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philip mudd joined the central intelligence agency in 1985 on a panel specializing on asia and in the middle east. after the september 11 attack he was a cia member of the small diplomatic team that helped piece together a new government for afghanistan. after returning to the cia he became deputy director of the counterterrorist center and served there until 2005. he was the first deputy director of the federal pair of investigations national security branch and later became the fbi's senior intelligence adviser. philip mudd has received numerous awards and his comments about terrorism and congressional testimony have been featured in rock cast and news. he is now the present of mudd management. the company specializes in consulting analytic training public speaking about security issues. he's a senior fellow at the new america foundation and the

george washington university homeland security policy institute and serves as senior global adviser to oxford analytica a british-based firm specializing in advising multinational companies. he sits on the advisory board for the national counterterrorism center and for the director of national intelligence and deserves on the aspen institute, and security groupie ladies and gentlemen please welcome philip mudd to the national archives. [applause] >> you missed the most important part of that which i lived part time in memphis tennessee the bluff city. thank you. i was running in midtown memphis which is and historic part of memphis it must be three or four years ago wondering whether to write another book and reflecting on some of what i

witnessed at the cia particularly during that excruciating time after 9/11 and realizing some of my colleagues many of whom are friends had written their stories but many of the people that i worked with would never speak, would never write in their stories would never be told as no one talked to them, put their stories together in one simple narrative and explained what happened. so i decided that morning running my five miles in midtown memphis i would do that. this is mostly their story. not a history. it's not every document that ever appeared related to what we call the program detention and interrogation. it's a story of men and women that i served with that decided to speak with me because they trusted me. step back in time with me. we are going into the time machine. you go back to the 1990s a lot of my colleagues talk about the

time and to paraphrase one of them when we thought we had killed the dragon soviet union and only snakes were left. that's a time after the fall of the soviet union the fall of the wall where people thought the intelligence challenges of the future may not reach the magnitude they reach at the time the soviet union but the counterterrorism people knew they had a problem. that problem started mostly when bin laden was in sudan and accelerated when he moved to afghanistan. when i spoke to them and i spoke to 35 or 40 most of whom will never speak and when i spoke them about those times there's a great sense of frustration and in some ways sadness. they witnessed the rise of a global network and that the tools they had were so limited when you look back in retrospect and realize that's only 20 years ago. that's less than a full

generation. the tools the cia had were limited. if you think about loss of budget and personnel, not accusing the national security interest of sure doing anything wrong. all of the stock the same thing, the dragon is gone but if you think about any organization with its a tech urbanization or manufacturing organization if you lose substantial pieces of money and people your ability to operate declines. there was also the attitude about terrorism. in fact again only 20 years. nobody spoke to could have imagined a world where someone said we could co-conduct lightning raids in afghanistan day after day after day. i thought that a raid would happen where there is high-risk of american soldiers lives was almost unthinkable before 9/11. forget about the u.s. invasion just a raid against no credit compound and they knew that we knew were some of the compounds were. much less and arms drone that

could kill a terrorist overseas. in debate for years, never happened. meanwhile there is bit of atrophy cia for example training spies. the number of spies in the training program declined. the attitude about character was mixed. remember after 1947 to the target that the cia typically chased were big targets, the soviets, the chinese, the cuban missile crisis, big targets. i returned from taking a leave of absence of the cia in 1992 and was told to go to the counterterrorism center because it was seen as the place where you sent people who maybe weren't ready for prime-time which of course was the model i fit. that changed over time. like any organization even larger organizations people make it different than the

personalities that i read about in the book that i knew so well were critical in keeping counterterrorism from declining further in the 90s. george tenet as cia director was immersed in counterterrorism and he insisted on budget and insisted on ensuring there was leadership there that was well-regarded across the agency not common in the 1990s including the direct are the center guy named cole for black legendary in my business to raise the probe i'll counterterrorism increasing the quality of people who were going over there increasing their respective counterterrorism in the cia before 9/11 that make no mistake peace dividend for intelligence in the lack of focus on terrorism meant that on that day, on that day the cia in the counterterrorist world with not only not repaired, they could not be prepared. they all talk to me about

