[inaudible conversations] >> good morning. my name is fritz jones on the vice president and director for foreign policy here working since my pleasure to welcome you to brookings this morning to see lots of old friends in the audience and several new ones and it's a pleasure to invite

you to our event with the assistant secretary of defense for into security affairs. we have been fortunate to engage him on several aspects of our policy research over the past decade and while he is serving in the administration since 2017 and randy thank you for your service to our country an important role you play in the administration. randall shriver was appointed as assistant secretary of defense i president donald trump on january 82018 previously having served as deputy assistant secretary for pacific affairs under which portfolio he covered china taiwan hong kong and australia all the easy stuff. earlier he held the role of chief of staff to the deputy secretary of state from 2,122,003 and served as an active-duty nato intelligence officer deployed in operation desert shield and desert storm. beyond his government career randy has been a leading thinker

on wings of issues in u.s.-china relationships over two decades and a robust voice on the future of that relationship asking critical crashed -- questions to manage and shape american policy in the region and with that background we couldn't ask for anybody better to join us today as we roll out our project on global china assessing china's growing role in the world today well recognized china has emerged as the chick truly global actor impacting every region the in the world on almost every issue. cast aside in his assertively seeking influence not only in asia but well beyond. the effort of this project is to capture baseline assessment of the trajectory of expansive global role that draws on her teeth bench of china and asian experts upon the expertise of our institution security strategy regional technology in economic scholars to capture the full scope of china's activity. he will focus on several key areas of research competition

great power rivalry frontier technologies china's influence on critical regions and china's approach to global government announced it will have two sessions. ryan hass will chair a discussion with randy and then we'll have a panel to chosun three sets of papers being launched or underway today. audrye wong contribute to the future of chinese foreign policy. cheng li and jamie horsley looking at domestic drivers of china's influence and rush doshi on strategic operations. before i invite randy it is of course campaign season which means think tank yourself trying to influence political campaigns as well as doing their day day jobs in the brookings we disclose all of that. you can find on the web site or in people's bios their campaign

affiliations. they do that off campus on their own time but its important part of how we think about the policy impact of prayer research into the lifeblood of the campaign and now with scholars advising foreign affairs and we also have scholars on leave working in the trump administration that all this is part of a long tradition of scholars from the foreign-policy program serving in the nsc state department of every president since nixon both republicans and democrats. i would like to thank the ford foundation for its generous support for this project which has not only allowed us to do this comprehensive research but to communicate broadly to the scholarly community and policymakers who will hopefully use the evidence and provide a baseline approach to china policy which i think we all understand will be a defining feature of american foreign-policy for generations. with that i would warmly welcome

randall schriver to the stage iv opening remarks. [applause] >> thanks bruce and thank you for the dictation to return to brookings. i really appreciate being part of this rollout of this impressive project. i've been following some of the papers that have been released but hearing your two year plan to help us deep dive in baseline this enormous challenge is really encouraging to know that you've got this project underway and thanks for allowing me to speak as a part of that. what i thought i would do is talk about our approach to china , our competition and what i thought it would do is go into a little bit more detail on sort of the fundamentals of his policy. a lot of people sort of jump right in strategic competition

or competitive environment without talking about the fundamentals of what are we competing for? how is competition implemented and how is it different from confrontation or conflict? if i could take just a few moments to do a bit of a deeper dive and explain our perspective from the department of defense i hope it would set the stage for discussion that would follow with ryan in the audience. with respect to our strategic competition we believe that it is a major element of our overall national security strategy and international strategy. we feel as though we are in competition fundamentally because we have different visions different aspirations different views of what regional and global security architecture should look like. if you are familiar with our national security strategy of national defense strategy and/or do you see indo-pacific strategy and we talk about the free

indo-pacific and are free and open the indo-pacific vision is founded upon what we regard as enduring principles and symbols that are near universal and why we share and believe they are principles that none of that all countries if countries embrace them. these include respect for national sovereignty no matter countrysides, fair free and reciprocal trade rule of law and rules-based order and peaceful dispute resolution. we fundamentally believe each nation must be free to determine its own course and we believe that all countries will benefit as well as participate in preserving a world-based order. we observed that china under the leadership of the ccp has a different vision and as i said different aspirations. it's increasingly developing the tools pursue its vision and

seems willing to accept more and more friction in pursuit of that vision. we are competing with china therefore because we see china's leaders as in competition with those both their ideas and their capabilities. globally china seeks to shape a world consistent with its authoritarian model and national goals. we see domestic governance in china is result of the ccp rule is increasingly authoritarian and less respectful for human rights and dignity and that they are even beginning to export some of these tools such as facial recognition software and nationwide surveillance capabilities to other countries who are learning from china's governance model. we are concerned that china has grown more willing as i said to apply pressure against other countries and except friction in pursuit of its vision. we have observed china using influence operations and a fan of domestic politics of other

countries undermining the integrity of elections and threatening internal stability using economic origin as we have seen recent examples in countries such as mongolia australia and canada promoting state-sponsored military and civilian technologies exporting the most effective tools as i said from its domestic toolkit to other nations for potential use for internal repression. we seen them extending its military presence overseas and expanding military ties with china and we see deploying advanced weapons systems to militarize disputed features despite pledges of the seniormost level that they would not do so. in dod we focus on the military component of china's growing military activity we take china there were that they seek to be a world-class military by 2049

and they are making progress toward that goal. the department of military developments in china are seeking to erode u.s. military advantages. they are working to become a preeminent power in the indo-pacific region while simultaneously undertaking plans to expand overseas presence and develop capabilities to sustain operations further from shiny shorts. we see china winning the pla operational reach to match what its leaders considered to be the global nature of china's economic and national interest. press reporting indicates that china has sought to expand its military base and access in the middle east southeast asia and the western pacific. chairman xi jinping himself has called for the completion of the security system for a war to strengthen protection of its overseas interests to ensure the security of major overseas projects and personnel. china's defense minister has cited a framework for china to

increased its military cooperation with other countries. while the competition with china takes place on various levels of the most fundamental and basic level what we are really competing force to sustain a position within the regional and international system which allows us to promote, support and protect a liberal rules-based order whose institutions rules and norms have fostered peace for decades. all of this matters because if the ccp and china were to be successful in its authoritarian approach were to become ascendant the world could look much different. states will have less control of their political and economic decisions. institutions could become less independent and less effective such as asean and other regional organizations. freedom of the season overflight in the indo-pacific may be challenged. freedom of those bodies of water we could also see a normalization of a lack of respect for individual and human rights.

all of this portends a less free and less open and more unstable and the pacific region with high potential for these trends to manifest on a global scale. as i said we few competition is being different than confrontation and conflict. compare that strategy is not meant to lead to conflict. the united states seeks to maintain the competition is a stable deterrence that avoid conflicts. while we compete vigorously with china are military-to-military contacts are aimed at reducing risk and promoting international marsan standards. we cooperated with china where interest aligned while competing within their rules-based framework where interest their verge. we will continue to call out china's behaviors that are counter to their rules-based order. briefly dod's response and as i said changing our mindset, we seek to regain the advantage and

applied towards things that are goes to deter china from to prevail at the outset of a crisis. meeting the china challenge requires this fundamental shift in mindset of our defense establishment. we are no longer period of overwhelming american dumbness but rather one in which our armed forces are adapting to fight against near-peer competitor source fielding sophisticated capabilities instead of expecting to dominate an opponent or armed forces are expecting to be contested ratified while achieving political objectives set for them. national defense strategy in our indo-pacific strategy within the department focuses on a couple of pillars that will be key enablers for us to succeed mainly the first two pillars of our national defense strategy which include building a more lethal joint force and strengthening our alliances and

partnerships. the first line of that for preparing a more lethal and resilient joint force takes into account the scope and pace of our competitors and patients in capabilities and prior to us as its investment in modernizing key u.s. capabilities across a range of domains. a nuclear forces space and cybercapabilities, missile defense and looks at how our force can be resilient in having more access options dispersal opportunities and adaptive tasing. with m. my office where changing how we organize for long-term strategic competition. in june our deputy secretary proved establishment of the new deputy assistant secretary of defense for china. his position is outward looking and inward looking. the inward part helping us drive alignment on china across the departments we carry out our defense strategy in its implementation. the second line of effort is our

