>> tonight on "the communicators." >> when it comes to facebook, the ftc recently find that company. how did you come up with $5 billion and where does that money go? >> so to take a second question first the money goes to u.s. treasury and in terms of the monetary fine, it's only one aspect of the relief we update from facebook. yes, $5 billion up, up into but also broad injunctive relief that constraints away which facebook can have consumer data going forward. >> watch our interview with ftc commissioner christine wilson tonight at 8 p.m. eastern on "the communicators" on c-span2. >> the council on foreign relations hosts a discussion of future of u.s. relations with turkey. panelist discussed relationship between the two countries. from last week this is about one

hour. >> good afternoon, everyone. i want to welcome you all to today's meeting on u.s.-turkish relations, the shifting nature of two named alice. i'm ellen laipson and i'm currently the director of the international security program at george mason university and it's a great pleasure to preside over today's discussion on a topic that i think is particularly compelling. so in our topsy-turvy world where we write love letters to authoritarians and would publicly disparaged our allies, it's interesting to think what is a u.s.-turkish relations fit in that sort a spectrum from how we treat allies and authoritarians. it seems to fit into every category, or maybe none, maybe we'll try to figure out today a special is the case of u.s.-turkish relations.

it's often been a tumultuous relationship, one where the executive branch and coastal always see eye to eye it is a fundamentally a secreta partnership, or do we have a turkey's democratic standing? if turkey is questioning its nato membership and its evolving come in its evolving relationship with moscow, what should the united states do? this is without even mentioning the incursion into northern syria and the decision by the united states to withdraw our troops from northern syria. there's just a lot going on in the u.s.-turkish relationship, and i'm delighted we have three that excellent speakers today to join us and to try to make sense of this. he's an adjunct senior fellow here in middle east studies of the council. he served on the department of state policy planning staff and

he currently is an active member of the board of trustees at the american university of iraq. naz durakoglu is currently a senior policy advisor to senator jeanne shaheen of new hampshire, but she is look back and forth between both male and executive branch. she served in the european bureau with the department of state and spent time on atlantic councils digital forensic research lab. very interesting project that looks at the digital dimensions of international relations. and gonul tol to my immediate right is a founding director of the middle east program at the middle -- the turkey's program at the middle east institute and is also an adjunct professor at gw. we decide to start with all three of our speakers giving their topline analysis of whether u.s.-turkish relations, what's the current state of play, is that the different it's been in the past and where do

they see it heading? they will each speak for two to three minutes on that very broad opening question and i think we'll start, , which like a fir? >> thank you again for having me. i know what's probably on everyone's minds right now is the current crisis and our own government is going to deal with this. what i can say is i'm coming from the legislative branch, and for many years the legislative branch has been pushing for some creative thinking, some new thinking on u.s.-turkey relations. obviously there are a number of different perspectives in congress, both on house come in the house and in the senate, but a lot of what you are seeing now is driven by a sense of frustration among senators and congressmen who felt, who feel that for many years we have been turning a blind eye to what they refer to as turkish red behavior

much of it obviously is focused on turkish president erdogan. i think from a low that going back to my time to make use go in the executive branch, i have to say i don't think those in the executive branch do not feel that frustration. i think they are very where -- very well aware that come to. there is more of a long-term thinking to what's going on with turkey. and obviously there's this constant fear that if you push turkey or president erdogan too far in a certain direction, they will actually go in that direction. i guess the main difference between congress and the executive branch on this issue is that the legislative branch in particular feels as though turkey is already there. turkey is already in the clutches of russia. it's an authoritarian state, and for the most part we can do much while turkish president erdogan is there to actually bring

turkey back. so they're looking at what sort of examples does this set in terms of her own relations with turkey, and turkey is relations with europe. and so this is what actually is driving some of what you are hearing now when it comes to the sanctions debate. it's not solely focused on the incursion in syria. this is actually a much broader conversation that's been had for the last few years over some of the steps that turkey has taken. i will say there is something fundamentally different about the conversation that's taking place right now. even though i think the legislative and executive branches have not always seen eye to eye and how to respond to turkey, i do think for the most part the legislative branch did defer to the executive branch for many years in terms of how to go about this relationship, how we should deal with turkey and president erdogan. i think since october 6 there

has been a tangible change, and a do think what you're going to see is both republicans and democrats take a very stern turn and look at their own authorities to address some of the issues a few are not being addressed by the administration now. and then added into this dynamic is, and democrats are a little bit more forward on this issue than republicans are, but just extreme frustration with our own president and not being able to really decipher what president trump is trying to do with his relationship, not just with president erdogan but with other leaders with a bit of an authoritarian bent. part of the discussion about sanctions and the response to turkey is also related to how to respond to president trump? and what members of congress you is just these open interrelationships with authoritarians, that don't really tieback interviews interest. they are trying to use what leverage they have and, quite

frankly, allegedly branch with limited options and sanctions happen see one of his option. >> why do we continue with the top line they picture. gonul? >> naz just talked about the frustration. i think there's something to be said about the nature of the current crisis. this partnership survived many crises in the past but this is certainly the most turbulent period in terms of turkey relations. there's something different and i would like to talk about several factors that make relationship between these two countries prone and make it difficult for them to solve problems. i think the number one problem here is centralization and personalization of power with turkey. of the last decade we have seen transformation of turkey from an institutional democratic state into a highly personalized.