feeling before but especially in the searing months and years after 9/11 about feeling like they were on the back foot. on that day and this is not over dramatize. everything changed. years of debate about armed drones done. years of debate about raids in the in the stands, forget about raids the cia will be first in with operatives in money technology guidance within weeks of 9/11. forget about raids by the u.s. army will invade afghanistan. the transition not only in resources but in attitude was foundational. the cia director used to assess i sat in on the nightly threat rethinks for years. we had five or six refers per day was trading back and forthwith another one of my colleagues opening the meeting with the threat matrix of 10, 15

or 20 threads people who would write in threats to web site and foreign security services who would tell us they uncovered a threat. intercepting predications were al qaeda was talking about coming to the united states but i started those briefings and one of the things that was so evident and that was spoken around some of those tables was a simple concept. we anticipated the second wave, what we called the second wave for years. the second wave was what we anticipated would be another 9/11 but perhaps worse because al qaeda had an anthrax program that we did not fully understand. four months come months and longer we did not understand the research and development and we did not understand whether they had taken strains of anthrax out of afghanistan. there was concern the second wave my aircraft and i might be anthrax and added to that was a fundamental problem. we did not understand the adversary. the human source penetration

that is the bread and butter of the human source of an organization, the human source penetration and this is an operative speaking to me. people who ran operations against al qaeda would tell you the human source penetration was. in the midst of america watching the horrific videos of people jumping off a dove wings and watching pages in the newspaper of faces of the fall and we were sitting behind the scenes with the director saying if there is that second wave tomorrow and you say i wish i had done this, that or the other thing. why don't you do it today? in the midst of all those there was a drumbeat in the spring of 2002 and i've witnessed a lot of this firsthand. it was intense and getting louder. that drumbeat was the hunt for the first major cia captains abu

peseta. one of the challenges of qaeda had was they miscalculated the u.s. response to 9/11. they did not anticipate such a huge response. they thought it might e.. they didn't anticipate they would take powers but they thought they response might be more crude missiles in the anticipated the u.s. military when in day working with the taliban would lead the u.s. military just as they bled the soviets. they did not have an exit plan. the military operations and intelligence operations and cooperation with the afghans the u.s. is working on the group called the northern alliance were so successful of qaeda had to flee before they developed a plan and many of them fled east into pakistan where they started making mistakes. mistakes that allowed us and a part of the business and intelligence that we called

targeting that has individual analysts responsible for individual terrorists and you know what the terrorist communications patterns are and you know where his family is and what the courier network is. we had an agile targeting analysts who were watching over abu zubaydah and the sense that the circle around him almost by the day was getting tighter. then in the spring the raid happened. he almost died and suffered wounds from a gun fight that ensued particularly a grievous wound to his leg. aside piece of the story is told in this book to ensure he would not die another bed of the agility after 9/11 that made the u.s. response so powerful. could you imagine calling a medical center before 9/11 and saying we'd like you galonas

some of your physicians to treat the terrorists overseas now? and we are going to put them on the plane. unimaginable before 9/11. that began the search for what it detainee could tell the caa about an organization that cia did not fully understand. forget about the plot. those are important. the counterterrorism business a lot of what i witnessed was not about a plot. aarp does this was a people business. people with these hard at building or harden in aircraft people who are committed to the murder of innocents will simply go on to create another class unless he can take down the architects of an al qaeda or an isis he will face plots forever. ours were the people business. how to find politics and finish a human being typically by staging a raid operation.

