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[inaudible conversations] >> i think we are ready to begin. go ahead in the those of you that haven't finished feel free to continue to enjoy your who launched. dr. brzezinski finished his. i have the pleasure of introducing the somebody who needs no introduction is and i don't intend to give one. he has spoken on issues we are here today to talk about candidly and openly and very forcefully over the last several years i think american policy is beginning to move in the directions he's advocated by mad shorty has a few more

suggestions for the president that he can share with us today. the zbigniew? >> thank you. >> thank you very much. it's nice to be here. i'm sorry that i will send an on the sessions held this morning because i know i would have learned a great deal in fact i don't think i have much to tell anyone in this group you don't know on the subject but nonetheless perhaps i can provide a basis for the discussion. i have to say also i am very impressed by the publication's that rand produced on the subject. they took over most critical issues on the relationship with iran and i think they are an important contribution to the understanding of the subject which has been the object of my judgment oversimplification rather than analysis over the last several years.

i am also very happy that jim is chairing the subject because i know he has been directly engaged in the relationship in particular at a critical time right after 9/11. so, taking all of this into account i think i would share with you some general impressions or thoughts regarding the american and iranian relationship as it may be unfolding in the near future. obviously the point of this relationship given that the am i did states has now stated officially by the president we are committed to negotiating relationship with iran without preconditions involves the irani and elections and we will know before long without -- my sense is that if mahmoud ahmadinejad wins these elections we are going to be in for a per go in time which he is going to be triumphant and he is being

contested and he knows he is in a very difficult race. he knows he doesn't have much sympathy in this country and for good reason. and he is going to be a triumph listen negotiator who was going to make life i think more difficult. if he doesn't when we will still have a difficult period of time before the iranians settled on to serious negotiations. the fact of the matter is the mahmoud ahmadinejad does not win it will require some sycophant readjustment and internal procedures and arrangements within an extraordinarily complicated governmental structure. i do not know how the supreme leader will react to the new president if it isn't mahmoud ahmadinejad whom it does appear khamenei is somewhat sympathetic but in the case it will be a

readjustment which will create other key players such as the head of the national security council, neither of whom views himself as a subordinate of mahmoud ahmadinejad. so we are going to have a difficult pattern of adjustment even with a new so-called president. i emphasize the word so called because i think there is a tendency particularly in america to think of mahmoud ahmadinejad as somewhat an equivalent to our president which he ought to easily is not and everyone in his group knows about it. the bottom line is the iran and policy-making process is going to be one way or another complicated by the outcome of the elections. it will initially become more intransigent in one outcome prevails. it will certainly require a serious internal readjustment and perhaps significant policy

discussions if someone else wins. but what then about the allied position at five plus one? it seems to me as of now we don't have a good sense of crystallized the position is. we are negotiating so to speak together in the united states negotiating by the direction to some extent. but is there a common position among the key players? my sense is that far from being so. there is a predisposition to take a stand in favor of negotiations but only in favor of negotiations when the going gets rough what is the position of the different parties? to the extent i want to engage i think the french and british are close to our position roughly speaking although in isn't easy to say precisely at this stage what our position is but

basically in a kind of a sympathetic fashion moreover in that which rio sarkozy himself has a tendency to take a very strong positions and it isn't clear how far he is prepared to push the envelope on the subject but he seems among the europeans to be what might be loosely described as more tough-minded or rigid or assertive more selfish and the british and certainly more so than the germans or the russians. how that might affect the negotiating process is hard to judge but sarkozy certainly doesn't want to be a wallflower in the process. he wants france to play a role. he alluded to that recently in djibouti commemorating the opening -- i'm sorry, not in jeopardy, the gulf, commemorating the opening of a new french military base in the area. the germans and the russians clearly are not prepared to push the envelope very hard. i don't think they are prepared

