monroe, tanish humphrey, sandra fluke of georgetown university law center, law students for reproductive justice, tea sefer of american university students for choice. thank you. ..

>> and the need for comprehensive women's health care must take priorities to the catholic bishops. as a student who does not practice catholicism, i chose to at catholic university because it provides a world-class education, a top notch faculty, and it's in a city full of opportunities. catholic university prides itself on welcoming students of all faiths, and all we're asking for is for this value to be upheld in the health care, the university provides for its students and staff. we are not here to ask the

catholic bishops to support a woman's decision to use contraceptives. we are only asking the catholic bishops to let women exercise their individual religious freedoms, and make their own decision in regard to their reproductive health. during a visit to my universities health center, i informed the doctor of my decision not to remain absent your i was told i need to start taking care of my body and protecting myself. so i asked, how am i supposed to protect myself when my university doesn't allow condoms or other contraceptives? and what catholic bishops do you propose those students who have severe medical condition which can be helped through the use of oral contraceptives should do? have you ever felt the pain of a very insists or cramps so

painful you need prescription painkillers to get through the day? know, bishops, you have not felt this pain. yet, you make decisions for millions of women with such conditions. and the university certainly expects all students to lead a virtuous lives. oliver, we all know that abstinence proves unrealistic for many college students. the university has acknowledged that sexual activity on our campus. however, its attempt to confront these uncomfortable shocks of life by mandating single-sex dorms, has been less than 100% effective. and it is time for the catholic bishops to consider the health and safety of university communities and provide the same access to contraceptives without co-pay that has been deemed necessary for all women by the institute of medicine. catholic bishops, i suggest you think about what it would be

like to spend a day in the shoes of a 20 year old woman, before of using your authority by demanding they comply with your value. i, as well as thousands of students at catholic universities across the country, support the obama administration's regulations regarding birth control coverage, as was the entire package of women's preventative care coverage. we will not compromise. we will not back down. religious affiliated organizations have the obligation to do what is right by providing women with unfettered access to health care, and we refuse to remain unheard. thank you. glaa[applause] >> well said. this is the students take my name is kathleen kennedy townsend. i'm the oldest of 11 children,

so clearly i know coming from a time when contraceptives were not easily available. i have four daughters, two of whom attended a catholic universities. and i want to say clearly that catholic women of this generation no that they need contraceptive coverage. they need it because they are women of conscience. they make decisions wisely, and they can make decisions about what is in the best interest of themselves, their families and their health. so bishops, don't seem to realize that 98% of catholic women use contraceptives. 98%. that means that the bishops have not been able to convince the women they are right. the bishops, therefore, should not use the power of a government to do what they can't do themselves. the fact is this is a moral question, and the question that women can have the opportunity and the right to decide for

themselves. this is what this whole argument is about. it is also about politics. 28 states already require that large institutions, catholic institutions, cover contraception's. 28 states. so why is it at this time at this moment in this political season that we have heard this problem? i think it is incumbent on politicians to support the obama administration you're out there supporting women who say that women are people of conscience, as you will hear. mentioned the people of conscience, too, if they're willing to listen to the needs of women. thank you very much. [applause] >> my name is erick orantes. i am a senior at catholic university of america. i was born into a catholic family. i was baptized catholic, and all of my life i attended catholic

schools. but as much as catholicism has been an influential entity in my life, i must say women have also been an influential entity as well. [laughter] now, not only my mother who taught me the strong characteristics that i have, but my very first foothold and steppingstones were from women of my city, of my state, and of my country. my first internship in san francisco city hall, up to congress with madame nancy pelosi, i have answered for them all. and they were forever grateful. and i am forever grateful that i stand here today defending women's health programs on campuses and all over the united states. let us explore how conscious structure and -- a contraceptive is proceed among catholics. we toss a number, 98% of catholic women who are sexually

active use contraceptives. this is an overwhelming majority that the catholic church chooses to ignore. and this large block of believers must, cannot be silenced anymore. religious leaders are stipulating tyrannical measures upon a minority that heavily relies on these medications. their statements and decisions not to support women's health programs directly affect my colleagues and my friends, that have to travel at great lengths to receive the health care they desire. secondly, we must take on this religious liberty complex that devout leaders rally behind to push and notion passionate and oppressive notion on a minority. as these group of men decide how to manage women on our campuses, they cloak themselves behind the first amendment. they speak of persecution of

their religious freedom, while trampling on the liberties of women. as a male student, i am appalled at such hypocrisy. all men of virtue should stand up for equality, especially when it comes to the independent decision-making of an individual. male or female. men should rise with women, and fight against injustices that shackle the progress of society. equal access to health care for women is not a religious issue. birth control does far more than what the catholic church proceeds, and aids millions of women around the world every day. religious power houses are hijacking our first amendment and the manipulated the american population to perpetuate the façade that the church is the victim to progress. the real victims are the 98% of

catholics who have to hide their contraception views, and be shunned from an important entity in their lives that should be more accepting than judgmental. this is not a war on religion. yet, the church has repeatedly denounced the progress of women. the 98% of catholics, along with all other contraceptive users, and defenders of equality must stand up against and a rationale he that is increasingly becoming the status quo. president obama has done a great deal to protect women's health programs, and we are forever grateful what he and supporters of women progress everywhere are doing to keep health care accessible to all. we will continue our efforts to support health care for women on campuses everywhere. thank you. [applause]

>> good morning. my name is keeley monroe and i'm speaking today both both as a forum universe alum and has a reproductive justice advocate. and i in here as my fellow speakers, who say where a woman goes to school over where she works should not determine her access to contraception. we are perfectly capable of making that decision ourselves, and the law should support us in that. i remember as an eager 18 year old ready to forge out into the adult world on my own, thinking there was no big a decision and decide where i would go to college because it would help shape who i would be. i chose fordham university in part because of the catholic teachings and traditions that he learned as a child, and because i connected to the jesuit traditions of quality education and public service. for them promised to nurture my

individuality, and nurture my individuality, and promised to challenge me to recognize and confront injustice. and in one way it did uphold that promise. i am dedicated to those two causes for justice and i so deeply respect the chance of education that i received a lasting values they instilled in me. but boredom also let me down. not to sound like a cheesy personal, but i was single 18 year old single, likes control of my body, looking for a portable contraceptives. and finding contraception at fordham was about as easy as finding a good men through a want ad. [laughter] micro friends and i, we figured out how to protect ourselves and how to stay healthy, but it wasn't on fordham's account. but by denying us access to

contraception, fordham didn't support us as they have promised to do. they put obstacles in the wake of us reaching our potential in fulfilling our promise to them, challenging social injustices. this idea of social justice that exudes so presently for me, and many catholics, seemed to be lost in the current battle over contraceptive access. social justice is a value that requires us to recognize the needs of others and help them to fulfill those needs so that they can lead healthy and productive lives. the u.s. catholic bishops claim these same values when they say that the hh as decision violates the catholic religious beliefs, but there vision doesn't include women. they say that it violates their religious conscience, but whose conscience really matters when it comes to birth control decisions? as my fellow speakers have said, most women use contraception at

some point in the life, including 98% of catholic women, and judging by the fact that only 10% of u.s. catholics believe that church leaders have the final say about contraception, i think we can all agree that a woman's own conscience matters the most in matters relating to her health and life. the affordable care act is about filling a need many women face, helping us to get access, a call -- contraceptive assets without co-pay is an important role in doing that because it will make women healthier and families more economically secure. the u.s. catholic bishops want to move us away from what the affordable care act means to do by limiting access to contraception to certain women based solely on who they work for or where they go to school. this is simply wrong, and an injustice to all women. i am here to stand with the

president and hhs, and a decision to stand up for me, and the health needs of today's students on campuses like fordham. thank you. [applause] >> hello. my name is transfixed. i'm a senior majoring in sociology at georgetown university. i and at rich cordray are for hoyas for choice, a pro-choice organization that is not officiate due to our stands on abortion, birth control, the hpv vaccine, condoms and most other areas of reproductive health. hoyas for choice is the only place to get condoms that are for free, or any comments at all go on georgetown's campus -- >> we are leaving this event to go live to the white house briefing room for remarks from president obama. >> hello, everybody. >> i was asked going to say goodbye but i guess it is afternoon by now.

as part of the health care reform law that i signed last year, all in insurance plans are required to cover preventive care at no cost. that means free checkups, free mammograms, immunizations and other basic services. we fought for this because it saves lives and it saves money. for families, for businesses, for government, for everybody. that's because it is a lot cheaper to prevent an illness and to treat one. would also accepted a recommendation from the experts at the institute of medicine, that when it comes to women, preventive care should include coverage of contraceptive services, such as birth control. in addition to family planning, doctors often provide contraception as a way to reduce the risk of all very and and other cancers, and treat a variety of different ailments. we know the overall cost of

health care is lower when women have access to contraceptive services. nearly 99% of all women have relied on contraception at some point in their lives. 99%. and yet more than half of all women between the ages of 18-34 have struggled to afford it. so for all these reasons we decided to follow the judgment of the nations leading medical experts and make sure that free preventive care includes access to free contraceptive care. whether you're a teacher or a small businesswoman or a nurse or a janitor, no woman's health should depend on who she is or where she works, or how much money she makes. every woman should be in control of the decisions that affect her own health. period. this basic principle is already the law in 28 states across the country.

now, as we move to implement this rule, however, we have been mindful that there is another principle at stake here, and that's the principles of religious liberty and an a noble right that is enshrined in our constitution. as a citizen and as a christian, i cherish this right. in fact, my first job in chicago was working with catholic parishes in poor neighborhoods, and my salary was funded by a grant from an arm of the catholic church. and i saw that local churches often did more good for a community than a government program ever could. so i know how important the work that faith-based organizations do. and how much impact they can have in their communities. i also know that some religious institutions, to those of billy with the catholic church have a religious objection to directly provide insurance that covers contraceptive services for their employees. and that's why we are originally

exempted all churches from this requirement, an exemption by the way that eight states didn't already have. and that's why from the very beginning of this process i spoke directly to various catholic officials, and i promised that before finalizing the rule as it applied to them we would spend the next year working with institutions like a catholic hospital and catholic universities to find an equitable solution that protects religious liberty, and ensures that everyone has access to the care that she needs. now, after the many genuine concerns that have been raised over the last few weeks, as well as, frankly, the more cynical desire on the part of some to make this into a political football, it became clear that spending months hammering out a solution was not going to be an option, that we needed to move this faster. so last week i directed the department of health and human services to speed up the process

that had already been in vision. we weren't going to spend a year doing this. we were going to spend a week or two in this. today, we reached a decision on how to move forward. under the rule, women will still have access to free preventive care. that includes contraceptive services no matter where they work. so that core principle remains. but if a woman's employer is a charity or a hospital that has a religious objection to providing contraceptive services as part of their health plan, the insurance company, not the hospital, not the charity, will be required to reach out and offer a woman contraceptive care free of charge, without co-pays and without hassles. the result will be that religious organizations won't have to pay for these services, and a religious institution will have to provide these services directly. let me repeat, these employers

will not have to pay for or provide contraceptive services. but women who work at these institutions will have access to free contraceptive services, just like other women, and they will no longer have to pay hundreds of dollars a year that could go towards paying the rent or buying groceries. i've been confident from the start that we could work it out and approach your pictures as i promised. i understand some folks in washington may want to treat this as another legal wage issue. but it shouldn't be. i certainly never saw it that way. this is an issue where people of goodwill on both sides of the debate have been sorted through some very complicated questions to find a solution that works for everyone. with today's announcement we have done that. religious liberty will be protected, and a law that requires free preventive care will not discriminate against

women. we live in a pluralistic society, where we are not going to agree on every single issue, or shared every belief. that doesn't mean that we have to choose between individual liberty and basic fairness for all americans. we are unique among nations for having been founded upon both these principles, and our obligation as citizens is to carry them forward. i have complete faith that we can do that. thank you very much, everybody. >> what have you learned from this experience? >> president obama in a very brief announcement reversing some of the original intention of health and human services rule on religious employers providing contraception am offering birth control services through a insurance. now saying that those religious employers will not have to do that but instead that insurance

companies will be the ones that will be directly responsible for those birth control service. we open up her phone lines to find out your thoughts on the issue that's been talked about a lot this week in washington and osha. you are the numbers. (202)585-3885 if you're a republican. democrats it is (202)585-3886. independence and others to 025-85-3887. will get two calls in just a moment. been the coast the white house for associate press just ahead ahead of the presence comment wrote that they fear has consumed media attention that threatens to undermine president obama's reelection bid just as he was in stride over in the economic views. political reality forced the white house to come up with a solution to a complex matter much faster than anticipated. coming up next let's go gophers let's go to than in philadelphia who is under democrats line. what are your thoughts? what did you hear from the president?

been a key so clearly states the case for what i think should be. the opposition has muddled the waters and sent passions high. i am into with the present and i praise him for what he is doing. >> host: to a republican line next is michelle in tampa. i, there. giunta i don't think this was ever an issue regarding contraception. whether it's available because it is available for everyone who needed this. this was a first amendment issue. and i think that is what is getting lost in the story and the reporting. that it is the first amendment religious liberty. that's why the president kept saying that. that's the issue behind this, not whether women can have contraception. they can. it's available. you can get that anywhere. any health department, there's

plenty of places -- no one is barred. no woman is barred from getting that prescription. this was a constitutional issue, a first amendment issue on religious liberty. >> host: thank you for your call. another caller from florida is on our independent line in palm bay. >> caller: good morning. >> host: good afternoon. go ahead, joe. >> caller: i want to know, all right, this is a wonderful thing he wants to do, not. why should i be paying for somebody else's contraception? on not having any of the phone, i shouldn't have any of the cost. >> host: what do you think the president's comments, now that he expects the insurance companies to pick up the cost now? >> caller: that's right. so the people that actually have to pay for their own insurance are going to be responsible for donating to the cost of other people's contraception. >> host: let's hear from

brentwood maryland. democratic caller. >> caller: yes. unit, italy an amazing as to how -- for women's health. i would like to know how they would react if the shoe is on the other foot. number of viagra and less you pay for it. and i'd like to know how they would react to that. but everyone has a right to choose as to what they want to do. and no one should have to stand in the way of them getting that type of help. >> host: the issue of the health department contraception rule has been talked about quite a bit at the annual gathering of conservatives, the conservative political action conference. we've been covering that since yesterday. coverage due to more. mitt romney will be speaking there this afternoon within the hour. you can follow that on our companion network c-span. in ohio, this is just and on our republican line. welcome. >> caller: hello.

i'll be happy to pay for viagra if i need but i don't know what the hell that point means. anyway, the present is such a disingenuous man, that it's kind of stunning listening to him talk about free health care. and, where does this concept of free come from? who is paying for this health care? if such nonsense. and for him to backtrack, you know, it is all calculated country plan on doing this from the get-go anyway. he likes to agitate people and pretend he is such a calm, rational human being. it's just not the case. >> host: thanks for your comments. here is aiming in bridgeport, connecticut, on the democrats line. go ahead. >> caller: i am calling to praise barack obama for the decision he has made. it benefits all women. and i believe that the choice

should be in the woman for what they decide to do. although there is something, you know, i feel it is better for the government to pay for that, than to pay for the abortion of so many women that is doing. so i praise him for the right decision and i would like for the republicans to stop -- [inaudible] he is president of the whole country, not just the democrats. they should cooperate and do the right thing for all people host for a couple more minutes of your phone calls and they will show you the presents, took we mentioned the coverage of the conservative political action conference went on in washington. mitt romney as i said within the hour. jonathan wright and politico about the return of the culture war is the headline on his article this one. he writes that there's good reason for republicans to welcome the fight begins talking

about culture wars. it is one in a series of culture war issues that have surged to the forefront of the political debate and knock the economy off the front page, with a reference there to the discussion in many of these speeches about the health departments world. new jersey, bill on our republican line. >> caller: how are you? things are everything you're doing a c-span. a lot of the callers i think are missing the point. this is not about a woman's right. this is not about the catholic church's views on it. this is a constitutional issue where the government now is going to be able to dictate to anybody, private citizens, insurance companies, what have you, what to do. they're going to dictate to us that we have to buy a product, and to me, that's what this issue is about. it's so much more than everything the way it is being depicted in the press. this is about constitutional rights. i don't want the federal government dictating to the

citizenry, will we have to buy and what we don't have to buy. >> host: you think there is a role for the federal government to to insurance companies what should be in a basic insurance policy, women's health, men's health? do you think that is the role of the federal government? >> caller: that is not the will of the federal government. insurance companies are a business, and they should be able to decide what they can and cannot offer, according to the bottom line. >> host: thanks, bill. one more call. gary in northeast maryland on our independent line. >> caller: how's it going today? drama going well, thank you transit i didn't even know obama had a speech but if he did i'm sure did miss anything. i would just like to comment on the afford will killed tasha affordable health care act. my personal opinion i just think it is an assault our civil liberties from the get-go. and this newest you there just to find out about it, which

congress should have read in the first place, all this contraception stuff, like the last caller, this is nothing to do with contraception or women's rights a thing like this. this is an absolute assault on our civil liberties. and if we don't stop now, this is just going to be the start of government domination, the aspect of everything we do. i just hope we can stop them. all right, man, that's all i've got to stay. >> host: thanks for all your calls. he mentioned the health care law, and just reminder, there's five and have hours of oral arguments coming up at the end of march before the supreme court. c-span and other media organizations have requested television coverage of those oral argument at the end of march. you can find more resources on that on our website at c-span.org. here on c-span2 inches about a half an hour or so we will take you live to a discussion on the implementation of the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty. it will feature current and

former arms control officials. we'll have that like for you at 1:00 issue. right now though here's what the president had to say just a few months ago at the white house. >> [inaudible conversations] >> here we go. >> here he is. >> that was pretty good. hello, everybody. i was actually going to say good morning, but i guess afternoon by now. as part of the health care reform law that i signed last year, all in insurance plans are required to cover preventive care at no cost. that means free checkups, free mammograms, immunizations, and other basic services. we fought for this because it saves lives, and it saves money. for families, for businesses,

for government, for everybody. that's because it's a lot cheaper to prevent an illness than to treat one. we also accepted a recommendation from the experts at the institute of medicine, that when it comes to women, preventive care should include coverage of contraceptive services such as birth control. in addition to family planning, doctors often prescribe contraception as which reduces the risks of all very and and other cancers, and treat a variety of different ailments. and we know that the overall costs of health care is lower when women have access to contraceptive services. nearly 99% of all women have relied on contraception at some point in their lives. 99%. and yet more than half of all women between the ages of 18-34 have struggled to afford it. so for all these reasons we decided to follow the judgment

of nations leading medical experts and make sure that free preventive care includes access to free contraceptive care. whether you're a teacher or a small businesswoman or a nurse or a janitor, no woman's health should depend on who she is or where she works or how much money she makes. every woman should be in control of the decisions that affect her own health. period. this basic principle is already the law in 28 states across the country. now, as we move to implement this rule, however, we've been mindful that there's another principle at stake here. that's the principle of religious liberties. and unalienable rights that is enshrined in our constitution. as a citizen and as a christian, i cherish these rights. in fact, my first job in chicago was working with catholic parishes in poor neighborhoods,

and my salary was funded by a grant from an arm of the catholic church. and i saw that local churches often did more good for a community and a government program ever could. so i now how important the work that faith-based organizations do it and how much impact they could have on their communities. i also know that some religious institution, particularly those affiliated with the catholic church have a religious objection to directly provide insurance that covers contraceptive services for their employees. and that's why we originally exempted all churches from this requirement. an exemption by the way that eight states didn't already have. and that's why from the very beginning of this process i spoke directly to various catholic officials, and i promised that before finalizing the rule as it applied to them, we would spend the next year working with institutions like catholic hospitals and catholic

universities to find an equitable solution that protects religious liberty, and ensures that every woman has access to the care that she needs. now, after the many genuine concerns that have been raised over the last few weeks, as well as, frankly, the more cynical desire on the part of some to make this into a political football, it became clear that spending months hammering out a solution was not going to be an option, that we needed to move this faster. so last week i directed the department of health and human services to speed up the process that had already been in vision. we were going to spend a year doing this. we're going to spend a week or two doing this. today, we reached a decision on how to move forward. under the rule, women will still have access to free preventive care, that includes contraceptive services, no matter where they work. so that core principle remains.

but if a woman's employer is a charity or a hospital that has a religious objection to providing contraceptive services as part of their health plan, the insurance company, not the hospital, not the charity, will be required to reach out and offer the woman contraceptive care free of charge. without co-pays and without hassles. the result will be that religious organizations won't have to pay for these services, and no religious institution will have to provide these services directly. let me repeat, these employers will not have to pay for or provide contraceptive services. but women who work at these institutions will have access to free contraceptive services, just like other women. they will no longer have to pay hundreds of dollars a year that could go towards paying the rent or buying groceries. i've been confident from the start that we could work out an

approach her, just as i promised to i understand some folks in washington may want to treat this as another political wedge issue. but it shouldn't be. i certainly never saw it that way. this is an issue where people of goodwill on both sides of the debate have been sorting through some very complicated questions to find a solution that works for everyone. with today's announcement, we have done that. religious liberty will be protected, and a law that requires free preventive care will not discriminate against women. we live in a pluralistic society where we are not going to agree on every single issue, or share every belief. that doesn't mean that we have to choose between individual liberty and basic fairness for all americans. we are unique among nations for having been founded upon both of these principles.