abu zubaydah was the first one they went down. the reason he was significant as i mentioned a lack of understanding of al qaeda. counterterrorism is often the people business. obviously the first questions you might have for a terrorist would be can you tell us about plots and can you tell us about the second wave and can you tell us whether their hijackers and that states that the stuff behind the scenes, can you tell us what their position with why? who are the key players? who are the trainers? who are the facilitators? who is creating the false documents? who were the carriers critically important for intelligence. who carries messages between al qaeda met who don't want to -- that basic material is critical and we did not have a good understanding of that in the spring of 2002. abu zubaydah talked but then in

memory of the people i spoke with the shut down. and he told his interviewer's his interrogators go home, have rabies, don't come back because i'm not speaking anymore. so in the intensity of that time when was saying make sure this doesn't happen again when of president of the united states is make sure that doesn't happen again in on the anticipation of the cia will was the second way that might include anthrax cia officers in the cauldron of in the spring and summer of 2002 said well, if abu zubaydah shutting down what our options? >> can options? >> consented to the u.s. justice system where he will lawyer up and never speak again. we can send them to another foreign country that might have charges against him. the prospect is that of the country will interrogate him themselves.

we will not sit in a room and they will shield from us critical intelligence that we need. they also will not have the same priorities that we have. they are going to want to ask questions about their country. we want to ask questions about america. so through a series of conversations among cia leaders there is a fateful decision that is the subject of this book and that is should we developed our own secret facility called "black site" a clandestine facility in friendly countries overseas where we will transfer of qaeda prisoners in this case no qaeda prisoner and interrogate them using the hardest techniques that have been splashed across every page in newspapers in america for decades. there's another piece piece of this process. everybody knew that people would ask questions later on in everybody knew that this was not only sensitive but would be controversial.

that's the secret lack site networks of their conversations between the inspector general at the cia and the lawyers at the department of justice to set and interpret law for america to say what is appropriate in terms of interrogation for a cia black sites that will comply with the u.s. constitution and would comply with federal law. we wanted on paper and we moving until it's on paper. through the summer of 2002 cia lawyers at the department of justice discussed what could he done with abu zubaydah. he was already transferred, stable and transferred to a black site that the formal authorization for the department of justice did not arise. until august of 2002. august of 2002 was when mike colleagues mark the beginning of

the black site program. i abu zubaydah went through tough interrogation techniques. people talk about waterboarding didn't -- waterboarding. there were more than 100 detainees at the black site. three of them were waterboarded. i abu zubaydah was one of them. one of the challenges of talking to a detainee and one of the challenges in discussing this in a public environment where we don't have the luxury of time that we have this auditorium is people will look at me every day and say welcome on, if you put somebody under duress they are going to lie. so let me explain as we went through that process with abu zubaydah y. and i'm not here to defend the program. i'm here because i thought the views of the cia should be explained so americans on either end of the spectrum those who want to attack what was done and those who supported and i hear both when i'm on the streets and understand what happened and why

and will be able to walk in my college shoes and understand what they did regardless of whether i like it or not put on the foundational question of why would you pressure someone to speak with techniques like sleep deprivation because you know they are going to lie and my answer straightforward. first of all people not under duress of lie. that's not the full answer but al qaeda terrorists under duress is going to make up stories all day long. that's not the real point. the real point is an analytic effort i mentioned earlier called targeting. you cannot have a successful client interrogation of the high-end up-ended prisoner bless you know so much about the prisoner not a low-level guy but so much because you've been following for so long that you can come up with in concert with other experts position psychologist interrogators that he can come up with a package of questions over weeks or that detainee starts to realize hey

these guys know a lot more than i know and b they seem to know when i'm lying. when that prisoners under duress , when that prisoner has been in a confined box when the prisoner has been under sleep deprivation and is exhausted and when the prisoner starts to realize he can't lie is way up we start to get answers. not truth, not the truth. we were not stupid. some answers never came particularly for example locational information about osama bin laden but you get what we call compliance. someone will try to give you bits and pieces about mason that they think are less valuable. there's a guy we trained a few years ago who was a german and our camper they think his name is hans. i'm making up the stories that those bits and pieces are invaluable gold for an intel guy.

