natural disaster. i'm fortunate to be able to have served with pat leahy here in the senate. he's more than a colleague. he really is a dear friend. his wife of 52 years, marcel, my wife and i know well. we have helped each other through our times of joy and our times of travail. they have three children and five grandchildren and pat in a moment alone will start telling you about them. senator leahy, congratulations on your 15,000th vote as a united states senator. [applause] the presiding officer: the majority leader. mr. mcconnell: as the democratic leader's pointed out,

this is, indeed, the senator from vermont's 15,000th vote. that means he's taken the largest number of votes among all of us currently serving here in the senate. it means he's taken the sixth largest number of votes in senate history. it means he's taken more votes than any other senator from his state and vermont's been sending senators here since the late 1700's. that's not the only thing that sets him apart from every other vermonter to serve here in the senate. he was the first democrat elected to serve from vermont. unfortunately that's a habit that has not continued. i think we can safely assume he's vermont's first batman fan boy to serve as well, the first bat fan, probably the first deadhead as well. there's no doubt our colleague is the longest serving current member of the senator from any state and we're happy to recognize today his 15,000th

vote. mr. grassley: madam president? the presiding officer: the senator from iowa. mr. grassley: could i have one minute to speak to that point? the presiding officer: without objection. mr. grassley: i want to commemorate my friend and colleague for casting his 15,000th vote noticed the senate. senator leahy has been a stalwart member of this body since joining the senate at the age of 34 in 1975. four decades later, senator leahy continues to serve his state and our nation with great passion and conviction. senator leahy has been a good friend as we worked together in leading the senate judiciary committee. so, senator leahy, congratulations on this tremendous milestone. i hope that we can cast many more votes together as we continue to work in a bipartisan way on the committee. i applaud the senator from vermont for his great commitment to service and i wish him many more votes in the future.

[applause] mr. sanders: madam president? the presiding officer: the junior senator from vermont. mr. sanders: junior above senior here, pat. i just to want say a few words in congratulating senator leahy not just on his 15,000th vote but on his many, many years of service to the people of the state of vermont, a state which is very, very proud of all of the work that pat leahy has done. i think as we all know, senator leahy has been a champion on agricultural issues, on protecting family farmers, especially in dairy and organics. he has been a champion in fighting for civil liberties in this country. he has been a champion on environmental issues, making sure that the planet we leave our kids is a clean and healthy planet. he has been a champion on women's issues and on so many other issues.

so, senator leahy, on behalf of the people of vermont, i just want to thank you so much for your years of service. [applause] mr. leahy: madam president, i -- the presiding officer: the senator from vermont. mr. leahy: i'll speak further on this later on, but die want to thank my dear friends, senator reid, senator mcconnell, senator sanders for their comments and i appreciate the opportunity to be able to serve with them. you know, the senate offers both great opportunities and responsibility for this senator from vermont -- as for both senators from vermont and all who serve here. we have a chance day after day to make things better for vermonters and for all americans. we can strengthen our country. we can ensure its vitality in the future.

we can forge solutions in what's been an unending quest throughout this nation's history to form a more perfect union. i cast my first vote in this chamber in 1975 on a resolution to establish the church committee. now, the critical issues of the post-watergate era parallel the issues we face today, prove the enduring fact that while the votes we cast today address the issues we face today, problems will persist, threats will continue, improvements in democracy that all members of this body revere can always be made. i think back to the 15,000 votes i cast in behalf of vermonters. a lot of them come to mind. some specific to vermont. some national. some global. writing and enacting the organic farm bill, a charter for what's become a $13 billion industry.

stronger regulations on mercury pollution, combating the effects of global warming, emergency relief for the devastation caused by tropical storm irene, adopting price support programs for small dairy farmers. fighting for the privacy and civil liberties of all americans. supporting the reagan-o'neill deal to save social security. nutrition bills to help americans below the poverty line bipartisan, strongly bipartisan campaign reform in mccain-feingold. bipartisan leahy-smith bill on patent reform. reauthorizing and greatly expanding and strengthening the violence against women act. having bipartisan support on that. oh poeing the war -- opposing the war in iraq, a venture that cost so many lives and trillions in taxpayers'

dollars. the senate at its very best can be and should be the conscience of the nation and i've seen that when it happens. i marvel in the fundamental soundness and wisdom of our system every time the senate stands up and is the conscience of our nation. but we can't afford to put any part of that mechanism on autopilot. it takes constant work and vigilance to keep our system working as it should, for the betterment of the society and the american people. and we can only do that if we work together. i'm so grateful to my fellow vermonters for the confidence they've shown in me. it's a measure of trust that urges me on. i'll never betray it but i'll never take for granted. reflecting on the past 15,000 votes reminds me of the significance every time we vote and while i feel very energized about what votes lie ahead and how we can make a difference.

so i thank my friends, the two leaders, for their remarks, my colleague, my respected senate colleague, senator sanders, my friend, senator grassley, with whom i've served a long time. i appreciate my friendship with them. i appreciate my friendship with other leaders, including senators mansfield and byrd and baker and dole and lott, durbin, daschle. and i have lifelong gratitude to my former colleague, senator stafford of vermont, for his mentoring and friendship. when the first from our state arrived, and senator stafford, mr. republican, took me under his wing and guided me. and i'm privileged to serve now now -- i mean, our whole vermont delegation is here. senator sanders, congressman welch and myself. not many other states could do

that and fit all of them in this body. and lastly, madam president, i remember what a thrill it was to tell my wife, marcel, when i cast my first vote. and now 40 years later, i can still tell her about the 15,000th vote, and shns, she and our -- she knows, she and our children and grandchildren, are the most important people in my life. so, madam president, i don't want to delay the senate's work further but i thank you all. i thank you for friendships that have meant more to me and my family than i can possibly say. and i look forward to continuing serving here. thank you, very, very much.

