends in ukraine -- assistance. that defense production piece is front and center for us as a catalytic project. we have seen some remarkable steps forward and just to make short years but my goodness with a lot more work to do ahead of us. let me just cite one amazing example, the checks. the checks used to produce about 10,155 per year. they are now two years later

producing 100,155 100,1. that is one example. there's many more what they've e in germany over the last year or so has also been impressive. we got a lot to increase reduction in the united states, especially on ammunition but, frankly, across many systems. but on ukraine the ukraine piece of it, there's a very interesting set of different lessons that we learned from them and we're learning in real time, and that is this war with russia that the canadians are in the middle of defending their territory has brought emerging tech into it sometimes feels, i'm no general milley has a great quote that in your book, that it feels, it's trench warfare. it feels like not like world war ii, there's an omen of that with the tanks went back and forth, but the trench warfare really

brings us back to world war i. and yet the ukrainians are paying you technology and drowns. they are using apps, swipe right for more ammunition. i mean, it's unbelievable what the greens have done in terms of attaching new technologies to basically soviet legacy equipment. so on that side of things, yes, they are feeling now the pinch and the shortfalls that exist in europe and in the united states, but they've also continue to innovate throughout the war and use technology to their advantage. and that's why nato just recently created, the celtic of j tack which is going to allow us to work with the ukrainians and extract lessons learned -- j tack -- on how derek fighting the russians, what modern to combat with the russians look like, no one knows than offense in ukraine right now. and how it is pieces of a sci-fi movie and it also has pieces of

world war i conventional warfare. >> it's interesting you say that and the fact i was going to ask you, you had it right about the general milley quote. he's colorful and i will cut out lipid of the colorful piece, because as he always says he speaks, army is his first language. but he said trench warfare for while we thought this would be a cyber war. and we thought it was looking like an old-fashioned world war ii tank war. and then there are days when i thought they were fighting world war i. >> exactly. >> the fact of the matter is, i mean i said this in my words, not his, it is part 1941 -- 1914 mac 1914, part 1941 and part 2024. >> completely. that's exactly it. >> is nato now, does it it have its head around that alteration that you are doing something

that mixes? >> absolutely. first and foremost we are obviously working to extract those lessons learned and what it means for the alliance. we're increasing production. we if not increasingly about how nato standards need to continue to drive and send signals to defense industry. you know, if nato says, for example, let me pick a random number, nato mandates that all members must have, let's say 30 days of ammunition, , and then suddenly says not 30 days, six months, a year, three months, whatever it is, , and dramaticay increases what the nato standard is that while allies have to meet, it obviously been since the right signal the industry that hey, this has a future and that merits reopening these old alliance. because the answer you get from defense industry so often now when we pound on the doors and say, please reduce more and

faster, both for our own stocks and four friends in ukraine, they often say well, you need it right now. will you need it next year? and we seen this movie before where nato allies think they need a certain capability and then they back off it or they pivot to something else or planning dictates a different set of requirements. and so we're tied to take a long, hard look at what those nato standards are, particularly as we refill our stocks based on the assistance we provided, but then to send the right signal that this will be a lasting project for the alliance. the way we see it, this would be, the defense production piece of it will be, , over the next decade we are going to be working on not only ensuring that we have the stocks necessary to counter any potential threat but to backfill and continue to get the ukrainians what they need. >> so this is expensive.

>> indeed. >> what would you were describing her i know you we celebrity the 2% marker for 20 of the 32 countries. but the 2% marker was set ten years ago. >> correct. >> and i spent as you a couple months in berlin, and spent some time with the german defense officials about their plans to do exactly what you just described. and while the plans are impressive, you can't do it for the 72 billion euros in europe they spend on defense. hard for me to say this with any accuracy, but i have my doubts and you can do it for twice what they're spending. and yet the political conversation in europe, including in germany, has not caught up with the cost of doing what you just described. >> yes. there is good news and bad news. >> good news is ready 2%.

bad news is 2% will not do it in more. >> if you go back and look at the language from the vilnius summit last summer. what do we say about 2%? we said that it is a floor not a ceiling. and we said that because increasingly we will look at what's going to be required for the future, we increasingly believed that additional resources above and beyond every country hitting 2% are going to be needed. and sector austen has been clear about that. no doubt general cavoli will mention it again later today. and what are we seeing in europe? we are seeing countries now stretched a 3%. with a number of countries that are already at 2.5. not just the baltic states by the way. romania, some of her friends in the nordic countries. i mean, a whole, a whole array of countries, are looking at 3%, at the polls are talking about 4%. now obviously with the polls because the writer on the edge

of what's happening in ukraine, they feel this war in ways others maybe don't feel it. so acutely. but it is a conversation that is occurring across the alliance day in, day out about whether or not even when we all hit 2%, whether or not that would be sufficient. because you are right to point out that not only to do the back to work that we have to do but to prepare for all contingencies, including in some of those new areas that i have mentioned, it's going to require resources. >> so the bill in congress right now, the 64 billion, if you get it, much of the emanation as i read that built this is going to backfill in things with or be given them. it would actually result in more ammo going immediately to the ukrainians. >> it's both. it's both. and that's what we have to get the supplemental done. it is absolutely critical we get this through congress. the ukrainians need the support

desperately. they need to have u.s. continue to leadership. they need these resources. we want to make sure that they don't go into the summer rationing their ammunition or facing any unnecessary shortfalls. we want to put them in the best position possible to face spit their already rationing. >> they are rationing. there are shortages currently. but they are grappling with an ivory much hope, we all hope that that supplemental will get through no later than the end of this month. >> so let's talk for a moment of a something to praise end of your discussion, which is the delicate dance about how you talk about admitting nato eventually, admitting ukraine eventually into nato. no secret there's big divisions within the nato alliance on this. this. the eastern europeans are pretty clear and were clear in vilnius the one thing in basically now.

president and chancellor scholz were basically the two leaders who were most vocal on the question that you cannot advance i country while it is in the midst of war. and it sounds from what i'm hearing like to want to take a word used in vilnius, which is vague about when ukraine would get admitted. and move or a similar wording forward for the 75th anniversary. president zelensky came in pretty hot to the vilnius meeting, read his tweets as all of you were. thomas how your managing this. >> well, look, in vilnius we get a lot. we came together. it wasn't easy. it had some challenges. allies have different perspectives on this as you noted. but we did come together and we

did a couple of things. first and foremost we said to the ukrainians, there's no question about membership. you will become a member of this alliance. your future place is in nato, and will continue to work to get there. we also make clear that there are a number of reforms that they need to undertake to be granted full-fledged membership, and that's a challenge that all aspirants have faced. and they're making good progress. progress. and if equity said secretary blinken in brussels last week and we were able to get a a rt from the ukrainians on all that they're doing on their governance and security reforms. and it's an impressive list it for a country in the middle of the war to continue to make progress, for example, on anticorruption is extremely admirable. so we have applauded this episode want to encourage them to keep going. but we also in addition to basic saying to them, look, nato will agree to full-fledged membership for ukraine when conditions are

met and when allies agreed, and that holds for this summers sumr speeders and the war ends. >> right. >> or as you set out a stopping point. >> exactly. but what we did do is we created a new nato ukraine council where ukraine comes in and sits as an equal around the table and is able to share first-hand impressions of insights from the war. we can hear what the requirements are but we can also talk about of right of other subjects. we that meetings of the navy ukraine council on the tax on critical infrastructure. we've talked to them about cyber attacks and looked for ways to provide additional assistance. but we did another important thing last year, and that was to lift map. the membership action plan that many new members have gone through which can be a bit of a lengthy process. we removed that entirely and that said you will not have a membership action plan. you will proceed towards a session with the time is right. so your question is, well, what

are you going to do this summer on top of what you already did last summer if membership is on the table? and there we will have concrete deliverable for ukraine. i can't get into the full details on that at this juncture, but we are on a way to get them on what we're calling a bridge to membership by deepening nato's work with the ukrainians on questions of interoperability, on modernization, providing additional resources to our friends in ukraine, and institutionalizing some of the bilateral support that has been provided. >> you mentioned cyber. before the war broke out summer just before the war broke out, nato agreed that a major cyber attack on a mentally cosseted something that could trigger. tell us all a bit about what you've seen the russians doing come both how they're using cyber inside ukraine where at

moments the cyber attacks and the kinetic attacks seem to type together, of which are seen outside of you can where i think we have probably expected a more active russian attack surface in the nato nations. we have seen some, but not dramatically-the background noise. >> well, i guess the way i would describe that is it has in essence been a steady state. the russians, this is one of the favorite tools of the variety of hybrid tactics on which they regularly rely. malicious cyber attacks is a play that we've seen them rely on time and time again obviously to have an impact inside ukraine on the battlefield with the ukrainian public to create political strategic dilemmas for president zelensky, to drive this information. they also use this information on a regular basis as well.

.. >> those two actors increasingly learn from each other and rely on that cyber instrument to divide the nato alliance from within, to divide europe from the united states. >> talking about-- >> well, info wars and also cyber attacks on our structures, on secure systems, on what the ukrainians are doing on the battlefield. what is nato doing about it? nato started first and foremost protecting its own frame works, that was number one.

and cyber domain which happened in 2016, as you noted. from there, last year, we built a virtual cyber response capability under which an ally that is under attack can knock on nato's door and say what's available here in terms of i need forensic's help. i need help patching a system. i've got part of my government that's off line. what can nato provide me on the fly and there we have this virtual response, almost like a chinese venue, a whole array of options that you can hand to an ally and say this is available for you today. >> have you enacted this and made use of it so far? >> well, yes. i don't want to get into details about that, but, yeah, we've put it to good use and now, at this summit, what we're also going to be focused on. we're going to have four or five new cyber deliverables at the washington summit. we're working at building capacity across the alliance.

as you know better than anyone, we have nato members that are best in class when it comes to preventing, deterring, detecting cyber attacks and we have allies that are catching up. so we want to bring the capacity of all allies up to the same level when it comes to counter defense. >> of your nato members, the u.s. and britain have pretty extensive offensive cyber capability written about over many years. do you envision nato having an offensive capability as well? >> we're not talking about that as a structure. >> okay. >> let's turn a little, you've raised the chinese cooperation with the russians in cyber, but obviously, it's much broader than that. i would say one of the surprises of this era is that the partnership without limits,

and turns out president xi and president putin is one of the dynamics of super power conflict now and it's also what nixon and kissinger spent decades or years, anyway, trying to avoid, opening the nature one. two years into this, because that was announced at the olympics in-- or just before the olympics. >> that's right. >> prior to the invasion in 2022, how do you assess the level of chinese and russian cooperation? and i guess i'll throw the iranians in as well because obviously they've been providing a lot of battlefield help, drone help, to the russians. >> yes. and let's not forget dprk as well. i mean, the amount of assistance that the dprk has provided to their friends in russia has also had a major

impact. >> talking artillery, missiles. i think it has had an impact, why don't we leave it there and certainly something that the allies increasingly talk about, but this brings us back to the theme that i mentioned earlier. why does nato invest so much, or why is nato investing so much in the partnerships with japan, australia, new zealand, what russia is doing in this moment. we can talk about the prc, not direct lethal support, but indication they're providing some sort of material source through dual use components and we talk about that through the alliance and with our indoe pacific partners as you noted the iranian piece as well where they've provided a whole array of very effective lethal drones

to their friends. >> the u.s. has been doing a lot to try to -- and to try to interrupt that supply chain for the drones. sanctions of many kind and so forth. how effective is that being? do you think there's been any impact on the iranian ability to produce? i know they're now trying to produce iranian factories in russia. >> yeah, we do believe there has been an impact. it's an ongoing project for the transatlantic partners. the sanctions piece obviously isn't handled by the -- i'm sure they could tell you why the last two years have been incredibly transformative for the u.s.-eu leadership because of what happened in ukraine. the amount of work that we've done with the european union on sanctions on support for our friends in ukraine has also been just absolutely remarkable, but back to your

question about the prc and russia, we do find ourselves across the alliance increasingly grappling with the question of how do we draw attention, each of us, bilaterally in our relationship with the prc to call them out on this material support, to apply pressure not to provide that kind of support and make sure that they understand the consequences if they continue down this path and i think it's been a very effective area of work for all the transatlantic partners. we're seeing many countries across europe be much more forth coming in calling out the chinese for this no limits partnership with russia, but also, for their political support to what russia is doing in ukraine and that material support that i just mentioned. >> the core of the nato security guarantees since

nato's creation 75 years ago, has basically been the american nuclear deterrent. and yet, we have seen in the past two years a revival of nuclear threats that are worrisome. i describe in the book the scare in october of 2022 when you and your colleagues were quite concerned, in fact, some of your colleagues said 50-50 chance that russia would detonate a battlefield nuclear weapon in ukraine. first, tell us a little about how that experience may have been transforming for the nato members. were they as fully aware as the u.s. was of the nature of this threat? and then, let's talk a little about how it may be changing the way that nato is thinking about nuclear strategy. >> well, yeah, a couple of things on that. first, when we rewrote the

concept in 2022, you see when you read the document, nuclear deterrence remains the backbone of nato's deterrent policy, no question. our wording is very, very clear as long as nato exists, that's not going anywhere and i think the language on that is crystal clear, but i think you're right to point out with the war in ukraine and all of its nuclear saber rattling that we've seen on the part of president putin, we now have gotten into kind of almost a review of what nuclear deterrence involves. what it means, we're working day in, day out to move our nuclear iq. just the whole theory of deterrence, i would say, came back to the forefront, and we're back where nato started 75 years ago. obviously, we take what putin says seriously and the u.s. was

