determination on the prosecution. so, what we will do is we will do the best we can to get information from them and then we will provide that to the committee. but ultimately right now it is under the jurisdiction of the department of justice to this and i think it would be great if you could let us know when they pass it over to the justice department and who is with some of these committees can communicate with the justice department to get from them an idea about time. >> absolutely. >> i look forward to working with the chairman and the ranking members, too in regard to possibly cid and doj officials. this live beyond your proof you that there should be accountability. and we cannot proceed without it we estimate and i think another thing to take from today that i ask of you to consider -- i think the suggestion that the leadership change include somebody in uniform to make sure

the uniform code of justice is something that reigns with that and is a very, very significant suggestion and one that adds strategic planning and organization plans to look at. i think it is something that garners you're serious consideration and i went to thank mr. kaufman for bringing that up. to this chemical we shall be adjourned. thank you everyone for being here today. ..

>> okay, ladies and gentlemen, can you not coming. my name is john hamre, president at csis. i said to the foreign minister of the last we had a crowd like this was when bill gates was here before he gave his money away. it was quite a crowd and of course this is probably the most important -- certainly the most important thing i am going to do

this week in an exceptionally grateful that the foreign minister has come to csis and made his part of his visit to washington. we've had a chance to visit to find working the ship with the foreign minister when i first met him back in 2008. and at the time, felt this was an exceptional intellect in a very remarkable position. but most impressed me was something that sounds so some of when he started talking about the zero problems with neighbors. you know, it's not a nice idea. it would not be good if every country thought about that is their strategy. unfortunately, not all of his neighbors had zero problems. he lives in a very complicated neighborhood and he keeps being drawn into that neighborhood is because he is the type of his intellect to make real difference in the world that

needs making an enormous difference in the world. you will note that here that is why there are so many people here. so i don't want to take any time. i have a lovely long speech was going to give and of course i would normally irritate you at this stage. so could i ask you to warmly received the foreign minister of turkey, foreign minister davutoglu. [applause] >> thank you very much, dr. hamre for the excellent introduction. thanks for this opportunity for me. it is a distinguished audience. since you made reference to her previous meetings, i have made reference to some of my previous statements here before because i think maybe because of being a

student of international relations in teaching for many years, i prefer ours process analysis rather than picture analysis. maybe some of you want to listen more to my assessment about the existing picture, focused on syria. but i will insist on process analysis, from where we are coming, where we are now common and where we are going. at one of my conferences here, i made a reference to modern history and i said, after all morris, there is some sort of new adjustment of world order straight conference for a new international organization or

stir a conference or no international organization a new convention like after 30 years war and westphalian peace, westphalian order, we had napoleonic wars, and congress of vienna. after world war i we had the good nations. after second world war we had congress at united states in a system which is famous complicated compared to the previous experiences, economic, political, new institutional station. at that time and i can come i said the cold response, the poor comic report, continued i must have a century. after the cold war, so there is no new set of norms reflect gene and needs a post-cold war situation. there's no congress the congress of vienna. there is no international or a stationary than there is no reform international organizations. there has been many discussions

on reforming the united nations system, but still the united nations is functioning like before. the last indication was the veto and u.n. secretary council as if cold war was continuing. so we have to make -- first it to see the big picture. today we are facing a huge economic crisis, global economic crisis and political crisis in turkey. but we have to understand from where we are coming. since there is nobody adjustment of international system, since there is no new set of norms, since there is no information of existing international organized nation, i can tell you that there were big earthquakes in the last 20 years. earthquake is a good analogy for turks, maybe for americans who came from los angeles.

maybe i don't know -- it was not a good analogy for washing until last year. so you can at least understand the psychology of earthquake. earthquake means the existing natural status quo is shifting. when i say political earthquake or international earthquake, it means the international system machine chain and the name added to idea cursor changing. during the cold war, we could predict all the assumptions, actions or attitudes that they may not truce. but after cold war, during these transformations, it was difficult to predict and today it is very difficult to predict the reaction. through earthquakes to mention for the first earthquake was in 1991 concert in the previous --

the indications of the earthquake came in the fall of berlin wall in a 1991 the soviet union collapsed. it was the geopolitical quake. indications are changing geopolitical structure. and the result of the earthquake, ridges of new states and transformation of the states in eastern europe, caucasian and central asia. and the basics listen at the earthquake was freedom and democracy. i'm sure i'll remember the ad of history series car et cetera. and you need the concept of the new world order. now you can ask, do we have a new world order or disorder? from that time, for almost 10 years, with observe democratic transition in eastern europe. this is important because whenever we add in turkey, as not only to minister of foreign affairs, but as an intellectual

domain criteria and my decisions for us country, and our decision comes as not to be on the right side of history. i will come to that point. today this is the main difference between the actors come at those who are understanding the flow of the history, those who are trained to resist the flow of the history. in the first decade after the cold war, from 1991 until 2001, the earthquake was a geopolitical earthquake from the value is freedom and democracy. as turkey, at that time, we were on the winning side of the cold war. we were supposed to win some thing, because we spent a significant part of our budget to national defense is a member of nato. but to be frank, when we look at this years, turkey did not win much. we face many difficulties come in many challenges.

we had to take their responsibilities in bosnia, in kosovo, and many other events. at the end of 10 years, just to give one indication, our practice to income in 1991 was around 2500. in 2001, as there are 2800. for spending on the budget to defense throughout the cold war, and the increase of the per capita income around $200 or $300 is not much to gain. but the issue is, because said the security risks around, turkey was a morris security oriented policy applying country in this earthquake. in 2001, second earthquake was security earthquake. the concept of security has changed because of 9/11. so before, the security was seen as a security among the nation. if you -- when you refer to

security and defense company means you are defending your country again aggression of another state or another blog. but this time, 9/11 showed that there is a vulnerability of security everywhere in the world, even in new york and in washington. so that changed the concept come of this mindset at the international system, from freedom to a security oriented approach. the regulations were done. new regulations, domestic regulations, migration regulations from starting from their come and talk international conventions after 9/11, after 2001 all operations for more security oriented operations. operation in kosovo with some pain -- or bosnia was freedom, more reference to freedom -- liberating syria vote, that the operation to afghanistan, theater and was more security needs come against terrorism.

in these 10 years come until 2011 and this is the area of our government in turkey, we acted differently. we didn't want to have a security oriented policy. we wanted to have freedom and democracy oriented politics. and what we did, we try to incite new policies, which one of them was used by dr. hamre. we try to define new priorities that turkish domestic and foreign policy. and the domestic field, and the main was democratization, but democratization packages, several democratization packages. when there were restrict to regulations being implemented in europe, and u.s. and other parts of the world, turkey in 2002, 2004, 2006 try to expand

democratic area, democratization process. at that time, we declared site principles you assumptions that turkish foreign policy in order to understand our foreign policy today vis-à-vis syria and tunisia, egypt, we need to refer to this reference. the first principle was the balance between security and freedom. the first time in a tv interview to you syscon's upcoming security and freedom, justice son -- to change the mindset of turkey's safety. turkey, throughout the cold war and after the cold war, in the 1990s thought that they may need of our society a security -- security against soviet expansion, security against dastardly tension between greece and security, or security against pkk terrorism, but i'll security references.

what we said that now there is a new -- there is a needed a new new set of norms based on more freedom but equal security because again today we have this position, why? because of the sacrifice security for reagan, you will have chaos. if you sacrifice freedom for security, you have dictatorial regimes like, today, besides regime or mubarak regime before. for many case, this is the talk that they need to sacrifice from freedom because security at her because of security threats about various. similarly, what we were told throughout the cold war, this communism and come another

radical has gone another separation will come. if you have so many fears you cannot have a logical analysis, what reset in order to be legitimate democratic government, they should be balanced approach between security and freedom. and a government is legitimate if he says to his feet will to his people about the government will provide maximum rate them without risking the charity in maximum security without limiting freedom. so this is to allow for an alice v. now, in our religion, the regimes are facing this challenge. they all prefer security and that other people, weep for freedom. maybe another time, maybe another spring. second prince was, as dr. hamre

mentioned, i was not planning to refer to this, but i want to be well understood here, zero problems with neighbors. yes, still we have this sensible. why? we wanted to change the mindset and set of norms that turkish foreign policy. before, we were feeling that we had problematic relations with all neighbors. but in last nine years, during the second earthquake, we have proven that turkish neighbor relations could be improved. and today, if you go to turkish people and ask, do you feel any threat for many neither or how do you see the future of our neighbors? there will be no such psychological fear, like cold war that russians are the enemy. greeks are our enemy or iranians

or bulgaria is the former soviet. no, today this concept has achieved a success that turkish mindset has changed. everybody agrees that we need to have maximum integration with their neighbors. yes callier put them assyria, but it's not because of our choices. it is because of their domestic problem. the key is we want to have zero problems with the people. therefore i say process analysis, not picture analysis. if you have a picture today, you may say they have problems with syria. yes come with problem with your administration, but with syrian people, and in the future after a process i am sure we will be having excellent relations with the new syria established by the people of syria by the free

truth is serious. in order to avoid the existing crisis and that we cannot sacrifice for future relations with syria. there was a risk when prime minister girder gone -- made a prime statement from turkish national assembly against mubarak when 1.5 egyptian people gathered interior and asking mubarak to leave and zero criticized at the time the main opposition escobar continues, what will you be doing? and it was interesting. it was sent to me by my former colleague, expressing come at praising the relationship and expressing disappointment or at

least very polite disagreement about the statement. the next day i said, i trust egyptian people because egyptian people created one of the most impressive civilization. egyptian people and no. and because the buyer people, prime minister said to me this call that egyptian people should be given a chance in the history shows who is strong and he was right. after one week, mubarak left. if at the time you're reluctant and we were not sure about our values and we tried to praise or keep good relations with ben ali or mubarak, today turkish prime minister wouldn't be welcomed by around 20,000 egyptians maneuver to cairo last year september, 4000 -- 10,000 or so people in libya would worthwhile him in

four cities, waiting hours and hours for his arrival with thousands of turkish flags. here are her main preference is values. and there are problems that with our neighbors means excellent relations with maximum integration and excellent relations with the people of our regions. and we declared at their principles like active foreign policy for regional stability, regional -- reordering our surrounding region balkans, collocation can essentially shack on the middle east, the net to foreign policy, fort principle, in u.n., et cetera. so we made an adjustment in foreign policy and domestic politics. and i can say, in the last nine years, after nine years in power, turkey is one of the few countries which affect tabouli used that you post, the

aftershock of security earthquake in 2001. we were not tracked by security paranoia. we were -- we tried to -- we were not tracked by crisis. we try to provide and horizon -- a new horizon, a new vision to our region and to the world. we became number of u.n. security council. you know how we acted efficient they are. and we have today, even in the last two years, which opened 30 new embassies in different part of the world. in two years only, we have been 22 embassies in africa, five embassies in latin america, and three and a embassies in when there are -- there is a huge economic crisis. why? we want to make turkey a

country -- a center of stability and surrounding regions and a country providing new vision, new horizon for the inclination religions. coming to the third -- first in 2009, 2010, but the real work happen in 2011. this earthquake is an economic, political earthquake. and in this earthquake, where the economic, global economic crisis and its reflection to europe on one hand, and we have a regional political crisis -- transformation on the other hand. now, sydney and pa hand. now, sydney and pariah -- ankara, capital turkey, every