[applause] the presiding officer: under the previous order, the question occurs on amendment number 2587, offered by the senator from vermont, mr. leahy. a senator: ask for the yeas and nays. the presiding officer: is there a sufficient second? there appears to be. the yeas and nays are ordered. there's two minutes equally divided. mrs. feinstein: madam president? madam president? the presiding officer: the senator from california. mrs. feinstein: thank you very much, madam president.

i rise, regretfully, to speak against the amendment directly following one of the idols my life's important monument of 15,000 votes. the presiding officer: the senate be in order. mrs. feinstein: but so be it. as it might become very clear here, senator burr and i, on a bill that came out of committee 14-1, have tried to keep a balance and have tried to prevent this kind of information sharing from being a threat to business so they won't participate. and, therefore, the words that are used are all important as to whether they have a legal derivation. senator leahy's amendment would essentially decrease the amount of sharing by opening up the chance of public discloash

you're through the free -- disclosure through the freedom of information act of cyber threats shared under this bill. now, we seek to share information about the nature of cyber effects and suggestions on how to defend networks. this information clearly should not be made available to hackers and cyber criminals who could use it for their own purposes. so we worked -- senator burr and i worked closely with senator leahy and cornyn in putting together the managers' package to remove a foia objection that they viewed as harmful and unnecessary. that has been removed in the managers' package. the presiding officer: the senator's time has expired. mrs. feinstein: i thank the chair. mr. leahy: madam president, much as i -- the presiding officer: the senator from vermont. mr. leahy: much as i hate to disagree with my dear friend from california, i would on this. i don't like to see unnecessary exemptions to the freedom of information act.

this exemption was added without public debate. it should have actually gone to the judiciary committee for consideration. and i think it would have made very clear if it had the vast majority of sensitive information to be shared under this bill is already protected from disclosure under existing foia exemptions. so a new exemption is unwarranted.but also what bothers me, this foia exemption preempts state and local information laws. those who believe in local control would vote for my amendment. such a sweeping approach that's in this bill would knock out hundreds of state and local laws if we don't oppose this new foia exemption, then i expect more antitransparency language could be slipped in. the presiding officer: the senator's time has expired. mr. leahy: i thank the chair. the presiding officer: the question is on amendment number 2587.

the yeas and nays have been ordered. the clerk will call the roll. vote:

vote:

the presiding officer: are there any senators in the chamber wishing to vote or wishing to change their vote? seeing none, the yeas are 37, the nays are 59, and the

amendment is not agreed to. under the previous order, the question occurs on amendment numbered 2582 offered by the senator from arizona, mr. flake. the senator from north carolina. mr. burr: madam president, i ask unanimous consent that the flake amendment numbered 2582 and the coons amendment numbered 2552 be modified with the changes at the desk. the presiding officer: is there objection? without objection. mr. flake: madam president? the presiding officer: the senator from arizona. mr. flake: i thank the chair of the committee, the vice chair and the ranking member for working on this. this was initially a six-year sunset. this has been moved under the amendment here to a ten-year sunset. i believe it's important when we deal with information that's sensitive to have a look back after a number of years to see if we have struck the right balance. we've done that on other sensitive programs like this, and i think it -- it ought to be done here, and so i appreciate

the work that senators burr and feinstein and my colleagues have put into this, and i urge its support. mr. burr: madam president? the presiding officer: the senator from north carolina. mr. burr: i thank my colleague. we have agreed on this and hopefully we will do this by voice vote. the presiding officer: if there is no further debate, the question occurs on the amendment, as modified. all those in favor say aye. opposed, nay. the ayes appear to have it. the ayes do have it. and the amendment is adopted. under the previous order, the question occurs on amendment number 2612, as further modified , offered by the senator from minnesota, mr. franken. mr. franken: madam president? the presiding officer: the senator from minnesota. mr. franken: thank you, madam president. franken-leahy-durbin-wyden amendment addresses concerns

raised by privacy advocates, tech companies and security experts. the senate is not in order. the presiding officer: the senate will be in order. the senate will be in order. the senator from minnesota. mr. franken: my amendment addresses concerns raised by privacy advocates, tech companies and security experts, including the department of homeland security. the amendment tightens definitions of the terms "cybersecurity threat," and "cyber threat indicator," which are currently too broad and too vague and would encourage the sharing of extraneous information, unhelpful information. overbreadth isn't just a privacy problem. as d.h.s. has noted, it is bad for cybersecurity if too much the wrong kind of information floods into agencies. my amendment redefines cybersecurity threat as an

action that is at least reasonably likely to triad versely impact an information -- to try to adversely impact an information company. and it ensures that there is appropriate limits. the presiding officer: time has expired. mr. franken: i would ask for 20 more seconds every. the presiding officer: without objection. mr. franken: it also tightens the definition to avoid the sharing of unnecessary information. the amendment is modest. it makes only changes that are needed for the sake of both privacy and security. i urge my colleagues to support this amendment. thank you for the extra time. thank you. the presiding officer: the senator from north carolina. mr. burr: let me say to my colleagues, this again, we're trying to change the words that have been very delicately chosen to provide the certainty that companies understand and need for them to make a decision to

share. like some other amendments, if you don't want them to share, then provide uncertainty and that's in language, changing from "may" to "reasonably likely" changing from actual or potential to harm caused by an incident. the department of homeland security is for this bill. the white house is for this bill. 52 organizations representing thousands of companies in america is for this bill. we've reached the right balance. let's defeat this amendment and let's move to this afternoon's amendments. i yield the floor. the presiding officer: the question occurs on the amendment. is there a sufficient second? there appears to be. the yeas and nays have been called for. the clerk will call the roll. vote:

vote:

the presiding officer: are there any senators in the chamber wishing to vote or wishing to change their vote? if not, the yeas are 35, the nays are 60. the amendment is not agreed to. the senator from missouri. a senator: i ask unanimous consent to address the floor for up to 15 minutes. the presiding officer: without objection. mr. blunt: and, madam president, i have six unanimous consent requests for committees to meet today during today's session of the senate. they have the approval of the majority and the minority leader, and i ask unanimous consent that these requests be agreed to and these requests be printed in the record. the presiding officer: without objection. mr. blunt: madam president, last week, i came to the floor to express my support for the cyber information chairing act that we are dealing with today. the bipartisan vote that happened later that day of 83-14

was an important step in the right direction to really deal with this issue. the debate, i think, has been encouraging. we need to deal with this threat to our economy. it's a threat to our security. it's a threat to our privacy. and we need to deal with it now. as i have said and others have said before, if we wait until there is an event that gets people's attention in such a dramatic way that everybody suddenly realizes what's at stake, there's no telling what kind of overreaction the congress would make. this has been a good debate at the time we should have it. now of course we need to move on. there have been a lot of amendments offered. many have been accepted by the bill's managers. today we'll finish with almost all certainty the remaining amendments pending on the bill and hopefully finish the bill itself. a lot of these amendments have been very well intentioned. in fact, i suspect they have all

been well intentioned, but in many cases, they just fundamentally undermine the core purpose of the bill, which is to have voluntary real-time sharing of cyber threats to allow that sharing to be between the private entities and the federal government and even for private entities to be able to share with each other. this is a bill that creates the liability protections and the antitrust protections that that particular kind of sharing would allow, and of course throughout this whole debate there have been lots of discussion about how do we protect our liberty in an information age? how do we have both security and liberty? and having served for a number of years on both the house intelligence committee and the senate intelligence committee, in the last congress serving on the armed services committee and this congress on the armed services appropriations committee, there is no argument in any of those committees that