and our obligation as citizens is to carry them forward. i have complete faith that we can do that. thank you very much, everybody. >> what have you learned from this experience, mr. president? >> the presence remarks and just a short time ago. coming up shortly, state and defense department officials have given an update on the new strategic arms reduction treaty between russia and the u.s. and the future of the strategic nuclear reductions process. the brookings institution is the host of this discussion. we will have a live for you starting at 1 p.m. eastern here on c-span2. until then your phone calls from this morning's "washington journal." >> host: let's show you a bit of reporting from the pentagon announcement which is described as long-awaited yesterday on combat roles for women in the u.s. market. pentagon will keep women off the

front lines as the way they wrote the story, will open 14,000 support positions. the pentagon announced thursday it is keeping its longtime ban on women serving as infantry, armor and special operations warriors in ground combat units come but it will open 14,000 support positions for them in units closer to the front lines. people say this codifies what has been happening on the ground in iraq and afghanistan. at a conference report pressed officials to i might lay up ahead opted to continue the ban. let's listen to a little from the prescott punch yesterday. this is george little, the spokesperson. >> more than 14,000 additional positions will now be open to women across the force. secretary panetta strongly supports these changes. he recognizes that over the last decade of war women have contributed in ways to the military's mission.

they put their lives on the line to defend the country and have demonstrated courage, patriotism, and skill. they have proven their ability to serve in an expanding number of roles all across the battlefield, and these changes will allow them to accomplish even more. as we make this about the i would like to stress that secretary panetta believes this is the beginning, not the end, of a process. we will continue to review requirements determine what additional positions may be open to women. >> host: announcing a change opening up 14,000 support jobs on the frontline but not not allowing women in the infantry. more press coverage. this is the new york times. pentagon allows women closer to combat but not close enough for some. elizabeth has written this piece. reflecting a steady but glacial evolution of the role of

american women of war. the pentagon took a small step thursday and announced that women would be formally permitted in crucial and dangerous jobs closer to the front lines but stop short of officially allowed women to serve in combat. oand in many cases they have coe under fire and fought back. so the question for you is, should the ban continue for

women in the front lines? what the arguments are for and against it would like to hear from you. we also have a live data a line set aside for women in active duty and veterans details of your own story. (202) 628-0184. we'll put that number on the screen for you. women on active duty and women veterans to tell your own story until short opinion that women on the front lines in the u.s. military. you can also tweak us and you can send us a facebook posting it as a matter of fact, this has been a facebook overnight on our page. let's show you one of these comments as we begin. i wonder why anyone would want to go into combat and infantry as long as it does not lead to myself or my daughter being forced into draft eligibility. whatever floats your boat. is make sure you are making people money to the boys. let's hear from pennsylvania. john, independent. you're on the air. >> caller: good morning.

i totally think the pentagon is being completely hypocritical here. if women are going to serve in the military and they should be able to, just as men. as a former veteran myself, i think they should be able to fight in combat positions, support or direct combat. if the service member, mail orofino can do the job, they should be able to be in the combat positions whether they're in a tank or support will. is just hypocritical for the pentagon to say will only allow them to do support functions but if they want to serve in the military, mail orofino, they should be able to be in combat positions. that's what their career needs to have happened under for them to develop their careers regardless of being men or women pics i think the pentagon again is being hypocrite ago. i support women's roles in combat, in support in whatever role they choose to be in. >> host: thanks for your call. colorado springs, republican, you're on the air. >> caller: yes.

in 2009, politico reporter on the soldier's load have to carry up to 142 pounds. rifle, mortar rounds, stuff like that. i think if you're going to really talk about this, i think you should be suited up just like somebody in combat would be, and chill out. actually, for women to move and fight, unicom if they're going to try to carry the minimum required to load. it's pretty ridiculous. not a lot of women that way much more than 142 pounds and don't have the strength to do it. did somebody who can't move, can't help somebody, if someone is wounded, they can't carry them out of combat. you have a useless body their on-field. >> host: richard from colorado springs. similar incident at code on twitter. strengthen physical condition to

endure fatigue a question which is being politically adjusted to meet political goals. that's his view of the pentagon's announcement yesterday. new from -- more from the new times. congress has repeatedly balked at allowing women in combat and has in recent years as the pentagon sometime sharp questions when it becomes obvious through new supports that women were serving in combat in the back and afghanistan.

next is new canada, maine. this is john who was on our independent line. good morning, john. >> caller: how you doing? good morning to you got to be kidding me. you've never seen a few most species of any species actually, like you take for instance, the insect, spider, they will kill a male after she's finished within. how about the law in? the female lines to the hunting. not the male lions but the males just sit around and, god knows what they do. you know, there's an old saying, hell hath no fury as a woman scorned. you know, a bowl is naturally playful, but a mad cow, stay out of its way. i tell you, the most dangerous creatures on this earth. >> host: for all of those biological reasons you cite,

john can you say yes to women in combat role? >> caller: damn right. as vicious as they come. they are the most deadliest animal on this earth. >> host: facebook, women already played a significant part in situations where there legitimate combat threats. the fact that they are not officially recognized in doing so is just bookkeeping with a basis in our cake is on gin and policy out to change to reflect reality. next is a phone call from new york. good morning to monica, republican, you are on the. >> caller: on them mother of a son and a daughter. if my daughter gets drafted i know she can do the job. the pentagon is sexist in this regard. and are very strong women leaders, very strong women fighters everyone equal rights and we need equal rights and put gender aside. >> host: thank you, monica, from your. from the "washington post" on his politics and the nation's page, their coverage of the

announcement yesterday. many ground rules, grand jobs remain off limits is the subhead. the pentagon will maintain bans on women serving in ground combat units. we do have a line set aside for women who are in the military who are veterans would like to do a little bit about your own experience with this and what your opinion is on advancing the policies that women would be on the front line. pentagon yesterday opening about 14,000 jobs in the services most affected army and navy or marine corps not many jobs opening up, and air force as you saw from our graphics already 99% of their positions are open to women. twitter, i think it is societal that women should not be in combat roles but think about

cost in your town. it comes down to drink next up is eugene, oregon, michael independent. you're on the air. >> caller: thanks for taking my call but i'm really upset about this. i can't believe this. the only reason they are doing this, including -- we don't have a draft, to put women in the military, i mean, after the film festival, all the rage that happen to our own women. i mean, are we really, are we a just society quite this is crazy. the only reason you want to women or anybody is because we don't have a draft. they were taking people that were ex-felons in criminals around as if it wanted to join the military because we don't have a draft. and this is so upsetting to me. this is not advancement. this is not, this is not moving

forward. this just upsets me to no end and i can't with all the people that have called out support this. >> host: thanks to much. next up is george, democrat in feasterville kentucky. what is your opinion? >> abstinence my opinion is this, the guy said what i was going to say. you have a lot of men who won't go. for instance, cheney had five deployments, romney, five. none of them -- world war ii, my god, we have plenty of men. i mean, maybe not enough but with plenty of men, and women stayed home in the factories making armor, arms. is a changing world, but we need to have a draft and it would stop a lot of work. thank you very much. >> host: thank you george from kentucky. back to facebook. as a woman there are some situation in the military that women should not be part of.

including certain special forces groups. we are asking whether that you think women should be on the front lines. here is an opinion from lawrence korb, who served as assistant secretary of defense for manpower during the reagan administration. is now the center for america's progress, a progressive think tank. open combat roles to women, he argues the military has no more excuses for denying females a

chance do any jobs which they are qualified. here's what he writes a long with lucy danza. that's the question we're asking you this morning. should women be permitted on the front lines in the military. next is a call from nashville, tennessee. this is jack, an independent. adorning. >> caller: good morning to you. barring the conventional wisdom provided by draft dodgers and our previous calls, my personal opinion is it's a bad idea only because of the current social status. right now we still have the mentality of a society that mean few but they need to protect females. so you put those people in a combat situation, and a male

goes down. well, you will have one guy dragging by the scruff of the neck and beanpole behind a truck. of the no goes down and all the guys in the area are going to try to protect the female. that is actually dangerous and counterproductive to a mission. so it has less to do with whether or not a female can do a job. it has to do with changing our perception as a society so we can get to the point where we don't think of it as male or female soldiers. we have one standard, and they are soldiers. and if they can all do the job at the same level, then i think we would be good to go. but as it stands, i don't think we are ready. they are to me things we need to change first. >> host: thanks, from national. back to the video from yesterday's announcement at the pentagon. you hear next from virginia penrod he was deputy assistant secretary for military personnel policy. how about that title? this is an exchange with a

reporter at the press conference. >> the current standards that exist for infantry, all men cannot meet those standards, and the decision, if you look at the fourth reason again, if the majority of women cannot served in that mos, serve to answer secretary memory stick. that's based on experience with leadership and expense in combat it and i trust that the service leadership understands those standards. if you look at the standard, every analyst for military operation as a standard. you probably can help me out with that. army standard for infantry. there's so much weight. [inaudible] >> if you don't, but what is the opening of, give these women the chance, there would be that many women but what if you ruled out even offering women the opportunity to try to serve? >> some of the exchange with

reporters at the pentagon yesterday with pentagon officials. brenda mcdaniel on facebook rights this, women train as hard as men to get it past the psychological test and they should be allowed to fight next to their male soldiers. next is a call from branch, louisiana. john is on air. go ahead, republican trevi i would like to point out that there is some policy in the deal about women fighting individual. that happened in 1948. it was done away with it if you can see women walking on an issue with doozies, their police officers. they're not infantrymen. i am a 30 year veteran of the army and was a combat veteran as a 20 year old infantryman in combat. i can tell you right now in my opinion, this is politically driven. it's not driven by a needs

analysis in any way, shape, or form. if it were it wouldn't be even brought up. the fact of the matter is the vast majority of women, and a lot of men, could not carry out the duties that are required. and it's pointed out earlier by someone, there are guidelines on all of the requirements for every mos. not everybody can carry out the duties, particularly in the infantry, but i would like to point out again, this is being driven by political correctness. and one thing that is not being taken into consideration is it you cast men and women, and i know this just and practical experience, into a combat situation where they're living in the field, you're going to have some problems between the sexes, and you cannot take young people in particular, 18-24 years old with raging hormones, and tell them to behave. it will not happen. you will have problems, and this is entirely driven i think by

politicians and by women who want to advance in the military. the purpose is to defend the nation. it is not for anybody's career. and again, as a 30 year veteran i served with a lot of women. i served as an administrative first sergeant during desert storm, all of our people did an excellent job. we are not in a combat situation. we did not have problems because of that. >> host: thanks for your call. charles cook goes by first primary on twitter tweets in. oh, wait out a. tell it to a fired -- a fighter pilot as she lays a thousand pound bomb on you. talking that pentagon's policy on the women in the front lines. announced that they would ease some of the restrictions, and open up 14,000 jobs to women bring them closer to the front lines. on the database, -- "daily

beast." u.s. is is restriction on women in the combat steel bars them from front left at the pentagon said women will be assigned to battalion. decision-making now veterans say is too little chilly. we have a line for female -- if you like to specifically tell us about your experience and your thoughts on this. on thursday she writes the pentagon issued a long-awaited announcement about its policies excluding women from serving in the military's combat roles. starting this summer women will be able to permit to be assigned to battalion's opening up 14,000 new roles for female service members but they will still be barred from front-line infantry and special ops forces. coming a year after, to separate the advisory board urged the defense department to recommend, to overturn its existing policy altogether. many female veterans feel the announced it is too little, too

late. one called it a slap in the face. a former marine commander who is now exceeded direct of the service women's action network said the pentagon's refusal to overturn the ban not only is sexes a potentially damaging to the military as a whole. ..

you can't deny people if they have the desired to do things and they are willing to put their life and who am i to tell them that they shouldn't serve their country if they have the ability but as other scholars have mentioned as the inmate thing to protect women, so men have to be solved, and eventually where we wouldn't need anybody but in q3 much. >> host: thanks. after the announcement yesterday the pentagon this has already made its way to the presidential campaign trail. >> i want to make every opportunity for women to serve this country and they do so in an amazing and wonderful way and there is a great addition and has been for a long time to the armed services of our country but i do have concerns about women in front-line combat. i think that can be very compromising situation where people naturally when they do

things that may not be in the interest of the mission because of other types of emotions that are involved and i think that's probably -- it always happens of course with the come artery of men and combat, but i think would be even more unique if women were in combat and i think that's not in the best interest of men, women or the mission. >> host: jennifer howard writes the right turn column in "the washington post" from the conservative perspective. she wrote about rex and warm's common sense of other emotions could preclude women in combat. sometimes and male-dominated

jobs. what you think on this topic next up is washington, d.c.. this is lawrence, an independent. good morning. >> caller: thank you very much. thank you for c-span. my comment is simply that the question itself has an illogical assumption that is on mississippi to begin with, so i feel the same way about the question and women should be in the military, period and i would advisers to read mark twain which is available on the web. thank you. >> host: lawrence from washington. here's another facebook comment. it is a volunteer military to offer position is not to force someone into a position. to not offer the position is a bad example of what it is we are allowing these people to die fighting for or whether officially infantry or not. next up is cambridge maryland. george, republican, good morning to you.

>> caller: good morning. i'm a vietnam veteran, and while i'm serving in vietnam and had the experience of being opposed by viet cong soldiers they were quite adequate their jobs. >> host: are you facing opposite any concerns about being engaging in combat -- >> see the washington journal every morning at seven eastern on c-span and we will go live now to the brookings institution. this afternoon, state defense department officials are updating on the new strategic arms reduction treaty between the u.s. and russia. the chief to become chief negotiator is expected to talk about the treaty implementations and the future of the strategic nuclear reductions process.

>> [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations]

[inaudible conversations] >> good afternoon. welcome to the brookings institution. my name is stephen pifer. i am the senior fellow here and also the director of the arms control initiative and i will be chairing the the two panels we have today. first, please if you have a cell phone either turn off or silence it and then second, i would also like to express brookings saw' gratitude to the fund which is generously supported the arms control initiative and makes evens like this possible. last sunday, february 5th, the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty had its

first anniversary of the century of the force, and what i've noticed about the arms control agreement is to get a lot of attention when they are signed, and they get a lot of attention during the ratification process. and then they sort of fall off the radar screen and certainly if you go back to april, 2010, when president obama and president medvedev signed the new s.t.a.r.t. triet got a lot of attention. and in the last several months of 2010, when the treaty was being debated for the part of the ratification process on the hill, it got a lot of attention. and then and february of last year, on february 5th, secretary clinton and the foreign minister lavrov expressed that brought the force and we really haven't heard a lot about the treaty since then. as a part of the objective today in the panel is to correct that and talk about what has happened in terms of implementation of the treaty over the last year, how has that gone, and then take a bit of a peak looking forward. what sorts of things might

follow the line on s.t.a.r.t.. and our first panel we have a terrific set of speakers for the u.s. government. i'm not going to do the full biography because you have them in your program, but briefly. on the left, rose gottenmoeller, the now acting undersecretary of state for arms control international security. we have from the joint staff, mike elliott who's the deputy director for strategic stability. and all my far right we have ted warner from the office of the secretary defense. he is the senior adviser to the undersecretary defense for policy for arms control and stability. but i think what we have here is fair to say this is really the core of the leadership team that negotiated. this by the way is the treaty. it's a seceded protocol and it's quite a production, and the really produced this treaty. and we are delighted to have them here now to talk about what's happened. so, let's start thank you for

that introduction because i think it gives the audience a real good sense of how we the team feel about it. it was a big effort to get it negotiated and to get it ratified by the u.s. senate and the washington state and federal council and it didn't force but then i did kind of drop out of sight to everybody inside the u.s. government said this was a very welcome the opportunity today and a bit of a celebration as far as i'm concerned about the first birthday of the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty. i am also delighted to be here with michael yet and ted warner again as already mentioned by steve they were my very close partners, leadership team of the delegation on the u.s. side of the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty negotiations in geneva in 2009 and 2010. so we are really i would say a close nick and have others

involved in the agency and was a super team on our side as it was on the russian side. the russian side had in and formed a team of diplomats and experts involved in the negotiations of the treaty also the interagency group on their side. i wanted to start by talking a little bit about implementation of the treaty, what has happened in very general terms. mike elliott is going to dig down deep and give you more details about how the inspections are actually conducted so you get a feel for the detailed seriousness of the effort and then ted will pick up and talk a little bit about the future but then we will kind of hand the baton are found in terms of how to answer your question. first of all, i will just say we realize going into the negotiation of the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty that this is going to be different than the last one that was negotiated back in the early 1990's, the

s.t.a.r.t. treaty was really born at the end of the cold war and was a very important role to play in that it helped us bring the nuclear forces of the soviet union and the russian federation united states as well. through the period of the important transition in a very stable and orderly way. we knew that this treaty was going to be much different in that it was the first treaty that was really negotiated long after the cold war had ended. so there were some different things we really had to consider. one was we were thinking about going live or the president made very clear in his initiative speech from april of 2009 that we would intend to go lower in a step-by-step process and but we wanted to ensure that this treaty in the step-by-step process gave the flexibility to

go lower, so the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty has one of the basic temmins preserve each nation's ability to determine their own strategic structure giving both sides the flexibility to deploy and maintain our strategic forces in a way that best serves our own national interest. so that was important and one that i think was important post cold war nature of the new treaty. s.t.a.r.t. has a strong and flexible implementation regime that gives great insight into each other's strategic forces and i think it is worth emphasizing right at the outset that the measures for implementation of the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty whether verification or other types of measures are totally reciprocal. the same obligations on the shoulders of the united states as far on the shoulders of the russian federation, so bear that in mind as we talk through the treaty that these obligations are totally -- the inspection

process i will say at the outset has been going very smooth. i would say in general the implementation has been conducted in a very businesslike and pragmatic manner. this was the attitude that we had after negotiating in geneva and it is definitely carried forward into the implementation process both on the russian side and the u.s. side we've been keeping the focus on problem-solving, on being pragmatic about how we go about it and it's really again i think a quite suited to the post cold war era that we are now in where we have really some serious security issues that we must address on both sides and continue to address regarding the nuclear forces, but we can go about it in a very pragmatic and problem-solving kind of way to be a set her about the first year of the treaty, and goes from february 5th so since the treaty was entered into force on february 5th of 2011 when the minister lavrov and secretary clinton exchanged the paper work to bring the treaty into force

it so we just ended the first treaty. in that treaty we kept pace with each other on inspections. i've been joking it was a bit like tag team first the russian federation would announce the inspection and then we would and then we would announce one and a lot, so that the net result was that we kept pretty steady pace with each other throughout the year and each conducted 18 inspections, which is what we are allowed under the treaty, the team inspections annually. so of course with the new year beginning we will again begin from zeroth to 18 and i assume we will have the same kind of steady progression in the inspection process. for these inspections according to the terms of the treaty, we are able now to confirm the actual number of warheads on any randomly selected russian icbm to reassume the we were not able to do under the treaty, and again, once again obligations are reciprocal so the russians can do the same for us. and mike elliott will be talking

more about this so-called the hickel on the site inspection process. we have also both sides conducted delivery vehicle exhibition. last march the united states conducted exhibitions of the heavy bombers and the russian federation conducted an exhibition of its ls 24 icbm and seceded mobile launcher. this was the first time by the way we got a good look at the irs 24 so that was in the extradition process as the treaty was first entering into the force. the united states and the russian federation has also been sharing eight mountain of data with each other. over the course of this first treaty year we have exchanged 1,900 notifications pursuant to the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty. why so many notifications? these notifications help us to keep track of the movement of each other's strategic forces and changes in status.

for example, the notification is sent out every time a heavy bomber is moved out of the country for more than 24 hours. as we are exchanging information at a greater rate than under the treaty just to give you by way of comparison, 2009 was the last treaty year s.t.a.r.t. went out of force in december 2009 and the first treaty for the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty as i said went from february 5th, 2011, february 5th, 2012, comparing those treaties were 28.5% up on the number of notification exchange. so we are exchanging more information under the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty them under s.t.a.r.t.. on top of the individual notifications, we exchanged a comprehensive database once every six months, so to times a year. this account combines the notification to create what i like to think of as a living document. every six months we have a comprehensive snapshot of the

two strategic forces look like and throughout the course of that six month period on the day in and day out basis we are updating the status of the databases, updating the status of the strategic forces so that we have a very good visibility into each other's strategic nuclear forces once again very good for the mutual predictability and a mutual confidence, which is the whole point of the exercise. the data exchanges are providing as i would say much more detailed picture of the russian federation strategic nuclear arsenal than we have had in the past again vice versa is true as well. the russians are getting a closer look at our strategic nuclear forces than in the past, and of course both of us back of our exchanges of information and inspections with our own national technical modification with life and other kind of monetary platforms that we use to relieve back our goods on the ground as senator lugar likes to say and also the other kinds of information exchanges that take

place under the treaty. ted is going to want dhaka bit more about this because he just spent the last couple of weeks in geneva for the bilateral consultant commission of the so-called implementation commission of the treaty which has now met for its third time but we have some good news out of the meeting. remember to elementary was one of the tough issues during the course of the negotiation and there were some issues that were left hanging at the end of the negotiation that needed to be wrapped up and we knew in the implementation process and so this week they were fined in geneva the agreements that basically wrap up those issues and if you are interested, i am not recommending it, not many people are interested in the elementary but if you are interested, those agreements appear on the web site of the bureau and you can get a look at them. ted me want to talk a bit more about them if you want to take this on some more.

