hello and welcome to unspun world. why is israel's government deliberately flouting the wishes of its leading ally, the united states? perhaps it goes to show what netanyahu is willing to do for his own political survival. this is definitely kind of bringing israel towards a more isolationist stance. what's the extent of china's infiltration of western countries? whether it's in the uk or in other countries — we've seen them in the us, we've seen them in australia, there's a canadian parliamentary inquiry — there's something going on there. and why is a law on foreign agents in georgia causing mass demonstrations? they see it as a pivot in - the country's foreign policy. it is quite black and white. you know, it's - either eu or russia.

top american leaders often have problems with israel, which depends heavily on american support... gunfire ..but doesn't necessarily do what the us wants. usually, though, american officials keep quiet about it. not so the us deputy secretary of state, kurt campbell. he said publicly the other day israel's leaders mostly talk about the idea of a sweeping victory on the battlefield, but the biden administration didn't believe such a thing was possible. neither do many other observers. so why is israel pursuing the idea, and why is benjamin netanyahu so willing to ignore what the us wants? i put these questions to shaina oppenheimer, a journalist with bbc monitoring injerusalem. first and foremost, he has some

very far—right coalition partners who have been very hawkish and very clear with him that they want to see the government do certain things, for example, for it to press ahead with a full—scale invasion of rafah. and they would also like to see what they would describe as a total victory image in gaza, a total defeat of hamas. it is very paramount to the existence of his very fragile government and coalition. so he has to kind of manoeuvre and balance the pressure of that and israel's relationship with the us, which is certainly at what seems to be a historic low. but it is an incredibly risky strategy, isn't it? perhaps it goes to show what netanyahu is willing to do for his own political survival. not only does he want his government to stay in power, but it's important to remember that he's also facing three different charges and

trials of corruption. so it would be very crucial for him to stay in power in a bid to perhaps avoid being charged or avoid serving prison time. and, you know, turkey has already moved to stop trade relations with israel. there are moves now we see from the international community perhaps to recognise a palestinian state. so this is definitely kind of bringing israel towards a more isolationist stance. and in a certain way that almost works for netanyahu, depending on how you see it, in the sense that his base certainly thinks that only he is capable of ruling israel, only he would have the courage to say that israel will stand alone in this war if it has to. i find it difficult to know who the real mr netanyahu is. are these things that he really wants to be doing, or is he forced to do it by the circumstances he finds himself in? i think he's certainly

intelligent enough to know the direction he's pulling israel towards. um, it'sjust a question of, has he isolated himself so much and been so consumed by his own political survival that he can't see past that? or he has just actively chosen not to care and put himself first? and a lot of people would say that he has chosen himself over the country. and of course, there's the whole issue of what he did, what he said, what he knew before the 7th of october attacks by hamas and the investigation that will take place, and how he deals with that, how he, uh, escapes the blame for that. the head of the army's intelligence resigned in april, i believe, because of this. and even just this week, as israel marks memorial day, we saw the army chief come out, he took some responsibility for some of the army

failures of october 7th. netanyahu still hasn't done that. and i think it's very much something that he's aware that the pressure to answer these questions will only increase, when and however the war ends. and that's perhaps another motivating factor to kind of prolong this war. how do you feel this is going to end? i mean, is it going to be kind of an untidy business where the israeli army pulls out of parts of gaza but keeps, stays in some, and there's no kind of clear—cut solution? it's very clear that the israeli army and israel doesn't have some kind of long—term plan for gaza in terms of who could potentially rule it, who could potentially administer it. but if you look at what's happening on the ground already, the israeli army is going back into places like jabalia in northern gaza, where it had previously said that they had completed their operations there.

