husband was at the continental congress, that was amazing. then we went to plymouth and stood there and thought about our four ancestors who came over on the mayflower so my 10-year-old grandchild is very steep now in american history .. >> .. r >> washington five every morning at 7:00 a.m. eastern on c-span .org. we now take you to the arab center for a discussion on iran. the growing tensions between the u.s. and iran. live coverage on c-span2. >> today we are pleased that

c-span is covering this event. i would like that's the reason i'm starting on time because we have a few more people coming in and a difficult afternoon at the present building and we will welcome them when they get here but i would like to ask for your cooperation in terms of turning your phones off to make sure that the ringing does not get broadcast to the whole c-span audience worldwide and to avoid as much as possible walking walking in front of the cameras. it does not look good for people in the middle of that conversation going back and forth. also, i'd like to announce that for those of you who are new at the arab center usually our

question and answers are done in writing so anytime you have a question feel free to write down your name and identify yourself and write your questions when you are ready, raise your hand that would collect them and pass them on to the chair of the panel and then your question will be read and addressed, if you wanted addressed to a specific family, please indicate that. let me say a couple of words quickly about the chairman of the panel and then the subject matter a little bit and turn it over to them. i am very pleased and honored that my colleague and good friend for many years -- neither one of us want to say how long but has agreed to chair this

panel particularly with the facs at the arab center and a professor at georgetown and a long time resident and active scholar in washington, dealing with these issues, at least in general but particularly on this issue with u.s. policy toward iran. i would like, for those of you interested, to recommend to you couple most recent work for us. if you like to go on our website arab .-middle-dot dc .org his most recent papers on tunisia and north africa adjusting to the departure of [inaudible] and trying to cope with the transition there and also another one on the issue that the subject of today, a paper written a couple weeks before that on the subject of dealing

with iran. let me just say aside from being a nonresident fellow at arab center, daniel bloomberg is the director of democracy and government studies at georgetown university. he's also a senior nonresident fellow at the project of middle east democracy here in washington and did serve as an advisor and consultant, special advisor [inaudible] between 2008-2015 and has worked in various advisory capacity to the u.s. government, including the state department, the asian agency for international development focusing particularly on his specialty, as i said, human rights security sector governance issues.

in terms of the subject matter i find from the questions that are raised on imitation and announcement and dan will be talking more about that in a moment but it's been interesting for those of us following the dance that is taking place between washington and to run back and forth, it's a dizzying tennis match diplomatic with tit-for-tat aspects to it which makes it sometimes very difficult to follow and is somewhat chaotic. clearly the parties have not connected yet in terms of taking the positive reaction many of us would like to diffuse the situation and prevent or from devastating the region whether by intention or mistake but definitely the resolution in

washington specifically and also on the iranian side makes you wonder as if my friend, this morning and an article and an op-ed piece in which he said [inaudible] it's kind of funny because my colleague at the center i welcome you to look it up on a website called the arabian gulf must not sleepwalk toward war and sadly enough, it looks like the region is sleepwalking in that direction. the panel today will be focusing on those two assessments, is it triggering reconciliation or sleepwalking in the wrong

direction. with that said, i like to pass the microphone on to daniel bloomberg to proceed. >> thank you. that was very gracious and generous introduction to the chair and i appreciate it. it's been true that we been friends since graduate school and i will not mention the year. i'm delighted to be here and i have been looking forward to my co- panelists and i have to say that i remain as mystified as the direction of u.s. foreign policy is so many of us and i'm hoping, however, in addition to getting our insights we can find some arenas where we might differ because the tendency and understandably converge rather than diverge but we will see how that goes. as cleo said we will be taking questions to bring them up here throughout the question and abusing my role as chair and from there we will look at the

cars of your questions and have a very good discussion. our panelists will roughly talk ten minutes. my job, along with my colleagues, is to enforce those rules, ten-12 minute vigorously so we can finish on time and have the discussion. that further ado i will briefly introduce the panelists in the order they will speaking which is the order printed on your handout. university associate, georgetown university good place to be, congressional research service writing on issues for the golf for many years and you followed his work i'm sure. [inaudible] who i just met today from the research fellow and she is based in california, happy to have you with us today. last but not least, my colleague

barbara who's director and nonresident senior fellow of the future of iran's initiative counsel. without further ado, we will begin. >> thank you very much. it seems to me that the order of speakers is that age goes before wisdom. [laughter] since i am the oldest on the panel but that also means i have been doing this whole iran business unfortunately for 40 years, 40 arduous years. [inaudible] i just wanted to flag in terms of giving it credentials from my talk in my latest book called arab iranian relations with accommodations and relationships. it's available on amazon

everywhere. having said that let me just start. a few points and hopefully we can have a discussion later on. before doing so i want to say i got a set of different instructions. one from the organizer of the panel and the other one was from a respected chairman so what i have to do that is try to combine those things and hopefully come up with, as i say, something that is not entirely incoherent and has useful points. one of my earliest instructions was that how serious is the risk of war in the persian gulf and

certainly what is iran trying to do and the other side of the conflict, what is the united states doing? i say something with white certainty that iran does not want war. that is for certain. whether or not the strategy that it is pursuing including the so-called tit-for-tat escalation that was mentioned is not a method and it could happen. wars generally happen because of it [inaudible] we have to remember history and certainly the first world war happens like that. germany did not have a plan to conquer europe so the accumulation went off of hand but iran does not want war.

