>> good afternoon everyone. i want to welcome you all to today's meeting on u.s. turkish relations, the shifting nation unto alex. i'm currently the director of the international security director at george mason university. it's a great pleasure to reside over today's discussion on a topic i think is particularly compelling. in a world where we write love

letters to authoritarians and we publicly disparage our allies is kind of interesting to think where does the u.s. turkish relations it in the spectrum from how we treat allies and authoritarians. it seems to fit into every category or maybe none and were going to try to figure out how special is the case of u.s. turkish relations. it's at the motionless relationship one with the executive branch does not always ci to eye. is it fundamentally security partnership or do we have a stake in the democratic standing and if turkey is questioning and involving with moscow what should the united states to prove this is brought out even mentioning into northern syria in the decision by the united states to withdraw troops from northern syria. there is just a lot going on in the u.s. turkish relationship and i'm delighted we have three such excellent speakers to join

us and try to make sense of this. the professor of international relations at lehigh university where he served for over a decade as chairman, an adjunct senior fellow in the studies of the council. he served on the department of state cleaning staff and currently an active member of the board of trustees at the american university. currently a senior policy advisor to senator of new hampshire. but she has moved back-and-forth between the hill and the executive branch and served in the european bureau with the department of state and sen spet time on the digital forensic research lab, very interesting project that looks at the digital dimensions of international relations. and many immediate right is a party director of the middle east program at the turkish

program at the middle east institute and adjunct professor at gw. so we just decided to start with all three of our speakers giving their topline analysis of whether u.s. turkish relations, what is the current state of play, is a different than the past and where do they see it heading. they will each speak for two to three minutes on the broad opening question and i think will start. >> thank you all. thank you again for having me. i know what is probably on everyone's mind is a current crisis and how our own government is going to do with this one i can't say i'm coming from the legislative branch and for many years the legislative branch has been pushing for some creative thinking, new thinking on u.s. turkey relations. obviously there is a number of

different perspectives in congress both in the house and on the senate but a lot of what you are seeing is driven by a sense of frustration among senators and congressmen who feel for many years we have been turning a blind eye to what they refer to as turkish bad behavior much of it is focused on turkish president. i think from a little bit coin back to my time two years ago in the executive branch i have to say i do not think those in the executive branch do not feel that frustration, i think they're very well aware of it to pre-but it's more of a long-term thinking to what is going on with turkey and obviously in constant fear that if you push turkey or the president they

will go in that direction. the main difference between congress and the executive branch on this issue is that the legislative branch in particular feels as though turkey is already there, the already in russia, authoritarian state and for the most part we cannot do much while turkish president is there to bring turkey back. they are looking at what this has in terms of her own relations with turkey and turkeys relations with europe and this is what is driving what you are hearing now and it comes distinctions, is not solely focused on encouraging and syria. as a much more broader conversation that has been bad for the last few years for the steps that turkey has taken. i will say there is something fundamentally different about the conversation that is taking place right now. even though i think the

legislative and executive branch have not always seen eye to eye on how to respond to turkey, i think the most part the legislative branch did differ to the executive branch for many years on how to go about the relationship, how we should do with turkey and the president. i think sink since october 6 the has been a tangible change. i think what you will see is both republicans and democrats take a very stern turn and look at their own authorities to address some of the issues they feel are not being addressed by the ministration. added in to the dynamic, democrats are more forward on this issue than republicans but extreme frustration with her own president and not being able to decipher what president trump is trying to do with his relationship, not just with the president but other leaders with

authoritarian. part of the discussion with sanctions in response to turkey is also related to how we do do we respond to president trump and what members of congress feel is open ended relationships with authoritarians that don't tie back into the u.s. interest. were trying to use what leverage they have and quite frankly we implemented options and sanctions happen to be one of those options. >> let me return to sanctions later, when we continue with the topline. i just talk about the frustration on the hill and i think there's something to be said about the nature of the current crisis. the partnership survived many creases in the past but this is certainly the most difficult. in the relations. i would like to talk about several factors that make the relationship between these two

