are happening, and the security incidents are happening, there are hundreds more actually i could talk with you about, but frankly, i don't have time. i hope i painted the picture because i'm baffled. you sent chris stevens to libya and to benghazi, and granted, he never raised the flag and said i want out. and granted, he never said, shut down benghazi, and i understand and appreciate that you deferred to him. but you also, madam secretary, we have no record of you ever talking to him, that you never talked to him personally after may of 2012 when you swore him in as our ambassador. am i wrong? did you ever talk to ambassador stevens when all of this was going on in the hotbed of libya? that is a yes or no question, madam secretary, i'm sorry, did you ever personally speak to

ambassador stevens -- we don't know the answer. did you ever personally speak to him after you swore him? in may? yes or no. >> yes, i believe i did. >> when was that? >> i don't recall, and i want to clarify for the record, this document is about all of libya, and not just benghazi. >> you know, congress woman, i appreciate, and i really do, the passion and the intensity of your feelings about this. we have diplomatic facilities in war zones. we have am bass stores dors that we send to places that have been bombed and attacked all the time. >> and you're their boss. >> you're right, i am. >> you're their leader, is that correct? and are there ever situations where you call them, where you bring them in, where you are personally caring and concerned

and are letting them know that? are there situations where you recall, and i would like to know the situation with ambassador stevens, and what month it was with ambassador stevens because there are no call logs with him. and we have no record that you had any conversation was the ambassador after you swore him in, and before he died. and you were his boss. >> i was the boss of ambassadors in 270 countries. i was the boss of ambassadors in places like afghanistan, where shortly before i visited one time, the embassy had been under brutal assault by the taliban for hours. i'm very well aware of the dangers that are faced by our diplomats and our development professionals. there was never a recommendation from chris stevens or anyone else to close

benghazi. now, sitting here, in the comfort of this large, beautiful hearing room, it's easy to say, well, there should have been. somebody should have stood up and said, do that. but that was not the case. and it is a very difficult choice, with respect to any of these facilities, given the level of threat and instability that we confront around the world today. and it's deeply, deeply distressing when any of our facilities or personnel are in danger, and we do and have done the best we can, and i think we can do better, which is why i implemented all of the recommendations which we have barely talked about. and those were essential in trying to improve and better

position and prepare and respond. and that's what we tried to do. and, you know, i find it deeply saddening, because obviously, everyone, everyone who knew him, everyone who worked with him, including libyans, as i said at the very beginning, would have given anything to prevent this from happening. our security professionals usually, in fact more than 99 plus percent of the time get it right. >> and madam secretary, we would have given anything to have you talk to him in july, he would have told you that he asked to keep the security in libya that he had, and he was told no by your state department. we didn't give him everything. thank you, i yield back. >> answer the question if she would like to? >> it's the answer i've been

giving all day. chris stevens had the opportunity to reach me any time he thought there was something of importance. the people with whom he worked and the people around him and with him, they very well understood the dangers that this were confronting, and they did the best they could under the circumstances, and many of the security requests that i just detailed were agreed to, and others weren't. >> the gentle lady from california. >> madam chairman, i want to thank you for your patience, and it has been a long day. i want to begin by apologizing for my republican colleagues who either want to either write your answers for you or testify for you, because i think it fits in better with their outlandish narratives of what happened. and since they insist on criticizing you for not doing anything right, i want to talk to you more about a line of

questioning that we pursued in the first line of questioning. i asked you about what you were doing in the night of the attacks in benghazi. you said previously you had spoken with the white house that evening, and the cia, and the defense department and the state department, and you also spoke directly with people on the ground at the embassy in tripoli at 7:00 p.m. and i can tell from the documents that you spoke with the deputy in tripoli. and can you explain the importance of that call and why you felt that was important? >> well, for a number of reasons, they were a source of information. they had their own sources on the ground that they were reaching out to, trying to gather additional insight into what happened. and what provoked it, and who was behind it. but much more importantly, even than that, they were in a great state of dismay and grief.