let me be clear. increasingly the center of decision-making is iran and i are dc. the i rgc now has become master of iran and the sanctions that have been going on particularly since the so-called crippling sanctions hillary clinton put it has actually increased the power and the role of i rgc in the economy and the economic problems leads to potential for social tensions and the regime will have to resort to some sort of coercion and i think this is where the i rgc [inaudible] if something comes up and i think

we can credit that. president roh honey, i feel sorry for him but increasingly he has become not even a respected bad carrier and i was much [inaudible] i think that is something we have to keep in iran does not want more. on the other hand they also said we don't want talks. now, once in a while i don't want to get into that other will we talk about that but if the time comes from afraid my take on what is happening and is that he also has said we don't want talks and basically of course foreign minister sometimes have come on and said if the american return to the jcp oa we will

talk but that is obviously, i don't think the trump administration will return to jcp oa in order to have talks with iran, unfortunately. i think it would be wise but i don't think so. maybe some in between measures that can be agreed upon that i don't know. i don't think that will to very much happen. the other thing that i think increasingly happening is that this is something we have to keep in mind. the issues and problems in the persian gulf are becoming almost, you know, much more internationalized than they have been before. this is in part because the trump administration together with policy of more aggressive policy toward iran has also picked fights with both china and russia and these are -- one

thing to me personally i'm of the generation of iranians that come from a region that has been very much pressured by russia historically for at least 300 years is that, to me, is alarming is the growing closeness of iran and russia with rumors being believed iran might light them [inaudible] if that happens, the great dream would have become a killer. as happened with the searing conflict the thing that is becoming is no longer iran against the ute national states but it's nationalized. iran and russia are going to have maneuvers toward the end of this year. we shall see what happens but what i'm trying to say is the more we delay some type of compromise with iran the more it

becomes international and we will get them most troops wanting to get [inaudible] that might be difficult. the other question i was asked to address was that what would be how demonstrating [inaudible] in the region? it's quite obvious as everyone has said they cannot win any conventional war with bombings and so forth so but when you are fighting for your life or you thank you will be destroyed or obliterated that is the word president trump used then you will do whatever you can to extend the damage and so i use that. iran's biggest deterrent, which of course, is a double edge sword including the strait of hormuz it's the [inaudible]

option. in others, if i go down to bring them down with me. if indeed there is the worry then iranians will use whatever means they have to create as much chaos as possible but most importantly even if iran does not do anything the very fact of the shock of the war to global economy is obviously will be an affect everyone globally but certainly countries that are in the region will suffer loss more. all the iran strategy in the persian gulf down in the so-called -- taking ships and so on is to show basically and this is, i think, is right and not look, if you want to use the strait of hormuz we have to use

it too. part of using that is that we have to be able to have a living and the sanctions are limiting [inaudible] i'd like to make it interesting analysis about the [inaudible] i never had hope for this but it shows how this one cannot work. let's not be complacent about the potential damage that the war could do in the surrounding areas and i think that may not be limited to the persian gulf and that definitely would have impact in iraq and so on. thank you. i think that yes, i think it will be quite damaging and the u.s. economy and global economy.

the other thing i like to add is that i think i covered the view from iran and then i will talk about the talks. let me first say that talks are not panacea. one of the things i have been surprised in recent times is that there is this dichotomy created between war and diplomacy. i think the two are absolutely separate. war is a type of diplomacy or at least -- war is diplomacy by other means. it means diplomacy is a contest of power and one can get what one wants. the question becomes under what conditions and he talks between iran and the u.s. can be -- how shall i say? productive.

here comes the issue of what the united states wants and what iran is willing to get. then you talk about iran's nefarious -- another thing i like is why don't we call the way it is. what are we complaining that iran is doing, that there nefarious actors -- the most important problem i think is iran's attitude to the arab israeli conflict. its actions live on. whether it's hezbollah or support for hamas or whether it is, to me, anywhere unacceptable and those mostly talk about israel does not have right to exist politically, not in the middle east. these are the main issues and i think there's big attentions in the persian gulf. [inaudible] there has always

been a connection between the persian gulf and anyway, don't want to go too much into that and this is the problem of age. too many historical memory. as long as iran is not willing to change policy in that and i don't think they are, as of yet, willing to do that it will be difficult to talk. the iranian regime does not show sign that they are willing to do that. they are willing to come to agreement with the arab states, all arab states from egypt and even saudi arabia. recently they had talks and even [inaudible] is changing. that can be done. but that means linking the persian gulf politics -- but this has been both the policy starting with george w. bush that has created much greater

linkage and that frightening arabs of iran might make them more accommodating to israel and so on. i think iran is lost and they don't know what they are doing. the cause of the problem -- i ran unfortunately -- in an article recently i argued that the iranian regime from the public's basis for political legitimacy [inaudible] i said they have to change the revolutionary framework into the framework that is basically nationally concept and i don't nationalist but it means iran's interest, i ran safety and iran's prosperity should be the priority and not the spread of liberation of palestine or whatever they are doing what the problem is if change happens that would mean doing away with

i rgc and the whole lot of those clear goals that have been basically leading iran pleading i ran dry. i will end it before might two minutes is up. this is a quote from the former commander of i rgc, general [inaudible]. he said if we talk to america, nothing will remain of the revolution. the problem becomes here that we have to find a way of trying to [inaudible] persian gulf politics. and eventually things will work out but as long as we keep this tension in the other point and i will finish that the whole question of for the u.s. -- the

problem has become one of the private forgive me if i use this metaphor but iran is the [inaudible] so far they have escaped punishment. iraq is gone, syria, more or less destroyed, but iran has yet so the elements in the united states want iran to cry uncle. of course they would prefer if they did that through talking and that is why you have 12 points and this i have to say here that has been the constant policy of the united states at least since 1988 and i would go even to 87 but this is not merely a trump problem. if we think it in terms of trump then it will be -- unfortunately, iranians thinking in terms of trump and i keep telling they should not expect anybody else to do much better

until or unless they change some of the basic issues. you cannot challenge the country and its interests -- you cannot say you will drive the united states of the middle east and hope they give you the means to do that. but i think this is what you are seeing is a gradual combination of the crisis that has been going on for years. i will stop here and hopefully later i might add a couple more things. thank you. >> thank you very much, professor hunter. i thank you put one of your fingers on the key issues here. the hardliners. any relationship with the united states is existentially threatening and for them that would be the end of the revolution. how can you compartmentalize this obama solution that was focused on nuclear issues to try to break them apart and now that particular policy has been jettisoned. one question where do we go from here and can we engage that

