space. final topical functional topic is transnational organized crime, which poses a growing threat to u.s. and allied interests. these criminal groups will supply the dominant share of illicit drugs fueling record mortality rates among our population. they will continue to traffic in human life. they will deplete national resources and siphon money from governments and the global economy. i'd like now to briefly go around the world on reasonable topics starting with east asia. if you went out and hired a private plane, and launched it from los angeles, and went around the world and stopped at every hot spot in this world, you would make multiple dozens of stops. that's the kind of threat that we face. but let me start with east asia. north korea continues to pose an

ever more increasing threat to the united states and its interests. pyongyang has repeatedly stated that it does not intend to negotiate its nuclear weapons and missiles away because the regime views nuclear weapons are critical to its security. kim also probably sees nuclear icbms as leverage to achieve his long-term strategic ambition to end seoul's alliance with washington and to eventually dominate the peninsula. in the wake of the icbm test last year, we expect to see north korea press ahead with additional missile tests this year and its foreign minister has threatened an atmospheric nuclear test over the pacific. modest improvements in north korea's conventional capabilities will continue to

pose an ever greater threat to south korea, japan, as well as u.s. targets in those countries. china will seek to expand regional influence and shape events and outcomes globally. it will take a firm stance on its claims to the east china sea and south china sea. its relations with taiwan and its regional economic engagement. china also intends to use the one belt, one road initiative to increase its reach to geostrategic locations across eurasia, africa, and the pacific. we head to south asia. in afghanistan, kabul continues to bear the brunt of the taliban led insurgency as demonstrated by recent attacks in the city. afghan national security forces face unsteady performance, but with coalition support probably will maintain control of most major population centers.

complicating the afghanistan situation, however, is our assessment that pakistan-based militant groups continue to take advantage of their safe haven to conduct attacks in india, in afghanistan, and including u.s. haves therein. pakistani military leaders continue to walk a delicate line, ongoing pakistani military operations against the taliban and associated groups probably reflect a desire to appear more proactive and responsive to our requests for more actions against these groups. however, the actions taken thus far do not reflect a significant escalation of pressure against these groups and are unlikely to have a lasting effect. in the last month, the administration has designed -- excuse me, designated eight militants affiliated with the taliban, haqqani network and other pakistani militant groups. and we assess that pakistan will

maintain ties to these militants while restricting counterterrorism, cooperation with the united states. next is russia. where president putin will continue to rely on assertive foreign policies to shape outcomes beyond russia's borders. putin will resort to more authoritarian tactics to remain in control amid challenges to his rule. with respect to russian influence efforts, let me be clear, the russians utilize this tool because it is relatively cheap, it is low risk, it offers what they perceive as plausible deniability, and it is proven to be effective at sowing division. we expect russia to continue using propaganda, social media, false flag personas, sympathetic spokesmen, and other means to influence to try to build on its wide range of operations and as

bait social and political fissures in the united states. there should be no doubt that russia perceive that its past efforts as successful and views the 2018 u.s. midterm elections as a potential target for russian influence operations. from russia i'll turn to the middle east and north africa. this region will be characterized by political turmoil, economic fragility, and civil and proxy wars in the coming year. iran will remain the most prominent state sponsor of terrorism and adversary in the middle east, especially in iraq, syria and yemen. iran will seek to expand its regional influence and will exploit the fight against isis to solidify partnerships and translate battlefield gains into political security and economic agreements. we also assess that iran will continue to develop military capabilities that threaten u.s. forces and u.s. allies in the

region. for example, iran has the largest ballistic missile force in the middle east. the islamic revolutionary guard corps poses a risk to u.s. naval and allied naval operations in the persian gulf. and lebanese hezbollah with the support of iran has deployed thousands of fighters to syria and provide direction to other militant and terrorist groups all fomenting regional instability. iran's provocative and assertive behavior as we saw most recently this past weekend in northern israel increases the potential for escalation. turkey will seek to thwart kurdish ambitions in the middle east and the ongoing turkish incursion into northern syria is complicating ongoing counterisis activities in the region and increases the risk to u.s. forces located in the area. syria will face unrest and

fighting through 2018. even as damascus recaptures urban areas and violence decreases in some areas. iraq is likely to face a lengthy period of political turmoil and conflict. the social and political challenges that gave rise to isis remain and iran has exploited those challenges. to deepen its influence in iraq's military and security elements and diplomatic and political arms. the war in yemen between the iranian backed houthis and the saudi-led coalition is likely to continue and will worsen the already tragic humanitarian crisis for 70% of the population of about 20 million people in need of assistance. the situation in yemen is emblematic of the far larger problem, the number of people displaced by conflict around the world is the highest that it has been since the end of world war ii. turning to europe, where i want to draw your attention to two