able to share more with our allies to help them understand what we were seeing, but honestly, it's what putin has been saying that's gotten everyone's attention. he's been very public about this and medvedev has been outspoken on ukraine. and not as much recently. in the early stages of the war we talked about the potential use of tactical nuclear weapons and so you can imagine what the reaction was around the alliance. we were deeply concerned. at the same time, i think the u.s. made it very clear, publicly, but also privately with our closest allies that we didn't see any clear indication that the russians were actually preparing to use nuclear weapons. not then, not now. and so, we take this nuclear cyber rattling seriously. we continue to monitor the

situation. we're in close contact with aum of our allies up and down the eastern flank, obviously, gravely concerned about this prospect, but we have also one, reassured our allies about what we were seeing, whether or not anything-- we were seeing any signs of weapons being moved closer to the border, but also just the need to continually warn the russians that there would be serious-- i think jake sullivan said catastrophic consequences should russia opt to do so. >> well, that october, 2022 incident that president biden compared to the fundraiser in nuclear and want to hear him as his most candid was a pretty serious moment. they did not move nuclear weapons, they did hear commanders discussing possibility and that made a big

difference. a last question for you as we think out about the summit that is coming forward. there are the assurances that you can put on paper. there are the capabilities that you can build and you've described to us how you're doing that, but the political atmosphere makes a big difference to allies' conviction that the u.s. would be there should they need to invoke article five. you've heard what one candidate said publicly about what he would do if somebody hadn't made, you know, paid up. i assume he meant, but it's hard to know the 2%, but separate and apart from candidate trump's, you know, arguments, there is in europe today in part because of our own hesitance in passing the

ukraine bill and all that, a questioning about whether or not the political body of the united states is as committed to nato as it was before. the republican party has several prominent members who have expressed their doubts, both about aid to ukraine and some about nato. they may be just voicing noise out here and i suspect the majority of the party still has its old views. this must be a problem that both drives you crazy and you can't do anything about. [laughter] >> because all you can work is on the capability side not the political will side. >> well, that's not entirely true. i think it's on all of us, those of us that work on nato issues to continue to make the case and last year i traveled throughout my home state, the

state of michigan to have conversations with the governor, with a variety of student groups. i went to both university of michigan, michigan state. i was able to do talk radio, do a lot of outreach to try and answer those questions about why do we still have the nato alliance and why should we keep supporting ukraine. and i'm heading off to ohio tomorrow to do the same thing. so some of it's out of my control and i was sure were you going to ask this question, but here is what i say when i get this question frequently. so there's two concerns about the united states that you hear on the other side of the atlantic. one is, are you going to get the supplemental done or is u.s. support for ukraine over? is it now on us? will europeans have to take over and provide the remaining assistance to ukraine? and two, can we count on seven more decades of u.s. presidents of all political stripes standing up and committing and

supporting the nato alliance? and i think my answer on both fronts is pretty optimistic. one, i think that we have visitors coming through from congress almost every week, delegations that are made up of republicans and democrats travelling together and all i here from them time and time again is we're going to get the supplemental done and we need to continue funneling support. there's a broad base of support in the house, in the senate, it's bipartisan to continue supporting ukraine. there are members in the house, we all know, that are skeptical, don't want to see the supplemental go through, but by and large when that vote comes to the floor, we're confident that we're going to get it. >> to get it to the floor. >> have to get it to the floor. that's the challenge. two, on broad u.s. support for the alliance, i'll say public opinion data, actually the most recent poll that came out showed that u.s. support for the nato alliance is up. it seems that folks increasingly understand why

this alliance serves u.s. interests and why it serves our allies interest and that bumper stickers that we say a lot, stronger together. isn't just the bumper sticker, it's the truth. coping with ukraine is something that we need to do with 50 other countries around the world in terms of providing valuable security assistance. coping with instability elsewhere in the world requires us to work with our closest allies and partners, it's not just ukraine. i think that fundamentally americans understand the value of alliances and the importance of the nato alliance in particular. but also, i'll say, when i travel around the united states and encounter americans in places far away from washington d.c., i think, again, there is this kind of bipartisan support that it's-- nato is not a partisan issue. it always, i suppose, has the risk of going in that direction

like any foreign policy subject, but from where i sit right now, whether i'm travelling across the united states or engaging with delegations in congress, or doing press interviews with talk radio outlets, i mean, i think nato enjoys a privileged place in american foreign policy that by and large, the majority of americans understand why it was created and why it's still relevant 70 years later and that's what we're going to be trying to do at the summit this summer. >> all right, if people would like to line up and, i think what we're going to do is probably take two questions at a time, since our time is short. the ambassador revealed-- and of course, the depth of her diplomatic skills that she went to both michigan and michigan state doing this. >> outreach, speeches. i didn't study at both. >> no, i understand that. >> now it's nice--

. even just attending the two for a day tells you if your skilled here. why don't we take the first two questions here. >> thank you. so, jason davidson from the university of mary washington and the atlantic council. last week the secretary-general confirmed that at the washington summit the aliens will put forward its first southern flank strategy. now, some people would look at that and say, well the alliance has a really big problem on the eastern flank, why is it messing around on the southern flank. so could you say a little about why the alliance and why the united states should care about the southern flank of the alliance and what specifically you would like to see in the southern flank strategy at the washington summit? >> great. and let's take the one behind you? >> i find it an interesting discussion and on sanctions. i was wondering when you came to the point of the sanctions effectiveness. so actually when you would talk

about sanction effectiveness, it comes to my mind and we do research, also, how effective sanctions are about evasion. because russia is evading sanctions with the use of many, many countries, especially from the former soviet block, central asia and china, you know. and what is the philosophy that you have. how is addressed at the nato level and the u.s. government level? i'm from center of political and global strategies. >> great. so, let me start with the south. it was a good question. you know, we have kind of a phrase that we use around the nato alliance that we have a 360 degree approach, which means that the alliance is not exclusively focused on the north atlantic or its southern flank or its eastern flank, that we simultaneously try to take on all of those areas, and

those new regional plans that i mentioned in my remarks actually divides the-- all nato territory into three different regions and there is a region, general kavoli can say more on this, nato south, how to address any potential forms of instability or attack on nato's southern flank. but there is a question on the table and that is while the alliance is focused on the war in ukraine, what more can the alliance be doing to address some of the potential challenges or threats that emanate from the south. and there, there's a whole array of things to talk about and it won't surprise you to hear that our southern member states from portugal and spain to greece and turkey, italy, a whole array of countries want to see the alliance fortify its

initiatives in this area. late last year we appointed a group of experts, a small group of policy makers and academics with deep experience in handling some of those southern challenges. and they just recently came to the nato alliance and presented us with over 100 different ideas of what the alliance could do to move out and strengthen its deterrents and effects and the way it protects the southern flank. now, nato is in the middle of debating those over 100 recommendations and there are a lot of good ideas there. there are small things and bigger, ambitious initiatives. between now and july, they'll settle on a handful of initiatives that enable us to deliver on something for the south. and as i noted, also, earlier, there's two chief threats that

we're facing inside the nato alliance, russia and terrorism and so we want to ensure that nato continues to do good work in both of those spaces, fortifying its deterrents to encounter those threats. i don't want to get into where the u.s. position is on those 100 plus recommendations and i really can't get into the details of that because we are literally right in the middle of debating all of those good recommendations, but you're right to note that the alliance will have something more to say about its southern flank and the reason i think that's important, i think why the secretary-general thinks it's important is to showcase to any would-be adversary or actor that we are prepared for all contingencies. this is the alliance that can walk and chew gum at the same time. as i said, nato is addressing what's happening in ukraine, but simultaneously moving out on an array of new initiatives.

on the sanctions question, i mean, again, nato doesn't take on sanctions per se, this is not part of our chief work inside the alliance, so, i'm hesitant to get into it. i will say that we believe that the unprecedented sanctions that both europe and the united states have imposed since the start of the war, has had an impact. there are instances where we see evasion and we continue to work with our closest partners in europe through the g7 and u.s. relationship and other bilateral rips to get at the heart of that to prevent it from happening and remains a key feature of what we work on with our transatlantic partner, but we believe the sanctions that have been put on the table since the war started have left the russians with 400 billion dollars less than they would have normally to put towards

this military operation, and the fact that the russians are now turning to countries like the dprk or iran or the prc for capabilities and technologist says a lot about what the west has been able to do to shut off the flow of potential components that could help them pursue this war. >> by the way, this, we're hearing upwards of half of it. >> there are instances where we see a significant level of what they provided actually, not, not working, no. >> two more here and then i think that maybe brings us to the end. make the questions short and crisp, we're running down on time a little bit. >> hi, i'm a graduate here. my question is to do with defense procurement.

the edict last month to increase the role, and one of the issues that european member states, while they are nato standards they each apply layer their national requirements onto those procurements, so, 13 different national varients, which respects supply chains, nato logistics, ability to mobilize and fight together. i was wondering how nato is approaching not just expanding the defense industrial bails and procurement, but also seeking to better align capabilities to sort of stepping on each other's feet. >> okay. and one more question there. >> all right. my name is greg morris, i'm a historian with the department of state. the question is, the u.s. withdrawal from afghanistan in 2022. what impact did it have with u.s. relations with other nato allies and was there an impact

here regarding intelligence sharing in the months leadup to the start of the war in ukraine regarding u.s. intelligence sharing with allies? thank you. >> so on that question, you'll remember that i mentioned that i was confirmed in late november of 2021. so i actually was here at the state department serving as a senior advisor to secretary blinken throughout most of 2021. i was not inside the nato alliance at the time during the withdrawal from afghanistan and i feel like i'm probably not the best person positioned to talk about that. on the question of fragmenttation across europe's industrial base and the associated challenges that we're seeing as a result of

underinvestment over many decades, i mean, this is a challenge that nato is going to have to work on very closely with the european union and we were pleased to see the european union recently roll out a european defense industrial strategy. it's a very interesting piece of work that clearly, very clearly articulates the challenges that europe faces for the foreseeable future when it comes to building up its defense industrial base and getting at duplication, some of the challenges, the fragmenttation, that were mentioned by the individual that asked the question. we do, however, want to ensure that as of european union thinks about taking on a variety of new initiatives to build out defense production and build capacity, that it relies on nato's standards. the last thing we want to see

is for the european union to establish its own set of standards. we would then have situations where countries are looking at their own national standards and requirements, they're looking at what nato is deliver mandated through nato membership and a new aspect with it, for the european union potentially putting a different set of standards. the european union is reassuring us they would rely on the standards and we want to keep it that way and encourage our friends in the european union at least in the short-term as they look and address the shortfalls that we address at the top that it continues to look at noneu member states for ways to backfill. now, i understand why the european union wants to focus on eu members and building up their defense industrial base in europe, but we have to work together. we have to find ways to

aggregate demand. we have to look at multinational solutions that will help us produce faster and get more for ourselves and into the hands of our friends in ukraine. >> well, thank you. i've got a list of more questions, but we are running out of time. so, we will have to save them for the run-up to the nato summit or something like that. but i thank you for spending all of this time both in your prepared remarks and your very candid answers here and i hope that we've given the-- a good startoff for what looks like a really promising and interesting day. >> thank you very much, david and thanks to all of you for coming out this morning. thanks to georgetown university and i hope the rest of the day goes well. thank you.

[applause]. we ask the audience to kindly remain in your seat as the speakers make their way out. and in the meantime, if you've not done so already, please submit your question for the afternoon with the general supreme court allied commander europe, use the qr codes displayed to your left and right. we'll give you a moment to do so. we are now going to take a short break. as a reminder, bathrooms are located outside gaston on the first and fourth floor of healy hall. for those of us virtually, we'll return at 9:45 with our first panel. thank you. [inaudible conversations]

[inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations]

>> this discussion commemorating the 75th anniversary of nato, taking a short break here, for security studies here in washington d.c. is hosting the event. live coverage on c-span2. >> we do have three very special announcements, first, during this anniversary year the u.s. mission will be renaming its executive conference room after madeleine albright, our 64th secretary of state. [applause] many of you knew her, i know you did, and the first woman to ever serve in that role in the united states. now, as many of you know,

secretary albright played a crucial role in advocating for nato enlargement, leading to the inclusion of several central and eastern european countries. she also championed nato's involvement in conflict resolution and peacekeeping efforts, particularly during the balkan wars of the 1990's. albright's diplomatic finesse and strategy vision strengthened nato's role as transatlantic security operation and it's so fit that go we honor her tonight, particularly with so many of my u.s. colleagues here that had a very close and special relationship with secretary albright, including secretary blinken and former colleagues, brian, suzie george among others. second, aid like to draw your attention to a very unique item that we borrowed from the nato archives and this one might

surprise you a little bit. nato's first cookbook, yes, that's right, cookbook, you heard me directly, titled "the best of taste", published in 1957 by the supreme court allied commander atlantic officers' wives club. the book highlights recipes representing the 15 allies that we had at the time. now, dwight d. eisenhower, by that time the president of the united states, submitted his favorite recipe, old-fashioned beef stew. now, in that spirit, we've prepared a wonderful menu for you tonight, but it does not include beef stew so rest assured. but what we did do tonight with the menu is we have created an array of very distinct dishes featuring the specialties and the special food of each of nato's 12 founding members.

so you'll see trays passing tonight with flags on them denoting which country that particular dish is from. finally, and this is what i'm really most excited about, i'd like to introduce our special guest of honor beyond the two gentlemen sitting to my left and right, standing to my left and right. our special guest of honor this evening, harry s truman himself immortalized in bronze for his namesake home in commemoration of nato's 75th anniversary. the eight-foot statue created by artist tom corbin is a generous gift from the truman library institute and i'd like to thank our guests from the institute here tonight and also recognize clifton truman daniel, president truman's eldest grandson.

