now a discussion on the war of europe means in ukraine. we'll highlight peace talks and define what victory would mean for both sides. from the center from international studies this program is just over an hour. on c-span2. >> [inaudible conversations] >> good morning, good morning and welcome to cfis. i'm delighted you are here with

us in person and joining us online. this is for what i think will be an interesting discussion. we are here to discuss a new report. this, of course is the famous thinkk tank in in the u.k. and we'll talk about the report. it's entitled how to end russia's war on ukraine and save the future. it's written not just by cure but many authors at chatham house. we'll discuss the potential for a peaceful settlement of the war and promises and pitfalls and what the report should outline. prior to the war, in fact in russia at the peace table to try to negotiate the settlement. let me introduce our three

panelist here. my job and this is basically to kickoff the discussion and get out-of-the-way. we have three excellent panel then, to my far left is sam green, the director for the democracy for the democratic resilience program. professorru of russian pol sick. he founded and directed the kings russia for 10 years. the people i go to when trying to understand what's going on insidens of russia. fix in the middle and senior

fellow for europe at the council on foreign relation. political scientist and german andn european security transalantic relations. particularly used to reside in berlin. you are now here in washington. maybe we'll kickoff theco conversation by handing it off to outline the report and give us the highlights of why did you all want to write the report and what did you find? >> thank you very much. thank you for having me here and my colleagues. it's a great pleasure to be here and in this room.

we spoke about how russia was preparing and we are dealing with the i results. thank you for introducing the reportrt how to end russia's war on ukraine. this isn a plea to find ways toa durable and viable end to the war in ukraine. then you can look at how not to end the war in ukraine. it's a breakdown of proposals and lead too much worst situations. not just for ukraine the youngest people have an interest in a secure and prosperous europe. there is a common theme to the

topics. peace fire and compromise. all ofti the different things he been put forward as roots to peace. a the common theme identified is all of them display a greater fear of the feet of russia. on the centuries all experience of looking at russia and it has to be said being consistency right about russia and how to deal with the challenges and how not too. they arrived at the conclusion of defeat for ukraine is more dangerous than ukraine being assisted to victory. it's a collective conclusion.

it s needs to be increased by te a significant factor. the tie to ukraine is now. we want to increase aid to ukraine many months ago. looks at the political aspect. >> some were a bit surprised. everything possible could be done to assist ukraine and has been done. that sounds exhausting if you

float that idea. despite the fact aid from the unitedm states has been the greatest in termshe of volume. also measure it in terms of capabilitynd and proportion. you see, the distinguishing future of the united states by comparison of other countries. they provide the capabilities. now, of course, ukraine is paying the price. that reluctance is repeated in the face. this is f not the case ukraine n be aided without triggering the escalation of peoples fear. it's together with nuclear weapons. the second thing that sounds surprising is if you look at it from this context that's aid to

ukraine has been successful. it's the necessaricy of supporting ukraine and not provoking the nuclear escalation. that defines success as no nuclear launch. they would be launched in the first place. wheneverin we hear people laying out their expectations it's far more t successful a long-term russian information and influence campaign. when i say long-term i mean going back over decades and not just the current war than an objective appraise sal of the appraisal of russia using nuclear weapons. we don't arrive on that because weep covered that in a previous report. how russia uses nuclear threats

to shape response to aggression. the answer is very, very, successfully. we heard the argument it's hard to donate sufficient capabilities to ukraine and ensureur a victory because of te concern with the looming conflicts withe china. we think there s is an argumentf speeding it up. in order that, the window is dealing with that problem while china has an threat. atthis is one more reason to reduce the threat from russia in order to make europe more secure and tackle the issue while we can. so, all of these are the basic assumptionsti behind the proposs of bringing the war to ukraine to an end that we believe will make it worst and not better. it needs to achieve a major

victory. in order for russia to succeed it needs to carry on doing what it's doing and sit-in control of ukrainian territory and hammer the economy to make it hard to function. itmy needs to exploit the reluctance of western partners and ity needs to wait. it needs to exploit the fact there are limited patients and political cycles in the primary western backers that leads to russia's advantage. once again, this is an urgent problem dealing with if we can't do it several months ago this would have been the best option. we are now towards the end of a long tour of capitols. the team has arrived hereafter being in berlin, brussels

