♪ ♪ ♪ ♪ ♪ ♪ ♪ ♪ ♪ >> the u.s. senate is coming in at 3 p.m. eastern today. a vote on whether to move forward on the nomination of joshua jacobs to be veterans affairs under secretary for benefits is set for 5:30 p.m. eastern. that vote is expected despite a hold on the nomination and initiative by senator grassley

due to what he insists are inadequate responses from the department to letter ceased in regarding allegations that mga employee resigned last year violated ethics rules. more when the senate gavels in this afternoon at 3 p.m. eastern and as always live coverage here on c-span2. >> avril haines is director of national intelligence. she talked about cybersecurity, its consequences during a the conversation hosted by the carnegie endowment for international peace. director haines addressed the repression of online freedoms for people living in authoritarian nations and foreign meddling in u.s. elections. this is just over an hour. >> good afternoon, everyone and welcome to the cardigan, for international peace. my name is dan baer and i'm a senior vice president for policy

research year. it's a pleasure to have youou here. today we walk into a particularly special event the director of national intelligence is not one of the cabinet officials most often speaks publicly and so we're very excited to have avril haines with us today. for those of you have not met hero before, she is had a distinguished career in the u.s. government, several administration. she served kaohsiung president biden's cabinet of the seventh confirmed director of nationa' intelligence. she served as a as a princl directory national security adviser for president biden and deputy director the cia, what the state department ands many other things in her career including independent bookstore owner and senior fellow and abscisic celebrities at a storied career and somebody because a pleasure working with or i can tell you that she is as great as she is part, as gracious as she is committed to principles and a real joy to work with her. i walknd him or to the stage. [applause] >> desha welcome her to the stage.

>> well thank you, dan, for that and cuddly kind introduction, and it's such a joy honestly to get todu see you and you know you're part of leading this wonderful institution. i also want you thank the the president who is not here for inviting me as well and extend my gratitude to the wonderful expert who reside at carnegie endowment for international peace and his work has for years been enriching our analysis and thinking in the intelligence community on the many challenging issues we face across the country. thinking as a civil servant in government who is had the chance to see firsthand how important the intellectual exchange is that occurs between government entities like carnegie endowment, i kept of how grateful i am for your work. many of you challenge our thinking and were to ensure we're focused on what matters and not missing the broader strategic picture as we manage urgent crises and many of you have been or will come through

government having had a chance to think things through from outside without the standard constraint to which were subject to make us better. the intelligence community in particular benefit from such collaboration because we we'e trying to understand and reflect on the world around us and in doing so we have looked to bring rigor, expertise, evidence, to bear on our analysis as all you do. we recognize that pressure of our work can make us susceptible toto insular thinking and cognitive biases and a set our interaction with those outside the community the contest are hypotheses and better inform our work are crucially important. physically perfectly fits into topic today digital repression, an issue for which it is critical to other wide range of perspectives both in and out of government not only for purposes understanding polansky but also to address the problem. people like danan and steve whoi see her as well come literally wrote the book and digital

repression. alln of you in so many others at carnegie and other organizations such as freedom house and even the private sector have contributed to our thinking on these questions and each of you with a different expertise, experiences, information and perspectives that are fundamental to understanding polansky.ca -- the landscape. attention, specifically the degree to which new technologies organizational approaches to digital repression being deployed by authoritarian governments and exported to other countries are advancing authoritarianism and undermining democracy. i know for some it might seem strange to have a leader in the intelligence community discuss this but i think it is crucial we lend our perspective to this issue, making clear the distinction between the work of an intelligence service versus -- in a democracy versus in an

authoritarian state. in democracies they are subject to being held accountable to oversight mechanisms that work to ensure we remain focused and legal to help decision-makers make better foreign policy decisions while protecting civil privacy and liberty and in my view of the intelligence community is a critical ally and should contribute to the promotion that helps protect against the digital tools like censorship, misinformation, mass surveillance, and spyware. we have a unique perspective and understanding of state actors and security services to enhance our capacity to reveal

approaches that might support the resilience of an open information environment in democratic societies. i may explain why we are so focused on this issue which i see is a critical threat. the struggle to bolster democratic governance at home is the defining challenge of our time. democratic leaders around the world are pursuing efforts to strengthen democratic resilience . efforts are beginning to include political freedoms and efforts to counter corruption and a lack of economic opportunity as secretary yellen also noted is