[applause] >> after tonight's event, president truman will be displayed permanently under the pergola in the garden behind us for residents of truman hall to commemorate for years to come. would you unveil our guest of honor? [applause] >> and now, without further ado, it is my pleasure and honor to introduce secretary of state, tony blinken to share a few words with us on this very special occasion. >> thank you. [applause] >> thank you very much, thank you, friends. very hard act to follow, but it's so wonderful to see and we're looking forward to president truman's permanent

placement shortly after this evening. so, first, welcome, everyone, and julie, thank you so much for welcoming us to your very humble home. [laughter] >> i know you've been complaining for a long time there's just not a lot of elbow room here and we can all see what you mean by it. julie arrived just months before putin launched his full scale invasion of ukraine. the fact that the ahas not only weathered this crisis, but emerged bigger, stronger, more united than ever, is in no small part because of ambassador smith's leadership. there's no one i would rather have, and more important, the president would rather have representing the united states in this place at this time than julie smith. thank you. [applause] similarly, i think

all of my colleagues united in believing this, for the united states, for all of the members of nato, none of us could have hoped for a greater champion for this alliance than this, no one could have done a better job holding us together when others were trying to divide us, no one could have done a better job carrying the alliance before it. and we've said it different ways in different times, but always bears repeating, we're grateful for your leadership. thank you. [applause] >> i also want to thank of the those members the work you do every single day with your teams to really move forward

with the work of the alliance. none of this happens by itself. none of this is automatic. it's because of the day in, day out work that you're doing to lead the alliance forward. now, i am really pleased that we're here when we're renaming the conference room for nato for secretary albright. she was for many of us, a real mentor, as well as a friend, a supporter, an incredible counselor. i think we all miss her every single day, but we're also animated by her spirit, her determination, and in many ways, animated by her vision of what the united states can be, should be, as well as what this alliance can be and should be. this would be her kind of night. she loved nato and she made a huge contribution to it.

almost exactly 25 years ago. across the atlantic at the truman library in missouri, madeleine formally welcomed poland, the czech republic and hungary into the alliance and quoted an old european expression to mark the moment, hallelujah. that drew the alliance to 19 members. of course, today we're 32. at the time madeleine and her counterparts were looking forward to another washington summit, the one marking the 50th anniversary of our alliance. she reminded the audience that day, nato strength depends on its unity and she warned, and i quote her, we know that when the democracies of europe and america are divided crevasses are created through which forces of evil and forces of aggression may emerge, but when we stand together, there is no force on earth more powerful than our solidarity on behalf of freedom.

madeleine understood this because she lived it personally. as a small child, her family had been driven from their home, not once but twice, first by the nazis and then the communists before finding refuge in the united kingdom and then in the united states. someone else understood this profoundly, harry s truman. he understood on a personal level what can happen when we allow the forces of evil, the forces of aggression to spread. when the united states entered world war i, he rejoined the u.s. national guard and he was put in command of an artillery unit that saw brutal combat in france. he later wrote this, i know the strain, the mud, the misery of the soldier in the field and i know, too, his and you can add today, her, courage. that experience left truman, along with generations of men and women who survived the two

world wars, determined that history would not repeat itself. harry truman believed the best way, maybe the only way, to ensure that was to bind america's fate to that of other nations who shared our values for all to commit to defending one another's territory as if it were their own. now, those of us here today in some ways may take that for granted now after 7 #-- 75 years. this was a radical belief and also untested one. in some ways, it's easy to assume that nato's success was somehow preordained. it wasn't. it required that the 12 founding members of the alliance and those who came after, not only to build the foundations of these, but to keep fortifying and adapting the foundations as new challenges emerged. challenges that the founder of nato couldn't possibly forsee and for three quarters of a

century, that's exactly what our alliance has done. that's how nato helped prevent the iron curtain from undeveloping the free nations of western europe. how it helped divert war at with the soviet union and helped newly independent nations walk the path to democracy. for those achievements, and so many others, we are indebted to the millions of soldiers, sailors, aviators, whose courage, and willingness to put their lives on the line had given weight to our sacred commitment to defend one another. we're also indebted to the leaders and diplomates who shaped the alliance over these 75 years, not just those who were present at the creation, but also those present at nato's many re-creations over subsequent decades, their collective service have given people on both sides of the ocean that joins us a rare and invaluable gift, unprecedented security.

and yet, even as we meet here this evening, that security together with the alliance's core principles, the democracy of liberty, the rule of law, this is once again being challenged, challenged by those who believe that might makes right and those who would seek to redraw the borders by force. and of course, we know many new challenges have emerged, again, ones that the founders of nato could not have possibly foreseen. challenges unimaginable to nato's ar architects and the alliance is meeting these threats as they always have by adapting together. over the past three years, we've enhanced our deterrents, we've reen forced our eastern flanks, ramped up the industrial capacity, launched a new strategic concept and welcomeded two exceptionally capable new members. all work that our leaders will

carry forward at washington summit in july. but even as our alliance changes, even as it evolves, its purpose remains enduring. ours is a defensive alliance. it's never had and it will never have designs on the territory of any other country. as truman said at the founding, the purpose of this defensive alliance is to allow us to get on with the real business of life, the real business of government, the real business of society, achieving a fuller and happier life for all of our citizens. in that way, the true measure of nato success is not merely the enemies that it's deterred or the territory it's defended, but all the ways our citizens have used their security, used their freedom, to improve their lives in tangible ways. no wonder that democracies continue to make great sacrifices to join this alliance. no wonder nations far beyond

the transatlantic region, including dozens represented here this evening, are striving to deepen their partnerships with nato. so, as we celebrate this extraordinary alliance, let's not lose sight of why we created it. or why it has endured these 75 years and let's recommit ourselves to shoring up the foundations of peace, as well as anticipating new and emerging threats. finally, let us together protect all we've built in 75 years. >> welcome back, everyone, if you don't mind taking your seats, we'll get started in just a moment. [inaudible conversations]

>> we're pleased to introduce our first panel of the day, 75, looking back. and joining us in conference with leo michelle moderating the discussion. dr. colburn at duke university and historian specializing in transatlantic relations, she's the author of euro missiles, professor heidi hart professor of political science at california irving, and international affairs fellowship. she's an expert in european security and defense and the author of two books published by oxford university press, nato's lessons in crisis, institutional member in international organization and time to react, the efficiency

of the international organizations in crisis response. professor renning is professor for research at the faculty of business and social sciences at the university of southern denmark, the author of several books on nato, including one published just this month by yale university press titled "nato from cold war to ukraine, a history of the world's most powerful alliance", and finally, leo michelle is with the institute of international affairs for security and strategy. he served in the u.s. government for 35 years in a variety of roles, including as a policy advisor for arms control and nato issues in the office of the secretary of defense. please join me in welcoming the panel. [applause] >> welcome. >> thank you very much. when mark twain, the humorist

and essayist was asked by a reporter about rumors of his failing health, twain famously answered, reports of my death have been greatly exaggerated and i think that nato officials can certainly empathize with twain's reaction because over the past 75 years nato has had to navigate many serious tensions among its members. some of these were rooted in differences inside nato, about, for example, nuclear strategy, the alliance structure and its operations and others flowed from disagreements over policies of or actions by one or more allies outside in regions or on issues outside of nato's purview and just to give you a flavor of some of these not so important disagreements,

during the 1950's, the allies were struggling over the questions of german re-armament and the succession into nato was the federal republic. the debate of the implications of a massive-- what was called the massive retaliation doctrine and that approach to nuclear strategy and very sharp divisions among washington, paris and london, during the 1956 suez crisis. the 1960's saw intense debates over the concepts of flexible response and very bitter and long lasting recriminations of france's withdrawal from the integrated military structure. in the 1970's, two nato allies, turkey and greece, nearly went to war over the cypress issue and the euro missiles affair of the 1980's brought to the surface long lasting tensions

and disagreements among allied governments. this was fed by massive public protest that at times seemed to post an existential threat to the alliance itself. but it's important, given that background, it's important to keep in mind that ultimately the alliance remains strong during and after the cold war because its members did not allow their differences ever to override their enduring shared interests and values and i think interesting values are both important, both are important to nato. of course, a lost has changed over the last 75 years so the question we have to ask is will the past with prologued and that's why we are going to have a two-part discussion, first sten and suzie will have more to say about the gold war and heidi will reflect on lessons

learned from nato's post-cold war experiences and as mentioned out of area operations. we'll then turn our attention to the current and future potential challenges facing the alliance and i have the clock here and i intend to reserve hopefully at least 30 minutes for questions from the audience. let me start with sten. congratulations on your recent book. as mentioned and it has been mentioned already, during the first two decades of the post-cold war period, nato's emphasis really did shift largely to crisis response and crisis management and counterterrorism in area of operations, but russia's full scale invasion of 2022 certainly has put deterrents and collective defense back at

the center of nato's priorities. so kind of looking over the cold war period, how has nato's approach to deterrents and collective defense during that cold war period influenced its structure, its assessments and its policies and actions today? basically, what's changed fundamentally and what's happened? >> thank you for that question. and let me, first of all, say what a pleasure it is to be here in georgetown today and to be on this panel with heidi and suzie. change in continuity, in a way to bracket about 30 years of cooperation and security and say now we're back and nato has come home, it's collective defense. it's true there are many parallels and one of the parallels i like drawing on is

back in the '80s we used to say that the europeans would say you're so lucky, america, you have president reagan, you have bob hope, you have johnny cash and europeans would say we have our heads of government, but we have no hope and no cash. and here we go again. and so there are many parallels, defense forward, reinforcements, group of commissions for the nuclear deterrents. manage the central front and the flanks, manage the threshold and threats from the adversary, soviet union and russia. and essentially manage escalation. all of this is back, but i would put my emphasis on this continuity. and this has to do with the fact that for those 30 years of

crisis management and cooperative security, the muscle memory in nato of collective defense went away and four structures became much smaller, much lighter. they were deployed out of area, and then especially to afghanistan, and nato was not set up to defend itself. it was no longer a collective defense organization in capacity. of course, in name, it was. and now that it's reinventing that collective defense capacity they've gone from 16 allies in 1990 to 32. there's a war going on, which was not the case back then. there's limited defense. europeans are waking up to the demands of not only mobilizing for defense in the middle of germany, but further east.

the logistical challenge is so much greater and the 30 years of cooperative security with russia meant that in large, nato did not move western forces or military infrastructure eastward. there was nothing there, exis september the-- of course, the military forces of the new allies, limited as it was, all of that has to be invented. and there's a very poor connection between conventional defense today and nuclear deterrence. it was a weapon of last resort and strategic thinking during the cold war where you had, again, a theory of escalation that may have been imperfect and controversial, but at least, it was a coherent theory. today, there is really no theory and they're having to invent that as we heard ambassador smith say in slightly different words.

all of this has to happen in an alliance that's more complex, not only 32 allies, but there's so much else going on the alliance. there's the southern flank, which is about terrorism, and if anything has caused a lot of headache in nato in the 2010's, it's really not crimea in 2014 annexation, it's the civil war in syria and how that estranged turkey, the u.s. and france and left president macron to say that nato had become brain dead. that -- that was syria, that was not russia. so the southern flank is a lot more than during the cold war and then on top of that, china now in the strategic concept answer again, we heard ambassador smith say that, emphasize this, and the need, therefore, to develop partnerships with the key u.s. allies in the indo-pacific.

and that was a frame work around u.s. allies and elsewhere. all of this at a time when russia is conducting major war in europe. so the complexity compared to the cold war is much greater. the muscle memory is low to nonexistent and the need for leadership is therefore, much greater. and when i say leadership, i don't just mean in the high pace of summit that nato has come to depend on. i think there's a limited amount of leadership in those summits. when i say leadership, i mean clear priorities for how nato is going to manage this very complex agenda. it cannot address all of these issues and say, now, that's leadership. it has to prioritize. and that's a work in progress. >> well, you mentioned the nuclear subject and let me turn

to suzie. nato, of course, does not own nuclear weapons. it's the weapons of the three nuclear allies, the united states, france, and the u.k. that formed the basis for the nato strategy. the goals of nato's early nuclear policy which were to deter aggression and nuclear allies did not fundamentally change during the cold war, but the strategic balance has changed during that time and nato had to make important, sometimes very painful adjustments. you've chronicled some of these in your excellent book which i'd recommend to our audience here under your missile saga of the 1970's and the 1980's. it's a long and complicated subject, but i'd like to ask you if you could describe the key considerations, that shaped nato's nuclear posture and its

policies during the cold war, and how those have evolved during the first 20 years or so of the post cold war period. >> yeah, it's-- so when you think about nato's nuclear posture, and we start from these two principles. the core objectives on one hand of deturing aggression in the north act streety area and then as a compliment to that, providing reassurance to each and every significant tri of the treaty regardless of their size or geographic location and when we put it in those terms, it's simple, except that the geography of the treaty area is hard to defend. ...