morning when i wake up and start to work him usually wake up in other countries, is still a semi-and in ankara, when we turn our eyes to her west, in europe, from precept is vain, there is a sum of economic crisis, democratic governments being placed by technocratic government in some countries and there's a huge worry about the future of your -- european union. and we, as turkey, we want to be in european union and we are following every event in europe -- european economy for future. when we turn our eyes to east and south, from iran, from iraq a mysterious specially up to morocco, there is a political turmoil, political change. and in the middle of these two crazy zone, there is a country having a stable, democratic

process, we had elections last year, one of the fastest growing economy. last year we were -- into quarters we were the first, and the other two quarters through the second biggest growing country and there's a country with the very act to foreign policy. when that area but is instead a game tunisia, it was a big challenge. it is a big challenge for the region. it was saved a challenge for turkey. the same day when bouazizi burton himself as a protest in protest or jane tunisia, are remain statements. i'm a special cabinet he did not wait to a strategic decision. our assessment was that this tunisia and revolt is not a

nation revolt. it is not revolt of one country. it is a widespread regional revolt because now it is time for a change. and we asked, what should be our foreign policy? well, how should we approach this process? and we said, we will be supporting the demands of your people, wherever they are. whatever they demand, it is their right to demand. and why? because we thought this is the flow of their history. and one of -- my speech last year in march i said, this is the normalization of history because there are two abnormal structures in the region. what was colonialism we separated cities, societies from each other, like french and

british colonies in syria or british colony and each had, et al. and colony of libya, french colony in algeria and tunisia. so these are all separate from each other. the second ave. analogy was during the cold war because there were two men was progress, south of communist thomas nowadays time to have one single regional ownership and throughout the cold war, because the arab or i'm because those the soviet type of government, there is an absence of link between the leaders and the people. and we said it was a risky decision. it is always. now, some people are surprised, as a fork or academician, how we

have two stake such a critical decision. usually academicians are long thinking, selecting people. that's the image of the academicians or utopia case the claim to me that my -- some of our foreign policy is utopia. if you make an assessment in each history values come you have to make courageous decision. and the leadership should show these issues. yes, turkish foreign policy took a risk last year. today it is easy to say, it was normal to say go to mubarak ordered was normal to be to save go to ben ali. you remember in tunisia some democratic western countries cited with said three in early days that the group will. we took risks. why? because we have a vision or

region. that vision for a beach in this new regime, new political systems based on the demands of the people in a new regime only integrated to each other around the values and true economic interdependence. that was our policy before, when we had good relations with existing authorities, because at this time there was no war between the authorities and their people. and this is our policy today. second principle was if we are on the side of the people, then how could we hope this process? and we said can reduce other means of diplomacy to the end in order to prevent bloodshed, massacres, bloody transition. in every case in the middle east and north africa are are unique in itself.

the demands are saying -- the processes pain. but the character of the countries, the existing countries are different. e.g. is -- egypt libya tunisia, they are almost all muslim sunni arab people, while iraq or syria you have much more diversified cosmopolitan indian states. the army structures are different. egyptians are different than they been army. each case is unique but the demands of the area can generation for all. and our approach to this transformation is the same, but in each case we had different

diplomatic methods to help through this process. today in syria, what we try to do for egypt and tunisia have because of knowing. first of all, let me say last month when i went to tehran, before coronary gave a press conference, i give a statement. i said, we don't want to cold war structures and i region. cold war tensions come a new cold war polarization i region. then last week in munich, the day when the resolution was vetoed, i repeated the same. we don't want to see new cold war logic rising regarding two or region. but today name? edmonton said the reaching new polarization such as shiite

sunni countries asked to polls. and this countries are making cold war against each other. were we don't want -- we don't want static oriented countries and revolutionary countries trade you don't want after camp david thayer was rejectionist camp, a combination camps of this type separation know or pro-west, anti-west countries. and i region today, there is one in single difference, those who are trying to keep cold war structures and those who are trying to understand the flow, the logic of the flow of history and try to respond to the demands of the people accordingly. what do i mean that's? mubarak was pro-west. said six -- assad was pro-soviet

and cold war and anti-west afterwards. mubarak work gadhafi was sunni -- some say it -- [inaudible] close to shiite roach, but not shiite at all. but our attitude against mubarak, said three, gadhafi and assad is insane and the demands of the young people and to rear and the demands today of the people of homes are safe. they don't look at this as pro-west, this is proteus or this is sunni, this is shiite. they have the same demands. but people interrater square, young people want to do is free and fair election, transparency, accountability. and what people in homs today want his same, rule of law,

accountability, free and fair election. so it means it is not an issue of shiite and sunni or static or revolutionary pro-west, anti-west issue. we have one consistent roach. turkey has a consistent approach. we are against any person and i region. we don't want to see autocratic tendencies. we don't want any regime seen the any country as if it is their own personal property or property of one archaic ideology, but blocks the people people of that nation. and turkey in principle is against foreign intervention. we showed this many times. but at the same time, if they are is an oppression by an autocratic leader against the people, nobody can expect as for international committee to be community to be senate.

two weeks ago i listening must go, i was asked a question that assad was -- had good relations before -- but you have some problems now, how do you evaluate? i said, before he was not fighting against his own people. now is fighting against his own people. when i went to -- last time to damascus in august, i made it very good to him. they said mr. president, if there is any foreign attack against you, we will be siding with you. but if you fight against your own people and for assistance decide either with you or with the people we will not even think why my minute. we will be with the people. we want president bechard said six to be like gorbachev, to

transfer an assist on to adapt after the cold war structures. he preferred to be like milosevic. it was his choice. and today we are siding with the people of homs at the people of sarajevo, like the people of gaza against israel or sarajevo again milosevic. for us, one of the oppressor from this religious background and another one if jew another one is christian. it's not different. oppression is oppression. we want to have a new vision. today, when we look at a religion, derek three subregions. one is north africa. if we had this meeting last year, i think many of us wouldn't imagine that in one

year, there would be free and fair elections in tunisia, in morocco, in nietzsche. but in one year, we are optimistic and we're hopeful because they were free and fair elections in these countries and there is a transitional process going on in libya. we have many challenges. we should not forget we should not forget in the first earthquake geopolitical earthquake, it started in 1991, but even in 1999 we had kosovo war. it is a long process. in fact, all the transitions should have been achieved in the middle east in the 1990s. but unfortunately the presence was much more stability rather than democracy in the region. in this north africa, no voluntary national organizations, actors, ngos, a regional powers should be having

full solidarity with the new governing in tunisia, which is a success college is a good coalition of three big parties. the prime minister is from a not a, president is from a leftist national party and speaker of the president is a social democrat. this is a good combination. they have to be siding with the new egyptian parliaments. we should not look at the composition of the parliament and think that there was some worry. even in washington, what would be happening to the secretary of israel if there is a conservative -- if muslim brotherhood government comes to power in asia? this would not be the concern. for the egypt, there is only one authority to decide, egyptian people. know what they're concerned should we does or should lead international politics.

if there is a democratic government, that democratic government will decide what is good or what is bad for the people. if the people is not happy with the government, the next day the election, they will change, not ice. we have to a full solidarity during this assist with libya. and we have to create success stories rather than creepy new images, negative images regarding middle east. the second zone is more cold countries, less populated, more income, and there are many young demonstrators. in kuwait, there was an election. in bahrain, despite his several difficulties last year, there is a root word. at that time also we -- i went to buy rain to discuss with both sides in order to open the way of dialogue, but at the end of the day, more stable. but the more challenging.

-- more challenging for those subregion is the third, which is from iraq, syria, lebanon -- a really very challenging neighborhood. and the back bone of this is today's syria. regarding syria, last year, we had three stacia coomassie. the first stage was bilateral engagement with the administration. we did it. we worked very hard, eight months, until september. unfortunately, weren't able to convince the administration to start a violent and go direct to the reforms. then we started after september we started regional initiative with the earthly. we supported all arab league plans, arab league observers. when arab league came to a point that is there is enough international support, we had the third stage, international stage, and the arab league

support to the resolution to u.n. security council, and turkey supported this resolution. unfortunately, there is a veto. now, at this stage, we cannot just waiting seed. we have to create a new international awareness regarding the sufferings of syrian people. therefore, in these days, we are talking and consulting with other concerned parties and that there's an order to create such an international awareness. so in short, the economic political earthquake, the aftershocks will continue to come. we cannot be daydreaming. it will be -- there will be many challenging risks in front of us. the two things, to references to make a strong. one, the values are different name. we will continue to defend the same values everywhere in the

world. second, at the foreign policy diplomacy, rational and active diplomacy to resolve this issue through peaceful means. if we can achieve these economic -- managed this economic and political earthquake, economic local earthquake and appropriate manner than a new convention, a new conference, a new restructuring of international organizations will come as the new challenge in an address because we we need now a new global order, a real inclusive global order. a political order based on dialogue, multilateralism, and economic order based on justice, and a cultural order based on inclusiveness and accommodation. all the regional issues should be referred to this new global order.

thank you very much. [applause] >> probably one of thee of the t presentations i think we've heard in quite a while. thank you, foreign minister. i've asked dr. aliriza to be the moderator for the questions. we only have about 10 minutes am afraid to say because he has to get him place us. bulent, please. >> yes, there's a whole bunch of fans. i'm a straight right at the end. so your hand. can you identify yourself? >> my name as said arikat from

al-auds newspaper, publishes in east jerusalem. sir, wanted to ask you about the southern part to syria, but palestinian israeli conflict. you see any movement in the 12 months and what role turkey will play in a row? remix site, since the agenda in syria i focus there. but whatever happens in our region to be understood could not -- cannot be understood without making reference to palestine into kurdish. others in the middle east merging. at the core of this crisis, with palestinian question. therefore, in this new era, there should be a new app push to the palestinian question. first of all come are for should be reconciliation of palestinian groups. in the last five, six months,

together with egypt, we are working very hard to unite al-fatah and hamas and to have one authority and one single authority in west bank and gaza, because without having one authority, even if one side makes a deal, a piece, it will be difficult to implement. and i am happy to say that there are some positive that will open a nasty note last week there were some positive developments. as you know, last week there was an agreement signed between mahmoud abbas and khaled mashaal in doha. before that we had not but abbas and ismail hiniyah come to turkey. we had meetings with colleague

michelle to encourage them. the critical term as both sides except to peaceful resistance. this is a clear indication that hamas is now a doubt any peaceful method of poet ticks. but at the same time, mahmoud abbas physics at dean if the people is under for so many decades, it is their right to defend themselves, to resist, but in a peaceful manner until peace is achieved. this is good citing palestinian side -- this is good news on palestinian side. we expect a good news from the israeli side. unfortunately, until israel didn't give positive messages, neither to the region nor even to american and. the settlement will continue.

the provocative statements regarding palestine is continuing. and the two state solution is not being defended openly by the members of israeli government. now it is time to decide, what is the future of palestine? nobody can expect this existing, status quo, to continue. palestinians deserve their stay. i have to be very frank here. russian veto was wrong regarding syria. american veto is wrong regarding the recognition of a palestinian state. at the policy is consistent with the human conscience, with the human wisdom, then that politics is sustainable. today, we'll global society, wherever you go, if you make a poll whenever, wherever you

want, all human beings come to humanity, is behind the recognition of palestinian state. and all human beings come ask xm dogmatic people, are behind the demands of people in syria. and these are not contradictory. as turkey, we will support the recognition of past onion state. if possible tomorrow, if possible today, this hour, because this nation deserves to have their own state. if there is a new negotiation for this come that israel must come to the table without making a pre-judgment, such as settlements. enough is enough. the people of our region including turkey, we are paying for this because of the prolonging of palestinian israeli crisis. israelis must decide what to they want. to them on wednesday? they are afraid of the demographic rights of palestinians. they don't want one state. do they want to states based on