i'm not going to say much about it but i did want to stress one point. in my view it is helping us to build a foundation for the next phase of reductions. the preamble of the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty makes note of the fact that it is part of a step-by-step approach leading to further reduction negotiations, so we are hard at work thinking through what the next steps may be and it is a very i think it foundation that we have laid through the negotiation and not implementation of the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty, and will help us as we move forward phases. the last thing i will say this is this is an appeal to all of us and many of you have heard this from me in the past the next treaty will be one that i think takes a more challenging directions. president obama the date that he signed the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty in april of 2010 said that the next treaty should focus on the reductions in three categories.

first is further reductions in deploy strategic nuclear weapons. that's always how we have looked at these negotiations in the past read the deployed nuclear system is missile or bomber but missile with a warhead loaded on it that is a deploy a system and then of course in the launcher and prepared for operations if god help us it wherever necessary. but in the future the president said we should also look at the category of the non-deployed strategic nuclear weapons that is weapons ever held in missouri and the storage facilities and non-strategic nuclear weapons come on strategic nuclear weapons are sometimes called tactical nuclear weapons. so the president laid out a very and vicious, very ambitious goal for the next round of negotiations and it is an appeal to us all that we need to be thinking about how to go about it and with the concepts and procedures might be, what the verification techniques and

technologies might be the will be required for this more ambitious phase of the future reduction negotiations. so with that i am going to turn directly to mike come is the right? >> maybe you can describe a little bit better the impact of the committee on the u.s. strategic forces and how the u.s. military handles these inspections and such. >> thanks again for the introduction but also for inviting us to participate in this session. for me it is always good to get together with rose and tag because of that relationship we built over a full year of working on this. what i should point out in the beginning as well the negotiators put the treaty to get over your both on the u.s. side and the russian side it's the military on both side who actually have to carry through the actions, and so as writing this was a challenge for us we were in constant communication with each of our services as ensure our russian counterparts

were. and in the end is up to them to make interpretations when the words are blurred or when there's different interpretations. so i'm going to try to talk you through the various mechanisms including the hands on business of running an inspection and how that plays out and helping both sides verify the tenants of the treaty are being met. during the first year as rose said, we've been working relatively diligently to carry out a wide range of exhibitions to show what particular systems look like, demonstrations to show how we are going to do specific procedures. we've actually gone through some elimination's and some come versions of the systems out there for some specific delivery vehicles, and along the way we have had the opportunity for both sides to conduct 18 on-site inspections which was the quota for both centuries.

now, in addition what underpins this is a series of notifications. almost 2,000 that are made the information is gathered together by the military services and passed through the state department and then transmitted to the russian federation. this keeps them apprised of weapon movements as we go, as we move from spot to spot and i will point out a feature of this treaty in doing that is when we make these notifications we use what is called a unique identifier to not only tell them what system is moving but specifically what system is moving. and so it is the basis of a more full accounting system during this environment. now, when it from time to time uncertainties or ambiguity, we've rolled up in anticipation of the situation and provisions for a bilateral consultative commission over the bcc as it is known.

i want begin to go into the deutsch specifically other than to note there's been three sessions so far. we have worked through some of the early issues and in terms of understanding with the negotiators meant when they put this together. and if you have specific questions, i think i will defer to ted warner who as the deputy commissioner to return from geneva and tough third session in the b.c. sea. now we thought you might be interested in precisely how the military goes through, and i say in a letter become it's the mother to be on both sides that goes through the process but i'm going to focus on the u.s. perspective for this how we go through the process and doing the inspection. the first thing that you need to understand in this process that we declare the the twice a year and the database declarations of the systems, the strategic delivery vehicles and the warheads that are located throughout each country are done

in a large way is a snap shot twice a year. when an inspection happens one of the things that will be done is we will give them to the inspection team as they are rife specifics of what is at that particular base in that particular moment in time and will be in relatively great detail. the process of inspection then is to use a statistical sampling process to confirm what that database says it over the period of these 18 inspections each year to read out over ten years it gives both countries an opportunity for the sibling to confirm we have the two sides compliance with treaty as i said or you've probably read both sides have the right to positive forces the way they wish in terms of the number of each delivery system, how many warheads are going to be on each

one and why they are located within their countries and lays out the notification process lets them know where they are going so that on the date inspections are called by one country to the other day that should have a good idea when they depart their home country with the expect to see at this space. i will note that some of the things that were in the inventory when we began this process had already been taken off the books and an example of this is we finished the conversion of all of the heavy bombers so they are no longer capable of imploring the nuclear warheads and therefore only in the conventional. at the same time, we've taken -- we are in the process of taking the remaining peacekeepers icbm launchers off of the books to the elimination process, and we are beginning the process of the eliminating 50 icbm launchers

for those that work and use in this early part of the treaty. also along the way we have had an opportunity to start discussing the number of reentry vehicles on each one of the minuteman treaties and we will soon start that process for some of the slb and launchers. that the deck of those activities are then transitioned they are maintained because it is changing each week for each month certainly so that when the inspection is called to arrive they want with the snapshot is for the moment but as you know we are headed down to these limits to the 700 deploy strategic delivery vehicles that meet the icbm and the heavy bombers, and part of this flux back-and-forth is that the forces on both sides if they are going to be able to operate effectively have to be able to move the systems back-and-forth for the maintenance as rose said

earlier when you take the warheads off or take the icbm out of the launcher or that launched it becomes mom deployed so we report that back-and-forth that goes to the database that the inspectors will see when they get there. the next thing to think about is the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty if you want this to be a true snapshot and the ability for each party to verify the treaty it needs to be short notice and so these are literally short notice inspection each side has to notify no later than 32 hours prior to their intended a rifle at the point of entry which for the united states is either washington, d.c. or san francisco. the base personnel are used as a sort of in trouble part of a broad inspection team comprised of members of the defense agency

and to each particular unit as they are selected. when the inspection team from the russian federation notifies the united states of their intended revival at the point of entry, this is a clue to the defense threat reduction agency who populates database available or a website available to all the military bases out there that the russian federation has initiated the inspection process. at that time, everyone for that particular treaty will be aware that they may be vulnerable for an inspection in this window when the russian inspection team arrives at the base the dennett notify the team within four hours of their rival what they're intended inspection site is. at that time the escorts notify the specific base that will be

and we remembered now this is some hint there could be an inspection coming and the have clear instructions they will be inspected, and in fact that the russian inspection team must be delivered to the inspected base within 24 hours of the selection of the particular case they are going to. when they do this this sets off a series of activities of the local unit as that unit commander ensures his base is prepared to receive the inspection team and to ensure they have the opportunity to fully exercise their rights under that treaty. this thing this could be as mundane as making sure you have sufficient numbers in the base building office and that could be up including moving people out of there if necessary to make sure we of room for those people on the base rate make sure as you know that we are

doing routine operations within one hour after a vacation. any movements of the strategic delivery vehicles, movements of the warheads have to stop and be locked down so it becomes the unit commander's responsibility to make sure each element of that criteria is met for the inspection team. now the military will then move the motion inspection team as i said within 24 hours and bring them to the particular case. where they will be met by the treaty compliance officer or t co. the tco is the operations guide for any unit commander out there who makes sure that anyone who has to participate in an inspection knows precisely what you're going to do in terms of facilitating the russian inspections teams ability to complete a task. they will be the one that actually escorts them around the facilities to allow them to do that. they will make sure that the

maintenance teams that have to configure whatever the inspected system is are ready to receive the inspection team and then actually walk them through that process. this includes, again, water and inspections to make sure everything is ready in advance, and making sure that any operation is not germane to the inspection had ceased appropriately, and there is attention here if you can imagine for both military is that they have the right or the responsibility to offer the other country the opportunity to fulfill all of their rights, but at the same time the heavy responsibility to protect from a security standpoint those things that are not directly involved in the inspection and so they have to walk through this diligently walk through this process on that. now, there's basically two types of activities that are going to happen to be a i will start with

the icbm. the slb m is relative to this and then what happens in the bomber community. when the icbm site, the war had assemblies have to be separated from the selected icbm what the russian inspection team is a case. they will be told when the right at the base of many different missiles are out there in place on that particular day. they will be told precisely how many warheads on each one of those. the russian inspection team leader then selects which he would like to inspect, and he has the opportunity to select assuming there are empty launchers on the location to designate one empty to confirm it has no bustle or warheads in the particular launcher. when the maintenance team goes under observation from a russian inspection team to the particular wanted it's been designated they then have to go through a process where the

separate what's called the front section from the icbm and they put it in a specially configured mobile vehicle that protect that section from the elements. i will point during the spurt of time the russian inspectors must be offered a final opportunity to observe this front end section to make sure that nothing is removed from it so they can confirm with confidence that it has exactly what we said was on the front of that. that may not seem like a difficult task, but in north dakota in january when the dirt in the snow are going sideways at 40 m.p.h. it is not an insignificant deal and you have to remember that there is a strong need to protect the weapons systems from the safety standpoint, so we have to work through that mechanization of given the opportunity to see clearly what's there and make sure that we protect the weapons

system at the same time to read after the inspections are given an opportunity to look at the front end to confirm the presence of the precise number, this system is returned. the russian inspection team can move off and see dhaka and the launcher if there was one then and they are then returned to the main operating base whatever it happens to be for that matter. usually we have an opportunity to do some sort of cultural event and i will tell you a lot of times it is a trip down to local mall to a little shopping. certainly given the opportunity to have dinner. they are given transportation back to the point of entry and they depart usually the next day. in between there there is one important thing that takes a little bit of work if everything works right and there's absolutely no ambiguities the russian inspection team will report with precision what they did. the u.s. export team will

correspondingly say with the observed during this period of time and the teams get together and write a report of that and then submit the report in a very detailed process. periodically there may be an ambiguity that arises as to precisely what went on during that process and the will then write down in some detail how, the ambiguity was the u.s. will then in response to that right on what they observed and what they believed if they are able to give a response to the russian team at that time, with the situation is or what we're finding information is. for those things that they are not able to work out on site past top they may end up in this bilateral consultations commission in which we work through whatever the issue was and and sometimes it's simply procedures. we need to be able to stand in a different place to see the item of inspection more clearly or it

wasn't absolutely clear because of the lighting conditions what was there or something like that but each one of these things is not unusual and is almost always worked through in a short purple of time. not submarines the differences it is a flow they take first when they arrive at that base and contact the tco which were on the days they would like to inspect ander embrey from the configuration of that particular submarine and then they are given an opportunity to begin designate the launch tube that they go through the same process is just loaded into a different position since the our pure site and if they are an empty launchers on the submarine deal also would have an opportunity to look at the mt launcher. on the doors is a little different. both sides understood that since the early 90's the bombers of both sides and the longer sit on

alert so there wasn't exactly similar situation of declaring how many weapons are on each one of those bombers and then going out and inspecting the numbers of the bombers to confirm that the reality is even if they are not loaded zero is a number and so this process the a rival of the bomber base we declare the number of the bombers there and do there are no numbers they would be the normal condition. the russian federation then gets to go to the selection of three of those heavy bombers and in fact confirm that there are no weapons on those particular bombers through that process. the same procedures in terms of ambiguities is carried through and at the same process of taking them back to the point of entry and returning to their home country. in reverse, the u.s. military which populates the inspection teams with the defense for reduction agency goes through a reciprocal process with the russian federation which we go

to each one of the facilities and go through basically the same process and cultural events. and with that we will turned back. >> if you want to offer a couple of comments on the bilateral commission and also has mentioned, the president described it as a step and talks about another step coming. with the u.s. government is doing with regards. >> thanks kostis. excuse me. i welcome the opportunity to see my colleagues again. i see mike in the pentagon perhaps all too often so that's not so unusual that rose and i crossed paths more frequently. i just came back on wednesday from the bilateral commission meeting with about two weeks in duration. the treaty says that you should meet generally sets the standard of the two times per year you

don't want to meet you can sort of agree on one another to do less. and you can also through the notification process decide to do more. we met twice during 2011 and once here in the calendar of 2012 though i guess we were actually still in session between the time of the birthday of the year of the entry into force. just a couple things. the bcc probably about 20 or 25 people we have representation from all of the interested components on both sides, the ministry of defense, the ministry of foreign affairs the people who worry about the nuclear weapons themselves on the russian side. on the u.s. side we have representatives from the department of state from the various portions of the department of defense from the joint staff, sometimes from strategic command, which is the overall operational command that

has oversight of the strategic nuclear systems from the office of the secretary of defense. we often have representatives from the services and will have other specialists. a couple of examples of what we have handled within the three meetings of the bcc, there were some things rose made reference to. the treaty said that within the first year it was up to the bilateral consultations commission to fill out some details to get ready to do this exchange of information, tell metric information is the radio signal that monitors the performance of the missile during a test launches, so telemetry is just this information that is used by the testing party to in fact monitor the performance of the missile. that's why they've done the launch to see if it is performing the way that it's supposed to and it is an opportunity than from the other side to just get insight into

the capability of those missiles. we had to reach a couple of enabling agreements. we had to hold a demonstration playback equipment and recording media that was abused. those demonstrations were held in the mid summer. in the wake of that, the russians said we would like to -- we would like to get an agreement about how the procedures for the future demonstrations might be. we worked through that in one session in the fall and be completed in the session that was completed earlier this week. the other thing that we have to do, we had to agree with great precision about the portion of the flight of the missile for which telemetry would be exchanged and there was a process gone through to say we are going to go from point exit to point why and you'll see that you're interested in going on this department you will see the actual agreement with a carefully crafted language on precisely what portion of the flights for which telemetry will

be. at the beginning of each year you have to make an agreement now on the calendar year previous of which flights are going to exchange. and that was also a process we went through and completed. the decision on the exchange we conclude the agreement here in early 2012. it was about flights that were conducted during 2011. one other thing that i would say is we end up with these ambiguities particularly in the first year of the application of the new treaty. we are building on the experience and this whole inspection process that might outlined. we are very much building on 15 years of experience of implementing s.t.a.r.t. i. i was in charge with the health of some people that actually in the room here of negotiating painstakingly not so much what is in the treaty because the

treaty is only 15 pages long or so and there is one page i think 17 pages, one page on inspections, but we have 80 some pages in the protocol and another 90 pages in the amex and we had to go step by step as i heard the description because we had to get through that very detailed. one new thing we did on this treaty is we had these things called the unique identifier. so every missile that falls within the scope of the treaty has to have a single unique alphanumeric indicator on the submarine launched ballistic missile or intercontinental range missile and heavy bombers that are equipped for the nuclear armament. one of the things we found on both sides, but painstakingly support a call where precisely must keep this unique

identifier? sure enough when it came to implementation on both sides there were minor missteps. somebody put it on the second page of the missile instead of the first stage of the missile. somebody put it beside when they were supposed to put it on the missile. so this kind of thing, which is natural when you have implementation over many different bases, so the other issue that he talked about is when you are holding an inspection where do you stand? can you make sure you have continuous observation of this, this and this? we've had to work through those kind of things. again we work through them i think in a highly productive manner many of the people who negotiated the treaty and involved in the process of implementation and you can tell even by the third meeting of the bcc that test the manner in which we parse the work, got to work, went to the working groups, figured it out, settled most things otherwise we say we are not quite there yet and were

on the interstitial period we can exchange drafts of this solution and we may solve it during that or will do it at the next time we meet. let me talk a little bit about what we are doing now and what lies ahead. there is no doubt that president obama made clear at a time of the signing of the treaty that he looked forward to at least one more round of strategic arms, nuclear arms reduction with russia. he did make, i will repeat the point, we want to broaden the scope. the strategic arms limitation process beginning in the late 60's and running up until around 1980 in the strategic arms reduction process renamed by president ronald reagan and now directed not just toward limiting the buildup but actually driving down the strategic offensive. we've really are at a stage where we need to broaden the scope from the strategic nuclear

weapon to the non-strategic nuclear weapon. most of those are what we would know as tactical nuclear weapons. that is they are delivered by the shorter range systems, they are delivered by the artillery pieces. they can be delivered by fighter-bomber aircraft. they can be delivered submarines and nuclear torpedoes or the like. the russians attended the committee had a nuclear ballistic missile defense, the abm system and for instance surface to air missile assistance. so the president said is this time the next time we look at this we really ought to look up the total operational inventory, the nuclear stockpile of operational weapons and that would be strategic and non-strategic and both deployed and long deployed to read the deployed weapon, and again it is a little bit repetitious, is one that is literally located on its

delivery vehicle. in other words in the case of its launcher, the mobile home transborder for the land mobile or its ballistic missile submarines. but the vast majority of nuclear weapons held by both sides are not in this sort of operational ready status. the vast majority of them are in the nuclear storage sites. the nuclear storage sites may be located very closely operating base. they may be located more on a regional basis or they could be a large sort of central stockpile of such systems. the united states almost two years ago in the spring of 2010 announced that our total stockpile was 5,113 nuclear weapons. these are both strategic and

non-strategic deployed and mom deployed. the russians have not revealed a number for there's though the numbers you here in approximations or at least in a shouting distance of the russians have. though the distribution of the weapons within this are quite different. president obama said next time we conclude a treaty at least the objective would be to bring under control of the treaty and reduce within the treaty strategic non-strategic deployed and not deployed. there are various ideas that have been bruited about about this. we have not yet gotten close enough to the negotiations to be now in the u.s. government trying to precisely decide on the manner in which we are going to attack this problem. we are doing -- it is interesting how this has gotten to the way that we talk about the bcc. we keep talking to each other about doing our homework, so we

talk about whose assignment is to do the homework. so we are doing a couple of important home work assignments if you will in the u.s. government and the nato alliance. in the u.s. government we are doing the the nuclear posture review implementation or follow-on study which has been under way since about summertime and continues and will be completed in the months ahead and that is a very important study to provide a basis and ultimately the study will come through the interagency process at various levels and go to the present itself and allow the president to then adopt his election and guidance he would provide back to the department of defense and the strategic command on the nuclear planning and it also will influence the course of what's possible in terms of our future force

posture and force structure. so that in portland home work is going to provide the basis for what is an acceptable nuclear posture for the united states nuclear structure for the united states, for the deterrence and defense and protection of the united states and its allies, and that will also provide the basis for sort of how much is announced and how much can we read use. at the same time that we are doing this internal homework on looking ahead towards our structure and posture, and nato they are doing a deterrence and defense posture review and that's important because the u.s. nuclear capability in particular the non-strategic located within europe are very much a constituent and important critical part of nato's overall nuclear posture.

nato did its own strategic concept and continues to endorse the need for having a nuclear component of its overall defense posture. that concept was adopted at eight lisbon nato summit in november of 2010. in the wake of that, the decision was made to do this nuclear posture deterrence and defense posture review which is to look at the nuclear conventional and missile defense forces that nato needs in order to look towards the deterrence and defense in the rest of this decade and onward. that work began last summer. it is due to be completed come through the north atlantic council and the duty to basically endorsed by heads of state when they meet at the next major senate which is to happen in chicago in may. so puerto rico, everything has to have an acronym of course,

the defensive posture review will influence some of these issues, and within nato they have also talked to a final thing i will talk about. the next steps in the arms control are not nearly this question of the negotiated agreement. the russians do not appear at this moment to be that interested in particular with the presidential elections there and here to getting under way the new negotiation of the challenging nature as i just laid out. so, as we look forward to perhaps starting those negotiations within a year or two, we are also looking at a different sort of intermediate steps that could be taken. transparency and confidence-building measures like information exchange could we exchange information on both sides about our total nuclear weapons stockpiles may be even

more granular information about some of the strategic forces non-strategic about possibly the locations. these are the kind of things we are thinking about. nato is thinking about them more in the year of atlantic than those in european russia context. so there are steps that can be taken. finally, the last point i would make is that the former boss was recently just stepped aside, ellen tauscher had been cheering and continues to be a special envoy and have responsibilities to help share a running dialogue or conversation as we a band called the these days with the counterpart deputy foreign minister. they've been looking at a series of issues. the russians have made clear if we are going to move on to further nuclear reductions, there are a set issues that need to be addressed at least in

parallel as this goes along. the most controversy all of those has been the question of missile defense, and that's gotten very much connected to the potential for the russian and nato cooperation on the territorial missile defense in europe. the two sides are working on that problem. there are other issues like long-range conventional systems. the russians are concerned about what they believe may well be the weaponization of space. they talk about the need to address the conventional arms control issues in europe as the treaty seems to be having run its course in many ways what has been -- what are the next kind of steps for the conventional arms control. so, then undersecretary tauscher and her counterpart have been meeting periodically come and they have now committed during this year to meet in what are called strategic stability talks.

that term has been used to cover such conversations in the past as well, and in this case it is suppose to be a running set of discussions about some of those neuralgic issues if you will come and to discuss the potential for moving forward and building basically the basis if we have sort of unilateral homework we have alliance homework, the kind of homework that we are doing with the russians themselves in this step-by-step process is this set of strategic stability dialogue. we had a first such major expanded meeting on that matter in december we look forward to next meeting in march, and i can see a whole series of these meetings that are likely to run through the rest of the year. let me stop at that and i would be happy to answer questions. >> thank you. let's go ahead and open up the floor for questions. if i could ask if you could state your name and affiliation and try to keep your questions

short we have about 25 minutes for the q&a session. >> the nuclear deterrent is based on the threat -- >> the microphone is not on. >> just speak up. i think you can do it. >> nuclear deterrence is based on the threat to destroy certain targets with nuclear-weapons. what are the targets we are threatening to destroy with our 1700 deployed warheads? >> certainly won't go into any detail. let me talk about the overall philosophy. the philosophy that's been articulated since late 1970's

and onward was called at that time the countervailing strategy has been to hold at risk of the targets that the other side value's most, and that has been a wide range of targets but i really can't get into the specifics on that question. >> china is -- [inaudible] do we really know how big, any idea of its magnitude? it couldn't be much bigger. >> i have seen some of the -- i actually know the individual in question. i won't name him, but i did business with him. he was a long term student at the soviet military affairs, and we worked together on some

issues. there is fair controversy associated with the question of his whole study of the study that he and baker with his students did using a lot of open and internet sources. i was working on the problem on the side of the chinese nuclear arsenal just today. i don't know what the unclassified number is on that at this time. i would like to give it to you. it's certainly considerable smaller than both of the u.s. and russia. i think an unclassified numbers you will see numbers in the 50, 100, 150, something in that neighborhood perhaps 200. but think of that as compared to the u.s. number given almost two years ago of 5,000 the russians are at least at a level of where we are and probably a bit more. so again the chinese nuclear arsenal is certainly a place in order of magnitude smaller than those numbers.