>> now, what those two components mean in deterring aggression and providing reassurance change and evolve over time. in part that's because the landscape changes. you have changes in nuclear weapons technology, , and capabilities as well as in the threat perception particularly of the soviet union and then of course its core success of the russian federation after 1991. and so the alliance as in so many places needs to adapt. there are a few different areas or in key themes we might pull out in nato's nuclear posture over the years. the first being changes in doctrine and strategy here so at the time of the signing of the

north atlantic treaty in april 1949 the united states is the only nuclear power on the planet. that changes only a few months later when the soviet union detonates its first atomic weapon and, of course, that's a very different landscape if you think about how you deter aggression or provide reassurance than ones with the use nuclear met. by the early 1950s nato decided to rely heavily on nuclear weapons including stationing u.s. battlefield weapons in europe and relied on a strategy leo refer to of retaliation. essential you going to go from zero to 60 very quickly. throughout the the 1950s, te 1960s the viability of that massive retaliation strategy was heavily debated and contested as many allies wondered whether the changing strategic balance between the soviet union and the united states, the change of weaponry meant that massive retaliation would really protect

them. by 1967 the lights had adopted a new strategy of flexible response based on the principles of escalation. they use all these hokey metaphors to describe it, , a ladder with various wrongs, a chain with various links connecting it. my favorite british system, a a robe, seamless robe of deterrence. there were no snags within it. at the end of the cold war, the alliance's nuclear posture changed dramatically and was considerably reduced given changes in the overall threat prevention cups of significant cuts to nuclear weapons at nato across fidgety weaponry down the battlefield weaponry but also a move treaty nuclear weapons as weapons of last resort come something that is still lingering in nato's nuclear posture today. so through all these changes and

doctor strategy that's only one piece of the posture puzzle. another is about reassurance. and reassurance is not easily calculated. it is in the eye of the beholder and ever-changing, and data lines of large and unwieldy as nato you have a lot of actors with different perceptions of what will, in fact, reassure them. so nato's nuclear posture is shaped by a series of proposals, successful and failed over the years to share control and ensure greater input in the alliance about what weapons would be fielded, , where they would be deployed and, of course, how and when they might be used. i could point to the atomic stockpile proposals of the late 1950s or the multilateral force and atlantic nuclear force proposals that failed in the early 1960s. instead, the alliance decided to great a committee of nuclear piney group, or in pg, which is still with us.

and instead move towards other forms of reassurance. so we could take him for example, the station of u.s. weapons in europe in early 1980s like the contentious -- the other piece i would like is that arms control has played a central role in nato's nuclear posture. in large part to signal allies intentions. and often it has relied on a paired approach with their modernize or feel new weapons also propose arms-control talks alongside that to manage the cost of those deployments. that's really drawing on a broader principle an ally to thinking that as long roots but was enshrined in the report in 1967, pairing dialogue and defense. and so it's this approach that forms the basis of the 1979 dual track decision which calls for the deployment of those i mentioned a second ago. as a concluding note i would say

i focused primarily on the cold war. like because nuclear posture so much less than born in the post-cold war period. it's centrally the alliance receives considerably in the 1990s. i think this something we are grappling with no sort of nuclear weapons and nuclear questions, the theory of deterrence is back to work i did forget how much, much of the old cold war context can and should inform the conversations today. >> we will come back and a second round here about looking ahead to some of the nuclear challenges. id mentioned this period -- heidi -- since the end of the cold war up until arguably two years ago with the russian full-scale invasion of ukraine. there's been this parentheses were nato is focused are heavily

on out of area operations, just remind everyone bostick a complaint in kosovo, serbia and libya, and stabilization and training efforts in afghanistan. one could add training into iraqi security forces. just to remind you, we all suffer a little bit from amnesia here, at its high point the nato-led operation in afghanistan included approximately a little bit more than 130,000 military personnel. 90,000 of whom were american, and 40,000 from allies and partners. 30,000 strictly from allies, canada and the europeans. and the were at one time were six of our nato allies that suffered per capita more killed

and wounded in action. not to minimize the contributions and sacrifices of the american forces, but we shouldn't forget that bravery and also the losses were not a monopoly of the united states during this, what was a very long war. i think it is fair to say felt that is operations had mixed results. and you have written a book trying to look at how nato in about trying to learn from these operational experiences. let's start with the question did the allies even agree on where the mitchard teaching errors? or what they accomplished through these operations? one of which of course is ongoing and that nato presence

in kosovo. although much reduce since the postwar period. >> thank you again for the opportunity to be here to speak. to this point about learning, one of the things that was quite surprising for me in doing the research on learning in nato context was nato actually relative to other international organizations that are out there does have quite significant institutionalization. you do have a lot of different offices. you have multiple places within the organizations bureaucracy for opportunities to learn here and entire nato lesson process but what a surprise about that was despite of course a strong military culture in this political military alliance is that so much of the learning happens in the corridors in the informal spaces, and that there

was actually, despite i think interviewed 120 officials across the alliance in act, aco, nato headquarters, et cetera, was that much of that learning was through these interpersonal networks and relying heavily on old-timers, many of whom as we've heard earlier have retired, sten mention come at a rotating out. old-timers who are becoming suddenly very important for the knowledge that they have as the so-called cold war warriors. what does that mean? well, that means that learning still matters. the advantage of having lessons learned processes is that it encourages people to think and talk about learning. i think one of the big takeaways is we should maintain these bureaucratic structures, but, unfortunately, we see a large reticence to seek out and read

the state. so to answer your question yes, there is consensus. yes, there have been numerous strategic lessons that have been put out. i think much of the value i would say is in some of the internal documents. i would just that i'm speaking of my personal capacity since i work for the state department, nato desk at the time of the ukraine war, but that in itself is very important. having and creating spaces for learning to happen, even though you have extreme time pressure and nato has a quite significant reactive culture to maybe reference what you were mentioning. what are some of those lessons they came away from my research? so first of all when we think about afghanistan in particular, one of the questions that i asked was what do you think in anything all of these officials is a biggest strategical,, biggest failure that we should

reflect on? and typically this is done before the taliban took over. this is several years back. but the key take away was civilian casualty, , that we wod address that the importance of civilian casualties. what's interesting about that is subsequently we've seen scholarly research that is come out to show that on a subnational level scholars have been able to trace how specific incidences of violence against civilians then has translated to higher rates of radicalization in those areas within afghanistan. so certainly we do start from the premise of sabina casualties matter for clear moral reasons. i would say additionally civilian casualties matter for operational effectiveness. and that was something that came out very clearly. i would very much implore anyone is continuing to work on nato today to not forget afghanistan.

there had been like us that these lessons learned processes pick some of them have been referenced by former assistant secretary general apiece in atlantic council joe would encourage industry. if you are interested i would encourage you to read by potential since there's countless, countless quotes of folks talk about his lessons from afghanistan. it also lessens from the libby operation. but that libya -- another issue is a cigar report. that is something that in interviewed folks very few people had interviewed has looked at those reports. >> explained the acronym. >> sorry. this is a think stands for special investigator general of afghanistan. >> yes. >> help me with the our, reports. summit can fact check the audit. basically this is, i should probably know, right? basically this is a special office that is set up for the

purpose of oversight of this afghanistan operation segar was specifically part of deity but was meant to have some independence so that it could exit oversight. so the rescinded individuals out of the field and try to do interviews. i interviewed folks myself and frustration that talked about about just getting lost along the way, try to get access to information. part of three why this is really relevant today is that just because nato spent two decades in afghanistan but also because we think about security assistance i were providing for ukraine, when we think about nato's continued presence in kosovo, a lot of those mistakes that were made on the ground for things that we can actually translate into these other out of area context. i would just say may be to conclude is that another key take away the came out from

nato's responding to crises more broadly survive researchers looked at crisis a kind of a broader context that we shouldn't underestimate, we shouldn't underestimate president putin's extensive at this point disinformation campaign and his broader desire as he stated for reunifying the soviet union. in the interviews i conducted at the time this was sort of shortly after crimea have happen, the annexation of crimea, and many of the new officials were really limiting the fact that russia's status as a nato parter had not shifted. that even strategy and thinking towards russia, there was some hesitance to shift that. maybe that speaks to some other broader issues about cohesion that nato is continued to do to struggle with today.

>> well, you've given me the perfect opening. i would like to reverse the order now and come back to you, heidi, to pick up on that. based on your research and some government extremes exe learned, what challenges pose the most serious problems do you see going forward to nato's cohesion? and of which is mention a couple. we have seen indications of democratic backsliding among some of the, small number, but still significant within nato's ranks here although nato leaders routinely emphasized the importance of protecting democratic values, what's called the rules-based international order. some bit of tension there. according to its strategic concept 2022, it's quite

interesting language that nato adopted, said nato quote cannot discount the possibility of an attack against our allies sovereignty and territorial integrity. i don't recall seeing that in previous strategic concepts. but the russian disinformation efforts that up and mentioned already a couple of times seem to, and these are aimed at undermining the credibility of article v and seating distrust among the allies and among government and among the public come this campaign seems to have intensified somewhat. and there could be other shocks, external shocks, to go eat in nato, and i'm thinking possibly some of the fallout from different perspectives on the ongoing conflict in gaza raven the security impacts of climate change -- in gaza. how can the political lines of 32 sovereign and independent

countries, what can nato do to better anticipate and tackle such diverse range of threats and some opportunities as well? >> one advantage of thinking about nato returning to collect a defense is we have really seen an emphasis on those core values. and so i would argue that in the aftermath, in the aftermath of the full-scale invasion of ukraine in 2022, we saw in domestic publics across the alliance solidarity as ambassador smith had referenced, complete support for not just the alliance but for ukraine and the blatant disregard of ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity.

so as a result on that piece i think we continue to see cohesion. on some of those democratic values. but i would argue on this issue of democratic backsliding this has always been an issue. i would say since the origins of the alliance. it's not something new. it doesn't mean we shouldn't take it seriously. we absently should but there have always been struggles in maintaining support for democratic institutions -- absolutely -- within some of the allies at any given time. what we had seen, when we think about this cohesion around maintaining support for ukraine, at this moment which is such a critical moment, is the concern about this domestic support, right? making reference to the public opinion polls, ambassador smith mention, over the decades there

has been strong public support for nato across the alliance. we had seen since 2014 if you look at the public opinion polls some partisanship slightly that even among conservatives still see a majority of conservatives here in the united states who are supportive of nato. but the concern links back to the disinformation campaign. so once they recently found, it was will get ten different allies and found that one quarter of respondents in those ten allies, including the u.s., cited nato as a cause of the korean war. and, of course, much of the russian disinformation campaign has been focused on linking -- the ukraine war -- linking nato to the ukraine and basically trying to focus on nato as like i said as a cause, and enlargement specific as a

justification for this full-scale invasion, despite the fact it's very important to point out of course that rush itself had sent multiple international agreements recognizing, acknowledging, legitimizing the sovereignty of ukraine. and so i would think in terms of some of those recommendations of how to confront some of these challenges, i mean at this point i think every high-level person in nato nato should be talt this issue. i think unfortunately it's really been underestimated within the alliance. i think the nato public diplomacy division is doing a fantastic job but needs to be more speaking up and really clarifying because there seems to be so much confusion. i've given several talks, council on foreign relations at different venues as i imagine many of the speaker on this panel have done, and there continues to be confusion and misinformation about what nato is, what it does, and how, how

this invasion of ukraine fundamentally threatened the broader collective defense that we're thinking about in protecting the alliance moving forward. also really rely relying ag back on those old-timers, those cold war warriors who have deep expertise, not just in terms of the knowledge that they bring to the table but also just their familiarity i would say with russia, the russian playbook. so thinking about the eastern allies, thinking about finland, these countries have really have that experience and the thinking oh, just because they are small allies acted have something to bring to the table. that is of real value. on some of the other challenges that you as what some of the of the challenges that nato is facing above and be on the clear threat that we are all talking about today russian aggression

against other eastern europeans, countries, is the existential threat of climate change, something working on right now. a lot of my research is focused on nato adaptation. how neat is changing over time. and so a co-author of my jackie burns and i interviewed 63 officials from across the lines to try to get a sense that why and how is nato adopting in ways that is to climate threats. i think it's important to point out as an existential threat, climate change is a threat to deterrents tickets also threat to nato's ability to be interoperable. so as was the individual allies that dispose be meeting these put a significant climate targets, they are moving and sometimes different directions at adopting different types of technologies. so how does that affect them to go back to the initial question, how does that affect nato's ability to be effective in its operations? can a british tv plug in in

estonia, for example? as a start think about bolstering the eastern flank. our nato defense plans, are these incorporating climate threats? our old plan sapping climate security, is that in the compass apart of the planning process? are climate threats part of tabletop exercises? are they built into wargames? these kind of things. i think there's still this challenge among many folks in the military in particular, this broader resistance to think about climate because of the stereotype of all, climate is kind of a tree hugger type phenomenon when in reality we can see a people living it every day the ways in which climate threats are compromising the ability of the alliance to really do its job. >> thank you. i think we were probably come back to this and i will

anticipate a question or so on that issue. susie, i want come back to the nuclear topic. of course in response to this increase in russian nuclear saber rattling as we call it, at least in part two russian modernization and changes in doctrine and deployments, nato summit declarations have become progressively more, progressively stronger i would say in their language describing the importance of deterrents for all of nuclear weapons, the important things like what we call nuclear sharing arrangements within the alliance. things like that. and allies, the u.s. and allies or do something about it. there are programs now to modernize the dual capable

aircraft, diploid why several allies. older you was gravity bombs in europe are being replaced by more modern reliable, effective weapons. nato has become more transparent fiscal in its nuclear related exercises and its new members finland and sweden are members of the nuclear planning group. looking ahead, do you see a stronger consensus on nato nuclear issues of the have on the past? and i mean, we have to be alert to possibilities something good happen to change that consensus. do you see risks to that consensus as well that we haven't mentioned so far? >> yeah. i think it's clear that nuclear weapons remain central to the alliance's posture, i do not need me to tell you that. ambassador smith told you that

already this morning. the strategic concept is explicit, that it is the nato defense the deterrents is based on a mix of nuclear, conventional missile defense along with adjacent cyber in space capability here but that doesn't get at this question, is it stronger? so i would say certainly in the wake of our -- in february 2022 we have seen more talk about nato's nuclear capabilities, more willingness to be explicit in terminology that as long as nuclear weapons exist in the world, nato will be a nuclear alliance. that may sound obvious but to even get such clear language is often hard in an alliance like nato. but just because the language is more explicit, the historian in me can't help but point out that doesn't mean it's stronger, per se. and so i would point to one