and i thought it was important to speak with our team in tripoli directly, so they knew we were trying, as best we could from so far away to help them, and to help their colleagues. we also had pushed to have an additional team of security officers fly from tripoli, and really the embassy in tripoli just took that on, and they came up with the idea and put it together. and got the plane, and sent more help on the way to benghazi. but it was a very personal conversation between me and those who were in our embassy. this is a place that i had spent a lot of time and paid a lot of attention to. as i said earlier, we had to evacuate the embassy before al

gadhafi was still in power, and i spoke to those people on the embassy family, as they were on the ferry going back from tripoli to malta. so we tried to engage and support our teams when they were facing these very difficult circumstances. >> now, this committee has interviewed your staff that was with you that evening, the chief of staff, sheryl mills, and your deputy chief of staff, sullivan, and they explained that you participated in a secure video teleconference with officials from the community and the white house department of defense, and they told the committee that your attendance at the deputy's level meeting broke with protocol and surprised other attendees, but you simply said, "these are our people on the ground, and where else would i be?" why did you think that it was important for you to participate personally in that

deputy committee meeting? >> the people who were on that sivits, were part of the operational decision making, and i wanted to know firsthand from them, what they were trying to do to help us, particularly dod. and the intelligence committee, because at that time as i recall, the cia annex had not come under attack, and we were trying to get all americans out of benghazi and trying to provide planes for evacuation, so there was a lot of detail that was being worked out and i wanted to be as hands on as i could be. to know, number one, what all of the other agencies were doing to help us, and what we could do to try to assist them in their efforts to get to benghazi and do whatever was possible.

>> were ther participants surprised by your visit? >> apparently, they were, because they weren't expecting me to walk into the room and sit down at the table. >> do you think that your appearance at that teleconference appeared to them how seriously you were taking the attacks. >> i'm sure that it good, congresswoman, but we had been reaching out and sounding the alarm for several hours, and we were getting a very positive response from everyone. >> the defense department. >> yes, the defense department. the cia, obviously the white house was deeply involved in reaching out and coordinating with us. so we knew people were trying to help. there was never ever any doubt about that. i just wanted to hear firsthand about their assessment of what they could do. could anybody get there in time?

how were we going to evacuate the americans? and we were also still unsure of where our ambassador was. which made all of this incredibly difficult for everybody in the state department. we didn't know where he was. and we didn't know whether he was alive. and it was shortly after that in the evening when we found out he was not. >> your chief of staff also explained to this committee that you were concerned the night of the attacks, not only for the safety of your team in benghazi, but also the teams in tripoli and elsewhere. she said this about you. she was very concerned. and very determined that whatever needed to be done was done, and she was worried. worried not only about our team on the ground in benghazi, but worried about our teams that were on the ground in libya and a number of places, given what we had seen unfold in egypt. can you explain the context of the evening, and why you were concerned, not just about what

was happening in benghazi, but the risk that americans were at elsewhere? >> well, that's exactly right. i was quite concerned when tripoli, because we didn't know if there would be coordinated attacks. we were still trying to gather information about who was behind what happened in benghazi. in the course of conversations with our team on the ground in tripoli, we began to explore whether they should move from where they were in the place that was operating as our embassy at the time to a more secure location. there were lots of concerns about what to do to keep our team in tripoli safe. as i testified earlier, we were very concerned about the impact of the video sparking unrest attacks, violence in a wide swath of countries, and it turned out that that was well founded concern as we saw the

attacks and protests across the region all the way to india and indonesia. so there was a lot of effort being put into not only doing the immediate tasks before us in benghazi, and doing whatever we needed to to keep our people in tripoli safe, but beginning to talk through and prepare for what might happen elsewhere. >> we're going to switch the line of questioning for just a second. and i have a couple of minutes left. following the attacks on benghazi, but before the accountability review board completed it's work, you did a number of things to evaluate and improve security at overseas posts. and this is even before the drb had finished it's investigation and findings and recommendations. i know that you mentioned them multiple times today. but some of my colleagues appear to have amnesia about what you really accomplished. can you tell me about some of

the steps that you took to implement in the state department, even before the arb completed it's work? >> well, although the arb had not completed it's own investigation, clearly in the aftermath of benghazi, we were doing our own evaluation of what had happened, and what we knew about the circumstances and what we needed to do to try to get ahead of any of the other potential problems. one of the decisions that i made and discussed with general dempsey, and secretary panetta was how we could get more assistance from the department of defense, and in particular, we sent out teams to the high threat posts that we have to get evaluations from those on the ground. so that we would have a better idea of where there might be necessary upgrades to security,