issue but i don't you have prepared some remarks so go right ahead. >> thank you. sometimes i am in a crs capacity and not sometimes in a crs capacity. today i am not in a crs capacity. i will be speaking in english. [laughter] >> i liked that. [laughter] >> i think professor hunter was correct that iran does not want more war but however in my estimation and my analysis iran is probably in the starkest position i have seen it in many years. they have basically rescued a thought from the brink of extinction, hezbollah is stronger than it has ever been, iraqi shia melissa's is the preponderant power in iraq and the uae has now left yemen leading the saudi campaign against the iran backed houthi's

taking by a thread. i ran his back to houthi's and that's very clear and so iran does not want more. i totally agree. however, iran, as we said, is being strangled by sanctions and its oil exports are approximately 10% of the a fine of 2.5 million barrels a day and it is shut out of the international banking system. it is -- it's estimated that its gdp will think about six, 7% this year which if the u.s. shrank about six, 7% that would be a severe recession, not a mild recession but a severe recession. and so, iran is feeling, in my estimation, extremely confident that it can make a tremendous amount of trouble for the united states if there is a conflict. iran will go to the mat to try to achieve the lifting of

sanctions. a succession of mediators appear to have taken the chance at the plate and struck out and there is not tremendous amount of active mediation that is appearing to bear fruit and i want to talk a little about the fact that this puts a big burden, i would say, on the european countries. they continue to support the jcpoa, nuclear agreement, and feel it was a victory for european diplomacy and saw no real credible rationale for the u.s. to leave the accord and they are trying mightily to preserve it and may succeed, they may not. i want to talk about what they're trying to do and what others are trying to do to keep this agreement in place. perhaps, salvage the situation and maybe pull us back from the

brink of conflict which is the point of our meeting today, to talk about are we at the brink of conflict and maybe how it could be avoided. professor hunter mentioned [inaudible] the instrument for supportive trading exchanges. it is a european union vehicle, a barter exchange. basically, the europeans have started it and it is processing transactions but it is not a completed eight transaction but so far it's limited to humanitarian affairs issues, goods which are not sanctionable under u.s. sanctions law. it is a vehicle whereby basically european exporters to iran will be paid by european importers and iranian exporters will be paid by iranian and the money stays on each side of the divide, basically.

so, the money does not go from iran to europe or europe to iran but it stays on each side of the divide and therefore presumably it avoids dollar transactions and avoids sanction ability and that is the thesis and it has had difficulty and it will have difficulty. the europeans are considering a number of ways to try to make it more effective and maybe make it viable and they are considering expanding it to oil transactio transactions, very difficult because under u.s. law indirect transactions -- if someone buys iranian oil that they sanction transaction whether it went through [inaudible] or not but whoever took the delivery of iranian oil could be subject to un things. oil may be difficult but it's under discussion and the other near-term option being explored is that the europeans appear to be exploring a plan where they

will basically pump capital into the transaction and make advance payments to european exporters so they are not waiting for an iran importer to pay. it's -- i'm trying to make sense of it myself but it looks like with the europeans are trying to pump capital into the mechanism to accelerate it. the other issue that is under discussion is for others outside europe to join this vehicle but china is talking about joining the vehicle and obviously, china is flush with cash. other ideas, china still does by iranian oil. yes, they buy less than they were but however if you watch cnbc you know the u.s. and china are in a very, very significant trade conflict now. is it beyond thought that china

as a way of messaging the trump administration might try to buy more iranian oil? that is certainly on the table, i would say. china has basically said they are going to continue to buy iranian oil there was a chinese company sanctioned last week, [inaudible], i'll have to look up the name because it's something like this but they were sanctioned a few years ago for selling gasoline and it's a minor chinese company but now it is sanctioned last week for transactions with iran. then let me just briefly discuss another idea that is out there. even though i do not recommend options and that is not what i am doing. i can talk about options and debate them but i cannot

recommend anything but another idea that is out there is so after the trump administration left the jcpoa last year, the europeans, eu announced $20 million development grant to iran. $20 million is a small amount. iran is out maybe 40, $50 billion a year because of the oil. to make a run hole for the jcpoa they would need to be staked to about 40-$50 billion, is my estimation. cannot europeans simply pump that much cash into the iranian economy? tough. probably not. could china pump half of that? probably yes. is injecting capital into the iranian capital through cash grants, loans, is that sanctionable? i don't see that it is. there is a sanction for countries that aid countries on

the terrorism list which iran is on the terrorism list and they would be eight u.s. section which would be to cut aid to that country. china does not get u.s. aid. you europeans do not get usaid so i do not see a way that pumping capital into the iranian capital would be sanction will. i'm not an attorney and this is my first assessment so these are ideas that are out there. the europeans did pump capital into the turkish economy for the refugee issue and again, i'm not speaking on turkey. so, i think my point is, there are ideas out there. am i saying jcpoa can be salvaged? i'm not assessing that and that's not my place case right now. are there ideas that are being explored? yes. could these ideas potentially salvage the situation?

