i'm robin from the university of

kansas. what a great place to. reassess ronald reagan's rhetorical legacy. and we've got such great reasons to do that. i think reagan is routinely recognized in the same class for eloquence as franklin delano roosevelt, only slightly behind abraham lincoln. and that's not such a bad thing, to only be slightly behind abraham. he used his words win two overwhelming presidential victories, and his words helped what has been called by many authors the age of reagan. we have four panelists today and i'm going to introduce them now now and then we're simply going to go in order that's listed and and we have agreed that we're going to take no than 15 to 16 minutes each, leaving some time discussion at the end. i know there very distinguished scholars in the room and we all look forward to that. the first presenter is alison

brash from the university of wisconsin. the world has a stage. reagan's foreign policy rhetoric and the invocation of peace. and she's talking about research done as part of her outstanding new book, rand fowler of abilene christian university is going to talk about the great communicator and the great satan revisiting reagan's approach to iran. elizabeth spalding from the victims of communism memorial foundation and pepperdine is going to talk about the moral that the the evil empire in sdi and the moral rhetoric of peace through strength and was summed trepidation. i'm going to back clean up and talk about the arc of reagan's soviet rhetoric. a grand strategy for the cold war. allison. wright, thank you all very. i had a brief title at the last minute, too, so apologies that i

did not let you know that. but the world is his stage. scenes from reagan's rhetorical legacy. if the cold war, a drama enacted in various places and moments on the world stage, ronald played a starring role. his was the marquee name, the actor who appeared on set at pivotal junctures in this geopolitical contest. and in fact for many u.s. americans, the 40th president of the united states spoke as the ultimate cold warrior episode that reagan cultivated, embodied and embraced a hallmark. reagan's rhetorical skill lay in his ability, make complex policies, proposals, ideas come quite literally to life by using images, bodies and to bolster his argument. aristotle once rhetoric as the ability to see in each particular case, all the available means of persuasion. and this description positions rhetoric as a radically contingent exercise, one that requires the orator to first

identify by, and then to address the complexities of the political and the historical moment, while also attending to the overlapping and, often conflicting expectations of multiple audiences. no small task. but as i detailed in my recent book and other published work, some of the most important means of persuasion reagan deployed not just through his words, but through the images, the stories and the the people and the places he gestured to rhetorically. in so doing, he invited his to see themselves as participants in the narrative that he recounted. and in fact, i would go so far to argue that this invocation of images, bodies and places is what made him the great communicator. to be sure, his nguage was eloquent, moving and able to help members of the u.s. public see themselves as part of national narrative. he described, but it was also physical, tangible and material laden with elements.

the vivid pictures he displayed the ordinary civic actors he featured. and the symbolic places from which he chose to speak. this is what made his image of the nation come to life. and so in today's talk, i revisit three specific scenes in which reagan used his rhetoric to bring people and places before the eyes of his audience. and although these specific episodes are, i would imagine, well-known to many in this room, i draw on these examples not just to demonstrate how the centrality of, images, bodies and places in reagan's rhetorical practice created a lasting template for all future presidents to use, but also demonstrate how future presidents after reagan utilized these strategies, they've come to shape how we think about and we talk about our expectations for presidential rhetoric seen one. visualizing the landscape of u.s. when reagan defeated jimmy carter in the 1980 presidential action by more than 8 million votes, many saw reagan's victory

as a direct rejection of carter's at home and abroad. paul fessler notes that when ronald reagan took office in early 1981, the united appeared weak and faltering in foreign affairs. the united states still reeling from defeat in vietnam faced not only a soviet expanding into afghanistan, but also a major hostage crisis iran. it seemed as if america's as a strong, confident international superpower was fading into a distant memory. reagan addressed this perception of a weakened america in his inaugural address, pledging that as a nation took the steps to, quote ourselves here in our own land, we will be seen as having greater strength throughout the world ande exemplar of freedom and a beacon of hope for those who do not now have freedom. as john and robert roland have argued, reagan's first inaugural address offered, a foundational statement of his governing and of contemporary conservative

ism. by offering we the people as the antidote to big government, the heroes of this moment, reagan argued, ordinary americans who went about their lives and their livelihoods with quiet determination, a form of patriotism. but reagan also used the or location of his address to remind his audience of a shared historical narrative, one he believed would inspire a renewed sense of national identity. in so doing, he also established a new norm for presidential inaugural addresses. for the first time, the ceremonies were held on the west front of the u.s. capitol, allowing the assembled audience to look out over the national mall as new president spoke. photographer and news organizations also captured and circulated images of the scene and those watching television coverage at home were transported to the through vivid imagery and depiction. and so you're now going to see in clip which was broadcast on c-span and what viewers at home may have seen.

you're missing sound. i'm just showing you the images as i talk about it. toward the end of his speech, reagan emphasized the significance of this view, and he said, standing here one faces a magnificent vista. opening up on this city's special beauty and history, the president went on to reference sites as the washington monument, the jefferson and the lincoln memorial, and then across the potomac arlington national cemetery. reagan said that inspired by those giants on his shoulders, we stand, he asked his audience to see themselves as a living, breathing between past, present and future, a nature, a nation of individual actors who could, with their best effort and their willingness to believe in themselves and to believe in their capacity to perform great deeds that they could confront. the problems facing the nation. reagan's depiction of these people, places and moments that comprise the nation's history was made possible by his direct

references to the markers on the symbolic landscape before him. later, u.s. followed suit with, the exception of reagan's second inaugural, which was held indoors due to bitterly cold temperatures. all successive inaugurations have been held on the west front of the u.s. capitol building. several presidents, including barack obama and joseph biden, have also rhetorically gestured to the scene set before them to evoke a shared historical narrative. most recently, in january 2021, and just two weeks after the attack on, the u.s. capitol building, biden repeated point at his audience to various places on the national mall to remind his audience the sacred nature of the space. and in so doing, he also noted resiliency of the american project. like reagan, biden reminded his audience of other moments in u.s. democracy had been tested and yet endured. this was a history that was not certain, not guaranteed. the democratic experiment was.

one that required collective commitment. a respect for. and a conservation of the nation's most foundational and principles. the challenge now, biden said, was whether the nation could meet this moment and write the next great chapter in the history of the united states. and it is a challenge that remains a scene to elevating ordinary american heroes. one year and six days after his first inaugural address on january sixth, 1982. ronald reagan delivered first state of the union address. in his speech, he cast a hopeful vision for american renewal, even as he addressed the weak economy and proposed cuts to the federal budget. but what made reagan's 1982 state of the union address notable transformative even was his salute to lenny's sputnik during the final moments of his speech just two weeks earlier, sputnik dived into the frigid waters of the potomac river to a passenger of an air florida that

crashed into the 14th street bridge during takeoff from what was then known as washington national airport we now know it, of course, a the ronald reagan airport. sputnik became overnight celebrity and the di replayed heroic chant for millions of americans on the evening news, the white housinvited sputnik and his wife linda to sit next to first lady nancy reagan in the house gallery during reagan's address and, the president concluded his speech by identifying sputnik as an example of the spirit of american heroism at its finest. even as he honored publicly, reagan also the young government employee, to represent what he called the, quote, quiet, everyday heroes, unquote, who sacrificed their time and their energy to revitalize the american spirit by pointing out sputnik to those in the house gallery and to millions of americans watching at home. reagan helped his audience visualize what.