one of our great vulnerabilities is cybersecurity and how we protect ourselves. we saw just in the last few days the head of the c.i.a. had his own personal account hacked into by apparently a teenager who then is in the process of sharing that information. if the head of the c.i.a. and the head of the homeland security doesn't know how to protect their own personal information, obviously information much more valuable than they might personally share also is at jeopardy. you know, we do need to ensure that we protect people's personal liberties. we need to do that in a way that defends the country. both of those are prairm responsibilities that we accept when we take these jobs and certainly are the responsibility of the constitution itself. i think chairman burr and vice chairman feinstein have done a

good job bringing that balance together. this bill is carefully crafted in a way that really creates a number of different layers of efforts to try to do both of those things. first, the bill only encourages sharing, doesn't require it. doesn't require anybody to share anything they don't want to share, but it encourages the sharing of cyber threats. it works on the techniques and malware used by hackers to share that information. it does not, it specifically does not authorize the sharing of personal information, and in fact the bill explicitly directs the federal government to develop and make available to the public guidelines to protect privacy and civil liberties in th course of sharing the information that is shared. the attorney general's required to review these guidelines on a regular basis. the bill mandates reports on the

implementation and any privacy impacts by the inspector general, by the privacy and civil liberties oversight board to ensure that these threats to privacy are constantly looked at, and senator flake's amendment, which we accepted as part of the bill just a few minutes ago, guarantees that this issue has to be revisited. now, i gave a speech at westminster college in fulton, missouri, about a month ago at the beginning of the 70th anniversary year of winston churchill giving the iron curtain speech on that campus and talking about liberty versus security there, i said i thought one of the things we should always do is have a time that forced us as a congress to revisit any of the laws that we have looked at in recent years to be sure that we protect ourselves and protect our

liberty at the same time. this is a voluntary bill, and maybe that wouldn't have been quite as absolutely necessary here, but i was pleased to see that requirement again added to this bill as it has been to other bills like this. this is a responsible bill, and the people you and i work for, madam president, i think can feel good about the responsible balance that it has. it defends our security, but it also protects our liberty, and i look forward to its final passage today. the debate would lead me to police chief and the votes would lead me to believe that's going to happen, but of course we need to continue to work now to put a bill on the president's desk that does that. there still remains, madam president, things to be done. one of the things that i've worked on for the last three years, senator carper and i have worked together on this, senator warner has been very engaged in this discussion, as has chairman thune, and that's the protection

of sensitive personal information as well as how do we protect the systems themselves. now, clearly, this information sharing will help in that fight. there is no doubt about that, but in addition to supporting this bill, i want to continue to work with my colleagues to see that we have a way to notify people in a consistent way when their information has been shared. there are at least a dozen different state laws that address how you secure personal information, and there are 47 different state laws that address how you tell people if their information has been stolen. that's too much to comply with. we need to find one standard. this patchwork of laws really is a nightmare for everybody trying to comply, and frankly a nightmare for citizens who get all kinds of difficult notices and all -- in all kinds of different ways.

without a consistent national standard pertaining to securing information, without a consistent national standard pertaining to what happens when you have a data breach and your information is wrongly taken by someone else, we've only done part of this job. and so, madam president, i want us to continue to work to find the solutions there. we need it find a way to establish that standard for both data security and data breach. i am going to continue to work with you and my other colleagues, our committee, the commerce committee is a critical place for that to happen. i wish we could have done this on this bill. we didn't get it done on this bill. but i would see now the first step to do what we need to do is dealing with the problem of cybersecurity in the way this bill does and then finish the job at some later time. so i look forward to seeing this bill passed today. i'm certainly urging my colleagues to vote for it.

i think it has the protections that the people we work for would want to see, and i am grateful to my colleagues for giving mae me a few moments heo speak and would yield the floor. the presiding officer: under the previous order, the senate the previous order, the senate >> during their opening remarks both senate leaders called for support of a two-year budget agreement reached last night. the hills rising, the white house urged members to pass a budget based on a bipartisan agreement reached by congressional leaders monday night. the deal accomplishes a central goal of lifting spending caps

known as sequestration while shielding social security and medicare beneficiaries from harmful cuts. you can read more on this at the hill.com. >> we have posted the 144 page budget deal on our website, c-span.org. both the house and senate have yet to consider the measure. >> i'm craig, c-span's capitol hill producer. i usually cover the house and senate floors legislation going on and off of the key events on capitol hill. we as a network committed to covering the hearings gavel to gavel with a very high providing. we've covered all the hearings by the select to me on in gaza in the house of representatives. this is one of the next in the series that we have covered. i got the of 7 a.m. the crews are already set the.

they put cameras in before and got in place of the early in the morning. for our morning show washington general so they could show what is going on in every grow. even before anybody was getting there i was starting to tweak things happening outside the room as well as inside the room. room. i wish i want a camera crews were doing, how the committee was setting up, how we made sure that we were as close as possible getting the key moment when she came into the building and then she went into an annex room across the hall with her team, with her age, with her stuff. the reporters assigned whether they were print, online, assigned desks that they could report from. a lot of people i talk to from the public said it was the first hearing. they called it an historic moment for those interested to see and hear from them. i twittered at a picture at the end of the show secretary clinton talking to other members of the house again mainly democrats, and she seemed very

pleased, had a big smile on her face and chairman county who appear to be sweating at the time, was seemed happy to be leaving the room now that the hearing had concluded. i thought the most interesting thing was those conversations that didn't get captured on camera. i did mention what about chairman gowdy and mrs. clinton's a template or other moments come other members of congress talking to each other. coverage to the house andion ton senate. the houatse on c-span, and the senate on c-span2. when it comes time to this key hearings, we are there. we devote resources of the cameras, putting on television, radio and online and make sure that viewers can completely understand without any commentary that entire event. this is one of those key events covering this hearing with mrs. hillary clinton before the

house select committee on benghazi better think a lot of people will remember from years on. >> israeli prime minister benjamin netanyahu is set to travel to the u.s. next month. next, the history and future of u.s.-israel relations with former advisers to presidents bill clinton and barack obama. this was hosted by the washington institute for near east policy. it is one hour and a half. >> good afternoon and welcome to the washington institute. i'm robert satloff, director of the washington institute. i should welcome you to our new shriver family conference center in our new offices. a letter to google to host this special program which is a book release event.

