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[inaudible conversations] >> settle in for the last session of the day. so good afternoon. i've got the privilege of introducing our next speaker as the honorable elaine luria. i think most of us are familiar with her. and those of you who studied the navy force structural certainly are, a short bio, graduate of the navy academy, as a marine i checked out on that long before we got to the nuclear part. she was a congresswoman who represented the virginia 2nd district. she was a vice chair of the sea powered arm of the house services committee and most importantly, she was from alabama and we also proudly

adopted her. i think those of you who have done naval reading and it came up previously on a panel, the article she wrote for the war in iraq a couple of years ago, trying to tie our fleet structure to the strategy and i think that mark mentioned earlier, that you know, that provided a construct for getting to a fleet size that was operationally relevant. so with that, i'd like to welcome congresswoman luria. thank you. [applause] >> well, good afternoon, thank you for having me and as i noted on the way up, i'm the last speaker so i'm all standing between you and a beer and happy hour, so, i am really happy to be here and appreciate larry's invitation to join you today and to be here with leaders in expeditionary warfare in the military and private sector and those

working tirelessly to make sure that our navy and marine corps have the tools that they need in a very, very complex environment. it was only towards the end of my career in the navy that i came to be part of what we considered the expeditionary force, and i commanded an assault craft, too, serving on two carriers, a cruiser, destroyers and it was late to the expeditionary force in my navy career, but subsequently in congress had the opportunity to serve as the vice chair of the armed services committee and was involved in a lot of debates that had to do with the future of the expeditionary force, our future of ship building and really the investments that we need to make for our defense and our country. and especially in the capabilities to deal with expeditionary warfare. i experienced this before the nda cycles and every year considering the annual defense bill. it really became clear, and you just mentioned a minute ago,

larry before i came up, that i kept asking leadership in the military, what was the strategy that was driving the requirements that they came and presented to us in congress for each of these annual budgets and i did reflect back to secretary layman's 1980's maritime strategy, and multiple conversations with him about how that came about and how they were successful on implementing it. and the call for the navy predated him, but in the reagan administration, there was support from president reagan himself that gave the navy the ability to build the 600-ship navy. >> there was a strategy that supported a clear u.s. objective and that was to defeat the soviet union and the cold war. while i was in congress, i aimed at military leadership as i came before the armed leadership year after year looking for a year maritime

strategy and i looked a lot to process these strategy, the goldwater nichols act. all things must be joined and acquisition must be joined and why we can't have a clearly articulated maritime strategy that can then inform the ship building plans, the 30-year ship building plan and others coming to congress and recently and after leaving congress, i kind of took a step back and i said, maybe there's a bigger issue than that. you know, when asked to provide a strategy, our military leaders, i think they're well-intentioned and sometimes the strategies come across the vision statements and sometimes they're more talking points than actionable strategies that they can present to congress, to justify the investments that we need to make in ship buildings and in our industrial base and ultimately our maritime forces. simply put, the strategy drives those requirements, but i took a step back and i said, well, let's look at our

overafternooning national strategy and let's look at statements made by policy makers and military leaders and i found that there's a muddled use of language that has, i think, been complicating the ability to articulate a clear strategy. so in other words, in the words this is a political object. let's focus on our potential conflict with china, what is our political object within china and the guiding documents, national security strategy, national defense strategy, words that should provide clear, unambiguous road map for our military to develop that strategy and their war plans to support our national policy, they're just not very definitive. and i can only assume that the authors of our national security strategy, they have selected every word carefully. and i want to take a minute and look at the words that they

use, specifically one word, but we'll get back to that in a minute and i wanted to make this presentation a little interactive. i hope, larry, you're okay with that. i just want today call on some volunteers in the audience to answer a simple question, so i don't know if that has three or four people, now, might raise their hand, want to volunteer an answer. we've got marines in the audience, you can't be that timid. okay. i've got one volunteer, anyone else? okay, two, three, so everybody on the left-hand side is wanting to volunteer. no wrong answer or letter grade. the question, in one sentence, can you describe our national policy in the indo-pacific region. let you think for a second. if you look at the notes our policy should be a broad statement should be a government in pursuit of a national interest.