he was describing the ideals of a modern american hero were now reflected in the person of lenny sputnik. this salute to inaugurated a new generic norm for the state of the union address. prior to 1982, presidents relied on strategies of language to deliver their report to congress. but reagan's featuring of one ordinary civic hero a new rhetorical strategy by which presidents now display individuals as evidence for their argument. beginning with reagan this now expressed expected invocation of a sputnik offers the opportunity to display both rhetorically and physically. the civic ideals they wish to laud, the national issues they deem important, and the policy proposals they wish to. these scott notes then provide a physical representation of the overall body politic living, breathing, metaphor, testifying that the state of the union is fact strong. the presidential deployment of

scott next can also provide a cautionary tale, one that can be used to galvanize members of congress and, by extension, the u.s. public. such was the case in 2018, when donald warned of the threat north korea's nuclear arsenal posed to the united states and its allies. to underscore the point, the president featured several individuals who had direct experi ence with the depraved character of the north regime, and one of them included ji sung hu, a north korean defector who escaped to south korea in 2006 and so you can see in this image, the crowd is applauding and mr. sung ho is holding up his crutches because he had lost two limbs as part of his escape. and prior toisife in north korea, psident trump heralded mr. sung ho's and sacrifice , quote, a test, admit to the yearning of every human soul to live in freedom, unquote. this trump argued the same desire that had inspired early americans to declare independence from great britain and to form the united states. and, like reagan, had first done

in 1982. trump the u.s. public to recognize quote the heroes who lived not only in the past but all around us defending hope, pride and, the american way. the task, he said to his audience, was, quote, to respect them, to listen, to them, to serve them, to protect them and, to always be worthy of them unquote. and this is the task remains. scene three commemorating d-day, reagan's deployment of bodies in place continued two years later when he commemorated the 40th anniversary of d-day. in his speech at point, a hawk, reagan told the story of the mission that 225 u.s. army rangers undertook on the morning of. 6th of june 1944. their mission, he said, was o of the most difficult and daring of the entire invasion for these u.s. army rangers were to up the sheer and desolate cliffs behind him. and you n see those the image on the right to take the enemy

guns that could have decimated restf the allied warships ferrying troops across the english channel. throughout his 13 minute speech, reagan repeatedly referenced the 62 surviving u.s. army rangers who enacted the narrative he had described and who were seated before him. and he reminded his audience that were here together in the very place where these events unfolded. now, to be sure, the text of speech is moving eloquent, beautiful. it's a rhetorical masterpiece. but what made it stand out? an exemplar of presidential commemoration, was how reagan repeatedly pointed his audience to physical material evidence the boys of point, a hawk and, the sheer and desolate cliffs behind him to encapsulate his argument, the decision to feature these people and places was not some mere flourish. instead was a deliberate rhetorical strategy supported by reagan's white house speechwriting team, most specifically. peggy noonan, secretary of state.

short schultz and a number of white house advance staff. indeed, as materials from the reagan library here make plain. officials saw the president's featuring of the boys of point a hawk and his rhetoric in place as a central of his overall commemoration. numerous u.s. presidents followed his example. but i think it's important to note how reagan reagan's commemorative action extended well beyond the 40th anniversary of d-day and also influenced his reelection campaign. in fact, the retelling, the normandy invasion, became a central part of the 1984 convention film the producers of the convention documentary that was shown in dallas. that fall explained in one memo to the campaign that their goal was to position reagan as a narrator of a shared. they wrote that, there would be no interviewer or narrator, only the voice of the president. and i quote from their memo he is our guide. in effect, the film as the president speaks, we begin to dissolve through and see those

actual elements of which he speaking the verbal images become, visual images we see and hear those moments the president is talking about. and we begin to relive those events and experiences on film, unquote. on the final evening, the 1984 republican national convention in dallas the u.s. public encountered these striking images in an 18 minute campaign film. and what up on the screen is the of the film that uses reagan's speech at point hawke. entitled a new beginning. the striking video montage featured snippets of speeches at point of hook, including panoramic shots of the cliffs at point of hawk and endless road rows of white crosses and stars. david in the normandy american cemetery, the most poignant aspect of this section was how the campaign interspersed reagan's speeches with actual of the men storming the beaches on june six, 1944.

the video also featured close shots of the 62 boys of pointe a hawk that were present reagan's address and as the listened to reagan's narrative of allied landings landings at normandy, they watched and white footage of soldiers swimming to shore. when reagan recounted the courageous climb of the u.s. rangers 40 years earlier, the camera zoomed in on the faces of the aged veterans. this juxtaposition of text and image provided a striking tribute not just to the men who fought at normandy, but it also reinforced reagan's image as a focused, patriotic head of state dedicated to protecting us democracy at home and around the world. conclusion reagan's rhetorical legacy as these scenes make plain reagan's skill was not due to alone. the president used his spoken oratory to bring people, places and historical events literally before the eyes of the audience, helping them to see or imagine the policies events he sought to

describe. throughout his presidency, reagan relied on such imagery to make complex proposals tangible and relatable to the ordinary citizen. his vision for what the nation had been, what it was and what it could be came to life on the national mall. his hope for an active, engaged u.s. public was embodied in the person of lenny slotnick, an everyday american hero, and his enduring in the u.s. commitment to defending democracy in europe was encapsulated by physical presence of 62 u.s. army rangers, 40 years after they scaled the cliffs. pointe a hawk. but examples also demonstrate how the words and actions of u.s. presidents shape the norms of presidential public address, not just what we expect a president do or say within a particular context, but also how their speech and contributes to the nation's character, its ethos, its overarching narrative and sense self. when the president speaks, people listen and they respond. kind. what a president says and how

they say it matters. the choices of individual chief executive. a precedent for what the public can and should expect to hear from their leader. past choices dictate present expectation ones and the rhetoric of past presidents. the choices current and future chief executives make for good or for ill. as president reagan understood the significance of, these rhetorical norms and even more importantly, his sacred responsibility to protect and defend the institution, the u.s. presidency and the u.s. constitution. as we reflect on reagan's legacy, rhetorical and otherwise, we would do well to consider what the 40th president's vision of the nation and his fundamental respect for the presidency as an institution might teach us and what it might require of us in the present and in the future. thank you very much.

well, me say slightly taller. it's an honor to. have you all here especially knowing that taylor swift is performing down the road this evening. so i'm very that you're all here. i learned that this morning at the hotel. okay, so my talk is over. reagan, iran. typically when we think about reagan in the middle east, oftentimes think of lebanon, perhaps the airstrikes in libya or the iran-contra scandal. but i want to refocus us on a topic that isn't often discussed, and that is reagan's relationship with the islamic republic. so to begin, i'll set the scene for. you see if i can get this to work. there we go. in 1979, much changed in the middle east. and i'm just going to highlight three events that you may or may not be of. number one, the soviet union invaded, afghanistan beginning their ten year occupation of the countr number two, drew heyman, maltby and several islamists radicals

with him occupy the mosque in and they held it for two weeks fren special forces able to evacuate them from the premises. and thir coue, you had the iranian revolution and the hostage crisis that it resulted in. and so during the 1980 campaign, reagan didn't necessarily raise the issue. but was, of course, dominant in media narratives. and on the evening, in december 1977. jimmy carter, very regrettable said the shah was an island of in one of the more troubled areas the world. as late as august 78, he received a cia report that that iran is not in a revolutionary or even pre-revolutionary state. november the next year, the us ambassador in iran cabled back to washington. the authority of the shah has been considerably. his support among the general public has become almost invisible. we need to think the unthinkable at this time. and of course the unthinkable

did occur. and ronald reagan, during october 1980, made his one remark where he said, i just don't understand why these hostages are still. and, of course, this has been described as a german or media event. we have walter cronkite, ted koppel going on the air every single night saying it's been this many days it since the hostages have been taken. it dominates the airwaves and carter even says, i wish if i'd seen one more helicopter, i would want reelection. so this was an event that, of course, prime and the american public to view the islamic republic in a very negative way, that americans have very hostile attitudes, iran as a result of this. but it's not clear what meaning this will take within reagan's larger foreign policy dramas. so we look at ronald reagan, he comes into office the consummate cold warrior and he casts a vision of a two sided conflict, both globally and the middle east, in the vehicle through which articulated that was strategic consensus.