particular risk area that i see, which is the current consensus around nuclear weapons in the place in the lines but around i iolite defense in general is predicated on a fundamental target. never lies above all on u.s. leadership, u.s. capacity, and you was willingness to continue playing that role. it relies on the protection of the u.s. nuclear umbrella. editing the diplomatic thing we could say is that not every leader in the alliance of the 31 member countries looks at politicians in washington and assumes that that will last forever here and so that opens up the possibility or potential for proposals for other allies to consider how they might reduce or leave behind their reliance on the united states and on the american nuclear deterrence. i don't think it's a coincidence

we've seen talk of proposals that sounds suspiciously like things i write about any archives of 1963, around 19 cigie for as a european sharing scheme both conventional and even occasionally nuclear in nature. so nato is returning to the past, and investing on this old writ of deterrence, but i think any cursory review of nato's history during the cold war should be a pointed reminder that that nuclear posture was almost always contested. and it's because it is not based on firm, easily quantifiable and agreed-upon things. it's based primarily on emotions, psychology, perception, confidence, right? what i would bucket together as the studies stuff. and plenty of other issues be on the nuclear posture shape, that sense of confidence or whether

an ally is reassured. so in the 1970s, nuclear debates about whether or not the united states could be trusted or impacted by everything from the conduct of the vietnam war to jimmy carter's human rights policy. right? all of those things on how washington's allies understood the u.s. commitment to nato, and whether it was reliable. i think nato's history also remind us that sustained attention on the alliance's nuclear dimensions and nuclear capabilities can provide some degree of reassurance to public but it can also elicit broad concern about what a world with nuclear weapons looks like, right? if you look at nato's history during the cold war there are recurring episodes of antinuclear uprisings and we shouldn't assume that those are inherently relics of the cold war. we still live with nuclear

weapons. nuclear weapons can still do immense damage and we shouldn't be surprised if some people do not unquestionably show the logic of deterrence as the best way to preserve. if that consensus remains fragile today, i don't think that should surprise us, but rather they should be something we can see very clearly from the alliance's past. managing that consensus will require as it always has careful and ongoing calibration to adapt to new circumstances and use. that's something that's been true for seven decades and a think will be as we move forwar forward. >> sten, i want to come back to you as the european on our small panel here to talk about the secretive elephant in the room. and i'm going to be less diplomatic perhaps than our moderator, , david sanger, just remind the audience that in

february allies are a former president of the united states claim to uphold and allied leader, quote, you didn't pay, your delinquent, no, i would not protect you. in fact, i would encourage them, he's referring to russia, to do whatever the hell they want, end of quote. our allies have also witnessed his loyalists in congress dragged their feet on providing critical military assistance needed by ukraine. i know you can't speak for you but i'm going to ask you to take a stab at this anyway. what is the effect, from your perspective, of such statements and actions on european thinking about the credibility of u.s. commitments to nato? and can europeans, , up with ths in error quotes, trump proof the light as some have suggested in recent articles? >> so the worst thing with

nuclear issues, the political kind. there's no question that stoltenberg, general sector stoltenberg is try to trump proved the alights on ukraine. he is setting up a policy that will be durable whatever comes in november. however, the impact on european thinking i would say is considerable, and it is, it is unprecedented in history of the alliance. we have seen concerns with russian soviet behavior before and obviously rush is on the warpath. we have not seen this level of concern with the american commitment to europe. and come what may in november, could be trump, it could be biden, there's widespread sense that biden if he wins will be

the last truly trans-atlantic president of the united states. and trump is not just trump. it's about a political movement that is reached into congress, that has captured broad segment of the american population, and there's a sense that this is here to stay. however, it expresses itself in american politics, it's a fact and europeans will have to live with it. at a time when russian is trying to impose great lyrical change on europe by way of war. this is obviously shaking european politics in a big way. the most obvious example of how this has changed europe is a fact that finland brought themselves and sweden into nato. i would never have thought that it would happen my lifetime. i'm not that old.

this is, this is absolutely stunning, that finished president some was happening in russia and said this is a dangerous for me to get into nato -- finnish. and the fact that the swedes made in as well. something is really up. back in back in the '80s,i like the '80s, an american colleague wrote of european defense that it was sort of like room full of filing cabinets looking at each other. things are not that bad, but there's a lot to be done in order to see how europeans would react to this. let me just mention a few good things and delicate to some things i think i'm more worrisome. the good things is about the european unions defense policy has collapsed. and when i say that, i mean it

is being retooled. the older version which was very much about autonomy and crisis management and reaching out our area, it's clearly not the answer to the collective defense challenge that europe is facing. so there's a lot of energy being put in europe into retooling you instruments for collective defense at the defense industry level. and ambassador smith spoke to this. a lot of money is being put on the table. 80% of what the europeans are buying today is being fought in the united states. they want so 20% in europe. they want that to be 50% by 2030 am building up the defense industry because that is where capacities come from. more collaboration defense and

usher collaboration, more defense openness, more competition. you can say this is europe's pentagon moment. if all this works out, the defense industrial strategy of the eu, the u.s., europe will gain is sort of pentagon motor engine in european defense industry. that will be huge. we also see with the european peace fund, facilitate a skull, which is all about funding crisis management in north africa but it is to become a security assistance fund for ukraine. so collected defense is making its way into the eu, and the eu as i think working very well with nato on how this is going to play together. where i think the bad news sort of begins a little bit is this has to be translated into european capacity, operational

capacity, for defending themselves, ourselves. things are moving slowly. i said that earlier. there's a lot of defensemen in europe that will go towards meeting the native defense planning process capability targets for individual nations. and that is fine. that's good. that getting those targets to become an operational capacity, we don't have an answer to that yet. i am a member of a network of experts and we put out a statement on this, i can go into further depth on this, but moving from capability targets to operational capacity is europe's next challenge, conventionally. suzy mentioned europe and nuclear deterrence and how we're getting back to some sort of sharing scheme. i entirely agree.

something is going on a new creatures because that is ultimately how we guarantee each other's collective defense. and if the u.s. pulls out a little bit, a lot, entirely, someone is going to have to fill in that gap nuclear wise. of that debate is happening. and you saw president macron talk about french boots on the ground in ukraine. he did have in mind trans warfare for the french army. he had in mind putting a european nuclear power into the game. someone who russia cannot coerce by the threat of escalation because they have nuclear weapons. this is truly very important for europe, and the chairman's they know it. they know however much they build up conventionally, they will be coerced above all by russia because they can't go to

the nuclear level. who is going to have germany's back nuclear wise? that's a key question. that's emerging, rapidly emerging german debate. france has more nuclear weapons than britain, but they have no street reputation for protecting others nuclear wise. they do not extend their concerns. nor does britain, and they have fewer. how is this going to happen? that debate could work out well, and it could open europe for a competitive space on nuclear deterrence. and if i was poland, i would probably consider giving my own nuclear weapons if the u.s. pulled out. so it's a very dangerous situation. very important, very dangerous. let me finish off by saying trump. he is a phenomenon of north-south policies, and we have that in europe, too.

it's about immigration. it's about identity. it's about border, secure borders, and how you speak to popular concerns conces happening to our society. and europe's political center is as beleaguered as your political center. it's not holding very well. the fringes are mobilizing. there are all kinds of issues taking a stab at the political center. and the political centers are keeping the east-west axis against russia together. and so transformation,, conventional bilat, nuclear debates, with a political center that is not doing well here that's europe's condition. and so let me finish that by quoting donald trump. we would to see what happens.

>> touché. we have, i have broken a promise. i said maybe 30 minutes. we have fewer the net for questions, but i would invite members of the audience of questions, please. i which is say let's try to keep in brief mistake to at a time. -- and let's take two at a time. >> i am a european-american, belgian american i know brussels. that's where i grew up. i think the united states and its allies have not won a single war since world war ii. what makes you think you will win the next work against russia and china, considering that the

other wars were ruled against small nations? >> is there a second one? why don't we take a turn? who would like -- >> i think the answer to that question is, no one wants to fight a war with russia. they want to deter it. and we want deter by conventional defense. europe will be impenetrable. they cannot get in but even if they could and then there will be deterrence to punish that penetration. there's no desire to fight that war. the war with china is going to be economic and technological. hopefully. and more at the level between

dasher war at the level between russia nato, u.s. china is going to be so catastrophic that the parable to what went on in afghanistan iraq, libya, kosovo, it's just a different ballgame. and you would hope that deterrence works. >> i will just out on to that to say that there is an war underway, and that's an informational war. and that's one of these concerns, right, that we're talking about here is who is going to win that information war? and that's could help decide who the next president is here in this country. that's going to decide who is elected in terms of some of these governments in europe where as we heard the center is a little bit wobbly. and there's also a cybersecurity

war going on, right? as we heard earlier with ambassador smiths reference come every single day that are cyber attacks on nato, and allied governments by many of these large actors with whom we are talking about. and we hope as we just heard that we don't end up with a conventional or a nuclear war, and that deterrence works. >> anything, susie? >> heidi mentioned a few times information and the misinformation and disinformation landscape today and i think we are recalling an old problem. so yes, it is a key today, but the allied leaders of 1950 worried deeply about the popularity of damn the palm campaigns and popular sentiment

in terms of nuclear some rather than support for building up what became nato after north korea invaded south korea, right? there is a long tried-and-true information gain serenity alliance because leaders by merrily in moscow have known that kalish is one of the most valuable things for the alliance, and in an alliance of democracies turning public opinion against allies and publics against their governments is an easy source of leverage. so i think when you talk about having, talking to the old-timers, right, part of it is remembering our own histories. the alliance has a long history and it's not all good or instructive, but they can help us think through the challenges about previous generations of policymakers grappled with not always the same but similar problems over time. >> sir, please.

>> i.t. security studies at m.i.t. this is a great panel and especially appreciated the engagement with nuclear issues. i want to try to pressure a little harder on the nuclear deterrence question. i am an old dog and it worked on nato warsaw pact back in the day, and it was very clear that nato white up to the end rely very heavily on the threat of relatively early first use of nuclear weapons as a key part of its deterrent posture. and we threw everything but the kitchen sink at in terms of nuclear weapons. that's have got up to six 7000 warheads in europe. the allies were quite insistent that remain this way. we could not get them to buy more than 30 days worth of conventional stocks, to build a fight in the conventional or because they want the threat of nuclear escalation be front and

center. so i'm trying to come up to today and ask you to speculate a little bit on how this issue may play out. because as you have correctly said, in our narrative we talk about a fairly extended nonnuclear campaign. we rely very heavily on the nuclear shield i mean the nuclear shield is meant to come out very late if at all. is not clear to me at all whether countries heavily engaged with the implications for their conventional force planning, that this change has. right? nato forces are still stuck in the size and organization that they generated for the last 30 years. there are no reserves, and no

reserves of people. not just weapons but reserves of people. so this is a high hill to climb, and a wonder, this is future telling. how do you think this will play out as people really begin to engage with these issues which is like planning real capabilities? >> thank you. could we have a second question? i would ask, sorry, try to keep them briefed so we can get in at least a couple more here. i realize it's a complicated subject matter. >> thinking about strategic, perhaps a bit different. in 1970, i'm sorry, in 1989 i believe texaco purchased russian submarines and sold them to sweden. do we think there's any critical approaches leveraging private sector today, understanding capabilities of press not wanting to add to the shipyard

graveyards that we've seen accumulating in india, for example? is it really a build more capabilities question, or are we also looking at aging infrastructure across the board with all nato and u.s. structures and whatnot and there are also different guardrails that the u.s. and nato are subject to that india and israel i don't believe -- [inaudible] for example. >> since i've already broken one rule, let's break when were a let's just take the third question now and we will just cut it off at that point. please. >> first of all, thank you all for robbing you. dr. colbourn, i was in your international relations class, and about four years ago. i know you probably don't remember.