to commit themselves to very drastic sanctions the kind some would like. and their position from the outside probably will be supported by the chinese who are not a party to the process but who have a role to play and the rule is not insignificant in the long run. this sort of, on durham of issues is complicated by the fact as of now there is no sense of clarity on the side of the five were six, however you count them, regarding what is actually the status of the iranians who nuclear quest. what are they actually seeking right now? the analysis of 2007 hasn't been rejected. a onetime judgment that appears to still be the judgment, that is to say right now there is no convincing evidence that the iranians are actually seeking a

nuclear weapons capability. that they are in the process moving towards weaponization. there may not be definitive evidence in the contrary either. but it is certainly not the case one can assure with confidence as is often the case in press analyses in public comments that the iranians are actively engaged in seeking nuclear weapons. none the nonetheless it remains as it unfolds they move closer to the edge by the inevitability of the program by its technological dynamics. so even if they are not seeking nuclear weapons they are certainly moving closer to having the capability eventually of having nuclear weapons. that distinction however has to be kept in mind we are negotiating with someone who is in fact asserting they are not seeking nuclear weapons and we are not in a position

definitively. we have conclusive evidence. that certainly complicates the negotiating process. it raises the question how do we negotiate, how do we negotiate on the subject? i think there is a school of thought some people are advocating with different degrees of commitment and degree in favor of insisting on some sort of preconditions perhaps the iranians ought to in some fashion make an act of goodwill regarding their enrichment or something to that effect. there is certainly morrill, is negotiating that we should move into the process with explicitly new concepts of more severe sanctions, that the five or the six ought to agree in advance on more severe sanctions and let that be known to the iranians.

there is certainly a predisposition on the part of some to argue that this formula all options are on the table to be emphasized which is a way of saying to the iranians if you do not accommodate force may be used against you. there is certainly a predisposition which perhaps has been even intensified not intentionally but by something obama said to put a time limit on the negotiations and certainly there is external pressure in favor of that from the israelis and the president was actually extremely clever in the way he fashioned his acceptance of the suggestion but in a manner which is so qualified that if he so chooses he can also ignore. nonetheless there is an effort on the part of some to say he has accepted time limits when the time limit is the end of the year. last but not least, there is

still inclinations to combine entry into the negotiations with something in terms of diplomacy amounts to an explicit insults namely repetitive charges of the iranians with active pursuit of terrorism, and although that isn't discussed openly is at least a question whether we have terminated all forms of covert activity designed against iran and government. in the earlier policy promoting democracy or perhaps just regime change but that is not necessarily the same as the former. and so, all of that does raise questions how are we going to negotiate? i think obama's elusive treatment of the time limit and his reference to no preconditions in the speech yesterday such as he is prepared

to to give the negotiations a serious try, serious try that is to say to enter into them with a desire to help them succeed and they understanding that any complex a negotiating process and this one is bound to be complex would take a long time and enhance notion for the negotiations sometime next year. i don't think it is something that he is likely to entertain very seriously. i think also the administration realizes to make the negotiations on the nuclear issue forward it will be necessary to address several other issues at the same time that is security issues in the region first of all, perhaps implicitly at least the discussion of iran's role in the region and there certainly the question of iran's role in afghanistan which remains pertinent to ongoing efforts in

afghanistan. their economic issues between us and the iranians we have claims against the iranian, damages and otherwise, the iranians have claims against us because of sanctions and withholding assets and so forth. so there is bound to be a set of negotiations going on at the same time and perhaps by movement on some of them movement and other issues more difficult issues may be facilitated and i emphasize the word may be. but it is going to be wave theory difficult and complex process. on the issue of the nuclear program itself, i think the negotiating point of departure might well be the desire to exploit more explicitly what the iranians have been affirming publicly for quite some time namely the three in vocations. we don't want nuclear weapons,

we are not seeking nuclear weapons, our religion forbids us to have nuclear weapons. notes incidentally this stands in sharp explicit contrast with the position of the north koreans. the north koreans have been saying the very opposite. we want nuclear weapons. we are seeking nuclear weapons, and in your face, taha, we have nuclear weapons. that makes it tough to negotiate about and of arrangement which excludes nuclear weapons. the iranians perhaps out of the seat but perhaps in part at least truthfully are saying we are not building nuclear weapons, we don't have nuclear weapons, our religion forbids us to have nuclear weapons. that provides a point of departure saying to them this is reassuring but we have some legitimate doubts to question the degree of your commitment of