countries conflict prone and for them to solve problems. the number one problem is centralization of personalization of power in turkey. so the last decade we seeing confirmation of turkey from an institutional to highly personalized. all foreign institutes is centralizing the presidential powers. in the past the united states, the u.s. policy sought to whether investing in the situations or through regular government contact. these things are not there anymore. the president is the key figure. and you would think this should make things easier because you're dealing with one man. but 30 is not saudi arabia or egypt, despite centralization of power and authoritarianism it's

public opinion and election still matters in turkey. you're dealing with the public that is anti-american. they think the u.s. is in decline and become irrelevant. so you combine that very anti-american public opinion with a very personalized system in which there is no one that can put the brakes on his worst instincts. so you get turkey where the worldview and domestic electoral consideration becomes decisive and foreign policymaking. in the second thing i want to talk about is the change in turkish military. the turkish military has been an asset in this relationship. and despite the marginal progress for, it's always been very tornado for the united

states and a very strong actor that pulled the relationship during difficult times. but now, it's become the ideological. just recently i saw turkey soldiers on their way to syria flashing party signs and some said they were going to the land were a psalm of osama rose. this is something you would never see before. turkish military has become ideological and also a similar story you see in washington. they are skeptical of the views of turkey and turkish military. so the third factor, when we have these problems there was a threat that kept these countries together despite the problems and now not only is there not an

overall site. turkey is working with the groups so i think it's difficult to gather and bridge the gap in the last factor i want to talk about is a question of nationalism. he has built his political diplomacy and possessive nationalist anti-kurdish policy. in the national string is pushing him toward confrontation with the united states. so they are served by the very erratic and strong anti-american hedging with russia where the anti-critters policy. i think in the past fixing

relations through government contact and thinking -- many of the problems that we seen in turkey are in rooted interviews confirmation. >> your take on the current and effective state? >> some times people say -- let me take a step back and look at the turkish enema can relationship rate for the most part the one thing that determines and most important factor in the relationship was the real estate people talking about location, location, location. the fact that turkey was controlled and if you look at it from a nato perspective was most

eastern part of confronting the soviet union. that's the conflict break that vision of turkey has not disappeared, it still remains in you still see government or elsewhere in washington you see the notion that turkey is important because the location is crucial to nato and plays a very important role in the way people perceive turkey. that said, if security and location was the most important factors in the turkish american relationship that changed for a little while when the turks engaged in very serious reforms because of european process and then a significant change in washington that many would look at turkey as a model country. here's a muslim country going through significant democratic changes on its own and this

could be essentially immortal for the rest of the islamic world which the united states had serious problems on the democracy side. and that little window of opportunity appeared. now were essentially in the third phase and i heard the other day general say that turkish geopolitical shift is one of the most significant strategic surprises for the last ten or 20 years until there is a deception that turkey is moving in another direction. that direction is that that direction is of the soviet uniom still 1950s. so with russia and maybe other adversaries of the united states

and maybe china. but i would argue, this is not the case. turkey is not moving towards russia, turkey is making all kinds of deals with russia, we see relationships between russia and turkey but fundamentally, this is about the president, he is trained to create a new turkey in his mind a new narrative for turkey, ambitions for turkey but mostly he's ambitious for himself. and what is really happening he wants to see turkey as a leader, i'm not sure exactly what, maybe he wants the world around him. but look at his finances, policy

options, you saw me last week in the new york times he's not talking about a nuclear option, he has been saying that for a while. he has been wanting to reform the security in 2017 had detailed plans for the and he thinks they should be a permanent member of the security council and the world is greater than the five permanent members. you see very ambitious but this is very much in line with authoritarian leaders with policy. it comes very aggressive and ideological. it is also pragmatic. he knows how much to push and when to stop pushing and went to make deals. and this is to understand he can be stopped. but the most significant aspect

of his foreign-policy is is really domestic, away of consolidating but also making them the most important leaders may be overstating -. in the process, he is creating essentially a system that is completely personalized, the state has been deemed institutionalized and he is for facing debt. he needs a message that continues to galvanize and mobilize people. part of that message is and has to do the intake and is a liberal democracies. you have seen him calling europeans nazis. but of course turkish created with europe, one of his great

buddies is nicolas maduro. all of these policies are designed for domestic purposes and especially an amazing amount of interworking comes from the powers by the turkish base basically saying turkey has one big enemy and that's united states. >> thank you. i think what we should follow up with, to remarks on the domestic determinants of the u.s., turkish relationship. an interesting piece in foreign affairs about the turkish desire to take over northern syria as being driven by specific domestic realities of his hold on power at home. i thought you could say more about that. >> i've always argued that turkey's reaction to the conflict in syria must be seen against the backdrop of president to consolidate.