paris. i haven't thought about this before. we are s trying to get the messe across about this report. we have time to get the message across and the time is now. this is i the window, in which, decisions can be made and have a generational effect on ukraine. that's whyhy we are pulling out all of the stops. we plead for mistakes to be made. i thank everybody that has come to listen to this today and everybody online. thank you for your attention and hearing us. i'm grateful to see what colleagues think of the report. >> ith realize, when i introduce the panel i failed to introduce myself. i'm max. i'm over the program at cis. i'd like to ask you one question

to start off with. the question of nuclear escalation and signaling that it's oftentimes described as the united states could push harder. they could go farther. we could provide weapon systems that we arete not providing. l the long-range strike that will become infamous. this is because of escalatory reasons. the other side would say, they ehave the balance right. all they are providing in providing these weapons to ukraine. they gradually escaladed and oiled the frog and russia is used to what the west is doing. if you inject a system that would provide shock or surprise, othat could be a trigger in whh

russia may respond, also, an extension of that, there are the limits on ukraine to not strike russian territory. do you think they are well-founded or gradualous approach not just in the united statesro but other countries hae been doing that prevented a nuclear escalation or are those false arguments. >> you will find success no nuclear launches have been undertaken. is thathu doesn't rest on an objective appraisal of what they might actually do. it's notng a sudden shock when it's debated for months during the political holdups before a decision has been taken. in terms of the repeated proof, this is not a cause for putting

a complete break on straights. we not only had the iterations through the systems in the past. months later, also, we have an examplese of european partners o have slightly lost patients. withco the straight about russin and nuclear intimidation. we want- to demonstrate this. provided challenges and nothing bad would happen. >> the problem courses and it comes again. you said, it is an over capacit. >> this is through russian territory r and it's unpractical

and moral ground. we are protecting russian. >> especially when it happenedda long time ago. as long as we assist russia in pretending toh the population. the warar is happening far away. >> it goes intoct effect. >> we are cluing. this is one of the reasons why it's so baffling. as to why the constraints have been o put in place before bedrk and the fundamental assumptions when so many of them have been demonstrated by events that are completelyev false. >> i'd like>> to turn to you yor

thoughts on the report and fallacies that the report points out and argues that this is a fallacy that war should be settled at the negotiating table. wdo you think there is a potentialar negotiating partnerr will it be extremely difficult to have any lasting settlements with putin on the other side of the table. >> i'd like to say how important andta useful this is. we recommend this report to anyone. ise think, sometimes it's very confusinge especially with whats going on. wend are now trying to find a wy through the arguments through

negotiations. just for handing this out at home. i think what the report identifies is that's the best option to end the war with russia. that's something we would agree with. we would like ukraine to have it's territory back. the caveat i'd make at this point isis that the progress demonstrates it's not that easy. i mean, we are in a position that's not ukraine's position but this years position with russia having it. it's really hard. it's hard on a human level for

ukrainian soldiers. one could make it if they would have strategized. i any there are many arguments to make but it's hard. you s have soldiers that have to go through that. that's whygo we don't see this magic success we have seen last year with the counter offenses. i mean, to, you know, put into question the counter offenses. it's important to be careful with optimism. i think something changed with the counter offenses. that's the definition of who is winning and who is on the losing side. it was russia attacking most of the time.

the success we are able to push russia. now that you are going in it's more difficult to be on the defense. now this has changed. for russia and putin it has changed. they are demonstrating victory on ukraine. that's sort of changed it a bit. mr. putin and the impact and incentivized to wait and incentivizes to wait. it incessantizes to wait any domestic troubles will not. it won't cause the fall from power. it incentivizes to wait holding

out to get the moment for russia. i was wondering for the west if that's f a challenge, we can't fight for ukraine. we can't be the ones managing equipment. ukraine has tore do it. we contribute to make this initial offering it's just resounding defeat. you change the political counter offenses. the two points changing the political contextat of ukraine. this is something we can influence. wehe can decide where ukraine place will be in europe. it's not about territory and defeat. de it's about bringing ukraine home to the west. i do think that's something where we will deliver in

victory. we conquest to this giving ukraine a political home. that's why we have aided them. in wuss mentioned there. it wasn't created to spend a lot of time thinking about the formulation we had. there must have been something and invited ukraine into nato and made it clear. the other part is the u membership.er that's something that's the harder part is probably not with ukraine. it's about the youth we had. it will take longer and difficulte. to achieve. i don't see the kind of urgency there. they want ukraine and nato