>> it's wonderful to see you get. >> my question is, given that how conflicts are shifted in the past decades, with now even nato getting involved in operation apparent resolve which is american blood operations in iraq and afghanistan, and the recently right now there's a greater focus of the trend to the more active role in the pacific. how do you see, question for the entire panel. how do you see nato adjusting to his commitments, that potential shift in military posture in the pacific with all the different conflict going on? does it make sense for an alliance that was built primarily for the defense of north america and europe to play a a greater collective securable in the pacific? and doesn't even make sense that we are kind of elevating all those non-nato allies that we have in asia, japan, south korea, australia, out of the state in the structure? thank you. >> can ask et to maybe take,

take a pic of questions are part of the questions? if you can keep your responses to say two minutes or so. then we'll have time for a closing. >> sure. so on your point abbasid this is really big concern, the concerned about reserves and the concern about people there and i would just point out the differences that you see in conscription. here in the united states we have the draft, but we now are in a voluntary armed forces. and even though the draft still exist in the form of young men signing up, this has not been opened up to young women even though it's been discussed numerous times in congress. so i would say that's a real concern. on the last question, i'm thinking that is a possible to be thinking about the asian

pacific region, and as u.s. priorities, uk priorities are shifting in that direction, does it still, should we still be thinking that nato has the presence and really has some meaning and some significant contributions to make it are very operations? and i was a yes. the greatest example of that is what's going on in kosovo. if you haven't been following this, nato for many decades now has had a presence in the form of a modest, a military operation of in kosovo. and so as tensions have been rising in recent years with several significant violent outbreaks, and there's been, nato has contributed more troops and boosted the troop presence of there. so i think in the same sense that we are now reflecting back on the consequences of the withdraw from afghanistan, thinking about what would it

look like with the complete shift away from some of the other operations that exist right now, is it worth the cost to maybe maintain that presence in kosovo, given that some of the conflicts are not 100% result? we talk a lot in political science about the post-conflict and questioning is a post-conflict really post-conflict, given that conflicts have a tendency to cycle back up. >> an excellent reminder. susie? >> i will take first nato's role in the indo-pacific and what their relationship looks like. there's always been tension in allied strategy about whether or not it's fundamental role was regional engagement or global engagement. in the 1950s one of the early pushes was for the duration of a global strategy. the british have made a similar push earlier in the 1950s. this question of is the treaty

area really the only place that nato should be operating, has a long history? i think we are seeing the latest phase of that but but i wouy there are lots of ways that nato can be engaged in shaping the strategic landscape in the indo-pacific without suddenly turning its attention away from europe to the indo-pacific. sigh think we can see that reflected in a lot of this investment partnerships with australia, new zealand and japan and the like but also thinking about what a stable europe means for the broader international study landscape. and so i don't think they are quite as much attention as often believe they are. on the question of deterrence and sort of future forecasting where we are going, the cold war history of the debate over deterrence give us so much contradiction to parse through. the prevailing european view was

yes, rapid escalation and nuclear weapons because it makes deterrence more credible and more likely to protect their homeland. when american planners talked about what that would look like to use those nuclear weapons, most of the same european said wait, wait, wait wait, i really don't like the range of those missiles you're planning to launch, you know, those 400 kilometers, that that strikes my neighbors house. the 1000 clobbers strikes my next-door, the country won over house. and so always a fundamental tension about theory and practice. i thought it was particularly telling this point that ambassador smith said that they were getting back their nuclear iq. so if i do hypothesize about where we're going, it's that when a lot of what has worked in the last 20 or 30 years is because people are not paying attention to it. and now that the relationship between conventional and nuclear

deterrence is back on the table in a real way, fundamentally converted in major ways from what it was during the cold war with much greater emphasis on conventional capability, when people start earning over those rocks i think people are going to find that assumptions underneath and are are very uncomfortable ones. and so i would speculate that we are due for a considerable round of probably very unpleasant debate about what is required and what the implications of that will mean because the fundamental geography of the alliance is the same. how things impact the vote in omaha, nebraska, is not how the impact summit in central poland. >> sten? >> well, thank you. on the indo-pacific, i think, and maybe that was impacted, maybe it was deliberate that you put in exactly the right terms. nato has collected coy role in the pacific, collective

security. that is talking to the key u.s. allies, getting them multilateral lies in a dialogue on technology, disinformation. but on collective fans, nato is and must remain euro-atlantic centric. it cannot by its makeup and its complexity, take on collective defense role in the indo-pacifi indo-pacific. it simply would not work. and the way the address china is about china coming to europe as stoltenberg said, and working the multilateral framework with these key u.s. allies in the region. i think this is a future for nato in the indo-pacific. an american colleague of mine said both russia and china are headline news, but russia is above the fold.

i didn't quite catch the private market question come so maybe we can discuss this in the break. on nuclear issues, i think we've seen the future, and that is allies will want to play out conventional defense in a way that is bigger than during the cold war. and it's true that during the cold war the europeans wanted to accelerate escalation to get the u.s. involved. the u.s. sought to delay escalation beyond the conventional, so to not be involving nuclear weapon level. that was then. now, nato is at the point where they're really building up defense so they're very careful to say defense and deterrence. and we see the planes come out of the past two years, defense planning, 300,000 reaction groups, from my defense, et

cetera. it's all about not pushing nuclear issues to the forefront. why not? one issue is that in europe, as in the united states i guess but he knew the europeans seem a bit better here, we have been through a couple of decades of hopefulness that perhaps nuclear weapons would go away. the abolitionist movement, president obama's global zero, public opinion has not come back to embrace a nuclear deterrence is something that is beautiful and nice. and the political center i talked about that is not solid in any case is not about to go more solid if they embrace nuclear deterrence against their own population. so there's a great big gap between with a population is on nuclear deterrence and with the political center is.

.. intermediary. it's off the table because i. everything for russia is dietrich so escalation is much for unpredictable about is a challenge for eight months while

they were the a lot maintain considerable defense department but the conversation is to be held. this afternoon there will be a continuation of this topic. we have to call this torment, i think it's been very rich but a couple things have been mentioned. a couple personal reflections, neither nato excessive nor

strong comments were great ordained. come to the conclusion people make policy. hopefully with a combination of foresight in history, important values and ability and will continue to meet those men and women nato affairs so this is mainly directed in the audience. i saw with him a few hours canadian and early zero five

foot first time in history and came back to washington and was quickly approved, meant something. not only to protect our airspace put the responsibilities around the world and the efforts to afghanistan. in those areas were nader was not prepared to act as an organization, make no mistake, everything was done for decades, exercising and training was

vital for the performance of paramilitaries. without together. another example, i spent a lot of time working with both and it's remarkable. what's remarkable is how quickly those two countries partly members and we applied at the same time in may of 2022 look at the shortest lapse of time but as of last month, and smell a

member. ministry of defense month they make their countries more interoperable to make mark aware of what made our best and look at the old mets and work and receive the benefits i hope students me audience income for role-play have to play" an american mark bring, it's fitting closed by remembering a little-known european expert, sir mick jagger athletic i think of him because interest

organization, some think he's saying you can't always get what you want but if you try real hard, he might get what you need. please join me in thanking the panel. [applause] >> thank you for your valuable insight confirm and shape the future. we ask the audience remained in their seats. i quick reminder this is a good time to submit questions.

we will resume programming at 11:15 a.m. our second panel virtual for. thank you. >> this discussion commemorating 75th anniversary of nato, first university center for security washington d.c. hosting the event. live coverage on spent two. [applause]

record morning coming out early on monday morning and thank you for the lovely introduction. it is a real pleasure and honor are looking for richard questions a few minutes. three quarters of a century nato has been a cornerstone of peace and security uniting nations in a collective commitment are shared values. nato's success story is remarkable and is one by no means preordained. in 202475 years after product

the alliances bigger, stronger and more united into speaks to the alliances adaptability nato's resilience but that commitment and urgent soldiers and sailors and aviators that operate under the nato umbrella but the attractiveness of core values, individual liberty as a rule of off. i have enough time to go through all of nan nato's achievements over the last seven decades but there are seven decades, but a superb conference in a series of discussions and i congratulate but i want to walk us through all that has happened inside the

nato alliance the last two years russia launched unprovoked war of russia ukraine. these last two years have been transformative and i don't use that word lightly. i don't think there's a better word to describe the war started and they showcased time and time again innovation so let me walk you through five big changes just in the last two years. after many years focusing on expeditionary operations during the 1990s operations your life has come home and return to collective defense and taken a series of dramatic steps to

enhance deterrence. before the war even started nato allies were moving or if posture and eastern europe. nato just a few months after the war started announced for new battalions look like prepared with simple owned right after russia wanted to crimea in 2014. last year the alliance rolled out new regional plans to provide clarity to all allies in terms of was required to protect every inch of nato territory. we are working on a new command-and-control structure the military exercise with 90000

not enable us to exercise north american troops across the atlantic to europe to defend the territory. coming home first to enhance deterrence. second, for ensuring increased significantly in recent years you remember 2014 all allies such 2% of gdp on their own national defense. when we started ten years ago we had three countries in the alliance and by last count we don't know where we are going to end up by the end of the calendar year but we have 20

allies with the 2% pledge. it's a significant increase over a decade, of course we want to be all 32. the last two years particularly bright countries like germany but an extra 100 billing euros into speaks volumes where we are it's not just 2% of gdp, but ensuring access to the question of ukraine and we are seeing remarkable level of burden sharing across the alliance.

round 110 billion and ukraine. i remember of the alliance providing assistance to your grade. humanitarian burden sharing is something tremendous positive shift over the last two years. there was a knock at the door and to countries that had hundreds of years decided to ship their policy and request nato membership. ninety-two years but immediately, they wanted to start immediately and an official member last spring and has taken a seat at the table a

couple weeks ago and they are making meaningful contributions to the alliance every day. a new strategic concept in 2022, nato rewrites the conflict is about this concept in addition to the alliances russia and terrorism much of the prc challenges associated in the friends from indo-pacific. the members in the indo pacific, that's not the plan and they

don't have an interest.ur next i will discuss nato, our first panelist is nato. joining him doctor heather williams and professor stephen flanigan will be monitoring. nato assistant secretary general or defense policy and planning through september of 2022. please the team responsible for the alliances capability for

planning, posture, plans and policy questions including clear issue. over 30 years as a diplomat to the united kingdom. deputy director os w and head of the security. regional and european security in northern and central europe and written about nato's defense deterrence posture. doctor heather williams is director of nuclear issues and senior fellow international security program and an associate fellowhe harvard kennedy school in the program at mit. control, deterrent and king's

college in london and served as a specialist advisor into the proliferation treaty. i don't senior fellow and adjunct professor of security studies at georgetown university. senior director defense policy and strategy and previously for central and eastern europe national security council staff. numerous book reports and commentaries international security. please join me in welcoming the panelist to the stage. [applause] >> it's a pleasure to be here

and having a chance to delve into the issues explored a little bit in the first panel now will get a bit more into defense. elsa to stage and in short each of our panelists. the consensus on the appropriate size and strategy for equitable sharing and strategic risks has been an enduring talent and realization of nato deterrence of defense policy to be heard already. it became clear ambitions goals

set at the 1952 meeting that was never going to be achieved so nato shifted to greater reliance on nuclear defense on u.s. strategic forces and moving to retaliation in the 50s which envisioned or sustained conventional forces preserving ambiguity. we heard in the first panel strong opposition in many countries to the 1979 decision

deploying nuclear weapons in europe for new capabilities and strengthened u.s. strategic deterrence to improve capabilities nato launched long-term defense program 1979 to mitigate negative shifts but the soviet union exporting emerging technology. while few allies but the goal to realize the program nato continued deterrence. after the cold war territory became last urgent and the focus of military effort shifted to

peacekeeping and counterinsurgency operation. nato undertook steps to ensure vulnerable allies and develop his presence. his 2022, nato has taken steps to strengthen the eastern part of the alliance and other elements strategy and military posture and added this today. allies are seeking way to expand cooperation in both areas. we've asked our panelists to

discuss next steps to sustain what nato calls deterrence and defense. we are very fortunate to have three speakers to address these issues and i will turn to them sequence and in each of their expertise. would you provide the audience an overview and military posture advancing nato summits tried to hug to the deterrence.

>> it's a real pleasure to be here and i think you're right there's something quite profound happening and has been for a couple of years focused on building regional security now back to putting that at the heart. >> the overall approach on the primary goal is to make sure there isn't an attack and we have been pretty successful but there is a recognition that the scale of the challenge and

brushing objectives, we can't take it for granted. the best way to achieve it, we would when importing that back at the heart of nato and what is happening at the moment. we are conscious that we have to think of this we have to manage deter but is stopped short in this and then we have to be ready and be able to win a

conventional attack and we have to be ready to maintain nuclear weapons and a strategic effect and how they interact with it's about convincing them that you can exploit. the professing that's happening, the alliance of national defenses so we have war plans and teaching plans and approve

the end open conflict and you will hear this afternoon to follow through the logic of the plan what they are doing and how and it is quite transformative. there's a lot in terms of the headquarters and norfolk virginia and northern europe.

this is the core of my job and allies are much more transparent and her pretty good idea over the next couple of years and a couple of areas will need target first at long range and let it move things around. we still need the ability to

bring land forces together we have a pretty big area. there is no recognition and's are changing now. but i hope the numbers will keep rising and they were not spending that much and all that will take time and you need

industrial capacity. i am quite optimistic moving in that direction. sometimes people underestimate reset but the organizational structures and funny and getting people to understand and what it means. not just frontline countries but also where areas so it's really exciting time.