it's always been the case. in 2011 his number one priority was division and security wit. at home he consolidated his power. in 2011 his ideology cannot play a role because he was still vulnerable and facing the position. but by 2011 here consolidated his power in the uprising is an opportunity to embark on the process at home. so that shaped his priority in syria and in 2015 that priority changed because in 2015 president and his moving party with the majority after many years and that was thanks to the rise of the party. after the june 2015 elections to hold onto power he decided to strike a deal with the country

of the nationalist that is known for the intake turkish dance. after the deal he turned his attention domestically in his priority was to have it at home in the region. so his priorities shifted accordingly starting from 2015 and continuing in northern syria became the number one priority. and hopefully the regime took the back seat. in effect he weakened the opposition and for instance turkey actions played a role because turkey decided to end the fighters in the fight against occurs. in turkey worked very closely with iran and the regime started from 2015. which ended up the regime on the

ground. . . bigger margins. and the number one reason is obviously, the current downplay. one of the top reasons for the seniors, was the presence of 2.6 million refugees. convincing and increasing and national backlash against the refugees. snap priority is again, syria. so is now talking about creating a safe zone. that could host up to 3 million refugees. that is his plan. i think that is even more urgent priority for him than containing

the syrian currents. he said that we have to clear that area, the northeastern syria. because it is going to make it difficult for us to establish a safe zone so we can send back the syrian refugees. you can see that his narrative has shifted in the way that he talks about the cards. it is still important but i think his number one priority is the refugees now. that's why we have seen what we've been staying today. the most recent encouragement and northeastern syria. and russia. that's what he's been trying to do. >> i would not think it would be an exaggeration that relations between the white house and congress on foreign policy issues is also an estate of some

agitation these days. weather it's ukraine or the turkey syria crisis. i wonder if you could fresh out for us a little bit different parts of that conversation and weather

veto both in the house and the senate for majority. >> in this complicated dynamics and crisis in u.s. turkish relations, there's more than two actors, with much of russia and syrian regime, thinkers deserve a little more attention is a party to this current crisis in u.s. turkish relations. are you looking at the carnage future looking at within turkey and the activities of the syrian kurds as well is iraqi kurds. someone or if you want to address how the carnage question has always been part of the u.s.

turkish relationship and weather what is the carnage side of the story these days. >> for the guards, clearly this is the major setback. they been here before. everybody knows that the kurds have been betrayed and left right center whenever it was convenient. in the united states in the mid- 70s. there's been numbers of cases. in terms of understanding also, let me just mention a couple of things. everyone kept staying that this was the white pg. is a tribute threat, to turkey. but the truth of the matter is, it was never at cost of the never engaged the turks

militarily. never a threat. the americans would also not let them. what is forgotten here is in the elections the municipal elections that you mentioned this year, and one point yet everyone realizing that his party was going to lose and none other than the pkk in jail to see if he could convince armstrong to tell the turkish kurds not to vote for the opposition. so this is part of the pragmatism that i talk about. he is very pragmatic way nick comes to syria, there was a real threat to turkey and syria. it was not necessarily white pg itself. when it was a possibility of the emergence of another autonomous in syria especially after the

creation of the kid. both instances, the midwife of the creation of the kurdish government in iraq, was the united states. united states was doing exactly the same thing in the weight of the turkish perspective. in the process of helping a group that had created no autonomous functioning region and syria. and the logical step is one the syrians and once the civil war is over, with united states hell, that the city syrian cars would grab baton to me and syria. that in and of itself is the strategic step. was next. in an environment where there is paranoia and what we have seen is the enemy, you see all of the time government officials and just mentioning the fact that what they really want to do, and

they were wanting to split turkey up. and turkey being split up, it's not real of course but for monday people it is actually a governor rising organizing, pain. it was critical to stop the syrian kurds from achieving anything. that is because they created an autonomous region supported by the united states. what about the future of the cars. the cars have been here before. and they have [applause]. and they will [applause]. it is always two steps forward and one backwards. so over the years, all you have to do is look at the history. the last 100 years. the kurds have made slow improvements.