significant developments that are likely to continue to impact european politics and foreign policy in the coming year, let me state first the continent's center of gravity appears to be shifting to france, where president macron has taken a more assertive role. results of the recent german election, i think, enforce that assessment. second, recent efforts by some governments in central and eastern europe to undermine judicial independence and parliamentary oversight and increase government control over public media are weakening the rules of law. these steps could presage further democratic decline and offer opportunity for chinese and russian influence. there are many more topics i could discuss. i haven't even gotten to the western hemisphere or africa. but i would like to close with a discussion of one additional threat, this one internal and

somewhat personal. i'm concerned that our increasing fractious political process, particularly with respect to federal spending is threatening our ability to properly defend our nation, both in the short-term and especially in the long-term. the failure to address our long-term fiscal situation has increased the national debt to over 20 trillion and growing. this situation is unsustainable as i think we all know and represents a dire threat to our economic and national security. former chairman of the joint chiefs of staff mike mullen first identified the national debt as the greatest threat to our national security. since then, he's been joined by numerous respected national security leaders of both parties, including former secretary of state madeleine albright and henry kissinger and former defense secretaries bob gates and leon panetta. and our current defense secretary jim mattis agrees with this assessment. many of you know i have spent a

lot of time in my last term in the senate work on this issue and unfortunately the problem continues to grow. so i would urge all of us to recognize the need to address this challenge and to take action as soon as possible before fiscal crisis occurs that truly undermines our ability to ensure our national security. with that, i and the rest of the panel are happy to take your questions. we appreciate the opportunity to be with you today. thank you, mr. chairman. >> thank you very much, for that very thorough overview of the world and what is at play. i'll recognize members based on superiority for up to five minutes. the chairman recognizes himself. admiral rogers, according to the statement for the record, the most detected chinese cyber operations against the united states private industry are focused on clear defense contractors or it and

communications firms whose products and services support government and private sector networks nationwide. rate the intelligence community's performance when it comes to notifying clear defense contractors and other sensitive private sector actors about malicious cyber activities on their networks. >> you're asking many to rate a function for which i don't have responsibility or day to day execution. it is not informed by day to day experience so to say. this is an issue as nsa and cybercommand i try to work aggressively. as you have outlined, this is a tremendous concern for us as a department. clearly i think we are not where we need to be. the challenge i think is we have got multiple areas of knowledge and insight across the federal government, within the private sector and how do we bring this together and integrate a team with some real time flow back and forth? that is not where we are today. that's where we got to get to. >> in your estimation are we

doing enough to warn the private sector of the threat that is out there? >> i think we are informing them as we become aware of it, but one of my concerns is we're only going to see one slice of this picture. i'm also interested in from the private sector's perspective, tell us what you are seeing and if we can bring these two together, we'll have such a broader perspective and much more in depth knowledge of what is happening. . i think it is our ability to bring us together as a team. >> given you've seen the difficulty of this committee and the intelligence committees had with communicating with tech companies about a way forward that is in commonality are you concerned at how this is going to become an increasingly challenging landscape for both congress and for the intelligence community working as we see new tech firms emerge every day in.

>> yes, i am. quite frankly i wonder how bad does this have to get before we realize we have to do some things fundamentally differently. i would argue if you look at the internet of things, you look at the security levels within those components, folks, this is going to -- we think the problem is a challenge now, but we just wait, it is going to get much, much more, exponentially from a security perspective. >> director pompeo, north korea is likely to press ahead with more tests in 2018, missile tests. noting that north korea's foreign ministry indicated a test over the pacific may be under consideration, what is the ic assess the regional reaction to this kind of test would be in. >> senator, thank you for the question. if i may just take one minute to say i've been doing this a year now i want to express my appreciation to this committee for helping the cia do the things that it needs to do, providing us the resources and authorities we need. we have put a lot of effort against this very problem.

you've all been incredibly supportive of that. my team thanks you for that. we think a test like that would certainly further unite the region, having said that our sense is that we have built a global coalition pushing back against kim jong-un and his terror regime. with respect to what each particular country might do, i prefer to keep that conversation to closed session this afternoon. >> great. what is the ics assessment of north korea's willingness to employ its expansive conventional military capabilities? >> senator, one thing that director coats referred to in his opening remarks is that kim jong-un remains not only intent on staying in power, that the thing all dictators prefer to do, die in their sleep fully at the peak of their power, but he has a submission as a

long-standing north korean idea of unification and using a nuclear umbrella with their conventional forces to exert coercive behavior certainly inside their country, certainly against south korea, but more broadly something our analysts are continuing to lack at, we can see as they ratchet up their nuclear capability making a response more difficult, their capacity to do harm in the region as a result of their incredible conventional capabilities alone increases. >> probably for general ashley and admiral rogers, according to statement for the record, the widespread proliferation of artificial intelligence is likely to prompt new national security concerns. how is the ic accounting for the possibility that these new national -- of these new national security concerns, are we seeing indications now that our adversary is working to harness technologies like artificial intelligence and as the ic looking to maximize the