so the second the army may pull out, hamas might regroup. hamas, at the end of the day, it's an idea. you can't fully destroy that. and then you have the other aspect, which is some of the international diplomatic efforts to perhaps use this situation to say we need a long—term solution. there must be some kind of future palestinian state. and then there's a lot of questions that arise of who would run that palestinian state. israel and netanyahu will be looking for some kind of victory image. and what that image will be, perhaps could be at the end of some kind of rafah invasion, which could have a very serious cost for israel in terms of its international ties and standings and, critically, its relationship with the us. the ruling chinese communist party is habitually thin—skinned about criticism, either from inside the country or from the chinese diaspora around the world,

and there have been accusations from a variety of countries, from canada and the us to britain and australia, that chinese security is spying on or actively trying to control dissidents. the other day, three men appeared in court in london, charged with spying on dissidents from hong kong. so what's china up to? gordon corera, the bbc security correspondent, has just started a podcast called shadow war: china and the west. i think it's remarkable at the moment that there are so many cases involving china spying, interference, whether it's in the uk or in other countries. we've seen them in the us, we've seen them in australia. there's a canadian parliamentary inquiry. there's something going on there, i think, in terms of an increased understanding of the kind of activity china undertakes, and it comes for a lot of reasons, one of which is it's a more contested world that we're

living in right now, in which power is being contested, in which the different sides are, if you like, grappling and using spies, for all those kind of things that spies do, whether it's espionage or interference, to try and secure advantage in the world. are western countries doing exactly what the chinese are doing? there's no doubt the west spies wholescale on china, and has done for many years. they've done that through intelligence gathering, through human spies, but also through what's called signals intelligence — gchq, nsa collecting data and sucking up information, intercepting signals. that, if you like, is regular spying. i think what's interesting at the moment is the claim is that china is doing something slightly broader, rather thanjust, if you like, intelligence gathering. things like going after dissidents, critics of china who are in the west. so whether those might be people related to hong kong or tibet, it might be chinese dissidents who'd been involved in tiananmen square who've come

to the west, and that these people, china is going after in a more aggressive way, often using its intelligence services. also, political interference. there are claims of this in various elections, trying to shape political debate or push who might be able to stand for office. i came across one case which was actually in the us more than the uk, but of a guy called yan xiong who'd been one of the tiananmen square student leaders. he'd escaped, um, this undercover operation called operation yellowbird, into the us, and had lived for 30 years in the us, but then had decided he wanted to run for congress and wanted to see if he could get selected. and that clearly was unacceptable to the chinese authorities, it seems. that's the allegation, at least, because the fbi say they intercepted phone calls from someone in china, hiring or asking a private investigator in the us to go after him, to spy on him, to surveil him, even if necessary to smear him or stage an accident. all because they felt

it was unacceptable to have someone who was associated with tiananmen square to be even possibly elected to congress. but i think a lot of it comes down to what the particular sensitivities are of the communist party of china, and their first priority is domestic security and stability, and the hold of the communist party at home. is it, do you think, um, because culture and language are so different between china and the west that we don't see nearly as much of the kind of things that the russians do in quite large amounts? russia has tried to interfere in elections in the us, famously 2016. it tends to want to just kind of sow division, whereas i think china is a bit more trying to direct debate and influence debate about what is said and what's not said, rather than just sow division and cause difficulties. does it really matter very much?

if china is going after dissidents, trying to challenge free speech, that matters, i think, for issues of values, notjust, you know, within western countries. and i think that potentially poses a real challenge for, um, some of the ways we think our societies should operate. and for the first time, we're starting to see some of that friction points. i think it poses challenges internationally, because i think there's a contest between china and the west over influence globally. and i think it matters because there are still risks of conflict. i mean, there are risks of conflict over taiwan, over accidental escalation in the south china seas. so how far the two sides understand each other really does matter. with a meeting between xijinping and vladimir putin, is there any question, do you think, that they might kind of co—ordinate their efforts? or is that a nightmare that we don't need to worry ourselves with? they've both found themselves at a moment of increased tension with the west together. and i think for that reason, tactically and opportunistically, they are more inclined