yesterday they got defeated and yes he got killed and people got displaced, but let's face it, everybody in turkey realizes that the turkeys main and single most important problem is a kurdish problem. syria now has a kurdish problem is something that people really didn't focus on a few years ago. i can assure you that being a card, i also look at the situation, already being the impression and in favor of syrian kurds. and especially, the fact that the syrian kurds managed to defeat isis. made an alliance with the united states and is soon is it was broken, it was broken by one member. i present trump. not by the american government. in that sense we have a very bizarre situation in washington. if there is a change of

government here then maybe things will go back to normal. with that said, there was an alliance between the pkk cards if you want, and the united states. since these are all small steps if you want and that improves slowly the kurdish relations internationally. that doesn't mean it's going to be her state anyway, in the future and chances are it will be autonomous regions. but that is where this is going. think of it is two steps forward and one step backwards. >> we are now a minute or two overdue to our members and guests. let's join the conversation. i do ask you to first of all, today we're on record is you may have been able to tell what the cameras. please wait for the microphones and speak directly into it. state your name and affiliation.

please limit yourself to one question. so i'm going to start in the back please. >> rachel, reporter with cq roll call. next week the house expected to pass suspension of the rules a resolution recognizing the genocide, the resolution said this should be a one-off, continuous part of the u.s. policy towards turkey. with a panel comment on that as well is what this will infuriate the turkish public, will it play wants hands to rally is based an increase him to be reelected. >> statement it is on the roles kemeny and anastas have intentions of moving that. this it's not the first time we've seen the genocide resolution. and yes each time, and

infuriates the turkish government and public. that being said, i think another reason and what is happening right now the hill, there's such heightened emotions over what they just saw over northeast syria. again this is the collection of heightened emotions over time. over us for hundreds and over a number of other issues so i do think there is an effort to try and get everything out of the gate right now. all necessarily, not weather or not that it is a strategy that will lead to shaping turkey his behavior or not. at the same time i do know this is on the radar and this is definitely one of the reasons why the hills feel the need to move forward on the measure as well is others. >> i think also, that they're using this is a political tool. first i think he service to the victims of the genocide. so every time when something is wrong with turkey, you bring

this issue to the table. i don't think it's the right strategy. >> basically, certainly has been played into the governments and the anti- americanism. but this is old stuff etc. remember, everyone is pragmatism. when it comes to making deals, he will make deals. trump lost him the most insulting letter anyone is ever sick. in the white house. 1974, was a famous . sorry, 1963 famous johnson letter and took a long time to get over it. this time, it is really insulting letter, and is he said, putting in the trash can and must a deal with trump. so he's going to be upset, elizabeth with it.

>> i'm from john hopkins site and you make it convincing everyone's pragmatism and he's already gotten this for hundreds was to earn a severe threat yesterday fights, that is a done deal. my question to all of you really, is how important is nato to edit one. i am not suggesting that turkey should be kicked out. i might just see press technically that they have been to in the last few decades we're countries and numbers of nato have been chastised and punished that went out being thrown out. sixty-seven to 73 and for a few weeks in the summer of 75 when portugal looked like he was going communist. in both cases, they were denied intel. it is a rough on the knuckles and i might be a way to make

clear to everyone that there are limits. basically my question is how important is nato. not the united states. >> clegg is the variation question would be is more likely nato would take action or that in with himself with a is the friendship toward others, i am suspending my nato membership for the following reasons. >> is actually going to mention this in my initial comments that i was running out of time. i think nato is very critical to turkey. and he understands it. in turkey, there is nothing with nato, much diminished power. remember he wants to create may turkey and make important power in the world. another nato, your wings will have been cut. so he's playing this game, because the as/400 his, but is never going to be made, he keeps pushing to see how far he can go. >> we also have to know on the