1967 borders, not less, and east jerusalem as the capital city of palestine? this is the consensus of the u.n. security council resolution. this is consensus of the u.n. security council resolution. this is consensus of august. two state solution, then they must come to the table instead of building new settlements in the palestinian according to the 1967 borders. if they say that there will be no state, then they have to say this openly so that we will know who want peace, who want not to have peace. this new regional environment gives new hope for a middle eastern peace process. i hope this new logic of history, and act accordingly for

having a two state solution where palestinians and israelis have a mutual respect, but full independence and serenity. >> i think we may have time for one more question. can i ask you to stand up, please. [inaudible] schematically a microphone, please. [inaudible] >> mr. minister, you have a light it's showing that the iranian government. what is your take on the iranian attitude? how serious do they take the possibility of a military intervention by israel, number one? and number two, what kind of incentives will bring them back to their negotiation table with

the p-5 plus one? and finally, how do they justify comics than attitudes towards syria? >> regarding nuclear issue, as someone who does unshed hoods over this issue in the last five or six years especially in 2010 we worked very hard for ato with brazil. i can say i am very sorry in fact because of the failure of all of these negotiations, because i know to uncle details, throughout these negotiations, i became like a nuclear expert, because even for the last day of nishiki shins before tehran via, agreement was done, we negotiated months at 18 hours the table, all the details. last year we had the last round of talks and last-minute i went

to tehran. i encouraged and called for another round of talks. they said they were excited team. i spoke with cathy ashton and she except did and we are now working for a time for the next round of talks. knowing all of this, i can tell you the problem is not a technical problem. the technicalities of nuclear issue could be resolved in a few days. because it is discrete, what every man wants is the race for knowledge. we tell them you have a big other nations. but he will comply with npc and iaea regulations and they will check. what you want an p-5 plus one, that there is -- that should not be a nuclear military

technology, so there should be certain assurances for both sides commit to each other. for turkey, our position is clear. we don't want any nuclear military power. either a binary gender of the world. but at the same time, we don't want any limitation against -- regarding the development of peaceful nuclear technology. technical details are so easy to solve. the problem is there is no strong political will and there isn't a dead fish you of politicals. on one side, it is coming of course to negotiate, but there is a huge discussion inside iran because it became a national issue, so a possible deal shall satisfy iranian domestic public opinion. on the other side, cathy ashton was full, she's working very hard with good intentions intentions skillfully podesta

satisfy the parameters for six of their countries, in this sometimes may have different positions. i can say, if two negotiators come together with all mandate, it could be resolved. in mutual trust in 2010, through tehran d.o., what we want to achieve was confidence building in mutual trust. if the idea was implemented, 1800 kg of iranian low enriched uranium would have been taken to turkey. the number of the amount of leu would've been so minimal said they would be any possibility of a 20% enrichment in iran promised at the time freezing 20% enrichment. if these two conditions, especially fresen 20% enrichment has been achieved, in fact there is a -- this is a full guarantee of assurance that it cannot be a military technology to develop.

these issues could be discussed if there is a strong political view and mutual trust, as i said. so there are three options. negotiations i think that the only meaningful option, and which can create a result. but genuine and concentrated negotiation, not negotiation this month and after six months and come again. i told to those sites come and stay in like the pope, like stay in one room, discuss everything, then you can go. otherwise, in six-month come to some other regional parameters are coming, new tensions are emerging, new accusations emerging. one session, put everything on the table with all mandate, i can assure you in a few days a few days they will solve because i know both sides concerns and assumptions. second option, sanctions.

in 2010, we saw those implementing the deal, sanctions were imposed. would have been? and two years a rant produced much more leu. started 20% enrichment of meu. sanctions being imposed, why turkey is so interested, and because we are the losing party because of the sanctions and because of this tension. and third, and military strike telling you here i'm a military strike is a disaster. it is should not be an option. especially in the sister turning point in our region, we don't want to see another huge tension because it is not it just a regional tension. we don't want to see such a military strike you does not reasonable, it is not feasible. nobody with ink like saddam time, if there was one place, one attack, even that was wrong,

but from historic perspective, i have seen. in this case, it is not feasible, not reasonable, and we will weigh against it is turkey. we will never, never endorse any military strike for any military tension, and other military tension in the region. regarding syria, it is a big llama for iranians. i spoke with them very frankly. even the terminology is interesting. bashar assad once said that is a fight between arab nationalists and islamists. it was the nondramatic statement. if this is a fight between an arab nationalist aside and islamist groups, then where is iran's islamic republic of iran, and worse arab league? the arab league is supporting people come iran is supporting an arab nationalist. so these type of ideological

orientation is wrong. at the end of the day, including iran, our country should be showing solidarity with the people of syria. i hope they will understand that it is better to be on the right side of history and not the right side of the demand of syria people rather than opposing this demand. those who were posing against that -- those who are resisting are trying to prevent these events of the people, they will be losing in the future because i said from the very beginning, this is a difference between those who are understanding the flow of history and human conscience and those who are trying to resist against the flow of history. whoever is resisting, israel or iran or other countries, our same. they will be losing if they resist against these demands.

thank you very much. [applause] >> thank you very much. [applause] please let the foreign minister get out, because we've got to get him out of the building. thank you. apologies to all of those who had your handset. we just ran out at time. [inaudible conversations] ..

our international coverage continues with remarks from state and defense officials on the new strategic arms reduction treaty between the u.s. and russia. the chief trade negotiator talks about the treaty's implementation and the future of the strategic nuclear reductions process. this is an hour and ten minutes. >> good afternoon.

welcome to the brookings institution. my name is steven pizer, the director of the arms control initiative. first, if you have a cell phone either turn off or put it on silence, and then second, i will also like to express' the brookings gratitude to the fund which is generously supported the arms control initiative and make stevens like this possible. last sunday february 5th the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty had its first anniversary of the century of the force and put on notice about arms control agreements is they get a lot of attention when they are signed, and they get a lot of attention during verification process and then often the sort of fall off the radar screen. if you go back to april of 2010 when president obama and president medvedev met in prague and signed the new s.t.a.r.t. triet goblet of the tension in the last several months of 2010 when the treaty was being

debated for the part of the ratification process on the hill it got a lot of attention and in february last year, said it requested and foreign minister lavrov x gentrification its should be enforcing and you really haven't heard a lot about this. part of the objective today on the panel is to correct that and talk about what's happened in terms of implementation and how has that gone and then also take a bit of a peak looking forward, what sort of things might follow on the new s.t.a.r.t.. in the first panel we have a terrific set of speakers in the u.s. government. i'm not going to do the full biography because you have it in the program, but on my left, rose gottemoeller, the acting undersecretary of state for arms control in the national security. we have from the joint staff mike elliott, deputy director for the strategic stability and on my far right we have ted warner from the office of the security fence. the senior adviser to the undersecretary for policy of

arms control and stability. >> i think what we have here it's fair to say this is really the core of the leadership team that negotiated the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty. this by the way is the treaty that's a sea of pravachol and all of the amex. quite a production. but they really -- we are delighted to have them here now to talk about what's happened. so, rose, let's start with you and what's happened over the past year. >> quite a bit. thank you come steve, for the introduction because i think it gives the audience a good sense of how the treaty feels about it. it was a good effort with negotiators and to get it ratified by the u.s. senator, by the russian state and federal council and get it into force. but then ended kind of drop out of sight to everybody inside the u.s. government, so this is a

very welcome opportunity today and a bit of a celebration as far as i am concerned about the first birthday of the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty. i am also delighted to be here with mike elliott and ted warner and again as already mentioned by steve, they were my very close partners, leadership team of the delegation on the u.s. side of the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty negotiations in geneva in 2009 and 2010. so we are really i would say close-knit triumphant and we have many other people from the interagency involved as well and it was a super team on our side as the russian side, the russian side had an informal team of top flight diplomats and experts involved in the negotiation and the treaty also the interagency group on their side. i wanted to start by talking a little bit about the implementation of the treaty, what has happened in very general terms. mike elliott is calling to dig down deep and give you more

details about how the inspections are actually conducted so you get a feel for the detail and seriousness of the effort and then ted will pick up and talk about future but when the q&a comes we will hand of baton around in terms of how to answer your question. first all i would just say we realize going into the negotiation of the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty that it was going to be different than the last one that was negotiated back in the early 1990's with the 1980's, 1990's the s.t.a.r.t. treaty was a treaty that was born right at the end of the cold war and had a very important role to play in that it helped us to bring the nuclear forces of the soviet union and the russian federation denied states as well. that's the period of the transition in a very stable in an orderly way. we knew that this treaty was

going to be much different and that it was the first treaty that would really negotiate long after the cold war had ended so there were different things we had to consider. one was we were thinking about going lower. the president made very clear in his initiative speech from april of 2009 but we would intend to go lower in a step-by-step process so we wanted to ensure that the treaties of the process and gave both sides the flexibility in future to go low worse of the s.t.a.r.t. treaty is one of the basic tenets that preserved each nation's ability to determine their own strategic nuclear force structure giving both sides of flexibility to deploy and maintain our strategic nuclear forces in a way that best serves our own national interest. so that is very important post cold war nature of the treaty.

s.t.a.r.t. as a strong flexible implementation the gives great insight into each other's strategic forces and i think it is worth emphasizing right at the outset that the measures for implementation of the s.t.a.r.t. treaty whether verification or other types of measures are totally reciprocal. the same obligations on the shoulders of the united states as far the shoulders of the russian federation. so bear that in mind as we talk through the treaty that these publications are central for. the inspection process i will say at the outset has been going very smoothly. i would say in general the implementation has been conducted in a very businesslike and pragmatic manner. this was the attitude that we had at the negotiating table in geneva and it is definitely carried forward into the implementation process both on the russian side and on the u.s. side we've been keeping a focus on problem-solving, being pragmatic about how we go about it and it's really again i think

quite suited to the post cold war era we are now in where we have serious security issues we must address on both sides and continue to address regarding the nuclear forces but we can go about it in a very pragmatic and problem solving kind of way. throughout the first year of the treaty it goes from february 5th to february 5th. the treaty was entered into force on february 5th 2011 when the minister lavrov and secretary clinton exchanged the paper work to bring it into force, so we just ended the first treaty in that treaty. i've been joking ebit it was like tag team. the federation would announce an inspection and then we would announce one and they would. so the net result is they kept pretty steady pace with each other throughout the year and each conducted 18 inspections which is what we are allowed on the treaty 18 inspections.

now of course with the new treaty beginning we will begin again from zero of to 18 and i'm assuming again we will have the same kind of steady progression in the inspection process. through these inspections according to the terms of the treaty, we are able now to confirm the actual number of the warheads on any randomly selected russian icbm or slbm something we were not able to do under the start i treaty and once again come obligations are reciprocal over the russians can do the same for us and mike elliott will be talking a bit more about this so-called reentry vehicle on the inspection process. we have also both sides conducted delivery vehicle the exhibition. akaka the intent last month the united states conducted a bombers and an exhibition of the associated mobile launcher as it

was entering into the force. the united states and russian federation have also been chairing a mountain of data with each other. over the course of the first year we have exchanged 1,900 notifications pursuant to the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty. why so many notifications? these notifications help us keep track of the movement of each other's strategic forces and changes in status of the strategic system. for example a notification sent out every time a him bomber is moved out of countries for more than 24 hours. so we are exchanging information at a greater rate than under the s.t.a.r.t. treaty just to give you by way of comparison, 2009 was the last treaty year for s.t.a.r.t.. windel the force in december, 2009 and the first treaty for the s.t.a.r.t. treaty as i said went from february 5th,