potential of emerging technologies in our own processes and analysis of data and intelligence? >> if i could take the first shot at that one, you look at dia and thanks for all the support that the committee provides to the defense intelligence agency, if you look at our coordination, you look at foreign militaries and the operational environment, so this is central to looking at doctrine and what they're developing, you think about artificial intelligence, our near peer competitors, our pursuing this and it is commercial technology that is available. but you look at the volume and big data and what is available, the ability to digest and pull all that information in, artificial intelligence will be integral to that. an example of one of the projects we work on, at the open source level, project maven. you look at full motion video, for example, social media, full motion video, you're never going to be able to afford the workforce that is going to be able to go through all the material, whether it is video, whether it is what admiral

rogers works in the way of intelligence or what is available on the social media. so artificial intelligence, machine learning, really where we are now, more mesh learning than it is artificial intelligence, we're seeing all of our competitors invest in these kinds of technologies because it is going to get them to decision cycles faster, allow them to digest information in greater volumes and have a better situational understanding of what is happening in the battle space and just what is happening in the strategic environment. >> i would agree with general ashley and highlight every organization on this table is faced with the challenge of victims of our own success in some ways. the ability to access data at increased levels brings its own set of challenges. we're collectively all attempting to deal with this. when i look at potential adversaries, i see them going through the same set of challenges i would argue when i look at the prc in particular there is a national strategy designed to harness the power of artificial intelligence to generate strategic outcomes. many along the lines that general ashley highlighted to generate positive outcomes for

them. if you look at their research, you look at how it is affecting the amount of data they're going after. i can remember five, ten years ago, looking at some data concentrations and thinking to myself, this is so large and has such a disparate amount of information in it, boy, it would be really difficult for an opponent potentially to generate insight and knowledge from it. i don't have those kinds of conversations anymore. with the power of machine learning, artificial intelligence and big data analytics, data concentrations now increasingly are targets of attraction to a whole host of actors. you have watched the prc and others engage in activity designed to access these massive data concentrations. >> if i could follow up on that one also, this is one of those areas that is available in the commercial industry so you see a lot of investment, academia and others, that are pursuing this. so there is a key piece of this, i think it is worth addressing as well, which is how do you operationalize it. so you go back and if i could just use kind of a world war ii example, the fact that there

were planes, radios and tanks was not unique to the germans in world war ii. they came up with an operational concept. and peter singer, if anyone ever read wire for war, ghost fleet, a futurist, and we set a panel with him a couple of years ago. i asked him as you look at the things that are emerging, the technology and things that are coming out, what do you see in the way of breakthrough that gives somebody a really marked advantage? and peter's comment wasn't that i see something, give someone such a marked advantage, it is who is able to harness it, able to operationalize it and put it to effect. that's really key differences. a lot of that technology is going to be available globally. >> thank you. if i could ask you permission here, ga has probably taken some very significant lead on this given the enormous volume of collection that they take and the inability to process that through the use of humans.

robert, i asked robert to be prepared to answer that question for you because i think they're taking some leading efforts that might be helpful. >> great. i think it is important to note at the front what hasn't changed quite frankly. the mission, the responsibility, this whole table has is to provide you with the decision advantage. what changed is the world around us and now within us. and so what we used to hold exclusively because we had capabilities that others didn't is now more shared and so as admiral rogers said, this is something we all lock arms on because it isn't the access that is exclusive anymore, it is the use. it is the concept of operations as general ashley said. i have the same concerns you do about getting the cooperation we need from these companies. i'm rather optimistic about it because i think at the end of the day, we can advance the american economy, we can advance the american entrepreneurialship and our understanding of the world in a way that gets back to that first step, which is

decision advantage. >> rest assured processing of data will come up in our closed session with you. i've got you targeted. vice chair. >> thank you mr. chairman, i take with some note the fact that the odni director started his discussion with cyber. it is very telling in terms of how we view worldwide threats. one question out on the record, we all know it has been over a year since the russian intervention in our 2016 elections. we also have seen russia intervene in a number of other western democracies. i'd like each of you to briefly reconfirm to the american public that our intelligence community understands this threat. last year, those of you on the panel, each expressed confidence in the january 2017 ic assessment that russia interfere in the 2016 elections. i'd like each of you today to

reaffirm that and also simple yes or no, do you agree with director pompeo that we haven't seen a significant decrease in the russian activity, and we have every expectation, director coats you have alluded to this, that they will continue to intervene in our elections in 2018 and 2020. start with you, director, simple yes or no will do. >> no change in my view of the 2017 assessment. i support that and i agree with director pompeo's assessment about the likelihood of the 2018 current as well. >> participated in that 2017 work, i stood by it then, and i stand by it now and i agree with director pompeo, this is not going to change or stop. >> it is not going to change nor is it going to stop. >> throughout the entire community, we have not seen any evidence of any significant change from last year. >> i agree with director pompeo.