possibly. i think i will end there. thank you. >> thank you very much. well, that's sobering because i think one recognizes that arounds regime depends on the sale of oil. because you can't sell oil you have a gun but your head essentially. if none of these arrangements work out, particularly in terms of oil fields, iran has few options, walking away from the agreement is one option out on the table now and escalating the gulf, as a response predictable to this situation. i think that's very important. >> i'd like to thank the arab center for giving me the opportunity to platform to share with such respect people in the field. i will take a slightly different approach to what were talking about and talk about the framing of the issue. the reason i take that approach is i think one of the things that form the weight we have a discussion and i believe a

discussion like this is important to have because hopefully what we are trying to gain at the end of the discussion is a revolution or this is just an exercise in us talking. what were trying to gain in the resolution have a full understanding of where the trouble comes from and stems from and how we talk about it is quite important. the framing we have seen in washington and will be seen in the media very often when it comes to iran specifically in the broader middle east as we talk about -- we have a baseline assumption that iran is a bad actor in the u.s. is a good actor. we talk about it in this useless dichotomy we don't have get any nuance into something why is the iran behaving the way it is. to say you're only behaving this way because there are bad actor we have no way of getting a resolution because we assume their irrational actors but if you look at what happened over the last year what you'll see is a very rational approach from the iranian site. there's also a bizarre paradox

and talking about iran. on one hand we have the argument that so powerful that it's and is in every pot in the middle east and controlling everything and yet, it's so weak that we can with one or two strikes, take them out. that paradox is again, problematic in finding a resolution. interesting thing but the paradox is it's steeped in history of orientalism. this is the exact type of oriental discourse that as long been used talking about the orient and seen as .-dot file -- .-dot file, even feminism and hyper- masculine, aggressive and dangerous. this is not something that is new to the discourse but something we've repeatedly seen in the same reason why the impeded our ability to have conversation as we talked about people with equal partners in trying to gain resolution is problematic in this framing as well.

so, i talked about why i think the framing is aborted because we try to gain resolution and today what i want to talk about is today we have two threats that are global and can you threaten -- one is climate change and one is the nuclear weapon. the jcpoa addressed not climate change but just idiot the both of these things require global cooperation with tcp away as a model for global cooperation with on top of that it's a model for nonpolar revelation. should have been something that rather than abandoning it should've been something used as a model to how dean requires the entire middle east and to make sure this is something a model used globally and to tackle the problems we will face in the next ten, 20, 50 years. we are seeing data coming out of the united nations the talks

about food scarcity, water scarcity and ease of the problems we should be focused on rather than having what is, in my opinion, a sideshow about a run. and how iran is simultaneously next existential threat and no threat at all because we could take them out easily. the crisis we are currently in his first based on that framing and that is why the trump administration have an incoherent policy. they don't have a coherent framing. the other reason is because the policy advisers are not aligned with his vision. we talked about now iran does not want a work and i agree. absolutely. they do not want a war with the violations we have seen small breaches that are calculated that iran has gone through in the last few months are easily reversible and if iran wanted to abandon the deal for good of followed suit with the u.s. over one year ago but they did not because they want to stay in the deal. they do not want the war. i believe president trump has made it clear he does not want a war. unfortunately, his advisers arguably do.

incoherent policy is coming out out of the fact that they have a vision that is not aligned. if we talk about -- will get into this more when we have question and answers but i think there is some concern that iran has said they don't want talks and i think professor hunter brought up in irg official but that if we talk to the rest nothing will remain of the revolution. while that mentality is certainly potent within the hardliners in iran, of course they did negotiate with the u.s. and to talk to the u.s. and we did have an agreement with so it's not that it's an impossibility to return to that status quo but that we, as the united states, are not acting in a way that would make it possible. we go back to the original point i made and look at the rainy inside as a rational actor we see one year of doing absolutely nothing but complying with the deal because they want to stay within the deal. this is what we call strategic patience. when iranians and we want to

talk about the view from tehran, i spent personally in iran doing field research during my phd program. from my understanding, at least for someone who's done field research in iran, the iranians are suffering currently under sanctions and while they absolutely have rightful defense and disdain even for the government they have what the united states approach is doing is actually helping them to unify five something they don't necessarily even like. that's the thing that is so frustrating. as someone who is an iranian-american and part of the dais for a to see it occur. you see people who are outspokenly against the government but now seen that they are protecting us so we see thing like drone strikes, tanker seizures and if the assumption

is that iranian is the aggressor the nasa problem and not understanding why the behaving the way they are. in fact, our drones are close to iran and our bases are close to a run but none of this is the place any more closely to the united states so from their point of view this is something i heard from a friend in iran after the drone strike. they were happy to know they could defend their borders. a war in iran is that something that they far-fetched memory. war on their soil occurred in the 1980s and a generation was defined by that war. they still remember it and don't understand it. the fear of not been able to defend their border was a potent fear and so now what they are seeing is their government having stepped up and defending their borders and it's not something seen as negative or we would never want to feel that our borders are not being protected by our government. what i am hoping is the rest of the conversation we can have with more details of how we can move forward but i do believe

the point of origin has to be the united states because the point of origin to put us on this path was a decision by this administration to abrogate the deal. if we go back to talk to iran and negotiate for more deals that we have to go back to the origin, reconcile that and on the iranian side they have to come back to full compliance if they u.s. and their maximum pressure campaign and then you can have a discussion more for more. >> think of it that was tremendous. to me that whatever the long-term framing of a run in the u.s. bad actor, good actor the dc framing these days is that trump administration has provoked this problem and in that sense, it's not a positive after. this seems to be the widespread point of view and maybe fox news does not share that point of view but the narrative suggests that the ending over the decision by the u.s. to exit the

iran nuclear deal was precipitated factor of getting us to where we are now today. barbara. >> i'm not sure there's much less for me to talk about but let me try anything the arab center and my co- panelist. i agree with a lot of what they have said. i wrote a piece the other week for the axial's website that said basically what it comes to iran the means has become the end. i think that is what we have seen from the trump administration. there is disagreement within the administration about a run policy and although not as much as there was at the beginning of the trump administration when you had people like jim mattis and rex taylor said and hr mcmaster actively urging the president to stay in the nuclear deal. the president fired those advisers got new advisers who are more hawkish on iran and

there are disagreements for whether military action can be taken john bolton in particular is quite hawkish and secretary of state mike pompeo more hawkish apparently than the president. the one thing they agree on is sanctions, more and more sanctions and it's not just if you followed venezuela, they are now under an embargo as well. it represents a sense of frustration on the part of the administration that the policy is not working. iran has not returned to the table and there are no negotiations on a new and better deal and if you remember the 12 demands that secretary of state mike pompeo put forward little more than one year ago around policies and activities are arguably much worse than they were then when the united states was in the deal.