>> thank you very much for a good segue even where you work in both, would you share insights from your work and requirements of deterrence by then i'll. >> nato's conventional defense

that will go back in time and crimea that question defense is that it took quite a long time and poland a lot it is the only nato military and at the same time battle groups more than

1000 troops. overall it still is poland's 1000 outcome of the compromise in 2014 when the county got in the new member states of the alliance but not only a nato response to his army nato was

created quarters all of it is limited by poland and this was reversed after 2022 on ukraine for more battle groups and

reinforcing these battle groups, a very important exchange but still not sufficient on the opinion of many but they were set up over the panel as well as training nato so very important changes adding to that.

in exercising across the northeastern plank. i have done, not yet, maybe we are heading toward this goal allies are capable but it does not mean it does not work. it does.

and that conventional very much on the elements in this plank and the potential conflict in

the defense on the page of national european investments in the state of transatlantic relation. all in all having in mind politically within the alliance and in the coming years on the baltic states and armed forces with nato weapons for the alliance, or them not to respond

going to nuclear escalation conventional deterrence, more elements working and making progress and important defense is necessary. >> we would like to come back to the question about these capabilities if you let nicely and talking about deterrent posture backed up by the guaranty nuclear capability to other allies that helped so want to ask, how do you assess the direction of the dimension of the alliance including steps

taken or should be taken to ensure strategic nuclear capabilities secure steps taken over the last couple of years? >> thank you for the invitation, honor to be on the panel. want to start off by pointing out fundamentals because i think they will that direction. as long as nuclear weapons exist, it will remain unbiased. it's worth pointing out nuclear capabilities, any sharing arrangements, those are getting a lot of attention, the nuclear posture united kingdom and france and the other factor we will going is nato has

consistently said they remain committed to arms control, nonproliferation and those are priorities that will have to work together to shape the direction the alliance goes on so there's a couple of indicators on these issues, clearly an effort by allies to strengthen allies. we learned deterrence issues and better understanding and extended care deterrence. the other direction we are seeing is the unity from my

perspective, there are two big factors that will shape the direction which is obviously russia particularly the question is how much they will rely on it going forward. russian forces have not performed particularly low but it isn't just about national performance, it's about investments to rebuild original forces, that is not a turnaround profit. while they do that we anticipate the shift also anticipate russia

continues it is underpinned the invasion. it has been insisted. this is a key part of that and i'm glad that came up so much in the previous panel. what is really important the impact of the thing that we are all obsessed with it and talking about. are they allies thinking about future competition? it seems like it has started and evolving for the way allies engage will be significant impact on nuclear posture. for example the u.s. conventional forces are divided, what is it mean for alex?

i think the direction traveled really is actively and seems to be what mayor wants in this posture. there's a couple of options that i think could contribute my just putting out there on the first would be supplemental new nuclear capabilities so the most obvious cruise missile or other regional capabilities. another option would be another important nuclear actor, the uk. if the uk wanted to add a big boat pretty serious domestic financial constraints. another one which i'm sure we will get to which is the nuclear sharing.

another option might be a change in nuclear posture and strategy to consider earlier decisive escalation pension weapons or nuclear weapons. the united states the longer signaling to one adversary so that's where i've been more decisive. what should be done to remain effective, nato's nuclear posture underpinned you want a safe and security nuclear, shall continue on the current modernization from up there will be challenges on that inc. in

the difficult growing. but proceeding the pace with rest modernization in a record at minimum i think is essential or nuclear security but in addition, other allies can participate exercising in the alliance continually multis of things they've been doing anyway and i know this panel is about deterrence, a key component of the conversation is talking european allies, i hear them more and more express their concerns and domestic politics is a part of that. the other part is that allies are concerned with competing priorities for u.s. attention.

it goes expert once we are now number three on foreign policy verities coming after the war in gaza and china so i want to make another equitation he in addition to following through and have large one of our greatest assets means in the national interest so i hope we can get to that. >> i like to come back to that and the impact it might have on

this habitability. i did want to turn back to initial capabilities. we did mention in the earlier discussion, very ambitious and much larger goals and working on these plans and it can be discussed in any detail whether it might be additional elements or reinforce by the decisions of the washington summit and the development of generational abilities.

>> of posture we have now and whether it is robust. the answer is the only way we defense was through even one scaled up. it's not the only way to defend all territory and ukraine cap draw on that and power protected from see. when i arrived in the baltic, a lot of firepower would come from the north atlantic but also, we are very focused on this question of this into place two things.

we need to know it's happening and get back to 2022, we saw it, we had a debate of what it meant and even russians can't have this. you need to act early enough to move forward and now the necessary authority to make the move into place before we get to that situation and the logistics of the terry on how you move across europe so there's a lot in that. on the fourth level to clearly

from a essentially what made european allies for the last 20 years is providing relatively small, sending them to the other side of the world and doing that on a rotational basis. a much larger force, you pretty much know where it is going and what it's going to be so the way in which we organize this as really changed. last year we confirmed this. the number of forces behind that is much larger. this most your interest lies

said if we collectible you got it. be made available we know there are capability gaps. but we have a much clearer idea no on how we can fight. >> that the good segue third discussion about learning lessons and when asked about lessons from russia for ukraine tornado strategy and how can be applied all and nato defense agreed to establishing on the nato ukraine.

>> definitely nato has a lot in this ability. how russia waking this but overall we had conflict between russia and nato and was on but that will change substantially the picture somehow special and fatal will be waged. please capabilities, something

ukraine does not have and currently limited access and need to look at lessons learned what russia takes in my observation with what nato should learn that we need more, we talked about that. the conflict for needs to grow to build reserve. we had discussion on going in the decision made already on the tract extending the voluntary

from drafting women or introducing service for military for young people so this is a discussion have. you had public discussions but come decisions were made it i think if you look at :'s decision that shows land forces

are marked in the war on ukraine could not be repeated and nato needs to reinvest these capabilities so another issue is we need to exercise information, training of ukrainian forces, time is missing it will have negative effects on the battlefield and ukraine. i think we are observing air defenses, they need to know ukraine has had huge amounts of equipment and supplemented we

don't have it in nato. we have huge gaps to be dealt with. we have right now problems in poland and we have been flying, is taking a turn for the second time talking with the opinion of many polls testing our reaction we don't have capabilities nationally and limited capabilities within 80 and we don't have a strong base system on the order to deter russia for

the air defense system. let us how huge the gap is not quickly need to invest : is doing that but it takes time. it's working on your defense on lower levels. the only way to capture such moves in the future. more long-range capabilities from germany, top military and being depleted.

the need for delivery. a long-range capability and increase. but what is particularly interesting from the wharton ukraine is introducing innovation to the battleground quickly how to it is not accustomed to development in this lesson. ...

>> and how to move come for example, major public services online come something ukraine has done under the war conditions. i think ukraine can compete, we can learn a lot. also similar military cooperation, that would be another point. >> great, thank you. i do want to come back to the nuclear question. before we do sin should mitchard recited i know angus has been working on come his colleagues at nato headquarters had working on looking at ways to encourage cooperation among allies and strengthening their defense industrial capabilities. you might touch on that. weekly before we go and then i come back to heather and will go

to some questions from the audience. >> sure. just say no, that are too big aspects of this. the first is society and something governments are thinking about and do they have plans for how they would experience a war eventually. this is partly psychological shift and using some allies addressing that by collision very directly about this. countries like sweden and denmark have stood up very boldly resort is said to the population you need to be ready for the prospect of war. it's also about are you planning, how you would keep going things like provision of energy, food, telecommunications, healthcare, transport, et cetera. what we do in nato is we set benchmarks for what does this look like in each of these areas and we have process of assessing allies against that come having them to learn from each other,

do compare and contrast that the other aspects to this thise relationship between the military and the civilians in a war. so many civilian governments over the last 20 years have got quite used to the idea that if there is a civilian contingency you turn to the military for help. with the pandemic or natural disaster or a terrorist attack. in a full-scale article v situation, actually that they do have is likely to get reversed because the military would be flat out dealing with the military threat. what it will need from the civilian side is access to transport, access to much larger healthcare and dealing with mass casualties, for example. and public access to stocks the food energy and things like that that it wouldn't be able to generate organically. this is why one of the things were looking at for the washington summit is allies making a pledge that they will

have nationally, each according to their own systems, a mechanism for doing that civilian military planning so that they know they are ready for that. there is a third aspect to civilians which is as well making sure that our infrastructure is not vulnerable to interference from hostile powers. it's a lot about china and when you look at how embedded china has become it a lot of infrastructure and sensitive services in an number of our allied countries, there is quite a big debate going on in it and in the european union about how to reduce the risks of those dependencies in exploited in a time of crisis or war? >> great, thank you. before we do ship to audience questions i did want as come come back to you heather.

he touched on some important issues on the board's of strength in the strategic, the is and other nuclear capabilities that at the strategic level the backup nato's deterrent posture. you mentioned uk is an option. what about the question of perhaps europe filling both combined uk-french effort and filling some of the pressure gets is going to feel if they continue to focus on deterring china unless i forget north korea as well? and interesting,, is a part of what was behind the macron gambit of think if you put a nuclear arms power on the ground in ukraine is that going to get put in some second thoughts? i know you would think that some of these issues with regard to russia saber rattling at csis in the pony party on deterrent and divide. it's a bit of the murder of question that maybe could touch on a couple of those issue. >> i will start with with e contribution of the uk and france in this debate going on out about your deterrence.

i'm not a european. spent enough time there. i am a bit skeptical europeans will put us at hundreds of years of history to completely trust one country, one of them. no offense to any of the french in the room. i'm really sorry. it is not to complete ruled out. just highlights how much really is hinging on the upcoming u.s. election. there is one thing about the uk and french arsenals at a do want highlight and that is the french arsenals really historically been defined by its ambiguity, by which they really religiously -- where as the british have try to strike a slightly different balance in terms of transparency into the arsenal, transparency into numbers and conspiracy into the doctrine. in recent years in the subsequent in the good reviews the uk is done we are seeing more of a shift towards ambiguity in the uk's nuclear posture. this is really fascinating

question that nato itself is also taking up, which is when it comes to nuclear issues to be drawn red lines? article v is a stronger line really as you can say but the nuclear component i think we're seeing that shift among allies with greater strategic ambiguity over all. and then to question about how to respond to nuclear saber rattling by the russians. i think the eliza done a pretty good job of, thus far. i saw the deputy secretary-general recently called it out as psychological intimidation, which i think it's a great point and something all of us have too sparse at how much of this is rhetoric and how much is reality. and kind address this that way. some of things the alliance did really well that it should continue to do come first and foremost is intelligence sharing component. that was really both within your lines but also more publicly but also calling out and trying to combat russian disinformation campaigns.

russian disinformation is really it's so pervasive but in the nuclear space in particular we are seeing it take on certain flavors. it's really aggressive. for example, in october 2022 there was a six day. mag were like every single russian officials offs that use a dirty bomb. this is clearly a disinformation campaign. maybe it was an attempt of the false like to maybe try to shape a wider narrative but nato members came out and precluding decisively said in a nuclear use a russian and met with catastrophic consequences. no, ukraine does not trying to develop a dirty bomb. and really try to stand up to russian disinformation in that way with us and we should anticipate russian disinformation, multiheaded, it's way to keep evolving, going to keep changing at the purpose of it is to divide the allies. so staying really on the front foot and forward leaning on combating that disinformation and combating it across the alliance i think some somea

taken more of a leadership role of combating disinformation and others, something i think there would be great to see more of the eyes get involved with dirk i think one of the point around disinformation but not just disinformation the russian nuclear saber rattling, this gets to the core of what deterrent is, which is where to convince russia using nuclear weapons will not serve its long-term interest. that it will not achieve whatever those desired gains are by using nuclear weapons. and there are a lot of different ways to do that and that might mean new surety at some retaliation response on the part of nato. but the other idea i will put out has to do with what would be the international reaction. if rush russia's a first oa nuclear weapon in recent memory and however many years, then what with the international community do in response to the? i thought a lot of debates about this recent because i don't know, who in his facing a

decisive military lost as a care with international between rethinks? the truth is not of us know. if anyone of this room knows what vladimir putin is thinking that please come to the mic tell us. i think that is the best way to stand up to russian nuclear saber rattling is having that decisiveness that you will not get what you want by doing this. >> great thank you. ambassador smith mentioned the board's of information showing that was going on in terms of what was russia actually doing windows rattling that saber was important, so thank you. we have about 20 minutes for questions on the audience. as you know you've been directed to go to the microphone if you would and identify yourself. we look forward to some additional questions. i don't see anyone yet rising to the occasion. good, someone -- >> approaching. >> thank you very much for being here and taking the time. my question is -- >> kandi toussie you are? >> my name is jason rodriguez.

so my question is, what lessons from deterrence in ukraine and on the eastern flank should i made were poorly should not be applied to deter us in the case of taiwan? >> that's an interesting one. >> we will take a few and then let people -- yes, go ahead please. >> thank you all so much for being here and taking the time to speak with us. my name is alan. i'm a graduate student in security studies program here at georgetown. i also working lsd. my question cutting surrounds this point has been brought up about political development and implications for european security, given what could happen in u.s. politics in the next few months. specifically for poland, given

the tensions in europe, outside of europe, , how feasible do thk it is that that france or the uk could extend the nuclear umbrella over poland, or would it be more prudent for poland to think that develop its own nuclear weapons? and kind of it so when should that start happening? so just curious for your thoughts and opinions on that. thank you. >> why do we so we don't lose the first one, should we -- you want to take that second question and then come back -- >> we can take another one. >> one more, all right. go ahead. i'm sorry. we will take one more. >> i am christian, a recent grad from the program. i had a quick question. dr. williams brought up arms control is kind of still a pillar with new strategy to some degree but with the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty set to expire in february 2026 and russia-china really having no interest in engaging in arms

control, i'm curious what you all think should that still be a pillar and its of how you actually operationalize that? thank you. >> okay. you want to take that on poland? >> there was a lot of uncertainty in poland about the future of u.s. security and defense policy on the eastern flank. the situation that you are right now in the u.s. as a month's long discussion in the congress on ukraine supplemental racing i would say this level of uncertainty because they are showing to us that the domestic situation, domestic politics has a hand over security and defense strategic goals. but i think that overall poland

has a different experience of trump administration than the rest of europe, a much more positive one where paul and have created a workable more bilateral relationship with trump administration, and has to which poland has increased u.s. military economic political ties. we have another government which will make a difference since there is no, i would say kind of ideological affinity come so that would be a different situation but still i think there is some distance from the rest of europe and discussions in poland about the immediate repercussions of a change of administration for the eastern flank and for poland. the discussion about the nuclear

deterrence is there in the public but i think and beginning to be also in the polish administration. overall, there is a conviction that the u.s. nuclear deterrence is still the place and will remain in place, that we need to do much more in the conventional realm, so convinced the future u.s. administration, whether it be republican or democrat. that alliance, the burden sharing and the alliance, alliance nato north atlantic treaty organization a partnership, the benefits to use and i think and, therefore, from poland you can hear the proposals of setting the bar for defense spending hard to 3% in the coming years. for making european greater

input into regional defense plans, and proposals to strengthen, engagements and inputs a greater show of european willingness to cooperate with the future republican administration. nuclear discussions for us are difficult because of course there are in the public ideas about going nuclear for poland. but poland doesn't have civilian nuclear power plants, and hence that would be very difficult and only without of major allies that have nuclear weapons to develop nuclear weapons on its own. that would take time. and in the meantime, poland would become very vulnerable to some kind of russian retaliation