national defense strategies strengthening alliances and attracting new partners. america's alliances and partnerships are crucial in durable asymmetric advantage that no other country can match. for a country that values rules-based order to stop this way we can demonstrate her support for these principles is the action we take individually and together to pull a free and open region. our alliances and partnerships are important for a myriad of reasons. for example there is an inherent trust and confidence that comes with combined training and interoperability. in this vein the departments expanding collaborative planning prior tasing request for his military equipment to deepen an operability and training for high-end combat missions and alliance bilateral exercises. we look to strengthen both traditional partners and relationships such as japan and

we are working to integrate a national defense strategy with japan's national defense program guidelines. we are also working very intently and seriously on important emerging relationships such as with india, singapore and indonesia and vietnam. the 10 asean members in u.s. navy forces tested an operability command and control and the maritime security testit we hope now is annual u.s. asean the maritime exercise last month. having her engagement in areas such as the pacific islands to preserve a free and open border and we have enhanced their engagement in the freely associated states and beyond in that regard. beyond the indo-pacific the department is engaging across the globe and we have brought the china challenge into our discussions in europe and the middle east for example. china and others recognize art

images and their actively working to disrupt our alliances and partnerships in these key areas but we nonetheless see a strong interest in greater alignment on these challenges from our partners. we are also exercising with our partners in real-world operations to include enforcement of the sanctions against north korea. japan and uk's gun and a command center at the countries that include south korea, australia canada new zealand the united kingdom japan and france. we are all committed to enforcing the u.n. security council's resolutions. we are also working with our partners in the maritime spaces to include the south china sea and are working with partners to build capacity through initiatives such as the maritime

security initiative which has boosted key partners abilities and help them conduct maritime security and awareness operations. we are also part of the whole of government approach which is allied in partner centric response to china's expanding influence and coercion and their interest in acquiring and advancing themselves under the high-tech areas. we have ongoing deep conversations with our allies about protection of the innovation base and about the risks associated with new technologies such as 5g. to conclude the unfolding long-term strategic competition with china is the defining challenge of our generation and we embrace the dod. her current tragic or is largely driven by the ambitions and choices of chairman xi in the ttp elite the acquisition of capabilities to apply toward realizing those ambitions in the current policy choices and

actions which demonstrate active pursuit of those ambitions. remain open to changing this tragic or inner vision for free and open indo-pacific is inclusive and affirmative for any country china included who choose to support the enduring rentable embedded in our vision but we should be clear we do understand these consequential times and consequential decisions must be taken to the cost associated with complacency could be extremely high. the benefits of competing well in competing to prevail are equally high. with that i look forward to a conversation with ryan and the questions and discussions that may follow. thank you. [applause]

>> first of all mr. secretary thank you for being here with us and thank you for your rich and nutritious overview of the work is being done their area of responsibility. i want to give the audience a chance to jump in because i know there a lot of questions but before i turn it over to the group i did want to ask if you have questions building upon your comments today. first he talked a bit about the west china military-to-military relationship as wondering if you could take this into the engine room a little bit of that. how's it working and is it being insulated from ups and downs in the overall relationship or is it a derivative of the? >> we see from our chinese interlocutors that they want military-to-military relationship to be a stabilizing force. we welcome that so we have

maintained a level of engagement to include high-level engagement i think 2018 was the first year on record where there was a sec def visit to china. by that metric our engagement remains robust. our focus is on how we engage with china in this context of overall competition so that place puts a premium on confidence-building measures safety of operations of things like military maritime consultative at yemen and other measures and how best to ensure a safe operating environment while we know we have operated in close proximity to one another with greater frequency and how we make sure there's no unintended incident or accident. i plan to go to china next week so our policy talks continue. emphasis on confidence-building measures and safety continues.

i see many old-timers in the audience. we are more insulated from the political ups and downs and we used to be and i think that's a good thing. strategic competition was the theme of your presentation also one of the themes of this event today. can you talk a little bit about where that competition is felt most acutely in your day-to-day work and also where you expect your success or 10 years ago -- 10 years from now and 2029? there's an internal aspect and external asset. the internal is driving defense into alignment for this long-term competition. a lot of that is to help us internally with the joint staff and the services as they make their respective dishes and to make sure it's appropriate for the competition and the environment that we see.

the external peace is working with allies and partners. we do think that is the asymmetrical advantage that just can't be matched. of course also some contested areas south china sea, some relationships that might be contested where china has ambitions where we want to invest more. i mention this at islands and parts of southeast asia. we are building airplane as we are flying it if you will because we are in a competitive environment now but to get to your second part of your question i think the work inside the enterprise is a work that will continue for quite some time because the nature of our business. we buy things and programs that last decades and decisions now and in five or 10 years from now will have lasting impact. we want to be investing wisely.

i mention something new domains and areas of focus in my remarks but it's a dynamic environment that could change depending on the direction the china goes. they will largely be a competitor for these decisions and we have to be dynamic and flexible and make those wise decisions along the way. >> you mentioned alliances. you know their reputation as being a strong alliance manager and advocate of alliances. how are we doing? >> i think we have a very strong demand signal from our partners. they want largely to generalize we see a lot of interest in stronger defense and security relations with the united states. think we are being resource for that and resourced not only in budget terms but how are seniormost leaders are spending their time and attention. secretary s. burgess took his first trip to the indo-pacific

region. he's the second secretary will to do it. secretary mattis did the same. i think we are making the investments. we are trying make countries where they are. we have mature alliances and i mention japan and the work it's doing to align our national defense strategies and with the implementation of those what they will look like. we have emerging partners that are not ours but a place like get mom. we pulled 92% favorable as a country and get mom. i've been to vietnam five times and i'll be going next week and i will return with the secretary so that will be seven trips to vietnam in two years if that's any metric. i think we are doing okay. we have got a region that china plays prominently in and they have the ability to use economic ways and their own diplomacy.

we have a different approach to issues like trade which some of our partners are trying to get their hands around and understand the trajectory of that. that's part of the environment we work in. it won't give us a great but overall we are doing pretty well. >> you mentioned polling. vietnam has a 2% favorable rating for the united states. other allies have a slightly different picture. polling and our allies in the region showing support for favorable ratings for china the united states is gone down as well. this is evident in primarily australia but a number places as well. how does that affect your job? >> some of it is understandable. when you talk about burden sharing that's a stress and the partnerships that will sometimes be reflected in public sentiment it's something that's important

to the president and previous administrations as well. this administration has been more aggressive in trying to pursue admirable burden sharing. some of the countries, still you don't know the exact numbers but i would guess were going from the high 80s favorable to low 80s high 70 server role. you can fact check me on that. some places like the philippines we have the different private leader there who makes a lot of public commentary on the united states yet we remain over 80% favorable. maybe we are down historically but still quite high. it's important method but it's not the only metric you need to pursue the presence goals on burden sharing and things of that nature as we are doing what we think we need to do to compete with china. >> while we are on the topic of alliances japan koreas the relationship that appears to be in a downward spiral at the

moment. you've spoken publicly about this recently. can you give us a sense of where we are, where the bottom is in this recall and what role the united states can or should play in bringing our allies back together? >> i was meeting with prominent chinese scholar and i won't mention his name but he remarked on the growing tensions between japan and south korea and he said china's very pleased about this. i said why is china pleased about this in the citizen at obvious? they think what we need to continue to remind our allies is that the countries that are benefiting from tension is china, russia, north korea and that's not a good place to be. we at the defense department to maintain trilateral relations. i believe this morning.