all foreign and security policy making is centralizing the presidential palace. in the past, the united states, u.s. policy thought to weather the storm during the turbulent times by investing in institutions or through regular government context. but these things are not there anymore. erdogan is the key figure. you would think they should make things easier because you didn't with one man, but turkey is not saudi arabia. turkey is that egypt. despite the centralization of power and authoritarianism, public opinion and elections to match the turkey. you were to do with the public that is deeply anti-american. they think the u.s. is in decline and it has become irrelevant. you combine that very anti-american public opinion with a very personalized system

in which there is no one that can put the brakes on erdogan worst instinct. so you get a turkey where erdogan worldview and is electoral considerations becomes decisive in foreign policymaking. the second thing i want to talk about is the change in turkish mr. kirk the turkish military is been an asset in this relationship. despite the very marginals, pro-russia military it's always been very tornado, very pro-united states and it was this very strong actor that pulled the relationship from the brink during difficult times. but now that military has become very ideological. just recently i saw turkish soldiers on the way to syria. they were flashing far right,

turkey far right party sends sn some said they were going to the land where the son of islam arose. this is something you would never seen see before. turkish militaries become very ideological, and also it's a similar story that you are seeing here in washington. the central command is very skeptical, very negative views of turkey and turkish military. so the third factor is, in the past when we had these problems there was overarching threats that kept these country together, despite all the problems. and now not only is there not an overarching threat, but these two country are in bed with each others are any. the united states is working with the pkk syrian offshoot, and turkey is working with groups. it's difficult to get an bridge that gap in the last fact i want

to talk about is the question of nationalism. president erdogan has built his medical legitimacy on a very aggressive nationalist anti-kurdish policy. and this national string is pushing him toward confrontation with the united states rather than -- [inaudible] so erdogan's political interests are served by these erratic, very, very strong anti-americann narratives, hedging with russia or with their aggressive anti-kurdish policy. i think in in the past, fixing relations through government context and thinking that concessions will placate turkey is very outdated now. many of the problems that we are seeing in turkey's ties are rooted in turkey's domestic political confirmation.

>> thank you very much. henri, your take on the current effective state? >> sometimes people say -- my accent. let me take a step back a little bit and look at the turkish-american relationship. for the most part we all know the one thing that determines, the most important factor in the relationship was the real estate people talk about its location location location. .. the notion that turkey is important because it's

crucial to nato plays an important role. that said, it's location was the most important factor. that's kind of changed for a little while and the turks actually engage in various [inaudible] and then there was a significant change here in washington that maybe we should look at turkey as a model country, as a muslim country with democratic changes on its own. this could be potentially model with which the united states has this problem, especially on the democracy sector and that window of opportunity appeared as we

became more involved so we are essentially in the third phase and i heard the other day general mcmasters say that turkey's geopolitical shift was the most significant of the last 10 or 20 years sothere's a discussion that turkey is moving in another direction . and that direction implicit thought here is that direction is russia so in the 1960s but so as russia and maybe other shall we say adversaries of the united states and maybe china, but i would argue this is not the case. that is that turkey is not moving towardsrussia . turkey is making all kinds of deals with russia, we see very much into the relationship between russia

and turkey , but fundamentally as implied, this is really about erdogan. erdogan is tryingto create a new turkey , he is but mostly of course he's in it for himself so what's really happening is he wants a third way. he wants to see turkey as a leader. i'm not sure exactly what. but look at all his, some of his pronouncements, the policy options. he told me last week in the new york times that he's not talking about the nuclear option but turkey should have a nuclear weapons data, he's been wanting to the un security council, he had initiated transplants for that and of course he is a permanent number greater than

500 members so you see, a very ambitious, but this is very much in line with the italian leaders foreign-policy. its mission, it's sometimes is aggressive but it's also very pragmatic. he knows how much to push and he knows when to stop . he knows when to make deals and the trick here is to understand that he can be stopped but part of, the most significant aspect of this foreign-policy is it's really a way of consolidating power but also making himself the most important leader. , maybe the most important adults are but in the sense he's leading a system that is

completely personalized . it is institutionalized and he's replacing the state but for that he needs a message. he needs a message to galvanize. and a critical part of the message is has to do with antagonizing democracy. you've seen him calling europeans not see remnants. but of course, that is most turkish companies look at that, he one of his great buddies is nicolas maduro. so all of these policies are designed for domestic purposes and especially when it comes to america, amazing amounts of promise that gets defeated by this press basically saying that turkey

has begun to attack the united states. >> i think what we should follow up with is to remarks on the domestic determinants of the us turkishrelationship . you wrote an interesting piece in foreign affairs about the turkish desire to take over northern syria as being driven by him specific domestic realities of erdogan's hold on power at home. i was wondering if you could talk some more about that. >> i always argued turkey's reaction must be seen against the backdrop of president erdogan's struggle. it's always been this way in 2011 , before this started erdogan's number one priority was conflating erdogan's victory because he had consolidated his poweruntil 2011 , his ideology really could not play a role because

he was still portable, he's was facing opposition and by 2011 he had consolidated his power and saw the era uprising as an opportunity on this process at home. so that's why, that shaped his priorities in syria and that was again securing a victory and in 2015, that priority change. in 2015 president erdogan and his ruling party lost a parliamentary that was thanks to the rights of a pro-british party. and afterwards, in 2015 election, to hold onto power, he decided to strike a deal with the internationalists. that is known for their very kurdish sense. so after that deal he turned his attention to domestically, his priority was to continue kurdish nationalism both at home and in the region so he his priorities shift starting

from 2016 continuing the kurdish in syria became his number one priority and probably division into the back and in fact, erdogan weakened theopposition . for instance, the turkish actions in aleppo played a role in thefall of aleppo . fighting aleppo in their fight against the kurds and turkey worked closely with iran and the assad regime which ended up on the ground. and we have recently seen another change with local elections that don't huge blow to erdogan. in march 2019 elections the ruling party was almostall major cities . and