there were not tankers being sabotaged in the persian gulf or takers being seized, drones being shot down, yes, i ran was active in the region but i would argue that is more to do with u.s. mistakes like invading iraq in opening iraq to a running influence that it did to some sort of diabolical iranian hegemonic impulse. all of iran's nefarious, malign behavior has gotten worse since the united states left the deal. it makes perfect sense because iran is circling it will not sit there and have its economy completely choked off and have the international community pay no price. what is surprising is iran was patient for a year until the united states decided it would issue no more waivers for

iranian oil exports and it would try to reduce around oil exports to zero. all of this is quite predictable. sanctions, sanctions and more sanctions. last week was simply the height of [inaudible]. the united states which claims that it wants new negotiations with iran sanctioned the one individual who would lead such negotiations, the foreign minister. not only did they sanction him but on their website they put out in item that had an extremely ugly picture of the prime minister in a fight with hardliners, at the time but it faces screwed up and he looks very very angry and menacing. the text in farsi calls him a rude word in person and essentially called him a pimp for the iranian government. i ask you, if you want to have negotiations with an adversary, is this the way you go about it?

is this designed to encourage negotiations? one of the big questions we have is whether whether president roh honey will come in september and will the united states provide the visas and will it give permission and time so they can make their preparations and will impose such humiliating conditions that iran will boycott the un general assembly in september and it's entirely possible. in which case any chance for diplomacy and de-escalation goes out the window. so, i think u.s. policy, like many other policies under taken by this administration is maximum noise and maximum pressure and minimum results. things get worse and don't get better we don't find solutions. as someone who's been following

iran for 40 years although perhaps less intimately than professor hunter this is very frustrating because we were in a better place and as has been pointed out that only to have negotiations with iran during the time that led to the jcpoa but talks with iran under almost every administration and sometimes they been covert and sometimes they have been overt but there have been talks and efforts to de-escalation. what we have now is the situation where there are no talks and there are no channels and we are putting sanctions on the foreign minister of the country. last point and this is a quotation from lewis carroll that i first heard apply to ir iran, former u.s. hostage in iran and also former deputy assistant secretary of state and one of my favorite people and it goes like this.

when you don't know where you are going any road will take you there. [laughter] >> thank you. i will lead off with a question but i will invite anyone who wants to ask a question, write it down and my colleagues will be collecting them and bringing them up here but one of the things that barbara said about sanctions is sanctions have two purposes. one is to force or encourage your adversary to come to the negotiating table and the other is to destroy your adversary with the purpose of sanctions is to engage in a strategy of regime change and of course, iran has no incentive to come to the table and we are setting up your scratching our heads wondering what is the policy coming from the administration in that regard and here is my question on that particular score and that is where is trump in all of this -- it sounds like an odd question but it is and

interesting situation where apparently your ten, 15 minutes from an attack and we learn our president decided it's not a good idea but my sense is this inclination is not to make war and he probably would rather negotiate if he could but just does not know how to get there and particularly since he started by people who don't necessarily agree with him and my question for anyone in the panel who wishes to address this is what we make of this -- i'm not even sure how to characterize it but the strange by a vacation in the white house and is it possible for this demonstration to ashley negotiate and is it possible for trump to find his way towards offering negotiations and not take steps as was just described that completely upend any idea that we could possibly have.

barbara, anybody else, i'm trying to look into the soul of this administration and understand what the prospects are here which is after all what were talking about. >> i will start in opposite order down the line but one thing we have to stress is how much this is a domestic, political issue for trump. he left the iran nuclear deal because his supporters supported that and they wanted more pressure on iran and more sanctions on iran. saudi arabia wanted it emirates wanted it, israelis wanted it in the big donors to trump campaign wanted more pressure on iran. it's domestic politics for him and i don't think -- i can't see him coming back into that jcpoa and can't see him making concessions toward iran that would make it easier for iran to agree to new talks and you have to put something face-saving down on the table for iran to return to the talks and not simply try to wait until 2020 elections because we should

point out that all the democratic candidates with the exception of cory booker has that pretty much they would return to that jcpoa if there is a chase you pay to return to which gives iran an incentive to hunker down and somehow state within some aspects of the deal until 2020. it is hard to imagine the sanctions in our colleague robin wright wrote in the new yorker that rand paul, another one of the emissaries to the iranians met with him when he was in new york and invited him to the white house and when he said he would have to check with his government before he could come in pretty much turned down the request he was sanctioned and according to him he was threatened with sections if he did not come to the oval office. these are mafia tactics. these are not the tactics of a

great superpower. again what is in it for iran? trump will make no concessions and they won't even restore any of the oil waivers to iran why should they return [inaudible] there is no rational i can see. >> just a couple of footnotes to this. i may be a little bit off and i would not use the word dissent because -- but i do believe that iran, u.s. problems would be on trump. trump is the combination of the process that started and frankly on this i have to say depending on who started what depends on when in history you want to start. there are a lot of things that depends on the date you choose. the first is from iran that was

the first crisis and then there was [inaudible] of course, the sanctions started first with the early sanctions because of hostages but after that [inaudible] in my humble opinion the united states lost the best opportunity to have a copy of the talk with iran and that the best time was in 1988 and i know this for a fact i don't want to go into that iran was traumatized in the iraqi troops were still in iranian territory and they had indicated to the united states that the iraq he troops were willing to have all kinds of things. the other thing during the first bush administration was very powerful and now there is no way

to [inaudible] i rgc did not have that kind of power but the last time was poor timing. barbara herself has written about this and i like the book immensely and then in 2003 the u.s. policy consistently has been regime change without war, except for the brief time and the euphoria of the iraq he wore but i remember i read an article were set a real man goes to tehran and that we should have first gone to tehran and not felt odd. then things changed but iran was on the hit list. trump is a combination of all the stuff. let's just say on the other side what is happening with

