afternoon. so first we have sebas and mallaby sebastian is the author of five books, including the new times bestseller more than god hedge funds and the making of a new elite and. the man who knew the life and times, alan greenspan, his work has been published in various publications foreign affairs, the atlantic, the washington and the financial times, where he spent two years as contributing editor in the power of law, venture capital and. the making of the new future. mallaby tells the story of silicon dominant venture capital

firms and how their strategies and faith have shaped the path of innovation and the global economy. next, we have philip short. philip has written several definitive biographies, including mal a life pol pot, anatomy of a nightmare and, a taste for intrigue, the multiple lives of francois mitterrand. he worked as a journalist for the bbc for 25 years and as a foreign in moscow, beijing and washington, dc, and wrote for economist and the times of london in putin that is the first comprehensive of fully up date biography of vladimir woven into the tumultuous saga of russia over the last 60 years. next, we have michael beckley. michael is the expert on the balance of power between the united states and china, the author of two books and multiple award winning articles. he is an associate professor of political science, tufts university and, a nonresident

senior fellow at the american enterprise institute. he had previously been an international security fellow at harvard's school of government kennedy school of government. and dangerous the coming conflict with china coauthor with hal brands. he provides a provocative and urgent analysis of the us-china rivalry. and finally, last but not least, we have mina narula, ahmed, born in calcutta, india and she has enjoyed a varied working as a development consultant, journalist and, the foreign correspondent for new delhi television based in london. she has written and has eds and articles published in the age seminar. the wall street journal, the washington and post, cnn and the atlantic monthly. in her book in the matter of india, a matter of trust india, u.s. relations from truman to

trump, she draws a trove of presidential papers, newly declassified documents, memoirs and interviews to reveal the prejudices, insecurities and political imperatives that are so often have cast a shadow over this vital relationship. and with that i turn it over to the panel. great. well, thanks for the introduction. so when i took delivery of three books on three very different subjects, i understood immediately that these authors are united in their talent but divided what they write about and. you know, we've got a book on india, we've got a book on china, we've got a book on russia. okay. so all of these countries are part that brics club brazil, india, china, south africa. but the similarities are actually smaller than the differences. if you think about it, i you've got russia and china which both

have a gdp per capita of over $10,000 and you've got india which is around 2200. last time i looked. so it's a sort of, you know, five x or a four and a half x difference. you've got three countries which are indeed nuclear powers, but have different interests, different spheres of influence. and you've got two or parity in governments, but course, india is a democracy. you've got two members of the security council of the u.n. india, to its disappointment, is not among that group of permanent members. so i was thinking about how to knit this group together. i thought, this is going to take some creativity, but mitch over there is expecting the so we've got to come up with something. and what i across was a thought michael's book where he says quite sort of clearly and without much would say without much qualification that the united states does not have a xi

jinping problem. it has a china problem. in other words, however tempting it might be to personalize a foreign policy clash and say it's because this foreign leader is is a bad guy, it's wrong. individual leaders normally simply embody differences which are kind of hardwired into the dna of the countries that they lead. and so what i want to get to with all these countries is, if that's true, when you've got tensions between the united states and on the one hand, india on the other hand russia on the third hand, if you got three hands, china, is it because personalities or is it because something deeper? so, michael, you provided the springboard. so i'm going to come to you first and xi jinping as a leader who has kind of ripped up the post-mao tradition of leading for only ten years and somewhat of a collective fashion.

explain to us why you nonetheless believe that the american challenge, when it looks at china is not about this one person? well, think unfortunately, the united states, both a china and a xi jinping problem and on why it's broader issue with china. first, if you look at the administration of hu jintao, you realize that a lot of the policies were concerned about today the epic military buildup where china has churning out ammunition warships at a rate we haven't seen for many countries since world war two. a lot of the domestic repression, the kind of laying the foundation for what we're seen as some people called digital authoritarianism, the sort of orwellian system that uses artificial intelligence and hundreds of millions of cameras as well as more expansionist policies is economically. so the precursor to what we now call the belt and road initiative, where china has lent out more than $1,000,000,000,000, mostly to

poor countries to build infrastructure and drum up demand for china's exports. that begins in the last two years of the hu jintao administration. and a lot of this can be traced back to. the 2008 financial crisis because that really jeopardized china's rise china had been into open markets in united states and europe and japan and when you have this huge financial crisis, suddenly demand for that drops in china, realizes it's going to face a more protectionist and potentially more hostile world. and so to get out in front of that china has erected what is now this vast internal security apparatus has gone abroad in a big way economically and is also looking for ways to consolidate control over the territories that it claims, which includes taiwan as well as roughly 80% of the east and south china sea. so you can actually you know, in the book, we try to show this the starts under whose administration now xi jinping is certainly accelerated many of these and the images we saw of the 20th party congress were