before they want them in the e.u. if that's the case, we come into an exit situation. i don't see the urgency chasing this u membership and goes indi parallel with the discussion. we have p a clear commitment we have h control of the political process.li establishing reality. that's something that wasor missing and i'd like to add to the victy of the report. >> i'd like to bring you in and do a quick plug for the report we did about looking at ukraine e.u. membership. the e main conclusion we came to is the bias question if they

weread ready to join and in a wartime situation. you have to adopt the whole body. it takes a long time and it's complicated. very quickly, can the eu adopt a country of 45 million people that has5 a huge agricultural sector. it will be a huge impact for the budget. that's the question we haven't seens enough progress on e e.u. reform. what you hit on at the end is the crux of this. where ukraine would like a european western future and to be part of the european union. that helped kickoff the last nine years in 2013 -- 10 years i now in 2010 when protests emerges in kyiv about wanting an association withn the european union and russia wanting to kep

them out of that. so,p i'll turn to you for comments and report. it strikes we are at a fundamental impasse there wouldn't be a long-term negotiation peace here given the two separate desires. way we have a negotiated peace is one side can see they are not going to desire their current state. russia wanting ukraine back in andk ukraine wanting a european future. yeah. [ laughter ] >> i'll get[l to that in a second. i i'll start with the report. it's an excellent report. we did interviews about

ukraine. you have this under the table and read it once per week until it's over. it's coming up again and again. it's appropriate to identify the new report as you do as fallacies and myths. they comebi up and go around. they eat your brain if you are not careful. i have eaten a lot of brains and continue to. thank youo for that contribution. the timing is. th very importan. mood music has shifted and i think around the defensive work connection could be achieved through a -- to ukraine.

they arere not just doubts in ts town and elsewhere about whether we should have six teams. what degree they could make. thee ability to achieve that. i'm not convinced they are based on analysis as an emotional sensee of what's going on. that's just the nature of war. there is another, this is maneuvererring over to max's question. in all of the fallacies it's the sense we are more concerned about russia than we are about ukraine. there ise. another one that is they all think about the

stories. think aboutut the war in terms that are limited to ukraine. rather than r thinking about the warhe in terms of the interest f western powers. dthat allows you to control in process parity and security. certainly throughoutri the post war period. the postcode war period. maybe that's because some of that canha be taken in london ad we think about it. the only major nato member across the party consensus. what we see, together a greater recognition of the interest that are involved in this war. it's jot just a moral argument and why we should be supporting

the democracy or standing up to bullies or it's just the right thing to do. it's the recognition that the world that emerges if russia wins the war or frankly, if ukraine doesn't win the war. a world we won't want to live. it'st a word of less trade, process parity. pair -- prosperity. we should be worried about the signal it sends to china. i worry about how do we protect ourselves if the global system won't do it for us. there is, i think, it's not

red rick -- rhetoric. we think ability how to convince russia to let us in. how a do we convince them to lee us alone; at the same time, a parallel a negotiation is convincing europe and the u.s. twhat we need. not just to win the war. theht integration into western structureses that will leave

ukraine in a better place down the road. there is a greater recognition in europe but it won't work unless the u.s. understands it's fundamentally in the interest of security and process parity. not just a defeat because it didn't achieve things that putin spoke about on the 22 of february 2022. we have fundamentally, we established the rule of the global order in which we'd like to live. i'd like to turn to focus a bit on inside of russia. obviously, it's very momentous events over the last few weeks. putin might not be as strong of

a man as we believed. i'm curious, from the report. it highlights apart of what we are also after, trying to support ukraine is change within russia. i think,, one of the kind of premises we need to reassess is whetherd a long war favors russia. a long war with it's size and mass and the west going soft and not being able to maintain support, that would really play into russia's hand. we aress already seeing cracks n the regime. cracks there the defense. i'm curious, here, if providing our a support for ukraine or putting u a dollars figure with the model we'll provide 35 billion over 10 years or