>> you've been waiting for that answer. >> i have. i've had that one in the pocket for a while, yes, sir. >> as do i. >> one area that i think we were a little all caught off guard on, and to a degree understandably was how the russians use social media. and i realize this is a new area for all of us and there are legitimate issues around american civil rights that have to be balanced. but the fact is i think we have to have an organized plan going forward. this question will be directed at dni coats and director ray. if others want to weigh in. i'm -- because the notion that these companies while may be located here, operate in cyberspace and we have somebody masquerading as mike pompeo but is boris bagnov in st. petersburg, it doesn't fit

neatly into a particular flow chart. director coats and director wray, who is in charge of address the threat posed by foreign nationals, foreign nations in terms of their use and misuse of social media? >> there is no single agency, quote, in charge. there are several agencies throughout the federal government that have equities in this. and we are working together to try to integrate that process. clearly is something that needs to be addressed and addressed as quickly as possible. you and i have had a number of discussions about that. and so we are keen on moving forward in terms of not only identification, but relative response and things that we can do to prevent this from happening. we are gaining more, i think,

support, i guess is the right word from the private sector who are beginning to recognize ever more the issues that are faced with the material that comes through their processes. we cannot, as a government, direct them what so do. but we are certainly spending every effort we can to work with them to provide some answers to this question. i would agree with director coats. it is a team effort. one thing that really jumped out at me since being back in government is how much more of a team the intelligence community is than the last time i was in this space. i have one of mike's people who sits right, you know, in my inner team and vice versa and we're dealing with each other every day. so it is teamwork within the intelligence community and partnership with the private sector which is, i think, the other big change i've noticed, a lot more forward leaning engagement with the private sector in terms of trying to share information and raise awareness on their end because

at the end of the day, we can't fully police social media, so we have to work with them, so that they can police themselves a little bit better as well. >> i think the companies themselves are slow to recognize this threat. i think they have still got more work to do. but the fact that we don't have clarity in terms of who is in charge means we don't have a full plan. let me get one last question and quickly on the rise, chairman alluded to this as well, the rise of chinese tech companies and my fear is that some of these chinese tech companies may not even have to inquire an american company before they become pervasive in our market. i'll start with director coats and director wray. how do we make sure we send a signal to the private sector before some of these committee -- some of these companies in effect totally invade our market, particularly because so many are tied back to the chinese government. >> i think it is not only

sending the signal and working together, sharing information with the private sector and the public sector. it also, i think, involves a whole -- almost a whole government issue, particularly legislative, with the legislation that is being looked at in terms of the process. i think we need to go beyond what the current process is in terms of evaluating. we as a community will coordinate our intelligence to provide policymakers and those that are making these decisions with the best intelligence we can relative to what the situation is. we have this and view this as a top priority, and it is ongoing because as i mentioned in my early remarks here, the chinese are pervasive on this and we have seen it happen throughout both the public and the private sector.

>> we have tried very hard to be more out and about in the private sector in terms of providing what are almost like defensive briefings. so that some of the u.s. telecommunications companies among other technology industry members kind of can recognize the threats that are coming their way. i think i've been pretty gratified by the response that we have gotten by most companies once we're able to try to educate them. i think one of the bigger challenges we face is that because america's the land of innovation, there is a lot of exciting stuff that is happening in terms of smaller startup companies, a lot of them are a lot less sophisticated about the stuff and trying to make sure they're touching those and educating them as well is a continuing challenge. the reality is that the chinese have turned more and more to more creative avenues using nontraditional collectors which i think we in the intelligence community recognize, but i think the private sector is not used

to spotting. a lot of it is trying to educate them about what to be on the lookout for and have it be more of a dialogue. >> senator risch. >> thank you very much. first of all, i want to associate myself with remarks of the vice chairman when he said we -- this committee will always have your backs. for those of you who have been associated with this committee, dan you used to sit here and director bopompeo in the same operation across the way, you seem like part of the committee, we see you so much up there, you know that that's the case. we sincerely appreciate that. i would say, however, every one of us here knows what a tough job each of your agencies have. i'm speaking for myself and i suspect for most if not all of the committee, we have absolute 100% confidence in your ability to in a very neutral, dispassionate fashion, deliver to us the facts that we need in order to make the policy