strategic consensus was primarily the catchphrase of alexander haig, who is reagan's secretary of state. and theyaid, we're going to go to the region, we're going to unite all of our allies there in. recognition of a commonhreat, the soviet union and the region. and so al haig departed on a diplomatic and he went to jordan, he went to cairo, he went to riyadh. and he went and spoke with u.s. allies across the region and said, you know, why don't we set our differences and all recognize that the soviet union is the greater threat? it did not go well. he did not. let's say success. in fact, a kuwaiti newspaper that i have the joy reading thought that it was all a plot for him to lead marines to occupy an oil field. so you have a situation where. the reagan administration retreats from strategic consensus idea. but i think that there's three elements of this basic premise.

number one, that middle east is a battlefield. number two, that that battlefield has two sides tt are fiting it out. and number three, that t us will lead this battle in some form or fashion. and so i think these three themes continue on. so i'm going to pivot to my manuscript here, but i want to set scene for you and discuss the three acts of reagan in iran. so you might have noticed i've been talking lot about the soviet union and not as much about iran in this drama. and the reason for is because iran did not fit well within this picture painted by reagan administration. it's it's awkwardly as a noncommittal state, but still hostile to the united states. and so my claim is that treatment of iran was a tale of two terms. during the first four years of the reagan presidency, he depicted iran in criminal language, using metaphors of misconduct to depict the revolutionary regime as a

violator of international law. this picture of iran as a miscreant fit well. one on one, not as well within the overall strategic consensus campaign which read the soviet union as source of all regional disorder by second term. however, the administration had come to view iran as a major threat to u.s. oil access, and it shifted from the rhetoric of criminality to that of enemy ship drawing overt between the menace posed by iran in the soviet union. in the persian gulf. reagan borrowed from language he had used earlier describe communists to vilify regime in tehran in the picture painted by reagan's rhetoric. iran sought to impose its tyrannical rule as a would be hegemon, cutting off the needed oil supplies to the united states and its allies. this found purchase and press coverage, which malign the revolutionary islamic republic. and in the process, these outlets also circulated. this equivalence between iran and the soviet union and persian gulf security and us access to

the oil in the region. so act one as neither a u.s. nor a communist state. tehran did not feature prominently in the administration's early efforts to rally regional allies against the soviet union. instead reagan described the country as a criminal, said iran should have a government quote that would abide by international unquote if it wished for better relations. the united states. when asked if would permit u.s. oil companies to return to operate there eventually, he questioned whether iran could even enforce its own laws. reagan highlighted delinquency again when hostages returned, saying that it should be aware that when the rules of international behavior are violated, our policy will be one of swift and effective retribution, unquote. in a statement honoring, the freed hostages he contrasted dignity, determination and quiet courage with the abuse of their captors. implying that heroism was quote, something the iranians not understand. to reinforce this

characterization, reagan commonly accused iran of acts of terrorism. he did that during 1980 campaign. weeks into presidency, he thanked margaret thatcher for british to bring the american prisoners home from iran. and in the next breath he said together, we will work to continue to confront the scourge of international terrorism. indeed, reagan invoked the threat of international terrorism rather often in relation to iran. in a 1982 address, he called for a political settlement in the iran-iraq conflict and then immediately exhorted here is to continue the fight against international terrorism. other times, reagan referenced the threat international terrorism presents to the free world and the dire peril that terrorism and intimidation in the gulf posed. this was he continually characterized the persian gulf as a perilous region. these references worked to isolate tehran, both in terms of coverage and the treatment of the administration but also on the world stage. brian mccann writes that criminal criminality is not a static state, meaning but highly contingent rhetorics of law and order inscribe markers of fear.

those markers, in turn, work to justify criminals, surveillance and confinement by invoking fears associated with khamenei's regime, terrorism and the hostage crisis. reagan's utterances rationalized a policy of isolation, portraying it as a rogue, felonious state policing, not military confrontation. was the logic of the rhetoric of criminality. and of course, since khomeini hardly a communist. this rhetorical formula a way out of the strategic consensus. reagan didn't need say that iran was on the side of the soviet union, merely that it was an outlaw state. in an early outworking of the rogue state idea so that it was ruled by fanatical theocracy that was beyond the normal rules of the cold war and. so he continually summoned, like being a sheriff, a cop. so the united should treat iran like did all squalid criminals and lawbreakers. he said, we're going to bring the full weight of the law them.

ultimately this worked to subordinate iran to the soviet union as the primary threat that reagan identified in the persian. and i'll skip all the examples i have of u.s. media coverage. we do not have time for that. all right. act two, enemy ship. this assessment of iran began to change near the end of reagan's first term as the administration started to modify its internal its internal evaluation of the gulf in may 1984, in a c report reveals this shift in thinking titled politically sensitive approach to enhanced military cooperation with the key gulf arabs. the paper first reiterated the administration's elusive goal of organizing a truly multilateral effort to defend western to the gulf. it's an enumerated the various threats to western access to the gulf. and it said, although the continuing soviet occupation of afghanistan a constant reminder of the larger menace, it said the stalemate in attrition, warfare in afghanistan had made that less immediate, less poignant.

consequently the paper argued a new danger had started to be on par with the soviet union. iran and its particular brand of islamic fundamentalism has become the most immediate threat to the moderate. the nsc report said by formally arguing that iran a more direct security threat to the american allies in the gulf and the soviet union. this report captured a broader shift from a strict fixation on and reagan had long course called the revolutionary regime a danger and he characterized as this lawless, malevolent actor on the world. he had denounced the barbaric persecution of the baha'i in iran. he regularly said that tehran, quote, a place where international and common decency were mocked. so while it was common for him to use these in his public utterances, at no time prior to this that i was able to find in the archives did the or the nsc say that tehran was as dangerous as moscow in the persian gulf. this, in the administration's

thinking, shown most clearly in weinberger's june 1987 report to congress on gulf security. the 28 page document was intended address legislative fears that reagan had made an open ended, unilateral american commitment to all non belligerents shipping in persian gulf. this is during the iran-iraq war. the us started escorting oil tankers through the gulf and clearing mines as a way to make sure that oil access continued and was not hampered by the war. ultimately, what this report the free world was heavily dependent on oil, which meant it was our vital national for our vital interests are at stake in the and this meant that the of iranian hegemony over the gulf presented an equal hazard the soviet union. when it came to the free flow of oil. and so this report marked an like haig weinberger distilled an image of the gulf as under terrific from an imperialistic aspirant regional dominance.