fact that there is mistrust in spite of everything going on between turkey and russia. there is still a lot of mistrust between the countries. they don't trust each other. just a few years ago, in 2016, remember what that's when shut down the russian jets. at its nato allies, they appealed to them not to withdraw the patriots. that was in some ways, a turning.but is recently is just a few months ago, when he was talking about the tension, and again, and appealed to the nato partners. some nato is still very important. russia partnership it's not that tight. when at the point where we can talk about strategic partnership, i think that relationship is still very fragile. there's so monday parts of this unit. the everywhere, in east germany, russia, on the positive front and in the region and africa and

the caucuses, everywhere. so despite that close partnerships and turkey is the junior partner. i think i don't understand that. that's one of the reasons why i think leaving nato it's not going to be preferred. >> if i can answered that. i think it's also important, everyone is pragmatic. so obviously nato is going to be continued tool. it is in an alliance with a number of nations that take attention to turkey his domestic turn as well. some of the authoritarian actions and things. so is long is turkey is the nato, it is somewhat of a chip for erewhon to make sure that others aren't necessarily paying is it too much attention or at least expressing frustration with what he is doing internally and in his own country.

with that being said, you also have to look at turkey his actions and nato for the most part they are actually a pretty good nato partner with awacs and they have because of all missions and they are framing nation has been in afghanistan. it's not a country that i think we should, this rhetoric about kicking turkey at a nato, which we now know that we can't do. we do have to be careful because even in this really tumultuous time who we really have to be careful to try and hold on to those lovers that exist between the west and turkey and nato is probably the premier loophole and the premier foundation for making sure that in the future, a future turkey post area one will maintain his links. >> i'm going to go to the front here and then john. then to the back. >> i want to speak unto. the panel is spoken about them. a tool, the second plan is the public opinion against america.

my question is not only in foreign policy, united states and carriage, during recent years, we've been using lots of carriage. can you comment on that and reflect on your thoughts on what the best way forward. thank you. >> in terms of sticks and carrots, i think actually before this time. that we are currently in. since october 6. there has been discussion about carrots and sticks. in my opinion, in a outweighs the discussion on six. if i could be so bold to see that i think that's part of the reason we might be here right now as well. in terms of looking at other countries, yes. this discussion of sticks that way but also the discussion of carrots. with turkey, we need to make sure we're not pushing them away.

somehow the united states is million charge of making sure you can determine erewhon his next move in next ally is the next phone call. i think there is now more of a realization that the country itself, on erewhon is moving in a direction again, i agree with you that it's on the country itself. the country is much more than one man. and the one, but he is pretty much all powerful making these decisions. we have to see with the sanctions package and what will actually come of that. but i do sense that it won't be an exact replica of the bills you know currently seeing right now. >> and you have to be careful with the sanctions. you want to make sure you don't punish turkey. hard to be anti- american. that will only strengthen someone else. >> i'm wondering if anybody or all of you can reflect on this question.

i know that is hard to imagine turkey that went out armor one. what you think the speed of relations would be between turkey and the united states that went out anyone. i asked this question because mayday.very good.about the domestic turn is somewhat is happening in syria. strikes me into erewhon two years ago, was very proud of the way in which turkey had handled this refugee crisis. now the leading voice of pushing terrence back. strike to me that we talk a lot about and one is we should. this is the turkey u.s. problem arises and aired one u.s. problem. thank you. >> it is in a u.s. problem in the sense that there's always been anti- americans in turkey. he goes back decades but

everyone has organized it and has euthanized it and because there is no free press in turkey, and there's no outlets for alternative and viewpoints anymore. that view is becoming and it has become completely dominant. that said, turkey that went out argue one, i think he is trying to stay on until 2034. so thinking that went out him, is far away. that said, also italians are our own west enemies. we always make mistakes and they always make the kind of mistakes that ultimately become undermine them.

when no one had the elections canceled and had run again. please see the same thing in today in bolivia. in monday different countries don't know where to stop. ms. some.there will be other factors that will intervene and change turkey will come maybe before 2034 but it will build so the change that will come will also change relations because it will go back to the old normals i will see. but at the same time, close relationship and a working relationship. >> i think it's really important, because we do have to actually think about what turkey will look like. i know senator saxena has said this as well. one of a criticisms is we are not necessarily doing what we can is the united states to invest in that day.