also fundamental to strengthening democracy. there is a contest over information, defined by the increasing use of digital technology to promote authoritarianism. today's digital technologies are profoundly shaped access to information. initially they were instrumental in facilitating freedom of the press and yet they sparked a backlash from authoritarian regimes. to harness the same technologies in pursuit of broader objectives like suppressing political discord. foreign governments increasingly use digital information and tech to monitor and suppress political debate domestically and abroad. as text capabilities are

exported and implemented they make it harder to bolster democratic governance. the use of these methods to monitor and limit dissent will become more pervasive in the next few years, further constraining freedom. generative ai will increase the sophistication that regimes can use to deploy tools, making them that much more difficult to counter. so i want to talk about the russian and chinese and iranian models to describe the structural methods being exported and how we might approach creating greater resilience in society to mitigate the impact of these models with the objectives of creating greater resilience. authoritarian regimes are the biggest drivers in advancing

their control mechanisms. they often fear how open debate could jeopardize their hold. they are often clouded by paranoia and an overarching concern of control. authoritarian regimes grew concerned about the implications of the internet early on and then the arab spring was a turning point when the government came to recognize that digital connectivity posed and asked essential threat to their grip on power. public protests around the world have asked exacerbated fears. the p.r.c. is the global leader in digital repression and for the eighth year in a row china

was identified as the country providing the least internet freedom. beijing is better at censoring digital information than russia because they prioritized digital control before moscow did. they seeks to preempt challenges by demonstrating responsiveness, and remolding society to achieve their national rejuvenation. they are prevent -- they are often presented as features, not bugs. they control the flow of information and try to reinforce their legitimacy and chinese willingness to share the know-how and export technology is an enabler of transnational repression.

china's smart cities use surveillance tech to control traffic safety. they are one of the world's leading perpetrators of transnational repression. news reports of it have become common, much of it under foxconn, and anticorruption effort. last week the doj charge p.r.c. police officers for wielding thousands of fake social media accounts to spread chinese propaganda. russia is also a leading perpetrator but they take a different approach. they rely on complex legal and institutional structures. they are particularly active in spreading disinformation.

since the start of the invasion of ukraine moscow has employed a full spectrum of activities to defend their actions, seed doubt with respect to news and amplify unsubstantiated narratives. russian people are subjected to the sixth least free internet in the world. it reached an all-time low in russia last year in conjunction with the invasion in ukraine. it introduced a law prescribing up to 15 years in prison for anyone who spread false information about the conflict. moscow's effort to force foreign i.t. giants to abide by their requirements increased in 2022 as google and others received fines worth hundreds of millions

of dollars for not filtering content. the increased targeting has resulted in increased censorship and in some cases a full departure from the russian median space. -- media space. russia's most popular network is state-controlled. it gives kremlin control over the content russians encounter online. they pair the action with policies that pushed out indian media -- independent media. last january they began requiring foreign ip and media companies with more than 500 thousand daily russian users to maintain staff locally and

expected companies to restrict information that violated russian law. they charged russian companies to create digital platforms to replace foreign social media platforms, allowing for increasing control. they underlined internet freedom in -- undermined internet freedom in ukraine. they hosted cyber attacks and dismantled lines. a russia based influence operation in ukraine managed 60 websites impersonating news organizations and had accounts on major u.s. news platforms. iran has been imposing increasingly sophisticated internet shutdowns to stop protests.

they shut it down 18 times in 2022. i have gone through the approaches taken in these countries to achieve digital repression to give you a sense of the different models but authoritarian regimes are not the only governments conducting digital repression. it' this is particularly concerning as it is the key i battlefield r the competition between authoritarianism. we are seeing more instances of other countries engaging in digital repression and their adoption is in turn contributing to further democratic erosion.

we see other countries increasingly using tactics of internet shutdowns. last year governments and other actor shutdowns in that at least 187 times in 35 countries which was a new record. shutdowns were imposed during protest, active conflicts, school exams, elections, political instability or high-profile event such as religious holidays business by government officials within many cases imposing and silencing voices. we sawaw a record number of governments blocked websites with nonviolent political social or religious content undermined and uses rights to free expression and accessed information. the use of commercial spyware is on the rise which is in the past year to list have estimated as a $12 billion business. some states use spyware tools and inset program for legitimate purposes such as to target criminals and terrorists, governments are increasingly using spyware along with

legislative efforts to provide a basis for doing so to talk with political opponents and critics. a growing number of internet users around the globe only have online space but this phenomena some restricted to to china-russia and iran. authorities and 47 of the 70 countries covered by a recent research study limited users access to information sources located outside of the borders. we also see where china is not intentionally exporting its approach for purposes of extended its digital repression efforts that they're making it easier for others to engage in activity and may use or access to further the efforts to transnational repression. the internet of things is projected to reach 64 billion devices by 2025, and possibly trillions by 2040. all potentially monitored by various governments. this growth is connected to smart city initiatives which are