that we could immediately try to act upon. so we did begin a conversation with the department of dense, whicof-- dense, which i think tt it's admirable to say, that to seek the american presence beyond the defense department to be responsive to. we had to look at the high post. and take the second layer of those that could become more dangerous going forward. and really begin this process, and as i told congresswoman duckworth, i'm confident that it's still continuing. because we can't get behind the curve in being able to predict where there might be problems in the future. we had a perfect example of that in yemen. we kept the embassy open in

sana under dangerous circumstances for a very long time. and we even moved to a well defended position. thankfully we have not had incidents resulting in american diplomating killed, but it was a constant challenge to us. and there are many other examples, like the one that congressman smith has raised twice, pashour, which is an incredibly dangerous high-threat post. we tried to close as best we could, the relationship between the state and the dod. so wherever dod could help us, they would be prepared to factor that into their planning, and i was very grateful for their responsiveness. >> we're grateful for yours and i yield back. >> we recognize the gentlewomen

from alabama. >> i want to question about the attack, and you wrote in your book, hard choices that you were directing the state department response the night of september 11th, 2012, but you stated that you left your office the night of the attacks, and went to your home in northwest washington because you said you knew the next few days were going to be taxing and you knew the department was going to be looking to you. i want to talk about a few things. do you have a skiff in your home? >> yes, did i. >> and who else was at your home? were you alone. >> i was alone. >> the whole night. >> yes, the whole night. >> i don't know why that's funny. did you have any in-person briefs? i don't find it funny tornado watch. >> i'm sorry, a note of levity at 7:15. >> the reason that it was not

funny, it went well into the night when our folks on the ground were still in danger, so i don't think that it's funny if you were alone the whole night. >> you asked if i had a skiff. i had secure phones, and i had other equipment that kept me in touch with the state department at all times. i did not sleep all night. i was very much focused on what we were doing. >> who was at the office when you left? was sheryl mills, your chief of staff still at the office when you left. >> i don't remember. >> jake sullivan, was he still there. >> yes, they were all there when i left. >> newman? >> when i left, everyone was there. >> -- i can give you a blanket answer. when i left -- >> i'm going to ask specifics was patrick kennedy there? >> i'm sure he was. >> was fill up -- >> i don't know.

>> what about steven mall? >> i'm sure that the core team at the state department was still there. >> pat jones. >> i'm sure she was. >> bill burns and thomas miles? >> i have no specific recollection of any of the names you've given me, because when i left, i knew i would stay in touch, and i do not know how long anybody else stayed at the state department. >> while did you learn that shawn smith had died? >> that was earlier in the evening. >> and what about ambassador stevens. >> before i left. >> and what about the confirmation of his death, before or after his death. >> we knew that, yes. >> what about the recovery of his body, was that before or after you left. >> we got word that we had a

sighting of -- >> confirmation. >> well, i'm trying to tell you what we knew, and how we found out, because it -- it was something that we were trying to determine, and we had mixed signals about what we had learned. and it was our underring, and certainly by the time i left, that he was most likely not alive. but i'm not sure exactly when we were able to confirm that, because it depended upon getting firsthand information libyan contacts. >> where were you when you learned of the second attack? >> i was at home. >> did you go back to the state department when you learned about the second attack or did you stay home. >> i stayed home and i went to the it state department early in the morning.