if you follow the washington institute you know we publish quite a lot. we publish hundreds of essays a year. we publish them under our own logo on our own series of policy watches and policy focuses. we have our scholars publish them in major newspapers and periodicals and journals. and then once in a while our scholars publish books, and we are especially proud of the books that our scholars produce. they are among the most lasting and meaningful of the products of this organization. we are a research organization. we are not a fly by night topic driven headline focus institute. we want to add to our collective knowledge about middle east politics and the making of american foreign policy in the middle east, and nothing quite does that like a book.

and so today we are especially proud to be able to celebrate the publication of this book. i'm holding this up for our c-span audience. the publication of this book, "doomed to succeed," a book just published by the institute's counselor and davidson strategic fellow, my colleague, ambassador dennis ross. right at the outset please join me in celebrating the publication of his new book. [applause] >> dennis brings an entire professional career both academic and policy making to the writing of this book. dennis has spent the last quarter century, more than a quarter-century, in public service that dates back to the carter administration. he has served in senior white

house positions in the administration's of ronald reagan, george h. w. bush, and president bill clinton. and then, of course, in the administration of president barack obama. it's been the president's envoy for middle east peace. use been the coordinator of american foreign policy in the broader middle east, what was known in the obama administration as the central region, especially focusing on iran policy. he has seen the ins and outs, especially of the u.s.-israel relationship, and republicans presidencies and and democratic presidencies. there really is no other american who has a deep insight, personal background, expertise and experience to bring to bear on a history of america's relationship with israel going back all the way to the founding of the jewish state in 1948.

and that's what this book is all about. so today we are going to have a deep in depth look at what lies behind "doomed to succeed," why is it doomed to succeed, what can we learn about this relationship as we look forward to the arrival in two weeks time of the current israeli prime minister to meet with the president of the united states at a moment that is especially strained between our two allies. and they really can be no better companion for this discussion than the third person on this platform today. i am truly delighted to be able to welcome to this audience president obama's first, second and national security advisor, tom donilon, a true friend of this organization, a true friend of the u.s.-israel alliance, and someone who has over the course

of administration after administration contributed deeply, not just to strengthen this alliance, but to building the foundations for security and peace in the middle east. it really is a privilege to welcome tom, to tom and dennis together on this platform for a discussion about what makes the u.s.-israel relationship, how it has developed, what could lead to strains, what are the opportunities and the challenges, and where this relationship may be heading in the years ahead. it for some going to turn to my colleague, dennis, to explain why, why doomed to succeed? right -- why write this book? >> well, thank you. obviously, this is an interesting time to be writing about this. many people have asked me about the title. they look at some the tensions in the relationship and they say

due to succeed which applies everything will be okay, it's interest at a time when most people are completely pessimistic but everything in the middle east. this is a book about the u.s.-israel relationship is optimistic. it is it doomed to succeed. it's not doomed to succeed question mark. my original plan was to write an overview of the history and go through the administrations that had not served in any kind of summary fashion. the problem was as i began to get into it i had a number of wow mowitz. what anybody wow moments, i found that only i was finding all the same arguments i have dealt with, i found in many cases sometimes 50 years apart the exact same words being used. not just the same argument that the same words being used. the more i discover that the more i have these wow moments the more became convinced i really needed to go through each of the administrations answer

with the key assumptions about the relationship sort of emerged, why they enriched the way they did and in effect what had such a durability. one of the things that struck me was that the assumptions lived on, lessons learned from assumptions that should been invalidated were almost never learned. more i got into that the more i said okay, in my own mind i need to write this book, not only so i can in this sense give visibility to that, to expose that, but also a need to write the book because i know it's going to come out a year before the next administration. and i wanted the next administration, the next president, whoever it may be, and the people who are advising that next president, to be much more aware the history, to be much more aware of the assumptions. one of the things that tom knows in the policymaking world when you're in the midst of this, a tendency to look at your assumptions and even be aware of your assumptions is a tendency

that is mostly nonexistent. assumptions tend to be implicit, rarely explicit. i wanted to expose what the assumptions had been over time, how they have a durability and for sustained. i also wanted to highlight that the approach to israel has oftentimes been derivative of the larger approach to the middle east. many of those assumptions have also been misplaced. one of the key themes of the book that you will see when you read it, because i know you all will, one of the key things that you will see is there been a number of assumptions about what are the priorities of arab leaders. those assumptions have almost typically been wrong. a key driver for most arab leaders has been security and survivability. the relationship with israel, which is frequently influenced american policy makers, fearing that if we did certain things that this would somehow have an impact on our relationship with arabs. if you look historically and go

from administration to administration public of the specific examples, and what i do is go through the -- to teach administration and over the key events that are the key assumptions of responses, one of the things you will see is that typically what drove arab leaders was their preoccupation with what mattered to them. i'm not saying the u.s. relationship with israel was any deal to them but never drove what they did towards us. it never drove how they decided what their ties to it should be, how close they should be, on their standpoint the one thing that was critical, especially among those within traditional american friends in the region was how reliable were we? were we, in fact, going to be in fact the source of their security which mattered more to them than anything else. they were going to do anything to put that at risk. their relationship with us as a function of their priorities. not a function of what our relationship with israel is.

i demonstrate this in one administration after the next. one of the things that is what the book is shows the echoes that reverberate over time and how you see not just the same arguments reflected on the inside but the same behaviors on the outside. it's one of the ways i try to draw out one of the key lessons and i conclude the book with a series of lessons for the future, both about the u.s.-israeli relationship, and in terms of the region as a whole, but also about how we should be dealing with each other so that when the right lessons from the past. both of us have lessons to learn. even though this book is called primary from the standpoint of american policy there are lessons here for what the israelis should do as well. >> thank you very much, dennis. dennis is very brief overview doesn't begin to do justice to the nuggets of, the gyms of historical insight that are in

display. if you're a historian and you are fascinated by the cycles of history, to see the repetition of the same words almost, certainly the same themes, administration administration, almost mistake after mistake, it is truly fascinating. but someone who made no mistakes in his tenure in government, i now get to turn to tom, for your opening remarks about the book and your experience spectacular and much, rob and district i would see about my mistake but you are not cleared for those. [laughter] spins the news a couple of opening things and then make four or five observations on the boat. first of all it's great to be today in your new facilities. beautiful. it's great to be a today with a surprise for me my counterpart, general, national security advisor of the state of israel. like to see you, general, here

today. we had a terrific relationship and something i will die for the rest of m my life. speckled ungrateful uspacom talk about this book. the last book, maybe two books ago, the missing piece, that was 805 pages. this is only 408, so a little less of a lift to get ready, dennis, for this vendor prior works. i'm very grateful for that. let me make four or five if i could observations on the book. one is a general observation on the importance of the book. it's a big history. we don't have enough of that. its diplomatic history and we don't have enough of that. and it is useful history. i believe one of the great failures of american policymakers is the lack of knowledge of history and a lack of attention to understanding the history of the peoples and nations with whom we are dealing.