>> the other point i would like to stress is that in terms of the nuclear doctrine, the chinese have pursued a much different course from the cold war that were worked out by the soviet union and the united states and the legacy that we are dealing with today. so i think it is important to bear in mind that the whole premise for the way the chinese think about nuclear weapons and their doctrinal approaches is very different and it leads to i would say a requirement for smaller overall force structure. >> i would add one of the things the u.s. would welcome is a chinese revelation of the number as the united states have done and the number as we would encourage the russian federation >> the chinese have characterized their doctrine as clean but effective. some have called it minimum or minimal deterrence, but they clearly wanted to be able to

hold at risk and certain chinese major figures have made different comments about what they might hold at risk to do that. but they certainly have committed them to gain a nuclear capability in the late 50's and on into the 60s. they have had that certain approach in the lean but effective deterrents that can hold out risk probably urban industrial complex. ..

>> making no progress at all a long time ago. so you've come a very long way when we're talking a telemetry on the website. my question is though does go to this question of the number of weapons we are still retaining, the 5000 or so on each side, and the 1700 or whatever number exactly is, deploy. the idea that the chinese feel secure enough with a much smaller number of deployed warheads, maybe, i don't know. i'm not involved now. but is there a move in this process that gets us down to much lower numbers? when you look at the cost of maintaining 5000 warheads, and you know, really if we're never going to use that size arsenal, do we need to maintain it, only

because the soviets -- excuse me, the russians are still maintaining it? and can we agree that there is a more official way to do this? >> perhaps i will start and then my colleagues from dod might like to add them. president obama from the very beginning of his administration was very intense on moving in the direction of the total elimination of nuclear weapons. that's what his speech in prague in 2009 was all about, in april 2009. but he really ought position into the administration come into his presidency from the campaign. he was working those issues even when he was still in the senate. and i think became convinced of the necessity of moving necessity to lower numbers and eventually to the total elimination of nuclear weapons. the president is no not in practical about this. he said this is going to take a long, long time. he said it's not something to

expect to happen in my lifetime, but he's is nevertheless we must be prepared to move forward in a step-by-step way to steadily a lemonade the number of weapons in our arsenal, through negotiated reduction, and also to work to eliminate nuclear warheads over all. in the meantime maintaining as he said a safe, secure and effective arsenal. those two things go hand in hand. and it is i think an inherent part of this administrations over all approach to the nuclear enterprise, the nuclear doctrine and policy, and the force structure. ted or mike. >> i would add that the military's job is to meet the objectives that were placed before them by the president, and secretary of defense. it easy to think in terms of a large number of weapons we had or even a larger number of weapons we had 15 years ago. but i would remind everyone that

this was the first time that we were going to be at 1550 operationally deployed warheads. we are at that number on the way up, and it suggests there are other numbers we could go to eric important in having continuing that journey is the transparency, and in this case this treaty affords both sides to have more confidence in what the strategic environment is they face, and it's going to become important for others in the world to do the same thing, to help with him, again, it depends on the environment. and the instructions we were given. >> without breaking our arms, patting ourselves on the back, it's worth noting, i've been interested, i studied this issue for many decades. the figures i've seen in the last few years have said that at one point we had 31,000, 35,000 nuclear weapons, the united

states. and the russians i see one number, it might've been as high as 40,000. so get a sense as you come down a dramatic way. our high water mark in the what was probably 11-12,000 weapons associate with the long range intercontinental type strike systems. so the remainder must've been in the tactical, just by logic. so we have come a very long way. how far can we go down among other things? i do think it is, there's an issue of reciprocity here. we still believe that there ought to be something approximating a rough parity between ourselves and the russians. but it's a very good question that i have a feeling that some of your speakers later have an opinion on that issue. it's sort of how fast you can go. i think -- the president is very clear that he has an objective in mind that is very long-term objective, and i'm sure he, my

hunch is he might like to go as far as the traffic will bear. and that's why we need to get his homework done, look at it, and then work with the russians and see if we can, in fact, take this next step downward and broaden the scope. because this will be the first time that we would have taken on the nondeployed tactical world, or the nondeployed strategic world. so we have, it's ambitious. but one of the point i was going to say, if you have a treaty on this, remember what mike explained on inspections, the big new challenge would be you would have to open to inspection these nuclear weapons storage sites. that's a very sensitive issue, and how would you do it if there was some sort of sampling process or others, but one of the major figures in the white house on this matter, gary seymour, gave an interview on this a year or so ago. and he was talking about, you know, the challenges of verification that will go with

this, and particularly this question, not just clearing things real easy, it's trying to have inspections that try to see that people are living up to their declared data. so that's another thing that is going to make broadening the scope is going to have real challenges in this area. but we need to go lower, and i think the president, i know that president is very much committed to do so. we need to then work out a pragmatic set of steps that we can, in fact, undertake with the russians. >> just to be clear here, i think you said when you mentioned the nuclear posture and you get a follow-on study, as a result, as part of the president will say this is what i want to be up to do with my nuclear weapons and that then leads to a number, greg? >> the two are interrelated. it's how much, what needs to be held at risk, how do you in fact serve all the interests of the united states, the only

adversary is not confidential adversary is russia. there's other potential adversary. this hole calculus will have to go in. >> i have one small vignette onto an. you might've noticed, mike said we've been here before. we came up from the snows and now we're going back down again. just an interesting vignette. today we conclude negotiations of the tree i asked our colleagues in dod to provide me some historical data because i wanted to see when that moment was. so they likely had a chart together and they give it to me and i look at it. 1550 deployed strategic warheads him last time that number was in our arsenal was in the late 1950s and 1956, 57, i can't really fear of the top of my head. but you may have noticed the talking points after that this treaty will bring our deployed nuclear warheads the numbers that we haven't seen since the 1950s, the first full decade of the nuclear age. and that's when it comes from.

we actually did go back and look to see when was the time when we last had this level of number of strategic nuclear warheads deployed. we still have work to do, but i think, i think we have managed to really move things along. >> we have time for two more questions. david hoffman and then david copeland. david hoffman from foreign policy magazine. i would just like to ask you about the strategic nondeployed. you talked about this hope for more transparency on the russian side. secretary perry 18 years ago when he created what he called the hedge said part of it was due to geopolitical uncertainty about russia. it's 18 years later. we know a lot more about what's happened in russia. does administration. and we still need a hedge for geopolitical uncertainty, or just for spares? and if we don't need it for geopolitical uncertainty, is that something we can go lower on? >> hold that thought. david?

>> congratulations to the treaty for negotiate a more poorly for getting the treaty ratified. very few treaties get ratified. somewhat summer to the previous question, have you and the russians at all had discussion about speeding up implementation of the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty? currently isn't stretched over seven years. certainly there are people in the pentagon questioned why your spending money to maintain citizenship already agreed to get rid. is there any chance that the russians and us can speed up implementation of the current treaty? >> i'll take the last one. let me talk, your question, the guidance that we have been given is to think through this carefully. these are, in fact, nuclear weapons, and we don't do anything without thinking real hard about what it is. the policy community is going to reprocess of determining what

the appropriate mix is as we move forward, and in parallel with that we are looking at what steps would have to be taken. but i can tell you that they are, while there is some room for acceleration, clearly we give ourselves in a room during the nutrition on both sides, seven years, after implementation to get to those levels. there isn't a lot of room in there. simply because it just takes time. environmental impact statements have to be done, for example, for a limiting icbm launchers. the mechanics associate with altering a sobering ballistic missile submarine for example, this is a finely tuned in to end system. so we just takes time. i'm sure that we will notify the secretary of what the minimum time we can do it is in, but i'm not sure there's a lot of room in there. to go a lot faster. >> on the issue of the strategic

weapons hedge, the hedge issues you should link to to issues but one issue is geopolitical uncertainty. the other one is technical, the potential for technical failures within the very is components of the triad, known as the try again icbms as obedience and bombers. i believe they talk about the fact that they think there still aren't both of those dimensions are relevant. i think the technical hedge tends to be the more deterministic issue on what the size of it. it is one of the issues that is gripping look that within the current review, because the size of the hedge that is required is part of that calculus about how low can you go. >> and i would just add on that point, there are different ways that you can address the issue of need for technological hedge. one way that we have been considering and looking at very seriously, and, indeed, developing a budget for is to have a modernized weapons

infrastructure, a so-called infrastructure be more capable of responding to technological surprise than our current weapons infrastructure. so that's one of the reasons we've been placing an emphasis on modernizing weapons infrastructure and making it more responsive to those kinds of problems. >> yes, that modernization, however, even with the very considerable investment that's been committed to that over the next 10 years will only kick in that aspect in the 20 '20s. be okay. please join in thanking our panel. [applause] >> there is coffee and some cookies left. be back in his seat in about 10 as. will the second panel probably at 2:30.

[inaudible conversations] >> so about a 15 minute break. we will be back in about 15 minutes around 2:30 p.m. eastern to bring you a second panel, which looks forward on strategic

reductions. live coverage from the brookings institution here on c-span2. until then, your phone calls from this morning's "washington journal." >> host: let's show you a little bit of reporting from the pentagon announced that which is described as long-awaited yesterday on combat roles for women in the u.s. medicare. "washington times" gives it a leg coverage. pentagon will keep women off the front lines is the way they wrote the story. we'll open 14,000 support positions the pentagon announced thursday it is keeping its longtime ban on women serving as infantry armor and special ops warriors in ground combat units but it will open 14,000 support positions for them in units closer to the front lines. people say this conference will really has been happening on the ground in iraq and afghanistan. at an afternoon news conference reporters pressed officials to explain what defense secretary leon panetta opted to continue

the ban. let's listen to a little from that press conference yesterday. this is george little, the pentagon spokesperson. >> changes can more than 14,000 additional positions will now be open to women across the force. secretary panetta strongly supports these changes. he recognizes that in the last decade of war women have contributed in many ways to the military's mission. they have put their lives on the line -- they put their lives on the line and demonstrated patriotism and skills. they have proven their ability to serve on and off the battlefield. these changes will allow them to accomplish even more. as we make this announcement i would like to stress that secretary panetta police this is the beginning, not the end, of a process. these services will continue to determine what additional

positions may be opened to women. >> host: announcing some of the changes and the roles opening up 14,000 support just not about about women in the infantry. here's more press coverage. this is "the new york times." pentagon allows women closer to combat but not close enough for some. reflecting the steady but glacial evolution of the role of american women in work at the pentagon took a small step thursday and announced that women would be formally permitted in crucial and dangers jobs closer to the front lines. anmany women and back and

afghanistan have served in combat attachment to infantry foot patrols and in many cases they have come under fire and thought back. so our question for you is, should the ban continue for women in the front lines, what the arguments are for and against? would like to hear from the rose levy line set aside for women in active duty and veterans to tell us a bit of your own store. (202) 628-0184. will put the number on the screen for you. women on active duty and women veterans to tell your own story and tell us your opinion about women on the frontlines in u.s. military. you can also tweak us and you can send us a facebook posting it as a matter of fact, this has been on facebook for overnight on our page.

let's show you one of these comics as we begin here. i wonder why any woman would want to go into combat and infantry as long as it does not lead to myself on my daughter being forced into draft eligibility. hey, whatever floats your boat. just make sure you're making equal money to the boys. let's hear from mechanicsburg pennsylvania. john, anything, you're on the air. good morning. >> caller: good morning, thinking. i totally think the pentagon is being completely hypocritical here. if women are going to serve in the military, and they should be able to, just as men, as a former veteran myself i think they should be able to fight in combat positions, support or direct combat. it's the equality issue. if the service member may or the no can do the job, they should be able to be in a combat position whether they are in a tank or in a support role. it's hypocritical for the pentagon to say will only allow them to do support functions. if they want to serve in the military, male or female, they

should be able to be in combat positions. that's what their career needs to have happen in order for them to develop their careers regardless of being men or women. i think the pentagon is again being hypocritical and i support women's roles in combat, in support in whatever role they choose to be in thanks. >> host: colorado springs, richard republican, good morning. you were on the air. >> caller: yes. in 2009 political report on the soldiers loads and they have to get up to 132 pounds when they have their protective vests on come the rifle, mortar ground, stuff like that. i think if you're really going to talk about this, i think you should be suited up just like somebody in combat would be, and show how actually feasible it is for women to actually move and fight, no, it will be trying to carry what's the required load. it's pretty ridiculous.

there's not a lot of women that way much than 142 pounds and don't have the strength to do it so you just do, can't move, can't help anybody. if someone got wind, they couldn't carry them out of combat so they're just dead, and generally useless body there on the field. >> host: similar sentiment echoed by bill on twitter. strength, physical condition to endure fatigue is the question which is being publicly adjusted to meet political goals. that is his view of the pentagon's announcement yesterday. more from the near times. the new rules are to take effect gradually and will be reviewed by members of congress are not expected to object to them but congress has balked at allowing women in combat and has in recent years as the pentagon sometimes sharp questions where becomes obvious to news reports that women were serving in combat in iraq and afghanistan. here's more from this.

women might be strong enough for infantry acknowledged some psychological barriers. i think the infantry will have a hard time a very hard time ever accepting that i'm going to rush against the enemy and will be a female right next to me. nixes new canada, maine. john ruiz on a independent independent line. good morning, john. >> caller: good morning. you've got to be kidding me. have you ever seen the no species of any species actually? onit, take for instance, the insect, spider female will kill a male after she is finished with them. how about the lions. female lions to the hunting.

the males just sit around and just god does what they do. and you know, there's an old saying, hell hath no fury as a women scorned. a bull is naturally playful, but a mad cow, stay out of its way. the most dangerous creatures on this earth. >> host: for all those biological reasons you cite you said yes to women in combat roles? >> caller: damn right. as vicious as they come. of the most deadliest animal on this earth. >> host: here is derek rice on facebook or rights women already by significant part in situation where there are legitimate combat threats. the fact that they're not officially recognize is doing so is just bookkeeping. >> next is a phone call from new york. good morning to monica,

republican. you are on the air. >> caller: good morning. i'm the mother of his son and daughter picked up my son gets drafted i know my daughter can do the job. i think the pentagon is sexist with regard. they are very strong women leaders, very strong women fighters. and if we want equal rights, but gendercide. >> host: thank you, monica, from new york. from the washington post. pentagon to ease ban on women and some combat roles despite pressure many ground rules, ground jobs remain off limits is the subhead. the pentagon will maintain ban on women serving in the ground combat units despite defense officials say they despite pressure from lawmakers and female veterans who called the restrictions outdated after a decade of war. we do have a line set aside for women who are in the military, war veterans who would like details a little bit about your own experience with this and what your opinion is on

advancing the policies that women would be on the front line. pentagon yesterday opening about 14,000 jobs, services most effective army and navy. marine corps not many jobs opening up, and air force as you saw from our graphics already 99% of their positions are open to women. jan writes to us, i think it is societal that women should not be in combat role. think about cops in your town. it comes down to training. next up is eugene, oregon, michael independent, good morning. you are on the air. >> caller: thanks for taking my call. i'm really upset about this. i can't believe this. the only reason they're doing this, including accepting gays, because we don't have a draft, to put women in the military, i mean, after the film, the film festival, all the rapes that are happening to our own women. i mean, are we really, are we a just society?

this is crazy. the only reason they wanted women or anybody is because we don't have a draft. they were taking people that were asked the ones, criminals around is a that want to join the military because we don't have a draft. this is so upsetting to me. this is not advanced the. this is not, this is not moving forward. this just upsets me to no end and i can't with all the people that have called to support this. >> host: thanks very much. next up is george, democrat in the spill, kentucky. what is your opinion? >> caller: my opinion is this. the guy just said that i was going to see. there is no draft. you have a lot of men who won't go, like for instance, cheney had five deployment. romney, five sons, none of them serve. in world war ii, my god, we have plenty of men. i mean, probably maybe not

enough but we have plenty of men, and the women stayed home in the factories. making armor, arms. and we need to have a draft which would stop a lot of wars. thank you very much. >> host: back to facebook. -- >> you can see "washington journal" every morning at seven eastern on c-span. we're going live now again to the brookings institution this afternoon for more discussion on the new strategic arms reduction treaty between the u.s. and russia. >> let's go ahead and do with our second panel. during the first panel i think we got a very good position from three very senior officials in the u.s. government about how the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty has been implement over the last year ago and also a bit of a sense where the us government wants to go. but we will lose, use this second panel here to drill down a bit more and think about what happens now, what comes after new s.t.a.r.t.