decisions. one of the things that does rear its ugly head occasionally and causes issues and it winds up in the media a lot more than it should, is when your jobs intersect with domestic political affairs. and mr. wray probably you wind up with this more than anybody else. it gets messy. it gets difficult. i think we have all got to recommit ourselves to what we're actually doing here to reach the right facts. i would -- i would respectfully disagree with my good friend from virginia that we are no better prepared to handle the russians onslaught in '18 than in '16. when this happened in '16, those of us on this committee, those of you at the panel, most of you -- most everyone who works in the ic, we're not surprised to find out that the russians were attempting to meddle in our affairs and after we had the -- i think probably one of the best hearings we have had this year

was the open hearing we had on how they used social media and we saw how disjointed it was, how ineffective it was, how cheap it was for them to do that. but i think after that, with all due respect to my friend from virginia, i think the american people are ready for this. i think that now they're going to look askance a lot more at the information that is attempted to be pass the out through social media. the american people are smart people. they realize there is people attempting to manipulate them, both domestically and foreign. and i agree with everybody on the panel, that this is going to go on. this is the way the russians have done business. this is no surprise to us and we saw it, even more so than we got it in france and germany. in past year. so i think -- i think the american people are much more prepared than what they were before. dan, thank you for that analysis

of syria. i doubt it made it any clearer for me, for the american people, and it is a rubiks cube that is very difficult. and after this last weekend, i think got even more complicated and i think that we're going to have to keep an eye on that. i agree with you, cyber is certainly something that is right at the top. the financial condition of this country is of critical importance to us. i want to close, and i want to ask a question, a specific question to four of you, regarding korea. i think that's the most existential threat we face. i think it is something at our doorstep. a year ago we talked about this, it was then, this is now. the movement of north korea has not slowed down. in fact, if anything, i think all of us would agree it probably has picked up. and it is at our doorstep. this is going to have to be dealt with in the very, very

near future. we talked about trying to engage in conversations and what conditions would be, et cetera. i think we're still in the process of refining that. but that's moving. we all watched over the last week the smile campaign that north korea has inflicted on the south korean people. the south korean people seem to be charmed by it to some degree. some of them seem to be captivated by it. for my point of view, i think it is nothing more than a stall by the north koreans to further develop what they're trying to do and i suspect in my judgment i think we need to be very, very cautious of pompeo, rogers and ashley, i would like to hear your view of this supposed turn in the last couple of weeks by the north koreans. >> well, this is an existential threat.

potentially to the united states. but also to north korea. kim jong-un views this as any kind of kinetic attack or effort to force him to give up his nuclear weapons. it is an existential threat to his nation and to his leadership in particular. as you know, it is a very hard topic -- collection nation given their secrecy and so forth. we do know that kim, it is a one-man decision. we have processes in place here in the united states to have multiple engagements with various agencies in terms of our policymaking and relative to the decision that ultimately the president makes. that does not appear to be the case in north korea. the provocative nature and the instability that kim demonstrated potentially is a significant threat to the united

states. i agree with you that the decision time is becoming ever closer. in terms of how we respond to this, our goal is a settlement. we're using maximum pressure on north korea in various ways which can be described by my colleagues here. most of that in open session -- in closed session. but we have to face the fact that this is an existential, potentially, existential problem for the united states. >> wise words. director pompeo. >> the last part of your question about this past now almost week at the olympics, we should all remember that kim jong-un is the head of the propaganda and agitation department. there is no indication there is any strategic change in the outlook for kim jong-un and the desire to retain his nuclear capacity to threaten the united states of america. no change there.

>> admiral rogers. >> i would say if he thinks he can split the relationship between ourselves and the south koreans, he's sadly mistaken. >> and finally, lieutenant general ashley. >> no change to his strategic calculus, matter of fact under the kg regime, you've seen a much more delivered effort in terms of readiness, very different from his father. got a million man army, 70% south of pyongyang and the train in a very deliberate fashion. the calculus is not changing and we should not be misled by the events taking place around the olympics. >> my time is up. thank you. >> senator feinstein. >> thanks very much. i want to associate myself with some of the comments of senator risch. and we just had a secure briefing last week. and i think it was difficult and harsh. i harken back to the words of the secretary of state on the

four nos and one we do not seek regime change. two, we do not -- we're not seeking the accelerated reunion of the peninsula. and finally that we will not bring u.s. forces north of the demilitaitarized zone if the kon peninsula is reunified. let me ask you, mr. pompeo, you spoke with some certainty. does kim jong-un really understand and believe that our goals are not regime change or regime collapse? >> senator feinstein, i can't give you any certainty about what kim jong-un actually subjectively believes. very difficult intelligence problem anywhere in the world, most especially difficult there. and i have expressed this

before, we do remain concerned. our analysts remain concerned that kim jong-un is not hearing the full story, that those around him aren't providing nuance -- aren't suggesting to him the tenuous nature of this position both internationally and domestdomestically, the bre with china, the connection between the united states and the republic of north korea. we're not at all certain that the leaders around him are sharing that information in a way that is accurate, complete and full. >> in a recent washington post op-ed, victor shah, recently under consideration to be united states ambassador to south korea, warned of the dangers of a preventive united states military strike against north korea. he cautioned that such a strike would not halt north korea's nuclear weapons program and could spark an uncontrolled conflict in the region that could kill hundreds of thousands of americans.