we have a phrase in america we say well, that's history. that's not the way it works and the rest of the world. having a deeper understanding how we got to a recount, what the drivers or, what the narratives are, what the mythologies are. really important. niall ferguson in his volume one of his biography of henry kissinger makes that point powerfully. i gave a commencement address to your go at columbia university, and that was the one piece of advice i gave to the policymakers can which is to read history, we a lot of it, read it obsessively. absolutely critical. this is a great contribution to that, two of the future policymakers. i relationship with the dennis goes back a long time. i've spent a large part of my crew tried to talk to us into taking jobs. he worked in the bush 41 administration as the middle east negotiator.

we've been wrong the other side of each other. i prepared then governor clinton first debate in 2008 and dennis was in the white house during the campaign. we were on opposite sides. nonetheless, we asked, really begged denis to stay for six months, three to six months. we turned that into eight years, including one see in a nato meeting with his about to leave and i said dennis, you can't leave. i think he was coming back to actually. he said i promised the trustees at this cute i will come back. i said about you to picture the scene. i said, as chief of staff to senator christopher. i sit picture this. i'm in a hotel room on a secure phone and i'm on my knees begging you to stay. and dennis did and this country with all the better for it. i then tried to recruit dennis into the widest at the outset, i did the national security council and four then senator obama and try to recruit dennis to the white house that failed

but got in about a year later. so it's great to be a. and thank you for this contribution to history. the second thing i want to say is a couple of observations about there is chapters if i could. i want to talk about the carter chapter for just a moment. in reading it i was struck by something that doesn't get enough notice. we were at a conference the other day. the contributions made by president carter, particularly and the camp david accords, is extraordinary. it doesn't get noted enough. the camp david accords, i think the general would attest to come on important pillar of israeli regional security and remains so today. and were tested even during the muslim brotherhood very. although the muslim present government of egypt did not embrace the camp david accords. and would not directly engaged

at the political level with israel, a respected the accord and the remained in place even during that period and remain in place today and they need one of the most important relationships in the middle east for israel remains i think the egypt relationship. we also have our rising out of those accords a really core part of our regime, the secured and economic assistance to israel and egypt remain a core part of our approach to the region. i think, i noted that in your book and wanted to pull that out as something that doesn't get commented on enough in my judgment. the third point i wanted to talk about his leaders make the decisions they make about engaging in the middle east process. you make the point, dennis, the are a number of consistent assumptions that leaders embrace, and you called the myths, then the ecosystem israel to gain arab responsiveness, the

high cost of cooperation believe in resolving the palestinian from is key to improving the situation, the biggest myth in your powerbook. i think there are other things driving this from an old observation. and that is a president seen in context an opportunity. historic, or leadership context and the opportunity for achievement. i think that is what drove president clinton in 1992 to 18 in at an extraordinary moment and intrepidity. 1992 the united states after the fall of the soviet union, after the gulf war, the united states had an unlevel test unparalleled level of power and to take down a challenge like this. second, there were not some of the issues we have today as looming as deeply. iran was nowhere near the threat then that it is today. it was virtually exhausted i

think after the iran-iraq war. third, you had an israeli leader who i decided that as a matter of strategy and increasing strategic depth for israel which he called expanding a circle of peace, but he was going to engage directly and intensively in the peace process. starting with syria. you, dennis, working with secretary baker put in place, pushed away the taboo on direct talks between israel and arab nations to the madrid process, that was in place, take advantage of. there's a store in the book which makes the point, briefing governor clinton but coming into office in saint if you put the current state of u.s. power behind yitzhak rabin's intentions, there's a real possibility of achieving four arab-israeli peace aggregates in the first term as president. i think it's this or that is laid out in the boat. it was the context and it was

the opportunity for achievement as opposed to a cost-benefit analysis on israel versus the arab countries i think. second, if you look at the decisions that the bush 43 administration made, i think that was again about perceived opportunity for achievement as well, right? i think they rejected the clinton approach because they thought there was a general anything but clinton do with respect to foreign policy. they thought he invested personally and the effort and they're going to push away from that. if you look at the situation president obama came into, which was working at the beginning of the administration, i don't know if it was necessary, there was a set of circumstances very different from what president clinton faced. you had the peace camp greatly diminished in israel after the intifada and what i'll do. the intifada by what reflect back on, people do these days is around, the intifada was a

violent and highly impacting event with the death numbers which took a reflected on enough. 1100 israelis killed, 3800 palestinian deaths. it greatly diminished the peace camp in israel i think. second, 112006 parliamentary election among the palestinian authority. it fractured the palestinian authority. hamas through thought the out of gaza and to do much more difficult and weaker partner, likely to deal with. third the threat of iran was much different and a lot larger for president obama than it was for president clinton. where ivan was heading headlong towards development of a nuclear weapon. and essential issue as you point out in the book at this point faced iran, hamas and hezbollah all committed to destruction to do is a very different come in very different circumstances and

also u.s. relationships in the muslim world or in a much more complicated place after the iraq war, and in the midst of us pursuing the most aggressive counterterrorism campaign against violent islamic funded f those groups that the country had ever undertaken. we can talk about the decisions that the president made. before the point i wanted to talk about is personalities. they come through the book the record as well. too inept decades before the high level of national study can yitzhak rabin was most impressively i've ever met in the world. a strategic sense, a full of integrity, great strength, thoroughly reliable. and you could just feel it when you were with him. he was kind of, kind of this personal behavior, quite modest, but this deal came through in the decisions of his leadership. the other personality and the

importance of personal becomes the very strongly is yasir arafat, where he as given all these positive conditions that outlined, that president clinton faced a decade almost achievement, why didn't it close? and i think studying it for a line -- long time, and think about what was on the table, reviewed in return for today, forget about the clinton parameters that were in january 2001. a palestinian state in all of gaza and most of the west bank. the capital of the state in arab east jerusalem come security arrangements built about international -- the jordan river valley, a right of return to the new palestinian state, not to israel, and and into the conflict. arafat walked away from this. and get i know there's been some debate about this. rob ballen dash but i don't

think the facts are really in dispute frankly with respect to what the core offering was and has been accepted by -- a tragic example of the impact of personality on policy outcome. the last thing i wanted to mention, the fifth point i want to mention, on my own engagement with israel, and the approach that we have. we viewed israel as an ally. we view israel as part of an alliance system that the united states have been the work which is a unique asset. no other nation in the world has the kind of partnership alliance that the united states has put together and is a unique and important asset to be attended to constantly. second, given that in addition to the palestinian-israeli issues we also had obviously the most important security issue in the world, iran facing us.