to work together. i think if you're china, if the west's ability to support ukraine fails and russia wins, then i think it does damage to the western alliance structure, the confidence of the west, which may then encourage china to think it can do something in taiwan. there's not huge military cooperation going from china to russia, but there's a bit of support. and i think, you know, the worry from the west is that that could increase and that tensions could grow and that you could be faced with something more like a kind of bloc, you know, in which you've got kind of china and russia working together, and perhaps even iran as well, as part of that mix. and i think there's the potential for that kind of access to become more kind of, more dominant and more dangerous, i think in western eyes, certainly. to the caucasus now. georgia is a former soviet state which, with its christian tradition and its links with the outside world,

has long had an ambition tojoin the european union. but its current government, run by a party called georgian dream, has links with russia. a law which aims to cut foreign influence in georgia was withdrawn last year after big demonstrations, but it's returned now. the new demonstrations have been met with renewed force by the georgian authorities. the law would require organisations which receive more than a fifth of their funding from abroad to register as agents under foreign influence. it's very similar to a russian law which has been remarkably successful in silencing hostile journalists and human rights activists. i spoke to the bbc�*s caucasus correspondent, rayhan demytrie,

who's in tbilisi. it's about the funding that nongovernmental organisations get. the bill would require them to label themselves as an organisation that represents foreign power. the problem is that in georgia there are thousands of nongovernmental organisations and they are what the democracy in this country is built on. we're talking about notjust nongovernmental organisations, but also independent media. and what does georgian dream, the government party, what's its attitude towards the eu? is it in favour ofjoining or is this a way of preventing georgia from joining? well, john, eversince the georgian dream came to power — and that is 2012 — the party then was led by a billionaire, bidzina ivanishvili, who made his fortune in russia. and when he came to power, a lot of people were saying,

"oh, now the georgia will change its course "towards russia," because he, perhaps as someone who made his wealth in russia, represents russian interests. and the georgian dream and bidzina ivanishvili himself, they were denying it. he made a speech not long time ago, when the government organised its own rally in support of the bill, and it was the first time that the public heard kind of a political speech from bidzina ivanishvili in many years. and the comments after this speech were that the masks are off and he hasjust shown his realface. the speech was full of kind of conspiracy theories and it was full of anti—western messaging. he claimed that georgia's 2003 rose revolution was planned by some western powers, that they were the ones behind wars in georgia in 2008 and war in ukraine right now.

and what's his line about the eu specifically? for years, the georgian dream government has been saying that they are aligned with this big wish that this country has, which isjoining the european union. it is even written in the constitution of georgia. so, the government says that they are pro—european. they're very, very friendly with viktor orban in hungary and that is perhaps the model that they have chosen. conservative, nationalistic georgia that still wants to become a member of the european union, but under its own terms. and the demonstrations that we've been seeing, do you think they'll die down now or will things continue to bubble along and then perhaps rise up again? i don't think these demonstrations will die down. and we've been talking to so many people over these past weeks. they're mainly young

generation. these are gen z of georgia, and they were brought up with the idea that their country would one day join the eu. so what's happening now, they see it as a pivot in the country's foreign policy and they keep telling us that never, ever back to ussr. and that's how they see it. you know, it is quite black and white. you know, it's either eu or russia. do you think that the georgian dream is kind of fixed in power? will it win another election? partly what we have been witnessing in the past weeks here in georgia, it is about the upcoming general elections here in georgia in october 202a. critics and commentators are saying that the reason why georgian dream is trying to push for this legislation, perhaps, yes, it's not because they want to turn away from the eu.