to make sure that we have strong links to turkey civil society and to make sure that we are actually looking at other segments to see where we can actually grow our relationship in the future and i think we do that in other countries for sure but hasn't been is strong in turkey part of that because we don't have eight euros id mission and turkey. there are practical reasons but looking at russia, the turkish public is also war was also rather anti- russian as well. if you look at public opinion polling now, they are not is anti- russian anymore. so if you look a little bit of what the prevalence is doing with their problem of and others. i think you can see that there is a pit of a blueprint there that we probably should have followed is with our own public do public civil society and reaching out to the actual people turkey. >> actually i don't think that we can continue think about post area one turkey because i think

he is most vulnerable. because of the syrian intrusion, heard they are now being opposed. so the support for him is now 4g around 32 before that. i think this is going to be short-lived. so he is very vulnerable and i think of himself several scenarios where he can actually survive this one is which the pkk attacks and fight turkey, deftly going to empower is one, and the second is somehow, turkey his economy turns around, and the economy concerns are not there anymore. but aside from that, i think he is very vulnerable. and that's one of the reasons why that is not mentioned that it has to engage your position. and to your question about what happens then we go back to

normalcy. how would turkey u.s. relations look like. what if the thp is in power, first they have to dismantle this very personalized system that was built. the main position party if they are in power, you would have to leave the institutions. it will take a lot of effort and time. i think things will change. let's. >> let's go quickly. there are more hands. >> one, and one question. the comment is simply is a senate or others contemplate sanctions, just be sure that doesn't increase his popularity rather than decrease it so. so just be reflect on that. . . .

>> turkey, and where are the remnants of it in the body politic, i mean, where are the strong points, where can they be found? >> we -- [inaudible] >> it's alive and well, i can assure you. but it is dormant, all right? it is dormant in the sense that because erdogan is so omni present, because he dominates everything, the kamelaist element has been pushed out. today, for example, they announced important national events like the 29th of october, turkish embassies will no longer

serve alcohol. this is clearly an attempt at, you you know -- [inaudible] chief legacy. but the big problem in turkey, they were not democrats, so it's not to say that -- they are the ones who backed the military for all these years and backed military coups, so i'm a little bit reticent to look at them as a panacea. that said, the problem is that the main opposition party, the republican people's party is awful. i mean, they would not know how to win an election if everybody was against erdogan. they would still manage to lose it, actually. so the problem with part of it is is that there is no organized political movement, if i you want, to prevent cam limb.

it's out will there as an idea. as i said, it's dormant. >> did you want to -- >> yeah. it has been transformed. radical centrism is not there anymore. the main opposition party. if you look at the candidates that it fielded in major towns, istanbul and ankara, for instance, they come from conservative backgrounds. so it has transformed itself. but what has happened is in places hike military -- like military the, for instance, so many thing are in alliance weed weed -- with erdogan's nationalism. so they're not completely against each other. so you see merging of these two

ideologies. and the result is a policy that is very anti-western, anti-american and anti-kurdish. but both islamism's focus on state power is there. it's been mentioned how it's never been a liberal democratic ideology. he's right. they're both obsessed with state power and statism, and that's one of the reasons why it's not delivered on democratic consolidation. so imagine the worst elements was nationalism, anti-kurdish sentiment and statism. they have all of those, and now they are in alliance. >> you've been very patient. thanks. >> [inaudible] here in town --