for example, i think both rose gottemoeller and ted talked about homework. the nuclear posture that you fall on, and so what are like to do is talk what issues might arise with that and then also, you know, what possible my to be for arms control now, go here and also in russia next year. and help us think these questions. we have got to very good experts on the question. first jan lodal who i can hear the full bios but served in a senior positions in the department of defense including the undersecretary of defense for policy was he worked on a lot of these questions back in the administration. and we also have genes act in done a lot of thinking about on arms control question. he's a senior associate at the carnegie endowment for national -- international peace. jan, why did you start us off? entrance of the homework assignment, what are the sort of questions that are being asked now on these very tightly closed

doors? >> thank you, steve or i will try to provide a little bit of insight in this very complex process that goes on, mostly in strategic command and other places as well. where quite a few people are involved. trying to develop actual warplanes that would be implemented should the president decide to undertake a nuclear action, and try to determine how many weapons they need in order to create an operational war plan. and this is really a very different process than the process those of us who look at aggregate numbers and how much is needed and so forth, go through. now there's obviously a close relationship between these two, and a lot of what the president's nuclear posture review from last year tried to do was to make that relationship even closer. in particular, to specify that

the primary purpose of these weapons is deterrence. it came close, the posture review, to saying that the only purpose is deterrence, but they also included reassurance of allies, and a few other things that it's hard to argue nuclear weapons don't have any role in doing, but the posture review said that things should be structured in such a way that the united states could move to appoint where the sole purpose of its nuclear weapons was deterrence. so that means that the people put together the war plans first and have to decide what is needed for deterrence. we discussed theoretically in forums like these, but they have to decide specifically what kind of target and we have to destroy, does timing matter, and we have to destroy them right away if a war breaks out? do we have to be able to sustain nuclear operations over a long

period of time. doesn't matter what kind of forces were used on what kind of targets? lots and lots of complicated questions that they have to decide. now, the way these issues get decide to come which are decided pretty much by warfighters, technical people, can, in fact, determine the limits on what future policy can be. and, therefore, it has a big impact. and in many cases there are judgments involved. so this particular process that is going on now, to my knowledge is the first one of its kind where the president has made clear that he wants to make the final decisions on the key issues associated with these questions. it's been rare for the president himself to get involved at this stage. usually these plans have been put together, approved by the secretary of defense, joint chiefs of staff, and briefed to the president. but in this case the president wants real options and wants to

look at what is being proposed. now, let me touch briefly on the major categories of issues that will have to be dealt with. first and foremost is, some of you ask questions about this on the first bell, the targets. what targets should our nuclear weapons and attempt to destroy? and again the question is, what's necessary for deterrence, what do we hold at risk? when i say attempt to destroy i'm talking about be prepared to destroy because nobody is proposing at u.s. first strike, we don't rule out the possibility of a first strike, partially because technically that possibility is going to be there regardless of what we say. but the posture review makes it clear that a first strike is not what we're trying to do. we're trying to hold at risk, shall we ever be attacked by nuclear weapons, certain kinds of targets but enough targets that we can destroyed to make it

clear to the other side that they should never have attempted to attack us at first. now, this depends upon a lot of factors. several estimates, who we think might be an attacker is a lot different than say a new missile from north korea or iran, from several missiles coming from russia, who is not in any of the united states, none of these states are in principle but so this is it very difficult thing to calculate. what is the right target set. second of all is the question of how promptly can we count on a presidential decision to launch these weapons. this posture review makes it clear that the president wants to move away from relying on being able to launch our weapons before they could be destroyed by an incoming attack. and in effect be able to ride out the attack. and in some ways these

characteristics fight against each other. you may need more weapons if you get rid of carte blanche because you would have a higher risk by the time the president made a decision to retaliate, some weapons would be destroyed already. so the idea here of course is to avoid some kind of accidental war, some kind of war that escalates immediately when that's not what had to occur. and, therefore, get away from so-called hairtrigger decisions. and to give the president a chance, and the ability to survive long enough, to consider what his options are and what's really happening. the third issue that is race in the posture review, but really settled, to my mind, for the foreseeable future is this question of the triad. having three different types of nuclear forces. robbers, missiles, land-based

missiles, and sea-based missiles. now, there's a major change in land-based missiles and that they are all reduced to a single warhead. this was something that some of us have been pushing for 20 or 30 years. it has a very nice characteristic because it means that if you have approximately equal weapons on the other side and you have only one warhead on each side for-based missile, you can't gain anything military by trying to attack him because just for reliability and accuracy purposes you'll probably have to target at least two to have a reasonable chance of destroying one on the other side. so the force balance will move against you if you try to attack single warhead missiles. so this is a stabilizing move on our part to reduce the warheads on those missiles to one. and that then leads them pretty much as a hedge against some kind of failure in the other forces, and also a force that is easier and more reliable and

perhaps more survivable command and control if you're looking at trying to reduce any need for prompt launch, and they are no longer attractive targets, they become forces that could play in that respect. now, they really are two other components of her forces. we talk about i tried but we really have a five company we also have a few tactical weapons that we maintain. president george h. w. bush unilaterally eliminated about 5000 of our tactical weapons. we kept a few of them, and they take on relatively speaking, an increasing importance as the other numbers come down. the ones that we have committed to our nato allies, and the few others that we keep nondeployed and reserved. that could be used on aircraft if we so needed, that type of a capability.

so this posture review, this process that's going on i will have to consider those weapons as well. and then, of course, there are the stored weapons, the backup weapons that have been mentioned. and it'll be important to see whether the military commanders believe those weapons plate any operational role at all. if they don't, then the number that you need can be determined strictly in terms of maintenance considerations and reliability and so forth, and without considering operational factors. and george w. bush administration, their posture actually gave these weapons something of an operational role. and that hasn't been officially reviewed since that time. so, all of these questions will have to be dealt with in this

study, and again, i will emphasize that it's not an easy task and we shouldn't belittle the work that the operational, the operational command has to go through in order to come up with its recommendations. at the same time, it's important that there be strong civilian oversight both in the defense department and more broadly in the government of this process, because in many cases there are judgment dr. schear that go beyond pure technical military questions that will have to be addressed. >> james, ted warner mention in the first session that there are these strategic stability, so there's a dialogue going on between washington and moscow. but certainly by all appearances is not the intensity we had in 2000, 2009 and 2010 when you have negotiators meeting full-time engineer. so i guess the question is, are

we really thinking about what happens in 2013 after you have the russian election behind us and the election behind us to? i think about what each side, the united states and what russia's goals would be out of the next round of arms control. once you have that little, that longview, you can then start think about what is possible in the shorter term. there is a fundamental asymmetry between the two sides objective in the next round. the united states is primarily worried about russian nuclear weapons. rush is primarily worried about the u.s. conventional weapons. you've heard a panel of u.s. officials talk about the president's goal of incorporating both nondeployed and tactical nuclear warheads into the next round of arms control. i don't think i need to add anything to that.

on the russian side of things, and russia is firstly worried about u.s. conventional weapons that have the capability potentially of destroying a nuclear weapon. the most obvious example of that is ballistic missile defense. another example is u.s. program called conventional prompt global strike for long range conventional weapons. and in that regard the russians also in kind of info ngo discussion, some of them sometimes bring up u.s. cruise missile's, conventional cruise missiles. space weapons are relevant because that in the rush of you because that enables these conventional systems. and an occasion the russians bring up the kind of old thorny topic of anti-sobering warfare. that is five topics there. another thing that the russians sometimes say they're concerned about is the balance of

conventional forces in europe. during the cold war, nato use nuclear weapons to compensate for its conventional interiority. the russians basically say we do the same thing now. so your convention is superior, so if you want us to get rid of tactical nuclear weapons you've got to do something about conventional forces in europe. and then finally, the only type of nuclear weapon that the russians really care about on the u.s. side, or my really care about, are these u.s. nondeployed weapons. and it would take us the russians say, they're worried because the u.s. has missiles that are not water with as many warheads as they can carry, and so the u.s. can't upload those spare warheads onto the extra missiles. the u.s. says let's talk about nondeployed weapons. let's do something about them. and the russians again, we don't really want to do the verification of individual missile warheads.

let's just limit them instead. let me say that issues out of this thing at the russians would put onto the table, if negotiations ever begin is anybody's guess. i don't inspect them actually in practice to demand progress on every issue, but beyond ballistic, one of the remaining issues is not at all clear to me at this point. but in any case it is this asymmetry. the u.s. wants to do with nuclear russia wants to deal with conventional. so because the two sides will have to be making these trade-offs across different areas, negotiations are to be extremely long and difficult. each side is limited on what is willing to do. the u.s. is not willing to accept negotiator limit on ballistic defense, for instance. and on top of that, the politics

are deeply an auspicious right now but i think it's very hard to imagine in 2012 of being willing to really take a risk on arms control negotiations. so a comprehensive treaty i think is a long way off. there's been some talk in your is about what i call new s.t.a.r.t. heavy if you like, which would be new s.t.a.r.t. with lower limbs. i think that's a great idea. i think russians have absolutely zero interest in that i don't see that going anywhere. so i think, my message is really a lot could happen in the next year. very little i predict will happen in the next year. the discussions between, undersecretary, will presumably continue. those i think are very important, scoping out the issues, identifying possible

opportunities. i wouldn't in any way be little that. another thing that a thinker happen is unilateral steps by the two sides. that will avoid making negotiations if and when they commence harder. russia, for instance, has announced its researching and developing, a so-called heavy icbm. this is a liquid fueled, gigantic missile with lots of warheads. russia is not going to cancel that system, but perhaps, unicode one could imagine the russians not funding it too heavily so we take longer to develop so there might be some chance of incorporating into arms control. the problem with this is, the converse of what jan was think about it changed a single warhead missiles is these missiles really lack.

on the u.s. side, for instance, i would like to see the u.s. administration making the case much more strongly than it has already. the conventional prompt global strike is a nietzsche system. yes, there may be utility for at by the u.s. only teens a relatively small numbers of the system. and that might pave the way for some kind of agreement on how to deal with this later on. looking a bit further forward in 2013 perhaps, i think that are a vast number of informal confidence and transparency building measures. the two sides would compute that would advance the goal of a treaty. i think the goal has to be a treaty. you won't get the russians to agree to a process that doesn't have a goal as legally binding limits of some kind.

but i think it would be very beneficial if the two sides could agree that that goal should not prejudice confidence building transparency measure along the way. i think it was ted warner earlier who mentioned information interchange. that's one good example. let me give you three examples of what i think would be implemented relatively quickly, would help build the way to a further treaty. first on tactical nuclear weapons from this single and easiest thing you can do is to verify the absence of tactical nuclear weapons, it bases would be used to be stored but no longer are. both sides say there are bases in that category, particularly europe where these weapons used to be stored but no longer are. and let's go and verify that. let's have mutual inspections to verify that they are no longer there. for reasons i do have time to elaborate, i think that's actually a very good first step

on the way to a comprehensive accounting scheme for all types of warhead, strategic nonstrategic, deployed and nondeployed. so that's a good first do. secondly i would like to hang up the cruise missile issue as a part. i cannot imagine the u.s. ever agreeing informal arms-control limit on cruise missiles. but nontheless, the russians say they're worried the u.s. conventional cruise missiles poses a threat to the survivability of their silos. i think a useful thing to do would be a joint threat assessment between the two sides to analyze about where the convention actually poses a threat to silos. but one could imagine be very quiet behind the scenes joint study by the two sides, not declared to the public at all because of technical experts working behind the scenes. alternatively the two countries

national academy would perhaps be a good venue for doing a joint study by technically informed own governmental experts. and finally i would like to see transparency, each side nuclear weapons production complex restarted. during 1994-1998, there was a series of bilateral between floss almost and -- these were for the purpose of verifying material security, the u.s. sharing their best practice with russia about the accounting for plutonium and keeping it safe and secure. but nontheless, in the process, the two sides counties are sensitive areas of one another's nuclear weapons production complex is but as ago to lorna

was complex has become relatively more important. your ability to produce weapons, how quickly you could, becomes as if not more important as the number of weapons you have in the arsenal. so as you go to lower numbers you want to have some idea perhaps some vague a very rough parity between the two sides weapon production complexes. so i think we started transparency visit, unicode is a good way of making progress towards the long-term goal. and as i said, the fact that these have happened before, albeit for different purpose, demonstrates that this is the kind of idea that is i shall intimate if there is the political will to do so. none of these measures i expect to see happening in 2012. however, i think after the election when both sides,

domestic on both sides have called a little bit, then i think there is a tremendous amount that could be done but would advance the relatively long-term goal on a new treaty. >> let's open up the floor to questions. we don't have the microphone. just project. to i'm wondering,. [inaudible] >> i wonder if you'd be willing to comment on the potential paradoxical issue between the objective of moving toward a deterrence only posture, and our nonproliferation? because our posture depends on reassurance to our allies, extended deterrence, which was

again moving towards a deterrence only nuclear posture. i wonder if steve also could comment on this because -- [inaudible] >> let me say that first of all, i'd conclude extended deterrence which i'll describe briefly, this is the deterrence that we provide to our allies so we have this, as a treaty obligation, with japan and europe and other cases, israel, some places like that, our extended deterrent is de facto but not governed by the treaty. but in effect we say don't go to own nuclear weapons. you don't need them because we will use our nuclear weapons to deter any nuclear attack on you. now, there's a subtlety there, which is to deter any nuclear

attack on you. we don't assert that our nuclear weapons can deter any attack of any kind on our allies, and we believe that we and they together are working together should have adequate conventional forces to do with conventional threats. so i think that this gets into the whole question of why is a path to zero the most sensible approach. because of exactly what you said. you can't really unravel all of this if you're in a world in which nuclear weapons are seen to have military and political uses that go beyond the purpose of deterring the use of nuclear weapons by others. now if, in fact, you could get all states to agree to that purpose and say that's the only usable purpose for nuclear weapons, the united states has come pretty close already in its posture review. welcome in effect everyone has said, everyone else would give up their nuclear weapons, so can we. by the way the official policy of china is already there.

because they have a no first use policy. and if you say will never first, you are saying pretty much the same thing. it's not absolutely precise but it is pretty much the same thing. so if you could get into that kind of a situation, you could envision a world in which if everyone was reducing more simultaneously like we're trying to do with russia now, and adequate deterrence to be maintained until an effective the last minute when the last weapons were reduced, and the deterrent could be reduced as you go along because if the other side has less nuclear weapons you needless to deter the possibility that they might use them. so that's the concept i think for how you get out of this box. it's a long, difficult process, but as long as we are in the box we're in now, and we're not only path to zero and that requires

building the verification regime and all sorts of stuff to get on the path, well, the incentive for proliferation in fact are going to be there. at least in my view. and because anytime once they have nuclear weapons, the one thing that really works is deterrence if you want to protect yourself against that states nuclear weapon. so some of the state is going to feel threatened, and they're going to feel very much motivated to develop their own nuclear deterrent. we see this most dramatically with iran, and to some extent with north korea. north korea right now, south korea of course feels threatened by north korea but so far they're willing to rely on our nuclear umbrella and not build their own nuclear weapon. will it stay that way forever? it depends on a lot of things. iran, there's a lot at stake in the region that would be within, within range of the weapons they had even today. and so, if iran develops a

nuclear weapon, can we provide enough of a nuclear umbrella while other states that have nuclear weapons, also to share that responsibility of providing a nuclear umbrella? it's tough to do that, and, therefore, the incentive for proliferation is there. so kind of a complicated answer. i apologize for that, but you get to the heart of the issue of the nuclear limits they face. and there's no simple answer to it, in my view. >> let me make a couple of points. one of the clichés from the cold war is determined your adversaries is much easier than assuring your allies. allies tend to believe that muscle is necessary to deter their anniversary. then the united states believes it's necessary to deter its allies and adversaries. so there's a gap between.

i think the goal of policy has to be to narrow that gap, through very careful instance of dialogue with allies. one i think class example of that would be the obama administration's handling of the tomahawk land attack missile nuclear. this was a seals cruise missile. and it was a system that hadn't been deployed since 1991. it's been in storage from and in the run up to the year, 2010, there was discussion about whether to decommission it. the strategic posture commission which was a congressionally appointed commission in 2008 i think it was warned a very, very strongly against this. it said japan will be very, very worried. and we shouldn't do this. what the obama administration did was it set down. i invest a lot of their high level diplomatic, engaging with

the japanese government, and explain to them why in the view of the obama administration, dismantling it would not undermine the security of japan. and after a lot of very, very hard work and effort, i think you square the japanese government was for the. i spent a lot of time in japan and i never found a japanese official say that they are, it was a problem. you will find voices in the ngo community who are very unhappy about this. i have never heard a starting officials say even in private that they were unhappy about the dismantling. and that's what i think of to handle these. you have to really engage with allies. and convince them that your point of view that dismantling such and such a system are such and such a number of weapons won't undermine this agree. and incidentally, i think steve's paper on the next step

and he mentioned i think the fantastic suggestion of reconstituting the special consultative group who set up to engage with allies during the negotiate. i think that's the way of handling this issue. >> i think you are exactly -- or is this tension between reductions and how do you maintain the confidence in our part of our allies. and just to build on what james about deterrence and reassurance. because i think you're seeing this, it was going to be played at in the course of the defense posture review that nato is doing in the coming years of native. where on one hand right now some unclassified source of we, there's about 200 american nuclear bombs based in five countries in europe. as the american nuclear presents. i think if you talk to people in this town and said do we believe that those weapons are necessary in europe for purposes of deterring an attack on our european allies?

the former vice chairman of the joint chiefs of staff was asked that question, and he said these weapons have no military utility and that they cannot do anything that we can't. and i suspect if he took up poll around how most people would say we probably don't need to have those weapons there. u..

their security will be protected and i think some examples missile defense may be one way although perhaps not the way that missile defense is not a direct substitute for weapons but missile defense will mean the immediate presence of military force in poland and romania. my sense is that for those governments will be offered a degree of reassurance. it may not replace the reassurance of weapons devices and there may be mechanisms that allows you to reduce some of this the spurgeon between what you describe. >> can i add one point to to show how difficult all of this is? returning to the question of south korea. the united states has never taken off the table so to speak the possibility of using nuclear forces against north korean attack on south korea. north korea maintains a huge

force, 20 miles i guess it is from the edges of seoul across the border and it would be very difficult with conventional forces for the south koreans to paypal that invasion as it is now and the south koreans have come over a period of well since the korean war to rely on the nuclear umbrella of the united states to give them some confidence that won't happen. now that nuclear arms used to include a lot of nuclear weapons inside north korea all of which were eliminated when president bush 41 and eliminated the tactical nuclear weapon. that took some real diplomatic doing to make sure that was enough with our alliance for south korea. subsequent to that there've been reductions in american ground force presence in south korea, further exacerbating this problem. so if you read the net lawyer

posturing of you carefully the united states provide certain -- they don't apply to north korea because the words are very carefully written so that we do not take that off the table at this point. and that clearly has got to be in my analytical view one of the reasons why the united states could not say that deterrence of nuclear attack is the sole purpose of our nuclear weapons, because in that case, and perhaps some other cases we did not feel diplomatically that we were able to take this possibility using nuclear weapons against a mass of conventional attack. >> thank you. michael coffman. how would you view these initiatives in light of military

reforms going on in russia because from my perspective, a lot of our interest in our and our initiatives further arms control with what is going on with russian conventional forces so i would like to hear what you believe is their excuse to preserving their initiatives with us especially before any agreement on missile defense? thank you. >> the short answer is i don't expect russia to agree with these agreements without a suitable balanced quid pro quo. i recognize that the u.s. has its security concerns. russia has its security concerns and i think by and large both sides to security concerns that are partly genuine and partly manufactured. as a negotiating tool. so you know i hope the two sides

can have a successfully trade-off across the two domains. i said at the beginning the u.s. wants concessions in that area. rush up or nominally concerned about u.s. weapons and wants a trade off in that area. i don't necessarily predict these very difficult trade-offs will be possible but i think i am clear that unless you know it each side respects and addresses the other sides concerned nothing much is going to happen in the future with arms control and if it wasn't that wasn't clear from my talk i am not terribly optimistic about the next two or three years. not that i'm completely pessimistic but it will be very -- >> i would just add on this that i have spent a lot of hours, like everybody perhaps that you have talked to dave today in the

room, with russian officials, senior russian officials negotiating arms control and i think this is something we have to learn how to do together again in this new world. we have done it successfully in the past and now we have moved forward to this new start. that being said, i think right now the burden is on russia to move this forward. russia has gotten itself in a real bind with its doctrine and its statements. on the one hand russia acknowledges that the west is not a threat and the united states is not a threat. on the other hand their rhetoric continues to be very strong about nato and nato expansion and nato threatening russia and very strong about american missile defense threatening the russian deterrent and a bunch of things like this which really has no basis in fact and there is no military capability there

to do these things that russia sets forth as the threat that prohibits russia from agreeing to further arms control reduction so i see a whole lot of what is going on now as being the result of internal russian politics. yes the nato forces that are being structured are much less that they can certainly handle any real threat that russia might face today, but by keeping this large nuclear force and putting forth these reasons why this very large nuclear force has to be like it is until the united states makes other changes in a fairly small amount of effort we are putting into missile defense in europe and so forth, i think this is going to change until this internal problem inside of russia, political problem, gets changed because the substance is really

there. >> james let me follow-up on that question ask you a couple of questions. see if you think i'm being overly optimistic as i think there might be a couple of -- the russians might have after 2012 above and beyond these other issues and one is actually some russian analysts are concerned even with new start members where is the u.s. military plans right at the 700 deployed allowed by the treaty and the 1500 strategic deployed warheads. a lot of their systems now are going to come out of service and they just announced they're going to have to two new submarines next summer with missiles on board. the russians could come down to about 121,100. the second question we have is this question of non-diploid warheads and is not just the united states has more non-deployed russians in a strategic sense but if you look at most if not all of

intercontinental ballistic missiles on the american side are going to have fewer warheads than they can carry so for for example the minuteman warhead, think it was said will carry a single warhead but in fact it can carry three. i think the average missile will carry four or five so you can put these warheads back on and the russians don't have that capability because they don't have the empty spaces. so how much of an incentive does that give russians and how does that play off against the other concerns on missile defense conventional? >> beginning first with the non-deployed issue, it's very much the argument that everybody on the arms control community governmental and non-governmental visit to russia don't worry about the u.s. potential. so let's do, let's deal with that problem by dealing with u.s. non-deployed warheads. but i think that would be in the

russian interests. what russian -- russia would say when he say that is that kind of verification system would be too much for us to bear and we would love to deal with this by limits on missiles. we want to limit the number of missiles and in that way to limit your upload potential. i think this is unfortunate. i think the limit on non-deployed warheads would be in russia's interest and i think there is a potential quid pro quo on tactical. but i haven't seen a huge amount of interest on the russian side although i think it is an extremely good idea and one that i would hope the russians would take seriously. again, on the fact that the russian forces dismantled weapons are coming down in

numbers, again i think from my perspective, both sides want to be able to agree to essentially a new start -- again from my own conversations with russia there would be little interest in that and what they say is well we are building the icbm which is going to be able to hold 10, 12 however many warheads. that would enable us to build up our forces very quickly and very cheaply. unfortunately it would be a very destabilizing way the same time but nonetheless that is the kind of russian response to what are you going to be doing about the fact -- i think both of those are ideas that i personally like him personally think would be good ideas. i'm just not seeing other peoplh interested on the track to

discussions with russia. >> could i say this? this issue of tactical nuclear weapons is really the key and what goes around comes around. i've recall i think it was president nixon's last summit meeting when i was there was secretary kissinger and president nixon and we were surprised by brezhnev handing over a big chart with thousands of american tactical weapons deployed in europe all and that russia. and, i was given a job to write a paper explaining to them why this was not a threat to russia. well that was a hard thing to do actually. [laughter] and now, it's on the other side. not that the russian tactical weapons are aimed at the united states but they are aimed at egg and hit our european allies to whom we have a treaty extended deterrence commitment and so we

ought to treat them as if those things were threats to us. and so, this is another reason why looking at the total number of warheads which would deal simultaneously with this question of non-deployed and strategic weapons and tactical weapons which really when they go off does as much damage as the deployed ones and if there were a period of confrontation that would extended and lead up to some risk of nuclear war with russia, these weapons could the the -- fairly rapidly on both sides so it's a real risk and furthermore certainly the russian tactical weapons, our non-deployed strategic weapons are more susceptible to diversion and theft or falling into the hands of terrorists and the ones on operational systems and that is a major concern for us as well. all those things are concerned and i would hope, i would have

very much of a common interest here in dealing with this problem. is not just our interest or their interest. it's a common interest and so hopefully the political situation will evolve to a point where that common interest can come to the floor. >> does anybody really think that there is a realistic threat over the next for five years at the russians would withdraw from new start over something like missile defense and can anybody comment generally on what is driving their paranoia? maybe i just don't understand a lot of what goes on over there and their political situation but it seems like a major obstacle to make any further progress over the next several years is on the russian side and is there anything else in the offing that gives you any optimism that we can cut through

this paranoia on the part of the russians? >> i think it is helpful to recognize in answering that question very different constituencies and russia that have different concerns about missile defense. the kind of technically informed community says is we know that what is being deployed right now poses no threat to us but what we are concerned about and i am quoting, this is from memory but the pages written in russia by a very senior experienced russian former general, and what they said in a quote if the republican party returns to power than in 2020, massive

deployments of land-based, sea-based space-based missile defenses and lower numbers our deterrents could be seriously undermined. that is almost exactly quoting. so that i think is what the concern is, that the u.s. never says this is the endpoint, and with multiple systems there are some very serious analyst who do worry about potential threats to the survivability of their forces and what they further say it is the threat is compounded by these high precision conventional weapons. clearly ballistic missile defense cannot annihilate a russian first strike but if with conventional weapons the u.s. took out most russian nuclear weapons than those that were left after retaliation could be taken out with a pmd.