well, i won't comment on that because i'm not sure it actually came off but we will soon have an opportunity with the asean defense ministry meeting place where will have at trilateral meeting at the ministry of defense level. the happen the shangri-la with acting secretary shanahan. we have regular interactions at my level including we last met on may 9 in seoul. it was one of the days when there was a missile launch, a missile test and the south korean defense minister called the delegation leaders up to his office previously unplanned and said this is why we need to strengthen our defense cooperation and trilateral work. he said it to the japanese speaker who studied at the japanese air war college. we are trying our best to enslave the defense and security relationship from the political tension that obviously is

present. one of the reasons we spoke out is because that was spilling into the security trilateral work and in a helpful way but overall i think we are doing okay. it's it tough environment for defense ministries respectively in tokyo in seoul because of where their political leadership is on these things. i think we ultimately are going to be driven together because of the prevailing security interests and the security environment. i don't know where rock bottom is or how much time it could take but i do see so much that pulls us together. if you give the list of things japan would knowledge they agree on rules-based order respect for human rights and human dignity work in southeast asia on health issues, development. the list is quite long. so we will play a role if we can

if there's some suggestion we haven't been engaged in a high-level i can tell you secretary esper spent several times on this and secretary pompeo has former national security adviser bolton before he left office spent time on this and we are open to other ways we could deconstruct it hardy here. what typically happens is one country asks us to straight out the as a country to tell them why they are wrong. should we be a more active mediator if both sides can agree on what that looks like and if it would be a constructive role that we are open to finding ways to help bring the two sides closer together. >> they have one more christian than i will turn it over to our colleagues here. taiwan. taiwan is an issue you've spent considerable time on imports for many years. right now beijing is putting pressure on taiwan in the run-up

to a presidential election. which of the u.s. response teams adds pressure? >> without the framework through the taiwan relations act to get flexibility to enhance certain aspects of our approach. we made some decisions recently on security assistance that was consistent with the law and the growing threat from china. i think this is a particularly tense period because of the election. we are doing certain things to support a fellow democracy in carrying out a free, fair and non-coerced election so there is very little doubt the chinese will seek to meddle in that election then they traded in taiwan's greatest elections in 1996. it was missile exercises in 2000

this time i think it's a little more sophisticated with the use of social media in cyber means. we are supporting taiwan as a fellow democracy interested in seeing free fair and uncoerced selections particular on the cyber piece but over the longer stretch certainly will need to continue to be that good security partner good economic partner and preserve space for taiwan to keep its unique status until the two sides are better place to work things out between them. >> thank you. like turn it over now for any questions. we will take two or three at a time will start with this gentleman. >> hi. >> dave lawler from axios. secretary said in your march the china recognizes the advantages that the u.s. has in

partnerships in seeking to undermine or counter that and i was wondering if you could expand on that idea. thanks. >> we can go to the gentleman in the back. b think you secretary. assistant secretary did you watch the web live up to military parade in beijing today what are your thoughts on that? thank you. >> will take one more question. >> radio free asia and i've a question on north korea. the united states and north korea are going to resume negotiations this saturday and

how would you assess the u.s. china cooperation on getting north korea to give up nuclear programs and actually the chinese foreign minister in his united nations speech mentioned the sanctions related to north korea. how would you assess the u.s. china cooperation with korea? >> with a question about north korea the military parade and the alliance. >> in order, on military alliance and relates to the comment that i can fade from a chinese scholar that china benefits when there's tension between our allies and tension between us and our allies and as a result will seek to drive wedges and find those opportunities but a lot of times it's through their economic ways but a lot of times in the information space there's quite a bit about the united states being an unreliable partner so

it caprices power of course will be drawn back in the middle east this interest in the region is leading. they do it in a fur idea of ways you know i think that's part of the overall competitive environment. it doesn't bother me as assistant secretary that our alliance relationship or bites that reassurance in explaining where the benefit is in strong alliances and moving it forward prevents a burden i carry with no hesitation. the military parade, the national day event, i went home and spent time with my four kids and family. i did not watch it. i am seeing some reports on it and it seems like it was an impressive display. it's meant to send a signal i suppose internally and

externally so we will do the post-game analysis on it and i think it's in line with expectations. then the last question was about north korea and china's cooperation in particular. i think as undersecretary rud said yesterday in public we believe china can do a little better on the sanctions enforcement incorporating with us in our overall effort to get north korea to the negotiating table in a constructive way. we have seen some slippage on sanctions enforcement. and we are willing to work with china to strengthen that enforcement effort. i have said this and probably people have heard the story but secretary shanahan the then at inc. secretary went to shangri-la and presented the

minister with the gift gift and the said minister at the gift for you. he was very pleased with that and he handed him a picture book of north korean illegally shipped to ship transfers happening in territorial waters. that was a gift. the gift came with an offer. we'd be happy to work with you on curbing this. we can hand off targets in sovereign territory and handed over to you. we can do something more robust. we'd like to work with china on this but right now what we see is actually chinese vessels shadowing our courses that are trying to enforce the sanctions rather than enforcing the sanctions themselves so we hope they can change the course of that into a little better on sanctions enforcement. >> thank you. we have time for one more question. this gentleman here.

>> is china trying to insert its role into the conflict between pakistan and india over the cashmere and how are they doing that? >> i'm a reporter with voice of america. assistant secretary said earlier that china was happy about friction between south korea and japan and my questions more about the latter relationship between the u.s. and south korea the two countries have been suspending the large-scale military exercise in south korea recently requested the handover of more than half of the races

of the united states military in north korea. does that send the wrong signal to china as a weakening sign of u.s. and korea relationships? >> we have a question on india and kashmir. >> okay. china has a long-standing relationship with pakistan and they have growing competition with india. they think india seeks a stable relationship with china. we have an important visitor this week after prime minister modi's event in texas and then his work at the u.n. foreign minister to stay behind and we are having coupled -- consultations with him. they want a stable relationship with china but there's no to there is growing concern in competition there as well. i think on a range of issues to

include cashmere china has leaned towards pakistan. they have supported pakistan in there is some discussion about whether or not kashmir would be taken up in the u.n. and if china would support that. but in terms of something beyond that or more active i don't see it. i think many have concerns that pakistan keep a lid on militant groups that might conduct cross-border to these as a result of the cashmere decisions and i don't think china wants that kind of conflict or would support that. with respect south korea and our relationship there's a long-standing deep alliance and we of issues from time to time but it's a very strong alliance when we look at something like off come transfer and the remarkable thing is we are

pursuing it and talking about it and we are talking about one of the most dangerous areas in the world and we are involved in a process that will ultimately lead to south korea being in charge of combined forces that include u.s. forces. that's a pretty big statement of confidence in the alliance. we think it ought to be conditions based because of the seriousness of the security environment there and the need to ensure that we are as capable and prepared as possible. when we look at things like command structure, when we look at things like certain key capabilities for that contingency we are going to be pretty insistent that south korea acquires those capabilities before we agree to transfer and not tie tied to any political calendar. on the exercises, we need some adjustments. president trump felda felt it was important to make an

adjustment to give our diplomats space to work on this issue. i would just tell you in a combined environment what you really want to stress and test his decision-making, how you in a crisis make decisions in a combined environment and you can do that through simulation and war gaming and command post type exercises. we can train on all the other mission essential task in ways that are lower profile, some off the peninsula and some just smaller elements, training on the mission essential tasks. i think if general abrams were here and in fact i know he was here because he testified before congress we have made these adjustments to give art diplomats space that still maintain high readiness. we need to get ready for merging challenges. if there are further adjustments which i'm not aware there is any plan to do that we want to maintain the same kind of

readiness and again it's really focused on the decision-making combined environment where we need to be excellent so we are able to do that. >> mr. sisson secretary thank you for spending time with us this morning. i promised her staff would allow you to return to your day job in that time is come. on behalf of all of our colleagues thank you for such clear and valuable insight. [applause] and we will have our next panel join us on stage. .. [background sounds]

background sound. [background sounds] and sounds.