[inaudible] and all of that and this will be my last contribution but the problem i have personally, as someone who puts iran ahead of islam or any other religion or whatever, the survival of iran and prosperity is the most aborted. [inaudible] himself said [inaudible] you look at iran as a staging post for going after this and that's why i'm worried about the i rgc. the people who considered war whether by accident or design remember that minority of them may want apocalyptic war. increasingly with all the pressure one thing that is troubling to me increasing people are talking about getting ready for the coming of the messiah. you have to understand -- of

course, it's [inaudible]'s personality in the same way with trump he's very stubborn and he is very proud and i don't think that he cares. we've missed opportunities with president rouhani and even with [inaudible] so we have to do that. it requires for the united states and the middle east really wants to and the other thing the united states -- it started with clinton but clinton started it without the use of military forces and will escalate transformative policy for the middle east. you can't transform a region completely. it's not the mechanical thing or a puzzle that you move. it has therefore [inaudible] to

get back it seems to me one way of doing things is also to look at iran as part of the middle east puzzle and i think my one recommendation will be to try to reach agreement even without opening talks on specific issues with iran. for example, about the shipping in the persian gulf or about -- the one step will be to allow the process of reconciliation between iran and the gulf arabs to go forward. for that i think iran is ready and that we have no problem and then they can build upon and hopefully -- see we have always put preconditions. rather than looking at it as a process and end of which will be

iran is stopping his nefarious activities and all the others but if you go and look at the clinton administration and you have to accept these things and we can talk but that's not negotiation. that's demanding surrender and i think that is very difficult with any kind of party. ...

fire the people who are putting him on that path and bring it, which is why he argued that we should remain in jcpra. i really think that that's sort of maybe simplified way of looking at it but being advised by people who actually have the same vision as you would be the path that one should take if he wants to fit into it. it really does question his authority on this issue when he claims one thing and he says i don't want war, i want iran not to have nuclear agreements and we had an agreement that prevented exactly that and pulled out of the agreement. so to get cohesion, he needs to have same people with same vision as he. >> you know, i think the administration from what they

say seems to believe that the maximum pressure is weakening iran to the point where its regional activities are diminishing or will diminish and i don't see of that weakening or that iran has shifted any of its activities in the region and i don't see any evidence that the iran's economy is about to collapse, so whether iran will capitulate because of downtown, iraqis basically shut down iran's oil exports during the iran-iraq war. we talk about getting iran to zero, the iraqis had it at zero and did not collapse. it rationed, rationed goods but did not collapse. i think we have to as analysts look at whether the thesis that you can weaken iran to the point

where it surrenders is valid and i would say i don't see evidence for that right now. >> i think it's important also to note that the iranians sees that president trump not only does he not want another war in the middle east but wants to withdraw all u.s. forces from the middle east, you remember it was only last december he said he was leaving syria and backtracked on that envoy tried to get an agreement with taliban so u.s. can drastically withdraw tools from afghanistan. yes, there's maximum economic pressure but u.s. not eager to put boots on the ground which is reason for iranians to continue to test the united states with provocative actions in the persian gulf to pressure europe, the chinese and russians and others and to essentially wait

out trump. >> thank you very much, i have to say that the article was highly recommended reading -- >> iran source, atlantic council website. >> reminds us of a strange idea if a country is having economic struggles it has to defend national interest which is very bizarre assumption. here is an interesting question that i will read for you president macron proposed an initiative in iran and acting as mediator for u.s. and iran and a number of countries proposed playing the role, trump tweeted today that tehran is giving mixed signals including for macron, insisted that nobody can represent the u.s., does this mean that mediation is doom, what do you make of this statement, this is for ken and barbara. >> is this something that's tweeted today? he stopped beating up on beto o'rourke.

[laughter] >> and, yeah. trump wants a photo-op meeting with iranian, you know, this is a real clear goal, he wants to play, replay the tape with north korea, not like that's gone so well, maximum pressure, fire and fury and that's what he wants with iran, but the situations are so different, i mean, first of all, north korea is really a one-man dictatorship, iran is not, iran has politics, it has firm policy making through consensus and, you know, what's the percent drainage iran, iran is already a major power in that part of the world, doesn't neat legitimization from donald trump in the same way that, you know, a 33-year-old north korean, you know, grandson of the founder of the regime needed legitimization

but donald trump. it's simply not there. also the region, the region in northeast asia wants peace and wants north korea to be brought out, reintegrated into the region and at least until recently the feelings in the middle east were very, very different. i think if there's a hopeful, i agree that the united arab emirates, if the region understands that donald trump is not going to save them, it's not going to get rid of the hated regime in tehran, they are stuck with this regime for a long time, maybe they can sit down and start to figure out some of their problems together, you know, trump has shown that he simply cannot be counted onto -- to solve the problem of iran for the region. >> thank you, and i would add to that when you're playing the game of chicken and you're hoping that threats of u.s.

action will bring you onto compliance and doesn't do this, you're left to having to rethink your whole approach and probably what they're doing in dubai right now. reconsidering that that's going to work out, otherwise doesn't seem that the u.s. is going to necessarily go to war or that iran will certainly take the bait. here is an interesting specific question for which i have no clear guidance for, anybody who knows about this can jump, all-american aircraft and american aircraft carrier battle group has been trading water in arabian sea outside of strait of horm r -- hormuz, it's a question of what is the u.s. strategy in the gulf, we haven't talked about what's going on there and that's a mirky subject, so anybody else that wants to jump in.