he's not the only one. a number of experts on the area have said that. and he argued to continue to press for multilateral sanctions at the u.n., to provide japan and south korea advanced weapons training and intel, and some other things. has the intelligence community assessed how the north korean regime would react to a preventive united states attack? >> we have. i would prefer to share that with you in closed session this afternoon. >> would you do that this afternoon, please? >> yes, senator. we have written about various forms of actions, what we analyze, the certainty and uncertainty we have around that analysis, as well as what we think happens in the event that the united states decides not to do that and continues to allow chem jong-un to develop his nuclear weapons arsenal. >> have you explored what it would take to bring them to the

table? >> we have. i prefer to share that with you in closed session, yes, ma'am. >> thank you. >> thank you, mr. chairman. >> senator rubio. >> thank you, thank you, all, for being here. i also echo the same words everyone else shared with you about the esteem we have for all of our agencies and the important work they do. i think this already has been touched upon. i do believe that russia, vladimir putin in particular, his efforts around the world are very important. the biggest issue of my view is china and the risk they pose. i'm not sure in the 240 some odd year history of this nation we ever faced a competitor and potential adversary of this scale, scope and capacity. it is my personal view and shared by many people that they are carrying out a well orchestrated, well executed, very patient long-term strategy to replace the united states as

the most powerful and influential nation on earth. you see that reflected in this repeated use of the term community of common destiny which means a retreat from western values of democracy and freedom and openness towards some other model that benefits them and their pursuit of this appears to be every element of their national power, military, commercial, trade, economics, information and media, the tools they use are everything from hacking and to companies and critical infrastructure and defense contractors, everybody you can imagine to using our immigration system against us, to even our universities and that's where i wanted to begin this week. let me ask this, i start this with director coats. is it your view that the united states today as a government is prepared for the scale, scope and magnitude of the challenge presented by this plan that china is carrying out? >> we have full awareness of what the chinese are attempting, they have full awareness of what the chinese are attempting to do on a global basis. there is no question that what

you have just articulated is what is happening with china. they're doing it in a very smart way. they're doing it in a very effective way. they're looking beyond their own region. i think they have -- it is clear that they have a long-term strategic objective to become a world power. and they are executing throughout the whole of government ways in which they can accomplish that. we have intensive studies going on throughout the intelligence community relative to a to z on what china is doing. general mattis asked us for that. others asked us to provide that. senator warner called me last week. we had a discussion on that. i assured him that we are pulling all of our elements of intelligence gathering together to provide a very, very deep dive into what china's plant is doing now and what their plans

are for the future and how it would impact on the united states. >> just to highlight the different ways and traditional ways in which they're pursuing this plan, let me ask you, what in your view could you say in the setting is the counterintelligence risk posed to u.s. national security from that those in advanced programs in sciences and mathematics. >> i think in this setting i would just say that the use of nontraditional collectors, especially in the academic setting, whether it is professors, scientists, students, we see in almost every -- in almost every field office that the fbi has around the country, it is not just in major cities, in small ones as well in cross -- across every discipline. and i think the level of naivete on the part of the academic sector about this creates its own issues. they're exploiting the very open

research and development environment that we have, which we all revere. but they're taking advantage of it, so one thing we're trying to do is view the china threat as not just a whole of government threat, but a whole of society threat on their end and i think it will take a whole of society response by us. it is not just the intelligence community, but it is raising awareness within our academic sector, within our private sector as part of the defense. >> in that vain, last week i wrote a letter to five higher education institutions in florida about the confucius institutes, funded by china, chinese government dollars at u.s. schools and it is my view they're complicit in these efforts to covertly influence public opinion and to teach half truths designed to present chinese history, government or official policy in the most favorable light. do you share concerns about confucius institutes as a tool of that whole of society effort and as a way to exploit the sort of naive view among some in the academic circles about what the purpose of these institutes

could be? >> we do share concerns about the confusicius institutes. we have been watching that development for a while. it is one of many tools that they take advantage of. we have seen some decrease recently in their own enthusiasm and commitment to that particular program but it is something that we're watching warily and in certain instances have developed appropriate investigative steps. >> thank you, mr. chairman. vice chairman warner highlighted in his opening statement the importance of an effective security clearance process. so i've got a question for you, director wray. was the fbi aware of allegations related to rob porter and domestic abuse? and if so, was the white house informed this could affect his security clearance? when were they informed? and who at the white house was