2011-february 5th, 20 call. comparing those years we are 28.5% of on the number of medications exchanged but we are exchanging more information under the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty than under s.t.a.r.t.. on the notifications we exchanged a comprehensive database once every six months to two times a year. the full account combined in a notification to create what i like to think of as a living document to read every six months we have a comprehensive snapshot most of the strategic forces look like and from that six month period on the day in and day out basis we are updating the status of the databases with the strategic forces into the abyss strategic forces once again for the predictability and mutual confidence which is the whole point of the exercise. these data exchanges are providing a i would say much detailed picture of the russian

federation strategic nuclear arsenal than we have had in the past again this is true as well the russians are getting a closer look at our strategic nuclear forces get past. and of course both of us back up our exchanges of information and inspections of the national technical means satellites and other monitoring platforms that we use to really back up our ground with senator lugar like to say or the sector and also the other kind of information exchanges that take place under the treaty. ted is going to want to talk a bit more about this because he spent the last couple of weeks in geneva for the bilateral consultant commission, the so-called ecc the implementation committee which met for the third time that we had the good news out of the ecc meeting. remember telemetry during the negotiation there were some issues that were left hanging at the end of the negotiation the

needed to be wrapped up and knew at the bcc implementation process. so this week they were fined in geneva of the agreements that basically wrap up those issues and i'm not recommending it, not many people are interested in the town on the tree but if you're interested in those agreements appear on the web site of the bureau and you can get a look at them. and ted may montauk more about them. if you want to take on telemetry i do want to stress one point in my view helping to build a foundation with the next phase of the reductions the preamble of the s.t.a.r.t. treaty makes note of the fact that it is a step approach leading to the further negotiations so your hard work and thinking through with the next steps may be coming and it's a very i think the foundation that we have laid

it through the negotiation and now implementation of the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty and will help us as we move forward into the next phases. the last thing i will say there was that it appeals to all of us and many of you have heard this from me in the past i think the next treaty will be one that takes us into the more challenging direction. president obama defined the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty in april of 2010 so the next treaty should focus on the reductions in the three categories. the first is the further reduction in the strategic nuclear weapons that's always how we look to these negotiations in the past and the nuclear system is a missile or bomber and the forehead loaded on that. and in its juan churn has prepared for operations of god help us it wherever necessary. but in the future the president said we shall also get a

category of the non-deployed strategic nuclear weapons that is what been set for heldman research facilities and also on strategic nuclear weapons law strategic nuclear weapons sometimes called pact nuclear weapons of the president laid out an ambitious set of goals for the negotiations and we need to be thinking how to go about it and what the concept and procedures might be and with the verification techniques and technology might be that will be required for this more ambitious state of future reduction negotiations. with that i'm going to turn next directly to mike. is the right, steve? >> maybe you can describe a little more of the impact of the treaty on the u.s. strategic forces and how the u.s. military handle these inspections. >> thanks, steve, again for the introduction also for inviting us to participate in the

session. for me it is always good to get together with rose and ted because the strong relationship we build over working on this and the negotiators but the treaty together over year both on the u.s. side and the russian side. if the military is on both sides and has to carry through the actions. so writing this was a challenge for us. we were in constant communication with each of our services as insurance or russian counterparts more. and in the end, it's up to them to make interpretations window words are blurred or when there's different interpretations. so i'm going to try to talk you through the various mechanisms in the treaty including the hands on the business of running an inspection and how that plays out in helping both sides verify the tenants of the treaty are being met. during the first year as rose said, we have been working

relatively jill the gently -- diligently to carry out exhibitions and show what particular systems look like, demonstrations to show how we are going to do specific procedures. we've gone through some elimination's and conversion systems out there for the specific strategic delivery vehicles, and along the way we had the opportunity for both sides to conduct a team on-site inspections which was the full quota for both countries. now has rose said in an edition what underpins this is the series of modifications. she said almost 2,000 are made. the information is gathered together by the military services and passed through state department and then transmitted to the russian federation. this keeps them apprised of weapons movements as we move from spot to spot and i will point out a feature of this treaty doing that is when we

make these notifications we use what is called the unique identifier to not only tell them what system is moving that specifically what system is moving so it is the basis of the more full accounting system during this environment. now, when from time to time uncertainty or ambiguity comes up, we wrote in anticipation of that situation provisions for a bilateral consultations commission over the bcc as it is known. i want began to what they do specifically other than to note there's been three sessions so far. we worked through some of the early issues in terms of understanding what the negotiators met when they put this together. and if you have specific questions i think i will defer to ted warner who has the deputy commissioner for that return from geneva and the first session of the bcc.

now, we thought it might be interesting precisely how the military goes through -- and i say military on the both sides to go through the process, but i'm right focus on the u.s. perspective on how we go through the process of doing the inspection. the first thing that you need to understand in this process we declare data twice a year and the database declarations of systems, the strategic delivery vehicles and the warheads located throughout each country are done in a large way but it's a snapshot twice a year. when an inspection happens one of the things that will be done is we will give them to the inspection team as they arrive with specifics of what is at that particular case at that moment in time and will be in the relatively great detail. the process of inspection then is to use a statistical sampling

process to confirm with the databases and over the period of the 18 inspections each year to resolve over ten years it gives both countries an opportunity through the sampling to confirm the two sides are complying with the treaty. how this works as i said or you've probably read both sides have the right to posture the forces the way they wish in terms of the number of each delivery system, how many are going to be on each one and where they are located within their countries. this process leaves the outcome of the notification process lets them know where they are going so that on the day and inspection is called by one country or the other they then should have a good radio when they depart their home country with the expect to see. i will note some of the things that were in the inventory when we began the process have

already been taken off the books. an example of this is we finished the conversion of all of the heavy bombers so they are no longer capable of employing nuclear warheads and captured only in the conventional. at the same time, we've taken -- we are in the process of taking the remaining peacekeeper icbm launchers of the books through the elimination process and we are beginning the process of eliminating 50 icbm launchers for those unused during the early part of the treaty also along the way we've had an opportunity to start reducing the number of the reentry vehicles on each one of the minuteman three and we will soon start that process for some of the slbm launchers on each coast. those activities have been positioned through to the databases that are maintained because it is changing each week

or each month so that when the inspection is called and they are going to know that snapshot is for the moment and as you are aware we are headed down to these 700 who deployed strategic delivery vehicles that means slbm and heavy bombers, and part of this looks back and forth is that the forces on both sides if they are going to be a lot of rate effectively have to be able to move systems back-and-forth for maintenance. as rose said earlier when you take the warheads off or out of the launcher how that system becomes non-deployed so we report back and forth. that then flows through to the the database the inspectors will see when they get there. the next thing to think about is the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty if you want this to be true snapshot and the ability for each party to verify the triet needs to be short notice and so these are

literally short notice inspection. each side has to notify no later than 32 hours prior to their intended arrival costs at the point of entry which the united states is either washington, d.c. or san francisco. the base personnel are used as a sort of in trouble part of the broad inspection team comprised of members of the defense agency and then members from each particular genetic as they are selected. when the inspection team from the russian federation notifies the united states of their intended arrival and planted century this is the clue to the defense threat reduction agency who postulate the database available or website available to all of the military bases out there that the russian federation has initiated the

inspection process. at that time everyone for that particular plant will be aware that they may be vulnerable for an inspection. when the russian inspection team arrived at the base, they then notify the escort team within four hours of their arrival what they're intended inspection site is. at that time, the escorts notified us specific base and remember this is now still the have had a hint there could be an inspection coming. they now clear instructions they will be inspected and in fact the russian inspection team will be delivered to the base within 24 hours of the selection of the particular base that they are going to read when they do this this sets off a series of activities that the local unit as the unit commander ensures

his base is prepared to receive the inspection team and am sure that they have the opportunity to fully exercise their rights under that treaty. this thing -- this could be as mundane as making sure you have sufficient number of quarters available in the base building office and that could be up and in to noting the become moving people out for we have rooms on the dais to be a mature you know we're doing routine operations within one hour after notification any movement of the strategic delivery vehicles, a fence of the warheads on those have to stop and be locked down as it becomes a unit commander's responsibility to make sure each element of the criteria is met for the inspection team. the military will then move the russian inspection team within

24 hours and bring them to that particular base. where they will be met by the treaty compliance officer or tco. the tco is the day-to-day operations guide for any unit commander out there who makes sure anyone who has to participate in an inspection who knows precisely what they are going to do in terms of facilitating the inspection team's ability to complete the task. they will be the one that actually exports the art of the facility to ensure them to do that. they will make sure that the maintenance teams that have to configure pittard burba system is are ready to receive the inspection team and then actually walk them through the process. this includes again walk around inspections to make sure everything is ready in advance, and making sure any operations not germane to the inspection had ceased appropriately and

there is a tension here if you can imagine for both military is is the the right or responsibility to offer the other country the opportunity to fulfil all of their rights but at the same time they have a responsibility to protect from the security standpoint those things that are not directly involved in that inspection and so they have to diligently walk through this process on that. now there's basically two types of activities that are going to happen. i will start with the icbm. they are roughly similar to this and then let happens. on the icbm site, the warhead assemblies have to from the selected russian inspection team designated. will be told when they arrived at the base has many different missiles are out there placed in the launchers on that particular day. they will be told precisely how many warheads on each one of

those russian inspection team leader then selects which he would like to inspect and he has the opportunity to select, assuming there are empty launchers to designate one to confirm it in fact has no missile or warhead on a particular launcher. when the maintenance team goes under observation from the russian inspection team to the particular launch of that's been designated, they then have to go through a process where they separate what's called the front section from the icbm and they put it in the specially configured mobile vehicle that protect that front-end section from the elements. i will point out during this period of time the russian inspectors must be offered a full opportunity to observe this section to make sure that nothing is removed from so they can confirm with confidence it has exactly what we said was on

the front of that. that may not seem like a difficult task but in north dakota in january when the dirt and the snow are going sideways at 400 m.p.h. it's not an insignificant deal and you have to remember that there is a strong need to protect the weapons systems that we have out there from a safety standpoint, so we have to work through that mechanization to give them the opportunity to see clearly what is there and to make sure we protect the weapons system at the same time. after the inspectors are given an opportunity to look at the front end and confirm the precise numbers the system is returned. the russian inspection team can move off their empty launcher if there was one. they are then returned to the main operating base, whatever happens to be for that night.