the cia annex attack, as i recall, was late in the evening, early the next morning. by our time, around 5 a.m. or so in benghazi. >> did you meet with the president that night. >> i talked with the president, i did not meet with him. >> how many times did you talk to the president. >> i talked to the president that evening, that was the only time i talked with him on the 11th, and then i went over to the white house the next morning. >> so do you recall what time you spoke to the president? you said that england, and do you recall specifically while? >> i think it was late in the evening, i don't know exactly when. >> what specifically did you discuss with the president? >> well, i don't usually talk about my discussions with the president, but i can tell that we talked about what happened in the day, and i thanked him for his very strong support because he made it absolutely clear that everyone was supposed to be doing all they

could, particularly dod to assist us wherever possible, and i'm sure that i thanked him for that. >> what did he say to you? >> again, i don't talk about the conversations that i had with the president. we talked about the events of the day, and his determination to do everything that he could to try to help our people in benghazi. >> did you meet with secretary panetta? >> no, i did not. >> did you speak with secretary pan eat? >> the next day. >> not on the 11th? >> no. >> did you talk with general dempsey. >> the next morning i did. >> so you did not meet or talk with him on the 11th. >> congresswoman, it was not necessary, everyone was doing everything that they could think of to do. that's one of the reasons. >> i'm just trying to figure out if you did or not. >> i sat in on the sivits that congresswoman was, i wanted to talk to the operational people,

they were carrying out the orders that they received from the president on down. >> what about petraeus? >> i spoke to petraeus that afternoon. because i knew that we had an agreement with the cia annex, and i spoke with him about an hour after finding out about the attack, and after finding out what was happening in benghazi. >> your surrounding agents were evacuated to tripoli the morning of the 12th. did you talk to the survivors either that night or once they arrived in tripoli? >> we did not speak to them directly. we obviously made arrangements for them to be safely evacuated and then to be transported to a hospital facility that we thought was safe from any potential attacks. >> did you talk to them the next day? >> no. did you talk to them later that week? >> no, i did not.

>> did you talk it them when they got back to the united states? >> i did not talk to them until they had the opportunity to be debriefed and help the intelligence community and help the fbi as they were trying to build their case. >> how would it have harmed the case that they were trying to build for you, secretary of state, just to check in on their wellbeing? >> i did check in on their wellbeing. >> i did personally talk with the people who were taking care of them and transporting them. >> the survivors, when did you talk to the survivors. >> i talked to the survivors when they came back to the united states, and one who was for many months in walter reed on the telephone. >> so panetta and dempsey, you stated that they were the decision makers, but you never spoke with them while your

people were on the ground? >> i'm sorry. >> i want to make sure that this is clear. panetta and dempsey were the decision makers when it came to the response. we have already talked about -- what i'm trying to clarify. they were the decision makers and your people were on the ground, in harm's way, and you never had a conversation with them. >> i did not need to. during the turmoil of that afternoon and into the evening, we knew the president had personally told them both in the oval office that he expected them to do everything they could possibly do. and i knew that they would then turn to those officers responsible for carrying out that order. they were represented on that sivits, that's why i sat in on it. and remember too, congresswoman, we had a lot of other threats coming in. we were still worried about cairo. >> i understand, but you had

your people on the ground that were, attacked. i want to get back to the survivors in the little time i have left. did you talk to the survivors directly at all? at that point, can you tell us when? >> it was kind of a rolling series of conversations when they came back to the state department. i met with and talked with them. as you know, their names have never been made public. and i don't intend to today. >> can you give me a month? >> for some of them, it was less time than that. and for one of them, i did not -- i talked with him on the phone, and i did not get to physically see him until he had been released from the hospital. and that was early in 2013. >> i think, mr. chairman, there are two messages here. i think that the first message is that -- it's the message that you sent to your personnel

the night of the attack that you went home. they all stayed there, and you didn't go back until the next morning, and i think that the second message sent is that you used the fbi's inquiry as an excuse not to check in with your agents who were on the ground, who survived that horrible night just to ask them how they were. i yield back. >> well, if i could respond congresswoman, i think that again is part of a theory that you and your colleagues are attempting to weave. it was made very clear that the fbi wanted a fresh and clean opportunity to speak with the survivors, which i totally understand, and in fact, their investigation has led to the charging of at least one person, and i hope we find all of them and bring them to justice. >> the lady-year-olds back, and the gentleman from washington is recognized.