3.5 billion perld year. thatha would demoralize the kremlin farther. they go off and an american section thatn would turn the otherhe way. do you think a long war plays into russia's hand? maybe we'll go to you karen and then sam? >> does a long war play into russia's hand? putin believes this. if it's isolated from the amount of g objectives as it might see. . if it's as misguided in the invasion it's not possible. it's seen from within the kremlin. he can wait it out. the language being used about it

for as long as it takes we must define what the it is. this isin when conditions are met.nd it's encouraging. no, we don't have as you say staying t power and find a way o eex-- move out. they will be no change in the attitude that russia has that you spoke about earlier. first of all, it's entitled to deminion. not just ukraine but the other countries putin set out his ambitions to gain control of. also the military aggression is the best way to achieve it. that's not going to change unless and until it's demonstrated that it's a mmistake.

that's the first step-in a long process. not just the kremlin's leadership but society as a whole. the place it deserves to be. we spoke about where russia is. it's entitled to ukraine and ukraine by the contrast would join the west that's not resolvable withouto a direct military. that shouldn't be news because we have riten about this for a long time. thebe contradiction between the two sides. it will all shift and demonstrates to russia. it's's undeniable and ambiguous.

this is an essential component of that. he's right to say when there are other ways in which ukraine caught wind. it's not a substitute for ukraine regaining it's territories. for years they were under russian f military and demonstrating on behalf. it's the end of the world that russia made a mistake. just additional extras after the mental needs to do that. >> putin has rebuilt around this war. itus justifies the relationshipe

has. in is sensorship and oppression on different levels throughout russian society. it justifies the fact that you cannot generate wealth and come for citizens. to such an extent it's rather impossible to imagebl moving awy from it. his calculation is he needs, if not temperatures of fighting but a very real and imminent context with ukraine. this is of hiss power. i don't think it's a question to keep the war going. this war and his regime at the moment are inseparatable. i have a hard time imaging things changing in that regard.

i have seen a lot of things and had a hard time with that before. ii think we have to be clear. we could also see the troops on the border ahead of the war. it was clear that the war would happen butle it remained unclear why it would happen. we could see we would lead to the kind of conflict we saw emerge between the certain extent. the kremlin explaining the decisions that the russian elite made and kremlin made. decisions and made later. it remains a puzzle, something we're working on, but i think we have to be humble and our policy makers need to be humble when we're thinking about the predictive ability that we have in russian politics. what that means is that if

we're building a policy that tries to achieve an end to the war via change in russia, not only are we getting it the other way around, the change in russia is predicated on how this war ends, i agree with keir on that, but we're taking shots in the dark because fundamentally we don't have that kind of ability in russia, we can have more leverage one is to limit the war to a certain extent. the politics of integration are other things and i think while it's tempting to think that there might be some peaceable way to do a resolution that lies via political change in moscow, we've seen no evidence that we can actually create that change or even incentivize that change or even that we

understand what sorts of policies would lead to that kind of change. >> and liana, i want to return to you. you dodged my earlier question. >> i know, back to that. >> and a better place to address it where i think what sam is sort of outlining is that the war has become extension existential to putin. at what point can putin negotiate something that's existential. >> and i think i dodged it because of the question, prigozhin on russia's side. and i think there's an idea in this town that there's this kind of magical transmission bell between ukrainian military victory or military victor. during the counter offensive, and then the sort translate into diplomatic leverage and then you go to the negotiation

table and putin says well, this didn't go as well as i planned and well, let's negotiate. i think the logic behind this transmission bell is not clear to me. it's not clear why even if putin suffers further defeats he should go to the negotiating table, basically he's bombing and offering to sell russian grain for free to african country and demonstrated negotiations and not something which he sees as an off ramp. so that's why i'm very skeptical about this kind of, now, translation of military leverage into the problematic leverage -- i would say it's something limited to putin himself because it is his war and if we think about changes in russia domestically and isn't it -- if we go as far as the successes to putin which might show up if, you know, if he-- only if he leaves the stage by

an opportunity that might show up in a different scenario because the elite have seen what happened to people and certainly didn't have a deterring effect on them and i think there's one scenario to consider and certainly not a liberal democratic russia emerging, where should that come from. there's one area to consider, which is more like-- i mean, a leader who comes up who is not necessarily worse than putin, i think that's what we're most afraid of after the prigozhin scenario, is not necessarily better than putin, but kind of said, well, the worst of putin is something that we have to get rid of as autocratic, and putin was convinced about the necessity of the war, but still are they willing to think about negotiations to prevent the kind of economic disaster that russia is going into. so, i think thinking about the negotiations, that's why there's the category like the putin scenarios where we have