were striking especially you know, hu jintao being essentially walked out of the proceedings. and so that shows that xi jinping himself, you know, we think that the system sort of selects these type of leaders, the whole system. and if you look at china's history, we'll look for leader with these type of qualities. and it seems have found its mark with xi jinping. but would be a mistake to assume that if she fades from the scene you know you get different personalities in play. we don't think that that would radically alter china's long term trajectory as well as its policies. and in the tension between china and the us, which you see right now and some of it is generated by the us. right. there's been a hardening of u.s. attitudes. china. what would you make the same claim that this is really about something about, you know what, the u.s. interest is that leads to a more aggressive stance. could it be tied to personalities whether it be that of trump or somebody? so i think trump obviously

helped blow the lid off of the policy of american engagement of china and really radically shifted a harder containment policy. but i think momentum towards that outcome had been building for years, even in the half of the obama administration, they had become exasperated by what felt was just a non cooperator actor and a lot of this just makes sense sort of geopolitics 1 to 1, you know, a very powerful country is going to look to constrain the rise of a potential pure competitor. i actually think american china policy would have gotten more hostile earlier had it not been for a few sort of fleeting circumstances. you know, in the nineties. is it cold war has just ended. everyone thinks, you know, democracy and capitalism are just going to spread. and we're in this unipolar moment. but when i remember when george w bush was running for president, he started talking about china, a strategic competitor, and planned to get much more aggressive with china. then 911 happens and suddenly the united states needs china's

cooperation, you know, not to screw things up in the u.n. council, but more importantly, not to start in east asia. while the united states is going to be bogged down in the middle east. and so the united states gets distracted strategically. and i think that provides china the chinese themselves have called a 20 year opportunity to build up their own national power. now that the united states has been able to shift its focus back towards great power, competition. you're seeing the emergence of what i think was unfortunately a type of policy we see all too often in international history where you have these great powers competing for power, wealth and influence, and that's playing out today. so, so i mean, let's try and apply the same to india. you know, recently the us has been upset and disappointed because prime minister modi in india declined to come down on the u.s. side in terms of isolating russia over the ukraine invasion. but i guess you'd argue that that was not a modi problem. your book and the narration of

the very tricky u.s. india relationship over the past 70 years, there clearly seems to be something deeper about how these countries interact that is bigger than modi. so in india case, i would argue that that when world war two ended and when india gained its independence of india had a unique. issue, which is having come out of the yoke of colonial ism, india did not have any intention of lining up with another western, so they opted for non-alignment. they did not they wanted to be able to be free to, develop their foreign policy based on strategic interests that was universally by everyone and the indian establish movement, whether it was the congress party, the opposition of having said that, whenever you have a

country that's emerging i think that you you would find that the personalities of the leadership usually has a pretty signifier and a play, you know, plays a pretty significant role and has its stamp on that country whether i don't want to speak for russia we the russian expert here. but you know, if you look at lenin and stalin, they had a pretty significant impact on their country. same with nehru and, india and and you can look at sukarno in indonesia you know you can go down list of newly independent countries, etc.. so i think that yes, i think in newly emerging countries, i leadership and personal do play a fairly prominent role. nehru had a vision for india and india was a very poor and fairly illiterate country at the time.

so he he did have a strong role and they did have prickly relations. so you referred to that. and that was because of the the push in this country at the time, especially under truman, dulles, etc. . very much. you're either with us or against us. now, india's balancing of non-alignment was a in the side of their relationship. so it led to some pretty deep seated misunderstandings. the two countries from the beginning. one of the fun details that you would learn if you read this book. i recommend all of these books, but in minutes you learn that truman was a natty dresser with 96 pairs of shoes. but his diplomacy was somewhat elegant. he claimed, for example, that he could smell that he could smell that nehru was a communist which

he wasn't, of course, there is this famous incident where, you know, there's a supreme court justice douglas, who every summer would go off on vacation and truman discovered that he was going off to india one summer, and he calls him into his office and he says, i hear you're going to india. well, i want you to go off and meet mr. nehru and, you know, justice says, yes, mr. president. and he says he was sitting in that where you're sitting and can tell you he was a commie because i can smell a commie a mile away. and that was a commie. so justice douglas goes off to india and he meets nehru. he, you know, spends many dinners with him. and there is an intellectual he's written many. he went to oxford. he you know, he's an erudite man. and they get on get on very well to discuss discuss the indian constitution and the framing of it. when he comes back, goes to the president and he says, mr. president i met mr. nehru and

he's more economy than than you are. i and president truman just erupts into this you know he's furious and he said he just refuses to believe him and. he he has a meltdown and adds. justice douglas writes in these diaries, which i found buried in the princeton archives and says, well, you know, it was like blowing into wind. he says, there's just nothing you could do to. convince this man from missouri that, you know, a man like was not a communist, just believed in non-alignment. that's all. so, you know, fast forward to your question about modi. there's a big geopolitical shift taking in the world. as we we all know. there's a containment of china. the reason that in those days, despite the problems with nehru, the west did support india was because it was seen as a frontline state against chinese communist expansion. so today we're back full circle

and we are still seen a frontline against chinese expansion. and this time is, of course, its economic power and greater threat. and modi has opted. now he's watching balance take place where russia's lining up with russia. that traditional allies lining up with the chinese and russia has shown itself to be a rather ally. and so and they've decided put their eggs in the us basket. so i don't want to take up too much time. so apply this same question, philip, to russia, i suppose would be regarded, you know, exhibit a if you were drawing up a list of individuals who appear to have really stamped his mark on the global order, you know through sheer force of will kind of you becoming a you know, a modern. so do you think he would be the