usually we have an opportunity to do some sort of cultural event, and i will tell you a lot of times it is a trip down to the local mall to do a little shopping, certainly give them the opportunity to have dinner. they are given transportation back to the point of entry and they depart usually the next day. in between there there's one important thing that takes a little bit of work. if everything works right there are absolutely no ambiguities, the russian inspection team will report precision what they did. the uss 14 will correspondingly say with the observed during this period of time and the two teams get together and write a report of that and then sub net the report in a very detailed process. periodically there may be ambiguity a rising as to precisely what went on during that crisis and the inspection team will then write down in some detail what they believe the ambiguity was. the uss 14 will then in response to that right on what they

observed and what they believe if they are able to give it a response to the russian team at that time, with the situation is or what the clarifying information is. for those things they are not able to work on site, they may ultimately end up in this bilateral consultations commission in which we work through whatever the issue was. sometimes it is simply of procedures we need to be able to stand in a different place to see the item of inspection more quickly, or it wasn't absolutely clear because of the lighting conditions but was there or something like that. but each one of these things is not unusual in this almost worked through a very short period of time. jumping out submarines. the difference is the flow. when they arrive at that base de contact the tco. which ones are on the base the would like to inspect and they

then are briefed on the of configuration of that particular submarine and good given an opportunity to designate a longitude in which they go through basically the same process. it's just loaded in a different position and if there's an empty launchers on the submarine they would also have an opportunity to look at that. on the dollar's a little different. both sides understood it since the early 90's the bars of both sides a longer sit on alert so there wasn't exactly similar situation of declaring how many weapons were on each one of those bombers and then going out and inspecting the numbers to confirm that. the reality is even if they are not loaded zeros and no. and so through this process the a rival in the of bomber base we declare the number of bombers there and that there are no weapons on the bombers would be the normal condition. the russian federation then gets

to go to the selection of three of those heavy bombers and in fact confirm that there are no weapons on the particular bombers through that process. the same procedures in terms of ambiguity is carried through and the same process of taking back to the point of entry and returning to their home country. in reverse, the u.s. military which populates inspection teams with the defense for reduction agency goes through a reciprocal process with the russian federation which we go through each one of their facilities and basically the same process. with that i will turn it back to you. >> maybe one to offer a couple of comments on the bilateral commission and also as was mentioned, the president described the new s.t.a.r.t. and talks about another step coming. would you like to talk about the u.s. government is doing with

regards to what follows the s.t.a.r.t.? >> thanks, steve. excuse me. i welcome the opportunity to see my colleagues again. i see mike and the pentagon perhaps all too often, so that's not so unusual, but rose and i crossed paths less frequently. i just came back on wednesday from the commission meeting about two weeks in duration. the treaty says that you should meet and generally set the standard of two times per year. if you don't want to meet you can sort of agree on one another to do less and you can also threw a notification process decide to do more. we met twice during 2011 and once here in the calendar of 2,012th though i guess we were actually still in session to train at the time of the birthday of the force.

a couple things. about 20 or 25 people from both sides we have representation from all the interested components on both sides. the ministry of defense, the ministry of foreign affairs, ross adams, the people but worry about the nuclear weapons themselves and the russians play. on the u.s. side we have representatives from the department of state, from the various portions of the department of defense come from the joint staff, sometimes from the strategic command which is the overall operational command that has oversight of the strategic nuclear systems from the office of the secretary of defense. we often have representatives from the services and will have other specialists. a couple examples what we've handled within the three meetings of the bcc, there were some things rose made reference to the treaty set within the first year it was up to the bilateral consultative

commission to fill out some details to get ready to do this exchange of information, tell the metric information is this radio signal that monitors the performance of the missile during a test launches. so telemetry here is this information that is used by the testing party to monitor the performance of the missile. that's why they've done the test launch to see if it is performing the we that is supposed to and it is an opportunity from the other side to get insight into the key devotee of those missiles. well i'll we had to reach a couple of any billing agreements we had to hold demonstrations including the media the was granted used and the demonstrations the was used to be compelled in midsummer. in the wake of that, the russians said we would like to get an agreement about how the procedures for the future demonstration might be. we worked through that in one

session in mid fall and completed it in the session earlier this week. the other thing that we had to do is we had to agree with great precision about the portion of the flight of the missile which telemetry with the exchange, and there was a process gone through to say we are going to go from point x to y and you will see that if you are interested in going in the state department website you can see the actual agreement with a carefully crafted language on the precisely what portion of the flight for which telemetry will be provided itself. and finally at the beginning of schav each year, you have to make an agreement now on the calendar year previous of which number of flights are going to exchange. and that is also a process that we went through and completed the decision on the exchange. we conclude the agreement here in the early 2012 to the news about the flights that were conducted during 2011. one other thing that i would say

about the bcc as we end up with these in the committee's particularly in the first year of the application of the new treaty. we were building on the experience of the hole inspection process that mike out lined. we were very much building on 15 years of experience of implementing s.t.a.r.t. mccxxxv is in charge of the hold of some people that are actually in the real year of negotiating painstakingly not so much what is in the treaty because it is only 15 pages long were so. there's only one page, i guess 70 page, one on inspections we had 80 some pitches in the protocol and another 90 pages in the amex and we had to go step by step wincing as i heard the description of what we had to go through because we had to go through that very detailed.

one new thing we did in this treaty is we had these things called unique identifiers to be every missile that falls in the scope of the treaty has to have a single unique alphanumeric indicator. this is a submarine launcher or slbm or intercontinental icbm and heavy bombers equipped for the heavy armament. one of the things we found on both sides is obtained painstakingly seven the protocol where precisely to put this unique identifier sure enough when it came to implementation on both sides, there were minor missteps. somebody put on the second page of the missile instead of the first stage of the missile. somebody could decide when they were supposed to put it on this. so this kind of thing which is natural when you have implementation over many different bases. so this, the other issue that he talked about is when you are holding an inspection where do you stand?

can you make sure you have continuous observation of this and this? we've had to work through those kinds of things to read again we've worked through them in the highly productive manner. many of the people who negotiated the treaty are involved in this process of implementation, and you can tell even by this third meeting of the bcc that the manner in which we have parsed the work and went to the working groups and figured out, settled most things and other ones we say we are not quite there yet let's work on it on the international cocoa we can exchange the drafts of the solution and we may solve it during than or we will do it the next time we meet. let me talk about what we are doing now and what lies ahead. there is no doubt president obama made clear it time of the signing of the treaty that he looked forward to at least one more round of strategic arms, nuclear arms reductions with

russia. he did make the roads will just repeat the point we want to broaden the scope the strategic arms limitation process beginning in the late 60's and running until the ground 1980 the strategic arms reduction process renamed by president ronald reagan and not directed not just toward limiting the buildup but actually driving down the strategic inventory. we really are at this stage we need to broaden the scope from the strategic nuclear weapon to the non-strategic nuclear weapon. most of those are what we but as the tactical nuclear weapons that is they are delivered by the short range distance. the delivered by the artillery pieces and can be delivered by the fighter-bomber aircraft and they can be delivered in submarines and nuclear torpedoes or other likes. the russians have tended to even have a nuclear antiballistic defense system around moscow and

even had the nuclear tests for the service air missiles systems. so the president said is this time -- the next time we look at this we really ought to look at the total operational inventory from the nuclear stockpile of the to be operational within canada would be strategic and non-strategic and both deployed and non-deployed. the deployed within, and again it's a little bit repetitious is one that is literally located on its delivery vehicle. in other words or in the case of its -- inside its launcher its silo, the mobile transporter director launcher for the land mobilized for its ballistic missile submarines. but the vast majority of the nuclear weapons held by both sides are not in this status.

the bus to dirty or in the nuclear storage sites and they may be located in the closely operating base and they may be located more on the regional basis or they could be large sort of central stockpile of such systems of 2010 and announced our total stockpile was 5,113 nuclear weapons. these are both strategic and non-strategic deployed and non-deployed. the russians haven't revealed a number so the numbers you hear and approximations are at least in shouting distance of that and what the russians have, though the distribution of the weapons are quite different. but president obama said next time we conclude a treaty at least the objective would be to bring under control of the

treaty and reduce strategic or nonstrategic deployed. there are various ideas that have been bruited about about this. we have not yet gotten close enough to the negotiations to be now in the u.s. government trying to precisely the site on the manner in which we are going to attack this problem. we are doing -- it's interesting how this has gotten to the way we talk about but bcc we keep talking about doing our homework in russia so we talk about who's assignment is to do the homework, so we are giving a couple of important homework assignments if you will in the u.s. government and in the nato alignment -- alliance. we are doing of the nuclear posture review implementation or follow-on study which has been underway since about summertime and continues and will be completed in the months ahead

and that is a very important study to provide the basis that ultimately this study will come through the interagency process the high levels and go to the president himself and it will allow the president to then adopt his direction and guidance that he will provide back to the department of defense and the back of the strategic command on the nuclear planning and also will influence the course of what is possible in terms of our future force posture and structure. so that important homework is going to provide the basis for what is an acceptable nuclear posture for the united states nuclear force structure for the united states for the deterrence and defense and protection of the united states and its allies and that will also provide the basis for sort of how much can we reduce.

at the same time that we are doing this internal lamarca and looking ahead towards our structure and posture in nato they are doing a deterrence posture review and that's important because the u.s. nuclear capability and parts of it in particular that those non-strategic weapons that are located within europe are very much a constituent and important critical part of nato's overall nuclear posture. nato did its own strategic concept in which it continued to endorse the need for having the nuclear component of its overall defense posture. that concept was adopted at the lisbon nato summit in november of 2010. in the wake of that, the decision was made to do this nuclear deterrence and defense posture review which is to look

at the nuclear conventional missile defense forces that nato needs to look towards deterrence and defense and the rest of this decade and onward. that work began last summer and it is due to be completed to come through the north atlantic council and basically be endorsed by the heads of state when they meet at the next major nato summit which is to happen in chicago in may. so puerto rico -- everything has to have an acronym of course, deterrence and defense posture review will influence some of these issues and within nato they also talked about a final thing i will talk about. the next steps of arms control are not nearly this question of a negotiated agreement. the russians do not appear right at this moment to be that interested in particularly the presidential elections there and presidential elections here to

getting under way a new negotiation of a challenging nature as i just laid out to be as as we look forward to perhaps starting those negotiations within a year or two, we are also looking at the different intermediate steps that can be taken. transparency and confidence-building measures like information exchange could we exchange information on both sides of the total nuclear weapons stockpiles? me be even more granular information about some of the strategic forces non-strategic about possibly the location. these are the kind of things we are thinking about, nado is speaking about more in the year of the atlantic and its european russia context, so there are steps that can be taken. finally the last point i would make is rose's former boss has

recently stepped aside. ellen tauscher has been chairing and continues to be a special envoy in that responsibility to help chair a running dialogue or conversation as we often call it these days with her counterpart the deputy foreign minister. they've been looking at a series of issues. the russians have made clear if we are going to move on to the further nuclear reductions there is a set issues that needs to be addressed at least in parallel as this goes along. the most controversy all has been the question of missile defense and that's got injured much connected to the potential for the russian and nato cooperation on the territorial missile defense in europe. the two sides are working on that problem. there are other issues like the long range the systems. the russians are concerned about what they believe may week to

leave to be the weapon of state. they talk about the need to address conventional arms control issues in europe. as the treaty seems to be having run its course in many ways what are the next steps for the conventional arms control. so ellen tauscher and then undersecretary tauscher and her counterpart have been meeting periodically, and they've now committed during this year to meet in a work called strategic stability talks. that macroterm has been used to cover such conversations in the past as well. in this case, it's supposed to be a running set of discussions about some of those neuralgic issues if you will and to discuss the potential for moving forward and building basically the basis if we have sort of unilateral homework we have alliance home work.

the kind of the more we are doing with the russians themselves in this step-by-step process is a set of strategic dialogue we had a major expanded meeting on that matter in december we look forward to the whole series of these meetings that are likely to run through the rest of the year. let me stop at that and i'd be happy to answer questions. >> okay. let's go ahead and open up the floor for questions. if i could ask if he could state your name and affiliation and try to keep your questions short we have about 25 minutes for the q&a session >> the nuclear deterrence is based on threat -- >> the microphone isn't on. >> [inaudible] stat just speak up.

i think you can do it. >> nuclear deterrence is based on the threat with certain nuclear weapons. what is the target we are threatening to destroy with the under deploy strategic warhead? [laughter] >> certainly won't go into any detail. let me talk about the overall philosophy. the philosophy that's been articulating since the late 1970's and onward was called at that time the countervailing strategy had been at one day the wide range of targets i can't get into the specifics on that.