strikes while developing nuclear capabilities. with regard to european deterrence or ideas on enhancing european deterrence, i think there was a conversation about the french ideas, but on the margins of technology that the u.s. nuclear deterrence is in place, i suppose that there would be discussions in the future of how to strengthen european confidence and overall nato nuclear deterrence and that would be the way forward we would like to go. >> if we could turn, i would to come back to the lessons of taiwan, but on the question of arms control and also, heather, that's one thing we haven't talked about of the talk but in the context of russian saber

rattling, , what is lacking in terms of their not being come third been some channels established both nato and the u.s. in terms of strategic crisis indications with the russians. do you think there some area scope for that as well or funny way forward on reviving some of those crisis munication capabilities? >> yet, so thank you for the question. literally my favorite topic and you would've thought i would apply to that question. should on controls to be part of nato position? absolutely should be. however, arms control the future going to look very different from arms control of the past. i am not saying we should be painting ourselves to something that looks like start i&s or new start. we need to take a more expansive approach to think of arms ol of the know it is dead. it really is. like new start this kind of the last of its kind. i asked folks on the pony team to ask what arms-control

agreement from the cold war era are still in place and have not been somehow soiled by russia? it's official list. i could count on one hand. so arms-control as as a know, it's really not a thing anymore. one of those was like to say that tree. the disrespect but this is exactly the type of arms-control something we're particularly interested in right now. with the second control is not just legally binding, verifiable treaty. if we take this more expensive approach think of arms-control as informal agreements. things like the incidence agreement which in terms of crisis medication kind of what escalation that's a good example of the direction of travel i think we could be moving in. other examples might be things that they can more asymmetric approach. you could have joint statements that are focused on controlling behaviors rather than controlling weapons, shameless self-promotion of an article in foreign affairs on the skull -- and so it's not about rejecting

arms-control altogether issues that changing what arms-control will rethink arms-control looks like and what we want it to achieve. one of the point on this. i hadn't brought up yet but it's really important one. the entity is also arms-control. and we have these conversations about -- the npt -- develop an independent nuclear weapon, the service come out of south korea, you know, when we have these conversation with also talk about the npt. i believe the entity is very weak at the moment but also think we are lucky to have it and we should do everything we can to preserve and protect it. with that said nato and it is nuclear members in particular have to take a to arms-control because they will be held accountable in the npt. there are a growing number of doctors in the npt the record is arms-control to know is dead so what are you doing for article six? that is how this conversation still. so to maintain the npt nato has to keep its commitment to

arms-control and a final point, another reason i'm very skeptical about this idea of new independent act, nuclear actors like blossoming among america's allies, i mean, is politicon to be the first country since north korea to withdraw from the npt? i don't think so. i don't think that about south korea either. that's also why we need the npt and we need to keep it healthy. and so arms-control might look different but we still need it if anything for that reason. >> person in the back. patients from one alas, i went to pick up, angus, i know the sense of taiwan is not -- obviously we do know that we certainly there's a lot of evidence that prc's watching carefully the lessons the russians learning in ukraine, in terms of resilience. unexpected resurgence, the limited capability of some other cyber and other efforts to disrupt ukrainian capabilities space. i wonder if you might touch on

maybe or at least what you think some of nato has lessons drawn about the war in ukraine that may also be exportable, lets a. >> very quickly on the other question. not only would pull that withdrawal from a beekeeper the alley the help poland would have to withdraw from npt. that's a real know, i think. and on the nuclear deterrence point, of course the uk does the extent this nuclear deterrence to poland and all members of native because the uk's nuclear deterrence is specifically a psych ended. it is the only one of the t3 that does that in those terms. i do think even if you were to see a changed uk and french posture for the reasons that have the other two earlier, it would almost certainly still be

within a broad nato framework. that's the only credible framework in which to do that. what lessons have you learned from taiwan? i think the most important lesson is don't that conventional deterrence slip in the first place. because nuclear components, i.e. they do this are and will nicu commonly difficult and not very credible. nuclear deterrence, i was done this and what do you think about it, the risk a nuclear response. that's arguably more credible. so don't get yourself in a situation where your opponent as a conventional advantage over you and has achieved something and is in bringing nuclear deterrence into play to try and stop you from doing anything about it. i think that's overwhelmingly the most important lesson. but but i think we would alsok at the kind of broader dimension of deterrence. why did putin make the mistake

of invading ukraine in the first place because his understanding of ukrainian intent come his understanding of ukrainian coherence were clearly wrong. we mustn't let russia or indeed any other adversaries make the same mistake about us. we have to kind of constantly remind them our intent, a willingness to fight and defend ourselves, our coherence, they are all absolutely strong. so it's a mixture of conventional deterrence on the basis in which a lot of things rest, and a broader sense of psychological, political coherence and will. >> great, thank you. i'm sorry, the person in the back foot in fact, i can't quite see. >> thank you for being here. i'm also a graduate student from the program in my question concerns strategic culture. you are very much at the vanguard of european and

transatlantic security, experts and policymakers. do you use kind of convergence towards unified european our new strategic culture, or do affairs within data in the only term by a culture and individual sort of material and strategic integration? thank you. >> at the think there's another, why do we take taken togete we're getting close on time? >> i work at the center for european policy analysis. i wanted to ask about the defense deterrence plans and undated and his its allies n incorporate of the partners like ukraine or georgia that are facing russian forces into those longer-term defense plans in the next ten to 15 years in the interim to nato membership? >> okay. and one last one, please. >> great, thank you. my thanks to the panel for very engaging discussion. about resilience others, welcome on this topic.

nathan rogers, work in a transatlantic arena. question as we approach of course the summit. just mentioned the pledge for planning and disregard, tickler steps in the resilience discussion with nato. interested and if you'd unpacked that more for us, where we're going in the resilience agenda. of course with an original commitment to enhance resilience from the warsaw summit 2016. the allies of double down on this in 2021. what's in store this year for the resilience and would you kariba saints is increasingly central to allied deterrence and defense? of course militaries just go to war but nations to. all of governments, whole commute is responsible for being part of this. interested if you'd unpacked that for us and where the allies is going forward. thank you. >> start with angus come if you want to loop that question and

one of dda perhaps you want to address that quickly. >> yet. start with one of culture because that's an important point. sicko back i think to the fact we do have a defense deterrence come deterrence and defense strategy that is based on set the plans that will over the next few years give our allies and much more granular understanding of exactly what the arm forces are supposed to do. that will drive a level of requirement for interoperabilit interoperability, the ability to fight together at the granular level and then the broader strategic level. the we haven't seen since the end of the cold war. i think that is already starting to make or force our allies to become a bit let national focus and a bit more alliance focused. some of it is basic service, training but some of it is for example, equipment. we have a standard artillery

shell in nato, 155 millimeters. turns out for the last 25 allies have all got off and slightly tweaked their artillery and the shows they go in it. turns out you can't put a 155 mm shell from what i want into the guns of another. that's happened to all sorts of, for understandable reasons but it is now about to be reversed and we are now anything sort of going back to much tougher focus on interoperability standardization, and as it is both technical and it is culture. on resilience and kind of what next, i mean, we always make the point the resilience is a national responsibility and somehow escaped quite cross with me if i could make that point early on but it think where we are probably going is we've got a cycle of look at how our allies form against our resilience basement. i think over time that cycle

will get more demanding, we get that we're looking at. and we will do more to support allies learning from each other and supporting each other from that. secondly, i think the broader question of industrial resilience has really come into play over the last two years, that we've seen how much north america and europe has struggled to produce quickly enough what we need both to support ukraine and to support our own armed forces. i think industrial policy defense and social policy has become an issue. i think the third area i was really developing is that the of partnership between the private sector and the public sector when it comes to resilience. that the answer to besides the duchess make more space bigger and bigger and to add more and more function to it, more and more capability. the answer is to have properly planned partnerships with the private sector.

transport would be a good example. the most important single actor and european security is probably dutch boy, the german railway sets would be essential to moving things through the center of europe and the crisis. so it's those kinds of partnerships and understanding it will probably have to spend more time. >> thank you. just turning to justine and heather, briefly, on the question of culture, any thoughts on the alliance is doing in maintaining its strategic culture? >> thank you. that is a very interesting question. i think that the alliance have harmonized to certain extent with regard to russia, russian goals and russian way of thinking, , but still we see tht

some divisions and understand how to react to what rush is doing against ukraine. i would give to back examples. i think that there is a difference, there was a difference in approaches on how, on what, i now the west should shape the strategy of most deliveries to ukraine. and i think there is division between the eastern flank and western europe together with the u.s., with western europe being more cautious, with setting red lines that gradually have been crossed but still are maintained. and with eastern europe being of the opinion that we should strive to give ukraine is what we can from the very beginning in order for them to put out

brushes -- advance as possible. there's a few escalation that has, that have been existing in the west that's not as present to a lesser extent in poland. domestic consequences offer russian defeat is much more present than on the eastern flank. and the understanding that russia needs to be defeated in order for peace to be maintained in eastern europe is strongly on eastern flank and not that much in western europe. so i think still we have different understanding how to deal with russia and russian aggression and what should be the instead of the war. so i see the first division between northeastern members of the lines in western europe together with the u.s. and the second division is a very interesting one and shows to me how difficult, how

difficult situation we will have in europe if the u.s. withdraw. then we have had exchange are positioned and statements between french and germany on french, on macron proposal on putting soldiers in ukraine. french understand is if there is less u.s. in europe, europe needs to step in. chairman's understand if there is less europe, less u.s. in europe we need to be very, very careful. >> thank you. we will have to continue some of this discussion into the break and a deceptive auto wanted to give heather one sort of last chance to make one last comment. >> i'll be very quick on what to make a quick observation of the history of strategic culture because you're asking an important question. are we seeing a convergence in strategic culture with the nato? the answer is yes and no.

from a historical perspective these allies are now to buy shared history, why should interest in things like democracy and rules-based international order that is carryforward over decades. on the other hand, there is not a convergence and allies are not in model list. and just to end with two, personal observations but when i moved moved to europe from the u.s., the most shocking to me is the proximity of war. war feels so much closer in europe. this was in 2010, 2009. at every british train station has etched in marble the names of the kids from that town who died in a war. that since the war is so close and that war can happen and it could be your neighbor, that feeling doesn't really pervade or sink in the way that it does in the u.s. and so that influence a strategic culture. and of the very quick observation, it is, the allies are not a model list. that was my observation when a move to europe. when he moved back here and

being in washington i thought including leases the allies, the allies, the allies that there's only 32 opinions that to mention the indo-pacific, within the 20 allies there are probably 100 opinions. from the u.s. perspective we still have a little bit of a historical hangup untreated allies as if there all the same it always speak in my voice. that effexor strategic culture as well. that something that are really am trying to push in my own work to have a better understanding of the allies on a much more granular level because ultimately that will strengthen the light to suspect that's a nice coda to the spat upon by the future of defense and turns and white has to continue to work. and it's all the members of the chisel the community and the wider world. so please join me, we're at the break time for lunch. please join me in thanking our panelists for providing us a very rich intellectual menu. [applause]

>> thank you, panelist. we are grateful for your insights. once again we ask that you kindly remain in your seats for a moment as our speakers depart the stage. our next panel titled u.s. and european perspectives on alliance burden sharing will begin streaming live at 12:45 p.m. for those joining us virtually when fight you to tune in. it is a virtual only panel. for those of us here we would be breaking for lunch we encourage you to take advantage of the food options table on campus and dubai restaurants during this time. please hold on to your lanyards as you need them to gain the admits to the conference following the lunch break. please plan to be back and seeded by 1:50 p.m. in time for the start of arthur panel of the day which will explore nato's role in the indo-pacific. thank you. [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations]

>> cgress returns later today from its two week holiday break for legislative business and votes. the senate is bac at 3 p.m. eastern lawmakersill consider the nomination of a u.s. district court judge for nebraska for the 5:30 p.m. vote scheduled to advance her nomination. later in the week health impeachment managers will delir articles of impeachme against homeland security secretary alejandro mayorkas to the senate that will hpen wednesday to start is impeachment trial. the house returns tuesday at noon eastern. members will consider several bills including reauthorizing the federal workforce development programs. thursday the houseill host a joint meeting with the senate to hear anddress by japanese pre minister. watch live covage of the house on c-span, the senate on

c-span2, and remind you can watch all of our congressional coverage with our free video at c-span now were online at c-span.org. >> today social psychologist and author jonathan hyde discusses impact of social media on american life. hosted by the repeated american enterprise institute, you can watch the discussion by the typing eastern on c-span, c-span now or free mobile video app or online at c-span.org. >> celebrating the 20th anniversary of her annual studentcam documentary competition this year c-span as middle and high school students across the country to look forward one considering the past. past. participants were given to option to look 20 years in the future or 20 years into the past. in response we received inspiring and thought-provoking documentaries from over 3200 students across 42 states. our top award of $5000 for grand prize goes to nate coleman and

jonah come 10th-graders at weston high school in connecticut. their documentary innocence held hostage navigating past and future conflicts with iran. >> it is evident in the next 20 years the united states must make more policy that faces heavy restriction on all americans traveling to iran because that only will we see a less hostage taker but the united states will no longer have to participate in such considerable negotiations. >> congratulations to our winners and be sure to watch the top 21 winning documentaries on c-span every day this month starting at 6:50 a.m. eastern or eastern or in time online at studentcam.org. >> c-span until the view of government. we are funded by the television companies and more including comcast. >> are you thinking this is just a community center? it's way more than that. >> comcast is partnering with 1000 community centers to create