using emerging technologies to improve the ability of city leaders to leverage public resources to boost the overall quality of life, while at the same time creating vast amounts of data. china has a comparative advantage in the global export official recognition ai. autocracies are more likely to acquire this technology from jonathan from other countries. they are more likely to report this technology from chinaor whn you're experiencing political unrest. these technologies offer new possibilities for tracking and intimidating defenders,,bi monitoring political opponents and preempting challenges to government power that are hard to resist. moreover, chinese companies which are subject to chinese loss to provide the government with access to their information are leading providers of technology in the number of countries where democracy backsliding. such companies are able to offer

lower-cost solutions that those governments are ill-equipped to regulate or operate, and access to the data being collected and will increasingly be collected as these technologies continue to emerge will enable authoritarian leaders to more effectivelyy monitor population and potentially manipulate, control and exploit information based on thegh gain from the da. as a note at the outset the president, congress, democratic leaders around the world are mounting an effort to promote democraticti governance and counter the risk posed by the technologies i discussed today but significant work remains in what is clear that to be successful whole of government efforts that includes not just traditional public and private sector actors and also the carnegie is of the world is reallypu needed. the tools will have to be very to address the range of structural issues i've outlined. this is where our partnership can be most useful. president biden recently signed an executive order prohibiting u.s. government use of commercial spywarein that posesa

risk to national and has supported efforts in this arena as aggressively pursuing export controls told companies accountable that developed traffic or use technologies to conduct malicious activities that threaten cybersecurity members civil society dissidence, governments officials and organizations. together we need to t build on what has beenn done to improve the resurgence of countries to resist digital repression in all its forms. we alongside the private sector and research institutions can help to create greater awareness regarding the types of technologies as well as institutional legal and organizational approaches being used to engage in digital repression. in doing so we hope to highlight areas where frameworks might be developed by experts and policymakers in and outside of government to reserve to the greatest extent the promise of such technologies to support greater flows of information more timely and cheaper communication as well as smart technologies, delivery of services can protect the

environment but nevertheless, guarding against the use for digital repression. wees hope to design approaches that promote not only cybersecurity and appropriate law enforcement intelligence activities but also democratic governance, freedom of expression and political discourse. even data management approaches that recognize the dangers associate with the extraordinary collection of information that happen on a daily basis in our world. organizational structures and make it harder to engage in digitaliz repression and we need to move with urgency. during the coming years we can expect the government wills grow more sophisticated in their use of existing repressive technology and we will learn quickly how to exploit new and more interested technology, particularly automatic surveillance and identity resolution techniques. a multifaceted challenge of adversaries cannot be solved by government alone. digital repression and for

malign influence our whole of society challenges and we can no longer operate unparalleled but distinct tracks. now was a time for us to partner together. if you believe this is an urgent challenge we must workng togethr to protect the integrity of our democracy and democratic societies around the world. thank you for your time and i look forward to the questions, opportunity to talk to dan. [applause]th >> thank you very much for those of the meeting kickoff remarks and they get the hard part. for those of you in the room or watch it online, online you up to submit questions on your online platform. if you're into thed should be barcodes renderer will allow you to submit questions and then they will magically show up on my ipad. so when you get to that part i'll be able to turn to them.

i want to start where you started which is the unusual nature of the speech that uk because we're not used to having people from the intelligence community or certainly not the leader of the intel community sounding the alarm in a way. i wonder why you are giving a speech rather than say secretary blinken or somebody who is more usually at the front of policy -- foreign policy or security issue? >> thank you so much. it's great to actually be here with all of you. i will say, to be fair secretary blinken does give those comments and so the president and everybody else. it's important for our voice to be heard on this to make it clear it's not just the foreign secretary in a sense because about this issue but it's also the security services that care about this issue. i do care deeply about this issue. i believe it is a national security threat and if you look at our annual threat assessment

we for the first time have a whole section on digital trends of authoritarianism. that is something we're highlighting. it's also a place where i think we uniquely can bring analysis, insight into essentially how it's happening and what the challenges are. i believe that something we should be doing more generally but i want to make clear there's a distinction between intelligence services and a democratic society and there are structures around that and that does it mean that, in other words, we should be having the conversation where people have concerns that it is creeping into her own system and that something the needs to be on the table as well. at the same timen we're talking about how does this happen and howha can we all move forward ia way that isun going to counter what we are seeing and that we have concerned with. >> if you had to, that makes sense for why you're speaking out. if you had to analyze the timing