exception to the what i call michael's or that michael will send me disavowed but no i don't think he is an exception. one thing i've been struck by listening to both of you talking is that in the case of china and of india, not simply china and, india that forge their policies, the united states, the west had its role play, too. and, you know, it takes two to tango. and each of those relationships. and that's true of russia. but russia has a bit of a special case because soviet union collapsed in 1991 and there was a kind of there were two possible directions in theory, at least russia could have become and the west initially believed it would much more democratic, much more liberal, much more friendly to us, a much more kind of reasonable relationship. or it could revert the kind of

adversarial relationship it had had in soviet times. and you ask about the role of putin, i would say an awful lot of what we have, the foundations for it were laid back in the 1990s when it was bill and boris it was bill clinton and yeltsin who were the the the the couple of power holders and putin has built on that which suggests that no it wasn't putin who did all this stuff. it was a much deeper historical and bill burns, who now the cia chief he was the he was the ambassador in moscow and a very good u.s. ambassador to moscow. he wrote in his memoirs that kind of a train between the u.s. and russia was it was built into the equation from the start because america had delusion

that russia would meekly follow the course america set and the us led rules based society, as it's called, that america that russia would be a part of that. and had the illusion that united states would accept it as an equal. and neither of those where ever going to happen. but it didn't have to lead to the kind of shambles we today with a war in ukraine that is much, i think, attributable to putin. a different leader would probably have done different things. so, yes, there are the historical fundamentals kind of take us to the stake. we're in. but putin played a pretty important part in it, too. but maybe just to go back with, one more question, philip, about the bill and boris. i mean, what i remember is, you know, bill clinton going out of his way to, bring russia into

the what was the g7 and became the g8, a big effort from washington to prevent the collapse of. russian financial markets before august 1998, which failed and they did collapse into a big devaluation. but i think there was a rounds of assistance before, the collapse suggesting that there a desire from washington to be helpful. so i feel i mean, can't you tell a story that the u.s. sort of did its best, rather, just as it were, the china when it brought china into the wto to give russia a chance to be part of the western club, and then the russians take it? no, i don't. you can make that case. you know, very much a question of is the part full or is it half empty? the way the russians saw it, the west gave just enough aid so that they didn't revert to communism. and you talk about 1998.

i could talk about 1996 when yeltsin was standing for reelection. and was was terribly sick, terribly unpopular. and they really they really had to make enormous efforts, gerrymandering and all the that people do to try to win elections when they're very much behind. and they controlled the media at that time. yes. the west did pour in a little bit of money to help, but it was never enough. the first deputy prime minister, the guy who formulated economic policy for yegor gaidar, said, you know if you could give us just, you know, half as much, we'd probably be able to our economy to take off and really establish a proper market system. but you don't. and there was a lot bitterness in russia about the way things didn't go right now, i'm just giving you side of it because

there is another side which many people in the west believed and which has a lot to it, that russia was so dysfunctional, that if you pour money, it's just going down a black hole. so there's no point. it was that an argument which happened, you within individual western embassies, the ambassador would argue one way the head of chancery would another way. and in in governments, western governments. the upshot was that by the mid-to-late 1990s, most ordinary russians felt they'd been cheated by this, you know, democracy deal that they got from the west. there's a pun, and i won't repeat it because it's that democracy, which is. well, it's a it's a it's a an expletive ocracy rather than the democ racy. so yeah, that was the basis on

which putin took over. and yeah he did initially try to make a harmonious with the west, but it went south for reasons which we can certainly discuss later, reasons that came from sides but from the russians very much as well. so i have another question from michael, which is sort gets to the title of his book. i mean, one of the striking things about russia is that, you know, whilst being a declining power economically, it's been able to make a lot of geopolitical noise and the story with china, the kind of conventional story is that it's not the decline which is what you see in russia economically is the precisely the opposite. it's the rise in that creates the tension or clash with the west. so the decline story. dangerous rise is dangerous. you have a third story and please explain. so we china as peaking power at

this point and it's coming off of what more than 30 years of rapid growth but now its economy is slowing it's starting to get more pushback internationally. and my my coauthor brandes is a leading historian, johns hopkins. and we go back through history and look at every case of these these peaking powers. and they mellow out when their rise starts to come to an end. they tend to go out often in rapacious fashion, to try to rekindle their rise, as well as just to try to long standing. national goals while they still so it's it's the rise by the fear that if they don't take decisive in the short term they're going to be doomed to longer term decline. and actually russia is one of our cases. i mean, we note that in the 2000s, russia was a resurgent power. it was banging out 8% economic growth rates every year, largely