and engagement we have was not just that the political level but at the professional level. i think agenda will save engagement between us and the professional intelligence and military on the israeli side was critical important why is that? in a region where there's so much politics, which is so much mythology, so much ideology it was important for our decision-makers to us is a very best job we could to get ground truth and take him as closely as we could with respect to the analytics. that was, i was devoted to the the general was devoted to anything but a very big difference in terms of decision-making and in terms of assurances and reassurances on all sides. so with sides. so without looking back over to you, rob. i wanted to make a more couple personal observations on the book. >> thank you. thank you very much. [applause] >> actually. thank you very much.

let me post a series of questions to my friends on the panel, have a bit of a discussion, and then we will turn to you for your own questions. i would like to begin with one of the premises of the book, which is that you can go back to truman and divide our presidents really into two groups. one group who prioritized they shared values between the united states and israel. a group that included truman, reagan, bush 43, and i'm delighted that steve hadley, president bush's action saturday advisor, is here. bill clinton. and if a group of presidents the view is you do what a competitive lands, almost a zero-sum lens between israel and arab allies. and this includes eisenhower, nixon, bush 41.

it seems from the book that barack obama leans toward the latter group. where would you place president obama on this spectrum? >> the way i described in the chapter is that he is, in many ways, hybrid. when it comes to security, and tom described his will, when he came to security he was very clear from the beginning that security was something he walled off. ..

>> there are, the onus was entireln the israelis. and the instinct was the more competitive one. and it was, i think, driven by a sense that somehow it was in israel's best interests that it understood that on the peace issue, it was headed towards a cliff. and what i try to suggest in the chapter is that here the president, to be effective with the israelis, needed to create a connection with the israelis, and he waited far too long to do that. so in a sense, he was a collaborationist meaning he viewed israel through, i would say, the partnership lens. and even motionally felt -- emotionally felt himself strongly connected to israel x yet when it came to the peace issue, he saw it through, in fact, a different kind of lens. i'd just say one last word. the previous presidents, who you

identified who constantly made a distance, eisenhower, for sure. if you read the eisenhower chapter, the length to which eisenhower goes is really quite extraordinary. he contemplates the use of american force against the israelis in 1956. when the israelis requested arms throughout this period when the soviets began providing arms to the egyptians and the syrians and then later iraq, the recommendation frequently was to the israelis, you should engage, you should be a good neighbor. this is a good neighbor to all those around you who completely reject you. that's the better answer than providing arms. nixon, the first two years takes a very -- even though personally when he meets with golda meir, he takes a very different posture. he believed this 1967 war was a defeat for the united states. this was someone who made a

decision to suspend phantoms to the israelis at the very moment that the soviets, for the first time in their history, are sending military personnel and forces to egypt. and the reason he's doing it is because he wants to reach out to nasser. actually sends his undersecretary of state to see nasser right after the decision to suspend expecting a response, and the response he gets is clearly not the one he had hoped for. we gained nothing from it. carter, and this is an interesting contrast with what tom was saying about the notion of opportunity and threat, it's interesting that carter pursues peace out of a sense of great fear if you don't achieve it. clinton pursues peace out of a great sense of opportunity because there's something there. it's a very different point of departure, and carter's instincts -- particularly when you read his diaries -- his attitudes towards israel come through, again, in a very tough-minded way. the first bush, bush 41,

believed you live up to commitments. but he doesn't look at israel as any sort of special state. he thinks we have obligations and we should fulfill them, but he doesn't feel it's any sort of a special state. in a lot of ways, i think obama does feel israel is a special state, does see we share values, but he's worried on the peace front that the israelis are not fulfilling, are not living up to those values. >> tom, what do you think about this spectrum and where the president is? that's on. >> it's on? okay. i'd say three or four things. number one, i think the contours of the debate and policy approaches have changed pretty dramatically since eisenhower and nixon. and a certain, i think, assessment has been made about u.s. interests which are very different. and, indeed, so that the four corners, if you will, the guideposts have changed pretty dramatically since then, number one. number two, as dennis said from the outset, the president made

it clear that he had an absolute commitment to israel's security. and, indeed, if we were going to pursue a peace effort there, that was absolutely essential. that israel could not be expected to take the steps and risk towards peace that would be required absent the united states providing that kind of a clear assurance and to see it manifested concretely across a range of projects, number one -- number two. number three, i do think that the president feels a real emotional attachment to israel. and i think it may have been a mistake for him not to travel to israel earlier in his term to express that and to have the israeli public see that commitment. next, i think there really was a view, was a view that, in fact, that israel could do better,

right? in terms of its approach to the peace process. and there were disagreements on this. and, you know, it's a complicated matter including politics in both places. and we also have the complication of a weak palestinian authority as well. iran loomed over this entire relationship, and i think in that respect there was -- and we expressed it quite clearly -- shared commitment to preventing iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon. and we took, united states took -- and i spent an enormous amount of time in israel working with counterparts on this -- a full range of steps to pressure iran. you know, the time -- because the narrative is that the president came into office working with allies and friends. it was clear that if we were going to have them along on a pressure campaign, we were going to have to make a bona fide effort to engage in diplomacy.

we did that but the deal was with the russians, the chinese and the rest of the world that if we did this bona fide effort to engage, that you were going to join us in a pressure campaign. they wouldn't or couldn't engage, the iranians, and we undertook one of the most effective pressure campaigns put together in diplomacy, frankly, and it led to the negotiations. and it was a comprehensive, simultaneous et of pressure -- set of pressures that included economic policies, but also including building up our presence in the gulf to a substantial level where when we said all options were on the table, it was clear that we could absolutely implement that commitment. so i think in sum, i think that president obama had -- from the outset, had a commitment to israel's security. saw that as necessary if israel was going to pursue a peace effort. we had substantive disagreements with respect to a number of the peace, the steps that were taken. there were personality issues as

well that are pretty clear to anyone who has seen this. but he did protect through all the disagreements, including some of the public disagreements, the security commitment. >> let me -- >> i think dennis' point is fair. we probably should have put more emphasis on interaction between president obama and the israeli public and israeli political leadership. >> that's fair. >> no, i think one of the things you'll recall -- i say it in the book as well -- you asked me during the transition to write a memo on where the president's outreach speech to muslims should be, and i made the case that it should be cairo as opposed to going to jakarta. but i said in the memo, but if he goes to cairo, he has to go to israel. if he doesn't go to israel, the outreach will be perceived as