they want to eliminate this threat, as they see, that is coming from nongovernmental organisations orfrom independent and critical media. therefore, they are pushing for this law, perhaps to ensure another victory for themselves. cuba's economy has depended heavily on the sugar industry for several hundred years. it's been an important part of cuba's national life, and the people who work in the cane fields have a particular status. but now, the unthinkable is happening. the sugar industry is so uneconomic and badly run that cuba has had to import sugar to meet its demands. it's emblematic of the long decline of the quasi—communist system introduced by fidel castro. will grant, the bbc�*s

central america correspondent, told me more. sugar, to cuba, is a staple and has been to its economy for so, so long, you know, since colonial times and before. so to lose that industry or to see its demise to this point is, you know, is tragic for many cubans. the numbers speak for themselves, that we see an industry that only produced somewhere in the region of 350,000 tonnes of raw sugar last year. well, that's up against 1.3 million tonnes in 2019, so the drop—off has been dramatic. and, of course, the government is starting to cut down on the very, very heavy subsidies that are paid to keep things like petrol prices down. of course, it's just one more thing amid spiralling inflation, amid extreme scarcity of basic goods, amid the sort of rising cost of living and the fact that salaries aren't getting. . . have really no purchasing power any more.

it's just one more thing that's hurting cubans in their pockets, and it is extremely painful at the moment, because this is as hard as it's been for cuba since the fall of the berlin wall. i remember that time, i was in cuba shortly after the fall of the berlin wall. so, we're talking 1990 that the props were pulled away from underneath the communist economy and it's still going on, what is that, 35 years later? exactly. and, of course, one of the things that was pulled away, one of those props was the sugar quotas to the soviet union, you know, so that was a very, very difficult period. it's known as the special period, euphemistically, about how hard things became, rolling blackouts, again scarcity, really difficult times. well, i know cubans who went through that period and are going through this one and they say this one is worse, mainly because hugo chavez and venezuela's oil wealth came in at the end of the �*90s and sort of re—propped up

the cu ban revolution. as they look at the sort of international perspective at the moment, they can't see anywhere that a similar kind of support network is going to come from. what do people in cuba think might be the answer? i mean, when they look out at the outside world, there are plenty of ex—communist countries, as well as communist countries, that aren't doing too badly. are they aware of those parallels? i think they feel kind of hard done by in certain things that were beyond their control, and they do appreciate they're potentially beyond the control of the cuban government, too. and that one of backing the horse of tourism to be the economic motor for the future of the island, only to be hit with the covid downturn and the lack of international travel, i think people appreciate that that's going to take some time to recover from, particularly when, of course, that was also the period that the trump administration and subsequently the biden administration tightened the sanctions on the island at the same time.

that has been very, very difficult. but they look, as you say, at the outside world, and they wonder. they can't see anything getting better with washington and they look at somewhere like vietnam and they wonder quite why they can't replicate that model where there's more, much more economic freedom, economic liberalisation in exchange, as it were, for the political control remaining broadly the same. there is some version of that, perhaps some cuban version of that that might provide a road map out of this economic malaise. but as everything, as you well know, in cuba, the pace of change is glacial. it is such a tragedy, isn't it? i mean, we don't always, i think, appreciate what a lovely country it is and what intensely cultured and clever and charming people. and yet their system, their governmental system can't get it together and never really has been able to.

i mean, cuba, the things that it's offered notjust to latin america but to the world is stunning. you know, as you mentioned, its ballet and its cultural offerings, its music. you know, its people are incredible and their resilience in the face of what they have to put up with, you know, it's quite something. one of the leading economists, if not the leading economist on the island, told me that cuban sugar only receives 3% of government investment, so you simply cannot keep one of the landmark industries going, one of the most iconic industries to the island going if you're only going to give it 3% of investment. and, you know, there's a famous saying on the island that without sugar, there's no country. and unfortunately, that is now being tested to its absolute limits. will grant, speaking from mexico city. ukraine's armed forces are paying a heavy price for the delay imposed by right—wing republicans in the us congress over the $61 billion arms package