let me say i think personally it is fantastical sense at a number of different technical reasons i think dmd is unlikely to work against highly sophisticated missiles with advanced countermeasures like the russians have. neither do i think the conventional weapons are likely to be effective against mobile missiles. that said i also think russians are genuine and i think the leaf eating it will be very difficult. i would also say that these russians mirror almost precisely u.s. fears from the late 1970s and early 1980s when the u.s. was very worried about the so-called window of vulnerability in which the russians would be able to preemptively destroy u.s. nuclear weapons so i made the two sides have kind of switched

places in this regard. russia is remarkably like the u.s. history. i'm not worried about missile defense. i find it a very useful political bargaining chip that is on the table. i think there are some people that believe -- russia has a much greater the leaf and technical skills and technical ability than the u.s. has on its own technical ability. so i don't have a single clean answer but a series of overlapping definitions. >> i agree with everything james has said. i would reiterate though that i believe that this stems predominantly from what has happened to the russian conventional forces of which -- i wish ted warner were still on the stage because he is an excellent on this and i hate to state this but the russian conventional forces are in such bad shape that i think the russians have come to believe

that you can substitute nuclear forces for conventional forces and that you can deter a potential conventional attack against yourself with some kind of superiority of nuclear forces and that is one of the reasons i think it maintains this large inventory of tactical nuclear weapons. even though it's not quite clear with the conventional threat is there that they are worried about, but i think they are very much worried about the weakness of their conventional forces. they are taking steps to try to resolve that. i think they are making some progress there so perhaps that will reduce the paranoia. i personally don't believe that nuclear forces can significantly deter conventional warfare when both sides have nuclear forces. i think they offset each other so i don't think this is a real

impact and i think it's hard to think of a scenario where nuclear forces would help them in that respect but i think they believe it and they believe therefore that unless they can get the u.s. to agree to things that they see as favorable in the nuclear area they are better off staying where they are. >> to brief comments. first i think it's unlikely that the russians will at some point to withdraw. i think in 2010 when they signed a treaty they looked at their respective american transmissile defense and said even if things things go as far as we fear they might go in 2021 when the treaty expires, we are still going to be in a position where it's not a threat. the second is the paranoia i think in moscow is fueled in part by an incredible some might

say overestimation of american technical capabilities and i go back to when i was working on arms control in the u.s. government and serving it at the american embassy in moscow and 86 and 87 when there is this palpable fear that the strategic defense initiative announced that president reagan was going to put them out of the ballistic missile business and people think in five or six years. i think by 1987, moscow said this is really rocket science and it's very hard to do. but i think there is this tendency on the part of a significant part of the russian officials to look at american plants and say americans really can't do that and then -- so right now they say when you look at the approach phases one to three are not a problem. what about phases five, six and seven? i think that make the paranoia even more difficult to deal

with. >> i am from georgetown law that the federal legislation clinic there. kind of speaking to what you were just talking about, with russia's lower conventional weapons capabilities, maybe being compensated for by nuclear weapons or perhaps them putting confidence or pride in their larger numbers of tactical nuclear weapons versus the united states, how hard is it going to be let's say from russia's domestic letter couldn't concerned in maintaining the great power status or wanting to sort of still have some security over the united states, how hard is to make it for them to commit to any further reductions in the future and maybe on the flipside the united states perspective how difficult is it politically for any president to seemingly weaken the united states because the russia or other possible

adversaries? i wondered if you could speculate or speak to how those political difficulties could impede any further progress on reducing tactical nuclear weapons? >> well, i think you raise some very good points. i think it will be difficult for an american president to take steps that would lead to a major difference. we are down now to the kinds of levels where cost isn't a huge consideration. i don't mean to belittle the cost of these forces. it's not trivial especially in a time where we are looking for every possible way to save some money. one should not belittle a few tens of millions of dollars here but that is what we are talking about. we are not talking about hundreds of millions at the

margins with these forces so i think there is very little incentive for an american president to let things get a long way away from parity. i like many others have written and argued extensively against the concept of parity is being terribly relevant in the nuclear age. i think it is a political reality and we have to live with that. on the other hand i do think that this nuclear posture review makes it clear that the united states is very prepared to change not only its nuclear posture but our approach to nuclear weapons altogether so i think there is a lot the united states can do while the president has promised to maintain a strong nuclear deterrent in the way we deploy our nuclear forces and what we are willing to cooperate on and the openness with which we approach this process. if we can reach some agreement

with russia on a really workable cooperative scheme on ballistic missile defense which is hugely beneficial step i step i think we can begin to bring through this difficulty that you correctly identified. i also believe that there is plenty the united states can do to try to deal with some of the larger questions that face all of us, proliferation, nuclear terrorism, uncontrolled missile materials which could be used to make lumps and so forth. they don't deal with this particular issue of numbers between the u.s. and russia. i personally would hope very much that we can accept the reality of where we are on that and the reality of what the political situation is and don't let difficulty they are keep us from making progress in these other areas which aren't so

directly tied to the complicated political selection that you -- question that you raise. >> very briefly, you said it would be very hard for u.s. president to do something to make the u.s. weaker but arms control is not about weakness. arms control is about building mutual security cooperatively. that sometimes is very hard. there is no better example of that than with missile defense but at the end of the day the best argument for ballistic missile defense cooperation is bad the russians have radar that have better access or would provide the united states with better access to iranian ballistic missile options than the u.s. has itself.

those are the kinds of arguments that i think have to be made in the domestic context and the administration strategy when you start replication which is to say this treaty by itself make the u.s. more secure and russia could say the same thing. so i completely agree with you domestic politics is extremely difficult. and i think to some extent you have to be able, there has to be truth in every steps of arms control you take. and you can make that argument. >> last question. >> acting he adding he was james or steve. you had acknowledged that russian strategic forces may fall significantly under the new new s.t.a.r.t. ceiling. i'm wondering what you think about the idea of the u.s. as a unilateral confidence building measure of allowing our own

operational force levels to go down not below the actual russian levels but within the new s.t.a.r.t. framework to significantly below the 1550. >> i had never thought about it in that way before. i think that is really interesting. the difficult thing would be, firstly there would be a domestic policy difficulty. the other difficulty would be if the russians are committed to building a heavy icbm, which would enable them to build up their forces very rapidly. it would be potentially hard for the u.s. to go down knowing that russia would be developing a heavily system that would allow to go up rapidly again. the u.s. could intentionally match with that, so it's one of

those ideas i feel a need to think through. i've never thought about it in that way before but those were my initial reactions. >> i think that if some reduction made sense for unilateral purposes that having the russian forces below the limit would open some space to consider that but i think that's the only situation in which the united states is likely to oregon should take such steps. we need to remember that, the bugaboo of the tactical weapons. the russians have, nobody really knows because they have never accepted their obligation to give us a counting of those weapons but at least 4-1 or maybe five or 6-1 advantage and to deploy operational tactical weapons. we are not we are not talking

about strategic reserves, storage, needing to get them and reactivate them and maybe fix them up. these are ready to go weapons. you know they have got a lot of those things and every one of those things is ready to go, and did our allies in europe and so i think there is a broader balance here that we had to accept as well when we accepted this new s.t.a.r.t. treaty by leaving all of that stuff out and they had to start leaving out our non-deployed in all of that, so i think it's a little hard to upset that balance there of a relatively small reduction below the total number in the russian strategic deployed for structure is not the whole thing. skin fortunately her time is over but let me ask you all to join us in thanking our panelists.

[applause] >> thank you. [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] >> when i first started the book i also thought this must be an american story. this is about a country that worships the religion of self-reliance and individualism. this is a legacy of thoreau and emerson but it turns out that we are laggards when it comes to living alone. there has been much more common

in european nations and scandinavia and it's even more common in japan. >> just so we all remember, here is that wonderful moment when senator lott reveals his nostalgia for the states rights segregationist south. take a look. >> strom thurmond ran for president we voted for him. we are proud of him.

>> talking points memo.com publisher josh marshall on the internet and his web sites emergence into the breaking news business. >> the media because we are in such a different world today than it was even 10 years ago, i think things like that happen all the time now. i mean i know they are is certainly many big stories that cpm has had over the last decade more and more and now we have an editorial staff of 20 people so we are breaking stories right and left. i think the thing is it's almost become, it's almost become commonplace and it's not nearly as surprising today as it was back then. >> more about tpm and josh marshall sunday night at 8:00 eastern and pacific on c-span's q&a. >> just so we all remember, here is that wonderful moment when senator lott revealed his

nostalgia for the states rights segregationist south. take a look. >> strom thurmond ran for president, we voted for him. we are proud of him. >> talking points memo.com publisher josh marshall on the internet and his web sites emergence into the breaking news business. >> the media ecosystem is such a different world today than it was particularly 10 years ago. i think things like that happen all the time now and i know that they are certainly many big stories that tpm has had over the last decade more and more and now we have an editorial staff of 20 people so we are breaking stories right and left. i think the thing is it has almost become, it has almost become commonplace. it's not nearly as surprising today as it was back then. >> more about tpm and josh marshall sunday night at 8:00

eastern and pacific on c-span's q&a. >> this past wednesday the house energy and commerce subcommittee on communications at tap college he held a hearing focusing on cybersecurity threats to the u.s.. the role of the private sector as well as federal government. the heads of several internet security firms are on among witnesses. congressman greg walden aboard and chairs a subcommittee hearing. it's about two hours, 15 minutes. >> the subcommittee on communications and technology. i want to welcome members and witnesses for today's hearing on cyberthreats to communications networks and private sector responses. back in october the house republicans task force recommended the committees of jurisdiction review cybersecurity issues, so this hearing continues our

committee's review of cybersecurity issues with an examination of threats to communications networks and the responses of the private sector. threats to commit occasions networks have come a long way in a very short time and they are very very real and serious. before coming to congress i spent about 22 years as a radio broadcaster and is a small businessmen eye to worry about securing our committee keeshan's network. back and it was 20 years ago relatively straightforward. you had a fence around the tower and didn't get -- let people get near the transmitter. every once in a while some idiot would try to cut the guide waiters and those spun around and got them. that never happened in my station but it does happen occasionally but that was security of that wireless age. lyrical security remains important that cybersecurity has also become a pressing concern. now a small business confronts a

dizzying array of threats on line things like the zeus trojan horse and stuxnet. these threats are serious. unless they're cyber defense -- drain the bank account of the business crash and on line companies web site or launch a barrage of cyber attacks on the company's network. those are serious consequences for any business and small businesses that are at the heart of creating jobs in this economy. in our small business 10 years or so ago when we did create a computer network and put everything up on digital audio our main server was hacked and taken over now the stud and it started running slower and slower and eventually we determined it had been overtaken. every month we learned more about the cyberthreats and what we have learned thus far is of great concern. i'm concerned our communications networks are under siege. i worry that the devices consumers use to access those networks are vulnerable and i'm

concerned our process in looking at communications supply-chain issues lacks coordination. i'm also concerned our cyber defenses are not keeping pace with our threats and we are lucky to have the voices of five private sector witnesses to guide us through the complex issues of cybersecurity. i'm hoping that you will tell me that cyberspace is secure and we can all rest easier at night. unfortunately i read the testimony and it's not so so i expect he will tell us the threats of your commit occasions networks are all too real. american businesses are losing dollars, jobs, intellectual property and much much more because of cyber cream and cyber espionage and our security is potentially at risk as well. i also expect to explain what the private sector is doing to fortify our cybersecurity defenses. private sector owns most of the critical of the structure, the

wires, the servers and stations that make up our communications networks. and they are on the frontlines of cybersecurity. so i want to know what cybersecurity services are being offered to consumers and what protections are being deployed in our communications networks what affirmative steps the private sector is taking to lock down the supply-chain to combat cybercrime. i also expect to hear what you think the appropriate and i underscore appropriate, federal rulings or federal laws and regulations healthy with information sharing? our federal regulation of cybersecurity practices appropriate and if so how? should the federal government be providing incentives for internet service providers and other members of the private sector to invest and innovate in the cybersecurity arena? and how should our country's fiscal state shape our discussion as a federal role? these questions and others will form the basis for deciding what cybersecurity legislation if any is needed in the near term and

how we can best secure cyberspace and the long run so i want to take or panelist for taking time out of your schedules to be here to help inform this important subject of the energy and commerce committee on what we should do and how we can be better informed and doing our jobs. with that i would recognize the gentlelady from california, the ranking member of this the commit -- subcommittee, ms. eshoo. >> thank you for convening this important hearing and i want to welcome the witnesses and i am especially pleased that juniper networks and mcafee, two outstanding silicon valley companies, are here to talk to us about tackling the challenges of cybersecurity this morning. we all recognize the serious threat to our nation's communications network. since 2006 the number of federal

cybersecurity incidents reported to this department of homeland security has increased by 659%. it's a whopping number. and the economic impact of these incidences is equally significant. a recent study by the poneman institute estimated the median annualized cost of cybercrime to a victim organization is $5.9 million per year, an increase of 56% from 2010. the more we rely on the internet to conduct our business the more vulnerabilities we create for hackers to exploit. having served as a member of the house intelligence committee for eight years, i am very well aware of the threats, not just from criminal hackers but also obviously other countries. talking about the problem is not enough. we need to act and that requires the help of both the private sector and the federal

government. the private sector really represents 95% of the federal government. one of the first steps in tackling this going threat is i think education and training whether at home, in the workplace. every american should understand understand -- understand what they can do to protect themselves against cyber attacks. improve information sharing is the aspect of our response to cybersecurity. we are going to ask the industry to report cybersecurity incidents to the government and we need to establish a clear process to do so. i am pleased to support our colleagues, and mike rogers effort in cyber intelligence sharing and protection act of 2011. that was one of three bills in the house. there are at least three or four in the senate as well. it's also important to recognize the timely -- can be the

difference between a cybersecurity interest and one that impacts melons of users. the voluntary code of conduct currently being developed by the fcc is one of the proposed waste to alert consumers when a botnet are other malware infection is discovered. today's hearing is very important opportunity for us to better understand our subcommittees rule on cybersecurity including what role the fcc and and cia should play in protecting our nation's communications network and how the private sector and other federal agencies should interact with them. so thank you to all of the witnesses, those that come from silicon valley to instruct us and what remaining time i have i would like to yield to mr. mr. markey. >> last week fbi director testified that cyberthreats will soon surpass terrorism as the number one threat facing the united states.

we know from the department of homeland security that their authority ben threats to the utility sector. we also know that russia and china have probed our electricity grid to find vulnerabilities. our economy hinges on our reliable flow of power with losses that go into the billions of dollars with every major blackout. our national security also depends upon it. since 99% of electricity used to power our military system including strategic command assets comes from from the commercially operated grid. last september i asked all five commissioners from the federal energy regulatory commission under our jurisdiction to name the number one threat to electricity reliability. all five commissioners agreed cyberthreats are the number one threat to the grid. in 2009 the full energy and commerce committee unanimously passed the grid act which i authored along with chairman upton. that they'll gave the authority to quickly issue grid security

orders that vulnerabilities are threats have not been adequately addressed by the industry. it was killed in the senate. all five commissioners also agree that giving this authority would increase america's abilities to secure electric grid. with cyberthreats growing by the day threatening our security and our economy it is imperative that this community passed the grid act so we can move it forward and empower ferc to move quickly to safeguard electric grid from cyberthreats that are not sufficiently addressed by industry. we should listen to fbi director to the ferc and the warnings coming from russia and china and we should pass the grid act soon. i yield back. >> i thank the gentleman for his comments and we are now going to recognize the chairman emeritus committee mr. barton. before i do that i just want to say how important it is to have members so engaged in this and we are blessed to have an out here who served on the

intelligence community and mike rogers to cheers at now and mr. latta and mr. murphy is not part of the subcommittee but all of that is most helpful as we tackle both of these issues. i would now recognize the gentleman from texas, mr. martin. >> thank you chairman upton. i thought mr. markey was going to seek -- say the biggest threat to our grid was epa but he went a different way with that. back in 2006, chairman, subcommittee chairman upton held a hearing on this very same issue and as full committee chairman he and i sent a letter to the gao asking them to take a look at this issue. the response are we received then was the response that we are receiving today and that is that it is quite possible that we can have a major attack, a

cyberattack in this country that could dramatically affect our country. according to the norton cybercrime report this last year, cybercrime is 388 billion-dollar industry, with 431 million adults experiencing at least one cybercrime in the last year. in another study research has shown that the median annualized cause of cybercrime -- cost is over $6 million a year with the range being between 1.5 billion to 36 million per year. now these are real numbers, real statistics and that is for the year 2011. as we use the internet more and more every day, it is absolutely imperative mr. chairman and ranking member eshoo that we really take this seriously and as you pointed out and anna has

pointed out it's good to have the chairman of the select committee on intelligence on this subcommittee because he has access to information that could be useful if and when we decide to legislate so thank you mr. chairman for holding the hearing. as you know, there is an epa hearing downstairs on the energy subcommittee so i will be be shuttling back-and-forth. >> mr. chairman if you don't mind you link to mr. terry. >> i will yield two minutes. >> thank you mr. barton and mr. chairman. this is an extremely important hearing and that we have to elevate the level of discussion and potential solutions. there is only one silver bullet that exist to prevent cyber crimes. that is to completely disconnect your computer from any network. use it as a paperweight, maybe just play solitaire. that's it. if you are going to engage in

any level of commerce using the internet you are at risk. the only way we can try to minimize it because there is no silver bullet. the reason these folks are here today is for us to understand what tools may be available. the cyber task force, one of the things we concluded is that the vast majority of everyday hacking can be, maybe not prevented, but go a long way which is basic security features offered by private sector today or the networks or isps but we have to have people who actually purchased those are use those tools and in fact there is one incident in omaha with their entity that controls our facilities. it never thought that it was important to have those securities and guess what? they were hacked and all of their information was stolen. but for the next level, this is

where it gets dicey. how do you protect people? how do they protect their data? we can't engage in setting the standards because frankly we set the standards before the ink is dry on the pill. and the standards have changed. so, you are here to help us understand what solutions may be available to them to help secure our infrastructure. i want to thank you all for being here today. >> mr. rogers. >> thank you very much and in the short time that we have i can't tell you a more important issue. there a lot of things that can keep you up as the chairman of the intelligence committee and this one is one of the main ones. 80% of the attacks that happen every day can be prevented by the operator. it's those other 20% that are the devil in the detail.

