never changed it. and he was what's called an either/or president. you're with us or against us. heated in a very different world when he said i don't do nuance. i don't deal with it. and obama almost only does nuance. so we have the opposite of a president, two presidents back to back. >> when you write these books to hear from people in the white house? >> this time i did pick the first interview i gave with "huffington post" that day that the director king occasions in the white house called up the into fear and asked him. so i didn't hear directly but they did and ended up giving them a book because they wanted to see it. with the bush people i didn't are directly except i met a few people who knew him, met karl rove and different people. they were too excited. >> that was just a few minutes with dr. justin frank, "obama on the couch" is the name of the book to booktv covers dr. frank in a long form event at

politics and prose. you can watch that at booktv.org.

could have been something in defense, a policy toward highland. they're specific. an agency committees, usually cheered by the state department that would get together and draft documents that were essentially policy. the national security council. the eisenhower would preside. and the nsc itself was created by the national security act of 1947. and it was a a established to give -- the people who pushed it wanted to, essentially, to discern the president of forcing him to meet with his primary advisers before he made decisions because they recalled the franklin roosevelt decisions , he made and the way

you wanted to commend it did not like that, president truman was created -- was pleased with the national security council was created by law as part of the national security act of 1947, but he did not want it to constrain him. he said the president is president. there is no committee and making american policy. therefore, wendy -- when it came time to have a meeting he could be in the meeting and invite all the senior piece of -- people were basically a handful of people, and then they had another of subsequent meetings that he just decided not to go to. so he would demonstrate his independence. it was only when the korean war broke out the germans started to meet regularly with the nsc. eisenhower considered it rather differently. eisenhower also was very much president and he saw himself as the decision maker, but he placed a much higher value on a regular weekly meetings of this high-level committee.

the f to sweat every key was in town there was initial security council meeting, and they would typically consider these policy papers, which has been labored over by the various agencies, as i said the earlier, policy papers to be anything from overall defense policy to policy toward thailand a yugoslavia or somewhere. and then there would be basically a decision in the form of a paper issued by the national security council staff saying this is our policy until further considered. so eisenhower thought it was a good idea to have. he love think that when it was a crisis. really follow a decision. ludicrous would be different fellow but the thought having faced the issues together was good. he says it -- he is believed to lens said plans are worthless, planning is everything. >> host: well, what to the

role of the national security adviser, el was viewed by the state department's as originally? >> guest: the original idea was very concerned, vista department, because secretary of state marshall saw it as potential is open ecotones the harvested department store -- authority. early the national security adviser was careful lot to do that. divested department the perils for the presence in the nfc to make sure it did not turn friends of listed department turf. but tension begin seriously during kennedy and ministration because of the president's and george bundy himself and his security advisor, they did not seek to undercut the said department of gasol call of all,

to assess and work with the people who were responsive to the president or probable warrants. and secretary of state to a breakable men did not really mesh of the present. very uncomfortable with this new version of the national security verizon. so when eisenhower was president he had this man for planning, and he had almost secretly another man who later became famous, andrew pastor who was operational aid. he handled everything from the cia's intelligence operations to getting people together when they had to make a decision about the suez canal and the british-french invasion. in the currency was universally called cola's regular profiled and was to about his role was to publicize.

you carry a policy that way. these test and know what they're doing. yes for a toy because he concealed or semi concealed part of this process, but in any case , security people come in and say we don't like the planning process, but the system, that seems useful. let's see what happens. well, he comes in and is very smart. and then along comes something called the bay of pigs, which is a famous fiasco, an effort to send some -- send cuban exiles to cuba to overthrow the government of fidel castro. it was a bad move -- a badly planned operation. the people who planned it assumed that in canada would necessarily send u.s. troops. kennedy made it clear that in no way would he send u.s. troops. it was a disaster. >> host: did he have a role and that? >> guest: he did, would not a dominant role and did not control process. what happened, the cia people,

in particular johnny bissell control the process. bundy, in fact part of letter which i discovered in the kennedy library there. offering his resignation single wish i had serve you better during the crisis. but what happened was in the immediate aftermath kennedy said puerto bring a military person in because i have to get control the military personnel abroad and general maxwell taylor. but he also said, we have to coordinate policy more generally , so everything should go through a balky. and bundy who had until then density across the parking lot of the executive office of the president so looked rather than said i have to be in the white house. a have to be in the white house. have to be within one of the president. and so he looked around. it turned out there was this area that was used for storing files. citrus he managed to get --