[inaudible] >> i've seen some of the -- i actually know the individual in question. i won't name him, but i did business with him. he was a longtime student of the soviet military affairs and we worked together on some issues. there is a controversy associated with the question of his total study of the study that he and his group of students did using a lot of open internet sources to it i was working on the site of the nuclear arsenal just today. i don't know what an unclassified number is on that at this time. i'd like to give it to you. it certainly is considerably

smaller than just the u.s. and russia. i think an unclassified number you will see numbers in the 50, 100, 150-something in that neighborhood perhaps 200, but think of that as compared to the u.s. number given almost two years ago of the 5,001 and the russians are at least at the level where we are if not a little bit more. so again, the chinese nuclear arsenal is certainly at least an order of magnitude smaller than those numbers. >> the other point i would like to stress is that in terms of the nuclear doctrine, the chinese have pursued a much different course from the cold war doctrines that were worked out by the soviet union and the united states and the legacy of which we are dealing with today. so i think it's important to bear in mind that the whole promise for the way the chinese think about nuclear weapons and their doctrinal approaches is

very different, and it leads to always say the requirement for small or overall structure. >> i would add one thing to that. one of the things the u.s. would welcome as a chinese revelation of the number as the united states have done over the number they have as we would encourage the russian federation. >> the chinese have characterized their doctrine just to build on the point as lean but effective. some call it minimal deterrence, but they clearly want to be able to hold out risk and certain chinese major figures have made comments about the might look at risk to do that. but they certainly have ever since coming to them to being a nuclear capability in the late 50's on into the 60's. they have had a certain approach 1 billion but effective deterrence that can hold at risk

probably urban industrial complex. >> [inaudible] >> i'm not in the position to comment on that. i know that there are differences of opinion by those who study what is benign not in that position to be a spokesman on that issue. >> my name is jack segal. first a comment to all four people on the stage that they should be complimented for their accomplishments. this is very tough going. i recall talking about warheads with the ambassador and making no progress at all a long time ago so you have come a very long way when we are talking about telemetry on the web site. my question though the does go to this question of the number of weapons we are still reading. the 5,000 or so on each side and

the 1700 or whatever the number is deployed. and the idea that the chinese feel secure enough with a much smaller number of deployed. maybe. i don't know, the facts about china now, not involved. is there a move in the process that gets us down to much lower numbers? when we look at the cost of maintaining the warheads and, you know, really if we are never going to use that arsenal, do we need to maintain it only because the soviets and the russians are still maintaining it and can't we agree on the more efficient way to do this? >> perhaps i will start and then my colleague can add a unit. president obama from the very beginning of his administration was very intent on moving in the direction of the total elimination of nuclear weapons. that is what his speech and

prague in 2009 was all about in april of 2009. but he really brought that position and to the administration come into his presidency from the canteen. he was working those issues even when he was still in the senate and i think he became convinced of the necessity moving to the lower and lower numbers, and eventually to the total elimination of nuclear weapons. the president is not in practical about this. he said this is going to take a long time. he said it's not something to expect to happen in my lifetime, but nevertheless, we must be prepared to move forward in a step-by-step way to suddenly eliminate the number of weapons in our arsenal through the negotiated reductions, and also to work to eliminate the nuclear warheads overall. in the meantime, maintaining the safe, secure and effective arsenal. so those two things go hand in hand, and it is i think a inherent part of this

administration's overall approach to the nuclear enterprise, the to the nuclear doctrine and policy and force structure. ..

and it's going to become important for others in the world to do the same thing. but again, it depends on the environment and the instructions are given. >> without breaking arms and patent ourselves on the back, it is worth noting i've been interested in i studied this issue for many decades, the figures i've seen in the last two years have set a one point we had 31,000, 35,000 nuclear weapons in the united states and the russians might have as high as 40,000. so i get a sense you come down a germanic way. our high watermark to the strategic world is probably 11,000 to 12,000 associate with long beach international strike system so the remainder must've been to defy logic here. we've come a very long way. how far can we go down among

other things that make you think it is this an issue of reciprocity here. we still believe that there ought to be something approximating rough parity between ourselves and the russians. but it's a very good question. i've a feeling senator speakers later have opinions on that issue. it's sort of how fast you can go. the president is very clear that he has been objective in mind, a very long-term object is and my hunch is that you'd like to go as far as the traffic there and that is why we need to get this homework done, look at it and work with the russians and see if we can in fact take this next step downward and broaden the scope. this'll be the first time we would have taken on a non-deploy attack school world or the non-deploy strategic world. so it's ambitious.

if you have a treaty on this, mike explained on action debate in a challenge with e.u. have to open to inspection these nuclear weapons storage sites. that is a very sensitive issue. and how would you do it there is some sort of sampling process. one of the major figures in the white house on this matter, the interview on this a year or so ago and he was talking about the challenges of verification that will go with this and particularly not to declare things very easily. it tried to have inspections that try to see people are living up to their declared data. so that it's another thing that is going to make broadening the scope that's going to have real challenges in this area. but we need to go nowhere. and i think the president -- and as a president is very much committed to do so.

we need to then work out a pragmatic set of steps that we can in fact undertake with the russians. >> just to clear -- i think what he said when you mention the nuclear posture and the follow-on study, as a result the president will say this is what i want to be able to do with my nuclear weapons and that then leads to a number, correct? >> two are related with how much money should be out of this, how do you in fact serve all of the interest? the united states is the only add her scary as russia. there's other potential at her scary. this whole calculus will have to go in. >> one small vignettes i wanted to back. you might notice makes sense we have been here before. we came up these numbers in our going back down again. just an interesting vignette today we concluded the association of the treaty. i asked a colleague cynthia lee to provide me historical data because i want to see when i'm

on the bus. so they look we had a chart together indicated to me and i look at it in 1550 deployed strategic warheads last time that number within ours and all was in the late 1950s, 1956, 1957. actor robert at the top of my head. he might have noticed that this treaty will bring our deployed nuclear warheads to members we haven't seen since the 1960s the first full decade of the nuclear age and that is where that comes from. we actually did go back and look to see when was the time when we last had a small number of strategic nuclear warheads deployed. we still have work to do obviously, but i think we have managed to really move things along. >> we have time for tumor questions. david hoffman. >> david hoffman from policy magazine. i like to ask you.

you talked about hope for more transparency on the russian side. secretary perry, 18 years ago when he created what he called the hedge that part of it was due to geopolitical uncertainty. if the teen years later. we know a lot about what is happening in russia. this administration feel we still need to hatch at the geopolitical uncertainty purchase for spares? that they don't need to for geopolitical uncertainty, is that something we can go lower? >> hold that thought. david. >> with the financial legislation for negotiating and more importantly forgetting the treaty ratified. not all treaties get ratified. someone came up with the previous question. have you had a question about speeding up implementation of the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty. the paranoia starts over years and there's people that question why you're spending money to

maintain systems you party agreed to get rid of. is there any chance that the russian could speed up implementation? >> all take the last one. >> let me take your question. the guidance that we have been given is seeping through this carefully. these are in fact nuclear weapons and we don't do anything without thinking real hard about what it is. the policy community is going through a process of determining what the approved or it makes a assessing the forward in parallel with that, we are looking now at steps that to be taken. i can tell you that there is some room for acceleration. clearly we give ourselves enough room during the negotiation on both sides seven years after implementation to get to those levels. there isn't a lot of room in their entry because it just takes time.

environmental impact stations have to be done for example for eliminating icbm launchers. the mechanics associated with alternate submarine, ballistic missile submarine is a finely tuned and to insist on. so it just takes time. i am sure that we will notify the secretary with that minimum time we can do it is an march out when he is ready to go. i'm not sure there is a lot of room in there to go a lot faster. >> on the issue of the strategic weapon types, the hedge issue is linked to two issues. one is geopolitical uncertainty. the other is technical, potential for attack of failures within the various components of the triad, known as icbms, slbms and bombers. i believe they talk about the fact that there still are both of those are relevant. i think the technical heads

tends to be a more deterministic issue and what the size of it is. it is an issue clearly been looked up in the current review because the size of the head required as part of that calculus about how low can you go. >> i would just add on that point there are different ways that you can address the issue of need for technological hedge. one way that we have been considering i'm looking at very seriously and developing a budget for this to have a modernized weapons infrastructure, a so-called response of infrastructure would be more capable of responding to psychological surprise than our current weapons infrastructure. that is one of the reasons we've been placing an emphasis on modernizing the infrastructure and making up a responsive to those kinds of responses. at the very considerable investment considered over the

next 10 years will only kick in that aspect in the 2020. >> okay, please join me in thanking our panel. >> more on the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty between the u.s. and russia. analysts focus on election-year politics in the u.s. and russia and how it may in fact action on the treaty. this is about an hour. >> let's go ahead and go with our second panel. i think we've got a very good position from three very senior officials of the u.s. government about how the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty has been implemented over the last year and a sense of where the u.s. government wants to go.

but we are going to use the second panel here to drill down a bit more and take about what happens now, what comes after the new start? for example, the nose rose gottemoeller talked about homer. the nuclear posture in the follow-on study. and so would like to talk about what issues might arise on not and also what possibly might it be for arms control which is a food here and also in russian election. and help us think of these questions. we've got two very good experts on the question. first, g and lodal who has the full bias but today number of senior stations in the prior defense, including undersecretary of defense for policy, where these questions back in the clinton administration. and then we also have james tried to listen thinking in action and is a senior associate for the carnegie endowment.

so why not just artisoft and in terms of the homework assignment, what are the sorts of questions that are being now behind these closed doors? >> well, thank you, steve. i will try to provide a little bit of insight into this very complex process that goes on, mostly in omaha and strategic command, other places as well, where the people involved are trying to develop the actual floor plans that would be implemented should the president decided to undertake a nuclear action and try to determine how many weapons they need in order to create an operational war plan. this is really a very different process from the process those of us who look at aggregate numbers and how much is needed and so forth to go through. now, there is obviously a close relationship between those two

and a lot of what the press and review from last year tried to do was make that relationship even closer. in particular, to specify that the primary purpose of these weapons is deterrence. it came close in posture review to saying that the only purpose is deterrence, but they also included reassurance of allies and a few other things that is hard to argue nuclear weapons don't have any role in doing. but the posture review says that dean should be structured in such a way that the united states could move to appoint that the sole purpose of this nuclear weapons was deterrence. so that means that the people who put together the plans first and and foremost have to decide what is needed for deterrence. we discussed theoretically, but they have to decide specifically what kind of targets to have to destroy?