to think about negotiations, the negotiations with putin, especially throughout the next year, again, until the u.s. election or something which at least to me seems very unlikely. >> yeah, i think the -- i agree that the kind of potential for negotiation to me really would be someone coming after putin that wants to sort of extricate russia from a lost war, but then has to be seen, i think, as a lost war. i wanted to bring up the-- what you sort of started with. liana, when were you talking about the counter offensive and potential for stalemate. right now i think washington, ukraine, everyone on the west is sort of depressed that the counter offensive didn't produce a miraculous sort of victory. the russian military hasn't collapsed suddenly although we've seen political instability. but let's just sort of look ahead in a pessimistic scenario if the counteroffensive doesn't

go as well as hoped, there's a relative stasis on the ground. this is essentially the scenario that we saw post 2014-15 when russia seized crimea, when russia seized the donbas there was fighting. ukraine fighting and russia, then the peace process. what do you-- keir, what would you say, we have to be practical here, ukraine is not going to be able to take back all of its territory and there should be some sort of peace, some sort of cease-fire, even though it's temporary they'll need the breathing space to potentially prepare for round three. do you think that that's what some of the peace negotiations are about, basically negotiating halftime and how long that will last? >> i wondered who the they you

meant was. it is, explained. quite a bit in this report russia to take a breather and this is why it's an aspect of the freezing in the conflict at the moment. we see as with the minz agreement, it provides an excuse for them to look away. it serves russia throughout and provides an fig leaf for abandoning support that ukraine so desperately needs. in the progress of the counter offensive and the outcome of n.a.t.o. summit, ukraine has fallen victim to expectations what unrealistic and yet widely shared. we have them everywhere, there was the expectation that there might be a reposition of the autumn of last year offensive and rapid territorial gains in spite of the months that russia has spent with that breathing

space provided by the lack of support to ukraine. after all, who remembers the spring offensive that never happened, to set up those plans to make it harder for ukraine to achieve what it wanted especially because, as you said, the onus of victory has been placed on ukraine, but the victory is being demanded without the key components to actually achieve it and ukraine now being expected to prosecute a counteroffensive without the tools and capabilities that any n.a.t.o. military would consider absolutely necessary to do it is once again paying the price in blood for that. there need to be not only a revision what is being provided to ukraine, but clearer communication that the fact that ukraine is facing at the moment are a result, in large part, of the decisions that have been made by western capitals and the biggest that it would surgeon into a

self-fulfilling prophesy. those would be comforted is not succeeded because they didn't provide assistance that they wanted and therefore a negotiated settlement is the way to go. so you can see a certain amount of satisfaction from those who have argued against support for ukraine in the stalling, as they put it, in the stalling of the offensive and rapid gains have not been made. and that for ukraine and european security just like the minz agreement, and giving them a satisfies fire agreement. >> sam, turn to you, it seems what's critical her is that ukraine is going to have to keep fighting and keep fighting to keep trying to take back

territory and that will rely on the west and you talked about european resolve, and i think we've in fact seen that with a number of recent announcements and commitments and security guarantees and that have been-- when we project out, do you think that-- how do you see this sort of war proceeding? do you think the ukrainians will just keep going if the gains are hard fought? are we going to enter a kind of world war i style years and years and years and eventually one side essentially breaks? >> look, i'm not a military analyst so i'm going to be very careful about this. i'm also not-- i'm a russianist and not ukrainianist, and to interpret ukrainian society.

however, we're seeing things that worry me and they should be worrying a lot of us. i think that there is, and i think remains a commitment in ukraine to the complete restoration of ukrainian sovereignty and integrity. there are not unreasonable questions whether or not ukraine can achieve that given the level of support both military and political that they're receiving from the west and all of these stories to embattled with are heard loud and clear among ukrainians, both ordinary citizens and decision makers. and the sacrifices that they are making. pale in comparison. we complain about oil prices and that sort of thing. it has been said, you know, that everything that we are losing is replaceable and so