if the prisoner is compliant and get you what he thinks is throwing information about somebody's who trains at german the frenchman of bread or an american and who trains three years ago game on for people in my world. i'm going to balance that against every bit of data we have had every travel data we can acquire and every other detainee detainee that i not all of a sudden over the course of time those bits of sand will tell us who that person was based on one tiny shred of evidence, shred of information from a compliant detainee who was giving you stuff you thought was irrelevent. the point i'm making is of course people lie. the only way you can get out of the fox is developing an interrogation package that is so complete that the detainee feels he needs a lifeline. that lifeline was the cia. a lot happened after the initial stages of the abu zubaydah

interrogation. when i spoke with lawyers and managers of black site they talk about the maturation of the program. the first months and years first months in user testing them every of an agency that's trained to collect information from spies overseas that are serving in the person conducting interrogations at the cia has never done for the cia values agility but sometimes they step in the progress because they believe nobody will ever do it despite the fact that we don't have experience we will do it. i was part of the ethos that led to the black site interrogation program but because of conversations with lawyers who were meant to listen i know some of these people black site matured. policies and procedures tightened. training change. there were some individuals involved in the program early on who should not have been involved particularly over time people who were recruiting and said i really want to get in this because i want to go after

people who committed the acts of 9/11 those people or weeded out. you would not pass the application process that the program assured unless he could prove you were in there to be the professional. their witnesses outlined in the book and mistakes early in the program but is lawyers training leadership got involved particularly after regis mistakes. other things happened that were surprising. i can tell you sitting at the threat table in 2002, 2003 in 2004 in toys shifted to the fbi in 2005 i thought we were losing that may come as a surprise the u.s. army had it invaded afghanistan. i saw a network that i did not think we were in for for years and the volume of threats and attacks that we could not contain. nonetheless the people i spoke with uniformly said business was

good. they never anticipated the volume of high-end prisoners that happened because of the accelerating rates around the world. for example the architect of 9/11. the architect of the human bombing against the uss cole. time and time again rates happen faster and faster as the intelligence picture clarified. not only did the program in terms of policies and procedures mature the sites matured to the cia needed more sites. they start developing their own custom-built site. the first site was not custom-built producer mode site that the foreign governor offered the agency. the expertise the agency had in training people to talk to prisoners and determining what the -- techniques are most effective in determining how to build the psychological package around each individual terrorists so you could maximize the process and that terrorists

would say wow they know more than i expected. i had read or speak. better and better and better. but there was a flip side. and that was the iraq war, the declining unity in america after the remarkable unity of 9/11 leading up to the iraq war and increasing questions about whether the cia program was sustainable especially and many of my colleagues would view this with some sense of pride especially since a second wave never happened. let me put it this way. the fact that america have the time and space to discuss what should be done in a democratic society resulted partly from the fact that there was not another major attack. many of my colleagues are persuaded that if there had been more catastrophic attacks people would have asked far fewer questions about what techniques america used against terrorists.

let me make it simple. the decline of the program was partly due to the success and keeping america safe. the debate was a good thing. the word that was used by my colleagues was simple. that word was endgame. as early as 2002, 2003 early on the cia was starting to say our job is to extract intelligence from a human being, from a terrorist. we are not jailers. we are not the bureau prisons and once we extract that intelligence we are not going to be holding people for 20 years. we don't even necessarily want to hold them for two years or one year. we want to extract intelligence and move onto people who are professional in incarcerating individuals. nobody wanted to answer that question, nobody. as soon as you answer that question you acknowledge there is a cia black site program and

a you acknowledge publicly what happened in that black site program. weeks about locations at least one location was closed because it was disclosed in the late would also more questions in the american public and among members of congress who had not been reached on the program. very few were briefed. i was among those who brief him. he told them what we are doing. we told them in some detail but very few were briefed. increasing questions within the cia and what the endgame is about to the cia with whatever happened to khalid sheikh hamed? the white house and the memory of my colleagues was not too excited about dealing with this question. i understand once you open the door on black site yet to answer question about how one what you offer is that this led to increasing frustration including

frustration in white house meetings were officials time and time again told me they were saying we cannot be put in the position of being jailers. view the american policymakers asked us to go down this road of detention. you have to to participate in the painful conversation about what happened after. the questions continued and got more intense. directors transition. one director who transitioned going back to 2006 as michael hayden a legendary director among cia officials. the foreign director of the national security agency amanda intelligence and the military highly respected for his discipline. he came into the cia and 2006, four years about the detainee said we have to put this on more solid ground. let me read everything and he was a voracious reader of information about the program so