persuade can adults who was a person. they got private offices for themselves, secretary in the white house with clinton when the president was, he could be there in one minute. and that was very important. he was a sort of person, when he had a question he lead to quick answer. if the president was available it could happen tomorrow its immense. very bang, bang in administration. they let's start in shorthand. he listens like obama. he thought he understood things. tell me what is new and interesting. >> host: who was george bundy? >> guest: well, some people felt that he was relieved of the

fact of president of harvard college because he was very smart, brought lots of very impressible to the harvard faculty. for a person in that position he was surprisingly popular among the faculty, and he -- kennedy had guns in the omb is kennedy was on the harvard board of overseers. a harvard graduate, and so he was a senator for massachusetts. he saw and operate with the overseer and he was impressed. so that is lori came from. he was not -- he had previously written memoirs of a very important figure in the nation's security policy and lower to end before that he had not done major work inside the government before, but people's sons of some of that if you could manage ordinary independence harvard professors he did probably

manage government to a westerner to be the case. >> host: to president johnson of a national security adviser? >> guest: he had two. the first one he had was george bundy. he inherited sunday, monday served him until march of 1966, so almost as long as he served in the. initially johnson taught first of all, was desperate to it keep the kennedy people. he needed them. he did not have the background of the staff people who have that sort of stuff to the refugees, but at the same time he resented them because he felt that they were looking down on him. sometimes these are self-fulfilling. you think that and their relations to be false and maybe eventually they do. anyway, are leon in these bundy very much and even invited george bundy's mother to the white house, she was in town to

help persuade bundy to stay on. but, he then -- bundy pushed very hard for expanding our involvement in vietnam, which most of this year was probably his most egregious mistake. he then later regretted it, some sort of maricopa. but he wanted the president to speak out, the particular and defend the policy. johnson wanted this to what he was doing as long as possible. he felt to verify speak out there will take away my great society, a program. as soon as they have this excuse. i want to keep it secret, keep the factory and made these decisions secret. but the thought that was very bad. when bundy was invited to debate it was morgan, a prominent

critic of the war in vietnam then monday accepted without johnson -- asking johnson first and johnson rest to decide that he had to go a professor that time to be in emergency is lucifer. he had to cancel.

the foundation embodies said yes. bennett johnson shows somebody named walter ross tell who was a convinced advocate of what there were doing in vietnam to fight the north vietnamese communists. he was also reassuring to the president's in terms of your on the right track. criticized. criticized, too. being tough and good. and so none of johnson's other advisers recommended food jobs were appointed to. in fact, some people said though. johnson said, i have my

intellectual. but he was closer to johnson than bundy ever was, but he was about as close -- trusted by the citizenry. he did not do the job was well. reports it out, you have to be tested by the people. the people have to believe the you're going to bring issues straight to the president's, and even if you're viewed as of agree with the vessel security visors, he should be able to presented fairly to the presence. people did not quite trust him yet. >> host: professor, henry kissinger, colin powell, brent volt scowcroft, the all served as national security advisor. has the power of the nsa grown? >> guest: at least the adviser, the power reached its height with henry kissinger. he rose with richard nixon did

not trust the state department and very much wants to dominate foreign policy in self. he found it very congenial partner, and so he said at the beginning that he would resurrect the russell security council like eisenhower and have this open process where everyone could argue. it was structured so that he could clearly make decisions. he did some innovations in terms of private deposit to fund political studies. like eisenhower where they try to reach consensus, under nixon there was retaken senses of the options or so the president to choose one and not be buried under a bureaucratic consensus. and they did that for a while, but nixon, after he came to office, found he really did not like high-level meetings with people shouting in the tether and challenging the view that was unwanted. he found themselves in a peculiar problem the could not face tell somebody, even as president and say, i have heard

you and and not doing that than i expected to support or line in doing colleges this. he could not to the. therefore he retreated from the problem. his most brilliant court here problem -- 64 your biggest kissinger court of the president and reinforced ceos. the same time you as a brilliant policy person a literary hard before it became dominant. nixon, when he decided he was boito opened the chinese response he has to send somebody to turn the. terms of nixon was a little worried. why? of the president already is pursuing the story line. the presence is terrible, and therefore kissingers saved us from nixon. well, kissinger and nixon were on the soundtrack.