of the warning, you described two broad trends. 11 is about geopolitics and the frame of democracy versus authoritarianism but really this is this is a challenge of rising authoritarian power one could say in the moment we're living in. theri other is the part of technology and evolution of the next wave of digital technology post internet or building on the internet set of technologies whether those are and i are smart cities, internet of things. the timing of the your alarm cry, is it driven more by geopolitics or as somebody sue the over the intel community looking around corners and saint gosch the something that's about to hit as an we are not there yet, we need to be ready for this? >> so i say it'ss a combination. here's what i think is intensifying in this moment that makes it so critical. if you look at the combination

of the pandemic which basically both putting emphasis on tracking data of individuals who had contact with like all of us do, all of us engaging more through digital means, right? and pushed society into that space with increasing amounts of data that was available publicly about all of us in many respects with the extraordinary trend of digital technologies, of emerging technologies. weng talk about the trajectory r the internet of things which is enormous as i indicated in my remarks but that combined with a whole series of otherre types of technologies like spyware and someone how to become commercially available that are cheap, easy to get so you can engage in digital authoritarianism at scale. and then you look at how it's

not just being engaged in it to scale by the classic authoritarian countries that you're used to looking at but what you're recognizing is theirs and export of the structures, and really from my perspective in addition to them wanting to sound the alarm, put forward what the threat is and to try to analyze it, part of what i'm hoping to do is to set up for a better conversation about how we can create greater resilience for it because i think part of the challenge is you said okay, there may be some places where china or russia is looking to export this technology so that they can engage in transnational repression or so they can help a leader they want to have, remain in power to control their own information environment. that is certainly one way in which it might occur. it's also the case you now as a leader in the country can

basically purchase a lot of these tools, can see the model being used t in china or a russ, decide how it is you want to apply it in different spaces. unless we start to understand the structural changes happening here and how that scaling works and how it can be so pernicious then we will not be able to create the norm and framework, technology standards, export control all these tools can be brought to bear to help us to promote greater resilience in our societies. >> you mention president biden recently signed an executive order barring the use of spyware. is that trying to hold back the tidede in some way? is a value of something more symbolic in that it does signal the need for normative development and the senate institutional approaches that it is on its face for the specific bar? and a second part, that action

one a lot of praise from human rights community but didn't have blowback from partners who make that kind of technology or who want to use that technology may be for legitimate purposes? >> justs? to answer the last question first, i've had no counterpart for example, say to me this is a problem or an issue or to disagree with it in any way. it is more than symbolic i will say but i do think part of what it does is as you say set the standard, and if you think of, if we think the norms is a space we want to move into in this area, we want to create norms that give us the framework through which to look up what is acceptable and not, the predicate is agreeing on what the norm should be. like on what is the space that is acceptable to occupy for legitimate purposes, and what is an acceptable?

part of what the president is doing in a t scenario is kind of map it out that space. saying he was something unacceptable and we want others to join us, and in the context of the democracy some others joined. starting to promote that the generally creates a standard that we said okay, that's not okay. and then there is all of the things that canan happen afterwards through policy needs to begin to backstop that in a way to make it more challenging for folks who engage in it. >> as you think about, that's one specific set of technologies. you mentioned i would be remiss given the moment we're living through if i didn't talk about ai and jamaican generative ai in your remarks. -- you mentioned -- given the commentary many of us have read in the last few months about the eyes going to change everything everywhere all at once, how do

you choose what to focus on and have you identified anything that you think or any set of things bullet points that you think are the real risks that are emergent from an or is it too soon to tell? >> you're right, there's no way i consider and say understand all of the implications generative ai for theim communiy let alone the world. what i do think is true is with generative ai and other emerging technologies we're seeing it is making it easier to be surprised by significant developments. in a way that's a big part of ourar work is indications and warnings. make sure wetok, provide policymakers with some sense of what's likely to happen that's meaningful and important for them to be focus on in order to address major national security and foreign policy issues. this makes it more challenging. the one thing i can say is that it is going to make it easier

for basically authoritarian governments, others who want to engage in digital repression to do the job. i'll give you one example. i list in my remarks are whole series of tools that are part of digital repression were identified and misinformation and disinformation is one of them. there's no question with generative ai you can be more sophisticated in your production of misinformation and disinformation. that's obvious. that is going make it harder to counter. it's critical for us to be able to do that as effectively and on a timely basis. maybe generative ai will give us tools to counter it. it is increasingly complex and environment for us to keep on managing the degree to which things are developing and were trying to counter them. so having broader framework set were able to stick this into an sort of a consensus on what is