unlike haig, weinberger identified iran, not the soviet union, as this dangerous foe. this portrayal of iran as an equal, if not greater threat than the soviet thus grew out of the original image put forth by the reagan administration of, a two sided conflict with an imperialistic power seeking to gain advantage over the region. the body of the report went into more detail. it said since the gulf is a region vital economic importance, we have strategic interest in ensuring that it does not come under dominion or hegemony. a power hostile to the united. and so this is an echo of the carter doctrine, but it takes a step further by identifying iran not the soviet union as the country at threat. and so the magnitude of this development can be in how the report described gulf domination by moscow or tehran as equally either, quote, soviet or iranian hegemony. the gulf, in, quote, it stated, would represent a serious strategic setback. and so for the first time since the beginning of the cold war,

since all the way back to truman, u.s. defense planners talked about a country than the soviet union as a power might be able to dominate the gulf and its oil. and so on a rhetorical level, this was marked by a shift to enemy under an enemy ship framework. rhetoricians make an active and ongoing construction an enemy who must be vanquished. jeremy engels observes in his book enemy rulers can bolster their authority, manufacture consent in such a way to provide rhetorical cover for leaders to prosecute aggressive policies against those identified as enemies the nation. that was certainly the case in this instance. once we get to intervene. can we have the united states taking active steps to, confront iran militarily and to, as reagan said, let me find my quote. reagan promised to find ways to end this scourge once for all. so i'll skip through my other quotes that reagan had and we'll get to intervention by show of

hands as heard of operation praying mantis. okay, we have a couple hands. all right. this move to describe iran as an enemy. took place in the midst of hostile engagements between two countries. these clashes built on earlier actions taken by the administration in the iran-iraq after become to share after it had begun to share geospatial intelligence. iraq in 1982, for example. the administration launched operation staunch, which was a global effort to halt conventional weapons to iran in 1984. u.s. ships started escorting oil tankers through the gulf from 84 to 86. iranian and mines damaged 67 oil tankers, which significantly global gas prices and maritime insurance rates. and so reagan reacted, ordering the u.s. navy to conduct more minesweeper escort missions, reflecting operations and retaliatory strikes, which culminated on april 18th, 1988, when u.s. warships sank over half of iran's navy in operation praying mantis. days later, reagan followed up this action by commanding the navy to use military force,

defend neutral ships from iran. and then, of course on july 3rd, the trigger happy quote, uss vinson's shut down iran air six, five, five. a civilian plane carrying 300 passengers. reagan attributed this tragic incident to the ongoing war, which he blamed iran for continuing. and so operation praying mantis still ranks as the largest u.s. naval battle since world war two. portrayal of iran as an enemy, therefore not simply a matter of words. his function to legitimate actual military against khamenei's regime. in this regard, reagan's characterization of iran as an enemy that demanded active intervention to stop and as a danger to gulf security. and u.s. allies there prompted a pivotal step towards the united states not only articulating a responsibility to protect the gulf, but also asserting a military of intervention to exercise duty as it saw fit.

iran contra doesn't fit nicely in this story when, of course. the united states was caught selling weapons to iran. but i would argue, and i'll end with this, that iran-contra operates as evidence for the thesis that iran underwent a under reagan's presidency after the 79 revolution. it was unclear what iran's relationship to the united states be, especially coming from a president focused so much on the rhetoric of cold on the soviet union, the overarching threat by the end of his presidency of these top boy, he had applied to communist countries that they were aggressive, imperialistic that they sought to dominate their. neighbors have been transferred to iran. the fact the iran-contra scandal happened and it generated such outrage is a testimony to how much this vision was accepted by the american people. and so i think to conclude my talk.

i would say that observers who saw iran-contra at the time were left with one of two conclusions. either reagan administration had lied about iran being an enemy or it had dealt weapons to a nation. it described as a threat to the flow of gulf oil and, by extension, u.s. national security. that reagan chose to admit a lapse in judgment rather than argue that iran was not quite so bad, is instructive, for it shows how salient the image iran as an american enemy was in the eyes of the administration and perhaps the public. by the time the iran-iraq war had ended, the u.s. navy had shot down two civilian airliner disabled oil platforms, destroyed the bulk of navy. and, of course, had cleared thousands and thousands of mines. these actions marked a stark contrast from the administration's early days of proclaiming that, the soviet union lurked behind all the middle east ills, whereas reagan had started arguing that the persian gulf was simply part of the wider cold war. by 1988, his team was effectively making case that conditions unique to the gulf

most of all the threat iran allegedly to the free flow of oil mandated military operations be undertaken for reasons disconnected from the cold war. ironically reagan fulfilled the carter doctrines pledge. the states would prevent a hostile power from seizing control of the gulf now by targeting targeting the soviet union. but authorizing air and naval strikes against the nation's former gulf ally. thank you. thank you to the library and to the ronald reagan presidential foundation and institute and all the other partners. one, i'm affiliated with pepperdine university's school of public policy. it is fitting we meet to discuss and analyze all things reagan, especially during the ongoing anniversary of his. i'm one of the participants here

focused on the meaning and significance of president ronald reagan's key speeches and, how they help us understand his strategic and moral thinking. my questions how did reagan get to 1983, especially march 1983? what made reagan reagan? and what did he bring to the white house with him? what was the end? his cold war strategy of peace through strength expressed, pursued as president, especially in two central speeches. at a moment, reagan both saw and helped to make. did he stay the course, so to speak? what, if anything, can we learn from this strategy for today and some these questions obviously will have to be for discussion here. and i hope throughout the conference. in a year that was in retrospect a key inflection point in the cold war march 83 marked a critical month for reagan. the strategic initiative, sdi is often dismissed as

technologically or it is presented as either an aspiration or idiosyncratic element of defense buildup or a bargaining chip that he stubbornly to use in later cold war summitry. such interpretations devalue and ignore reagan's own that informs his visionary project. this thinking is best understood, especially in the proximate. by examining reagan's announcement of sdi in, his march 23rd remarks on defense and national in combination with more famous statement just over two weeks earlier in the profound long context, this thinking is best by examining how reagan got to march 1983, the evil empire of march 8th distills a lifetime reflection on human nature theology, politics and, freedom. sdi should be seen, as a practical manifestation of

reagan's political, strategic, moral and religious understanding of cold war, which he describes the evil empire speech as part the struggle between, right and wrong and good and evil. and in the time here, i would like to briefly go through these these four areas, political, strategic moral and religious. to understand how reagan got to march 1983 and how he understood what he was saying and doing political reagan placed the cold war and the necessities requirement and contingencies imposed by the central of his time in his framework for politics overall, justice was central as was freedom a good in of itself and a necessity to the exercise of justice. he wanted to be a man of peace not war and said this privately and publicly and. i have seen in my my week of research, my days of research here many of this.