>> the national policy indo-pacific is probably too concentrated on that aor and does not take into account the remaining global interests. >> that's one perspective, but, a show of hand, is that answer what is the national policy? okay, no. all right. next i saw you raise your hand. >> to deter china to become the dominant player and global guardian in that area of the world. >> dominant player, global guardian. okay, do you have some thoughts? i think you raised your hands here? >> i'm not sure what it is, i'm just going to -- i think it's to retain a rule based international system -- but i'm not sure, a lot of ambiguity, to answer your question. >> thank you all for volunteering, did anybody else want to jump in that didn't get a chance to volunteer?

sure. >> i was a pacom cooperation planner i would say a free and open indo-pacific in pair -- to include india, and a rules based order. >> i would say all of you, i think, have elements of what the folks who wrote the national security strategy are going after. i expect that some people that talk about facing challenge, free and order and free and open of indo-pacific. all of those are in the parlance when we hear it talked about and i want to take a minute and just look at what the national strategy, and national strategy say about the u.s. policies in the indo-pacific region. so let's look, the national security strategy, the administration's policy objective is to promote a free and open indo-pacific. you got the indo-pacific, the

verb, promote. and at the same time seems to acknowledge that the pacific is not currently free and open when it goes on to say, a free and open indo-pacific can only be achieved if we build collective capacity, so achieved. that sounds aspirational to me, but they didn't choose a word such as sustained or ensured or defended, they said achieved, which it seems like something we could achieve in the future. to ask to translate, and the guidance under which the dod, or anybody who has a piece of this, uses as guidance, to promote a free indo-pacific. how does the word, the military

promote something? what end goal does this achieve? what do we achieve by promoting? and is there a decisive end state when we promote something. before we get into that. what do we mean by free and open pacific. so i look back and i found in december of 2021, secretary of state blinken, he defined the term so i'm going to read his quote. he said now we talk a lot about a free and open indo-pacific, but we don't often define what we mean by that. so pause for a second and the secretary of state acknowledges that we don't often define the term that is the political object as a nation that we're seeking to achieve and he goes on to say when we say that we want a free and open indo-pacific we mean on an individual level that people will be free in their daily lives and live in open societies. on a state level that individual countries will be able to choose their own path and their own partners, and we mean that on a regional level

that this part of the world, that in this part of the world, problems would be dealt with openly, rules will be reached transparently and applied fairly. goods and ideas will flow freely across land, cyber space and the open sea. i've warned larry that i'm going to cough occasionally up here. and we take a look at the national security strategy and highlight this, our goal is clear we want a free, open, prosperous and secure international order. we seek an order that's free and that allows people to enjoy their basic universal rights and freedoms. it's open and that it provides all nations that sign up to these principles and a opportunity to participate in and have a role in shaping the rules. it's prosperous, it encourages all countries to raise the standards of their citizens and

security, note these words, that it is free from aggression, coercion and intimidation. and so, let's take a look now at the national defense strategy, the words that dod uses to portray and see if we think that free and open is met by the criteria outlined by dod. national defense strategy recognizes prc are pursuing holistic strategies that include varied arms of coercion, malign behavior and aggression to obtain their objectives and it goes on to say the most comprehensive and serious challenge to u.s. national security is the prc's coercive and increasingly aggressive endeavors in the pacific region and the international system to suit its interests and authoritarian preferences. so ask the audience using the

definition that secretary blinken gives, the goals that we have and the national security strategy of free,open, prosperous and secure and then we compare those to the prc actions we see today that are outlined in the national defense strategy, is the indo-pacific, free and open today? and as i said early on, the writers of the national security strategy must have chosen every single word carefully and in choosing the word promote instead of say, ensure, or defend, i think the administration can always say we're successfully promoting a free and open indo-pacific. it seems like you can promote something endlessly, even if you watch it be systematically eroded. and so, i have posed a couple of questions, what does promote mean as an end and how is that translated into the national defense strategy and the