acceptable and what's not will be increasingly important. >> are you worried about, most of your remarks were global in nature and looking at things happening around the world but we know that russia in particular and china have both engage in what we would use to call information ops in the united states. are you worried the united states especially will have an election next year in the run-up to those elections are we prepared enough for the new capacities that are provided by ai for misinformation and disinformation? >> this is an area we spent an enormous amount of time on, trying to protect from election influence and in affluence. i do think it's going to be possible for foreign actors to engage in more sophisticated kind of misinformation and disinformation campaigns. we are working hard to continue to try to be on the edge of it so were able to warn the

americane public as appropriate and we do this through the long for the lack fbi and dhs department of homeland security truly on the front lines of thi this. >> russia and china and iran figured in your remarks although the examples you gave with respect to iran for more focus on iran's use of digital repression domestically. russia and china both have more obvious examples of what he views it beyond their borders. i was struck by the distinction what he heard is a distinction maybe you will correct me it seems like both use digital repression that russia's more folks on disinformation and misinformation control of information whereas the chinese model is much more built into technology and surveillance. how do those different strategies changech the way we have to think about how to respond. >> it's true we see that china is more sophisticate from a

technology perspective in censoring and soti on. that's largely because they just started earlier. they prioritized it. russia even culturally tends to be quite legalistic in their addressing issues, and they have created this incredible organizational structure, digital ministry, your to basically get a license and put forward bandwidth requirements and all sorts of things that give them the capacity to manage was happening. they put a series of laws. this isn't to say china doesn't have laws on these issues that are intended to facilitate the work they do. they do. and also russia has technology as well and is deploying it to, in fact, they do engage more in the disinformation space than china but that doesn't mean again there is an overlap. what i would say she is full

think about this different ways is the following for each have slightly different model for how it is the approach of it even technically that slightly different models. part of what i'm hoping is useful is as we try to lift this up so people understand what the model is common then frankly folks at places like the carnegie endowment, and research institutions, , policy community can begin to think through how to be counter that particular model? how do we deal with this particular type of issue and how can we create norms and make it harder for other societies to essentially adapt it wholesale. in part it could be a technical issue. it could be you are developing a standard for how and i mentioned data management, like how do you store data and what are the restrictions around data and what are the technical ways in which you might do it?

encryption or other types of things that might help to protect the privacy of data and make it harder to bring things to get in the way that would allow you to use tools that could engage in repression but part of it can be in ways we have privacy in civil liberties officers in each of our services, that we have a right of institutional structures that help promote certain aspects of our systems that we think are important or values and principles. those are things that matter. i have seen, i sort of feel like i went into law thinking many, many years ago obviously, decades, but in any event, believing law was the way to change society. i watched the civil rights movement and other things and saw how critical it was to society and to our capacity to change. i feel the older i've gotten the more i recognize the culture and soft law and institutional

issues are absolutely critical if notre more important at times to actually producing change. i think those are important and it's the structure that is being used to engage in digital repression,ga not just a digital technologies that are important to the picture. >> i wonder whether you've gotten pushed back. you mentioned the export of these technologies. theseof technologies are not the only technologies being exported and obviously the export of technology is essential to economic development in huge parts of the world. we had a conversation at the imf and world bank here about digital public infrastructure and we digital public infrastructure hasas expanded banking to many millions have hundreds of mates of people in india and has a promise to do so elsewhere in the world. i wonder whether you've run into this challenge of how to get the benefits of export of technology while also being mindful of the risks?

large-scale consumption of chinese technology that may have backdoors or that kind of thing. those conversation with partners who i guess in good faith trying to square the circle and both harvest the benefits of technology for the population and also in be mindful of the risks. >> absolutely. i think this is one of the challenges. as i look to the next ten years, it strikes me that we are going to have smart cities. we're going to be collecting more data. it's going to be easier to access it in many respects. the question is how do you manage it in a way that provides you with some sense of security or capacity cannot see it manipulated for illicit and unacceptableab purposes? thinking through howow do you design export control regimes or other forms of tools that allow you to manageal this in a way tt give us the benefit but without, some of the harms, ipc is a $64