he could master the detail. let me read everything and figure out the right path is. i talked to my colleagues. his effort led to a few more interrogations but by that point the writing was on the wall. just five years after 9/11, just four years after the 2002 capture of abu zubaydah the program was already declining. the appetite wasn't there. hayden asked questions about what worked and what didn't. waterboarding was dropped as the interrogator said we don't think despite the national conversations we don't think it's the most significant tech week we have and we don't think we have to use it anymore. sleep deprivation for example comes up again and again. people don't like to be tired and they start to lose their will. hayden scaled back the program. there were more and more

conversations with the department of justice but sometimes the programmer shutdown including by director tenet because the department of justice officials were starting to scale back on the original opinions. every time they scaled back cia's leadership or at least it if you want to change the documentation we are not living in tell you change it. we don't do without paper and the paper has to explain how what we are doing is compliant with federal law. the writing was on the wall. george bush made his famous announcement and said we have these prisoners. there were these black sites and we are transitioning them to guantánamo or some of them including khalid sheikh mohammad that was not the final end of the program including under general hayden. there were a couple of more prisoner software is to go to the program but once the president made that announcement

i think in retrospect you could say that was the beginning of the end, the final chapter. some cia officers went to brief president-elect obama but the program was in shortly after the president came to office he said the united states had committed what he called torturing these folks. i think the colleagues i spoke with bristled at that. every president has the right to change policy that we had been told and this is a lesson of covert action from the beginning of time. been told by one administration that this is not only a policy of the land but in compliance with the lava lamp and told them what you did doesn't comply with the lava lamp and doesn't comply with basic values that we all signed up for. that was painful. and the program is done.

i did spend time with everyone of the individuals i spoke with could some of them had unique questions because of their jobs. interrogators, asked about interrogation. senior managers include tight interviewed cia directors most of whom i nail about white house deliberations but i asked, questions which is the final piece of the book. ethics and reform. i think when my colleagues look back they look back in one sense with the knowledge that anybody on september 122001 would have said there will be a second wave. we were prepared to this and if you argue against the second wave if you said there will not be another catastrophic attack in this country people are going to say you are crazy. so in terms of perfecting there was a fair amount of unanimity

in this. many of my colleagues with back and say i was a tiny piece the puzzle that ensured 3000 more people didn't die. they look back on the program itself. i would say not with regret. they feel that was a piece of the puzzle that might have killed -- helped keep americans safe that they do look back i think with knowledge that an america the once said we wanted to ensure there was the second event. very quickly what you did was wrong. that was paint over my colleagues. many of them would look at the program and say that will never happen again in my lifetime, not, not because they regretted or because they are embarrassed about it or because they thought it was an effective but because they know people who have experienced a nova program like

that were ordered by another president years down the road for three years five years 10 years people would say what did you do, why did you do it and now you may be culpable for legal action of the next administration. some of my friends were investigated by the department of justice. in terms of the program itself my friends look back and say we were a piece of a the difficult time in america that will never happen again and maybe we helped ensure another kid gets to grow up with their parent. terms of the ethics the best capture of this was with one of the most awful lot as yours but i don't mean people in the typically because i told them i would not and i don't want them getting an e-mail. one of the most thoughtful op sirs ever worked with gave me a snapshot of ethical thinking that captured a lot of what i

witnessed. there are technical pieces of ethical thinking. what is the law of the u.s. government text of the law allow you to do something quick that the department of justice piece of paper this is where you are doing applies to the constitution. what are the regulations of your agents? is their formal guidance this is what you are doing complies with what the agency is written down as formal policy. then you start getting tough. those are pretty straightforward there is a classic question as he stepped down the list of ethical questions how clearly can you explain this in a public audience? he's to call this the "washington post" test. if you are in front of a journalist who somewhere to the "washington post" test can you capture what you are doing and why in one sentence that your mother would understand and it he can't, be careful.