>> i to the point out that to this point, secretary clinton has testified here longer than she did in previous two testimonies on this subject combined. >> okay, we're watching testimony on capitol hill, the continuing testimony of former secretary of state s. hilliary clinton, about exactly what happened in benghazi, libya. and we're pleased to have with us now, ambassador woolsey, the former director of the cia, serving in the first administration of bill clinton, and he's surge serving with the chairman of democrats. you've been listening to hilliary clinton today. and what in your opinion strikes you as the take away point, and what have we learned? >> clearly, it was a mess in benghazi, and the response was not as fast as one would

reasonably have hoped. there were not aircraft carriers ready to launch on what was taking place, it was not the way you would like to see the u.s. government function in a difficult life-threatening situation like this for an ambassador. and those. having said that though, i think i would say my overall impression is that former secretary of state hilliary clinton is doing a good job in the hearing. she's maintaining a calm demeanor, she doesn't appear to be rattled. some of the questioners have gotten very excited. and television is a hot medium. and you look pretty dumb sometimes when you look real excited. and she has avoided that. and i think that some of the questioners have spent a lot of time on material that doesn't

really matter. for example, she got communications from her old friend, sydney blooming that th. and he was not permitted to work in the administration. he can send a note and say, i think you're messing up and i think that the u.s. government should do this and that. that's in the first amendment, people can petition the government. so there's no reason to spend a lot of time and effort on the fact that sydney blumenthal was communicating with her. >> do you think that the republicans made the point in the comparison with the access that blumenthal had, and what they seem to be suggesting, she wasn't so accessible to her ambassador on the ground? >> i would say to a small point.

secretary of states have 100 ambassadors to deal with, and the fact that she listened to an old friend and got various types of communications through when she was at home, she had the secure telephone, et cetera, those -- i think those are relatively minor points, and i think that the main point is whether or not she's telling the truth. because if it is demon bestable that she's not, she has a battalion taking notes on whether or not she said something that wasn't so. and if she has, she could be at risk in the legal process. i think that it's less likely than not, but not impossible.

>> so one of the points that the committee has made, she was telling her family and the prime minister of egypt one thing about the likely cause, the likely terrorist who fomented this attack, and she was saying something else publicly, simultaneously, even days after, that it was a planned attack by al qaeda or al qaeda affiliates. at the same time publicly. >> you're quite right. >> go ahead, sir. >> you're quite right, there's a discrepancy and an important one, in that the administration's characterization of things, we have concord al qaeda, and al qaeda is not a problem anymore. and if they admit that this was something planned by a terrorist operation, and the

mortar fire particularly makes it look as if it was, they may not be telling the truth to the public when they go to o'the sunday talk shows and emphasize this notion that it's all the result of a random video that's critical of islam. i think that it's true that there may be untruth in that. but politicians and government officials get to shade the truth when they're speaking publicly, unless they're under oath. it's not good that they do that, but they do it quite a bit. the question is, is she -- the legal question is is she lying in any of her discussions before the committee, where she's a sworn witness, or anything elsewhere she's is obligated to tell the truth.

that could be very serious for her if the government decides to pursue t. >> ambassador woolsey, thank you very much for joining us on aljazeera. if you can, please stand by, and we'll have to rejoin the hearing in progress. secretary of state clinton. >> but i do want to pick up on the point you're making, because i do appreciate it very much, congressman. i care very deeply about the people who serve our country. i worked with them and knew them and saw them in action. on my last full day as secretary of state, we were able to hold a ceremony awarding the five diplomatic security agents the highest award for heroism that the state department has to offer, and we did it then so that the fifth man could be there,

because he had been in the hospital for so long, and he was able to be there. i got a chance to meet their families, i got a chance, all at once, not individual, but all together, to thank them and commend them for their heroism. and i'll tell you, the agent who had been in the hospital all of those months, as i was leaving, he called me over, and he said, secretary, please do everything you can to make sure that i get to go back in the field. and i told him i would. and it was one of the requests that i made on the way out the door. he was determined to go back, to do what he could to protect our diplomats. protect you when you travel.