>> doesn't have to be in the gulf to be affective. the issue that i look at deployments that have been announced since may and several batches including deployments of some advanced combat aircraft, additional air defense weaponry, u.s. forces are back at air base where they haven't been since 2003. the question is are these deployments deterring iran and i would have to say not yet because iran is still attacking tankers and seasoned tankers, so this is where this goes back to what i started with what i gave that iran feels very confident because they can make so much trouble for the united states at this point that, you know, they are emboldened to push the envelope to get what they want and, you know, obviously what i say to people, you know, anybody that thinks that a u.s.-iran war is going to stay limited to the

strait of hormuz is not looking at what i've been -- what i'm looking at or anybody in this panel has been looking at so i think we have to get away from this notion that any conflict with iran is going to stay limited to some sort of a classic clash in the strait of hormuz. >> thank you, thank you very much. i'm going to take the opportunity to throw an iran-related questions that echos some of the questions here and that is in terms of row -- rouhani, the whole career, his whole career on this deal, some of us were there in 2013 at the meeting in new york city and bouncing off the walls, he was so happy, i mean, it was a new day, they were coming back, they felt that the history was with them, here we are years later and, you know, the different

forces they represent, do they have a future, how do they survive this -- this very difficult situation in which they've placed all their bets on this particular agreement and now it seems to be possibly to be dissolving before their eyes. >> i think that i was going to write an article but then i got -- it was trump and hard place colon, hard liner, you have to see, i think that i have known since he was interning at the iranian mission. again, that's why when you're old you remember things a lot more. [laughter] >> so there's no mystery. and so -- i always liked him, i always liked him. certainly very bright and so on

but there's some point, one of the first in negotiations after the u.s. invasion of afghanistan, basically gave the house key to the americans and got rid of the legitimate government according to united nations and allowed to come -- this was the victory. he really was -- because he speaks english fluently, revolution guards and others that have never learned the foreign language, at least not to be able to, you know, be fluent and i think that that's what happened after iran's diplomacy of decision. i personally and basically gave away, afghanistan, any say in

afghanistan at the bond meeting and i think that's contributed greatly, contributed greatly to the victory. for the first time foreign policy became issue in presidential elections. the concessionary foreign policy. the other thing that's obviously -- someone very close to me the other day it was very close to me, jcpoa and he said that didn't iranians have some lawyers to look at this agreement, it is full of loopholes and things and that is what has been done. so what i'm saying is as a result of this and the last obviously was withdrawal from

jcpoa and the calls for resignations so on and so forth. the iranian government needs because they don't have a strong enough foreign ministry. they should have 200, instead one guy that can actually interact. so that's essentially have to do in order -- i was worried actually about this. i thought, you know, his wife might be in danger. i thought he should stay in one of the trips and so therefore i think that he has been doing and he has been doing quite a bit of lashing himself, i had never seen him, gestures he has been doing and stuff is very unrealistic because what he has been doing, going embracing, foreign ministry so on and so forth.

it's for him, for his protection. in fact, because -- he has become a hero, he has become a national hero. >> because of the sanctions. >> because of the sanctions and because of all these things. in fact, he had to go and say that i promise you that i will not run 1,400 iranian, the problem is, again, i will come back and i will close. the united states, i don't want to go too much in history, especially from '75 to '79, our policies contributed to the iranian revolution and that was biggest lose for the united states, worse than the loss of china and the ripples of that

and if we have war with iran and iran is disintegrated, it will continue another 50 years or something like that. so we have to be very careful what we are talking. it's not because iran is such a big deal, no. very sick and because something like that collapsing, everything is not going to remain the same. the problem is we have never wanted to be with iran slowly and that comes to the dynamics of i don't think -- the mind set of how we view these people, they only understand first, you have to kick them before they get, you know, do that, but beyond that, i think -- the

dynamics of great power behavior. one of the problems of iran, i'm very upset that iranians are fighting americans so-called imperialism. to me russian imperialism is worse. it is. the point i'm trying to say is this, iran has been challenged all of the time even when it was very weak. for example, he wanted to buy ships and came to america, asked american ambassador, but u.s. should send ships to iran because they we wanted to protect the persian gulf. antislavery to control all of the -- what was piracy and it is the dynamics of great powers and

regime of power. so some of these things is that -- i don't want to use it again, but the united states wants global and secondly wants in middle east and iran is challenging germany, iranians, if you make your bed, you have to lie in it. i'm not saying that u.s. has rights, no, but iran also has to realize that it cannot fight with united states and not to be punished. this is going to happen. and so it seems to me that, you know, the french have expression and i have to confess -- the french have word, at the end of the day, at the end of day you have to slide things, in other words, you have fundamental

vision. by contrast, i studied in england, by contrast, no, if it's wishy washy, you will get something, doesn't work. i believe iran-u.s. relations have relieved level that has to be -- and i think either u.s. accepts iran as regional player and then in exchange for that iran has to become a more responsible player, not going iran talking about, you know, destroying a country or doing this, that or we are going to see, you know, more of the same, even after -- >> in light of challenge -- >> you are talking about --

bouncing off of the walls, right ? not the only one bouncing off the wall. iranian populist has jcpoa and some conversations try to deny that, undeniable fact. in terms of polling, if you look at the elections in 2017 in iran, 70% to have voting population voted and rouhani won by a landslide because of jcpoa. it's important not to ignore the people that are coughing up these types of leaders, if he has a future, he has a future because the iranian populist want a relationship with the united states, they do not want this continued sort of consistent aggression that we are seeing and so i absolutely think that has future beyond just the politics, he has a future because that's what the population of the country wants

and the only other thing that i wanted to add, you brought up 75 to 79 as when the u.s. and i would push back to 1953 and say if there is -- we have to be able to look at the iranian perspective on -- on this dichotomy of u.s.-iran relations as well and if we are talking about u.s. and germany and bring u.s. and germany then we also have to be cognizant of the fact that if we believe in sovereignty that nation state would try to fight that to germany and would naturally do so. >> can i just have -- >> no, i just want to comment. i hope that nobody lost my remark which i said speaking on behalf of social forces, i spent the better part of 10 years working and precisely the relationship between leadership and iran's social political arena and how they are linked and i would to emphasize an