much of what ukraine is losing is not. they feel that keenly. and are inevitably going to face decision about how long could they keep this going and should keep this going, given uncertainties about what we will provide. they need to know that there is something at the end of the road to fight for and to the points about euro atlantic integration, but also need to hear from us clarity about what the "it" is and keir said, that we are aiming for. now, i think we do have to be-- put it this way. it's not wholly unreasonable for western politicians, including the administration here, to leave some flexibility when it comes to what the --

strategic ambiguity does have a role to play and keeps russia guessing in ways that might be useful. also i think recognizes the fact that what we're really aiming for here is ukrainian victory ukrainian terms and ukraine at the end of the day will have to be the one that defines that. we need to be alive to the prospects. that, you know, ukraine and ukrainians themselves will determine when it's time to stop, but the worst thing we could possibly do is set the conditions in which they will do that. because that then lays the groundwork for fiscal responsibility, resentment and for a ukraine that, in fact, becomes the key to european

insecurity in the long run rather than security. >> we have about 10 minutes left and i want to take some questions for the audience and i want to go to liana. and i should have asked you what's the thinking of russia? we've talked about the kremlin, but russian public, see attitudes shifting towards this war in some way that strikes me we were in the united states after the invasion of iraq. it took two years for the democratic party, we forget, to turn against, fully against the war. and that once you're in it, the country tends to rally around it. is that what's happening in russia or are we start to go see cracks about really understanding about wanting to pursue this war? >> so, with again some circumspection because the information that we have from

russia. there is a reality around the -- it is an emotional kind of euphoria that does connect people to one another and make it very difficult for people to interpret this war in ways that may be that adhere more closely to reality, but i think there is softness of a kind, which is is that adhere rent to that party line. even now with all the repression we've seen, it's fundamentally generated by people being afraid of things or being hit on the head by stepping out of line and generated by people's fear of stepping out of line in their social circles and becoming ostracized and seen as untrustworthy and somehow as unrussian. if they criticize the war. which means that people are very closely attuned to the conversations they have around the kitchen table in their social media groups, and with their colleagues and their

neighbors. when that begins to shift, i think there's very little evidence that there's much leverage that the kremlin has and drag those conversations back on board and as a result, we see much more sort of rhetorical commitment to this war than we see behavioral commitment to this war and we're still not seeing people lining up to volunteer, to fight. we're not seeing un-- grass roots rallies in support of the war. we're not seeing campaigns-- there are some people. there will always be some people. but we're not seeing, i think, a population driven to to support this war in ways which would sustain it beyond say the interests of putin or russia. >> okay. >> yes, just to add to that, i think one element of this kind of support is kind of -- one

often hears talking to westerners, in touch, saying we might not believe everything our media says and obviously they're not talkling about, you know, the sacrifices in ukraine and how hard it is there and we hear from the soldiers going there and coming back, but at the same time we also don't believe what the west says, right, and this kind of moral equivalence, this lack of beliefs that there is a truth out there that you can report, it's something which has been trained with -- trained in russia for so many years and that putin with this idea that everything is spined. both western press and whatever the -- and it ends up being much closer to the russian position which is much more extreme than what is reported in the west and i think that that will make it so difficult in the end to have this kind of acknowledgment and not to end up in the space of-- that we've seen after many other wars, which is, well,

we've done mistakes, but it's not that we deserve the kind of treatment that we get. it's not that we deserve, you know, putin and so on, and this is part of the broader war of the west and of n.a.t.o. again, that's something difficult to fight. also one thing to look out for is the presidential elections in russia next year, and it's not about the results, but it's about basically how the presidential administration prepares for that, and how much effort they have to put into making these elections work in the way they want them to work. i think there has been some reporting about, you know, taking back some social reforms. we need to make sure on the socioeconomic side people remain calm, but the question for me is, will putin think, well, it doesn't matter anymore, i just fake as much as i can to get the numbers that i want to get or does he actually see that he needs legitimacy

and has to put effort into making subtle attempts to make these elections look in his favor and i think his recent selfie tours he's done among the russian population shows there was some insecurity about his support with the russian population, which to me suggests, this is something he'll try to get back on track to the idea that he is supported by the broader public and has support and not just being-- >> so we have time for maybe one or two quick questions if anyone has a question. we'll go to the question in the back. if you could ask the question and introduce yourself. >> yes. bob benson, center for american progress. the question i have for the panelists and thank you for the excellent conversation and, max, for hosting.