these propositions and what may even be more polite and say we have some reservations about your veracity but let us use this as a point of departure aiming at establishing the maffei arrangements that give a reason to take the assertions as the truth in the back and then gets us into the discussion but is still feasible in that regard. in fact, halting the iranian enrichment is now pretty much overdue because they have advanced so far on the alert and 80's to negotiate with them have been wasted perhaps that issue could have been addressed earlier when their enrichment program was at a very, very early stage. they are not going to dismantle what they have achieved. they are not going to abandon what they have been doing in this regard.

but perhaps there may be way is halting the process and in any case, of subjecting it to much more extensive inspections by the iaea, though inspections in keeping with inspections there are applied to other nnpt participants because it is doubtful the iranians who will accept additional regiment for themselves. that will fly in the face of their notion of sovereignty, that will make them an exceptional case internationally and for obvious reasons that will be very difficult for an iranian regime to swallow. nonetheless, it may be possible to negotiate some special arrangements under iaea that provides additional assurances. one of the candidates for the president that may be in the running has suggested in much of

his comments in the course of the electoral campaign on going in iran that a consortium for enrichment might be considered. that would be a significant step forward under the iranians who are prepared to accept that that would facilitate an arrangement peaden although that would be a special arrangement applicable i assume at this stage primarily or maybe even exclusively to iran. though it might be applicable to other countries in the region that wish to acquire nuclear power capability and its risk of that and there is talk of that in egypt and there is talk about and turkey so in that sense perhaps something of the regional type might be an arrangement would that prove to be feasible. nonetheless, one cannot exclude the possibility that it would be

no agreement and aggression rises of what. i will be explicit on this subject. i think the motion of the military strike against iran is an on starter for the united states and has to be a nonstarter for and nobody else and that means specifically israel. it is in on starter for the united states because we already have and how war and afghanistan and unfinished war in iraq. we could have military coalition in korea and there's nothing good for america in having a military coalition with iran over this issue. the consequences of that would be extremely damaging in the region and extremely damaging to the interests. the iranians will have the capability to retaliate against us in iraq that can make our life more complicated in

afghanistan and they can certainly interfere within limits but interfere nonetheless with the transportation of energy through the strait that can mass of the impact on the price of oil escalating in dramatically beyond 150 up to 200 so dollars per barrel with disastrous economic consequences for us with even more damaging consequences for china which raises an interesting question what political elite would see its own state interest advanced the most that were to happen? now it doesn't address all the issues connected with the war in this area but if these things were to happen the russian elite would benefit the most and the price of oil that undermines the chinese economic development and blogs us down in a war and impacts negative on the economy

is something people perhaps mr. putin himself wouldn't you as international disaster. that's perhaps another reason why we have to think not just twice but three or four times about the option and this is also another reason why we have to make certain israelis don't do it because we will be the ones to pay the price if they do it. there is no reason to calculate an israeli strike would be effective conclusively in preventing the iranians from acquiring nuclear weapons. it would be painful and damaging and would probably accelerate their efforts because they would become more explicit in a setting of national rage, national fanaticism and unified militant posture against israel and the united states together so there is no benefit for us to vignette there is no real benefit for israel in this either and i think that we do know one any service particularly not a country we

consider a close ally and whose security we are committed by being indolent on the subject. and there's no way the israelis can do it if we are not for it and if we are prepared to say you are not going to fly over our airspace which is iraq and you cannot refuel if we are denied and then the right to fly over because refueling is a complicated operation that requires safe circumstances for the undertaking. the turks will not agree. the saudis consider to wink if it was a quick attack probably not last a long time would be less effective and i doubt they could permit the repetitive acts involving an attack and they might very well interfere in particular with refueling so there is no question israel can do this on its own if we are very clear about it. but beyond that i think we