analysis that focuses exclusively on the leadership as i noted. do i want to return the discussion to the last two questions which get us back to 1600 pennsylvania avenue of all places and that is two related questions for which i'm sure none of us have a related answer, what strategy could help trump save face, what can be done in that regard and we've commented on that and this has been sort of commented before and i actually agree in terms of what could be the solution, why doesn't trump, you know, fire current policy adviser on iran and try somebody who is -- has views constant with his whatever that is and that's the big question, i will leave the two questions for our panelists and we will wrap up based on that and your responses, thank you. >> sure. yeah, i think that, you know, if the president were to fire particularly john bolton, that

would send a message to a lot of countries around the world that the u.s. policy might be shifting. but trump has had how many national security advisers? this is number 3. it's a possibility. another thing that trump could do is name an envoy for negotiations with iran, instead of trying to have a summit before you have negotiations, have the negotiations and we have a model which came from the obama administration, the omani's hosted talks that were private before we got to -- to bouncing off the walls when he met with kerry in 2013, rand paul is a possible, there are others, a lot of republican that is have worked with iran and have worked with iran successfully, jim was in bond and got the agreement that put a new government in afghanistan after the overture of taliban.

now working on the afghan file was ambassador both at the united nations and in iraq, he speaks dari and know lots of iranians. ryan, distinguished former diplomat, negotiated with iranis in iraq and held talks with them after 9/11 that were about how to manage afghanistan and -- and al-qaeda and so on. very capable guy. jim jeffrey, current envoy against isis and in syria, also has had long contacts and experience with iranians. the deputy secretary of state, a man named john sullivan, was young man in iran during the revolution, his uncle was the last u.s. ambassador in iran before the revolution. there's no shortage of

individuals. we have an envoy for north korea, i don't know that he gets to do much because trump keeps preempting him by meeting kim jong un, but you could go back to that model and work behind the scenes and have a realistic agenda, not the 12 demands and you could get somewhere. it's entirely possible if trump wants to go that route. but we've seen no indication so far that he does. >> anybody else want -- >> because it's going to come down to whether sanctions are going to be lifted. that's what i'm watching for, is there any indication that they're going to be willing to lift sanctions and so far i have not seen it. >> may i just say one thing that it can be -- has to be both for iran and the united states. everybody needs to hide behind, everybody needs to be able -- this is one of the sort of international negotiations 101.

you learn that everybody has to get and one reason jcpoa was that iran was in dire situation, i'm sorry, when you say they did not agree to jcpoa because of sanctions is not correct, they did. and i know that for sure. it wasn't the only reason but it worked. the other thing is that work in iran, i think that it made the -- made the actual recommendation, that's what europe has been asking iran, iranian parliament because iran has signed but the iranian parliament has not ratified it. it would increase mrnt current inspection and so on that is in jcpoa. in exchange at least for partial lifting of sanctions, so i think

that that will be, you know -- president trump can go with this, we know that iran cannot, you know, produce nuclear weapons which actually this is pushing open door because they have said we will not and in fact, as somebody put it app, even though it's weaker, prohibits the -- all the countries like india and pakistan, they were not members therefore they were not bound by the limitations of that. the last thing that i would add because i don't have nice platform like this because there's modern dimension to all the things that the sanctions are doing to iran. i mean, essentially it is

killing the country. i'm talking about even physically killing the country because of unemployment because of all kinds of other pressures. people are smuggling -- across the borders and so on. at some point it seems to me to be honest, i was arguing the other day that having a war might be more merciful because you will finish it rather than slow death that's happening. one thing that's amazing of certain human rights violation, loss of life for a lot of people is violated and i think that we have to bring this into the -- even though i'm a realist and i believe power of relations and

that doesn't mean that you have to be absolutely immoral in this matter. thank you. >> yeah, i think the question comes down to from american position whether we want to live with iran or not, we have to decide what the strategy is. yeah. >> and the question is for trump, honestly i think it's not going to war, as serious as it might sound. iran is somewhat calling his bluff. he continuously is putting more and more sanctions, sanctions, sanctions, that's all he can sort of do. he's maxed that out to a certain extent and now sanctions individual people, so it's clear, iran -- and i'm not going to get into the entire history right now because it would be ridiculous, iran is not going surrender, capitulate, they are either calling his bluff and he'll have to go another route which would be war or he has to reel back and i actually think

given reeling back because someone who ran a platform criticizing wars, especially wars in the middle east should get then into one that is -- that was likely going to be worse than anything we've seen so far because of the context of iran, iran and iraq are not comparable situations at all, it actually save face in sort of legacy if he can reel back from this and not get into something that can go on potentially for decades as we've seen in other conflicts. >> a war is not -- it's not a policy that wins much for apart from horrific implications wins for presidents domestically, it's a policy of peril. we have to recognize that and hopefully he does and he will see his way towards dealing with iran as opposed to simply sustaining the current status quo which will take us down very dangerous path, thanks to the entire panel for this excellent discussion and we look forward to seeing you another time.

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and access powers in 1941. later a conversation on the book 4 hours of, if ury, untold story of world war ii's largest airborne invasion and the final push into nazi germany. 8:00 p.m. eastern on c-span2. >> sunday night on q&a. >> political science professor talks about being physically attacked in 2017 after appearance of charles murray on campus. >> at the end of the discussion with charles murray you left the room and went where and what happened? >> i don't even remember much of it, i couldn't even tell you what door we went out, but we were taken out of the -- the

hall and confronted this mob of angry people. some who were in masks, they were shoving and jostling. target was charles murray. >> on c-span's q&a. >> up next member of iraq's parliament talks about relations between his government and the u.s. and efforts to rebuild iraq following the overthrow of saddam hussein. the atlantic council hosted this event. [inaudible conversations] >> hello, welcome to the atlantic council, resident senior fellow at the atlantic council and director of the iral initiative and this is an iraq initiative event. it is on record, so feel free