if you could speak about the intersection of the domestic. we've flirted with the popularity of the support for effort in ukraine, but haven't necessarily gone into the domestic side of the question with the upcoming presidential election and republican primary candidates and we know the story, but also, if you speak in germany, 22% in the polls and democratic back sliding within the alliance and in hungary, and some of these issues will be helpful. >> i think this is a great way to close. maybe we'll go reverse order and sam, we'll start with you and liana and then keir. >> it's a really important question. and i would come back to something i started with, specifically, you know, how we talk about the war. and the biden administration,

you know, may have reason for this, but they have spoken about the war in moral terms and political terms to the american public, but not in national interest terms and i think that's a mistake. i think it's a mistake partly because as we've seen in the u.s., morality is debated and debatable and in many segments of society, so what is seen by the administration of one party is moral, likely to be seen highly immoral by the opponents almost because it would establish. but also, i think because when you do put things in natural security terms and explain it to people, it becomes very much harder for the other side to campaign against it and it becomes a more sustainable, i think, project down the road. at the end of the day what we want is for the support to

continue regardless who wins the presidential election here. so my -- my wish is that the u.s. establishment would take a page from the-- some of the conversation that is we hear in london and paris, and even in berlin. i take the spanish elections with losing 40% of their seats in the spanish parliament, also as a sign, not all is lost on that front. >> liana. >> it's funny being in this town. ...

suspicious of who will -- but looking, to save the support for ukraine is really surprising, surprisingly stable because all the european countries, there are some outliers but otherwise instead of public opinion the west needs to support ukraine is still very strong. we need to thank vladimir putin for that because is not called down in this installation he continues to keep the issues in the news and really ingrained it in the public debate about the rise of the kind of support. the good news about that, the right wing party in germany they jumped from 9% in 2021 parliamentary election canal 2021-22% is pulling for the good news about that it's not about ukraine. it's not because he come out and say we should negotiate with

them, going support this right wing in germany. it's mostly about the population being overwhelmed by the shot they have experienced, the pandemic, the energy price shock which was particularly hard in germany. and now there was long pushed especially by the green party in germany to make some quick changes in climate law, especially on heating. that something which is completely overwhelmed everyone. ended on the other hand, how the way the party coalition interlinked evans because he cannot satisfy the old voters because they have to hide these compromises and a coalition which is not meant to be, this kind of party coalition. i do expect these figures will go down there we have elections in germany in 2025. wants to go to the voting box is a different question but it's

something which the broader politics in germany has to address pickets at something which is necessarily involving ukraine spirit keep it brief because i know you're right, support for ukraine, european public remains relatively stable. stable at different levels. it is very high among those frontline states that recognize precisely what is at stake because the next in line pickets much lower in this country that seem to have distance. the common factor across the whole of europe and of america not just here but broadly is a failure generally to explain to public what general is at stake, but the implications would be of a life ukraine to be defeated, or even align russia to o solidify the gains it's made at the moment. that is something which is generally lacking from the public debate unfortunately is a key ingredient of the reluctance that we still see in most european countries especially those that are west of poland to

take an interest in funding their own defense in preparing for the implications of the end of this conference whichever way it goes expert trend what i want to thank you. one quick thought of the u.s. election. obviously american elections are critical to determine our foreign policy course but one of the big question to the seminar towards the end of september is with would be any budget? what will u.s. support for ukraine look like in fy 2024 which for us begins october 1st? it is been since december since the previous congress that a big security assistant supplemental preparation was passed, and i think that maybe one of the reasons why in the g7 statement that came along with an data summit about security commitments you didn't see any dollar figure put on potential commitments because i'm sure there's a lot of back channel negotiations happening. we will have to wait and see if they met at the presidential election that shift some of the calculus and what is needed from european partners but i want to

thank you so much for an excellent report that one thing i should say is i normally don't do this but i encourage apple to take out their phone and opened up the podcast app on your phone and subscribe to our podcast russian roulette where we have these sorts of conversations but trade one let me thank you for coming here from london -- keir about how to end russia's war on ukraine in safeguarding europe's future and the danger of a false peace. i think of sam's as the highest praise congressional staff, the press should be reading this as well as academics and others to really break, does an excellent job of breaking down the arguments that oftentimes use as sort of call for stopping our support for ukraine to i want to thank you all and thank you all for joining us today. it's been a pleasure. thank you. [applause]

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