because of high oil and gas prices. but then after the 2008 financial crisis, when oil gas prices plummet and dragged down putin's popularity and, the russian economy, along with it, you know, putin starts, first of all, clamping down domestically. but also this is when he starts putting pressure on former states to join what eventually comes to be called the eurasian economic union. he basically wants them to become economic vassals of as a way to rekindle shore up both russian wealth status and power. and the ukrainians, you know, they part of their country says thanks, but no, we're actually much more interested in aligning with the west and eventually signing this massive trade deal with the european union. and we know how that tug war ultimately played out. so we just worry, you know, we go through all these historical cases and then we look at roughly the last 15 years of chinese foreign and we find that, you know, rising powers actually tend to be quite peaceful because everything is

going in their direction. why would you upend the applecart if it's, you know, you're gaining international power and to countries that are in freefall like the soviet union in the late 1980s. they also tend to be peaceful because they have no other option. they have to basically sell out. but it's these peaking powers where they've built up formidable capability is it's puffed up their egos and their expectations, but they're looking at a future of closing windows opportunity and opening windows of vulnerability. they tend to be the prime movers and shakers. i mean, there are catalysts examples like argue that germany starts world one in large part because it's worried it's about to get crushed in a russian and vise with an assist from britain. we know that. why did the japanese attack the united states at pearl harbor? was because they were super confident about their ability to defeat the united states. no, it's because they that if they didn't make decisive moves in the short term, they were going to be in a lot of trouble in the long term. and we we even if china doesn't go anywhere near, those catastrophic examples, there's any other moderate examples,

none of which turn particularly well, because these countries more prickly and aggressive well as more repressive internally. so therefore, you're arguing that it's this decade in which some kind of conflict involving china is the most likely. it wasn't before when they were rising first. it won't be in the future when. they stagnate properly. it's right now and you have this nice phrase, the geopolitical catastrophes occur at the intersection of ambition and desperation and so this leads to the obvious question. what probability do you ascribe to a military conflict between the us and china by 2030? so you know, major power war is obviously is always a pretty rare and not very probable thing. if you'd asked me this question maybe five years ago, i'd say there's a 1% chance of a war over something like taiwan. i now we're it's kind of bumped up into double digits, so maybe 10 to 15%. if you really pressed me, which may not sound like a very high

probability, but you know i play a lot of poker and i can't tell you how many hands or i've been, you know, a 90% favorite and i've lost all my money. so, you know, these things can happen and because we're talking about what could radically escalate to essentially a massive potentially of a nuclear conflagration between the two most powerful countries in the world even a 10% chance of a risk over like taiwan is way too high. and, you know, to your point, you know, the reason the is called danger zone was not just sort of piggyback on tom cruise and maverick, but it was more just because we tend to think about the u.s., china rivalry as this decades long marathon. in fact, there's a bestselling book called the 100 year marathon on where, you know, each side kind of has years to get its house in order. we actually worry that the sharpest phase of this conflict is going to be more like a ten year sprint in the 2020s, just given all of the that china faces and how quickly it's moving, not just militarily but economically, as well as to spread aspects of its system

internationally. so mina, thinking about india, i mean this you know, this sort of way of looking at countries and trying to predict how they're going to behave vis a vis the united states sort based on how they're growing. they have they gone through growth, but now they're facing and now it's dangerous. this sort of lens. i just wonder whether there's a policy error that u.s. is engaging in, which goes back to george w bush's opening to india and the acceptance of india as a nuclear power and. and the area would be, you know, the classic view of geopolitics in asia is from the us perspective, you know, we're worried about china, therefore we want counterbalance to china. india is a democracy. india speaks english, india has nice tech people that we like. so let's hope for huge indian growth. and this will be a counterbalance to china.

but you take the view that you know countries with populations north of a billion people that grow very fast are ultimately going to inevitably want a share of the power in the global and india is not a member of the un security council apparently you know that that could end up being the of era that we feel we vis a vis china by bringing them into the wto we thought that a rising china would integrate into the system and become a u.s. ally maybe a rising india might grow very fast and turn out to be more of a rival than a friend. or do you think that's negative. well. they've tried to make india a member of the security council, but china has blocked it. so. way back in. and khrushchev way back in 1955,

had suggested nehru that maybe they should nominate india and at that time demurred. you know, he thought that was a step too far. that was not necessary. he he thought they'd, be all kinds of resistance. so at that point, india actually didn't think it was ready. obama as you well know, sort of came to india and made an announcement, then saying that they were going to try and propose india. there was a lot pushback from china and. so they knew they couldn't get it through. but i think the was really to the indian public know and to let the indian bureaucracy know that the u.s. was on their side and was very much favor of having india in the security council. and, you know, india is going to

be india's turn is coming up in the g20 later to lead the g20. now it's a temporary position, but if you saw what happened i mean, modi's taken a pretty active internationally. now and india has a lot of power. it's a, you know, seat at the high table, at the global high table. i think it's taken as a serious country, partly because it's become economically, it's become a force in the world and its membership in the quad has made it a powerful player and you know, that, you know, initially xi actually not not xi, but i think his foreign minister several years ago and they had a first meeting a few years ago had said, oh, this is foam is going to disappear into the sea and this is not the quad is not an important instrument and they sort of pooh poohed the idea today, calling it the they're calling the quad and eastern nato and they're finding it