million question and i'm happy to sit in the intelligence community were not responsible for solving that one. what i will say, you both have licensing regimes, right, that say we are fine with you getting this type of technology so long as you comply with the following requirements. and you just have to report on a regular basis that you are doing so, or we have a monitoring capacity or we have ways check on issues. that is one form of addressing that issue. the other is to say you have to built intobu your design. we have a lot the building into our design for cybersecurity that we're trying to promote. we should be doing it for democratic resilience. there's ways to do this to try to promote whatever the principle is an essential looking for. it's not to say it isn't complicated or there is an transaction costs astr a

consequence, all those things but that has to be factored in. >> i'm going to ask a couple more questions and turned to audience questions. if you have a question key please feel free to submit it now. i would be remiss if i didn't give you some harder question before letting you go but one of them is about tiktok because that's another issue that is often in the news these days. i have read the polling data suggests banning tiktok is hugelyul popular actually with american voters. i suspect that is more to do with parentsrn being concerned e kids brains are being turned to mush and that done with nas couldd be concerned but from a national security lands whether the intel community is making recommendations either to the oversight committees in congress or to the white house about whether or not some sort of van, and understand their constitutional question but some sort of been on tiktok make sense of a national security standpoint and are specific

national security concerns? >> we do threat assessments which we provide to the congress and to the executive branch on these kinds of issues. typically women lookingy, at platforms like tiktok for other things what we're trying to look at iss basically the capacity to collect data and then who us access to that data. and what might that data be misused for essentially in the context i of any particular scenario of national security or otherwise. that is somethingwi of which we have done and, of course, the president has directed a ban work basis for use, with respect to tiktok which were intimating and that isic pretty much. >> where you are. >> yes, but last question which is a two-parter, first of all did you think before giving the speech today or beforee deciding to publicly weigh in that there might be some downside risks to the u.s. director of national intelligence giving up g on a stage and talk aboutut how the

world should be concerned about digital tools and that he might be used? is there a risk that gets thrown back at you or u.s. government? the second piece of that is that, self reflection is obviously the biden administration got a lot of well-deserved praise in the ukraine war in both awaits us medically declassified intelligence and shared it with partners and allies and even the general public and order to make people aware of what was about to happen. more recently we've seen use unauthorized release of classified intelligence and a wonder how that has spurred reflection on your part and your colleagues part about the balances between classification, compartmentalization, and making sure that people have the tools they need to do their work? >> way, that's a lot. okay, d i will deal with the lat one first and a first one.

it's very challenging talk about the unauthorized disclosure because it's an ongoing criminal process right now, legal proceeding. what i can say is, first of all, it's deeply depressing whenever one of these things occur for the folks in the intelligence community. many of us work our butts off so to speak just trying to protect our information in an appropriate way. seeing this stuff which may or may not be, right, in any form or any suggestion of this kind of the leakor is just very frustrating. i will tell you how challenging it is for many of us in dealing with this. we were always in any scenario in any incident that occurred s learned lessons once we

understand what happened and ensure we do a better job protecting our information moving forward. it iss also the case that in these scenarios what i think we all try to do is learn the right lessons and then not over torque as a consequence of an incident. what a meank by that is to tryo promote better practices while at the same time not undermining our capacity to do appropriate sharing and engage inty remissi. during the course of the ukraine conflict, we went through very careful process for ourselves to try to ensure we could disclose as much information as we thought we could while still preserving essential to our sources and methods. that was an appropriate thing to do. there's always the risk that come with that but also the benefit it can have for national securityio and foreign policy ad that of course is what our ultimate mission is. in trying to workk this through

will try to continue to approach it in a measured way. it comesit back to the first question you asked though. i obviously believe in the work wewe do. i think and intelligence community is incredibly important to the security of the country and to ultimately countering authoritarian aggression as a saw in the russian invasion of ukraine. of course and intelligence community engages in spine, right? but we have to do in a way that is consistent with a very robust legal framework and we have to be accountable to that and we have to be in my view as transparent as possible when we make mistakes. and ultimately held accountable for those mistakes so we can continue to work in a way that promotes national security but at the same time promotes the other equally important values that we holds as a country and our work.