do we have to destroy them right away? if a war breaks out, do we have to be able to sustain nuclear operations over a long period of time? doesn't matter what kind of forces argues on what kind of parties? lots of complicated questions that they have to decide. now, the way these issues get decided, which are decided pretty much by war fighters, check out people can in fact determined to limit on what future policy can be and therefore it has a big impact in many cases their judgments involved. so this particular process is going on now to my knowledge that is the first one of its kind with the press and has made clear that he wants to make the final decision on the key issues associated with these questions. it has been rare for the president himself to get involved at this stage. usually these plants have been put together, approved by the secretary of defense and the

joint chiefs of staff and briefed the president. in this case from the president wants real options and wants to look at what is being proposed. let me touch briefly on the major categories of issues that will have to be dealt with. first and foremost and son of u.s. questions about this in the first panel. the target sense. with turkish or nuclear weapons attempt to destroy? and again, what is necessary for deterrence? what do we hold i'm talking about being prepared to destroy because nobody is proposing a u.s. first strike. we don't rule out the possibility of a first-rate partially because technically that possibility is going to be there regardless of what we say. the posture review makes clear that a first strike is not what we're trying to do. we are trying to hold at risk

should we ever be attacked by nuclear weapons. search kinds of targets and enough targets that we can destroy and make it clear to the other side that should ever attempted to attack us at first. and this depends upon a lot of factors, who we think might be an attacker is a lot different than new missile from the korea or iran, from several missiles coming from russia. none of these states are in principle. this is a very difficult thing to calculate. what is the rate targets that? second of all is the question of how promptly can we count of a presidential decision to launch these weapons? this posture review makes it clear that the president wants to move away from relying on

being able to launch their weapons before they can be destroyed by incoming attacks. and in fact, be able to write out the attack. and in some ways, these characteristics are afraid against each other. he may need more weapons if you get rid of the launch because he may have a higher risk that by this time the president made a decision to retaliate, some weapons would be destroyed already. so the idea here of courses to avoid some kind of accidental war, semaphore that escalates immediately when that is not what has to occur and therefore get away from so-called hairtrigger decisions and give the president a chance to -- and the ability to survive long enough to consider what his options are and what is really happening. the third issue that is raised in the posture review, but really settled to my mind for

the foreseeable future is this question of the triad, having three different types of nuclear force is. bombers, missiles, land-based missiles and sea-based missiles, submarine-based missiles. there's a major change in that they are reduced to single warhead. this is something that some of us have been pushing for 20 or 30 years. it has a very nice characteristic because it means if you have approximately equal weapons on the other side and you have only one warhead on each silo-based missile, you can't gain anything militarily by trying to attack them because just for reliability and accuracy purposes, you have to target of these two have a reasonable chance of destroying one of the other side. so the first nozzle moves against you if you try to attack single warhead missiles. so this is a stabilizing move on our part to reduce the number of routes on this missiles to want.

that makes them pretty much as a hedge against some kind of failure in the other forces that will solicit orders that has easier and more reliable and hobbes were survivable command and control as you look at trying to reduce any prompt launch and no longer chart to target, datacom force that do not respect. now they really are two other combos of our forces. we really have five compliments. we also have deceived the weapons that we maintain. president george h.w. bush unilaterally eliminated about 5000 tactical weapons and we kept a few of them and they take on relatively speaking an increasing important that the other numbers that come down. the ones that we have committed to a nato allies and a few others that we keep not deployed, that could be used on

aircraft if we so needed that type of the capability. so this posture review -- this process going on now will have to consider those weapons as well. and then outscores there at the back of plug-ins that has been mentioned. and it will be important to see whether the military commanders believe those weapons played any operational role at all. if they doubt, then the number that you need can be determined strictly in terms of maintenance considerations and reliability in the fourth and without considering up durational fat tears. and the bush administration, their posture actually gave these but then something of an operational role in that hasn't

been officially refused that time. so, all of these questions will have to be dealt with and again i will emphasize that is not an easy task and we shouldn't be little of the work that the operational -- the operational command has to go through in order to come up with its recommendations. at the same time, it is important to be strong civilian oversight in the defense department and were probably in the government to process them in many cases there are justice that are scared to go beyond pure technical military questions after the address. >> jeans, ted warner mentioned in the first section that there are strategic since i love going on between washington and moscow, but certainly it's not the intensity we had in 2009,

2010 when you have negotiators full time. so i guess the question, are there things in the arms control world we really impugn what happens in 2013 at the russian election behind us? >> i think it's necessary oeste pan out and about with the united states would face that is the next round of arms control. once you have that long, you can then starts to think about what's possible in the short term. there is a fundamental asymmetry between the two sides objected to the next round of arms control. the united states is primarily worried about russian nuclear weapons. russia is primarily worried about u.s. conventional weapons. few have heard of u.s. officials talk about the president

cooperating both nom de plume intact to the call nuclear warhead in the next iron. i'm the russian side of things, russia is firstly worried about u.s. conventional weapons that have the capability of destroying its nuclear weapons. the most obvious example of that is a u.s. program called conventional strike to develop high precision moderates for medical weapons and in that regard the russians also have formal ngo destruction. sometimes they're not u.s. cruise missile. what does i wrote a in the russian view because that enables the hypocrisy and occasionally the russians bring up the old topic of intense

suffering worker. the five topics there. another thing the russians are concerned about is the euro during the cold war leaders used a nuclear weapon to compensate for its convention superiority. the russian space and say we do the same thing now. so you're conventionally superior. if you want us to get rid tactical weapons you've got to do something about forces in europe. and finally, the only type of nuclear weapons the russians really care about on the u.s. side or might really care about are the u.s. military deployed weapons and in particular the russians say they were missiles that are not loaded with as many were the u.s. could upload this air war has done to the extra missiles. the u.s. has type but not deployed weapons. let's do something about them.

the russians say the missile numbers. we don't really want to do the verification of individuals. luscious lemon and nurse. let me say that the weak issues such as this menu, the russians would actually put on the table if negotiations ever became. i don't expect them actually a program on every issue, but beyond moralistic defensible prompt global strike that is certainly on the table, one of the remaining issues is not a point. but in any case the u.s. wants to do with the nuclear, russia wants to do with conventional. because the two sides will have to be making this trade off against different areas, negotiations will be extremely long and difficult. and of course we've cited on what it's going to jail.

the u.s. is not willing to accept negotiating limits on ballistic missile defense. and on top of that, is the sense of politics is deep reinfection right now. it's very hard to imagine either state in 2012 been willing to rethink a risk on arms control negotiations. the comprehensive surety is a long way off. there've been some talk in the u.s. about what i call you start heavy. and you start with lower limits. i think it's a great idea. i think the russians have absolutely zero interest in not. so i think the message is really a lot could happen in the next year. very little i predict will happen in the next year. the discussions between under secretary will presumably

continue. those i think are very important for scoping out the issues, identifying opportunity. so i wouldn't in any way be little time, but they are not negotiations. another thing i think could happen the unilateral step to each side that will avoid making negotiation if and when they command. brush of her incense has disgraced you can develop being a heavy icbm. this is a liquid fueled, gigantic missile with lots of warheads. russia is not going to cancel back, but perhaps one could imagine the russians not funding it too heavily and would take longer to develop so they might be some chance of incorporating to arms control.

the problem with this system, the converse of what jane was saying about the advantages single warhead is these missiles really lack stability. on the u.s.a., for instance, i'd like the u.s. administration making the case much stronger than it has the congressional global strike is this niche system. yes there may be utility for, but the u.s. only needs a relatively small number in the fifth on and that may pave the way through some kind of agreement on how to do with this in an arms-control context later on. frankly that is all of it 2012. looking a bit further forward in 2013 perhaps, i think there are a vast number of informal confidence and trains. it measures that the two sides could pursue that would advance the goal. i think the goal has to be

treated. you will get the russians to agree to a process that doesn't have a goal as a legally binding limit of some kind. but i think it would be very beneficial if the two sides could agree that that goal should not prejudice informal confidence voting and transparency measures along the way. i think ted warner mentioned information. that's one good example. let me give you three examples of what i think would be implemented relatively quickly and would help both the way to a treaty. first, i type of nuclear weapons, the single easiest thing you can do is to verify the absence of technical nuclear weapons on bases where they used to be stored, but no longer are. both sides say they are basic in that category, particularly under are these weapons used to be stored, but no longer are. let's go in and verify that that

mutual inspections to verify they are no longer there. for reasons i don't have time to elaborate, that's actually a very good first step on the way to a the accounting scheme for all types of warheads, strategic, not just reject, deployed and not deployed. but that is a good first step. secondly, i'd like to have this cruise missile issue at the past. i cannot imagine the u.s. a very green to full arms-control limits on missiles. but nonetheless, they're worried the u.s. conventional cruise missiles pose a threat to the survivability of solos. a useful thing to do with be a joint assessment between the two sides to analyze the conventional cruise missiles actually pose with you. one could imagine a very quiet behind the scenes joint study by

the two sides, not to the public at all, but just working behind the scenes or alternatively the two national academy would perhaps be a good venue for doing a joint study high-tech enclave formed nongovernmental experts. and finally, in i would like the transparency of each sides nuclear weapons production complex beast we started in the debris before the start. there were tears of bilateral visits between los alamos. these were for the purpose verifying materials, the u.s. sharing best practice with russia about the accounting for plutonium and keeping it safe and secure. but nonetheless in the process of the these limits, the two

sides visited exceptionally sensitive areas of one another's and complexes. now as we go to a lower number, production complex has become relatively more important. your ability to produce weapons, how quickly your answer becomes is, if not more important has a number of veterans who have in the arsenal. see you go to lower numbers. you'll want to have some idea, perhaps some rest. he between each sides by the destruction complexes. so i think it is a good way of making progress towards that long-term goal. and the fact that these visits have happened before will be for a different purpose. i've demonstrated this is the kind of idea actually implemented on if there's political will will to do so. none of these informal

confidence and transparency measures they expect to see happen in 2012. however, i think after the election when both the domestic records on both sides and there's a tremendous amount that could be done that would advance the relatively long-term goal of a new treaty. >> okay, let's open up the floor for questions. >> we don't have the microphone. just project loudly. [inaudible] did not between the objective of moving towards the alternative only in our non-proliferation because our posture on

immigration depends on reassurance and extended deterrence, which works against moving forward. i wonder if steve also could comment. >> well, let me say that first of all i include extended deterrence, which i will describe weekly for those in the audience who might not be familiar with all of the theological terminology. this is the deterrence that we provide to our allies. so we have this is a tricky application with japan, europe and other cases, israel in places like that are extended determent is the fact, but not governed by treaty. but in effect, we say don't build your own nuclear weapons. you don't need them because we

will use their nuclear weapons to deter any new air attack on you. now, there is a subtlety there which is to deter any nuclear attack on you. we don't assert that our ends can deter any attack of any kind on our allies and we believe that we have a working together should have adequate conventional forces to deal with threats. so i think that this gets into the whole question of why are the paths to see are the most sensible approach because you can't really unravel all of this if you are in a world in which nuclear weapons are seen to have military and political uses that go beyond the purpose of deterring the use of nuclear weapons by others. now if in fact you can get all states to agree to that purpose and say that it the only useful purpose for nuclear weapons and i've seen some pretty close

already have an affect everyone has said if everyone else would give up to nuclear weapons, so can we. the policy of china's sincerity they thayer. because they have a policy that if you say would never do that first, you say pretty much the same thing. it's not absolutely precise, but pretty much the same thing. so if you could get into that kind of situation, you could envision a world in which if everyone was reducing more or less simultaneously like we are trying to do with russia now, an adequate deterrent could maintained until it in effect the last minute when the last weapons were produced in the deterrent could be produced as you go along because it's the other side has blessed weapons, you need less to deter the possibility that they might use them. so that is the concept for how you get out of this box.