military strategy. is the indo-pacific free and open today? are we promoting the continuation of something or are we perpetuating a state that currently exists today or are we promoting an ideal, something that's not a current reality, but an aspirational goal. and the policy objective of promote a free and open indo-pacific, the vagueness and lack of ability in success or failure of promoting this are exactly why it's so difficult to translate the national policy goal of promote into a military strategy that can be used to justify the resources that it needs. so i'm going to bring this back to the point of expeditionly warfare conference, is she going to talk about amfibs or marines, when you put it in context of discussions today and tomorrow in the conference, discussion about the imperative

to maintain 31 amphibious class ships and the war ships, renamed lanning ship medium and as we await the navy's 2024 budget, there's a lot of anticipation as always that there's going to be cuts and attempts to be commissioned ships again in the amphibious ships, and based off their age and act to preserve some of those in last year's ndaa, but again, i fear that they may come out on the chopping block. let's see how the amphibious force fits into the policy with the defense strategy, translated in the requirements presented at congress. in other words, how do we take the national security strategy and translate that into how many ships, so amphibious ships, landing craft, marine regiments, et cetera, that we need in order to implement the

strategy. taking the political objective of promote a free and open indo-pacific down the level, how does military leadership using that national policy goal come before congress and advocate that taxpayer dollars must be spent on these platforms to meet our policy goals outlined in the national security strategy? it seems a little difficult when you take a look at see that the national policy, the word promote, is so vague and nebulous and hard to define and really doesn't have an end stage. so, what does promote mean? when you look it up, it's a verb, it means to contribute to the growth or prosperity of. and so you might say, how are we promoting a free and open indo-pacific today. the complete engagement at pacom. many things, we're doing, presence in the region, in

times of natural disasters, tsunami, floods, earthquake, denying excessive maritime claims, freedom of navigation, enforcing fishing rights and port visits and engagements in the region and they're promoting a free and open indo-pacific and the question about structure, how many ships does it take to effectively promote? can we promote a free and open indo-pacific with 24 am fibs, with eight or 10? do we need 31? so what is the policy to change one simple word, if we were to change it from promote to ensure the free and open indo-pacific, the list is longer and the justification to invest in those platforms and their deployment to the region, training, everything associated with them would be a lot more compelling to congress and to

the american people. so imagine the scenario, the commandant, pacom commander, mr. chairman, i've been passed with a free and open indo-pacific, in order to do that i need this many readiness groups and marine regiments and these are the investments that i need in platforms and personnel and training in order to achieve this objective. and furthermore, here is the risk of not funding that. so just getting back to the muddled language that we hear, not only is the word promote used in the national security strategy, but there are a lot of other words being thrown around by leaders within the military so in a recent statement, some dod officials have been cavalier about the language that they've used and recently, brigadier general is the pentagon press secretary

had questions concerning secretary austin's travels or republic of korea he was quoted as saying the u.s. will continue to work with nations in the region to deter aggression and ensure in the indo-pacific region. and with a meeting with secretary austin and blinken and japanese counterparts and used the word ensure again. he says again our focus from the united states standpoint is working with our allies and our partners in the region like japan to ensure a free and open indo-pacific and to ensure that stability continues to be present throughout the region. and we can also look at testimony last year before the senate armed services committee, and the pacom commander he used words, in cases he said to advance a free and open, and to promote and

then characterized different allies and their relationship to a free and open end doe pacific, he said australia is a leading contributor of international efforts to promote free and open indo-pacific, india, a strong and capable partner, with a closely aligned vision, for the indo-pacific. southeast asian, a diverse group of people who share our desire for free and open indo-pacific. oceana vital to a free and open indo-pacific and he says the resources we commit now and in the free would preserve a free and open indo-pacific. so i think that preserve, obviously implies that it preserves something that he perceives that currently exists today so you might say it seems like you're nit-picking around this word, promote versus ensure, maybe you think it doesn't make that much difference, and maybe you think that happy hour is just around the corner and this is the last