and i was so [ audio difficulties ] about the quality and the courage of those americans who serve us whether in uniform or out. i care very deeply about each and every one of them. >> thank you. and one other point to make, do you happen to know where the cia director, general petraeus was when the second attack happened on the cia, and where he went? >> no, i do not. i don't know where he was when i reached and spoke with him. >> he was home, operating out of a skiff. and after the attack, he continued to operate out of that skiff, which is why it would be a far more productive investigation if we actually had the cia director and dod,

and instead of trying to pick apart every single solitary thing that you did, sometimes going even before and after that. if we were actually trying to get to the truth of this, we would have a broader array of people to talk to to get there. instead of picking you apart in every conceivable turn. we have gone back and forth. and i just want to make one other point, i like you and i respect you, but this whole going back twice now to the sum, having implied that this was because of a video, somehow you substitute the word sum for i, and think that there's no distance, and that's mind-boggling. why did you say that it was because of the video? well, i didn't. why did you say it was because of the video? and it could go on for another six or seven hours, but i think

that we all understand the english language, and when you say some have implied, that means that some have implied. that means some others have implied. so you know, it's just very frustrated. i served on the armed services committee, and we disagree about a heck of a lot. but we have great arguments in that committee. but it never, ever comes close to descending to this level. congress can in fact function, the house armed services under thorn bury's leadership, and all of the members of that leadership, they have aggressively questioned witnesses, but there's always an element of respect for the fact that we're all doing a very difficult job. and anyone across this dais in

the campaign knows what it's like, every single thing that you say and do, every look on your face and everything that you wear picked apart. it's not helpful to the american public and not to the political process, and it's damned sure not helpful to the people who died in benghazi or to their families. so i hope that we can do better, and i hope that we can be done with the competitive badgering after nine and a half hours. and i thank you for putting up with it for that long, and for your service. >> the chairman now recognizes the gentleman from ohio, mr. jordan. >> secretary clinton, in order to get the complete record of benghazi, we need to get the complete record. and your emails are part of the record, and we think that they could be incomplete in part because the emails keep changing. in february, you said, "i'm

being as transparent as possible, more transparent than anybody else ever has been. you didn't say more transparent than anybody. you said more transparent than anybody else ever. now, my definition of transparency including honest and straigh straightforward andg honest and straightforward from the start and the get go. the last few months, on march 10th, you said you provided all work related emails, erring on the side of what might be in the federal record. and you revised it, and said that mr. blumenthal had some

that you didn't. in march, you said it was your practice to email officials on their dot gov accounts and then you revive revised that stateme. you said it was to officials on their personal accounts. >> i'm sorry, but what does this have to do with what happened in benghazi? >> the gentleman is not recognized. the gentleman from ohio controls the time. >> it has everything to do, because we want the record so we can get to the truth. and maybe if the gentleman from washington would have showed up for more than one hour of the interview, he would know more about the situation and lack of getting the record. of course the second statement, the revised statement, was after this committee, i contacted abedin and sullivan and jake, asking for their personal accounts, and of course you knew we would get there, the emails, and the first statement in march was accurate. in march, you said no classified information was sent

or received on your personal accounts. you later revive revised your statement and said no classified marked classified was sent or received on your personal account. once again, the inspector general, the intelligence committee examined your emails, and determined that yes, some indeed were classified. secretary clinton, it seems like there's a pattern. a pattern to changing your story. in march, you say one thing, the truth comes out, weeks and months later, you say something else. that's not being the most transparent person ever. that's not evening transparent. so if your story about your emails keeps changing, then how can we accept your statement that you've turned over all work related emails and all

emails about libya? >> well, congressman, i have seed repeatedly that i take responsibility for my use of personal email. i've said it was a mistake, and i've said that it was allowed, but it was not a good choice. when i got to the department, we were faced with a global financial crisis, and major troop decisions on afghanistan, imperative to rebuild our alliances in europe and asia and on going war in iraq and so much else. email was not my primary means of communication. as i said earlier, i did not have a computer on any desk. i described how i did work in meetings, secure and unsecure phonecalls. reviewing many many pages of materials every day, attending a great deal of meetings, and i provided the department, which has been providing you with all

of my work related emails, all that i had, approximately 55,000 pages, and they are being publicly released. >> i appreciate that. and let's get into that. those 55,000 pages, there were 62,000 total emails on your system, and you stated that you used a multistep process to determine which ones were private and which were public, and which belonged to you and which to the taxpayer. who oversaw this multistep process and made the determination of which ones we might get and which were personal? >> that was overseen by my attorneys, and they conducted a rigorous review of my emails, and -- >> these are the folks sitting behind you? miss kendall and mills. >> that's right. >> and you said rigorous, and what does that mean. >> it means that they were asked to provide anything that could possibly be construed as