this is going to come at israel's expense. you'll also recall when you asked me to do a briefing to the president and vice president and i outlined where we stood, one of the conclusions the president drew at the very end of that meeting was i draw the conclusion, he said, i draw two lessons from this. one is we should have put settlement issue in context, and, two, i should have gone to israel after the cairo speech. >> you agree with that? >> yeah. >> let me pursue the question of personality this way. sometimes the relationship gets lucky, and there's a strategic convergence between the leaders on the two sides; clinton/rabin, bush 43/ariel sharon,. and sometimes you don't have strategic convergence. bill clinton figured out a way with bebe netanyahu to reach a

peace agreement at y river. what was so different about that relationship then that wasn't in the relationship, obama/netanyahu, that in which there was, in retrospect at least so far, no progress? >> i would say -- let me make -- i think there's two distinct points that i would make. the first one, i think to be fair, is that the more, what i'll call the more tactical one, then i'll go to more of the personality and, i would say, perspective one. arafat was prepared to do limited agreements. so it wasn't easy to end up doing y river, but in the end we were able to get there. it took, you know, after we did the hebron accord from the time that was concluded which was january of 1997 until the end of october 1998, we were involved in what was a period that was quite difficult. and through that period the

relationship between the president and the prime minister was not an easy one at all. but the key difference was that clinton had a strong feeling that when you had differences with israel, it was better to keep them private. his perspective was -- and just to give you a sense of how difficult things were personally at one point -- bebi came to the country. the president didn't see him, didn't talk to him on the phone. their planes were parked next to each other in l.a. the israeli press picked up on this, but clinton was very careful not to be publicly saying things that would be construed as being critical. and the reason was clinton operated on a premise that the u.s. was israel's only real friend in the world. we could have differences, we could have disagreements, but he wanted to keep them private, because he felt that israel's enemies would see that as encouragement, and it would

weaken israel's deterrent. i think president obama came in, and president obama had a different perspective. in many ways, and i describe this in the chapter, because he felt a genuinely very strong commitment to israel's security, he felt that also gave him a license to be openly critical. and he did believe, certainly early in the administration, that being openly critical could also create some benefit for us at a time when we were reaching out to the muslims. and he worried. i mean, i have a quote in the chapter where he says to malcolm -- [inaudible] in a meeting that they had in july of 2009 when malcolm says to him, look, if you want israel to take certain risks, they need to know you're going to be standing right next to them. and he comes back and says to them, look, for eight years the bush administration allowed no daylight at all, and we got nothing for it, and look where we are also with the arabs. so he drew that lesson.

now, that lesson in a lot of ways was a misplaced lesson. ehud olmert went farther than the clinton parameters and didn't draw response. the kind of mindset was in some ways because i'm so good on security towards israel and because i really mean it, that makes it easier for me to be able to establish some distance x. clinton's attitude was just different. the view of the world was different, the view of israel and its place in the world was different, and it didn't mean that president obama didn't feel, you know, that it wasn't in israel's interest to be isolated. in fact, he would say that. but he also saw at times a benefit in being prepared to establish some distance when he felt there were real disagreements. >> tom, you worked so closely with both these american presidents. >> yeah. i think as i said earlier i do think the context

is entirely different. remember, then-prime minister netanyahu was succeeded by shi monoperries in -- peres. >> preceded. >> yeah. >> and then he's succeeded by barak. >> so the context was entirely different, right? the u.s. position in the middle east was entirely different. and the politics in israel were entirely different, i think is a fair, i think is a fair point. with ehud barak succeeding netanyahu and moving towards camp david prepared to make unprecedented offers to the palestinians. after the decade of the 2000s, politics in israel were very, very different. the peace camp, as i said earlier, was much diminished. the politics of the coalition that prime minister netanyahu had put together was very different than the politics in

the 1990s and much more difficult, frankly, to make the kind of progress that president obama sought to, sought to make. >> let me ask you both about the -- >> don't you think that's fair? >> well, i think bibi's government from 1996 until 1999 was an arab-based, right-wing government. the government that bibi establishes when he's elected in 2009 has ehud ehud barak in it. so there was a center base in it. what is different is that arafat is prepared between '97 and '99 to do limited deals, not the whole deal. >> yep. >> and what we're looking towards in 2009, clearly, is the whole deal, not a limited deal. so that is a difference, but it's -- and it's, look, it's fair, and in every chapter i show the context. the context, obviously, does affect choices.

so it's a combination of the context affects choices, but the instincts of presidents and their point of departure is important in terms of the key assumptions they make about that context. >> tom, let me ask you about the concept of no daylight, no surprises. now, if you go back 60 years, the idea that the u.s./israel relationship would be defined by no daylight, no surprises is so other worldly. i mean, the idea that truman, eisenhower -- they were very far away from each other in terms of daylight and surprises. but in the last decade, two decades, this concept -- no daylight, no surprises -- has entered the lexicon of the relationship. is this a legitimate and reasonable standard of the relationship? is it something that was, that could ever be fully implemented? and how would you implement and execute that sort of approach to the relationship? >> well, i think it is a

principle that undergirds the relationship. and it's implemented through a deep and consistent engagement. that's not to say you're not going to have differences, but i do think it's a fair, i think it's a fair assumption to have in the relationship, yes. >> i do too. look, a major thrust of the book, and i, you know, i point out tom as an exemplar of this, is that you do best in the relationship not only from the standpoint of our mutual interests, but even on those issues where we will have differences. after all, the title of the book is called "doomed to succeed" because there will be differences, there will be ups and downs. but what binds us is much stronger than what divides us. and the key is, in a sense, having those people in key positions who are perceived by the israelis as when they ask

israel to do the -- to do something, the perception is it's asked from a per spective of, a, understanding israel's perspective, b, because there's a genuine belief what we're asking is generally believed is the right thing to do and not because somehow it's going to gain us something with the arabs. when you ask israel -- and that's something that i point out over time in each of the chapters -- when you're asking the israelis to do something that's difficult for them, they need to know where you're coming from. when you have, when you're perceived as genuinely having israel's best interests at heart and you're not being driven by concerns about where the other side is, then you're more likely to draw a response. looking at meridor because going back to the first bush administration, we would constantly talk about, you know, what we would do, when we would do it as a way of trying to prepare the ground for certain kinds of decisions even when we were in complicated circumstances. and one of the things i try to

point out is having those kinds of relationships by senior people makes a big difference not only in terms of the overall relationship, but also managing the areas where the potential for differences are real and actually tom and -- [inaudible] were, i describe it as a very good example on an issue like iran where we have different, we have the same objectives, but often times we might look at those objectives through a different lens. they manage those differences in a way that kept us actually very chose together. so i draw a distinction here between, you know, no daylight, you know, no surprises, no surprises, yes. no daylight, you know, if you manage it the right way, you can have differences without caught. >> and i think the key to this is having -- it doesn't happen in diplomacy as much as you would think it does -- is to have a complete and thorough understanding of the other