nixon was actually in particular the real driver a policy. convinced to do something well 04 kissinger. that was the precedent. and so nixon.

nixon did appoint kissinger as secretary of state. he clearly would not have done it if he felt he had no choice. and by that time it was barry and accusations of the watergate scandal involved in the burglarizing of the bureaucratic mess up committee headquarters western got to be true. the present himself was involved in this. he therefore needed the person had a stroke or petition. and kissinger, interestingly, for someone who had gotten his power begins it was so close to the president now distance himself from the president embraced people from the state department's. he does and operates very effectively from there. >> host: henry kissinger as

nsa increase the power, did it stay that way? >> guest: it never reached -- the difference between the kissinger and the bundy regime, the people who were working for the state department, if they could get to bundy they could get hurt somewhere. in the nixon administration they develop the system. they felt shut out. a lot of people were shut out. all of the senior nsc people were shut up because nixon did not tell the mall was happening either. so you had a monopolize power. visually handle and their range of issues, what they dominated them. nobody has done that since. the next paula marin was since the. he liked kissinger had been a

professor. both had been prominent foreign policy riders, foreign policy intellectuals. kosinski had tutored jimmy carter and did not have much foreign-policy experience. carter's personal choice. kosinski had very strong views of about what policy should be. he tended to be more entire soviet tumult wharves of listen soviet union than anybody else in the administration, including the president. therefore he was essentially the most hawkish member. he argued the losses who was a strong this chart -- crushes middle-of-the-road person and policy. harold brown, secretary of defense.

kosinski would speak out publicly for positions that the president had not yet endorsed. that meant that the administration looked like he was speaking with more than one voice. the press got a hold of this of the reputation in it of being very. people said -- end of citrus the president would give a speech that look like it was written by kosinski in half by vance. they introduced a bill setting the vessel security advisor would be affirmed by the senate. it was clear that we have two secretaries of state show we should therefore confirm the other as well. so the whole thing, the office became a major sibila is tsa seven office? >> no, it is never become a single office. they argued against area.

unless a senior advisor is not. the bourse nobody the best with to play the role isn't can scowcroft who was assistant under parity had it twice. he added under gerald ford. and george h. to the west. barry's strong intellect.

have to spend the first year establishing an this out just trust for the president's but just for the people are below you it takes readier to do that. it can become more assertive in terms of ron policy. do this quietly as possible. don't do not talk shows. you can avoid it. a perfect example of this was a little of the second year. everybody figured out this about the same was not doing to invade kuwait and then he does. and then he congress kuwait. their message is set to what we do it sooner one senior adviser on the nestle security council meeting, and everything is kind of fun stuff. end the secretary of state to as

you know, the great things people said, that is really off base. there has been this rule which we need to enforce up to the cold war the treaty should not, of -- conquered countries. this should be the rule will run from world war ii. the perfect case where it should not stand and be reversed so he goes to bush. here's what i think. george's to the bush. and he says no. if the president. his fury this absolute policy in that direction. so in races very articulate argument in favor of confronting

the iraqis. taking it to his stance. first they send troops to saudi arabia and then double troop commitments and final say no. in the meantime they also issued a worldwide alliance against some car which was very effective. as james baker, secretary of state, -- >> host: we are here at the university of maryland talking with im tester, kovner of the sport, and michele of the oval office. professor, what do you do here at the university? >> i teach in a school of public policy which is a graduate school of which prepares people for government service. >> host: director of the initial security and economic policy pro gram.