which the biden administration wanted to send to kyiv. the package has gone through, but the months of delay have put ukraine thoroughly on the back foot in the war. russian forces have been capturing village after village in the kharkiv region, where the ukrainian army did so well in the early part of the war. those days, when the russian defence minister, sergei shoigu, was in overall charge were disastrous for russia's army. it's taken until now for vladimir putin to push sergei shoigu aside and, probably as a reward for his loyalty, mr shoigu doesn't actually seem to have been demoted. but in his place has come not a military man, but an economics adviser, andrei belousov. at a time when the ukraine war is eating up 7% of russia's gdp, president putin clearly thinks he needs a clever financial brain, rather

than a military one, to oversee the war. in the 1980s, the soviet union's defence spending was onlyjust a little bit higher than russia's is today — 7.4% of gdp. since that's what most analysts believe is what brought the soviet union down, russia needs to make sure it doesn't lose economic control of the ukraine war. and that, in turn, seems to argue that the kremlin now thinks the war could last a long, long time. well, that's it from this edition of unspun world. from the unspun team and from me, until we meet again, goodbye.

hello, thanks forjoining me. fairly quiet on the weather front across most of the uk right now. the storms have also cleared from southwestern england as well as wales. this is what we had during saturday — flash floods in places. how about the weather on sunday? it's actually not looking bad at all for most of us. a lot of bright, if not sunny weather on the way. however, some coastal areas, particularly around the north sea, could be grey and chilly. so this is how we start the day. inland and out towards the west, the weather's looking fine and sunny right from the word go. but these eastern counties, or here, it may take time for that sunshine to break through that layer of gray or that stratus and sea fog that will have rolled in overnight. so the afternoon looking pretty sunny across most of the uk, again, with the exception of some coastal areas. could be some showers across southwestern parts of scotland, maybe the southwest of england. inland 22 or 23 celsius in that strong sunshine. but where the low, grey clouds stick around

anywhere along the north sea coast, but particularly the further north you are, it will be chilly, maybe no higher than around 12 degrees. we have that on saturday. could happen again on sunday. so through the course of the evening, you can see that low grey cloud. once again it's going to roll inland out towards the west, it's going to stay generally clear. now, here's monday. cloudy skies out towards the east, but then the sun comes out and it's a repeat performance. a fine day on the way. again, temperatures in the low 20s inland, closer to the coast closer to around the mid—teens. now, on tuesday, subtle changes. showers will appear in different areas. we could see some forming across scotland, northern ireland, the lake district as well. but i think the further south you are, the better the weather will be. temperatures won't really change an awful lot. in fact, overall, the first half of the week for most of us isn't looking too bad. but, as we head through wednesday and thursday, this low pressure sweeps in out of the east this time. it'll bring quite breezy weather

and also a spell of persistent rain, and at times it will be heavy. so a change on the way second half of the week, and that's reflected in the forecast here. not really bad at all until around about tuesday, bar a few showers here and there. but then wednesday, thursday and friday, it's all change and it's hello low. bye— bye.

live from washington, this is bbc news israeli police break up anti—government protests in tel aviv, as its military recovers the body of another hostage in gaza. president zelensky says ukraine only has about a quarter of the air defences needed to fend off russian attacks, warning moscow could increase strikes following recent

gains near kharkiv. plus: the president of georgia vetoes a controversial new law on foreign funding that's sparked weeks of protests. hello. i'm helena humphrey. glad you could join me. we begin in the middle east, where thousands of protesters have gathered in israel amid anger over prime minister benjamin netanyahu's failure to secure the release of hostages still being held in gaza. these are the scenes in tel aviv. police have arrested some demonstrators and used water cannon to disperse two rallies, which had merged. in the latest development, the israel defence forces say that they recovered the body of another hostage, identified as ron binyamin. in the latest sign of divisions within mr netanyahu's war cabinet, benny gantz has threatened to quit the government, unless he agrees to a far—reaching plan for gaza, with a deadline to do so in around three weeks�* time. meanwhile, the united nations

says more than 800,000 people