side's perspective, and in-depth understanding of the other side's perspective. not just take positions, right? and senior leaders take positions for reasons. and it really, i think, critical particularly in a relationship where there's so many moving parts to understand the motivations and the history and for the other side to understand, understand it as well from the american side. >> well, with that background, i need to ask you about the iran agreement and the sort of new world in which the u.s./israel relationship is now entering. up until july 14th and the approval of the iran nuclear agreement, we were essentially partners with the israelis. we may have had our tactical disagreements, but we were partners with the israelis. we're now in a detailed agreement to which the israelis not only are not partners, but they are vehemently opposed and

are not bound by. so when you think about the future of this relationship and dealing with this very complex issue of iran's nuclear and the implications for iran behavior around the region, what, you know, what sort of new understandings, new procedures, new approach to the alliance do you think needs to be put in place to manage this totally new and uncertain moment in the u.s./israel partnership? [laughter] tom, let me start with you. >> okay, great. first is that we and israel have a deep joint interest in seeing implementation of this agreement. the agreement will, in fact, prevent iran from acquiring nuclear weapons moving forward here, and most directly over the

next decade and a half and maybe two decades. so implementation is absolutely critical, and we share a joint interest in that, i think. it has to be the case that having a decade and a half of a rollback and a freeze on an iranian nuclear program has to be in the interest of israel and the united states going forward here. so implementation of in this, i think, is absolute critical. second, there should be understandings as to what the consequences are of violations of the agreement. and those kinds of conversations, i think, are important obviously among the parties enforcing the agreement, but also between the united states, between the united states and israel. third, the agreement, i think, is properly seen as transactional at this point and focused on a non-proliferation security problem and not at this point -- particularly given iranian behavior and what we can expect iranian behavior to be -- some sort of transformational

event between the united states and iran. which means that the united states needs to pursue in detail and aggressively, you know, confronting iran's behavior and other aspects of its behavior in the middle east. it means that the united states needs to put in place in detail a set of deterrent steps to insure that iran complies with the agreement. and if it doesn't, that it sees what the cost is going to be. being that the deterrent steps obviously include our capabilities and our declaratory policies which are very important in the region but also include broader steps like a much-deepened set of relationships and assurance steps with the gulf countries. we had a tart at the camp david -- a start at the camp david meeting, but we need to work much harder, i think, and with more detail with respect to the assurances there. including, in my view, thinking

hard about extensive deterrents into the middle east. so i think that the united states and israel would agree on all those points, frankly, going forward. there's obviously been a disagreement with respect to the agreement between the united states and israel, between president obama and prime minister netanyahu, but i don't think that negates the five or six points i laid out here with respect to a common interest going forward. >> look, i very much agree with what tom said, and i would just amplify it in the following ways. the deal buys you 15 years, so the focus right now should be what can the united states and israel as well as the other states do to take advantage of those 15 years? you don't sit back and say, okay, we've got 15 years. now you need to do something about it. what i would really like to see merge from the president's meeting with the prime minister on november 9th is a decision to create a joint consulting committee where, on the one hand, we would focus very much on the kinds of things that could be done to enhance

deterrence, bolster deterrence both at the level of iran understanding that after 15 years there's a firewall between where they are and moving towards a weapon and what is done in the region. and so i would like to see that joint consultant committee focus on the issue of implementation the way tom was describing. tom will recall in the year 2009 we had very extensive discussions with the israelis on how to plug the holes in the sanctions regime. and many of the suggestions that we got from the israelis we then acted on. well, the same thing here. nobody going to have a higher stake than the israelis in the implementation of this deal making sure that if, in fact, there are any transgressions, that they're caught, and we should have discussions about what those might be, what you do about it. the other thing that i think is very important under that rubric of a joint consultive committee, israel's now facing what is a very different kind of threat in syria.

the russians, without question, reduce israel's freedom of action. yes, there's -- they've created some channels. but we've already seen in one case when there were some firings out of syria into the golan heights and israel complained about it, putin came back very quickly and said, well, you know, the syrians have no interest in sort of -- pretty much pooh-poohed the kind of threat from there. i would like to see a discussion between us and the israelis on if, in fact, there's any effort to transfer weapons that cross israel's red line to hezbollah, what is our position about that? what is our position about, you know, the fact that there is now a revolutionary guard, hezbollah position opposite the golan heights. if that becomes more of a threat, what is our position about that? that is something that the united states and israel should be talking about. we have a converging strategic interest. the fact is, if you think about it, we all along had the same

objective as it related to iran not having nuclear weapons. that hasn't changed. all along we've also had the same objective that iran is destabilizing activities in the region need to be countered so that the regional balance of power doesn't shift against our interests, our mutual interests. that happens to be our mutual interests, also happens to be the interests of the gulf cooperation council. so, if anything, there are more reasons to be working closer together, not fewer reasons which is another reason -- i mean, in the end, when i conclude with the title of "doomed to succeed," i offer an explanation, if anything, the relationship is bound to be closer in the coming years because if you look at the region, the state system is breaking down. the nature of conflict is over the very issue of who defines and shapes and controls identity. nothing is more basic in terms of conflict than that. the one state that stands out having institutions, the capacity to deal with its problems -- its problems are real, but the capacity to deal

with problems -- is israel. at a time when the region is unraveling, this is hardly the time that we will unravel our relationship with israel. >> before i turn to your questions, i need to ask tom one more question. and that concerns some of the headlines that emerge both from the book and from op-eds that dennis has written. and that's about the impact of your own departure from the white house where it has been written that with your departure there was an increase in the white house of suspicion about israel, the idea that we give but we don't get from the israelis and the demise of true strategic dialogue with counterparts in the israeli security establishment. i know this was a great compliment that dennis paid to you, but i'd appreciate your observations on the impact of your own departure.

>> well, the principal impact of my departure is that i get a lot more sleep. [laughter] i get up a lot later. my service at the white house included 850 morning briefings with president, so -- >> but who's counting. >> yeah. so that's the principal impact. with respect to, with respect to israel, you know, the principles that undergird the u.s./israeli relationship come from the president, and the president's absolute kind of bottom line axiomatic commitment to israel's security is not in any question. and i don't think the united states has erred on that at all. you know, my own approach to that we talked about a little earlier. my own approach was to have intensive engagement. my own approach was to haven engagement not just at the political level, but at the professional level, if you will, intelligence and defense counterparts inae