[background sounds] to make everyone thanks for being with us today. i am the fellow the project an international order and strategy. also for security in emerging technology. this panel both to reflect on the remarks that you just heard from secretaries driver and to talk a little bit more about china's growing global influence. we are not going to have any prepared remarks. we are going to jump right in. before i do, the papers that we published at this.the project are focused on competition in the domestic drivers. behind some of foreign china's policy moves. among those papers today we have him writing about terrorist

things going on in china. china and the gray zone, a bigger focus particularly on what escalation could look like in the islands. caitlin, has written a book about nuclear competition between the united states in china and david dollar has a paper about china's particularly focused in africa. there's a case study they did. china's overseas based ambitions. and on the domestic driver front we have with us today, finley was written about transformation to the populace and what that means. jamie is the great paper on the shift in china's legal development and the growing role of party. then russia has contributed to a

prior launch to the series. i was focused on continuity and change in china's foreign policy role and what role has she played in it. so is audrey as well. her focus has been on economic statecraft. let's jump right in. i think a lot of current debate about the united states policy towards china, and also how monday other countries around the world are reacting to china's rise. it really turns on what you think china wants and what kind of resources and risk china is wheeling to wager to achieve some of those ambitions, which is essentially to be about what monday would call to at china's grand strategy. we want to know what their grand strategy is. on a post you a question has three parts. so the first is, tell us what the contours of the debate about china's strategy looks like. second what are some signs that we should be looking for.

particularly in the domains of the strategic competition that we are focusing on today. both of that is an economic and infrastructure development or security competition or the clash of values. and third, picking up on some of the remarks that the assistant secretary made this morning, he said the current tenant current trajectory is really being opened by president g. tells a a little bit about how she has shifted china's grand strategy if she has. >> the first question is basically about grand strategy. i think we all kind of know what we mean. we think of it as the coordination of multiple different instruments to advance strategic objectives. the carnation is what makes grand strategies, and extremely hard to pull off. what is undertaken by a country with a 12 million-dollar economy, those reports, robust

information. it has pretty significant implications. this we mean by strict grand strategy. why it matters, is precisely clause it was so hard to do. you can reshape global politics. when you're in late right now, is both of china has a grand strategy. you can really divide that debate into two categories. the one hand you have individuals who would say that it really doesn't have a grand strategy. i call them the skeptics. on the other side, you have people who might say that it does have a grand strategy for the believers. the believers, have not really attempted true persuasion of the skeptics yet remain unpersuaded. so why is that the case. we a lot of works come out that china has long-term plan. a lot of those worries get deep in the weeds. the kind of more commercial words, that went out really getting into tiny sources and that went out looking at the behavior, and serious vigorous way. that aside, people who don't think china has a grand his gravity.

the thing is is it too complicated we don't think that china knows what it wants. it doesn't have a clear decision making process that makes it easy for them to actually limit whatever they decide they do want. that there is vested interest that corrupts the national interest that there is nationalism which occasionally prevents china from pursuing an objective. i don't agree with all of those objections. i think china does have grand strategy. usa with the signposts are that we should look for how we know who to write and how do you know they have the grand strategy. i think three things you look for. first how do they think about strategies. the concept. do they have a set of ideas. the end of the way the means to accomplish strategic objectives. they look at capability. can the full enough. it is really hard to pull off a grand strategy. do you have the ability to override. and finally, you look at conduct, are they actually taking action. i think to cross all of of those

three and the made it through is yes. i want to made it through the questions at the top loophole first. we expect to see. one question, one big debate, is it focuses primary regional. or is it global. do they fired global. the big question. it's very difficult to resolve. an empirical way. but increasing this evidence, they are maybe thinking globally. you see that in the russia operations. not just in asia but in the arctic and additional cooperation it takes on allies in japan and south korea you see that in some of their areas. it's now the number one funded topic within the think tank within china. is to be american affairs. all of the circumstantial evidence that we are seeing things more than a global live. financial space, are they going to seek actually to undermine

the u.s. dollars etc. finally last.may be quickly how much is the about president g. all of us independently, always coming to the same kind of conclusion. my personal view is that of president had a third term, a lot of what we're staying staying now, with still continual. it's not about all about president g. alana rooted in the party in his own vision of how global order should be arranged and how it should be arranged and national rejuvenation looks like all of which has continuity. thanks. >> you said in your paper that there is a debate as russia describes about she's in fact broader debate also standing within the chinese communist party. on the one head you've clearly consolidated the power giving

himself like your tenure writing himself into the constitution as you.out any paper, going supporters of the national and provincial levels of leadership. building a new populace grand, and then focusing on both litigation and development of megacities. then on the other side of this debate, he also have an analyst like richard mcgregor, who focused on the backlash to the role. who help us better understand this debate including both of there are ways in which both elements of this debate could be corrected. >> is the good friend of mine. i respect scholar on chinese. it's called the party, a book. it talks about the backlash. i read his article. i say it is fair to say that you would probably agree with me, no

one can hope choose. the thing it's not so much black and white. [inaudible conversation] it's complicated. i think we should avoid this backlash to a certain extent clause based on the perspective. the title of my article i follow is the term called the pro regress. it's a combination of progress in the regress. actually got this word when i went to shanghai on an exhibition. i was also in that museum just a few weeks ago. he is the title as progress to describe?

chinese term, which was actually commonly used in chinese language. the term called which is based on asian mysterious things. it seems like we are moving forward simultaneously when we are going backwards. i think this is very important. i think people perfected, would get a different attachment about beijing teaching. this is also related with a harvard professor, putnam. about two decades ago, to levels of the chess game. sometimes politicians and state leaders are playing the game simultaneously, an international chase. it does not make sense to win the chess war to make perfect

sense. that's a dynamic that we should look at. we talk is it too much about trajectories. that are not true. i think the continuation. it's a part leadership. and finally, it's very important to understand the changing king is also in environment, is the action. for example, in the chess game, early on, it was quite a conservative towards markets. they talk about the market. enough of that, the recently shifted back last november was six points policy to promote the private sector and to continue

to emphasize state role in the state capitalism etc. all of these things tell us that is not just a simple and true or false live or wrong right from wrong, facts. it's important to look at beyond ourselves. be also aware of the dynamics that an opposition might take. argument. for intellectuals in china, backlash for some international communities also backlash. may not be necessary for africa. not in america. some of the people see the objectivity and development so again, different perspectives. with a different assessment. it should not be applied for us.

but it's very important to be appreciative of that simultaneously the progress and the regress. in certain extent in the case of china. >> you do talk about the populace grand. can we just lay out the concrete ways thinking about some of the attentions in the u.s. china relationships right now in the trade war reaction to the protest, and hong kong, detention in shandong, and now reports that some of this treatment may extend to other populations and for china two. how does this new brand of populism, what are the applications. >> certainly these are real challenges and problems. i don't want to underestimate these challenges.

trade war, it chinese middle class. as the country has was it more. especially china's steel, and not put emphasis on exports. >> they make some adjustments, in addition to what i said about the promote of the private development but also he played a part of the uk and japan and economic development going on in the region. that also that china, both of it's a rumor or truth that the u.s. stop the lifting of chinese companies, that china is already prepared. the technology stock market quickly approved. that should give them some

leverage. in my article it talks about the contradictory move on one hand for the populace. not politic reduction. it's also continuation with other industries. they are lucky enough in the polls to announce the by next year china will eliminate, real policy to implement that. neutral position. probably elimination and hopefully the next year, very popular on the poor people. but now he is reaching the middle class in the major cities. shanghai beijing and ching ching ching and guangdong area. and come to coria door. these places previously, almost doubling. [inaudible conversation]

a prodigy well-positioned to carry off the delivery on the treatment. >> regarded of shandong also what is going on in hong kong. these are big challenges. nationalism is on the rise. i think the chinese leader may not be as anxious as monday of us here believe clause for chinese, why should they be is it too nervous. it is an embarrassment. but now it sounds like they get used to that. clause the certainly dehumanize the protesters. and not just dates, uk and it's not my views but most people in china certainly feel is evidence for that. and also, it's not beijing's