so it's good to have something confirmed when you come to archives. right. for reagan peace followed from justice and freedom and should be defined by those with a similar outlook. this is a key reason that a recurring reagan theme concerns the importance and need for the unity of the west against soviet communism. the principles inspiring a government mattered to him, as did its structuring institutions and attitude toward the individual and community. reagan viewed ideology as a single fixed worldview that carried it a revolutionary plan to transform man state and society as, a perversion of politics. in the 20th century ideology brought forth totalitarianism in two species communism and nazism. from the 1940s on. reagan spoke against totalitarianism and, often interchanged use of totalitarian

and communist when referring to the soviet union in general. reagan viewed totalitarianism as a vehicle with its rotten core made of radical ideology and an illegitimate. for reagan, as other students of totalitarianism from anna iran to alexander sole, the ideology and the lies upon which it is based the ism strategic reagan typically operated the level of principle. looking at the cold war at its highest level, it was not his goal to go to war, but there was always the risk of hot war. reagan saw the cold war as a real conflict. he did not believe in measures or a long peace between. what he viewed as two worlds. it complete odds. he thought detente was not only politically and mistaken, but also incorrect. because it enabled soviet

repression and aggression and extended the cold war in this sense, the u.s. defense buildup and economic and technological strangulation of the ussr were tools, not ends. so were diplomacy dialog in the correct circumstance as reagan could and would use various at the level of strategy. he spoke of a forward strategy for freedom to achieve peace, strength to eliminate the stakes of the cold war. reagan quoted lenin. example it is inconceivable that the soviet republic should continue to exist for a long period side by side with imperialistic states. ultimately, one or the other must conquer and. i found yesterday in files here at the that reagan knew a variation on this phrasing from lenin at least as early as 1962. reagan cited brezhnev about the correlation forces being on communism side. and he understood that lenin

said the same and that communists did not define coexistence as as detente did for reagan at the level grand strategy. the cold war not be wished away. ideal ism or made into routine of power politics, realism. as early 1961, reagan stated there can only be one end to the war. we are. it won't go away if we simply to outwait it. wars end in victory or defeat. and this is the strategic context in which to place reagan's famous. we when they lose. through peace. through strength, moral as he had taken lenin's seriously as a strategic thinker, reagan took the american and soviet regimes. the united states form of government was built on natural and god given rights. the consent, the governed, the rule of law and limited government. rights secured, not created by this republican form of government. reagan said this for decades in

opposition, the soviet union required the abolition of individual rights. the false promise and subsequent negation of collective rights. lack of consent. and the repression of. dissent. tyranny. and the unlimited state and party. when reagan referred in a 1975 radio commentary to, a disease like communism, he offered a regime judgment. and due to this understanding, the regime reagan distinguish between and illegitimate government. the soviet union, although a superpower in world affairs by dint of its military and natural resources, was, in reagan's view, an illegitimate regime. if it could go, it should go. this is the moral in which to put reagan's we when they lose. through peace. through. for reagan, ussr was not only illegitimate with respect to its government and its treatment of

the peoples within its legally recognized borders. but it was also an illegitimate empire with respect to the people's and nations that enslaved and threatened outside its legally recognized borders. for him, no moral equivalence could or should be made between opposing regimes of in the cold war. religious. reagan's deepest well of inspiration. his religious faith, is intertwined with the political strategic and moral. how did he look at god and the human condition at grace and flaws? at problems ultimately conquered faith, hope and love. and researching here this week, i have asked archivist if there are more letters to be found like the one karen tumulty discovered or so years ago from reagan's to his dying father in law of the theological virtues. reagan was a man of hope with faith and love. he in the triumph of good, not passively not fatalistic with man, and in practice americans

and others of goodwill are doing their part in god's divine. part of the reason that the cold war was winnable for reagan was that the genius of totalitarianism including its soviet communist was evil. this meant it should not ultimately could not stand forever. communism aimed to overturn what god had made all of creation including the highest part of his creation beings. for reagan it mattered that, man was made in the image and likeness of god. as a result, human beings were not to be reduced to mere matter, as in. god was omnipod. and so power could be used for good purposes. although reagan deeply with lord acton, that absolute power in the hands of human beings corrupts absolutely. for reagan, there was goodness propelling the exercise of power and through strength because he believed that freedom was morally right and communism was

wrong. those who dismissed sdi as star wars did not think reagan of either possessing or expressing a spiritual anthropology. in reagan presidency, a strain runs of discovering the anti-nuclear. reagan, rather than seeing that reagan never liked war or nuclear destruction, he was a committed cold warrior so that there would be no world war three or nuclear destruction. he held these points of principle similar heinously. yet critics regarded reagan as a warmonger. and i have been struck here at the library this week at how dominant this criticism of reagan was at the time it's all over the place in the files and sometimes these are the same commentators who see a reagan one and a reagan two rather than analyze reagan as a whole person who has prudently applied the same fundamental principles and the sets of circumstances he faced, and seeing that the subsequent actions of america

and other states went into his assessment and that he was capable of looking at short, middle and, long ranges. he was able keep his end in mind. so the big question then, what was that end in the peacemaker? will inboden analyzes reagan's pursuit of and success in bringing the soviet union to a negotiated surrender. he responds and builds on melvin lafleur's question about whether reagan aimed to win or to end the cold war. although the two historians reached different answers in both, inboden points out that reagan was by fdr. his insistence on unconditional surrender in world war two, but knew that similar demand against the ussr have been delusional and foolhardy. in the case of the cold war, instead, reagan combined pressure with diplomacy working against the soviet system while working soviet leaders in seeking to bring the kremlin to a negotiated surrender.

this is very helpful in examining reagan's peace through strength strategy by looking at what made reagan reagan by following him on his intellectual political practical experi henschel road to the white house. it seems that reagan always thought the cold war be won. he committed to and brought this perspective him to the white house. what we when they lose mean it meant the false and about the ussr ideology illegitimate regime rotting and corrupt state, and the true and positive about america and the west, as well as about those brave individuals and growing movements and communities wanting struggling to be free behind and from the iron curtain, bringing all he had seen learned, read and written and said since the 1940s about totality, arianism and communism into the 1980s. reagan identified the current

factors undermining ussr and helped to the conditions for the soviets ideological surrender. and this is the context in which to place surrender, negotiate and strategic by the ussr. reagan wanted to free held captive by despotism for. if the truth prevailed, then the legs could be kicked out from under the lies of the totalitarian. as president reagan called for and pursued the ideological surrender by the soviet union. in his grand strategy of peace through strength the evil empire and sdi speeches constitute a culmination of decades of thinking in reagan aimed to change the terms, debate and break the status quo. he believed that a victory, the level of ideology would morally disarm the enemy. political rhetoric, economic and prosperity. armed diplomacy, allied

relationships and well conceived. consistent pressure on the communist totalitarian were all essential to that strategic end. and in the midst of securing ideology, victory toward the end of his presidency, reagan extended magnanimity in victory. thank you. in talking about the arc of reagan's soviet rhetoric policies, i'm i'm boiling down a much larger project. i've written about all reagan's soviet speeches. i also wrote a book about reagan's great speech at westminster. i written with my friend, former and colleague john jones and much of that work, students sometimes say to a soviet policy that so dated with putin's invasion of ukraine and chinese

efforts to express power in. east asia. it doesn't seem very dated to me. there are three theories that are presented about the influence of reagan on in the cold war his cold war policies and rhetoric. there is a triumphal theory that simply says reagan, the cold war and enforced the soviet union into collapse. commentator charles krauthammer. reagan's policies because it involved real armies supported by the states but made them the soviets spend blood and pressure and defense of these outposts. and it led to a radical reconsideration of moscow about the costs of empire. i think this interpreted is quite simplistic because it minimizes or ignores reagan's consistent for arms control and reagan's consistent commitment to nuclear abolition. and you also have to understand, reagan, of course, forced the