there's always a risk of embarrassment when you go out in public and and i in particue crappy ad honestly, but i think it's an important place for our voice be heard because it's part of trying to i can draw the distinction between when you do this the right we versus when you do thiss the wrong way. i want us to be helping to lead the charge in the sense encountering this. >> my h colleagues should know y screen is blank right now so that needs to be fixed please fix it. in i the meanwhile i'm going to continue to ask questions that i have for you. i wanted to ask about democracy versus authoritarianism of frame which is one joe biden played with at the beginning of the administration. there's been some conversation in the last year, i detected more conversation suggesting the frame is not useful or that it is, that there's too much of the

world for whom it doesn't resonate and that actually finds it a way of u.s. demanding that peopleeo choose sides. i wonder whether you think the frame holds up. obviously you use today and one can use it as an analytic framework that using it as a public diplomacy frame and a wonder whether you think, what you would continue recommended as a public frame of whether it's really only an analytic frame from utility standpoint. >> i'll do a quick one on that. it's more of a policy question. in some ways it's hard me to answer but what i would say is i do think that we have seen the narrative, for example, from china shift a bit in the context of even in the last few years were a few years ago it was more we are presenting another system that is more effective in

contrast tom your system in the way. in other words, ourds system is functional. our system delivers results, it was as a of a mess, and that being the intellectual narrative in the way that is being presented and a bit of that has shifted toward we have an alternative path still with the same teachers, in other words, we can deliver, but not framing it as authoritarian versus democracy. perhaps that is because they see that as being more compelling and yet at the same time when you look at their best friends, bff document with russia, it's remarkable how much democracy and their promotion of an international system that sounds very much like what we are promoting but isn't, is sort of part of the structure they are pushing forward.

i don't pretend to know what the right answer from a policy perspective but i think these are questions analytically that important for us to understand. >> great. we now actually have, i now have ideas questions. thes first one is how concerned are you about the use private sector particularly the tech sector that they may not be fully cognizant of some of the risks that their own tools could be manipulated or misuse to nefarious ends? do youou have worries they arent aware of the trends you are identifying? >> so we have been trying and our normal way to engage with the private sector to better understand what they are seeing. honestly, in many scenarios they see things before we do because they have the first basis of information. so what is, so i am, the answer is, in part they sometimes the things before we do and we need

to learn from them. but in part it is true they don't necessarily put it into the broader context which is something we can do and help them to discern from the information what's happening in certain spaces that may be useful. i again as i tried to outline in my remarks i think this is an area where you actually need so many different parts of society to engage together in order to put the whole picture together so you caner actually understand what's happening. that's an important conversation for us to continue to be having basically. >> there'se as a question here t the challenges that face democracies with respect to the broad set of issues you've identified and that we have seen anan increasing trend one would say in countries that we referred to as democracy taking steps that which you'll free speech, enhanced surveillance without sufficient safeguards. it was the summer for the marks

of immigration on the internet for identifying a normative framework and how concerned are you about backsliding in democratic partners with respect to these techniques in particular? >> ira am. as i am focused and i think one of the key pieces of the puzzle that doesn't get as much attention is this space. in other words, there's a fair amount of attention of china and russia are doing in the countries to manage information. it's useful to unpack the model part of what i'm trying to help people focus in on is how that model can be used in various forms or in various variations essential in other spaces. andr what i think is sort of soy and worried about it and think part of what we should be doing is thinking about how do we actually make it harder for society to begin to go down that road. .. and ways that allow us to then

focus a light on it and take action as a consequence? mr. baer: you mentioned the wake-up call in a way that the arab spring was for some authoritarian regimes about the power in the connection that people have to the internet. since then and even before then we saw this cat and mouse game we saw this cat and mouse game creative innovative citizens figuring out ways of fiction. you had to make an assessment could in the cap math game and are there any recent examples of citizens trying to get around these that inspire you? >> not tell you the latter. i do think the obvious problem your sophisticated on these

issues but it is true that we found initially in terms of the promise of these technology turned around by authoritarian governments on political dissent and as a general matter pendulum has swung more toward authoritarian let think we are making movements to bring of african so we will see. >> we talked about the need for innovation putting your jobs back on and looking at the possibility for institutions and frameworks for international standards. i understand you're not making policy but it gives you opportunity, you see a model for

the regulation for standard-setting you think is neededpp space? >> a terrible idea for me to put on thought have. it can go from some of the more obvious human related -- but to think of the telecommunications or others, it's always case-by-case analysis and the folks in it are the ones best positioned to know whether or not it's the right place to do that kind of work. >> another question here from the audience about a particular challenge of strategic partners in the united states like india where the maybe growing concerns

about the origin andhe how the united states think about the isde-off and whether there opportunity to push our concerns long-term. >> these are all great questions but they are policy questions. for us what we try to do is list the intelligence community will beri as policymakers figured out how to address these issues and this is an issue are policymakers care a lot aboutato trying to manage this they are going to want to take up these questions countries across the spectrum between authoritarian. >> you think value exchange programs is a wayas of helping people in different countries p understand? >> that's really interesting. i'm a huge fan of the program so i would absolutely value in that