skigs of the day, but you know, i think a lot of the language i mentioned and the testimony, for example, a lot of those are synonymous, however, there's a difference between the use of the word promote and ensure. to promote that would be to further something, to advance something to encourage something, advocate something, and be a cheerleaderer for something. but to ensure has had a definitive meaning, to guarantee, this make certain and establish, and one thing i learned in command, that if you want the most junior sailor to understand a policy you've got to make it simple and repeating it. go on the deck on any ship, in japan, find a sailor, a marine, and say what is the united states policy here in the indo-pacific, why are you here on this ship and he or she

should be able to say without hesitation, what it is. so i can see questions popping up here, so, someone's probably asking, what do you think it should be? i think it's simple, i think the u.s. policy should be to deter aggression, and ensure a free and open indo-pacific. the exact words that brigadier general ryder used recently however, nowhere reflected in our national strategy documents or other leaders in the administration. or the department of defense. and then next i'd say why should our strategy be clearer. why does clarity matter when it comes to deterring aggression and reassuring our allies and partners? excuse me again. in the national strategy, dod itself discusses why deterrence has been hindered in the past due to lack of clarity

regarding the specific competitor actions we seek to deter. the national defense strategy goes on to say, effective deterrents requires the department to consider how competitors perceive u.s. ally partner stakes, commitment, and combat creditability. so deterrence is about stakes, it's about commitment, and it's about credibility. so for stakes, i don't think there's any question in this room, that the stakes could not be higher, if china decided to impose its will on the region. if we move on to commitment and combat credibility, commitment more broadly, our commitment to the political object as outlined in national strategy, what is that that we seek in the indo-pacific? what is the political object? is it to promote or is it to ensure security in the region? and this is why the distinction between the two words is so worn. the smaller our political

object, the less value we set on it and more easily we should be endues today abandon it. corbitt writes the political object of war, the original motives, will not only determine for both belligerent the aim of the force they use, but it will also be the standard of the intensity of the efforts that they will make. in other words, what is our commitment? if our commitment is to promote, we can do that even as china coerces its regional neighbors through over flights, as long as china has excessive maritime claims, fishing, harassment, building artificial islands, the list goes on. we can promote a free and open indo-pacific while all of those are happening.

but if our commitment is to ensure a free and open indo-pacific many of the actions we say see day-to-day would violate that for a free and open indo-pacific and the third is combat credibility. credibility to ensure a free and open indo-pacific requires a different level of forced structure than to promote. go back to the discussion i had earlier how many amphibious ships do we need to achieve this policy goal, you can come to congress and argue you're promoting, with eight, why 31? the truth is the lack of clarity in what our political objective is which then determines our political strategy if you work your way down and therefore the requirements brought before congress, i think that it needs to be a lot more explicit in order to justify these investments and really as a

nation, are we willing to make the investments that would ensure our combat credibility. quoting corbitt again in some principles of maritime strategy, he says when the chief of staff is asked for a war plan, he'll ask what is the political objective of the war? what are the political conditions? how much does the question at issue mean respectively to us and to our adversary. when it comes to security in the indo-pacific region, i don't think there's much question especially with regards to taiwan, what it means to china. the question remains, what does it mean to us and are we willing as a nation to make the investments to ensure a free and open indo-pacific or will we be satisfied to promote a free and open indo-pacific even as china threatens, coerces and maligns the serenity of its

neighbors. so, thank you very much. hopefully that wasn't, to you you know, too much of a grammar and vocabulary lesson, but i wanted to dig in as to that words matter and we're basing everything off of the national security strategy and that's where we get our national defense strategy, that's where we get the requirements and how it comes before congress, that all of these things tie together, if our over arching guidance is that we're promoting, does that really get across the sense of urgency and amount of investments that we need to make in the indoe pacific. thank you. [applause] >> c-span is your unfiltered view of government who are funded by these television companies and more, including buckeye broadband. >> ♪♪

>> buckeye broadband supports c-span as a public service along with these other television providers, giving you a front row seat to democracy. >> and today in the senate lawmakers are set to work on a house passed resolution to repeal a labor department rule that allows managers of retirement plans to consider environmental, social, and corporate governance factors in their investment decisions. senators will also be working on several judicial nominations. votes are expected throughout the day. live coverage of the senate here on c-span2. the president pro tempore: the senate will come to order. the chaplain, dr. barry black, will lead the senate in prayer.