incompetence but rather some other policymakers or leaders. finally they also blame these people are thinking it is the public. the pressure is low. they don't want to see it happening. but it's already happened. they have the leverage where they are right and wrong at the moment i do not see it spreading to china. nationalism and populism. something you can't see. they talk about china coming up of edge and power. that interpretation more and more people believe. previously intellectuals, pro- u.s. intellectuals. but you see the switch and some people would now be persuaded in the united states would push

china back. that's the leadership. this is the way to offer the second question. >> everybody will probably want to weigh in on hong kong and changing as well. i will return to you, and the work that you've done on china's legal development. i think most that china specialists are generally aware that the party since the top of the states, and china but * you tell any contribution to our series is that on pressure that she the party controls being consolidated and institutionalize in a fairly unprecedented way through law. and you argue that this incentive it to mention is the legitimate project for the body be also worn on the other hand the parties heighten involvement in state governments that went out corresponding legal accountability, has continued resort to exceptional legal measures to deal with perceived

enemy enemies. they undermine the stability of expectations of trust abroad that the party needs to succeed. tell us why we see this move now and where we see it on president ching. >> thank you very much for the question. resetting the thesis for me. i guess to start off with first is the continuity piece which everybody has been talking about. there's a lot of continuity on gmp in the legal area. primarily, we need came in, for the very first priorities was to elevate what he calls role of law with a socialist rule of law with chinese characteristics. the ruling the country in accordance with law based evidence pretty sort of elevated legal project to a higher position for consequence of. the whole plan as well. in fact what we have seen on she, is the continuation of god shall things. the push to modernize the legal system that would deliver

crawlspace solutions and the majority of cases to both promote economic development and maintain social stability. on the other hand, what is new and when i fear for sort of a shift on shaping chain is an effort to then also legalize the status of the party. the party not registered on law, some people argue it always has had constitutional bases clause the parties mentioned in the preamble of the state constitution which discusses the history etc. but for most the history, the party it's not been specifically in main body of the constitution. this is one of the constitutional amendments that happen in march of 2018 with a remote the term limits and also set up a new branch of government. this is the division commission. to take on anticorruption responsibilities. the brent party into the constitution and the party his role in the leadership,

constitutionalize it. in addition, there is been pushed to my party and the leadership role into a lower law and nationally applicable revelation. so prior to cheese term, the party was mentioned in what they call the legislation 12000, in 2005, they amended the company law to require that all companies private or an investment and state owned have to establish a support these organizations. there was already written into the coming law. but on she, the parties being and to be written to a whole suite of national security laws that they've come out with in the first harm, but also in state council regulations as well. so sort of raises the question why is the party, why did they steal or feel the need to do this. the parties leadership as you know has always been asserted over everything. on she, it mayday big.of asserting and making very explicit party leadership over

everything including law and legal institutions. but again as he was talking about and tongue as well, they're the words, and then there's the reality in the practice. what i've also seen, and in my area i begin able to follow the state society interactions etc. and again party writing itself and for example, procedures for rulemaking. we always knew party controls legislation. then they control the congress, and state counsel. but again he felt that import now to write this actually in the state law to make very explicit. beyond this, the been asserting or institutionalizing their role in state government and a whole right of other ways. they go into excruciating detail in this paper but has to do with jointly issuing regulations with the state and the merger that happened just after the march 2018 national people's

congress of several state and the and party entities. the epitome of all of this is of course the establishment of the supervision commission which was given constitutional that is as a branch government and give it own organic law but in fact, in just the state fink of the parties, it's in section division. you have a lot of these more now merged parties and state bodies dual facing but increasingly taking on state governance activities. why is is concerning as you.out, is clause the parties even though they are trying to legalize the positions, they are accountable on law. so for example, if the party is part of the regulation of the state counsel, it was a state council regulation they have to go through, procedures, the regulations are made public, people can go to court and sue to enforce them. it is a party regulation, none of that applies. so party then removes the state

functions outside the purview of the law. that is one shift that i seem in the flesh, down a broader loophole, sort of reflects arguments that are made that she does recognize and appreciate the legitimating power of law. that is why he is elevated law is the cornerstone of their new governance strategy. winners in the fourth plan coming up, this would be doubly voted to discussing motorization of the parties governing capabilities and governance capacity. now another thing though is still disturbing, how do you square that's the importance law in the legal system with this sort of extralegal treatment that we see party calling out to perceived enemies in beijing. so in this, it was interesting to me to focus on the fact that there's been a persistence of an old malice and a concept of two

contradictions. you have not antagonistic contradictions among the people, it's a very natural conflict. these contradictions can and should be handled in accordance of the law. but then you have contradictions between the people and the enemy and those contradictions which threaten stability of the party state, those in our handled outside through extrajudicial and extra legal chorus of methods as well. and that's another concerning aspect of the parties move. this indicates the kind of conditional attitude towards law. if you know deemed to be among the people, and if the normal contradiction that the normal legal system, which is increasingly professional autonomous, real safe etc. but if you know perceived to be an enemy, then you know outside of that system. and all of this of course is implications for china's role in

the world and dealing with after actors both foreign companies, operating in china but also china's activities overseas. it's not again, look at the words, they are concerning. i was trying to identify why this party project make me feel uncomfortable. and i think to articulate it. partly clause it removes them from the area of state governance and kind of undermines in fact, the whole legitimation through legalization process. but again it's important to see out of plays out in practice. i totally endorse what colleagues and said to us today that when you are looking at china, making policy, we must take the party of this word but then go beyond it and see how it is playing out in practice and trying to analyze how any situation it is may impact us on her interest. >> take one example how it may play out in practice. always been in the news quite a

pit. one of the arguments that have been made is china actually does have some data protection laws. you may efforts to secure data from a service. your argument would seem to suggest that it's a party essentially became and begins to beat state law in one way. those flames would seem to be more hollow. would you agree with that or think of that in a different way. >> is the complicated situation so i think that case is pretty special, it's got a minute a military background etc. etc. it's everywhere in the world now. but to back up again looking at tracks on the ground. it's very interesting to me to see the party is doing a fairly live hand approach to the private sector. they realize the economy is loan, really need for private sector. in the main source of gdp growth

and job creations and of innovation. we've heard stories for examples that the party state has to negotiate with the pet kit to get access to the data. how much and how often in what forum etc. it's very similar to say over negotiating with new york city before it went in and terms of what they would have to turn over to the state as well. if you look at the party regulations and policies, they do treat private companies different from say state owned enterprise. there are a lot of new supports a couple of years ago about this new requirement that the party has to write the parties committees role into the sle and corporate charles charter of organizations to joint ventures between the foreign companies as well. so that was raising a lot of concerns about what exactly is the role of the party. we traditionally always have a

requirement whenever there is three more party members in an entity, both of as a law firm, the company or an ngo, you must, the parties members must forum a party organization. but now they are taking this great harm in trying to legalize it. and try to make it a legal requirement either a matter of law or in this case, the party. for the corporate charter amine. they have echoes that same requirement on private companies. they are also know there is a big push for all of the companies who are fed up, party organizations and much small private companies do. clearly the party knows they are trying to and while they really want to control them, and get access to data and other innovations, and they also don't want sector to be competing with the party his fink. they know they can't kill the golden goose. you see a very interesting dance going on here. when it comes to national security though, i think the suite of national security laws

which include counterintelligence national security and the data, and cyber security laws etc. for the in the party into it, the national security card control that but even in that case the party would be careful in how they deploy it. just like our government is. even though there case you would move the court to prevent the parties from asking them to. it's a very complicated made it through to your question. it's a complicated situation. >> you contributed to the paper earlier this year. and you write a book and you are making a case for someplace china's focus on subversion which you find is going around establish political processes and institutions. and in other as you see them engage in what you call stakeholder cultivation with her going through those institutions and processes. tell us why do you see different tactics in different places and how is this playing out through china's growth initiative.