informed? >> well, senator, there is a limit to what i can say about the content of any particular background investigation for a variety of reasons that i'm sure you can appreciate. i would say that the background investigation process involves a fairly elaborate set of standards, guidelines, protocols, agreements, et cetera, in place for 20 plus years. and i'm quite confident that in this particular instance the fbi followed the established protocols. >> so was the white house informed that this could affect his security clearance? that's a yes or no? >> i can't get into the content of what was briefed -- >> were they informed? >> what i can tell you is that the fbi submitted a partial report on the investigation in question in march, and then a completed background

investigation in late july that is soon there after we received requests for follow-up inquiry and we did the follow-up and provided that information in november. and then we administratively closed the file in january. and then earlier this month we received some additional information and we passed that on as well. >> okay. let me turn now to the two recent arbitrary and inconsistent decisions. the first was the public release of the nunes memo. the second involved the report that the congress required on russian oligarchs, the relationship with president putin, and indications of corruption. in that case, the secretary of the treasury released nothing other than a list of rich

russians taken from public sources. me question and any of you can respond, did any of you take a position on either of these two arbitrary classification decisions and did any of you have any communications with the white house about either of those classification matters? >> i'll start and the answer is no. >> no. >> i raised concerns on this issue with the dni. >> no. >> the cia was not asked to review the classification of those documents. >> not on the second. the oligarch treasury document, we did have interaction about the memo from chairman nunes. >> is there anything you can say

that protects sources and methods in an open session with respect to that matter? >> well, i would just say that -- as we said publicly, that we had grave concerns about that memo's release. >> okay. on incontraceptiencryption, i s ask about this, you have essentially indicated that companies should be making their products with back doors in order to allow you all to do your job and we all want you to protect americans and at the same time sometimes there is these policies that make us less safe, and give up our liberties. that's what i think we get with what you all are advocating, which is weak encryption.

this is a pretty technical area, there is a field known as cryptography. i don't claim to be an expert on it. but i think there is a clear consensus among experts in the field against your position to weaken strong encryption. i have asked you for a list of the experts that you have consulted. i haven't been able to get it, can you give me a date this afternoon when you give me -- this morning, a sense of when we will be told who are these people, who are advising you, to pursue this route because i don't know of anybody respected in the field who is advising that it is a good idea to adopt your position to weaken strong encryption. can i get that list? >> we would be happy to talk more about this topic this afternoon. my position is not that we should weaken encryption. my position is that we should be working together, government and the private sector, to try to find a solution that balances

both concerns. >> i'm on the program for working together. i just think we need to be driven by objective facts and the position you all are taking is out of sync with what all of the experts in the field are saying and i would just like to know who you all are consulting with and we'll talk more about it this afternoon. thank you, mr. chairman. >> senator collins. >> thank you, mr. chairman. director pompeo, last week the new york times published -- >> we have been watching this hearing, a senate intelligence committee hearing covering a wide range of subjects from russian interference in legislations to cyberattacks to north korea. there was just some significant news made by fbi director christopher wray on the timeline of events and the security clearance of rob porter. that is the key white house staffer who was just fired or resigned depending who you

listen to and when after allegations of domestic abuse went public. i use the words went public because now it seems nearly certain that the white house knew much of it a long time ago. listen to what the fbi director said about the security clearance process on rob porter. >> so was the white house informed that this could affect his security clearance? that's a yes or no. >> i can't get into the content of what was briefed to the -- >> were they informed? >> what i can tell you is that the fbi submitted a partial report on the investigation in question in march, and then a completed background investigation in late july, that soon thereafter we received requests for follow-up inquiry, and we did the follow-up and

provided that information in november. and then we administratively closed the file in january. and then earlier this month we received some additional information and we passed that on as well. >> okay. >> all right. just to review, they were told something in march, they were told more in july, more in november, the case was closed in january, some additional information this month as well. so began to be told of rob porter's situation as far back as march of 2017. i'm joined now by former chairman of the intelligence committee mike rogers, cnn analyst josh campbell who worked for the fbi, phil mudd and karen demerjen. the white house was given partial information in march, the full report in july, follow-up in november, closed in january, more information in february. they seemed to have known at least something for a long, long time here, josh. >> right. remember what we learned