work related. and in fact, in my opinion -- >> i'm asking how was it done. did someone physically look at the 62,000 emails, or did you use search terms and date parameters, i want to use the specifics. >> they did all of that. and i did not look over their shoulders because i thought it would be appropriate for them to conduct that search, and they did. >> can you answer today, what were the search terms. >> the search terms were everything that you could imagine that might be related to anything, but they also went through every single email. >> that's not answering the question. what were the search terms? what terms did you use? what were the date parameters, and what day did you start and what was the end date and the dates in between that they were going to look at? >> congressman, i asked my attorneys to oversee the process and i did not look over their shoulder or dictate, and i did not ask what they were doing.

>> you don't know what terms they used to determine which were your emails and which the state department got and the ones we might get? >> the state department had 95% of those work related, they were already on the system. >> i'm asking about the 62,000 that were exclusive on your system. >> 90 to 95% of all work related emails were already in. >> we know that the national archive has said 1250 were clearly perm, no way you should have sent them to the state department. and 15 you missed because we got those from mr. blumenthal when he came in for his deposition, so if you missed 15 you should have given us, and the national archive said that you should have never turned over. you erred on both sides, and that's why we want to know the terms. if you made mistakes in both ways, you might have made more mistakes, we don't know. >> well, first of all, you had

nine hours with one of my attorneys, and i think that the democrats just released the transcript. >> i specifically asked miss mills, and she gave me basically the same kind of answer you're giving me. >> she'll be happy to supplement the record. >> asking you. >> i thought my attorneys should do it. >> i hope to know the terms. i think that the american people would like to know what terms did you use so we could get the information from libya where the four americans gave their lives. in march, you said the server was physically located on your property which was protected by the secret service. there was one server on your property in new york, and a second server hosted by a colorado company in new jersey. there were two servers?

>> no, there was a server that was already being used by my husband's team, an existing system in our home that i used, and then later, again, my husband's office decided that they wanted to change their arrangements, and that's when they contracted with the company in colorado. >> so there's only one server? is that what you're telling me? the one that the fbi has? >> the server that was used in the tenure of my state department service. >> why did you -- could the secret service agent standing at the back door of your house protect someone from russia or china from hacking into your system? why did you mention the secret service. >> out of an abundance of being transparent.

>> what is the relevance to protecting from classified information? >> there was nothing marked classified on my emails, either send or receive. >> you used the right term, mark. you provided the statement there. >> congressman, there was a lot of confusion, because many americans have no idea how the classification process works. and therefore, i wanted to make it clear that there is a system within our government, certainly within the state department, where materials that is thought to be classified is marked such, so that people have the opportunity to know how they're supposed to be handling those materials, and that's why it became clearer, i believe, to say that nothing was marked classified at the time that i sent our or received it. >> all i know is it's different than what you said in march. i have one last question.

the fbi has your server, and they are doing a forensic record of it. and they may recover emails that you recovered from your system. you said you were more transparent than anybody else ever. so i want to ask you one simple question. if the fbi finds some of the emails that might be deleted as they're reviewing your server, will you allow a neutral third party, like a judge to determine if any of the emails deleted are relevant to our investigation? >> congressman, as you point out, there's a security inquiry being conducted by the department of justice, and i trust that they will do whatever is appropriate to reach their conclusions. >> but would you, as the most transparent person ever, commit to whatever they find, i want a retired federal judge to evaluate that and see if we need to get more information to

get to the truth. >> i've been releasing my emails to the public. and that's transparency, and as i stand by my statement, so far as i know in the modern era, i'm the only government official who has ever done that. >> the chair will now recognize the gentleman from georgia, mr. westmorland. >> thank you. madam secretary, so far today, i've said good morning, good afternoon, and -- >> serving breakfast, congressman. >> let me go ahead and say good night. i may be the only person on this side that doesn't really care about your personal email, because i know that you said colocolin powell had one. and mr. powell's emails all went through the state department server. just to clarify, the problem is

that you had full control of your emails because they were on a private server and not the government's server. and the other thing that i would like to say to miss duckworth, if you would read a testimony of the number of diplomatic security agents that served in benghazi, most of them were temporary duty, 45, 60 a day, people that served. if you will read that, i think that you'll find a lot of these things that the secretary said as far as enhancements was paid for by petty cash out of their own money, and and not really fulfilled or completed. the other thing that i want to ask you, madam secretary. >> will the gentleman yield for just 20 seconds? >> sure.