but don't know. on technology perhaps organizations so they could see how different entities work and allow for cultural norms we have. >> closing questions way to do another part. the first part is what would you like the public to understand? the second is about think tanks one of the things security policy and there's very little policy work done and there are some obvious reasons given much of the work is not noble or known by the public but there are parts that are known and i

wonder if there is an area, you do for four an organization in which policy can be made and i wonder if there's an idea that you think is right? >> on that last one, one of the things i try to do is once every month bring in folks from different ngos or think tanks under particular issue and ask them, what are the things they are concerned about they might get into or all of the critiques they have in these different spaces? it springs from emerging technologies to human rights issues in a whole series of things and it is fascinating

because first of all it is opportunity to hear directly from bringing an old senior leadership to do these things but it reveals my perspective two things, one is there are lots of places where folks identified, and emerging technology example where emerging technology one of the things we are worried about is this area as you were describing the concerns about technology more general, people will be so worried about national security uses and misuses of technology that we will not have the opportunity to gain the advantage of the technology specific examples of what they t were concerned about, there's

lots of places where it's an issue and where there is that concern working with the intelligence community to help us understand what we can do to avoid that will or develop structures can be useful, it's not something that is perfect for an answer but it is at least useful to be informed and get through in a way that is productive and the advantage of havingan ngos or others talk abt they often see these things before government so they have the opportunity to bring these issues up in a way that is helpful but the flipside is what we also get from institutions experts and other places talk to us about policy work they are

engaged in and even if we are not engaged, one of the things we can do is if a policymaker is interested for example human trafficking or something on a particular issue and you as an expert are entering different drivers of human trafficking or looking at different costs of human trafficking or things like that, if you are able to work with us to explain what those drivers are, the issues you are trying to create metrics around, we can create methodologies thaa allow us to track it and it's something policymakers trying to promote an argument for here are things you're looking for and what indicators you wish in concerned about people can act on it. here is the cost of whatever it is your concern about if we are able we can push back so there's

a lot of space part of why is question whether or notes the structure and scaling of digital repression if we are able to list it out effectively with the brains that exist in this intellectually good system they exist in, they can help us think about how it is we can monitorn and track this and more useful to policymakers to act rules and create that resilience. you have a second question. >> here is the thing i think about -- in many respects when i talk to folks in recruiting or fcaricatures of this and so on,

it is often especially with very young people through a dark lens almost like you're in the conflict and intelligence is therere and the source of what e intelligence community does it somehow to do with so many people hurting, it is also the case and i hope the ukraine conflict demonstrated this in many respects, our mission is one two promote peace. that is what we are basically designed to do, try to provide indications and warnings so that the united states doesn't havet to go to work so that we are able to use other tools to manage crises so that we m are able to exist in a more effective and prosperous and peaceful way andd again our

values and promoting those values and i think that's the thing i would hopefully leave people with. >> going to take a moment to answer my own question in a different way to say goodbye to everyone, one ofng the things ie always respected about you and that i think is generally true about the discipline is their role when we are in a meeting, the lawyers generally speaking are pretty good at making surepe they're not making policies, the intel people will often say this is just intel, i can't give you a policy recommendation and around the world people would be surprised to see how formal the divisions and roles are behind closed doors and how much people respect that set of rules as a

way of making sure decisions -- our intelligence is not instrumental or that the law is not but policy makers are forced to make policy with the insights and advice other professionals provide an i saw you oversee a process like that in your part of the when i tried to push you out of your roleou which is a gd sign of the discipline you continue, thank you so much for spending time with us and sharing your views and we hope you will come back soon and often. [applause] >> if i could ask the audience to stay seated so the security teams can get her on her way.

>> thank you very much. >> thanks, everyone. [inaudible conversations] >> u.s. senate coming in 3:00 p.m. eastern today, although on the nomination of joshua jacobs to be veterans affairs undersecretary benefits for 5:30 p.m. eastern principle is expected to hold on the nomination initiated by senator grassley you to why he insists out of an adequate responses. the letters he sent regarding allegations of va employees who reside faster violated ethics

role. more on the senate gavels in this afternoon and as always, live coverage on c-span2. >> the senate sgt. and arms the 2024 budget request securit on the capitol grounds of by appropriations live 3:30 p.m. eastern on c-span three. you can watch free video cap, c-span now for online at c-span.org. the upcoming south korea's president during his official visit to the u.s. this week first lady journey for the white house social secretary and adversely announcing plans influences in. this is 15 minutes.