rather a threat. so now they're taking taking it quite seriously because the quad has become a slightly more aggressive counter to china. so think that, you know. i think the us is building up the quad and i because australia and japan are now on board with it as a counter where where it goes in the future. i think. i think india is hedging bets bets to be quite honest you know this is this is what someone calls the most dangerous place on earth. everyone nuclear armed. i mean, the bet hedging feels like, you know, back to what you were saying earlier. you come out of colonization and you want to be nonaligned. truman says you're with us or against us. and they say, well, neither an, you know, that could be a repeat

of that, right? we're back. you know, after what happened last week at the g20, after what happened in the shanghai cooperation last month, where modi came out, frankly, and criticized russia quite strongly, i don't see how india can say that it's nonaligned anymore. so i think they seem be fairly clearly in the western camp right now. now, with. even though they have come out quite against the war and, you know, they're still. 90% of their spare parts for their military. they're still dependent russia. they have diversified their military down to 60% now so that all their new you know sales are now coming from europe or the us. but it takes a long time to divert ossify your military hardware, takes years so but for all their old military that

that's still you know russian made 90% of those spare parts are still russia now i'm i'm wondering russia is having trouble supplying its spare parts for the ukraine war and when i just mentioned this earlier to jamychal they turned to china to help them out. and china said, no. so there's a of geopolitical shifts going on in that region. now, i think china is also seeing trying to hedge its bets. so philip, want to draw on your expertise on both russia and china because of course, you wrote the biography of mao as well as the one of stalin. more recently i'm not studying putin. sorry, putin's stalin. freudian stalin rather than putin. i guess i had married in my head, so is in the wrong era? yeah, but you know,

traditionally one argument that used to be made in contrasting and stalin and mao not putin in my was that you know whereas russia had a doctrine of global revolution and therefore was sort of ideologically committed to spreading trouble abroad, china did not. and and now we're in a moment where china's willingness to kind of focus internally appears to have evaporated or at least it's by the desire to be more but dominant in the region. and so, first of all, do you agree that that was a valid ideological distinction to make during the cold war? and how do you see that now? well, i think it was partly valid i don't entirely agree because my saw china very much as a kind of revolutionary beacon beaming out to the rest

of the world that would inspire revolution everywhere else. now, that's not the same as having the comintern, the common form and world network, quite powerful communist parties, which the russians had, but still, you know, it wasn't it wasn't black and white it that way. but i've been very struck by by what you just said, nina, about gop political shifts, because we're all talking, michael, about china. you india may about russia, but there is a broader picture that we have entered a period where the the geopolitical givens of the last 30 years are changing. and we're going into uncharted waters part of the reason is that the relative strength of the united states has declined. and when i say relative but you know, back in 1960, you had 40% of world world gdp.

now it's 24%, which means other have got stronger. china, obviously india, the brics countries. but that is a process which is going forward. it's not going to stop this these challenges to american domination and fundamentally, what we're seeing, ukraine is, a challenge by russia to domination in europe. american leadership, if you like, in europe, the chinese, the indians as well have a certain sympathy with this and so do so does most of the global south that they would rather have a larger in things which means that the united states ought to listen to them more, that the europeans ought to listen to them more. and there will eventually a much more multipolar world. and it's in this context that i think we're all talking about

are individual. and conflicts and everything else. but the next ten, 20 years, putin said and not everything he said is wrong this is going to be a very dangerous and unpredictable period. and not just of what he's doing in ukraine, but because the whole chessboard is changing. yeah. and so i mean, in some ways you could say the new cold war is starting right? you see the us imposing an embargo, the export of advanced semiconductors to china, semiconductors are so central to modern industrial economy that it's kind of like an energy embargo. and if you look at numbers, as i happened to do for some reason recently and you look at, you know the size of total russian natural gas exports and before the invasion of ukraine and the total size was kind of one six

of the size of chinese semiconductor imports. so otherwise, semiconductors are a much bigger dollar business than natural gas. and we see how damage putin has done to the economies of western europe by putting an embargo on the export of natural gas. so for the us to say china won't get more advanced semiconductors is pretty big deal and coming off the summit just recently biden said you know we're not in a cold war with china. but if you actually look at the walkies, walking the talk he's talking kind of does a bit like a cold war. so i maybe michael to comment on that with his expertise on china and we'll come back to you, too. i'm really glad you brought that up because i've actually been surprised how little news coverage there has been because me this is essentially a signal of the economic warfare by the united states on china spends more to import computer chips than it does to import oil. and you know think how many aspects of our lives depend on

high end computers ships and so for the united states not only prohibit china accessing these chips but also no possibility to build itself and it is i think it could be a devastating blow for the chinese economy and no amount of diplomatic summitry can really squelch that out. so to me, this is a huge it'll be not just interesting but terrifying to see how china decides to respond to this. can they you know, they've spent more than $100 billion trying to make their own domestic semiconductor industry? i think china has no prospect of being able to catch up just simply because no country, i don't think, can produce these chips by themselves. not even the united states. united states is completely dependent on the dutch to make these lithography machines that only the dutch can make. they're completely dependent on the taiwanese to do the final of the most high end chips, dependent on various parts from south korea and japan.

