about environmental policy and the chicken little syndrome when it comes to global warming alarmism and then there's the chicken little and the people that have examined the science and understand the climate of the force is changing but it's not catastrophic and the impact isn't nearly as bad as a lot of people think. it's the first book with us and we are happy about it and that is new coming out. >> jim likely is the communications director of the heartland institute. you're website? >> heartland.org. >> another interview from georgetown university. charles discusses his new book "no one's world the west the rising best and the coming global term." the interview is conducted at riggs library on campus.

>> you are watching book tv on c-span2. and we are at georgetown university interviewing some of their professors who are also authors and now joining us is charles kupchan, the author of this new book, "no one's world the west, the rising unrest and the coming global turn," published by oxford. professor kupchan, what do you mean by the global churn? >> i refer to a period in history in which the world's center and gravity moves. the last global turn is when the world was relatively multipolar, but arguably the center of gravity was in the mesopotamia in valley and was to the east. then beginning in the late medieval period said wells, 1300, you begin to see the commercialism rise in europe and cities are born to lead you begin to see the middle class,

and by roughly 17, 1800, europe was dominant so the pendulum had swung from a stumble from that part of the world up to northern europe. but i am arguing in this book is the pendulum has started to swing again and that is because we seapower moving from the west that is to see north america and europe, and it's heading east, but it's not just hitting east and that is why it is called no one's moral. i don't believe that any country regional or model will dominate in fact i think we are headed to a world in the first time in history will be interdependent, globalized, but without a political anchor. >> why do these terms take so long? you're talking about since the 17th and 18th century you were talking about the next term. >> i think that this will be the fastest because we live in the

digital age and we are seeing how quickly china is growing, how quickly they are catching not get economically with a united states and consequently the degree to which globalization brings economic change to the midwest we've lost roughly half of our manufacturing jobs in the last ten years in part because economic activity is moving so quickly elsewhere. but in general, what happens is today's core over time becomes tomorrow's perfidy. periphery because tomorrow's cory and that is because we look as far back as we can go you see that great powers don't stay on top forever and that there innovation, they're know how gradually moves to other regions the less developed, and over time they are able to catch up with the core, and the end up being and hegemonic position and

the dominant position than in the cycle starts all over again. you are right to say that the last term was quite slow. the u.s. and the europeans have effectively been on top of the heap since about 1815 when the napoleonic war ended so we have had about two centuries, which is a pretty good run, and i think we are headed to now is the world that for much of the 21st century won't have a dominant player and that is an interesting world. it's not that different than where we were in 1600 when you have the holy roman empire, the ottomans, the japanese empire, the chinese empire, but the difference is in the 1600's goes into real zones didn't penetrate. they really interacted with each other. the each ago according to their own. what's happened now we are all smashed together. what we do here, with china

does, what happens in india affects us and why this why the next is going to be complicated, because we need to agree on a set of rules in ways that we have never before. >> how we set that year up in the 17th and 18th centuries became? >> i think the story starts with the end of feudalism, and to some extent, europe's strength was its weakness because when the structure began to erode, suddenly use of a town's emerging and they were populated by artisans, blacksmiths, the beginning of what you might call professional people, bankers, and then over time the cities became the vanguard of a commercial revolution and economic activity, debt instruments, banks, little workshops that eventually became laboratories. they were able to thrive because

the pushback against the bill because of the malarkey and the church. in the rest of the world empires were much stronger and they were able to maintain centralization. what you saw in europe the fragmentation of the institutions, the birth of the bourgeoisie that increases the products of the reformation that slowly pushed the church out of politics and led to the secular realm all of that happened only in europe and crossed the north atlantic and happened here in the united states but it led to the period in which technological and economically the western world pulled far ahead of the competitors and that technology also allowed them to penetrate the competitors. they get better ships, better navigation, and so by the end of the 18th -- the 1800's, the 90 century they dominated about 80

plus% of the world, and that is really something that is historical unique. >> some argue that the 1970's and 1980's when japan was on the rise becoming a dominant economic power could have been the term. >> deterrence we've seen in the last several decades have been turned within the family is to say among the country's all of whom kind of look the same for their liberal democracy and industrialized economy, and so if we say what's happened over the last to come 60, 70 years, europe, the u.s. and japan have competed to be the top dog. but i did is happening now is it is widening. there are many new cracks in the kitchen and the western model of industrial capitalism, liberal democracy come secular