certainly need to do more than just that if there is no agreement. we could certainly offer and should offer nuclear guarantees to every country in the region, israel included that is to say any threat of force involving nuclear weapons involving iran as a nuclear power would be a threat to viewed as a threat against the united states and i think we have sufficient credibility to make that stick. we can certainly consider the possibility of also perhaps suggesting nuclear-free zone in the middle east that would require israeli cooperation. but if the israeli government is in iran that has nuclear weapons poses an existential threat to israel israel and the effect is saying its nuclear deterrent is incapable of you during the iranians. the israeli argument is the iranians may be rational,

fanatical therefore as soon as they have one bomb they might actually use it against the israelis thereby creating extension of threat. if that is the case than the is really determined feels to detour in which case perhaps a nuclear-free zone in which there be a quid pro quo involving the iranians and israelis might be conceivably attractive although my suspicion is they would not be attractive either to the israelis or the iranians and last but not least means reaffirming by our posture and i see no reason to fear that with dismay. it has worked with russians at a time the soviet union was aggressive. it has worked with the chinese even though mao at one point talk of killing people. it worked with the chinese. it has worked between the

pakistanis and indians. the threat of war between pakistan and india was higher before the two became a nuclear power than it is today. largely because they both instantly realized that if there is a serious military engagement that excavates escalates it poses a risk of an exchange. this is one of the reasons why in the recent years the pakistani clashes across the line of control didn't escalate. both sides became increasingly prevent. and there is in fact object lesson in experience with nuclear weapons. they do create a kind of on comfortable and unpleasant self restraint and that is perhaps not necessarily the worst about comes in a region that is very dynamic and unpredictable and prone to violence.

this is not an overwhelmingly optimistic prognosis but does suggest there are options for the united states and the first option is to explore what is feasible regarding an outcome with which we can comfortably live and that is an of arrangement whereby iran is induced to become a more active member of the international community and is given greater opportunity for its own national development and it is induced to operate in the climate which is owned fanaticism and nationalism becomes less extremist and as a consequence of which also iran becomes a partner in more diversified set of of arrangements regarding distribution of energy in europe and asia from which to some extent iran is excluded by virtue of the ongoing conflict that would be beneficial to the europeans. so there are great stakes

involved and i think the president has made a commitment in his speech to pursue something along these lines. the speech was not a policy speech, it was a philosophical statement defining how america should really did say to the changing world but as such it allows the point of departure for a rational and perhaps productive policy. perhaps we could now have a discussion if you wish. thank you. [applause] the >> thank you. patrick from the washington institute for middle east policy giving it in discussing the question of a potential nuclear free zone in the least i think you said you thought that perhaps this might be

attractive, we could make the argument that this should be attractive to them because in affect the israelis seem to be suggesting their own nuclear deterrent wouldn't necessarily eerily detour iran to attacking them. in spite of several billion dollar investment by the israelis and robust nuclear deterrent including a second strike capability through the naval capabilities. well, israel is not certain that its own nuclear capabilities made toward iran what steps can we take federal going to reassure israel that our nuclear guarantee to would detour iran because if i understood you were suggesting you said we have sufficient credibility that if we offered to do the guarantee that would be a deterrent to iran so how are we going to persuade the israelis even though their nuclear capability cannot detour iran that ours can? >> first of any guarantee by the united states would designed to discourage other countries from

seeking nuclear weapons and would be designed to protect them house also its focus is not entirely on his real. as far as israel is concerned i think there is the legitimate question to ask how serious are the israelis about the existence of threat and that the iranians because they are suicidal will attack them and even are going to perish and so we would be in a sense of arnesen initio which hasn't been discussed seriously in israel namely how serious is that argument that the moment the iranians have the bomb they will be inclined to commit suicide, extinguish 3,000 years of impressive national history for the satisfaction of damaging his real somehow so i don't even take that argument very seriously myself. >> thank you, dr. brzezinski. flint from the new america foundation. i would like to take back to the part of the remarks which you identified some of the