and the last test that i think my friends have to think about regularly, i still think about it. what would your mother say? i don't care what the law says. i don't care what regulations are not obscure the "washington post" says. what would your mother say? using those litmus test to look back on the program i think most people still look back and say i'm not sure i can give you perfect answer to every question but i am sure of one thing. if you step back in time and drove down the b-w parkway in the spring of 2002 and recollected people jumping off of buildings and you thought that you were a tiny sliver of the response would have prevented that from happening again they still sleep at night.

thanks for listening to my story. [applause] we will take questions. because there is a televised component of this i was told to insist so don't lay me i'll insist that you go to the microphone so this can be captured on audio. >> a good talk. i'd like to ask you when you started about the dragon being slated things that remain part from the respect is as a way of aspect. the what if aspect. the soviets russians whatever departed afghanistan however they have structured their new aspects that could have been interesting and tap done. was that possible from the respective of people that were there that the u.s. could have somehow relied on prior to 9/11?

>> that's a great question. i don't remember anybody ever raising back, ever. the relationship with the russian security service. i don't want to get too much into detail was the i assume and still is obviously with russian recollection, even after 9/11 there was a lot of talk about, and threats etc.. i don't think the russians were a great partner even after 9/11 so the prospect that they would be extremely helpful as a tactical level which is really what the cia needed i don't remember. it's a great question and i will have to secretly asked my friend. i do remember that coming up at all. we started strong. thank you. never thought about that. if everybody else do that, that would be great. please, go ahead. b thank you so much for your fascinating story. somebody had grew up and i was in first grade in 2001 and

something to hear from somebody who was there a fully formed member of the intel community about the tragedy of that day. i'm really curious to know if in your view you think counterterrorism is on its way out? i know these days the discussion is really focusing on great power competition on the domestic what could be called terrorism the proliferation of right-wing extremists in the u.s.. and is this counterterrorism, is counterterrorism on its way out? >> it's a rare moment i will say this, i don't know. let me get an answer and hopefully i can give you a yes or no. i'm not sure for the simple reason that terrorism obviously has declined dramatically. remember was only 2014 when the

isis was in the news every single day. you look for to characteristics of a terrorist organization but i look for leadership. don't just take up the local police station or the military. the americans or the threat. i look for leadership that has time and space to act. we don't see that today the safe haven of leadership is some of leadership is gone from syria and iraq that the speed with which an organization can constitute leadership and safe haven in a place like africa i wouldn't rule out and i'm a pretty optimistic person i wouldn't rule out a group rapidly emerges. i agree with you by the way on the shift in focus to the post-1947 what about iran up what about russia and china in the south china sea tax is not hard to envision a world where the local government doesn't have the capability or the will to take them out.

just two quick things finally i would say on that. among the pack i'm not talking about lozenges talking about analytic capability. it easily transfers to example for white supremacist roots that are not suggesting the cia would do that. i'm talking about the tech geeks of how you chase somebody down. america starts to say we have a different threat the american in tow 20 including the fbi learned a lot about how to look at people and not just big threats. i see it changing but i'm not sure america has the stomach if there is a terrorist from the sahell that shoots up some -- shoots up something in american the america has any stomach but to say we will do this all over again. >> thank you for your talk. one to ask you about the language used around what happened at the black site. my personal view would need

regardless of the ethics of it the dictionary definition of torture and using words like enhanced interrogation is more of a euphemism. i'm wondering what language do you prefer to use and how do you see this debate around the enhanced interrogation versus torture? >> by the way most people don't ask that question politely. i really appreciate it. i'm serious. i get attacked a lot. i never went to a black site and i have never interrogated prisoner but speaking partly as a result of my conversations with colleagues that is a fair question. i can give you a couple of answers. technically speaking we didn't use the word torture. torture is illegal so you are acknowledged but you should be in a federal prison. the technical way people look at it, there are couple of phrases used and legal concepts.