nationalism is being called into question and that is in part because the west hasn't been doing so well. we are seeing the political polarization and the u.s., fragmentation in europe, japan has been stuck in an economic recession for decades and a lot of that is a product of globalization. we are seeing jobs leave, we don't have as much control over the economy as we used to come so the broad middle class in the u.s. and in japan are not very happy, and they are saying to their government help me. i don't like the situation and those governments are finding it very hard to respond. and that's why we see in the united states trust and the government is at historic lows. that's why in europe we see the nationalization of political life away from the european union, and all the while we see other models that are actually doing pretty well, steve

capitalism in china, they are growing at about 10% a year where the defense is stuck at around 2%, and they are not going to keep going at 10% but the success of their model does raise questions about whether we are heading to the world in which no model dominates in which western democracy, western capitalism will have to compete in the marketplace with other kinds of models, china being one, persian gulf another. the left-wing populism in latin america being the third coming and i think all of these of advantages and disadvantages, and that leads to a world in which the playing field will be much more level than it has been. >> to you see the charnel model as it the logical models rather than just pure economic models? and our people going to look to those like the look to the west in the past?

>> i would say they are a combination of the ideology and the socio-economic foundations, and i think the to our hard to untangle so let's take china for a second. what is so different about china's trajectory than the west as we were talking about a few minutes ago in the west, the middle class was the vanguard of change. they drove economic growth and pushed back against the absolute est.. the chinese state is much smarter than the monarchies of europe because the monarchies of europe tried to keep down the middle class. the communist party, the they are not particularly communist and agree to the middle class and make them stakeholders so if you were to talk to most entrepreneurs most professionals in china they don't want to change the system they are happy and that raises the question is

this stable? if those with a wealth and power are able to change it and are happy with something like dead democracy, does that give moble staying power, and if the chinese can make decisions about the high-speed rail and the network about investment for the long run, the of the five-year plan, a ten year plan, and the united states, believe it or not, we have a lot of government agency but nobody is doing the long-range economic planning. that is why i think the china model if it is going to carry the day it isn't going to be the model that everyone ascribes to, but there will be one version of modernity. it will have a large place in the world in the 21st century and the western model i think walt be as helpful and pervasive as we once thought. so history has been on the one

road heading towards some kind of in the point that looks like the west. now i think we're starting to see the road take different paths and that i think is one of the reasons that this century is going to be quite interesting but also dangerous because it requires a level of management and of consensus that historically speaking of the world has never required. >> charles kupchan serve the national security under president bill clinton, and in fact your former boss his most recent book, back to work, has aligned that hasn't been picked up on much, but he said as long as we are still organized by the states do you think there is a future where we are not organized necessarily by country or nation? >> mean ebit it is a long time away, and i think one of the interesting developments of the last couple of decades is how

strong the state remains. the kind of party the nation state is coming back because the globalization is extraordinarily powerful. it reaches into countries and across borders in a way that's very intrusive, and in some ways those states are basically saying stop. we want more control over our destiny. take for example what's happening in europe. europe desperately needs the government to stabilize the bureau to find its way out of the crisis. but what is happening is the politics is drifting back from brussels to the capitol of the european union to the nation's state and that's because the nation states or getting slapped around by the european integration and globalization and they are saying we are madder than hell. we aren't going to take it anymore. they are pushing back and so precisely because the globalization punters the borders, the borders are coming

back to life. so i think the 21st century will be a century in which the nation state is alive and well. >> if your theories or predictions turn out to be true is it a bad thing for the middle west? >> i would say it is a development. it is troubling in the sense that the u.s. has run the show for quite a long time and it's been able to create an international system in which western values predominate and in which they are inseparable from the interests. we have to prepare for a world in which the west is no longer as dominant as it used to be and which the west at one point represented 75 plus% of the world trade and gdp will not shrink to well below 50%. after all, the west only represents about 15 to 20% of the global po