and so how is going to make up for for all of that? it just doesn't seem possible. and i think it's notable that despite spending than $100 billion, you, china's national champion in this area, makes computer. they're about as cutting edge as a flip phone, you know. so it's just going to be extremely difficult for china to close that gap. but that actually worries me because chinese have made very clear an assault on china's economy. they see as an assault on the ccp on its hold on power, which justifies a whole range of options. they don't just have to respond in the economic sphere. they can respond in number of other ways and. so i'm just i'm worried that, you know, because we in our book, we study, you know, the history of u.s. japan relations in the 1930s. and when the united states cuts japan off from from oil the japanese, don't say, oh, well, i guess we'll just abandon our empire in east asia. you know, end up with with pearl harbor. so it's just it's very worrying to see how will respond to what i see as economic by the united states on china. you know, i mean, there's a dimension to this policy, which

is, you know, can the us keep its allies on board around this embargo. so specifically, as michael is saying, you need actually holland to be your ally, right. because they've got the best lithography company and that's the one that builds the machines with which you engrave the second sun to the under the wafers semi of silicon. so you need the dutch to be on side, you need the japanese to be on side. you need the south koreans need the taiwanese, because these are key economies in terms the supply chain for semiconductors. now when the us in day was trying to say you're with us, so you're against us in the cold war, you know, our allies at least truman did marshall plan, at least truman, you know, was the president who presided over the creation of the gatt, laid the cornerstone of the global trading system. you know, he was setting a system of international alliances, nato's that mean the

u.s. was not standing on its own in this. you're with us. so you're against us. cold war struggle. and this was at a time when u.s. share of global gdp was actually more like 50%, not 40%, because it was 1950, not 1960. and so the u.s. was super strong and yet it was super cognizant of the need to have strong alliances. now, the question today and this kind of gets slightly to u.s. india relations is if the wants to get strong alliances to it up in this embargo and it needs the taiwanese, the dutch and so forth to be on side doesn't have to offer something in terms of trade access or other economic cooperation. you can't say to the dutch, hey give up on the chinese market, but we're giving you zero extra chinese american access, you can't say that to you can't say that to taiwan. so do you think that in a way, you know, india in its historic sort of bumping up against the

u.s. in terms of trade policy around, intellectual property rights and trips and all that? you know, it could become a bit of a figurehead or a sort of leader in the rest of the world of the u.s. withdrawal, trade liberalization. yeah. so that india definitely had a very difficult trade relationship. the u.s. no question. that's very protection asset. but can i actually ask a question from the panelists? i'm on this on this issue because it you know, initially. the whole concern was that if countries engaged with each other on trade and, the world became very interconnected on with their trade with their trading and became trading partners. it would actually prevent wars

the future right that was the whole theoretical concept that countries would become so dependent on each other that it would prevent wars because they would have so many interests in common. but we've discovered that that isn't necessary in the case and we are in a terrible situation. so especially with china, it's most countries their largest trading partner is either the u.s. or china. and now we're in this terrible conflict situations, i'd love to hear from michael and you about whether what you think about that theory and where we are and where the future lies to your time on trade. well, it doesn't look very good, does it? i mean, everyone's drawing in their horns. yeah, i think that is that is part of the difficulty of the transition we're moving into

that people are reshoring or fringe during the new phrases are they want to rely less on globalized supply lines whether that is actually i mean i think one can in a way look at the situation the globalization that occurred as a rather exceptional situation and that we're taking some steps back from that is perhaps not as bad a thing as it seems. we may forward again in the future. i don't know where until we're very speculative area, but they're just two tiny things i'd like to pick up. one from you, sebastian and talked about the new cold war. i really have to disagree because i think one of the essentials of the cold war was and this relates a little bit to trade, one of the essentials of the cold war was it was an ideological conflict there is very little ideology.

now, i know joe biden talks about a war between democracies, autocracies, but that's very much for domestic. it's a spin that this is a war between good and evil. in reality ideology. doesn't figure that much. it's much more about about in the case of ukraine, military and in more more broadly about economics. and the other thing you china's pushing back, nina said, pushing back against indian membership of the security council. absolute. but i don't think the british or the french who are hanging for grim death to their permanent membership of the security council, would very much like enlargement, which would dilute their powers. you know that it's not just the chinese. others have their interests too. michael, what do you think about this idea, that the portrayal of the conflict between the us and china as something to do with

ideology is is a spin. whether it's spin, i do think we tend to downplay the ideological of us-china rivalry. a lot of people say, well, the chinese, they're not really an evangelical power. they don't really care if other countries sort of mini chinese. and i think that's certainly true but i do think that the communist party would certainly there to be more autocracies in the world, for one, because other autocracies are less likely to criticize the chinese communist party for its own autocratic methods. and second, you know, if china can make democracy look sort of shamble slick and chaotic and corrupt, then the chinese people are less likely want to emulate those and will be more likely to say, you know what? cp you're right, we have a hierarchical, well-ordered society where everyone knows their place and there is law and order. and so in, you know, especially over the last decade, been amazing the extent which xi