between criminals attack, economic espionage, disruption or attacking as we call it, on cybersecurity we have a very real and present danger when it comes to cyberthreats to our networks. nobody is more integrated than the united states and therefore we are more at risk than other countries. i do believe it is unprecedented in history that such a massive and sustained intelligence effort by a government to blatantly steal commercial data and intellectual property be used against the united states is well underway. we don't talk about it a lot and this is -- the real number we think is closer to somewhere between 300 alien and $1 trillion in lost intellectual property per year. countries like china are leading that charge. russia is not far behind. iran's capabilities are getting better and the most concern are

not nation-states who are developing cyber capabilities to conduct a disruption and attack activities against targets like the united states, all serious problems. i want to thank anna eshoo. we did a seminar at stanford university on this very issue. i think it was well received. her support of this bill is incredibly important and i look forward to hearing from the witnesses and i appreciate you being here so that we can get to that next step and actually do something that helps us get a fighting chance against the cyberthreats and i yield back. >> the chair recognizes the gentlelady from california, ms. matsui who will control mr. waxman's time. >> thank you mr. chairman for holding today's hearing and i would also like to welcome our witnesses and look forward to your testimony. there is no doubt that cyber attacks are really continued to pose threats in several aspects of our economy. communication networks are one of many areas that our nation must-haves to ensure safety and

some is particularly as we considered deploying a broadband network for public safety. advanced ip technology and public medications heighten concerns for cybersecurity. this new network however will share many of the same cyber concerns as any other network. this is something we have to take seriously and must attend. more of our economy involving ingenuity and the american technology industry. one of those technologies which will play a prominent role in our economy both in the public and private sector is cloud computing. we are also seeing consumer cloud applications like the icloud. as i see it one of those key issues is a challenge of cybersecurity relating to the cloud. the challenge is to find the critical balance and continuing to foster american innovation and growth while combating cyber attacks. for the most part the private

sector will need to be up to the challenge in managing themselves and the networks from potential cyber attacks. that said, i do believe that some balance may be appropriate where the government must partner with the private sector on enhancing our nation's cybersecurity preparedness. simply put, one cannot do it without the other. small businesses, many of whom rely on the broadband economy, are also very susceptible to cyber attacks. in many instances small businesses cannot fend off attacks because they do not have a plan or lack the resources. such an attack that would be very costly to their businesses. during this economic recovery, the last thing small businesses owners in my district and up across the country need to worry about is a cyberattack that would hinder their business. i am pleased that the fcc recently launched a public/private partnership the

small biz cyber planner which is on line tool that will allow small businesses to create customized cybersecurity plans. it is important that we continue to educate small businesses and the public in general about the risks of cybersecurity poses to small businesses, the government and to our economy as a whole. i also believe in a strong private public partnership is critical to protecting against cyber attacks. it is my hope that partnership continues to foster moving forward. i look forward to the purview jurisdiction of this committee given the communications and technology revel in for cybersecurity. i look forward to hearing from witnesses today in hopes they will have future hearings of the subcommittee so we can also hear more about the government's efforts to combat cyber attacks. again i thank the chair for holding today's hearing and that would be happy to yield to

anyone if they would like. i yield back the balance of my time. >> the gentlelady yields back the balance over time. thank you for your testimony and we will now proceed to the witnesses. we have a very distinguished panel and we thank you again for being here to share the information you have in your testimony and we are going to start with mr. bill connor who is president and chief executive officer of and trust. mr. connor's thank you free testimony and we look forward to your comments. >> good morning mr. chairman and distinguished members of the subcommittee. it's a privilege and honor to spend the morning here with you out of the cyberwarfare game, to discuss and educate what is happening below the screens. i like to focus my early comments on the arms race on one particular factor of security. is called -- browser. that vector of security is probably the leading cyber

stealer in the world today and it has been around a while. it certainly impacts a small and medium business and it certainly is impacting the changing nature of stealing money. both at the countries state and organized crime state. specifically it is known as induce. it is commonly now combined with spy bot. for those of you who don't know zeus was the original browser of software, started out of the ukraine and russia. it went under its own merger and acquisition by its lead competitor in the underground world called -- their tools and technology were next-generation. they emerged in merged in the fall of 2010, behind-the-scenes, as law enforcement started to attack it. the guy took his money and ran and combined it in february of last year.

that new -- is out in the market and you can buy it out on the market. no longer do you have to be intelligent to write it but to buy it you pay for support and they will help you design your attack vector on which banks, which geographics you want to do. how does this technology work? it's very simple. you cannot find it with a traditional software that you have on your desktop, whether it is an antivirus or the operating systems looking for it. it is software that is targeted to small and medium business because it is targeted for money. what it basically does his targets the small medium business that probably doesn't have the technology or banking understanding with its supplier to understand how to deal with her. how does the work? i am a treasure at a small business. i go on line to my financial

institution. i say i want to move 1000 or 10,000, let's say $10,000 to a supplier. i have an agreement with my local bank to have on line bill pay. i type that in and the bank sees that but before the bank sees it, this software wakes up in in the browser and changes the pay from one supplier to let's say six. it changes the dollar amount from $10,000 to $100,000 so what the bank sees as a $100,000 going to six people. that bank says, guess what? we have good security and you have your password. it's on your ip address in your network and your location. i'm going to send it back because i want a one-time passcode. 30-year-old technology we are trying to apply to the digital world. it sends it back to the comptroller of your business and says, please confirm by putting your passcode and that will expire in 30 seconds that you

authorize this transaction. that software wakes back up and converts that 100,000 ' 10, six payers back to one. you type in your passcode, and guess what? that $100,000 is now gone from the bank. you lose it in the bank loses it. ..

>> the good thing is the technology existed you without today. the banks are not doing it and small businesses don't know what to do. so our belief is very straightforward. much like quality there wasn't and a lexicon. to deal with cybersecurity we need a lexicon. much like quality, it isn't a one time thing like your 2000. we needed overtime. that's what education is critical. the second thing you must do is have public-private partnership. i co-chaired the peace. i tell you the legislative laws around this do not work for anybody. i think you've got to break public-private at different levels from intelligence to the people like me that tried to secure the u.s. government and others. the energy grids where department of energy works with those type of organization.

and, finally, we must take a unified effort in public and private to defend his because it is an arms race and it is a pace as we mentioned it earlier. thank you. >> mr. koh, thank you. actually testimony. i think we'll have to recess we can all go deal with our own campaign accounts. [laughter] would be back in about an hour. we really appreciate looking to get into questions with you. we are not going to go to mr. robert dix, vice president of government affairs and critical infrastructure protection for juniper networks, which i believe is from your district. you want to -- >> proudly. thank you. >> we're delighted to have you here. things are coming to distance to share your wisdom with us so pleased to see. >> thank you. to morning. thank you very much for inviting me to testify about cybersecurity. juniper networks is a public health private corporation hardware and software manufacturing record in sunnyvale, california, with offices in operations around the

world. information technology and can occasions networks are embedded in all manner of the nation's critical infrastructure including power plants and electrical grid, water filtration system, financial systems and transportation networks just to name a few. while such a wide risk assessment conducted or are being conducted in the i.t. into medication sectors validate that networks are resilient, it is important acknowledge the risk continues to grow and change our efforts to protect and prevent must be sustained and agile. in recognition of this rid of the private sector is working every day to protect against cyber threats through self driven research and innovation, industry collaboration and partnerships with government. let me share just a few examples. in 2000 7a group of private sector congress came together to address the issue of software assurance and improving the department progress. safeco the software assurance forum for excellence and code is a group of companies and subject matter experts that subsided competitive interest to gather

and share industry best practices through a series of written to revel those that of able not just to producing companies but to the industry at large. in 2008 a group of private sector congress came together to address the need for collaborative global incident response by forming the internet consortium for fans of security on the internet. once again the participating companies who compete vigorously in the marketplace routinely share information in an effort to mitigate the abnormal network activity globally. because the cause is greater than any one company. across the 18 critical infrastructure sectors we have organizations such as information sharing and analysis centers since 1980 working on the operational issues. additionally, with sector cord knitting councils that were tried as result of the national infrastructure protection plan in 2006. in the partnership with critical infrastructure security is the cross sector according counsel representing all 18 critical

infrastructure sectors and worked with a federal senior leadership council under the new partnership framework to advance the mission of critical infrastructure protection and cybersecurity. we are currently working with the administration on the implementation around presidential policy directive eight for national preparedness and review and update of hspd-7 regarding an all hazards approach to critical infrastructure protection in cybersecurity. mr. chairman, a number of users connecting to internet and other networks will continue to grow. global internet traffic is increasing at a rate of 40 to 50% a year and is expected to grow to 4 billion years and 2013. the explosion the use of smartphones and tablet and as an outgrowth of use of social media is rapidly changing the workplace and how we communicate. example, an average of 10,000 tweets per second the last three minutes of the super bowl on sunday evening. while introducing cyber risk in a way that few of us could have imagined, only a short time ago. this is the essence of technology. it enables us to do what we

never could have imagined. and that includes those with the phrase modus. the convenience of technology has changed making purchasing and sharing of personal financial information. so totally reasonable to expect the conversation about cybersecurity must include a discussion about economics. but there are two sides of this corporate if we focus only on technology and technology development were likely to miss the opportunity to examine the challenges and impediments to technology and solution of the option. the market is a living innovation at an unprecedented pace in history to go of the evidence would suggest the adoption of available solutions has not kept pace. it should be a topic of further examination and discussion. many low-cost and low-cost solutions are available to improve any users protection profile. accordingly there are many things we can do together. it is reported by reliable sources that some 80% of the exploitable over those are the result of poor or no cyber hygiene. for me this is basic blocking and tackling. if we can raise the bar for

protection it makes it more difficult and more costly for the bad guys to do harm. when our nation was confronted a couple years ago with the threat of the h1n1 virus we mobilize as a nation to war in and advise folks how to protect themselves from the risk of infection. we have the opportunity to use that same model to help educate citizens, small business, students, nonprofits and other stakeholders how to protect themselves from the risk of malware, phishing and other forms of infection in cyberspace. chairman walden, ranking member eshoo and minutes of the subcommittee, we must move beyond just think about the challenges of today to think about the risk profile of tomorrow. today cyber attacks are more complex and often difficult to detect and can target classes of users, even specific users getting access to valuable data and causing significant harm. with a commitment to working

together on a collaborative manner the united states will lead the effort to protection preparedness and resilience of critical infrastructure inside the judy. on behalf of my colleagues across the industry and the proud employees of juniper networks i think you can for the opportunity to testify before you this one. the threat is real. the vulnerability our extensive. and the time for action is now. the american people are counting on us to get this right, and the private sector looks forward to continuing to collaborative relationship between the congress, administration and private industry on this important issue. >> mr. dix, thank you very much for sharing those comments with us. we will now go to dr. james lewis, director and senior fellow technology and public policy program, center for strategic and international studies. dr. lewis, thank you for being with us. we look forward to your testimony as will. >> thank you, mr. chairman but i would like to thank the committee for this opportunity to testify. one thing that military and intelligence experts would agree on is that the cybersecurity prom is getting worse, not

better. there is straightforward evidence what we're doing now isn't working. most of these experts also believe that we will not change our laws and policies until there is a crisis. i hope they are wrong. we all recognize that growing dependents of our economy on cyberspace and the risk of this creates director of national intelligence testified last week about how iran, which is eagerly developing cyber attack capabilities is losing its reluctance to attack the american homeland to get the i director mueller testified, as you, that the threat we face now comes from terrorism and it appears the bigger threat will come from cyber attack. the ability to launch damaging attacks is spreading from if you advanced nations to many countries in the hostile groups. there is disagreement among when hackers will disrupt critical services in the united states, but most estimates put it at sometime in the next couple of years. cybercrime and espionage are

rampant now, costing american jobs and damaging american economic competitiveness and national security. this morning i was trying to think what i could say a little different. and i remembered that i attended as a backbencher for the director of central intelligence some of the first meetings in the clinton administration on commercial i think the internet. back then, we thought that it would be used for e-commerce, it would be ebay and amazon. we didn't expect a global network that would become the premier vehicle for espionage and a potential avenue for attack. we thought that if we make tools and information available, if we freed up encryption, companies and people would voluntarily secure their networks. i'm a little embarrassed sometimes i see a paper i wrote for the white house in 1996 that said that because i was wrong. the same mistakes in our approach to critical infrastructure protection. there were three big areas.

the incentives for cybersecurity ferry from company to company and sector to sector commanders and their insufficient. there are legal obstacles that limit the ability of governments and companies to cooperate and to share information. and in any case we need a coordinated defense, not a grab bag of individual actions. finally, we did not expect to face world-class opponents come as you heard from some of the earlier testimony, even, him, and they ranked opponents with access to world-class tools. we overestimated incentives and underestimated threats and legal obstacles. and i'd like to point out that congressman rogers bill would be very useful if we get it passed in removing some of the legal obstacles that hamper our ability to provide an adequate cyber defense. a serious defense requires coordination and mandatory action. the big telecom covers are pretty good at securing themselves and don't need more regulation, but the other sectors are in bad shape.

some people say regulation is burdensome but if we do not hold critical infrastructure to mandatory standards we guarantee a successful attack. nor does regulation damage innovation. an unregulated internet is not a substitute for a business friendly environment that innovation really needs. partnership and cooperation must become more than exchange of slogans. australia has a good model. we heard about that, where the government encouraged internet security providers to develop a code of conduct to deal with malware act that appears to be working. we're considering in the u.s. similar option. finding ways to expand the use of dns, a good story. this is a fundamental rule set to be addressed in the framework for the internet. would identify problems with it 20 years ago. we identified six is four at 12 years ago. we have not implemented these fixes. this is where we're finding some

new approach to get people to move faster would be really crucial. the defense and social base initiative which assures classified threat information is another good example of how to do real cooperation. there are many opportunities to improve cybersecurity, but taking advantage of them will require a new approach. i think one thing i can say is everyone wants to make things better. we all realize the scope of the problem. everyone wants to do stuff. hearings like this provide an opportunity find that new approach that will truly serve national security. i thank the committee for the opportunity and look forward to your questions in dr. lewis, thank you. we appreciate your testimony and we'll have a few for you, especially on australian model. we're going to go now to mr. larry clinton, president and chief executive officer of internet officer of internet security alliance. mr. clinton, thank you for being here today. we look forward to your comment. >> good morning, mr. chairman, members of the committee. it's been a dramatic change in the cyberthreat picture in the last 18-24 months.

our main concern about hackers or kids in payson. the fact that he cyber system has been breached is to longer the metrics that determines whether or not based to attack as the successor. cyberattacks of the increasing sophistication using was coming for dinner as the advanced persistent threat, or the apd. abd attackers are pros. they are highly organized well-funded often state-supported expert attackers to use coordinated sense of attacking methods both technical and personal. perhaps most indicative of these attacks are they target a system they were almost infinitely compromise or breach. unfortunately, conventional information security defenses don't work against abd attackers. this doesn't mean that we have no defense. it means we need to modernize our notion of what constitutes cyber defense. traditional approaches including federal regulation will not solve the public is they're

going to be largely reactive and will not stay ahead of the changing threat nature. words, bad resolution could be counterproductive depleting companies on building and house efforts in the regular documents rather than focusing on security. fundamental to stopping defense threat is to understand our biggest problems are not technological. they are economic. independent research has consistently shown the single biggest barrier to combating the cyberthreat is caused. president obama's cyberspace policy said many technical and management solutions that would greatly enhance our security already exist in the marketplace but are not being used because of cost and complexity. just last week bloomberg released an extensive study that found that to reach an acceptable not ideal, acceptable level of security and critical infrastructure would require a 91% increase in spending. the private sector has been extremely responsive to combating cyberthreat. average spending of cybersecurity in the telecommunications industry is

$67 million a year with government by the way being, including regular compliance being the single biggest cause. despite the fact our critical infrastructure is under constant attack we have never had an instance of serious breakdown, economic catastrophe, so what do what we have seen in the environment the army. this success is due in large part to the flexibility generated by the current system which relies on voluntary partnerships where in industry understands the management systems best and use their knowledge to respond rapidly to emerging threats in a fashion they believe can best protect a system rather than being driven by a preset government directed. nevertheless, there is a great deal that congress can do and the congress committee can do to improve our cybersecurity right now. first of all we need to get the government house in order. the national academy of sciences, gl and just last week the d.o.e. inspector general have all documented systemic problems in managing and cyberspace -- government cyberspace.

we need to provide the right mix of incentives and regulation. for industries where the economies of the industry are tied directly to a record reformat such as electoral you chose them water, transportation, the current structure can be used to motivate and both need cyber advance. for industries where the economics are not inherent to a regulatory structure, adding a new structure will compete innovation and investment making us less secure. in these sectors we need to motivate by providing appropriate marketing incentives to spur greater security and investment. an excellent example is mr. rogers bill was passed intelligence community a couple weeks ago which uses liability reforms to steal it additional information sharing. however, liability reforms on one of many incentives that need to be unleashed to up to secure our cybernetwork. other incentives include better use of government perjury, streamlining regulation in return for demonstrate security improvements, greater use of

private insurance, streamline permitting and licensing, stafford act access. this incentive-based approach was spelled out in some detail in the isa is cybersecurity social contract in 2008, and was also endorsed by president obama in the cyberspace does rooted in 2009, the multi-trade association and civil liberties coalition white paper on cybersecurity in 2010 and a house task force report in 2011. a great deal of work needs to be done to fill out how this incentive models can be used in the various sectors. in the meantime, congress to enact reforms or to the raj information ensuring bill and should do a good deal to go to court and it amongst themselves. passing that package of reforms would be a historic and politically achievable goal. ladies and gentlemen, of the commerce committee, you are dealing with the invention of gunpowder, mandating thicker armor is not going to work any more than building deeper modes was going to stop the orders,

you know, the invaders who invented catapulted or the line that was able to stop the germans in world war ii. we need a different approach. we need a contemporary and creative approach that engages the private sector with government, not having the government controlled for the private sector does. we really look forward to continue to work with you. >> take you very much for your testimony. we appreciate it. our next and final witness today is phyllis schneck who is vice president and chief technology officer of the global public sector, mcafee incorporate. thank you for being here today. we look forward to your comments been a good morning chairman walden and have fun. thank you, chairman walden and ranking member eshoo and other members of the subcommittee thank you very much for the opportunity to be this point i think and 50 for interest in cybersecurity as it applies to the telecom sector. my testimony will focus is put on for areas. the threat landscape comic imitation sectors unique will in cybersecurity, private sector technologies and policy recommendations.

first a bit of background. my technical background, i was raised i in the activities of te radio tower. my father is one of the first and see the and it is can you got me to write could be and how exploit code. but i was taught the responsibility of the. the response to the computing power that we have an focus on the passion about protecting that, protecting good-sized it also focused on partnership outside of mcafee as evolved iran the private sector sight of the fbi program. ran effort eight years from 2000 subject matter experts to 33,000 of today chair the national board of training to let us together the top analysts in the banking sector, telecom, pharmaceutical and others with the fbi under the same roof and/or positioned government and lyrics that helped to arrest 400 cybercriminals worldwide in the past few years. a little bit about mcafee. we're based in santa cruz. the world's largest dedicated security committee.

we protect business, governments, consumers all over the world from the full spectrum of cybersecurity attacks. we are a trusted partner to fight on savagery throughout the world and as a wholly owned subsidiary the intel corporation. post directed to the hardware so the buck stops at the harbor so the average is can get several giveaways but when hardware knows not to shoot a malicious construction. that's when we have the enemy. you heard this one to cyberthreat landscape has evolved. that's not a dormant activity. it's more as this. two kinds of companies and agencies across the world and the public sector and private. those who know their own and those who don't. we are looking at a mass movement of money markets in jobs between countries and companies and looking of the threat of destruction should they decide. this any is faster and smarter than we are at times. they are certain foster. and no intellectual property boundaries, no legal boundaries, no policy boundaries. and in many cases have plenty of money. it actually -- in which leads us

to the rule of the internet service providers. in the days in a a semi-first packet between my sisters room and mine, there was nothing in that route except one address any other. now we have an unknown set of routes but we have an ability and a great infrastructure run by the isp. that deliver our traffic and that of the adversaries are reliable. so the enemy has now used our great cyber infrastructure that we built as the good guys over the world as a math -- mass executive system from our. they do a great job. they're very secure as mentioned earlier by the current internet architecture allows everything to get delivered to the grid, to the banks, to the rest of the criminal structure. isps can play key role. they're doing some of this but they have challenge but one thing they can do is help detect this traffic in the network fabric. imagine if a network fabric was smart enough not to route the traffic of an adversary and a throughout traffic exactly can a

more secure technology and equipment from the market demand those technologies are armed with proactive technology to not let a mullahs if -- militias instruction and as i said it's up to every system to be hardened, up to every company and users to harden their enterprise. what are the challenges of the isps face a question same a couple, stewart can geishas act of 1986, a while ago, prevent sharing information outside of the telecom. some measure the difficult and innovate global to picture that the images but we can't make that will because legally we can combine our information together exactly it cost a lot of money. clean bandwidth cost money and users are not willing to pay the difference. we need to know. we need policy recommendations. and some proactive technology. we can put threat intelligence together and that the global cyber radar map of where the enemy is at any time. at mcafee it cost 160 million we see a risk profile. other companies do this.