soviets to do nothing. the soviets made decisions to do nothing, in part based on policies that reagan implement that imposed costs on them. a second view, which has been the reagan reversal view, very distinguished scholar fisher has developed this view and she argues, for example, the reagan administration pursued a hard policy only during its three years in office by of 1984. reagan was ardently pursuing rapprochement with moscow. he's a very sophisticated hearted analysis of the january 16th, 1984. the great, great speech. there is a third view that i have developed in these essays and i'm hoping to develop in a book that i sometimes have called reagan's rhetorical theory of the cold war and that view is not so much a refutation of the reagan reversal as a reenter her presentation of some

of the data arguing that reagan consistently on four primary strategies that these strategies evolved out in part in response to the rhetorical situation he faced example the evil empire speech part was aimed at undercutting the nuclear freeze, cementing support from evangelical goals, and that it played a crucial tactical role, and that these strategies also creating new conditions and that that allowed for the change tone that is so evident the january 16th, 1984 speech. and i point just as a starting point that reagan continued occasion very tough with the soviets. it's known, for example, that he used in ways that in fury aided gorbachev. and of course, the brandenburg gate speech. in a way, the most dramatic

moment when reagan challenges the soviets saying that they could prove that glasnost and perestroika was real. my opening this gate and tearing down this wall and and by the way defense spending did not begin to decrease in 1984. it in 1987. so i'm going to argue that there are four dimensions in was fundamentally a rhetorical. now why do i say it's fundamentally rhetorical abe reagan used major speeches. we know from any number of sources that reagan believed he could. the argument not only with the west, but that he could actually convince the soviet leaders of the superiority of the of democratic ideals. he was an idealist. john lewis gaddis has written about that, that reagan sought to break the to break the stale mate of the of the cold war with

the potency of ideas. but there's another way that the strategy was fundamentally and that is all the steps that the administration took were designed to send a message in that. i argue that the buildup not not preparation for war but was preparation for peace. that reagan did buildup to create the to have strong negotiating hand. and as soon as he thought had that hand, he immediately took steps to that led to the successful negotiations and that also explains i something that's been alluded to reagan's famous statement that that the only a appropriate strategy in the cold war is that we win and they lose because that strategy goal was

based in ideas. one more thing about that, reagan more than more than any other major political figure of the time understood the weakness of soviet union. yes, there were experts who recognized the weakness of the soviet economy. but reagan saw that before else, and he was often ridic fueled for those views and by policy commentary ideas of the time. so what are the four components in this strategy of the cold war that i see reflected across the arc of reagan's rhetoric throughout his presidency. the first one was to, in reagan's view, the truth about the soviet union and we know that reagan made any number of a harsh comments. and as i demonstrate later in the paper, these harsh comments on occasion continued after

1984. and even the great. january 16th speech included harsh. i wish i had time to make the argument in detail but the event and on and jim and sally passage of the most eloquent in all of reagan contained any implicit message that jim and sally could travel they want and ivan anana could not. so this strategy jack matlock referred to it as telling the truth about soviet union. reagan said, when i came into the office, i believe there have been some mistakes in, our policy. i wanted to do things differently, like speaking the truth them for a change. peter robinson, the great speechwriter, argued that reagan's insistence on telling the truth produced a trump like quality to his speeches, and i think that's especially evident in the great, great soviet speeches and goal of this was to

get the soviets attention. we know that he was successful in doing that after the speech, izvestia labeled reagan the new messiah. richard pipes said the london infuriated the russians more. anything else reagan had said. pipes added that reagan's response to him when he told that was so we touched a nerve. reagan wanted to touch a nerve to get their attention. he combine that with an arms buildup that as i have argued previously was not designed to prepare for war, but was designed to create a strong negotiating position. so that he could get real arms reduction. his objection, the previous arms control agreements had been that they had been limitation and not arms reduction. reagan said in his autobiography, i wanted to go to the negotiating table, end the madness of the mad policy.

but to do that, i knew america first had to upgrade its military capabilities so that we would able to negotiate with the soviets from a position of strength, not weakness. third, reagan's supported arms control and ultimately elimination of nuclear weapons. and he said this many, many times in public. but did. i remember at the time not that he made it thinking. it was entirely tactical. but we now know it was. not tactical. it was a very firm belief, even in the evil empire speech. reagan said, this doesn't we should isolate ourselves and refuse to seek an understanding with them. i intend to do everything i can to persuade of our peaceful intent to our mind, that was the west that refused to use its nuclear monopoly in the forties and fifties, something he said many times. and then he referenced his for a 50% cut in strategic ballistic

missile weapons. even in the evil empire always labeled the most incendiary of reagan's speeches. although possibly the first press conference might be in that as well, that reagan made clear commitment to arms control. now the linchpin of of this approach this grand strategy was defense of democratic ideals. i suggest to you that since the four freedoms speech, that the speech at west is the most important speech by president, talking about what western values, what what western liberalism means. there are wonderful pass and the speech where he makes clear commitment to democratic values. he echoed churchill when he said, from stettin on the baltic to varna on the black sea, the regimes planted by totalitarianism have more have had more than 30 years to establish violence. yet never say, but none. not one regime has. and i love this.

regimes planted by barnett do not take root. george w bush should have read that line before. we decided to invade iraq. i especially like passage that reagan wrote himself when he pitched the for democracy and freedom in the in the history of the west, beginning with the exodus from egypt. and then in a long rhetorical question and it's a long quotation, i'm going to read it to you because it is eloquent. the power of the democratic idea. and reagan wrote this himself who would voluntarily not to have the right to vote decide to purchase government propaganda handouts instead of independent newspaper prefer government to work out control unions, opt for land to be owned by the state instead of those who tell it want government repression of religious liberty, a single political party instead free choice, a rigid cultural orthodoxy instead a democratic tolerance and diversity.

and again and again, the truth and those words has been demonstrated often have have stifled dissent. but it remains that is that desire. ideas utterly central to reagan's policy. now there is evolution over time. in the beginning of his first term, reagan on getting the attention of the soviet sphere, the tough talk and the arms buildup, while also calling for eventual arms reduction and defending democratic values. after succeeded in getting the arms up and process there is a shift to greater focus on calls arms control. it's a shift. what i see as a shift in emphasis and when he proposes is the imf and that and the start and many of the beginning of cnf perceived it as an unfair but it

became basis for the actual treaty that was finally negotiated. i argue the principle that holds together that strategy is the defense of democratic ideals. reagan really that he could win argument and a situation in which it was in the interests of the soviets to change their policy. he was an ideal list and an old classical liberal. the consistency evolution present in reagan's cold war strategy and his rhetoric i think, reinforced judgment of gaddis that. reagan was a skillful politician as the nation has seen for many years and of its sharpest strategists think perhaps it also that american presidents should negotiate against the

studio chiefs first. and if if they did that, they would learn a great deal. now, i want to make the argument that this what i've called an evolution in his strategy is reflected across the arc of his rhetoric. i do not have time develop this. it now in the paper which really a very rough draft of about the first third of a book. i at the question of whether reagan consistently statements for arms control and statements affirming desire for peace between 1981 and 1983. and he did. and then i whether reagan continued to critique the soviet union and make other statements that were harsh in nature and defend an arms buildup after 1984. and i don't time to go through that today. i see that in all that the arc

of all his major soviet speeches. what this suggests is, i think, is that having coherent policy based in ideas that should be at the core of responding to threats to world peace from totalitarian governments. it seems to me that it has great relevance for how the united states and the west deal not only with putin and russia and but also in the future potentially with china. and so i the i see the evolution reagan's soviet rhetoric as demonstrating one final thing and you see this in the files and the speechwriting files that reagan the primary author of this strategy often over the pragmatists in his but also tony

dolan and the others who were let us say less pragmatic that reagan was the author this in the westminster speech. this is only one anecdote. but reagan either edited or wrote about 60% of the final speech. you cannot spend more than 5 minutes with speeches that edited. i remember. clearly when i first discovered that the realization that -- reagan was really because that skill editing reveals a very sufficient excited mind. thank you very much. well, we mostly kept to our time limits. and so we have time for some discussion. questions, comments comments. go ahead, roger that.