jinping has made, you know, loyalty to the party so critical. every aspect of life in china, you know, every company in china with more than a few employees has to have essentially a political commissar on staff whose whose role is to say are you being loyal. is everything you're doing in this meeting loyal to the chinese communist party. you've seen this surveillance state and the infuse in of party ideology. i mean, people in, the chinese government have to spend 10 to 15% of their time studying. mao zedong and xi jinping thought. you're right. so this the idea that somehow this is not an ideological regime always strikes me as a bit odd. and, you know, for the united states, you know, the united states certainly will deal with autocracies. but the united states would probably feel more comfortable in a world where there are more democracies for the exact know mirror image reasons, for for china. and you're seeing this playing out not just in the u.n. over know conceptions of human rights. you know, to what extent should we prioritize individual which

is what the united states or the community or the group china says you can actually trounce on some individual rights if it's for the betterment of the group. the united states takes a very different position. but also just in terms of support for various regimes around. the world china has been funneling not just loan, but also technology, surveillance systems to more than 80 countries around world to help them clamp down on their populations. and so i think fundamentally there is a strong ideological component and it also exacerbates the military geopolitical aspects of the rivalry, because the chinese and we now know this from documents that have been leaked out not just in the xi jinping era, but in the supposedly days of us-china relations under deng helping jiang zemin, were those leaders. zemin literally says to his comrades in this internal meeting, you know, clinton just told me the united wants to engage us, but don't be fooled by that. whether they call it an engagement strategy or containment strategy, what they want is to change us. they want our regime to change, to become a democracy, which

means that we effectively lose our iron grip on power. we will never, ever let that happen. we're not going to do a stupid gorbachev move and up. look how that turned out. in 1989. you know the berlin wall falls because of gorbachev. we faced the tiananmen square and we rolled tanks into the streets. we're still here and we're on our way to become the dominant country. i think in their minds it was a natural experiment that justifies their ideology. and then accentuates the ideological aspect of this conflict. today. and i'm going to ask a slightly different of question, but i also want to get questions from you guys. so if anybody one please echo. we've got one right away. okay, let's let's go. pc yeah, exactly. so many sort of villas. and my question is for the entire panel or even a moderator, i want to hear your opinion as well. so with the rise of authoritarian countries like russia, hungary, belarus, china, north korea and vietnam do you think the way that the u.s.

should reacting to these rising authoritarian nations is by fully embracing our western values, gay rights women's rights, freedom of religion, freedom of speech, freedom of the press which are all things that are lacking. all those countries i just named, um, philip. yes, i guess so, um. yeah, i'm reluctant always to take a black and white view because what you say, you know, the we, we hold dear in the west, there's an awful lot of disagreement in the in the west, the united states. you, you know, you republicans who wouldn't agree with a lot of what you just said about these being important freedoms. so that's why i kind of hesitated you know, i think we have to stick to our absolutely core values of of basic freedoms, freedom of the press, the rule of law, economic freedoms.

beyond that we get into culture wars pretty quickly. and i think we were talking earlier. democracy and autocracy. and the chinese will be happy. you know, all happy if our democracy looks a mess we're doing pretty good job of making it a mess ourselves. so, you know, yes, core values but that's what we should really stick to. should we do the next question or do you either want to comment? yeah, please. no. yeah, i want to hear from everybody. so yeah, but we also have got three people, four people behind you and you would like to. but i really. okay, let's take the next one. my question is for mr. beckley. i've been reading your book is excellent and you point out many areas in which everything that we hear about great the chinese are and so on, how they do have problem along the way. now we sort we heard from the

russians how great their communication service was, how great their army was. and we've seen that they weren't. the chinese have built an enormous military, but they've never fought against a power like the united states or even one that's well armed, like taiwan. so what do you think? or do you have any ideas or do you have any information about how they consider the effectiveness their military? are they all wolf warriors or are they still some who are thinking? so i think if you read chinese military analyzes, there are, ones that are very straightforward that say, look, we don't have no, no one that's going to be doing the majority of the fighting has any combat experience because china hasn't fought a major war since 1979. they also recognize that they live in a different era and that, you know, the pla china's military is an awesomely corrupt organization where know to move up the ranks. there's been massive etc..

xi jinping when he came to power in late 2012 his disdain for the play was so palpable he said this has become a fat bloated corrupt organization and. so he went he purged many many top level leaders. he even went after retired leaders and threw some of them in jail or some of them have just been disappeared. and this really scared the play. he's obviously pumped a lot of money into it. you've seen, at least on paper and in watching videos, you know, you can watch do their satellite photos of china doing bombing runs full scale mock ups of american bases and taiwanese bases and american aircraft carriers. so they've been training quite a bit, but that's not the same combat and the political science literature that when you try to coup proof a military when you just go through with a sledgehammer, take out a big part of the leadership it tends to not produce a very effective because suddenly the prime directive, everyone in that military becomes not to fight well, but to just show the

leader, the leader what they want to hear. look good for the leader. and so i think xi shipping should worry that his military on paper will perform in actuality similar to how the russian military performed. but the problem is, don't know if he gets that information for this exact reason, dictators tend to fall into their own echo chamber. so whether there is top level discussions, i'm actually frankly doubtful, even though at the lower levels, like even someone you know, outsider like me can get their hands on, certain documents and textbooks that are in chinese military academies. but i just don't i really don't think that gets filtered in a big way to the top level leadership, which is why i don't think we can that just because maybe russia's military performed badly, that china will say, oh i guess conquest is really hard, maybe we shouldn't we should lay off taiwan. i actually worry that there will drive other lessons like rattle the nucleus loud and clear, move big, brutal from the start. don't stumble into country and discount the weaknesses of their military. another question for mr. sure.