yesterday at the white house briefing and this was something pointed out by very smart reporters here at cnn that keyed in on that word extent when the white house said they learned of the full extent of the investigation last week. which, again, i'm not a lawyer, it sounds like splitting hairs, if you look at what the director said. there was a partial report, provided, starting in march, so it seems to be at odds with this notion that the white house knew nothing until recently. >> phil mudd, you heard the fbi director say that, he obviously came prepared with that timeline because he knew he would face questions and he knows the white house was in a way criticizing the process here. the fbi director phil mudd saying, look, we have been telling you something for a long time here. >> that's right. couple of things going on here in chairman rogers might want to weigh in. first, he was prepared for this and i think he did the right thing first, he tried to say we can't give you a yes or no answer. i'll give you a timeline that shows we followed policy and procedure. he didn't offer anything on what that information they passed said. i think i agree with josh who

can read between the lines what he's saying is in essence in what i took away is they knew at some point but he's not giving up information on the nature of the interaction with the white house. i will say i thought the question was completely inappropriate. there is a place for that question. obviously is a significant issue in america. but when you're discussing worldwide threats related to north korea, russia, china, to ask that the fbi director to participate in political shots at the white house, i thought it was out of place. >> mike rogers, the timeline, what did you see? >> i'll agree with phil here, real quickly, this was a -- this was really significant in another way. we actually pivoted to talk about china and what they're doing and not only in telecommunications with cybertargeting the united states. this is an important pivot for this worldwide hearing as well as what russia is doing and so that's really important. as far as the timeline was, what i just heard the fbi director say is by july it was done, meaning that all of those police

reports that would have indicated abuse or allegations of abuse by the women and there were so many of them were already in the file, which is likely why the fbi said this person does not deserve a clearance. they saw that. and then whatever they wanted to talk about later in november came in november. but it tells me that most of that investigation was done by july. >> which is extraordinary because it is now february, the year after. and remember, the two former wives, they were interviewed by the fbi, we believe, in january of 2017. so a full year ago. so they both say they told the fbi pretty much everything they have been telling the public the last few days, so the fbi was told about domestic abuse then. a partial report in march, one would assume that the fbi included that at least in the partial report, that seems to be why you would give a partial report. add to that the white house has

known this for a while. and even after they knew all of this, even after they saw the photo of colbie holderness with a black eye, this new information on top of it all, they arranged an off the record briefing so rob porter can tell his story to reporters. it is really extraordinary. >> right. and having the fbi director say in open forum and i understand the criticism of the question, but that's congressional hearings, having the fbi -- the director say in open forum that laying out this timeline, you assume that that information given that's so central to what we have been talking about for the last week would have been in that report to an extent. but the important thing he didn't mention is who at the white house, these interactions were with. who were the people that were getting briefings and how far up the chain it went, and right now in terms of adjudicating what the management -- the management jumpble is at the white house, that's kind of the central political issue right now for determining who is responsible, who stays and goes, and, you

know, what may change at the white house as a result of this. he's not the only person to have not secured final security clearance and be in a position where he's actually touching or viewing sensitive information on a daily basis. >> maybe dozens now. rapid fire, one more cleanup on this subject. josh, am i wrong to think given the fact the interviews with the former wives was last january, partial report in march likely would have included some information about that? >> yeah, could be expected. but, again, the fbi doesn't work on a timeline as they gather information, they provide it. i suspect that's what happened here. >> all right. the main subject of this hearing as we have been talking about, worldwide threats. stark, stark comments from the people including the director of national intelligence, dan coats. phil mudd, the dni flat out said that you could expect russia will meddle in the 2018 election. >> that was stark. i thought there were a few moments in here, a subtle hearing but a few moments that are important for americans. that's number one. not only uniformity in acceptance about what happened

in the last election, but uniformity in the view it will happen at the same level the next election. i thought significant, john, the judgment across america that the american security apparatus, people like the fbi and cia, should be participating with social media to keep bad stuff off the internet. i don't disagree with that. i think it is remarkable that people shifted to say american spy agencies should be helping americans not read bad stuff on the internet. unbelievable. >> chairman rogers, the floor for 30 seconds. wrap it up. >> first of all, russia has been engaged in political shenanigans since the 1960s. they're just a lot better at it now because they have a new platform in social media where they reach into your house. that was very significant today. it is not just going to happen, it is still happening around the world here in the united states going into 2018 and we are not ready for this problem. we don't have a whole government approach for this. second piece of this, watch what they're talking about on china. the 5g buildouts coming to

america, the chinese want to do it, that's the fight they're talking about in this open hearing. my thanks to all of you, a very busy day with all this breaking news. that is all for me. i'm john berman. "at this hour" picks up right now. this is cnn breaking news. >> hi there. i'm briae brianna keilar in fo bolduan. we're hearing from the representatives of the entire intelligence community at a key time, talking about russian meddling, talking about the timeline for the fbi and informing the white house when it comes to a top aide, rob porter, who was just resigned or pushed out depending certainly on who is characterizing what happened