one legal concept is knowingly doing something that could result in long-term physical or psychological damage to human beings so that you can say i'm comfortable with waterboarding. i think it's a human definition of torture. technik we it's not a legal definition. i'm not excusing it. there was another phrase used called shock the conscience. that's a legal phrase meaning if you. up someone for stealing you weren't going to put them in a black site at the pic of someone who's participating in murder of almost 3000 americans that doesn't shot the conscience if you submit them to sleep deprivation. i will close by saying i think the right conversation to have is not what the law is. of course this is some -- from someone who never got close to a law school. it's where you headed and where the congress is headed which is please don't look back. we did this in the congress said look forward is this where we

want america to be? it the answer is no simply create laws to stop it. if you are asking your technical question about how we talked about it a quick snapshot of some the language that was used. thanks for being polite or that's a fair question. >> hi it's been 17 years since the beginning of the black site established. this year they dramatically expanded the identity protections that in a broader way and one of the reasons the cia justified it was to save because of past issues do already ice based on -- . >> he's talking about the black site program. >> and i'm wondering from your experience why that would come up now in 2019. >> i've seen commentary with the congress saying trying to protect the identities of secret

officers more aggressively. i have not looked at the law. i can just tell you from a personal respective, let me put two things together. the anchor in this culture something that i have not seen before. that anger is fueled at both sides of the political debate. the second piece of that is icy elements and that the web site that i receive. the level of anger and violence in the culture today is high. if you just do mathematics 330 million americans if you start exposing x member of cia officers what is your statistical chance that one person was anger isn't going to show up at somebody's door because you can find people's residences by public reference? i don't worry about because i

work in a public world. i think about it a lot. people come up a lot but i can understand from i don't know the law but just looking at the world as i see it in knowing my colleagues in this culture with the number of people who want to send mail that says you should diet cancer that people might say maybe we should do harder work to protect those who took great risks because of the culture today even in contrast to 10 years ago i wouldn't guarantee that someone is not going to knock on the front door. most of it is someone's tiptop at their base. my mail is any indication that bill was worth it because the volume of people who write in the language they use is unprintable every day. every day. people say, my address is public knowledge and i can understand why people would want to be protected. yes, please.

>> image of the first wave of flu waited for the second way that never came being anthrax. are we on wave. or wait for and we skip the wave and these are different modes of terror or is the second wave the one that never came? >> that's a good question. i'm not going to give up soon because i'm tired. we focused on a large grouping threat from al qaeda. nobody talks about homegrown in 2002 when i was doing this threat briefings for director tenet. i'm not sure we use the word so our concept of second wave was another major organization creating another hijacking

catastrophe with 20 people. to answer your question i think what happened what i would characterize as the third wave was the realization that are made i'm going to say in 06, 07 and 08 that there was a diverse disparate movement of like-minded individuals who didn't really understand the ideology but thought their anger was validated. typically young people who were not connected to it but by watching a youtube video. the third wave was people who were left strategically scary. they aren't going to conduct an anthrax attack is harder to track as they are not part of an organization. i thought the homegrown in some ways for the third wave and then you start all over and almost repeating the process of going after an organization and sing it morphed into individual act years. a big organization of the sudden

you see people who want to see video. but we would not have defined the third wave or the second wave in any terms other than this is the next big one from al qaeda. we will do one more and then i will disappear and sign books and go sell more books. >> this may. up on what you were just talking about but i'm interested in what you have learned about the motivation of the people you interrogated and to what degree that might help us in the future anticipates or dispel the forming of more and more groups. >> there are two basic groups of people. the original al qaeda guys were very smart. khalid sheikh mohammad in the

book talks about this but sit in front of a white board and explained the ideology of a qaeda. they are also proud of 9/11. they were not apologetic. again one explanation for why was hard to get them to speak. i didn't do anything wrong. the motivation was interesting from an american perspective which typically is short-sighted and in some ways what's in it for me? their motivation would be they would say it won't come in my generation. it would not come in my children's generation that maybe my grandchildren's generation there'll be an acknowledged that the only way to live is by the rule of the book that nations across the arab world would say saudi arabia and egypt do rule by the rule of the book because the leaders there are corrupt and the only way to take out the government is to get rid of the