could you say something please about the origins effectiveness of putin's meddling in? i mean, do you think was decisive in 2016, but also regarding and how you see the west's countermove was how effective are they. in the case of brexit it's easier for me to answer because i don't think there was any any significant meddling. the was a little indirect act but no the british managed shoot themselves in the foot without any from the from russia i'm afraid in your case, you know those in the three key states in 2016 the margins were pretty small. did putin's did russian interference swing votes towards trump or did the the the the

democrats perception democratic voters perception that russia was interfering actually mobilize them more. you know it could have worked both ways we tend not to look at the the other side of that the possibility that the trump's association with russia in the public mind in the democrat public mind may actually have rebounded against him. so i think it's it's really i find anyway, as an outsider, impossible to judge now why did want trump in. i don't think he actually that it would succeed he did no i don't think he did. but i think he did want to discredit american democracy was the fundamental goal. and i think could say he didn't do such a terrible job of that. but whether it whether he moved votes, i don't think anyone is actually going to be able to

prove it one way, one way or the other. 2021 i, i don't think there a great deal of interference because he didn't need to if we doing such a grand job yourselves of messing up those elections, it was better that he stay away and he he didn't get involved. next question. question about the russians, as people and the chinese people, do you think that they have a national character they're like a dna that just never that never accept a democratic rule that somehow built into their culture, that they would always accept a leader they needed and whether they like it or not, that's way they have to live. in the chinese case. i don't buy that because you just look at taiwan and the people that are of chinese heritage, they're one of the, you know, most flourishing democracies in the entire world.

the ccp line, which they communicate to their population that democracy is not appropriate for china. i think just a this is one of the many reasons they wanted destroy taiwan is because it's this counterexample to their whole narrative in terms of that, you know, it's hard to make generalizations about you. 1.4 billion people. one thing i would say, though, is, you know, after tiananmen square massacre, the chinese regime realized that communism was just not going to cut it as sort of an ideology for the people. so what they what they did and this starts under deng xiaoping and extends to the present day is develop this new nationalist narrative centered around the century of humiliation you know from the mid 1800s to 1949 where china just gets ripped apart by imperialist powers and in on itself they say, look, are we the we are the ones that recovered china from that horrible catastrophe and we have to hold together as a nation because we're in a dangerous and

dark world. all of these other great powers are just out. get us that nationalist narrative. you know, with my chinese friends who, you know, these young millennials who, like in so many other aspects of life, are very just open, globalized, you know, citizens, they study here i have a lot of chinese students, but you bring up some of these issues that the has characterized in nationalist fashion and they can quickly you know, very much espoused in that. so i think there is a certain strategic that has developed in the country precisely because the state has promoted it so heavily. and what about the russians? can i may i briefly add something. yeah, i agree with what you've said. i think there are historical and cultural continuities, which you have you you have to take into account in both china and in russia, taiwan, it's a bit taiwan on the mainland, a bit apples and oranges. and yes, they are, of course, chinese and they have become democratic. but there we're in a very special situation with a lot of

american support and and influence. so i think it will be i think what one can say is it will be it's not going to happen overnight. it's going to be an extremely slow process. after all, we took a long time to get to our democratic societies the same with russia if you talk to young russians in moscow st petersburg the biggest cities. yeah they're very much like young frenchmen or young germans or young americans. they are very minded. but there a kind of historical overhang and to expect democracy is going to come about in russia ten years time, 15 years time. you know, it's it's going to take longer than that because the weight of the past and the strength russian culture, not in my lifetime of. okay, last question and then we'll wrap up. good afternoon. my question is why all these topics we're talking about here

are not in mainstream media. it's just. we are in we're really right now at war with russia and with china, who knows what will happen. we are not in real, but we are in competition with china and they are pushing us out of asia. so it seems to me that people on the street are just not familiar with that. but we are really at war. i mean, maybe i'll take that since i am a journalist, i don't that people are unaware of it. it's always very hard to quantify you know what what people know what they think you can do opinion polls and but i think that in the case of russia the ukraine war is pretty well

understood. and what observers um, i think in the case of the general drift is widely i know that when i write or in the washington post about china, a lot of people seem to read them. you can just see the numbers shooting up because i think people are pre-rock upi with china as the main rival in the world to us power. um, i think the specifics of the semiconductor embargo, as michael said, have probably passed people by because it's a bit technical, although it's a huge deal. um, but maybe give the american public more credit for understanding what's going than you do. but anyway, the public here has been great. so thank you for coming. you've been listening and thank you to the panelists. thanks, everyone. the authors will be autographing books just at the end of the

hallway and. the next session will begin