it's a long, difficult process. but as long as we are in the box the area now and we are not in a path to zero and that requires a regime and all sorts of stuff to get on that path, proliferation is going to be fair, at least in my view because anytime one state has nuclear weapons, the one thing that really works is deterrence if you want to protect yourself against the nuclear weapons. some of those staples you threaten that is not already nuclear power and they will feel very much motivated to develop their nuclear deterrent. we see that most romantically with iran and to some extent with north korea. north korea right now south korea feels threatening north korea, but so far they are willing to rely on our nuclear umbrella and not build their own nuclear weapons. but stay that way forever? iran has a lot at stake in the

region that would eat within -- target within range of the weapons they had even today. and so, if iran develops a nuclear weapon, can we provide enough of a nuclear umbrella all other states can also share that responsibility providing a nuclear umbrella? it is tough to do that and therefore the incentive for proliferation is there. so it is kind of a complicated answer and i apologize for that, but you get to the heart of the issue and there is no simpler answer to it in my view. >> let me make a couple of quick points. one of the clichés from the cold war is deterring your adversary is much easier than assuring your allies.

allies tend to believe that much is necessary to deter their adversary than the united states believes is necessary. so there is a gap between the assurance and i think the goal of policy has to be to do back at her very careful intensive dialogue with allies. i think a classic example of that was the obama administration's handling of the tomahawk land attack. this is a field cruise missile in the u.s. arsenal. and it was a system that has been deployed in storage and in the run-up to the 2010 nuclear posture review was escutcheon about whether it was the commissioner. the strategic commission which was a congressional bid appointed the commission in 2000 made more and very, very strong claim against dismantling key

dynamics. they said we shouldn't do that. what if our administration did what it set out to message a very high-level and engaging with the japanese government and explaining to them why in the view of the obama administration they would not undermine security of japan? after very hard work and effort, the japanese government run into that. i have never found a japanese official say that it is a problem it is dismantled. you'll find voices in the ngo community were very unhappy about it. i have never heard of serving officials say even in private they were unhappy and that is how i think you have to handle these issues. you have to really engage with allies and convince them that your point of view that

dismantling such a number of weapons won't undermine and incidentally you can see paper on the next step. he mentioned a fantastic suggestion of reconstituting with the group that was set up to engage attali during their negotiation and that's the way of handling this issue. >> i think there is this tension between reductions and how do you maintain the confidence in the part of our allies? i'm just about done the difference between deterrence and reassurance because i think you are seeing this as it was playing out in the deterrence review and the coming years, where on the one hand right now from unclassified sources they are 200 american nuclear bombs in five countries in europe as the american era. i think if you type of people in

this town do we believe those are necessary in europe for purposes of determining an attack on our european allies? the former vice chairman of the joint chiefs of staff assess that question. he said these have no military utility that they cannot do anything that the u.s. strategic bases or capabilities. i suspected he took a poll around town. most say we don't need to have those weapons fire. it's also a recognition that it is not just the united states. his 20 independent nation and a number of those allies are not so comfortable, they still feel to nuclear weapons, even though they may not have military capability, so have public utility affiliates in the american commitment. so while there may not be -- they have to be there for deterrence per se, i think that there is a strong e.u. and washington that you have to take account of the insurance allies

and if you're going to draw down the nuclear presence or perhaps disseminated, what are the mechanisms to ensure allies than in fact their security will be good. some examples are missile defense may be one way was not nuclear weapons but for example missile defense will be the american military forces, relatively small approach. for those governments then american military president would be the degree of insurance. it may not replace, but there may be mechanisms that reduce some of this friction between the elements to describe. >> could add 1.2. just to sell a difficult code that does, returning to the question of south korea, the united states has never taken off the table, so to speak the possibility of using nuclear force is again a north korean

attack on south korea. north korea maintains a huge force, 20 miles from the edge of the soul across the border and it would be very difficult with conventional forces for the south koreans to recall that invasion. as it is now. and to koreans have, over a period -- since the korean war to rely on the nuclear umbrella of the united states to give them some confidence about when this is happening. the nuclear umbrella used to include all those eliminated when president bush 41: mineta to tactical nuclear weapons. that took some real diplomatic doing to make sure that did not fit our alliance with south korea. subsequent to that, there have

been reductions in the ground floors and south korea. further exacerbating this problem. so if you read the nuclear posture review carefully, the united states provides no first use pledges and so forth. they don't apply to north korea because the words are carefully written so that we do not take that off the table at this point and not clearly has got to be in my analytical view one of the reasons why the united states could not say the deterrence of nuclear attacks is the sole purpose of her nuclear weapons because in that case we didn't feel diplomatically we were able to take the possibility by using nuclear weapons against the conventional attack off the table. >> in the back.

>> michael copeland. just a quick question. how do you view these initiatives in light of the military reforms going on in my respect for a lot of interest seem complete a disconnected with russia's conventional forces. i would like to hear why you think rationally choose to pursue any agreement on missile defense. thank you. >> the short answer is i don't expect russia to pursue a lack of the agreements without a suitable balanced pro quote. i recognize that the u.s. had a security confirmed. russia had its security conference. by and large both sides security

concerns are partly genuine and partly manufactured. as a kind negotiating tool. so i hope the two sides cannot be successfully trade off across these two domains. i said in the beginning the u.s. wants or fashions on that area. russia is predominantly concerned about conventions. i don't necessarily predict it to be very difficult to create, but i think i am clear that unless beachside respects and addresses the other side's concerns, nothing much is going to happen in the future of arms control. and that wasn't clear from attack, i'm not terribly often mistake about the next two or three years. i'm not completely pessimistic, but it will be very tough going.

>> i would just add on that at i spent a lot of hours like everybody perhaps that you talked to today in the room with russian officials from the very senior russian officials negotiated arms control. this is something we have to learn how to do together again in this new world. we have done this successfully in the past and now we move forward with this new start treaties. that being said, i think right now the burden is on russia to move this forward. russia has got itself in a real mind with its doctrine and statements. i'm the one hand rashad accepts and knowledge is the west is not a threat and the state is not a threat appeared on the other hand, their rhetoric continues to be very strong about nato and nato threat in russia and very strong about american missile

defense threat and the russians deterrence and a bunch of things i did, which has no basis of fact. there's no military capability to do these things the russia sets forth as the threat that permits russia from agreeing to further arms control. i see a whole lot of what is going on now as a result of russian politics. yes forces are restructured and much less they can handle any growth dress that my -- that russia might face today. but by keeping this large nuclear force and putting forth these reasons why this very large nuclear force has to be like it is until the united states makes other changes in the fairly small amount of effort we put in missile defense in europe and so forth, i think

it is not going to change until this internal problem inside of russia, political problems just change because the substances and tear. >> let me follow up and ask you to make a couple points in c. if i'm being overly optimistic. to look at nuclear arms reductions above and beyond these other issues. one is that analysts are starts numbers where is the u.s. military plans to be at the 700 allowed by the treaty and the 1500 deployed strategic warheads. now pressure can't because a lot of their systems are going to come out of service do have new two submarines at sea one says will be 10,211,100. the second where russia may have

an interest in non-deployed warheads and it's not just the united states is more nonfood warheads, but if you look at all of the intercontinental astuteness owes on the american side are going to have a man-to-man warhead will carry a single warhead. inside i think the average will carry four or five warheads. see sympathy for a.com and the russians don't have that capability because they don't have the anti-seize their spirits of how much of the incentive for the other concerns? feedback well, in private this is first and undeployed issue. this is very much the argument that everybody in the arm controlled, governments and nongovernmental effects you're worried about the government to

do with that problem by dealing with u.s. undeployed warheads. i think i would be russians. but russians say when you say that is that kind of verification would be true in truth and we would rather do with those by limits on missiles. we want to limit the number of missiles in them that way the architecture. i think this is unfortunate. it he in russia's in acting various potential quick procol ltd. on undeployed and non-tactical. i haven't seen a huge amount of interest to mac i.t. on the russian side of the think it's an extremely good idea, one i hope the russian would take seriously.

again, on the fact that the russian forces because of its dismantlement are down in numbers, again, i think both sides that should be able to agree to be essentially you start have a been a lower number. for mail conversation there is very little interest in that. this is going to be able to hold 10, 12, however many more had. babel enable us to build up our system very quickly. unfortunately, it will be in a very destabilizing way. but nonetheless, that's the kind of russian response to depend on the threshold. i think both of those are ideas that i personally like them

personally think will be very good ideas. i am just not seen -- haven't seen very much interest on that amtrak to discussions. >> can i say that this issue at the tactical nuclear weapons is really key and what goes around comes around. i recall president nixon's last sunday meeting when i was there secretary kissinger president nixon and when we were surprised by the president handing over a big chart, which shows thousands of americans tactical weapons deployed in europe, all aimed at russians. and i was given the job to write a paper explaining why this wasn't a threat to russia. well, that was a hard thing to do ask chile. and now, it is on the other side. not that the russians tactical weapons are aimed at and can hit

the united states, but they are aimed at banking get our european allies to whom we have a formal treaty extended deterrence commitment. and so, we are met to treat them as it does things for threats to us. and so, this is another reason why looking at the total number four has switcher deal simultaneously with this question not deployed strategic weapons intact to go out there and, what's really when they go off is just as much damage as the deployed ones. and if there were a period of confrontation that was extended, that led up to some kind of real nuclear work with russia, they would have to be appear that was quite extended and the weapons could be put into teary graphically on both sides. so it's a real risk or furthermore, certain that the russian tactical weapons and to some extent not deployed

strategic weapons are more susceptible to depression and fast and fun in the hands of terrorists and the ones on operational systems and that is a major concern for us as well. all of those things i can think that i would have very much of a common interest in dealing with this problem. it is not just our interest rate or interest. it is a common interest and hopefully the political situation will evolve to a point with a common interest can come to the floor. [inaudible] >> does anyone think there is a realistic threat over the next four or five years from new start over something like vertical defense class can anyone comment generally on what is driving their paranoia? maybe it's not that i don't understand about what goes on in their and their political situations, but it just seems that the major obstacle is making any further progress over

the next two years is on the march in side. is there anything else in the offing that gives you any optimism that we can cut recess paranoia on the part of the russians? >> i think it is helpful to recognize any of turning that question that it is not monolithic in different histories and russia have different thing about the facts. the kind of technically informed -- what the technically confirmed community sizes we know that what being deployed right now poses no threat, but what we are concerned about and i'm quoting from memory there is a paper written in russian that kind is very, very senior russians looking forward to

general is your t-shirt rocket. with a set and i quote is this a republican party returns to power, then in 2020, we have massive deployment lambastes amnesty based on estate-based missile defenses, then lower numbers could be seriously undermined it. that is almost exactly closing. for that i think is what the concern is, that the u.s. has never said, this is the endpoint for missile defense. and with multiple systems, there are very serious analyst who do worry about potential threat to the survivors. and what they further say is the threat is compounded by the fact position convention weapons. clearly ballistic missile defense can't annihilate a first strike on the way over.

but if with conventional weapons the u.s. took up most russian nuclear weapons, and those that were left at the retaliation could be taken out with bmd. you know, let me say i think this is fantastical. for in a different number of technical reasons, i think bmd is very unlikely to work against highly sophisticated missiles and advanced countermeasures like the russians have. and neither do i think the hyper fission weapons arafat is against mobile missiles. i also think russian concerns are genuine. and i think they are very difficult. i would also say that these russian fears mirror almost precisely u.s. fears from the late 1970s and early 1980s when the u.s. was very