great to have all of you here. and thanks for that excellent set of presentations. i am curious, particularly for the last presentations, but welcome the entire panel to address this. what you see reagan doing prior to his election today as it relates to peace, strength, about his commitment to arms control reductions. your in the last presentation that really advance your theory and seems there's a lot out there on the record in terms of reagan working particularly in 1976 his election in 1981 that might events your work and your arguments. thank you. sure i'll start. you can tell from my presentation that i went earlier and earlier when i submitted my topic. i was going to be focusing on the two speeches, but then i just kept going backwards. so. so for me, when i said back to the 1940s, i mean, going back to the 1940s, but the period you're talking about lines up a lot in

terms of content and rhetoric with, the radio addresses and we know that reagan all of those. and so again know looking at his handwriting robin talking about is is both illuminating and fun and you just see over and over and over all these different themes are there that he's going to develop in terms of strategy and policy and expression. and there are i mean, there are many examples, but it's it's in area to it's in the military part. it's in the arms reductions argument. it's in his dislike and hatred of war, the real meaning of peace he has multiple addresses on the real meaning of he does two addresses on the declassification of nsc 68 a classic truman administration statement and human rights throughout. you get a lot on that too. so all the different pieces of reagan are there and it's if

he's been thinking it through writing about it, speaking about it and then he's just ready, go do it. and i'm struck by i forget where nancy reagan writes it. it might be in her own book, says that her husband always a writer and people didn't notice that and i think getting to spend archives shows that because you're seeing you know i went through the too even though we've seen both you the andersons books and and the brinkley edition of the the diaries and stuff, but it still makes a difference when you can immerse yourself in his because that's his brain as robert was saying. and let me add that i've done an analysis of the campaigns in 1980 that i think are consistent with the argument. i've made some of his speeches cite the famous debate. what robert kennedy and the sixties and the speechwriter say consistently that the first place they always started was mining. reagan's previous speech because they agreed that there was that

reagan was his own best speechwriter. so i say, i see continuity now as reagan assumed office. this happened both when he became governor of california and became president. and, you know, he said things with more nuance than he did as a private citizen. and to some extent that happened. that change happened when he was running for president. i could i just very quickly on that, tony dole and even says in various places interviews elsewhere that when people asked him how, did you write so well for reagan, he said, it's because i went and read reagan and you ever you should look at the last address and look that dole on draft night and then look at what reagan does to it. and there there are places reagan will mark out for paragraphs and be big, have a partial sentence and a link to another sentence. eight or nine paragraphs later

and if it doesn't read better and he has cut out things that would have unnecessary terribly offended people for no reason. and then you look at the things he wrote like of the passages i just mentioned, it's just magic. henry agree with so much what you said. need to focus on one point where you haven't persuaded and thought i was following your argument your book henry about reagan i'm going give you another chance. okay. um, i you say that he was a committed the i the discussion about leverage, right? capability. and what ever do i guess i'm parting a little bit with the effective it is that did you say arms control and abolition. right but it overlooks the fact that he was always still concerned. he was still realistic enough to understand that you got rid of

weapons and they use nuclear. you still were going to face a world, which i think you have to respond. what would you use to deter? and if in that picture then comes this this high concept that. yeah, but aren't and other words it seems to me kind of saying that he was an evolutionary if you got rid of the weapons you get rid of war it'll be great. i'm not saying that reagan definitely saw, you know, deterrence as a rhetorical purpose. you know, you build up so you don't to fight. i see that as he as well. you have we think i think, think, think. how many nuclear weapons between the u.s. and the soviet union before the start treaty and how incredibly dangerous it is becoming again as. the chinese are dramatically increasing the number of their nuclear with who knows what, kind of command and control and decision making processes. you know, i think reagan

recognized those risks and consistently used an buildup. yes he's for arms control but to maintaining deterrence and you've written eloquently about how reagan thought that you could have conventional forces had have added and have have deterrence once got to us and sdi regime. and of course, reagan the advice of virtually everyone wanted to share the sdi technology even eternal nationalized the sdi technology, which i think demonstrates what an ideal star he was. he's an old romantic liberal, classical liberal. so i know you in the south thank you all for your patience. and so, you know, for a panel on reassessing reagan's rhetorical legacy. it certainly makes sense that. you all focused on reagan's rhetoric, but to what extent in your work do grapple with the actual effects of implementing

of reagan era policies? and to what extent does the development and implementation of policies reflect the ideals that reagan touted? and then so it's just an open question for anybody who wants to tackle that. and then i did have a more specific question for randall, because of course, the iranian communist party supported khomeini in the revolution and so did you have you found any evidence that, you know, intel analysts or reagan were aware of that connection? and if they were aware that, why do you think reagan didn't make more of a big deal about connecting the threats posed the iranian revolution and the soviet union? yeah, i think so analysts had known connections between radical groups which they grouped there with the iranian communist party in talking the party for very, very long. but it goes back all the way. i mean, i've written about the eisenhower administration, and that was one of the rationales.

and so intelligence community i have come across a specific document that articulate that threat assessment, but that is in found within those within the larger frame of, iran in the soviet union's relationship, reagan tended not to talk about any type of middle eastern politics because he was his main commitment was to israel and to. and so insofar the 92 campaign, he wasn't to talk about iran as the soviets partner, but what he did say over and over and over again. and what you do find in all sorts of campaign documents is this illusion that the soviets are behind everything in the at least behind terrorism. they're behind hostage, they're behind the plo, they're behind they're behind everything. and so i if you're reading between the lines, you can see a type of where reassessment of iran as partner of the soviet union without wanting to declare that outright.