>> guest: that's right. >> host: what is that? >> it is a part of our curriculum we have probably 140 students come in each year. libya quarter of undue national security and economic policy. and that basically, the premises particularly with the end of the cold war you need people to have some understanding of both the security side and the economic side of foreign policy. particularly the as its is not have that. of course i teach for a policy-making. unisys is it digress to governments. one group of people, the usc. by lars said two different groups of people the assurance to the seven lists

the rich and nestle security issues and the international economic issues between today with the european crisis just relations with europe and the economic growth with china posing liniments those challenges in that area. if it wasn't obvious before it is obvious now. the need to ascend the linkage. >> guest: just looking back at some of the national security and visors, kissinger, paul colorize called for in the status secretary of state. assessing the evidence? >> guest: it is, in the sense that they -- the secretary of state ship, even though it's of always an influential position is the of was the most pristine -- prestigious in the u.s. states. their parents were quite

different. power is only nestle security adviser for a year basically at the end of the raid administration. he was promoted from deputy. he then became chairman of the joint chiefs of staff as a military officer of the era he was very prominent and could have run for president.

i'm sure if we could get inside the president's mind to explain why. senior retired marine general which should is integrity by refusing to be chairman of the joint chiefs under dark rum so because he thought correctly that of rumsfeld which was george h. w. bush's secretary of defense was basically pounding people down and not letting member show any strength in terms of their own position.

others like pundits and to get power by enhancing other people. anyway @booktv sorry. >> host: added zero jones. >> guest: myself, a prisoner was not deeply involved one senior person, deal with military since he was not particularly strong. in any way. if you believe bob woodward's story, and i do, he finally told obama, not a good staff member. a point me to a cabinet position he was already waiting for issues to come to have to figure out rather than make sure he was the one who brought the issues to the present. and he would -- and so he was not -- his style was to lose

different. he wanted to structure a former process that no present other than eisenhower has been interested in structuring. obama was similar to kennedy in the sense that he was cerebral, like to have people around, interested more in people who could contribute to the session. and he wanted to make the decisions themselves. and he did the surf that lead. he was very formal in style. meanwhile different people in the obama on drive should better relations with the president began playing various pieces of this role. most importantly the deputy national security threats to think of the deputies committee which became particularly of the jurors is silly bush administration on, very important vehicle headed by the national security adviser.

the secretary of defense, cia together all trying to handle issues that are very important operational issues but may not raise the presidential level. anyway, he tends to be a master handling this process. so there is a cause i'm a target the was created, and rebuilt the buildings did not put in the sidewalks. it wants to see with the students walk. it looked and saw our vigorous was worn down added that the sidewalks with aggressive and more. i say in this case they wanted to see who was, in fact to be nestle security adviser, but the effect was the same. when it was time for jurors to go the sensible person to give the jobs it was tom bottled. he is a lot better.

at the key is able to man is the process. he and his says the substance. tonight wallow best? >> host: ensure. >> guest: if you looked at people who write about the subject : there are two different views. this senior manager in the other is the policy to root. the call people outside the process, looked like the second model. kent conceptions. there is some truth to this. others like myself and my co-author believe that although that sounds like a wonderful idea, part of it is it deflates

the role of the national security advisor beyond what is likely to be commended is likely to neglected the effectiveness of policy management. kosinski did not turn out to be an effective policy manager. kissinger was in effect a policy manager in the sense of getting issues structured and available for the president and the work of the staff but not in the sense of strengthening engaging in bringing a this is a long and working together. and so i think the scowcroft problem is better. the person who wears with the senior captain of people who was an ounce below them, but may well be as important because you so close to the presence. in our conclusion lisa there are three rules for effectiveness. the second is build trust down, not just your level, but at the deputies level.

>> host: there are a lot of details. just as just. presence in options : information coming details : in the form the president wants. some presidents like to read, essays, most like memos. some like to be talks to, so what to be talked to you have to be able to respond. not only is he much better, but he is much more in sync. did they talk to you? >> guest: yes botox to bundy several times. an oral history round table.

we had tony lake who was brent scowcroft. paolo, poindexter, the greatest failure of national security adviser resided over the iran-contra affair. so we interview the great bulk in one form or another. about we talk to other people too. retired drop of a process that worked. the website of the center for international and security studies. cissm dot com, and if you look fresh security kelso roundtable you will find the discussion of former officials for the next demonstration, one for the clinton administration, one for

the george h. w. bush of ministration. and these are in debt giving people a real sense of how the process worked, and they're totally on the record. end and the -- we had one of the former national security advisor, and to that the attached the text of our interviews. kosinski, i shouldn't, but i think we were not able to get him to agree to publish the interview. >> host: we have been talking with ibm kestler, the co-author of in this shadow of the oval office. doctor, 84 your time. >> guest: it has been a pleasure. thank you for having me. >> every weekend book tv offers 48 hours of programming focused on nonfiction authors of books. what's it here