>> in the interest of the economic straight craft. walter versus carrots. circumvent real stories features and procedures. also self correction. this is generated significant amount of public and clinical backlash. we see political compasses using offices in countries that are strategically important for china. malaysia, and all these kind of politicians that are holding office expected corrected long-term in china. this is important clause we are seeing resistance to china result initiative. across major developing countries. even those with perhaps a perfect privacies. in the backlash also produced a demonstration effect in which you see a public in different

countries, becoming more skeptical and wary of chinese financing. and being more weary about what chinese are doing. and so far it has created a bad reputation initiative. in the last couple of years. this means that the china has not been very successful before of having very ambitious goal is trying to buy over influence using economic tools. the same time, china's also learning. it is my conversation in china, my investors have knowledge on mistakes and china has made, and the need for better public profundity and cooperation and processes in expecting regulations and in the country. rhetorically i have practice.

in terms of rhetoric, we rebranded initiative, china recent years, has tried to have announced plans for corruption. implement projects. second perform, in april, this year, chinese also went beyond the usual rhetoric of the cooperation to really inspect the instability cracking down on corruption and proving transparency in working with other developed countries. an investment in financing and development. in practice, the context, you see chinese governments and chinese also being pressured to adjust the strategy. in malaysia for example, we've seen controversy over the drilling, major project was suspended.

after luncheons last year, china underwent a renegotiation process where the project is now moving forward. wasn't swift terms to malaysia, something that makes more sense for malaysia his economy as well. an example is miramar, again the government negotiated ed contract with the help of the state department. leaders have also publicly stated off having a bri and chinese investment. local people in local population. for how u.s. our country should think about china's initiative, i think first, china has to be in perspective by include in force. a lot of skepticism, and so in terms i think if you are thinking about the strategy increases, prominence and popularity and claim around the

world. that hasn't really succeeded as of now. for the u.s. and these really important to think about statecraft as an off sense strategy. not just how china is operating but how the u.s. response. in an international order today, the prominence of the economic and and tools, this effort to gain and competition efforts in political influence so we need a more comprehensive and strategic way of thinking about integrating national security think security national these of economic assuming. >> what would that comprehensive brush look like. perhaps you can join in on that as well. >> i think the u.s. by large strategy to think about military

options. i think that's a very important tool but i think that there should be better in coordination across a different discover it. in thinking about for example, the state department has organized by geographic regions and people they want think about china's ongoing initiatives and statecraft globally. we need to kind of overcome these styles and really have a more integrated approach and looking at china strategy in the region of rules. >> so let me just say a few things very quickly. a great example of continuity and training strategy. i say that clause off of the governor has announced there's a 2000 speech for president who was a major speech which he adjusted the guidelines and in that speech he proposed an inoperable network of infrastructure that would crisscross asia. that's in his speech in 2009,

monday years before it was announced. none in turn, is an effort to make sure china it was able to make it more competitive nationally and security of resources etc. there's a longer-term history some of these efforts that were formally enter side and elevated their presidency. so i know i mentioned that. i mentioned that clause that means that this is something that is not completely about branding and it's not random and it's not about vested interest. there's a larger rationale this been there for a long time. describe in political terms. where people say that as a example of failed chinese grand strategy. but in co- inherent backlash that china is facing challenges. i sick two things. but is it that way. this is as something that they've been do for a long time and second i would argue that they believe in china have built and outside of china the development was quite resilient. we've heard a lot about backlash.

the case where china had to try report, he went back this past january for $81 loan for highway construction. really well where china was adaptable. in malaysia, we negotiated terms and in the cause. one political group that was supposed the projects and another group one. they built a new extra push for a new redline would connect all of china. a lot of examples where it is sort of resilient as above. the reason i mentioned that for u.s. policy is the clause of this, it's not going to be enough to just completely weight until it collapses on its own weight. the united states is doing, a big part of it, other countries are also wheeling to cooperate. part two and this goes again that went out rate was talking about, making sure people are

aware of the problems that the governor has with respect to government. so there are extensive examples of these as always, from china being involved in co-op sure and at the local loophole. well documented examples. all the way from latin america and ecuador. all the way to pakistan, africa, where vice president is getting chaos and especially locket where there enter on it and it goes. when the information comes out, it can shape the politics of those countries. the question is with them come out. so there's informational covenant to combating this. which is asymmetrical. finally, it isn't a bad thing. lots of it can be good. policy structure is need it. consistent with strategic maneuverability to those countries but also completely indented. in this kind of choice of the program require a u.s. alternative.

>> i want to add a few things. based on what my colleagues just said. we do need to ask both of china has a reasonable power and global power has his own national interests. to give out the initiative number one and number two, predetermine the chinese particular try to use to build a road to undermine her challenger to u.s. asia region. is it predetermined. as an evil plan. possible if policy continues to be in china. and obviously depends on the system in the worldview. finally china could improve my made it through is yes and can improve. it can continue. i think this is the three things that are very edible by my

colleagues. >> i will just, from a legal.of view, everybody it's sort of like an employment initiative for the world these days. i would add it from the legal and government.of view and couple things, one the problems they run into initially, i don't think is clause china had these plan to go out there and subvert and establish procedures and engage in corruption. it's a very messy nonanswer to link to finalize project. a lot of the pressure in china right now is to pry try to him post more. in april there was an intent to start talking about clean bri as well as a green bri and transparency is the huge issue. from the point of view of american companies, even our lawyers, they would like to see an open system put in place.

there's a lot of pressure. also china to open up and determine on all levels as well. in addition to having counter strategies which we should, we had to find ways to support and cooperate sometimes often with her other allies but also directly with china really be a much better initiative. >> the government it's not always a bad thing. you can be leveraged to do good things for the rest of the region. but also not one thing, it is monday different projects and analysis. is that the overall program. is the specific project and if you look at some of the specific project, monday of them long perceiving and if you look at those projects, some of them including the ones interlock and the ones in la marque and in pakistan, are about a particular kind of strategy.

they have a lot of value, not uniquely chinese, every power dating back to the portuguese 500 years ago has recognizes things like this matters. but of course extensive chinese investments and don't take my word for it. she oceanic administration who read or wrote in the paper and said his speech, celeste toys that he let this note most ports could use opportunities for that liberation army. this unofficial source. he talked about securitization and, there is a discourse out there that sees this as a good thing for asia and a lot of public good. we should take them at their word and a lot of this. but some of the project, not the roads industry but the court another places, good strategic rationale. let's not paint with just is it too broad of a pates stroke. what he says is the project, it didn't happen by the way and

informed that second phase is announced the year before the for reform in the fifth anniversary in 2018, and in the speech he says where he going to be. when we focus on the big brush strokes in the big projects. paging would be smaller and greener and leaner and cleaner. it would also be more likely and directly benefit individuals and easier to talk about. a lot of the problems aren't always about chinese plan, monday of them are endemic to doing financing abroad. political economy which is different. both of those things have to be taken into account. the point is that the they are changing and adaptable. budget if it is good but we have to focus. >> , should we be concerned about the convergence of the surveillance technology. for example we need mentions this in this paper that there is a project in zimbabwe, on facial

recognition, how much of these are going to be intertwined you think. >> i think there is a big development part is sort of a digital development that is sort of silken component to it. i don't know that china specifically is exporting a system. i don't quite buy that. nothing and has a do that. i'm not sure and the way that this work is more explicit. sort of written about this as well. and more writers paper on the subject we suggest that some of the ways in which this kind of dissemination and will take place will be through channels that are not always even jell-o. he wants to sell, helping one country and made it through its internet. that is useful more liberal but there's a commercial operation. there are other ways in which we have seen china with surveillance technology in a bad

way. that's really hard to be paul bullock. ethical really long time to get there. if a boy to watch this space, this is one of the key questions will the rise of china to true global superpower mean that liberal values are going to be attenuated or processed. the question it's not nora now something we're going to see. something we can shape with good cooperative policy. >> i completely agree. broad range of actors and multiple competing. and i think that that has but clause it but were a lot of audiences that you see chinese are acting as ages. both of that was completely true or not, i think it is succeeding in the way that china is offering and to a negative perception. and what china is trying to achieve and potential effects that china has a domestic and