americans because the americans are the past -- backstop to these corrupt regimes. their philosophy was if you get out the strike and economic target of political target the congress a strategic strike they said the americans are so soft on the underbelly they will get out to support these regimes and we can move in more aggressively and take out these regimes in places like egypt and saudi arabia over 50 to 75 years. that was their loss of the. when huge caveat and of course they would save violence is justified because the americans are simply preventing the rise of people who live by the book. this changed when the homegrown movement started in earnest whenever it was the late 2000's. my experience and similar with isis is the further you get away from the new with the organization to homegrown as the

seventh 10 year old in colorado at 20 are open georgia the less likely that person is to understand what the ideology is. they are going to come at this with curiosity. they might be angry about something that they witnessed in school. the organization, think of this as the colts culture. the organization elevates their anger. they can give you three minutes on what the organization is all about it in contrast to khalid sheikh mohammed u.s. m3 questions about ideology they can't get you there. they are just ticked off in the groups has come to organization and we will validate your anger and we will give you youtube video that helped you understand why we exist so real differences between qorvis asian second if you chapter and verse on ideology and homegrown swear the ideology is razor thin. the final thing has to do with practitioners is you can't tell khalid sheikh mohammad what he did was wrong. you can't. he will explain to you

otherwise. when you're dealing with law enforcement action order of social services are as they should dealing with the home or on who has been likelihood you can turn that person is much, much higher simply because they don't have the depth of ideological indoctrination for understanding and someone who's an expert might be able to talk to them. after peralta can explain so the approaches to someone who is as a years long terraced and the homegrown kid who went the wrong way when he was 17 in terms of how you do you indoctrinate are significantly different khalid sheikh mohammed will be proud of 9/11 forever i suspect. thank you again. i think i will leave to go and sign a few books. thanks for coming. [applause] >> books are available at the cash register.

it's fascinating the media are constantly savaging the president for the language he uses. well, calling him a not or calling him a fascist while calling him every kind of despicable name you could hurl

at the president of the united states, again this is one of the things and the findings of the book that all modicum of decency has been cast aside but not from donald trump to his opponents are from his opponents to him. they have called him far worse things. they are attempting to do far worse to him than what they are doing to him. it's telling. they have no right, none. you have a right. i have for ray. these books have a right to pass judgment on donald trump's language. the press doesn't.

>> we have a great lack of concern for voice issues and the reason we have lack of concern is to start we in order to be a real man you have to prepare yourself to be disposable. to be a man you had have to prepare yourself to be disposable and war, disposable and the hazardous jobs of the work based were you work 70 hours a week at the executive level position and died from what the japanese call death from overwork. the reason we cared about men that we call them heroes is because they were willing to die for the rest of us. when you train people to die in order to love them you can't be too emotionally attached to their health. so boys have historically developed heroic intelligence

which is training for a short life as opposed to help intelligence which pushes training for a long life or her emotional intelligence which is training to be able to express your feelings, your fears and talk about them in a healthy way to other people without whining about them. this is a great opportunity for voice in the future but boys in the future they don't have their own sense of purpose have a purpose void and when they have a purpose voids combined with a lack of a dr. they have a purpose voids plus a dad void so they don't have the father to guide them to have the discipline to achieve a variety of purposes in their lives and then they become the failure to launch and they become ashamed of themselves and they become angry at people who are not paying attention to them and giving them praise like teachers

or male/female peers or their parents. those boys with that lack of purpose oftentimes get depressed , withdraw into video games, they don't want to be rejected so they go to because pornography is ask us to a of attractive women without fear of rejection at a price they can afford. there had do for me goes up and they get addicted to more and more risky things with women. then they finally meet a woman that is may be interested in being sexual with them the wind feels like she's being treated like an object because she's being treated like an object. she withdraws which only convinces the way that he's a loser increased as the shaman increases his anger in the worst-case scenario that's the background of the mass shooter's or the boys that are saying in a desperate way i will make people

were rats that they didn't worry about me, talk about me and care about me. .. notebook, a terrible thing to waste, environmental racism and assault on the american mind. present research how environmental