[inaudible] islamic council. moving to the eastern mediterranean, i was wondering how concerned are you with turkey's drilling activity in the cyprus' exclusive economic zone, and you see the u.s. administration doing manager to stop it -- something to stop anytime and 2007 the recent experience in syria -- and given the recent experience in syria, do you think this would be enough? >> i know you've written on this. >> i think it goes back to this notion with erdogan and the united states, united states has done all these things for erdogan, and it's basically his response is, okay, that was yesterday. what are you going to do for me today, right? we now he wants the kurdish military leader that trump touted to be extradited. so on the eastern med, and there are people in this room who know the situation better than i do,

but my sense is essentially two problems. one is drilling activities, and he's going to push as much as he can, all right? and the other is -- [inaudible] and whether or not there may be an attempt by the turkish -- or by erdogan himself to take over the -- [inaudible] this area which is uninhabited between the two. the point is i worry because every time he sees the west backing down, he will take another ten. he will -- another step. he will push the envelope. but what will he do? i don't know. >> i'd like to see how many more hands -- see if we can do a very, very quick round. pat, the gentleman there, and why don't we take all three questions and then we'll do a final round. very quick questions, please. >> patrick bare rows.

how does erdogan view the tension in the united states is? how does he see the difference between how the congress and the president -- i mean, there seems to be a bit of a bromance. does he see the president has a get out of jail card for him? >> hi -- [inaudible] i'd like the panel to talk a little bit more about the arrangement, two two arrangements between russia and turkey versus united states and turkey, how that will all play out. thank you. >> nelson cunningham, party associates. another intersection between turkey9 and the u.s. we haven't talked about really yet is golan. it's recently come out that rudy giuliani was lobbying for the extradition of guy land. people forget that, in part, michael flynn was brought down for work he was doing on behalf of that. >> thank you. you've got three issues. why don't we quickly each take one minute, if you could, to

just pick up on one question -- >> sure. ifered or wan doesn't see trump as a get out of jail free card, then he's blind. every time he's called him, he's been able to bypass those in the administration who may have other opinions and definitely, you know, congress has been concerned about this. and, yeah, we've seen those reports as well. i think it's all a part of a larger discussion about the administration, the president and who he surrounds himself with and what sort of effects those individuals have on our foreign policy. you know, there's a larger picture inquiry in the house that's taking place on some related matters. >> well, there was a question about russia, u.s. and syria. i think with recent deal between turkey and russia, turkey got half of what it wanted from putin which was now there's going to be, the kurds will be pushed back. there's going to be a 30-kilometer-deep zone, and

that's going to be off limits to the ypg forces, the kurdish forces. and that was one of the things that he wanted, erdogan wanted from putin. but he also wanted a larger zone, a wider zone so he could send back the syrian refugees. he didn't get that. russia only agreed to the current military presence in northeastern syria. and also with that agreement, turkey is one step closer to recognizing the assad regime again. because there's a clause in the agreement that refers to an agreement that was signed between turkey and syria in 1998,, and the agreement said it's the beauty of the assad -- the duty of the assad regime to address turkey's security concerns. so the assad regime is saying if you have problem with the kurds, let me deal with it. you stay away. but i think in the shore short term -- [inaudible] but i think that's going to be a short-term solution. can ask turkish forces to leave.

and in terms of american troops, well, you know, it takes a tweet to change everything. but at least just yesterday we heard that americans are now light presence is weighing option to send troops back to syria. if that happens -- which is not a realistic thing -- but if that happens, that would only strengthen the kurdish hand in their negotiations with the regime and russia. but it's not -- [inaudible] u.s.' problems in syria. >> [inaudible] >> on russia, look, i think you have to take your hat off to putin. i mean, he essentially is playing a three-stage game. first, he managed to create tensions between turkey and the rest of nato, and so that's always been one of his goals. we also saw him doing that earlier. he got the united states out of syria with, right? and third, and this is what the

kurds don't realize, his next step is he's going to get the turks out of syria because he he wants very much assad to resume power completely all over syria. he couldn't have done it as long as united states was there. so, essentially, turkey played boo his hands. -- into his hands. and you're already seeing, and this was to be expected, that the next move from russia is going to be for assad to take over which is going to create problems for turkey in terms of more refugees. so i don't know if actually, yes, erdogan won against the united states, but he lost against russia. so russia is the real big winner. as far as -- look, all these lobbyists and giuliani, the characters who have been trying to get gulan extradited, the problem is the turks have not sent a file that is one that you

can use in an american court because they put everything they want into, into those files, and they need to not necessarily make much sense. >> i'm sorry that we've run out of time, but i want you to join me in thank this terrific panel -- in thanking this terrific panel. [applause] and thank you all for coming. [inaudible conversations]