processes in different countries. so long the point about the u.s. going into china, i think that's absolutely important working with allies and partners and institutions, source of financing clause it's not credible to the united states to criticize over the developing countries. you can't take chinese money that went out that is not credible clause you are not providing other things. at the same time i think it calls for pure competition in chinese. to marsha researches and so i think also not only working institutions, promoting reform processes approval institutions. i think that that will create access and financing. i don't feel that the u.s. to share know-how research providing research. so that they on the ground and

the government both opinion and more aware of what is going on with the kinds of investments that china is the offering. it's a strategy of ensuring and pushing china to ensure to better transparency standards and government standards. >> let's go to the questions that the audience has and they have a mic. let's start here with the gentleman in the fourth row. when we take both questions in a row together. >> a look at china's military buildup in particular. and marvel at it clause nobody is thinking about attacking china. so the purpose of the military though, there is nothing more than supporting the congress or communist party. when you look at china's grand strategy. is it really just making the world safe for hypocrisy. clause the moral order clause

there, the more chance the party can sit survivor democratic pressures. >> please stand why you ask your question. >> discussing grants strategy, how much of this is driven by internal dynamics versus an assessment of the vulnerabilities and strengths of other countries. in other words, to the chinese look right now, and look what's going on in washington is the short-term gift, or part of a longer narrative of decline and withdrawal and to what extent in the leadership is there serious discussion debate about a long-term strengths and weaknesses of countries like the united states. >> military question, i don't

think the purpose of china's military modernization over the last 30 years has actually really been primarily about the primary party itself. let's go back, 1980 china was actually thinking about building the kinds of platforms it would be important in winning conflict with his saber in the south china sea for example. more about aircraft carriers actually. the structure they were dreaming about having a 2000 didn't happen. the reason it didn't happen is clause of three years. 1990 and 89 and 91. the gulf war and the continued dissolution of the association and satellite states. those three led them to think the united states was a primary adversary and it would be based upon what they saw in the gulf war. not buying vulnerable platforms like service vessels in large quantities more aircraft carriers, but instead investing in asymmetric capabilities. not clause they wanted take territory but deny the people in

the united states. what we now call denial first of china's hat. but monday of his capabilities were again not useful for taking anything. that changes. in the last 15 years we have seen a shift away from what could cause more symmetric one. those aircraft carriers, service vessels, platform vehicles. they want to use to be able to actually take more territorial operational shift. from defense and to defense to more offense of one. not clause they want to conquer the world clause they had equity in important national it just. hopefully i answered that in the military site. on the other side, think a question was really very useful. how much of china's grand strategy is externally driven versus internally dreaming. heavy creek question. a heavenly a lot of cheap chinese is externally driven.

a lot of domestic behavior politics are domestically driven but key strategic projects i think are more externally driven. what is clause we talked about the parties that are above the state penetrated every loophole and stated together that means it has the ability to rise over the interest. going back to the military case, the navy was keen on aircraft carrier. and a lot of influence and on the standing committee. the john shutting down time and time again clause it wasn't the right time for china to be building an aircraft carrier so they didn't do it. they pursued a larger grand strategy. people talk about public opinion and powerful forces shaping strategy or constraining it. i'm partially skeptical clause china retains the ability to erect monday of these nationalists when they are is it too out of line. so there it's not that clear path of domestic politics can

play. it doesn't necessarily work. the last question sort of about how much of the shape by the external factors. i think the primary factors that drive chinese grand strategies is the assessment of the united states. clause it is the biggest channel challenge to its interest. in the most relationship for its economic development. it has to pay to the united states. in the way that china strategy changes, it's like an oil tanker, it's hard to you would do a u-turn. the way it does to do it. as when there is a sharp discontinuous change in perception of the united states. 1989, cloisonné ally in the cold war. 2009, financial crisis. china went from thinking u.s. was asked ordinarily powerful. and now potentially 2016 to 2018, we see the election of

president tom, is the crisis of the west and western democracy and liberalism suggest that again u.s. is less threatening and may be an opportunity for more ambitious global agenda. none of this is bullet proof airtight but this account of how sara now. >> i see these two questions linked together. for the military one, china now has money, and they want to spend money in the military. they look at the china's map, on that perspective, the concern a lot of not only talk about that, the northern part of china but also look at the post north korea and the korean peninsula and the east tennessee, and particularly the taiwan issue. this goes to your second

question about which part is more important. i would say big but at the same time, conservatism is probably the primary driver. the other one of which become irrelevant. clause the duty to consolidate. for their very survival for success, is largely determined on both of you can defend their interests. and we are in trouble if you see, how independence or is it too soft, with the united states. it's a bad when we got involved. this is sometimes, a different picture. but also clause of china has become powerful and definitely needs a four inc. resources, is the military is also part of the data. but of course as it also action

dynamic and spiral and sometimes a weave and also feel that the united states, our interests in global power is weakened by china's challenge and emerging budget would decrease dramatically. that's it. we enter. so in monday ways we are a very dangerous. >> just to come back to another question. what is the debate look at how to take advantage of this moment where in the united states we have a lot of domestic turmoil and is the crisis of competence and democratic capitalism. how would you describe that. >> i think it is an excellent question. probably experience a lot of vicious infighting. and i, and politics, think of the second of politics, i do not foresee at the moment that this is the vicious power circling out.

it's a rumor. i think the impression of china has a tendency to unite together. we don't have different views necessarily, different potential of power inspiration. but at the moment, we do have them together, we enter this kind of dynamic so i think that as americans we do need to think about the challenge for us. in the chinese nationalist is on the rise. but that kind of crash, if our leadership continuous like this. we enter into this. china would talk probably take advantage of this. so that could well be china's advantage. >> i completely agree with everything that charlie said. it's true, the internal and extra role dimensions is very lengthy. questions for weather nut china is able to accomplish these.

here chinese letter and you fail in taiwan, the stakes are existential. clause of the stakes, i see disproportionate focus on foreign policy on the united states. i'll make it a little bit more tangible and concrete. we've all heard about this phrase. . . . it just means that when they are thinking about external consideration of the united states of the primary question that the primary variable. that links to ãquestion which is how are they to think about this moment in the west is struggling and if it's been that case for 30 years they

limited grand strategy to perception of the united states. i don't have a good answer, i don't have compelling evidence one way or the other because we don't have documents but what i have seen is a few things, greater funding for that as a policy priority of leadership. that something people have talked a lot about within the chinese system. we see more research along those lines. second, we are probably seeing interesting fridges and documents. xi jinping has use this phrase more than one times. ãbi haven't been able to completely unpack what creates that. finally, the assessment of the international system in the ã is a lot more positive for china, a lot more instability and a lot more opportunity as

well. i'm global governance especially we see far more references in those documents then we did under president hoover. that's an interesting shift from president who >>. >> this gentleman here, and then here. >> thank you. several advanced weapons word displaced in today's beijing ministry parades. such as ãbwhat kind of message would you like to read from these kinds of things? >> thank you distinguish panelists for coming here today. my name is jim rochelle from

policy bought comeau use data science and machine to analyze compositional policy intelligence. my question for you guys today is about how brookings is analyzing ãhow china is the using their global influence on a digital platform to influence other countries. for example, the way in the liberal western democracy of how we use digital platform is increasingly distant form and disorder how we think about how we vote but also in the office terry in countries like china using censorship's on the digital platform to influence people, how people think. quite recently doctor howard philip from oi y expert institute the internet institute has published an article on how china is using digital means to influence the

image of hong kong protests in the western world. for the first time you have you have the computational propaganda. my question for the brookings institute researchers, how are you analyzing that at the moment?>>. >> on a military parade, but you are going to ask me what's my favorite hong kong missile. [laughter] i don't have a favorite, they are also hard to choose from. on the message, i didn't think of it as ãbmaybe is constrained perspective. the military parades are not new in the prc a lot of countries have military parades. granted they were more missiles displayed in this parade in the past. i didn't really think of it the

message, if there was much is being sent i don't think it was regularly concerning. i thought it was fine if that's what they wanted to do a display military technology, that's fine. i'm much more concerned about what happens within region. we already know they exist. the other question is about data. under the china work under chung lee is increasingly taking chinese documents and digitizing them and putting them into data set and using that data set to the quantitative analysis. some of the stuff i talked to you about today would comes from the digitalization of mass quantity of documents. that is a useful approach to get traction of authoritarian questions. >>. >> let me ask you how many people watch the live broadcasting in the tv coverage on the parade. not many. so it's not symmetrical the

information. in china so many people watch and show china's muscle. in this country first my point is, that if the united states and china engage in the war this is a war that would be no green or consider to fight. i think that the assistant secretary early on in speech did talk about u.s. china despite distinctions. it's very important. i think you have no idea how it will be fought. and what time frame. certainly not like subsidies time. it's true. these are 2000 years ago.