in terms of policy, what i would say is the main effect of the tilt of of reagan's demonization iran and seeing iran as an enemy i would say resulted in the tilt towards iraq. so obviously the united states start sharing geospatial intelligence. in 1984 is progressively more involved in helping the iraqi side. and then by the time bush comes office, has established a very close relationship with hussein regime. there. so i think that there's a sense in which reagan's rhetoric cover to these types of transformations, even though from what i have been able to tell, he wasn't minutely involved in a lot of the policy formulation specifically the iran-iraq war or persian gulf, specifically. allison, do you want to add anything on the relationship of rhetoric and policy? it's a great yeah, that's a great. and thinking about what is the relationship between, i think you said rhetoric and effects, right. of of describing or seeing a

particular narrative of the world and then does that do on a practical level? right. and so i would say very agree with what you're saying in this specific right of kind of providing cover. but i also, too, that, you know, for for individual citizens, not everyone concerned with the minute details, a particular, you know, sdi or star wars or particular of the world right now. so i think if we think about reagan's rhetorical legacy, more broadly, one of the things that he did do and accomplish is develop a vision for the nation that individuals could see themselves as a part of right. an example, i use with students in classes, i show them the 1984 convention film right. and that starts out with individuals being interviewed and saying, you know, see myself in this particular vision that he is describing, to be clear, you know, it's a vision some americans cannot see themselves in. right. but i think that that that vision and that narrative encapsulates these policy proposals. so even if you have a public that maybe doesn't care about sdi on a technical level, they

do, you know, see themselves as a part of this anti communist narrative such as, you know elizabeth was talking about and i think that's where that that nexus of rhetoric and in fact, rhetoric and policy comes in right. is that rhetoric can both a producer history and it also provides individuals a narrative that they can see themselves as part of the policy even if they don't care about the minority else. let me add one other thing that in a way, rhetoric can become the ideology. i'm thinking of the most famous line in the first inaugural address in this present crisis, government is not the solution. government is the problem. but that has become that became just orthodox, conservative of policy and an essay the on the first inaugural i've written how may figures and conservatism referred to that as doctrine and? by the way, the introductory

phrase in this present crisis was largely lost in that and it became simply an anti-gay government philosophy. think of how that different that is from the environmentalism of richard nixon for example or even the montreal accords that were that were created that were negotiated during the reagan administration and that dealt with the ozone crisis, where there was a pragmatic that those words helped transform into a simply an conservatism. hi, i'm richard marsh from at the fighting to get back to sdi. the question for anybody that wants to answer how much was the reagan truly believe in the technology and, the ideas behind sdi? how much was just a matter of of rhetoric or getting to this this bargaining position and then

establishing a position of strength in the negotiations. is there a way to to know that? is anyone have an answer? well, again, from the 1970, he i mean, he at nuremberg. yeah. an had an interest. yeah. so when he realized this was a thing he came very interested in it and what was the goal technologically so i mean the evidence you know what see including insert what's in his handwriting and that he wrote for the sdi speech shows that he thinks this and b, even though it's a dream that he's talking about, he's saying in a bold and he believes he believes in america and americans ability to to create to develop so all of that i think meant for him. it was a real thing. and part of the reason he never wanted to write, he thought it was a real thing could be used to bring about real if he had

thought of it as just strategy, he would have given it away a rank ec because he was very close to, you know, even bigger arms, arms reduction, an agreement. my rating is reagan was really very good on larger ideal, logical questions. but technical questions. i think you're exactly right. he had faith in the scientists and, you know, he didn't need a lot of other details. go ahead. hey, gracie's university of connecticut. so this is a question just for anybody who wants to take it. but in rhetoric. there is always an. and so i was wondering how each of you it seems implicitly for many of you you're kind of assuming the audience is domestic or like an american public who who do you do for each of you, do you think is the audience of this rhetoric that you're talking. well, for my project, what i presented today as part of a

larger project that analyzes the core images and metaphors that reagan used to describe book. so for iran, specifically i think that the metaphor that he used of strategic interests picture right of this one big battle, everyone's one side or the other side. and those logic to kick. and so part of that audience question has to do with how does that core image get picked up by outlets or by other politicians or by the political opposition as, as reagan and his team himself. there's a question of not just audience, but who is the audience? how are they receiving it? how are they recirculating the ideas, even if they disagree with them? so in my project, that's what i'm tracking, is how do these core images get reproduced across multiple contexts in terms of audience? so i mean, there's obviously dozens of figures you could name, but clearly my case study,

the primary audience would be the american as well as the international scene, because reagan is sending messages to iran why he would consider a red line. he is also sending to american allies reassuring them that we will protect them. there's this larger question looming in the of what is the relationship of this conflict to wider american foreign policy that the rhetoric is aimed at for audiences an american audience he needs to maintain for the arms buildup up at the end of the at the end of his presidency maintain for the arms control agreements against. conservative opposition the time many conservatives who are very skeptical and some of that's tactical as i said responding to the nuclear freeze. there's a european audience because there's a major anti-nuclear movement. and he's especially concerned with the west germans because he's got maintain support, because it's putting the pershing's into europe is the linchpin of the strategy of

creating that negotiating to get rid of the intermediate range nuclear weapons, which are incredibly dangerous. so a narrow audience. he's he's obviously speaking to the soviets. he does he's saying that were true, that presidents never said because he wants to get their attention. he's also speaking to the people of warsaw pact and know from their reaction which was about half a second after the end of the soviet union, they asked to join nato. how effective that message was in combination with their own experience. so i think those are the four crucial audiences. you know, there's a statement about reagan that he didn't need a pollster because he had an intuitive understanding of american people. i think he had a very sophisticated understanding audience and multiple audiences. i completely agree. always audiences in mind and one example echoing that, robin talking about for the evil

speech, there's story about how the story about how behind the iron curtain prison, natan sharansky that the the found out about it because the guards let them read pravda he finds out about it by reading soviet sources and then he taps out from isolation on the walls in the way that they did. oh, my gosh. the president of the united states called it an evil empire. you know, keep fighting. and so we know this is just one story, but we know many where it mattered and it helped to create really these conditions. like i said, where people were fighting from within, behind the iron curtain, as well as the kind of pressure that the united states was leading the west to do from outside. so i think it's it's really, really important to keep the multiple audiences in mind and reagan did i would just add very

briefly several people have noted the importance of looking at the archives. and i think know there are always multiple audiences at play but also looking at particular moments and speeches, very particular audiences and the desire to reach specific ones. and i'll just say the third example that i mentioned, reagan's speech at point of hawke, one of the best descriptions that speech in the process of writing that speech is in peggy noonan's what i saw at the revolution and she talks about how she wanted the american public watching at home because that speech was timed precisely to coincide with the 8 a.m. morning news cycle on the east, which is why. and they went through a lot of discussions with french officials fighting over that time in the white house is adamant that it had to be at like 2:12 p.m. right. because it's going to be at 8:12 a.m. but noonan has this incredible passage where she says, my goal was to write so that the president describe what these u.s. army rangers did so that

the teenagers were eating their rice krispies would pause and stop and say that really? because at this moment in u.s. foreign policy right is post vietnam and thinking about how do we see vision in the world in this particular. so that was a very specific audience right that noonan was trying to reach and at the same time, it had multiple effects that as it moved out in the campaign film. and it's it's a passage that is still replayed at various conventions. right. and so i think thinking about those multiple audiences also tells us something the very specific rhetorical purposes in an individual speech. where at the very end, i want say one more thing, use my my role as moderator here. i think reagan was also a way speaking from the past future americans. and i want to point to two passages. one in the first inaugural and one in the great westminster speech, where he spoke to us. the importance of our democracy.

saying here in the first inaugural, he talked the transition of power as miracle, that almost no other country in the world could claim. i think reagan, if he were here today, he said we should remember miracle and protect it. and at the end of the westminster her speech, he spoke of the moment when church at the very end of the second world war when churchill lost an election and he praised him for wrecking rising the importance of democratic norms and leaving power and noting that he came back again on it seems me the greatest importance of of reagan ultimately is in his rhetoric is for that defense of democratic values as central to the american story and. his belief that ideas could mountains and they did in the cold war and perhaps they can

again so thank very much.