>> i think that's why it behooves us as members of congress to increase the security budget for the state department. they routinely get less than they need. and i don't think that the americans would be grudge us to help our diplomats. >> there was $20 million that you were going to send to libya for their security upgrades. >> you said that you had to wait on the 6th man. >> 5th man, i'm sorry. >> i was going to say that there was somebody hiding in the closet that we didn't know about. you also said in one of the last things that the state department sent more security from tripoli to benghazi during the attack? there was not a state department person on that plane. there were four grs agents, and two tdy, dod people and an

interpreter. >> that is exactly right. and that's why the cooperation and coordination that we have been talking about with congress. >> ma'am, with all of the information that we got, mr. glen daughtry is the one that said we're going down to help our brothers, and he got permission from the chief of station to go down there, and he took three other grs agents and then he got the two dod guys that wanted to go, they took the interpreter, and they chartered a plane and went down there. it was not a state department deal. and in fact, you want to know the truth, the only option that the state department had, was

the tess team that you and i talked about before. you mentioned that it was for rebuilding, and i've got the state department here about to fess, and i would read it, but it's going to take up too much of my time. but there's not anything about rebuilding anything. it says that it's for crisis management expertise, time sensitive information, planning for contingency on regulations, we thought that the ambassador may have been kidnapped, reach out to washington d.c., and specialized communications capabilities. that would have been the one thing that you should have done to get people on the way over there to help those folks that were still in an ongoing battle

that was ready to go, sitting there, but you know what? it never got -- the plane never got out of the hanger. those people never got a symbol. and we have got a chain of emails that the first recommendation came down from your own people. and then the fbi told your employees that the best way to handle the situation was to send the fess team, and that was the way it had always been done. so did you make the decision not to send the fess team -- >> congressman, first let me say that it's important to recognize that our deputy chief of mission, greg hicks, was fully engaged in helping to put together the team that flew from tripoli to benghazi, and we were very grateful that the

cia station chief and his colleagues were behind that, and we were very appreciative. they, as you know, didn't get there in time, because the attack on the compound was very swift. it was over in less than an hour, but they did help eventually to evacuate, and it was just an additional tragedy that mr. dougherty lost his life in attempting to stave off the attack on the cia annex. with regard to the fess recommendation, everything that you read was no longer applicable to our compound in benghazi. unlike the fess team responding in nairobi, where we were going to have an ongoing embassy presence, the fess team was very much involved in helping to stand off the

communications, and literally begin to get the embassy functioning again despite the fact that americans in many of the locally employed staff had been murdered in the terrorist attack. [ pause in captioning ] passed something referred to as seca. the secure embassy construction and terrorism act. which requires the secretary of state to issue a waiver, under two conditions, if the u.s. government personnel work in separate facilities, or if u.s. overseas facilities do not meet the security setback distances specified by diplomatic security. the law specifies that only the secretary of state may sign these waivers, and that requirement is not to be delegated. was a waiver issued for the temporary mission in benghazi

and the cia annex after the temporary mission compound was authorized through december of 2012, and did you sign that waiver, madam secretary? >> i think that the cia annex, i had no responsibility for, so i continue spake to what the decisions were with respect to the cia annex, i know its something for the other committees -- >> but you acknowledge that you were responsible for the temporary mission compound. >> yes, but you put them together. and i had no responsibility for the cia annex. the compound was neither an embassy or a conslut. those are the only two facilities for which we would obtain a formal diplomatic notification, and those were the only kinds of facilities

that we would have sought waivers for at the time, because we were trying, as has >> i survey facilities, and the standards that are set by the overseas security policy board are the goals that we try to drive for. i know that when the email went out that the night, it called undersecretary, director, spokesman, and it said ms mills was counsellor, it didn't say chief of staff. that t