but now we have economic motivation. we have nuclear weapon, 5g, artificial intelligence. we have a lot of things unknown. so we should avoid basically looking at the 21st century words used like 20th century master with 1/19 century mindset. that's a fact. not so much military strength, per se, but rather we should find a way to prevent this kind of thing from happening. i understand why china wants to show that at this critical moment on chinese perspective. i also see that from the audience. very few people watching. so that gives us perspective. we do need to communicate much better through dialogue.

this also relates to the issues we have not covered much about the trade negotiation ãon the one hand, the trade issues it's not as important in tackle war and certain security issues. but at the same time, united states and china should continue to engage economically if we do not do that, there's not much left. think about that. i perceived that way. we do need to continue to promote cooperation with educational culture, economic disaster. certainly we have a lot of tensions. your question raised about different ideology overt political system. it sounds like protecting china but am actually quite critical about a lot of things going on in china. media censorship and legal system in many ways a lot of asceticism. probably even stronger from outside. my friend ãis a scholar and

law professor. i actually publish a book he gave me a few years ago. at the same time, we also, i did a research about chinese legal profession. particularly focus on shanghai. my book is about shanghai. i look at the top 10 ãb they come from elite schools, harvard, columbia, stanford, berkeley b also interestingly, 75% of those partners go past new york bar exam 75 for this western american to provide you hope and economic front

eventually it's a paradox on one hand the legal profession is not but at the same time you see it changes. even in the legal process. also xi jinping is contradictory himself, he demoted the one-party plan on legal reform but not ãthere's backlash particularly the term limits. >> i don't know if you have a view on this but on the social media question broader more broadly on political influence, how much do you see efforts shape public opinion on chinese engagement with china economically? >> as an element of china statecraft is not something we should expect to see more of? >> i think especially with regard to the recent backlash.

people are telling me we see this video a malay lady in the chinese lady singing together in chinese and malay exhorting the benefits cooperation. how on good relations can bring benefits to all parties. i think china is realizing it really needs to work more on that and improve its image. whether that's going to be fully successful i think will have to go hand in hand with how china actually conducts the investments. >> to the point about what brookings is doing, i think you'll see more about this in the forthcoming set of papers on east asia. there will be discussions in the context of hong kong and taiwan as well. let's take two final questions. >> i'm sure we've all heard the phrase let a thousand flowers bloom. that phrase comes to mind as i listen to you this afternoon.

the question i have is, to what extent is chinese culture embedded in the design and implementation of economic statecraft? and what would be those aspects of culture that we can identify as specifically affecting how these policy initiatives emerge? >> and one final question in the back corner in the very back. >> he mentioned a lot about the grand strategy. i wanted to ask specifically about the economic grand strategy. as we see china made in china 2025 things like that are creating a lot of decoupling between the u.s. and china in economic terms. doctor lee touched a bit on this but one of the main

reasons we say u.s. and china would not have a conflict is because of the economic benefits we both gain. as we see more decoupling happening, what are some of the main things we can do to bring u.s. and china together especially when there is a lot of amplifying on issues like south china sea and things that bring a lot of tensions. >> culture and decoupling we have two minutes. >> the chinese leadership on a national lever no longer use the term made in china. they realize it's a very embarrassment. that's the realization that makes china sensitive in this area. that doesn't mean china will abandon the industrial policies. but a little bit it would spill

over. with that going on ãband early on the legal profession is real. a little more patient. that's why the economic corporation should continue. the culture things i don't want to commit too much. because ãbin particular in the first 30 years of upper prc the chinese economy are doing well. it's not just about the culture. sometimes political systems, policy, and entrepreneurship

etc., are all important. especially when china opens up then you really see the economic miracle. it's a matter of speaking about the culture. i would not emphasize too much on that regard. >> let's say i worry about law talking about cooperation keeping the doors open. china still looks to the u.s. also as one of the primary grounds of experience and law when they think about reforming the legal system. people don't realize because of reporting what the judicial reforms that have gone on under xi jinping for example. in areas i worked on in open government they adopt rulemaking from us.as well as ideas of transparency they have a free ãinformation act. continuing to look at our experience. xi jinping speaks against western-style constitutionalism, judicial independence etc. he wants

everybody to continue to learn the beneficial experience from the west. it's still true they look primarily to the u.s. because we still have the most dynamic economy. they look to where negative experience as well as the positive. i also have seen the normal legal system continue to progress both in terms of sensitive laws, anti-domestic violence. sexual harassment has begun to be explored now even though politically it still sensitive in china. a whole range of issues, mental health, etc. they continue to look to us this will europe and other countries. i would hope not just the western trained lawyers but many levels the judges the prosecutors, the police, we brought police from china the public security people to meet with counterparts and seminars in florida, discuss how you handle domestic violence issues.

i would hope it doesn't cease. this type of coupling is very concerning. on many levels. certainly in the legal area as well. even though there are a lot of contradictions in china and a lot of things we concerned about. still a lot of progress in the boat with going on. >> i just want to echo both those points. i completely agree it would be a real shame if we sell less interaction and people exchange and especially less exchange and legal areas. those should really be protected. it's an american interest for them to be protected. to have a concrete example, jamie and i have a colleague on working on some of the issues ã ãthere are areas we can actually cooperate in advance

of values we have in china. on the main china 2025 christian, and never thought the issue was important but i thought it got more attention it deserved because so much of it was happening and that initiative happened way before that. tech transfer through investment vehicles through theft, cyber espionage, through students sometimes. all of that is long-standing. a lot of that was state directed. in the past and it continues to be in the present. it was a particularly poor branding choice by china because he gave a coherent target for all of it. but it's no longer visible. the think tank has done a quantitative analysis showing it's disappeared from messaging in china and official publication. that tells you they messed up it's not out there but the point you raised about decoupling in those areas remain very serious. on the cultural point i agree with my colleagues i'm not an expert on the cultural

implications the applications of cultural economics.i think institutions meant a lot more i didn't want to get too far into it. others can hopefully give you more information. there is a rich discourse and you can quantify aspects of the culture. may be. >> to definitely echo my colleagues sentiments on the dangers of coupling and promoting economic corporation independence. ending efforts to recognize independence. it's actually going to sell it to divergence between united states and the trajectory of the two economies. if you think about economic statecraft this is not a cultural argument by any means but i think the way china is conducted receives ãb

this is a reflection of the political system and institutions and it's not cultural argument but we could see some trends in how china is conducting economic statecraft. >> in reading the papers, please look out for a podcast series hosted by our colleague. lindsay ford came every day she's putting out a new one with some authors of the gruber paper. i hope you will stay tuned for more events. more papers in the series. thank you for being here. [applause] for 40 years c-span has been providing america unfiltered coverage of congress, the white house, supreme court, and

public-policy events from washington dc and around the country.so you can make up your own mind. created by cable in 1979. c-span has brought to you by your local cable or satellite provider. c-span, your unfiltered view of government. this afternoon at the white house president trump took questions from reporters on a range of issues including turkey's latest military action in syria. the house impeachment inquiry. and trade negotiations with china. >>. [inaudible] we have no soldiers in the area. we been talking to turkey for three years, david wanted to do this for many years. he been fighting each other for centuries. they been fighting each other for hundreds of years. this has been going on. we were put into this battle