telecoms do this, governments can do. if we can check the information together and make a global threat picture. and prevent those from running. whether you're working with the hardware, keep the enemy out. for the policy the conditions we support the recommendations, starting with information sharing insurance reforms in tax credits, and certainly in the bill of represents rogers, rivers berg, and maybe the government to finally facilitate the good information sharing to put that information together to not only provide liability protection, protections for privacy and civil liberties but to balance out the advantage that adversaries had. that the government facilitate that collaborations of a can build a global threat picture can be back into the network fabric. isps play central in global infrastructure. they can help us. we can help them. we have to work on this legal and policy framework for global information sharing. thank you very much for trusting mcafee's use on these issues

but i look forward to answering any questions been very impressive testament, thank you. thanks to all the work you do to try to keep us secure. we will not go into our question phase, and i wonder, mr. clinton, you talked about incentives and were very specific. can you dive down a little deeper in terms of what that means in terms of more specifics on the incentives that would make a difference here? >> thank you. we are supportive of the approach that was articulated in the house task force report, which suggests that in many of incentives need to be developed because of different industries are responded to different things. defensive database might be attracted your the banking industry might be by an insurance incented. the utilities perhaps by getting rid of some of the outdated regulation that is based in an analog form rather than digitalize. so you need to have a set of

incentives. on the other hand, you need have some agreement as to what needs to be incentivized. and for that what we have suggested, and is in the mulder trade association paper that i spoke of before, he is that we need of some independent entity which does not create the standards or practices but simply evaluates the standards and practices. and underwriters laboratories for cybersecurity, if you will, and an organization which used to elect a higher or lower level of adoption based on their business plan, and their business plan would be improved because they would have access to lower liability costs, lower insurance, better chance of getting a federal contract, et cetera. so we are saying we need a new system, not a government mandate system, but a system with our government roles such as providing the incentives, and

our independent roles, something like this underwriters laboratories, and then responsibility for the owners and operators. now, in those sectors of the economy where the economic is already built into a regulatory model, then you can choose to the registry model. you don't need a new record from our. you can use. for example, with utilities they have generally a fairly detailed radar structure. the problem that they're having is that they get mandates at one level and the funding comes at another level. so there's going to have to be a correlation done on the government side. but basically we think we need an independent set of entities indicating what needs to be incentivized. that can be done on a continuing basis the government needs to provide incentives and industry needs to implement them in very helpful, thank you. dr. schneck, when you and your sister were trading packets when it should have been sleeping,

obviously, doing their homework, yeah, doing your homework. turn out the lights. that was when this threat was really computer to computer. now we understand it to be bigger than that, broader than that at home networks that can be taken down. so can you describe just what those threats look like and what should happen here? >> absolutely. we did that over 1200 odd, over a four-month. i remote a 300 baud where you put the whole phone in the cover. >> so the threat really looks at an instruction, not a piece of them in your computer that holds some word processing program but it's where your computer grabs the next instruction but what do i do next? at the root of every attack is i'm controlling my will, i'm your machine. whether i'm telling your machine to send a lot of traffic or it's something that might change the setting on sunday the control circuit relays on a special control system. i'm allowing, my will is being

change on your machine. i'm executing on your machine. so as we pointed out you can buy these exploits on the nitpicky to even lease botnets together in a screen that looks like it came off quick and. is a spreadsheet. you can choose addresses to send a pic you sent to rely on someone else's construction of a piece of code. b.c. 56,000 appearances of these pieces of code everyday called malware that allows my will to be instructed on your machine. so the idea is, to fall. one is to catch the ip addresses that are spreading across the internet, and that goes to that threat position, sharing the global threat picture. i can't forecast the weather without the weather from all the different states our country. that comes from in enabling information sharing but also the ability to detect and instruction doing something they shouldn't do. we have the resilience means i can run it in me gets to pick the enemy will look, the disease anybody but it will never hurt you. so we have to many instructions get in a stable, and simply be resilient to the.

and that's the ability to look at the operating system level instead of having to judge every instruction their, good or bad. .. >> maybe it should have gone through the fcc for approval, and it would have never happened. [laughter] my friend and colleague from california who brings so much to the discussion and debate for five minutes and questions. >> i thank each one of you for your outstanding testimony. i think this is one of the best panels that's been assembled on

a given subject matter, and it's highly instructive. i can't help but feel this is like trying to get socks on an octopus though. it's massive. there are -- i think that we all have a pretty good sense of what the threat is. i don't think that we have clear picture of really what to do with it. there's so many agencies, there was a mention of a 1986 law that i want to hear more about. we've talked about public-private partnerships. we know that 95% of this is in the private sector, 5% in the government. where do we begin with this? what are the legal roadblocks as any of you see them right now

that are holding us back to do what my next question would be. what's the new paradigm? if we have very good pieces in place right now, what do we keep, what should we get rid of, and to dr. schnek, do you agree with the notion of mr. clinton's of an underwriter's lab? that sounds very interesting to me. i don't know where -- who wants to begin with what, maybe with legal roadblocks that you know of. i think it was dr. schnek, did you mention the 1986 law? i'm not familiar with that and what it's blocking. >> so, i'm not a lawyer. >> neither am i, so maybe -- >> but the overall premise on the reason i mention that because the adversary can act on us very quickly because they have no roadblocks. i have the ultimate weapon and

that is we own the infrastructure that works at the speed of light, and if we have put the instructions together and intelligence together to work as your body does, attack a virus that doesn't belong there, they don't need a meeting to do so. we need the internet to work the same way, and the routers have food that. to do that, we have to replace chemical and biology with intelligence and data. that means getting all data from sides that we control. from the private sector, combine that with data in the government sector. not even classified data, this is all in law. i don't have the answer how how to make it work while preserving civil liberties which are crucial, but at the indicator level, this address, this location could hurt you and make that accessible to the router at several gigabytes a second.

>> does that fit in with the idea of the underwriter's lab? >> i think it's different. >> does anybody tell you you look like david gurgen. [laughter] >> i'm flattered, but i hear he's upset when compared to me. [laughter] i think it's -- we're talking about different things, and with respect to the legal issues, after he got elected, president obama appointed melissa hathaway to do that and there's appendix a, i big document going through the legal barriers that need to be reviewed, and so that's a place to start. essentially what we have here is we have a whole bunch of laws written for an analog world. >> right. >> we're in the digital world now. we have laws in the books

dealing with videotapes. i have not had a videotape in quite a while. there's a lot to be done to work out that legal under brush and modernize things. we suggested some of the things are regulatory and could be offered as incentives, you know, to get away from the burdens. some of them, for example, are due -- duplicateive, but we should have one audit, pass that, and you don't have to do the rest of the audits, but there's multiple agencies involved in this, so organizations spend their time and money doing redundant things. we should strip away those things. the last thing on where do you start? i would strongly suggest that congress start by cleaning up the federal government's roles and responsibilities. that's a much more limited system, can make progress really quickly while we continue to work with the public-private

partnership model that we have. >> thank you. i'm out of time, so thank you. >> let me -- yeah, your mic's still on. i'll yield to the gentleman from alaska, mr. terry. we have to get appendix a and a task force of the committee that gets into the weeds more deeply, and we have people with great experience here. >> where do we start, mr. clinton? >> well, first of all, start at the federal level, straighten out laws and speedometers in -- responsibilities in the federal government and the state and local level. for example, i mentioned the problem in the utilities sector where we have mandates that exist at one level, but funding comes at another level. we have to realize solving some of the problem is going to cost us some money. unfortunately, when you have state, public utility commissioners, they are

resistant to increasing the rate base, and it's understandable, but we have to find a way for a passthrough on some of these things. a good review and scrubbing of the governmental issues is one place to start. simultaneously, we have a lot of activity already going through the public-private partnership that can use a number of these things. mr. roger's bill is a good example, and then i think we need a really concentrated effort on working on these other incentive programs that started exactly what do we need to do with the insurance industry to get them to be bigger players, exactly -- >> in what way? >> well, you know, private insurance is one of the most effective pro-social motivators we have. people drive better. they give up smoking, ect. -- >> so cyber insurance? >> sure. so that if -- the problem that we have in insurance is there's a couple problems, but one is we don't have enough ac rare data

because the data is being held. >> doesn't google have all of that? [laughter] >> sorry? >> i'm sorry. >> a lot of insurance guys -- >> you guys were so good at humor, i tried it. [laughter] >> they they want to sthair data, but there's anti-trust problem, but if we could get them to share it, perhaps a public-private partnership, we get a more realistic view of what the threat is. if we share data, we can get a realistic view of the threat, and this would bring down insurance rates. when you bring down the rates, more people buy the insurance. when they buy the insurance, more insurance companies get in, and we have a virtue cycle going on and use insurance to create better cyber security investment. >> mr. dicks, a question for you, and you can add on where you want. for everyday users, small businesses, it's just a matter

of cyber hygiene. you know, also i say you pull out your soap and wash. what's that really mean? what can you do? what can we do as small business people or whatever? >> again, as i mentioned, we these a comprehensive and sustained national awareness campaign that tells the users how better to protect themselves from the protection in cyberspace. leveraging the federal government like the small business administration, internal revenue service, u.s. postal service and other agencies that interact with citizens and businesses every day is a place to message that. creating and leveraging a model like we did with h1n1 with a plan that drive people to a place to get information. it might be an isap and every member of congress has a link on their page that directed people to the alliance or the internet security alliance is a place to learn basic best practices, low cost or no cost things to do to

protect themselves. if i might add, another piece is to ensure an operational capability that presents something like a national weather service or cdc capability where we have a picture into the networks at all time in steady times and points of escalation. we worked through the intelligence advisory committee and delivered a report to the president that recommended a joint coordination center, a joint, public, private integrated 24/7 operational capability to improve detection, protection, and mitigation. we have to get in front of this. time now is spent in response and recovery. what we ran into? legal barriers. once we got into integrating, we developed a model in the private sector, and once we integrated the capability with the government, the lawyers said they couldn't talk to us or share the information. hopefully representative roger's bill breaks down the barriers,

but we should have an operational capability that has a picture as to what's going on in the network at all times, and we have those kinds of data feeds available, organizing them and having a national weather service type of capability is long overdue. >> thank you. >> gentleman's time expired. i believe mr. waxman is next for five minutes for questions. >> thank you very much, mr. chairman. dr. schnek, what special -- and anybody else who wants to respond -- what special considerationings do the growing use of smart phones and tablets present? >> thank you. several smart phones and tablets are small computers. they have the same as a rule -- as avulnerabilities as others d. when you think about the power thars in your hand, you now have the ability at twofold, one

enables the add adversary to ust to get into your network. in the interest of time, i'll simplify it, but people want to use the home device at work, and what happens is they want the adversary's discovered it, they use the unprotected home device that houses angry birds and launch an attack into the enterprise work because companies let folks use the small devices. there are technologies to lock it down. we manage that worldwide, but you look at a massive explosion of small devices, the lady mentioned the cloud. these devices leverage the cloud because there's not as much processing power as the big machine. pay attention to the security and motion data arrest and shared resources where they are when you're not on the phone. your personal information is on that phone, pictures, locations, and 23 you lose it, make sure there's the remote capability to destroy it. it's a wonderful device, but

it's access to all the critical infrastructure if you work in one and it's talking to your network and accessed to now your personal information, so i think it brings a wonderful new -- i spoke about this is the the consumer electronics show -- it brings a new sense of fun to computing, but it brings new dangers that we have to get out in front of before this is yet another massive vector because mobility is multiplying. >> i talk to hackers to see what they are up to -- [laughter] and recently, one of them told me that price for a tool kit to hack an iphone is $200,000 on the block market, and he said for other phones it's just $10,000, so, you know, i don't know. what this does though is force us to pay more attention to the service providers, to the big telephone companies, the isbs, the cable companies. responsibility shifts away from the edge, away from the consumer to the service provider. you don't patch your cell phone.

you don't program it. you depend -- computing is becoming a service, and that will change the contours of security and change the requirements for regulation. >> with all due respect, i disagree with that. if you look at matt cap's law and what happened with apple and at&t, the value has shifted. it shifted from the carriers to the end points, and this is about identity, and there's a good example. the threat i talked about going out of band use a mobile network and a device is a sure-fire way to stop that kind of transaction today. it's safe. it's protect the. it uses digital signature in a wireless network, and on a mobile device with digital signature which is probably why to try to hack the device costs more on an iphone or ipad than a normal phone, and if you use that, probability is on that

attack that you won't break it. there are good pieces, and i think -- my personal experience, the minute you think you're going to stop this in the network, the id and ip address is no longer the identity. the number one thing people fake is who you are. what you are in the application of who you are, and that is the hardest thing to combat in terms of good guys versus bad guys. the threat i showed you is not the identity of the person who is doing it. he faked your identity, and no perimeter technology, no network can deal with that until you deal with the end point itself. >> i don't think we're disagreeing though. i think you're going to see the authentication technologies you talked about will depend ultimately on the service provider. >> well, let me ask a question, and i know i don't have much time, but you mentioned in the testimony how communications networks are central to most

other critical infrastructure sectors. how does this then relate to the importance of this committee in addressing cybersecurity of communications networks? anybody want to respond to that? >> that's your jurisdiction. >> well, i think in the opening remarks, a few of you mentioned some of the things that are going on that at ntia, at fcc that could reduce risk; right? one of the examples we've heard about is, of course, is this measure to get the internet service providers to adopt voluntary code of coact were dealing with -- conduct dealing with malware. it's basic level stuff. the fcc has an effort to promote the use of dns security, and this is not to get too complicated, but it's a growing vulnerability, relatively easy to fix, and other countries move faster than the u.s., something we can probably do on a collaborative basis.

the third thing to look at is some of the responsibilities for other activities, other protocols, this is a place where you don't want the government creating technology; right? it's not for this kind of level of technology, but you do want it coordinating our response, and when you look at fcc and ntia, the dns sect, isp efforts, some of the other measures, commerce is doing similar things, and this is where you can play a big role. >> thank you, mr. chairman. with the committee's indulgence, we're all going to ask you about australia and we all forgot. without objection, can you talk the australia -- >> sure. well, phyllis talked about this as well. your isp, probably, has a good idea of what's going on on your computer at home; right? right now, they don't do very much about it, and i think bop

talked about this as well. you know, there's basic hygiene things that most people don't do. you're isp has fairly good knowledge when you're running malware, when you're part of a botnet, not perfect knowledge, but good knowledge. what actions can they take to stop that? australia's not the only country that does this anymore, but at one point they thought the attorney general will come in and tell the isps what to do; right? because the isps were not doing anything. it was a failure of incentives, and there was a tussle, political tussle. at the end of the day, the isps, and australia is easier because it's a smaller country. they said come up with a voluntary code of conduct that will let us deal with the malware threat; right? with a little guidance and help and involvement from the attorney general and the australian federal police, which is roughly equivalent to some of

our federal agencies, they came up with a pretty good system. it works pretty well. this will not deal with the advanced threat, but it will deal -- namely, the country in the world that's the biggest supplier of botnets in the world is the united states. it's not because we're cybercriminals, but because we're incompetent in our defenses. [laughter] the australian model changes that. we're number one. okay, great. [laughter] there's issues, and i'll do them quickly. other countries that do this, germany. germans have a lighter approach. what happens there is there's a pop-up on your screen saying basically we notice you're infected. call this number if you want help; right? the australians and other countries that do this say click here, and we'll clean your computer for you. a few other places don't go public, but just intervene without your knowledge. you have a privacy issue. you have to be careful about that.

one of the things that comes up over and over again is should we isolate infected computers? should we cut infected users off from the internet? some companies are beginning to do this. you put such a burden on me that i'm going to cut you off. the big issue; right? if you look at data places, there's an amazing drop in the rate of infection, so this works, and it would be useful if we followed the australians, germans, japanese, the turks, and a number of countries. >> two points on australia that i think are relevant to this group. australia looks at the energy grid, and granted their grid is different architecture than the u.s., more like ireland and others, but in the process that we're working with and they start with the infrastructure part and the actual production side of the energy creation. one, to lock down the ploys in the systems to end the creation

of the power and starting there, and then going to the export of that power through the grid as it stems through the different carriers all way to the end point in terms of that. i think also involved with other companies here in the u.s. helping them do that. the other piece is they look at health care. they think that's a critical area in terms of being able to have health care cards. novel idea when you get to privacy concerns here, but as i say, you can't have privacy without security and policy. >> right. thank you. thanks to the indulgence of the committee. i'll go to mr. rogers -- oh, dr. schnek, go ahead if the committee is okay. >> one point if that's okay. >> yeah, sure. >> the example on australia is a beautiful example of a need for information sharing. i'm challenging the wording a little bit, but the isps don't know what's going on with your

computer, not watching your banking or watching you work, but they see because they own the block of addresses, see the behavior as a footprint as it tries to send traffic, which the isps track to protect you from malware. they see the footprint. from that, they can see where traffic has come in. for example, a ridiculously large volume in a short amount time from certain machines and they can see these machines are infected, and with the australiaian model, they can let you know. it's showing how with representative roger's work, we can get a larger intelligence picture making for the humans that the pretty weather map picture that mr. dicks recommends, but there's the ability to look at who is infected where and look at incentives. how do we incentivize the public to do the computer hygiene? most people don't know what they computers do at night when they are sleeping.

if they did, they'd clean it up. it's important with the information sharing and incentives. >> i appreciate that. i appreciate the committee's indulgence in just trying to get more information out here. mr. roger, thank you. >> thank you very much. i know we're short on time. are you familiar with the company did you know tar? >> very much so. >> signatures and atrix is difficult, although, i think we're getting better, it's difficult. can you briefly, good for the committee to hear the story. >> great question. >> how a viability country went away in a month after being hacked. >> if you look at the internet when it was created, the little yellow lock, you all see that lock on your pc, and they they they are safe. very new people know what that little yellow lock means and what it is supposed to mean is the communication path is secure between you and the website that you're communicating with and

who is on each end of that. the problem is, and the ssl world, which is kind of the security level of that, the identity on each side of that may or may not be who is reported to be. we co-chaired along with a new standard on that called extended validation because if you go to the super bowl, even this past week, there's people advertising, hosting, and selling that little yellow lock for $19 for your business website. only problem is the verification of who on the end of that is lax. they look at it and go, oh, that must be you. the issue was this one company that provides the little yellow lock, and in this case, predominantly in the netherlands was breeched, and they breached from iran just like many other security vendors have been breached. we get a target every day from

country states, our little 350 person company with no help to the u.s. government, thank you very much, to defend that. well, this little company got attacked just like komono did and others did and they breeched that little yellow lock who said who they were, and they began to take down the government security because that government used the little yellow lock for all its online capabilities e and the people in iran, guess what, used that yellow lock to say they were google and other people, so anyone in iran that was googling content in that country was able to give out to the iranian government whatever they were looking at, whatever they were doing, and one government was basically shut down for at least 60 days, and unfortunately to those of us in the security world, we found out about it through the browser

form, and it ended our relationship with them prior to that, and even we were not notified, so that talks about to your question of the legal frame work of what's going on here and disclosure requirements and what's going on in the world. >> thank you. that's a great example of a nation state using its intelligence services to co-op something like that. did you know they are no longer a company? >> yeah, it's out of business. >> you want to talk the cost, there's a hack that took the company, and it's out of business. >> be careful. it was a subsidiary of a company business that still exists that agented like it never happened. >> but the contracts no longer exist? >> that's correct. >> okay. it's an american company that actually owned it. >> that's right. >> no longer -- >> eng the point you're on, congressman, is an important one. there's ways -- we've been

attempted to be hacked by the same group. we watched them try that over the last 12 months. two of the people that own the yellow locks in the u.s. and abroad have been taken down. >> yeah. >> relative to iran being able to break in and impersonate those pieces. it's happening every day. >> you see how dangerous -- i thought it was important for the committee to hear that particular case because it shows how sophisticated and dangerous it can be if somebody has a nefarious purpose. criminal's bad enough, but this was more than criminal. i'll ask two questions in close. we've been through this a long time. it's been very difficult to get to a place where we have a narrow focus on how to move to the next step. why has it been difficult to get narrow thank in the law, and lastly, dr. schnek and mr. mr. dicks can talk about this. you talked about hardware.

there is much concern about hardware entering our system that may be malicious and very difficult for us to, well, to understand exactly what that hardware is doing in our systems. can you talk about that and what we can do from a regulatory position or cautionary position from the united states government to ensure they don't enter our systems and our systems are not exposed when they leave the country to manipulation by foreign nation states, and i'll leave it at that. two questions i hope you can answer if the chairman is kind enough. >> thank you, because they are hard questions, great questions, but i'm glad phyllis got one of them. the neutral answer is to say when you look at the new technology, it takes the u.s. between 20-50 years to figure out how to get it in order.

look at airplanes, steam boats, electricity, cars. we're in year 18 for the interpret. we're not doing too bad i guess. we have years to sort it out. we have so many old ideas, they have not gone away. if it was in pd63, the clinton administration policy, and we're still trying it. it doesn't work. give it up; right? the second thing is as you heard, we had old laws real obstacles, and you are trying to fix this, but if it's the electronics communication privacy act designed for telephones, there's issues here, it's a hard problem, and it takes time to work out, but the prevail lance of the old thinking and the difficult legal environment we have is really slowing us down putting us at risk. >> mr. dicks or dr. schnek? >> first of all, i want the reco